Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons
for Future Olympics (31-MAY-05, GAO-05-547).
The 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, were held against the
backdrop of growing concerns about international terrorism.
Despite widespread fears of a potential terrorist attack on the
Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and secure event with no terrorist
incidents. To assist Greece in securing the 2004 Games, U.S.
government agencies provided training and other support in the
four years leading up to the Games. In addition, the U.S.
government provided some security and other assistance to
American athletes, spectators, and commercial investors, and
expects to continue such support for future Olympics, including
the upcoming 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy. GAO was asked
to (1) determine the U.S. approach and coordination efforts for
providing security assistance to the 2004 Summer Olympics; (2)
examine the roles of U.S. agencies in Athens Olympics security
and their financial outlays; and (3) review lessons learned in
providing security assistance in support of the Olympics and how
they are being incorporated into preparations for future
Olympics. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense,
and Justice concurred with the report or had no comments.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-547
ACCNO: A25417
TITLE: Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides
Lessons for Future Olympics
DATE: 05/31/2005
SUBJECT: Americans abroad
Counterterrorism
Facility security
Foreign governments
International agreements
International cooperation
International relations
Lessons learned
Safety
Sports
Strategic planning
Terrorism
Security operations
2004 Summer Olypmic Games
Dept. of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program
Greece
Italy
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GAO-05-547
* Report to Congressional Requesters
* May 2005
* OLYMPIC SECURITY
* U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future Olympics
* Contents
* Results in Brief
* Background
* U.S. Assistance Based on Security Capabilities Assessment,
Supported by Coordinated Effort
* U.S. Security Assistance to Greece Informed by Needs
Assessment and Military Exercises
* U.S. Olympic Security Assistance Coordinated by Embassy in
Athens, Supported by Interagency and Multilateral Efforts
* U.S. Ambassador Played Key Coordination Role
* Interagency Group Facilitated Domestic Contributions
* United States Worked with Six Partner Countries to
Coordinate Host Country Security Assistance
* Multiple U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for Greece
* Agencies Operated under General Policy Guidance and
Agency-Specific Authorities
* Many U.S. Agencies Contributed Security Efforts for the
Olympics
* Department of State
* Department of Justice
* Department of Defense
* Department of Homeland Security
* Department of Energy
* Other Agencies
* Agencies Identified Additional Expenditures for Providing
Security Assistance
* Security Planning Lessons Learned from Athens Are Being Applied
to Turin
* U.S. Government Agencies Moved Quickly to Collect and
Disseminate Lessons Learned
* U.S. Government Entities Are Planning for Security Support
to 2006 Turin Olympics
* Key Lessons Learned from Athens Being Applied to Turin
* Importance of Early Planning, Informed by Existing
Bilateral Relationships
* Designating Key U.S. Officials for Logistics and
Message Development
* Working with Multilateral, Bilateral, and Specialized
Groups
* Application of Lessons Learned also includes Specific
Projects and Strategies
* U.S. Support for Turin Games Faces Additional Challenges
* U.S. Role for Beijing Games Still Unclear
* Agency Comments
* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
* GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO Contact
* Staff Acknowledgments
* Ordering Information.pdf
* Order by Mail or Phone
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Requesters
GAO
May 2005
OLYMPIC SECURITY
U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future Olympics
a
OLYMPIC SECURITY
U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future Olympics
What GAO Found
In 2001, the United States began planning its security assistance for the
2004 Summer Olympics, responding to the heightened worldwide anxiety
following the September 11 attacks and Greece's request for international
advice on its security plan. The United States based much of its security
assistance on knowledge gained through Greece's participation in the
Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program and through the
staging of a major U.S. military exercise in March 2004. Based on these
assessments, the United States employed a coordinated approach in
providing security assistance to Greece for the Olympics. The U.S.
Ambassador in Greece coordinated and led the U.S. interagency efforts
in-country, while the State-chaired interagency working group in
Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic contributions. Furthermore, the
United States participated in a seven-country coordination group that
aimed to identify potential areas of cooperation on security and support
for Greece.
Almost 20 entities and offices within a number of U.S. agencies provided
more than $35 million in security assistance and support to the government
of Greece. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, and
Justice provided security training to various elements of the Greek
government; the Departments of Energy and Justice provided crisis response
assistance during the Olympics; and the State Department also provided
special security and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and
corporate sponsors. Following the 2004 Summer Games, these U.S. agencies
identified a number of lessons learned, such as the importance of
assessing host governments' security capabilities early to assist in
planning U.S. support, appointing key personnel to craft unified messages
for the U.S. security efforts, and coordinating with multilateral and
other organizing entities. These lessons were then communicated by
Washington, D.C.-and Athens-based personnel to U.S. officials in Italy who
are preparing to support the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin.
2004 Summer Olympic Games Facts at a Glance
Sources: GAO (data); MapArt.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 4
U.S. Assistance Based on Security Capabilities Assessment, Supported by
Coordinated Effort 5 Multiple U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security
Support for Greece 11 Security Planning Lessons Learned from Athens Are
Being Applied to Turin 17 Agency Comments 26
Appendixes
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 27 Appendix II: GAO Contact
and Staff Acknowledgments 30
Figure 1: Timeline of U.S. Support for 2004 Athens Olympics 8
Figures
Figure 2: Timeline of Planned U.S. Support for Turin Olympics 19 Figure 3:
Turin Olympics Mountain Venues 24
Contents
Abbreviations
ATA Antiterrorism Assistance Program
DCI data collection instrument
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
IOC International Olympic Committee
PDD presidential decision directive
State Department of State
USOC U.S. Olympic Committee
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
A
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548
May 31, 2005
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Co-Chairman Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation United States Senate
The Honorable Gordon H. Smith Chairman The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Trade, Tourism, and Economic
Development Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United
States Senate
The 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, were held against the backdrop
of growing concerns about international terrorism, combined with the
post-September 11, 2001, climate of heightened anxiety about terrorism.
Greece's history of domestic terrorism, increased security tension
worldwide created by the Iraq war, and two terrorist incidents in Europe
months prior to the Olympics created a challenging threat environment for
the 2004 Games. Despite widespread fears of a potential terrorist attack
on the Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and secure event with no terrorist
incidents. Although the host government is responsible for the security of
an Olympics, the United States provided years of security assistance to
Greece in advance of and throughout the Games. The U.S. government expects
to continue working to ensure the security of U.S. athletes, spectators,
and commercial investors at future Olympics, including the upcoming 2006
Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy.
You requested that we (1) determine the U.S. approach for providing
security assistance to Greece for the 2004 Summer Olympics and how such
security efforts were coordinated, (2) examine the roles of U.S. agencies
in Athens Olympics security and their financial outlays, and (3) review
lessons learned in providing security assistance in support of the
Olympics and how those lessons are being incorporated into preparations
for future Olympics, especially the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy.
To accomplish our objectives, we obtained and reviewed all available
interagency and agency-specific operations plans for and after-action
reports on the Athens Games and operations plans for the Turin Games. We
interviewed officials at the Departments of State (State), Justice (DOJ),
Results in Brief
Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) and at certain
intelligence agencies. In Athens, Greece, and Rome, Milan, and Turin,
Italy, we interviewed U.S. Embassy and consulate officials and obtained
documentation on the support provided by the United States for the 2004
Summer Olympics and planned U.S. support for the 2006 Winter Olympics. We
interviewed Greek and Italian officials to obtain their perspective on the
U.S. security support provided. We also created and distributed a data
collection instrument that enabled us to collect and analyze cost
information provided by key agencies involved in supporting the Athens
Games. We conducted our review between October 2004 and May 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
The United States began planning its security assistance for the 2004
Summer Olympics in 2001, responding to Greece's request for international
advice regarding its security plan and the heightened worldwide concern
regarding terrorism following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The
United States based much of its plan for providing security assistance on
knowledge gained through Greece's long-standing participation in State's
Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program1 and through the staging of several
military exercises, including a major exercise in March 2004 that was
specifically tailored to address a theoretical terrorist attack on the
Olympics. Based on these assessments, the United States employed a
coordinated approach in providing security assistance to Greece for the
Olympics. The U.S. Ambassador in Greece coordinated and led the U.S.
interagency efforts in-country, while the State-chaired interagency
working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic contributions.
Furthermore, the United States participated in a seven-country2
coordination group that aimed to identify potential areas of cooperation
on security and support for Greece.
1The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program provides training and related
assistance to law-enforcement and security services of select friendly
foreign governments, aiming to enhance their skills to deter and counter
the threats of terrorism. The assistance addresses four specific
areas-crisis prevention, crisis management, crisis resolution, and
investigation-and can take many forms, such as airport security,
crime-scene investigations, and chemical and biological attacks.
2The participating countries were Australia, France, Germany, Israel,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Under the guiding principles of certain presidential directives3 and U.S.
agencies' own authorities, approximately 204 entities and offices within a
number of U.S. agencies provided more than $35 million in security
assistance and support to the government of Greece in fiscal years 2003
and 2004. State, DHS, DOD, and DOJ provided security training to various
elements of the Greek government; DOE and DOJ provided crisis response
assistance during the Olympics; and State also provided special security
and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and corporate sponsors.
Most funds spent on the Olympics came from agencies' normal operating
budgets. U.S. government agencies identified specific costs for the
Olympics, including more than $10 million for travel and lodging expenses
for U.S. staff temporarily assigned to Athens and more than $9 million in
dedicated training to Greek officials in a wide variety of
specializations. In addition, the U.S. government incurred other
Olympics-related costs for activities that were accelerated or positioned
to coincide with the Olympics. For example, DOE programs provided
expertise and equipment to enhance Greece's capability to detect nuclear
devices and materials at certain land borders and a major port, and the
2004 DOD European Command March military exercise-which included
participation by the
U.S.
Embassy and Greek officials-focused on a theoretical
terrorist attack on the Olympics. Following the 2004 Summer
Games, the U.S. agencies involved with providing security
assistance identified a number of lessons learned, such as
the importance of assessing a host government's security
capabilities early to assist in planning U.S. support,
appointing key personnel to craft unified messages for the
U.S. security efforts, and coordinating with multilateral and
other organizing entities. These lessons were then
communicated by Washington, D.C.- and Athens-based personnel
from State, DOJ, DHS, and DOD to their counterparts in Italy
who are preparing for the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin. For
the most part, the key lessons learned are being applied in
preparation for the Turin Games. For example,
U.S.
officials in Athens noted that the long-standing U.S. relationship
with Greece helped in early identification of potential security
gaps and areas
3The President manages the operations of the federal government through
executive orders and issues decisions on foreign affairs and national
security matters through presidential directives.
4GAO surveyed the 17 entities that State had identified as playing a key
role in support of the Athens Games (see app. I for more information). We
received additional information on other agencies that also provided
support for the Olympics.
Page 3 GAO-05-547 Olympic Games
for U.S. assistance in security preparations. For Turin, the partnership
between the United States and Italy in combat situations and
counterterrorism efforts provides U.S. agencies with relationships with
relevant Italian agencies, as well as knowledge about Italy's advanced
capabilities to handle security for the Olympics. In addition, U.S.
officials pointed out the importance of designating key U.S. officials to
coordinate messaging and logistics efforts with the host country. In line
with this lesson, the U.S. Embassy in Italy has appointed both an Olympic
security coordinator and an Olympic coordinator for logistics. Finally,
U.S. officials noted the importance of working with international,
American, and local Olympics officials to enable U.S. security elements to
gain access to venues. The application of this lesson has helped U.S.
officials in Italy to begin working with the local organizing committee in
Turin on these issues.
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland
Security, and State and to the Attorney General for their review and
comment. The departments orally concurred with the content of the report
or had no comments. Technical comments provided by the departments were
incorporated as appropriate.
Since the revival of the Olympic Games in 1896, the event has grown from
Background
241 athletes representing 14 countries to, in the case of the 2004 Athens
Games, approximately 10,500 athletes from 202 countries. While the stated
goal of the Olympic movement is "to contribute to building a peaceful and
better world," its history includes tragedy and terror as well. At the
1972 Munich Games, Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli Olympic
team, resulting in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes. The 1996 Atlanta
Olympics were marred by a pipe-bomb explosion that killed one person and
injured 110 others.
One of the International Olympic Committee requirements for countries
bidding to host the games is to ensure the security of the participating
athletes and spectators, an increasingly challenging task in today's
environment of terrorist threats. In February 2002, just five months after
the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States hosted the Winter
Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah. Amid tight security coordinated under
the auspices of the U.S. Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)-with support from the U.S. military-the Olympics
concluded without any terrorist incidents. All eyes then turned to Athens,
Greece, for the 2004 Summer Olympics.
U.S. Assistance Based on Security Capabilities Assessment, Supported by
Coordinated Effort
The challenges Greece faced in hosting an Olympics included a continuing
terrorist climate as well as complications arising from its own
infrastructure projects. In November 2003, terrorists attacked the British
consulate and a bank in Istanbul, Turkey, killing the British
Consul-General and 26 others, and in March 2004, a terrorist attack on
commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed nearly 200 people. In addition,
between the 1970s and early 2000s, the Greek domestic terrorist group
"November 17" specifically targeted Americans stationed at the U.S.
Embassy in Athens along with other western diplomats. Finally, Greece
experienced delays in completing its infrastructure construction program
of roads, public transit, and venue sites; the late completion of some
venue sites complicated advance security planning as the Olympics opening
ceremonies approached.
The second smallest country to host the Games, Greece spent approximately
$1.2 billion on security preparations for the Games, along with about $10
billion for infrastructure improvements and other costs. The United
States, in partnership with six other countries, worked with Greece over
the four years preceding the Games to share knowledge, expertise, and
equipment. This assistance helped prepare Greece for the security
challenges of hosting this enormous international event in a threat
environment underscored by the ongoing conflict in Iraq, recent terrorist
attacks in the region, and Greek security and other issues.
The next Olympics will be the Winter Games in Turin, Italy, February
10-26, 2006. The United States is working with Italy to determine what
support it may be able to provide.
The U.S. assistance to Greece for the 2004 Summer Olympics was based on
security gaps identified through a needs assessment and Greece's
participation in several U.S. military exercises. Based on these
assessments, the U.S. Embassy in Athens led the governmentwide
coordination effort, in concert with a Washington, D.C.-based interagency
group and U.S. participation in a multilateral coordinating body.
U.S. Security Assistance to In 2000, Greece began its security planning
for the 2004 Summer Olympics and asked seven countries that had previously
hosted Olympics or had
Greece Informed by Needs
Assessment and Military significant counterterrorism expertise to provide
advice on its security Exercises plans. These seven countries-Australia,
France, Germany, Israel, Spain,
Page 5 GAO-05-547 Olympic Games
the United Kingdom, and the United States-formed the Olympic Security
Advisory Group, which provided coordinated security advice to Greece on
its security planning. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, Greece revised its security planning in light of the worldwide
heightened concerns over terrorism, and the United States began
determining its approach for providing security assistance to Greece and
to Americans who would be participating in or attend the Games.
The United States based its security assistance approach on knowledge
gained from Greece's participation in State's ATA Program since 1986. In
addition to this knowledge, the ATA Program led an interagency effort to
conduct a thorough needs assessment in December 2001 of the Greek police
and the country's capability to provide security during the 2004 Summer
Olympics. This assessment both reviewed progress gained from past ATA
Program training and identified several areas of potential U.S. security
assistance, including VIP security, port and maritime security, canine
explosives detection, and crisis response. Based on the assessment, the
United States provided additional training in preparation for the Olympics
under the ATA Program. This included providing the Greek government with
formal training courses and seminars and training for more than 200
Hellenic Coast Guardsmen in underwater explosive devices, advanced
improvised explosive devices, weapons of mass destruction first response,
and Marine interdiction procedures.
Along with the ATA Program, Greece also participated in several U.S.
military exercises that helped to identify security gaps. In the fall of
2003 and spring of 2004, the U.S. DOD European Command arranged several
tabletop exercises that enabled Greek decision makers at tactical and
political levels to test their strategies for handling security issues.
The exercises involved role playing through various crisis scenarios to
determine and practice effective responses. In March 2004, DOD's European
Command coordinated the participation of the U.S. Embassy in Athens,
several components of the U.S. military, and members of the newly elected
Greek government in a consequence management5 military exercise
specifically tailored to address a theoretical terrorist attack on the
Olympics. For about two weeks, staff at the American Embassy, U.S.
military personnel, and Greek officials played out roles and practiced
their responses in the event of such an attack. Greek officials stated
that this consequence management exercise enabled them to better identify
areas for improvement in their security plans and capabilities. Due to the
March 2004 military exercise, along with the other training, the Greek
commanders at the various venues realized that in the event they could not
reach their commanding officers, they needed procedures and plans in place
for undertaking emergency evacuations on their own authorities. In
addition, they needed the ability to communicate directly with
counterparts within certain emergency response units, such as the fire
department or police department. Figure 1 provides a timeline of U.S.
security assistance for the 2004 Summer Olympics.
5A foreign consequence management event is an incident that occurs abroad
and involves chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear contamination.
It is not limited to a terrorist incident; it also can be caused by a war,
natural cause, or accident. In addition, a foreign consequence management
event must threaten to overwhelm existing host-nation response
capabilities and prompt a host-nation request for immediate international
assistance. According to the Department of State, the release of chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear contaminants is required by
international agreements to be reported, regardless of how the agent was
released. Finally, consequence management of an incident is the sole
responsibility of the host nation. The United States may be asked to
provide assistance only.
Figure 1: Timeline of U.S. Support for 2004 Athens Olympics
June - State estimates that 35-150 Diplomatic Security agents will be
required for Olympic operations December 4-13 -ATA-led interagency review
and assessment in Greece . multiple Olympic
security concerns identified . ATA to provide training in a variety of
areas
meeting October -OSC
arrives in Athens
Legend:
ATA - Antiterrorism Assistance Program
EUCOM - DOD European Command
OSAG - Olympic Security Advisory Group
OSC - Olympic Security Coordinator
Source: GAO.
March 7 -Greek national
elections and change of
August - OSC April -EUCOM begins government
submits
operations plan formal planning of Olympics March 7-24 -EUCOM boots-on-
to State
for 100 security exercises ground joint U.S./Greek
agents exercise
U.S.
Olympic Security Assistance Coordinated by Embassy in Athens,
Supported by Interagency and Multilateral Efforts
U.S.
Ambassador Played Key Coordination Role
May -EUCOM Olympic September 2 - Majority of U.S. agents Guardian II
tabletop depart Athens; 12 remain to work exercise Paralympic Games
September 17-28 -Summer Paralympic Games
September 26 - OSC departs post
Based on the identified security needs, the U.S. Embassy in Athens led the
U.S. interagency coordination efforts in Greece. These efforts were
supported by a Washington, D.C.-based interagency coordination group, in
concert with the U.S. participation in the multilateral Olympic Security
Advisory Group.
Because of State's leadership role in U.S. foreign policy efforts, the
U.S. Ambassador to Greece played a central coordination role for the U.S.
interagency effort to support the Athens Olympics. Several agencies have
identified the Ambassador's coordination role as key to managing the
complex interagency process within the Embassy, as well as with each of
the agencies' central offices in Washington, D.C., and the DOD European
Interagency Group Facilitated Domestic Contributions
United States Worked with Six Partner Countries to Coordinate Host Country
Security Assistance
Command headquarters in Germany. The Ambassador's single point of contact
for all U.S. assistance for the Olympics was the Olympic Security
Coordinator, a State Diplomatic Security agent who was assigned to this
role in the fall of 2001. As the head of the U.S. Embassy in Athens that
houses a number of U.S. agencies, the Ambassador pulled together a central
working group that included the Olympic Security Coordinator, the State
Senior Regional Security Officer, the Defense Attache, and the DOJ/FBI
Legal Attache. The Ambassador met with this group regularly prior to the
Olympics to determine the roles and responsibilities for the various
participating agencies in helping Greece to prepare for hosting the
Olympics. In addition, the Ambassador led the planning for the agencies to
provide additional security and support services for U.S. athletes,
officials, spectators, and corporate sponsors for the Games.
The State-chaired International Athletic Events Security Coordination
Group (interagency group), an interagency working group in Washington,
D.C., facilitated and coordinated agencies' contributions to security
assistance to Greece. Established in December 2001, this group serves to
coordinate U.S. government efforts for supporting U.S. embassies and host
governments of major international sporting events with a variety of
counterterrorism capabilities. The group played a key role in supporting
security efforts for the Athens Olympics, in coordination with the Athens
Embassy-based efforts. The interagency group determined support roles and
responsibilities to be carried out by the various member agencies, and
drafted response cables back to the Embassy. This effort aimed to keep all
of the agencies informed and prevent duplicative or conflicting efforts by
those involved. The interagency group grew to include representatives from
the intelligence community, State, DOD, DOE, DOJ, DHS, and the Department
of Health and Human Services, among others.
Along with its internal interagency coordination process, the United
States participated in the multilateral Olympic Security Advisory Group.
The advisory group reported to the Greek Minister of Public Order on
security issues at the strategic level. The group also provided advice on
technical support issues at the operational level. The range of issues
included intelligence, planning, training and exercises, technology,
command and control coordination, and venue security. The United Kingdom
chaired the group, which met monthly to coordinate advice and information
shared with Greece and assign responsibility for providing Greece with
security training and equipment. One senior Greek official estimated that
the United States provided about 75 percent of the security assistance,
the United Kingdom about 20 percent, and other countries about 5 percent.
Operating under general policy guidance and their own agency-specific
Multiple U.S. Agencies
authorities, U.S. agencies coordinated their efforts to provide security
assistance for the 2004 Summer Olympics. The U.S. government spent Support
for Greece more than $35 million in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 in support
of the
Olympics.
Agencies Operated under General Policy Guidance and Agency-Specific
Authorities
Although the host government has ultimate responsibility for the security
of an Olympics, the United States has a vested interest in ensuring the
security of its citizens in all locations. In this regard, Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 62 states,
The first duty of government is the protection of its citizens. That duty
extends to Americans abroad, whether they are traveling in an official or
private capacity. The State Department, through its chiefs of mission,
will be responsible . . . for programs to preserve the safety of private
U.S. citizens abroad. U.S. citizens shall be adequately warned of the
danger of terrorist attack, advised regarding precautionary measures and
afforded appropriate assistance and protection.
Furthermore, PDD 39 states,
It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond
vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our
citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international
waters or airspace, or on foreign territory.
It also notes that State has the responsibility to reduce the
vulnerability affecting the general safety of American citizens abroad.
Under this general guidance, the U.S. government worked with the
government of Greece over the four years leading up to and through the
2004 Summer Olympic Games to ensure that American citizens attending the
Games would be safe and secure.
Under State's leadership, the other agencies used their individual
authorities to provide assistance. For example, according to DOJ
officials, FBI has the authority to bring cases to U.S. courts to
prosecute terrorist crimes committed against Americans abroad.6 Therefore,
FBI had crisis management experts and agents prepared to help Greece
process crime scenes and to gather evidence in the event of an attack.
Similarly, the Transportation Security Agency, according to an agency
official, has authority to work with foreign governments to address
security concerns on passenger flights operated by foreign air carriers in
foreign air transportation, and, therefore, provided Greece with security
assessments and training at certain airports.
Some officials at State and DOJ stated that they lack specific guidance
for
U.S. support of a foreign security event such as the Olympics. For
domestic-based "National Special Security Events," PDD 62 lays out
specific security roles and responsibilities for certain agencies, and PDD
39 provides guidance for U.S. policy on counterterrorism. Agencies used
these PDDs to provide additional guidance to the U.S. efforts in support
of the Athens Olympics. For example, PDD 39 created the interagency
Foreign Emergency Support Team, which was deployed to the Athens Olympics
to provide assistance to Greek agencies if needed. Although some agencies
told us that the frameworks of these PDDs helped to guide their security
assistance efforts in Greece, they also said that these PDDs outline
specific agency roles only for domestic events, not foreign-based events.
Some agency officials at DOD, DOJ, and State indicated that further
clarification of the agencies' roles and responsibilities in supporting
foreign-based events might be helpful, particularly for planning and
budgeting resources.
Many U.S. Agencies Approximately 20 U.S. agencies or component entities
contributed security efforts to the Olympics. Following are some of the
key contributions:
Contributed Security Efforts for the Olympics
Department of State State, as the lead U.S. agency for foreign affairs,
led the interagency effort both at the U.S. Embassy in Athens and by
chairing the interagency group in Washington, D.C. This coordination
effort ensured collaboration among agencies to prevent duplicative
efforts.
o State's ATA Program coordinated training provided by multiple U.S.
agencies over the three years leading up to the Olympics.
6See 18USC2332b(f)&(g) concerning the Attorney General's primary
investigative authority for all federal crimes of terrorism, including
those occurring outside the United States.
Page 12 GAO-05-547 Olympic Games
Department of Justice
o State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism heads U.S.
government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with
foreign governments. The office ran several interagency-staffed
counterterrorism workshops in Greece prior to the Olympics to train
Greek senior policy officials. These workshops provided opportunities
for the Greek officials to test their security strategies and receive
critiques and suggestions for improvements from U.S. experts.
o State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security protects U.S. personnel and
missions overseas, advising U.S. ambassadors on all security matters
and providing a security program against terrorist, espionage, and
criminal threats at U.S. diplomatic facilities. For the Olympics,
Diplomatic Security agents provided security to U.S. athletes by
traveling with U.S. athletic teams between the Olympic Village and
various venues, and providing a security liaison with the Greek police
commanders at the Olympic venues.
* The Diplomatic Security Bureau also co-chairs the Overseas
Security Advisory Council, a joint venture between State and the
U.S. private sector to exchange timely information on overseas
security issues with
* U.S. businesses. During the Olympics, the council interacted with
corporate sponsors in mutually beneficial information sharing on
potential security issues.
* State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, which is responsible for
assisting American citizens traveling or living abroad, increased
its outreach to thousands of American spectators attending the
Games, providing services such as replacing lost passports and
acting as liaisons with Greek law enforcement.
* The DOJ mission is to enforce the law and defend the interests of
the United States according to the law; to provide federal
leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just
punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure
fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.7
o Under its broad authority, DOJ provided support to the Greek
government's efforts in dismantling the "November 17" domestic
terrorism network prior to the Games.
7See also DOJ Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2003-2008.
o Under its responsibility to provide training and development
assistance to foreign criminal justice systems, DOJ provided legal
assistance to Greece in preparing it to fulfill its law-enforcement
responsibilities.
o FBI has a responsibility to conduct professional investigations and
authorized intelligence collection to identify and counter the threat
posed by domestic and international terrorists and their supporters
within the United States, and to pursue extraterritorial criminal
investigations to bring the perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice.
During the Olympics, FBI agents were prestaged in Greece to provide
crisis management assistance in the event of a terrorist attack.
o As part of its mission to assist other law-enforcement agencies in
order to suppress and reduce violent crime as well as protect the
public, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
supplied agents to work with State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security as
security liaisons for the U.S. athletic teams.
Department of Defense DOD's purpose is to protect and advance U.S.
national interests, such the safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad
and the security and well-being of allies and friends.
o The DOD European Command's large military exercise in March 2004
provided a unique opportunity for U.S. experts to interact with Greek
political and tactical officials as they practiced antiterrorism
responses to a theoretical Olympics-related terrorist attack.
o The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is responsible for reducing the
threat to the United States from nuclear, chemical, biological, and
conventional weapons. For the Olympics, it created some of the
tabletop scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction that were
used in other military exercises.
o The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency provides imagery, imagery
intelligence, and geospatial data and information for planning,
decision making and action in support of national security. It worked
with Greece to collect imaging data to provide detailed maps of the
rapidly changing Athens infrastructure prior to the Olympics. The
imaging and maps also provided the U.S. government with detailed
information on venues and surrounding areas in case there was a need
for emergency evacuations.
o U.S. Naval Forces Europe, which operates under the DOD European
Command, provided the temporary installation of a Dunlop barrier in
the Port of Pireaus during the Olympics. This large, floating barrier
helped to protect U.S. athletes, security officials, and VIPs who were
housed aboard ships in the port from potential terrorist attacks via
small boats.
Department of Homeland DHS is responsible for preventing and deterring
terrorist attacks and
Security protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the
nation, including safeguarding the American people and their freedoms,
critical infrastructure, property, and the economy.
o The department's Federal Air Marshal Service protects U.S. air
carriers and passengers against hostile acts, and, for the Olympics,
provided additional air marshals to accompany U.S.-based carriers
traveling to and from Greece for the Olympics.
o Transportation Security Administration experts provided assessments of
airport and mass transit security and helped to train Greek government
workers.
o Immigration and Customs Enforcement provided specialized training on
fraudulent document recognition.
o The U.S. Coast Guard provided training to the Greek Hellenic Coast
Guard under State's ATA Program.
o Secret Service agents provided expertise in VIP protection for State's
counterterrorism workshops in addition to providing their normal
protection services for certain VIPs.
Department of Energy DOE's overarching mission is to advance the national
economic and energy security of the United States.
* The DOE Office of the Second Line of Defense aims to strengthen the
overall capability to detect and deter illicit trafficking of
nuclear and other radioactive materials across international
borders. Under this responsibility, it provided expertise and
radiation detection equipment to the Greek Atomic Energy Commission
for installation at certain border crossings, Athens International
Airport, and the Port of Piraeus.
* Other DOE programs provided related support, such as upgrading the
physical security around a Greek nuclear research reactor and
securing radiological sources at locations throughout Greece.8
o DOE's National Nuclear Security Agency has a responsibility to promote
international nuclear safety and nonproliferation and to reduce global
danger from weapons of mass destruction. For the Olympics, it provided
personnel in support of the Foreign Emergency Support Team, a
State-led interagency rapid-response team that was deployed prior to
the Olympics.
Other Agencies U.S. Postal Inspectors, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the Defense Intelligence Agency, among others, provided additional
security support for the Olympics.
Agencies Identified Additional Expenditures for Providing Security
Assistance
We surveyed the U.S. agencies identified as contributing security support
in advance of and at the Athens Olympic Games, and the agencies identified
more than $35 million in additional expenditures in fiscal years 2003 and
2004 to arrange and provide this U.S. assistance. The majority of costs
identified by the agencies were travel costs for U.S. personnel supporting
the Games and for training programs provided to Greek officials and
security personnel. Agencies reported to us they spent more than $10
million in travel costs, including airfare, lodging, and per diem costs
for hundreds of staff who traveled overseas in 2003 and 2004 to provide
security assistance, with most travel occurring during the Olympics.
Agencies further reported to us more than $9 million in training costs,
including the costs for building and executing the consequence management
military exercises and FBI forensics trainings, as well as for translation
of training materials and providing translators at the training sessions.
Greece had received about $1.6 million in previous ATA Program assistance
between 1986 and 2001, and, in preparation for the Olympics, received over
$15 million in antiterrorism assistance between 2001 and 2004. While,
State was appropriated $2.763 million in fiscal year 2004 for
8For more information on DOE's Second Line of Defense programs, see GAO,
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing
Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports,
GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005); and Nuclear
Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear
Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002).
Page 16 GAO-05-547 Olympic Games
Security Planning Lessons Learned from Athens Are Being Applied to Turin
costs related to providing security assistance to the Olympics, all other
security assistance funding came from individual agencies' budgets and was
reprogrammed from other planned uses, which in some instances caused other
programs to be delayed to accommodate Olympics security needs. For
example, the public affairs section at the U.S. Embassy in Athens canceled
some cultural programs in order to focus on events that promoted the
Olympics.
The reported costs in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 do not capture the
entirety of costs for supporting the Olympics, particularly the
significant salary costs for the hundreds of personnel who supported the
U.S. security assistance effort. State identified about $660,000 in fiscal
years 2002 to 2004 in estimated salary, benefits, and related costs for
four staff who were hired to fill Olympics-related coordination roles.
However, the costs of salaries and benefits of other U.S. officials who
were deployed to Athens, or Embassy and other personnel who worked for
months or even years to support the U.S. effort to the Games, are not
included.
While the travel and training costs above were incurred directly in
support of the Olympics, some U.S. agencies accelerated or repositioned
other activities to coincide with Olympics preparations. For example,
Department of Energy programs to provide radiation detection equipment to
Greece were expedited so that the equipment could be installed at Greece's
ports of entry and at other locations in Greece in time for the Olympics.
In addition, the March 2004 DOD European Command military exercise-a major
exercise for training U.S. forces-was focused on Olympics-related
terrorist scenarios.
Following the Athens Games, U.S. agencies collected and distributed
lessons learned to agencies involved in security planning for the Turin
Games. These lessons included establishing bilateral relationships to
identify areas of potential assistance; designating key U.S. officials to
craft and deliver unified messages; and working with the local organizing
committee and multilateral contacts. These and other key lessons learned
from Athens are being applied in the planning efforts for Turin. However,
U.S. efforts to support the Turin Games face significant infrastructure,
funding, and coordination challenges.
U.S. Government Agencies Moved Quickly to Collect and Disseminate Lessons
Learned
At the conclusion of the Athens Olympic Games, U.S. agencies involved in
the security assistance effort moved quickly to collect and disseminate
lessons learned to their Turin Games counterparts. Officials at State,
DOD, FBI, and other key agencies completed detailed after-action reports
on the aspects of security support that went well and should be replicated
in the future, where feasible, and what aspects might be improved upon. In
addition, in September 2004, less than 2 weeks after the closing ceremony
of the Athens Games, Athens-based U.S. staff traveled to the U.S.
Consulate in Milan, Italy, to meet with their Italy-based colleagues for a
2-day workshop on lessons learned in overall coordination. The U.S. Milan
consulate also organized and hosted a three-day interagency conference in
October 2004 for Athens- and Washington, D.C.-based officials who will be
working on the Turin Winter Games.
Agencies and entities involved in the U.S. effort have also looked to
continually improve. For example, at the suggestion of agencies involved
in the Athens effort, the Washington, D.C.-based interagency group has
formed smaller subcommittees to focus on specific areas such as logistics,
transportation security, and intelligence support. The subcommittees were
named in late 2004, after the Athens lessons learned were disseminated.
Additionally, the United States is leading a Group of Eight9 initiative to
capture security best practices and lessons learned in hosting major
events like the Olympics. According to DOJ officials, since the advent of
the modern Olympics in 1896, Group of Eight nations have hosted
approximately 60 percent of all Olympics. Final Group of Eight approval
for the resulting handbook is expected later this year.
U.S. Government Entities Are Planning for Security Support to 2006 Turin
Olympics
While the government of Italy had yet to request U.S. security assistance
as of April 2005, the U.S. government, led by State, is actively working
to coordinate a U.S. security presence to support the interests of its
athletes, spectators, and commercial industries during the Games. The U.S.
Olympic Security Coordinator relocated to Turin from Milan in January 2005
and set up a support office in April 2005 to provide the U.S. government
with a forward-based infrastructure for coordinating security support. The
United
9The heads of state of the Group of Eight nations (Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
meet at an annual summit to discuss international economic and political
issues.
Page 18 GAO-05-547 Olympic Games
States is also contracting for additional office space in Turin to house
the interagency joint operations and intelligence center.
The U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator in Turin has already polled
participating U.S. agencies to determine their planned baseline, or
initial, presence. In April 2005, the American Embassy in Rome projected
that $4.4 million will be expended to support the ongoing planning efforts
and an interagency presence of about 150 to 200 additional personnel
during the Games. The bulk of the planned U.S. footprint comprises State
Diplomatic Security agents, with supporting roles from FBI, DOD European
Command, and other agencies. Figure 2 presents a timeline of planned U.S.
security assistance to the 2006 Winter Olympics.
Figure 2: Timeline of Planned U.S. Support for Turin Olympics
January - U.S. command post and security posture to be initiated
October April - U.S. liaison office December -U.S. March 10-19 -
-"Lessons operational in Turin joint Turin Winter
Learned" operations Paralympics
conference in center in
Milan Turin to
be outfitted
Legend: OSC - Olympics Security
Coordinator EUCOM - DOD
European Command
Source: GAO.
Key Lessons Learned from Athens Being Applied to Turin
Key lessons learned from Athens that were highlighted in numerous agency
after-action reports are being applied to the Turin Games security
planning. These lessons include the importance of planning early by using
existing bilateral relationships to assess the host country's security
capabilities; designating key U.S. officials to lead logistics and
messaging efforts; and working with multilateral, bilateral, and
specialized groups to improve coordination and ensure smooth access for
U.S. support. The lessons
Importance of Early Planning, Informed by Existing Bilateral Relationships
learned being applied to Turin also include more detailed strategies and
projects.
Many agency after-action reports from Athens and U.S. officials' comments
indicate the importance of early planning, informed by existing bilateral
relationships that reveal host country security capabilities. Such early
insight enables advance planning of baseline support, including logistics
as well as training and military exercises to enhance the host country's
capabilities. For Athens, Greece's participation in State's ATA Program
and an interagency assessment in 2001 revealed Greece's capabilities,
which allowed U.S. agencies to develop a succession of training activities
that began in 2002. In addition, DOD's European Command began formally
planning in 2003 for its March 2004 exercise. Such specially tailored,
elaborate exercises take at least 6 months to plan, experts told us.
Furthermore, early planning of U.S. baseline support for an Olympics
enables agencies to coordinate their efforts and plan more efficiently and
effectively, including arranging accommodations, vehicle rentals, and
communications infrastructure. For example, advance notification of the
expected U.S. agency presence would allow for planning of support
infrastructure, including operations and intelligence centers. Due to the
short supply of large office space in Athens, the United States divided
its operations centers there into discrete areas. U.S. officials who
worked the Athens Olympics recommend that operations and intelligence
centers for future Olympics be collocated, to ensure the efficient
delivery and dissemination of information among U.S. agencies; however,
acquiring and outfitting suitable space for a joint operations center
requires advance planning. Additionally, Greece- and Italy-based U.S.
officials told us that hotel accommodations within the host country can
sell out up to 3 years in advance of the Olympics, and prices on
accommodations, vehicle rentals, and communications wiring and
infrastructure dramatically increase as the Games draw near. Planning for
and securing the U.S. presence early would prevent some of the
last-minute, high-cost expenditures incurred at the Athens Olympics, such
as for installation of communications lines in temporary office space.
This lesson is being applied to Turin as the United States has used its
long-standing counterterrorism and military partnership with Italy to
better understand Italy's advanced security capabilities. Based on this
assessment, the interagency working group in Washington, D.C., is
determining the scope of each agency's baseline support operations to
prevent duplication of effort and identify the best sources and
capabilities
Designating Key U.S. Officials for Logistics and Message Development
Working with Multilateral, Bilateral, and Specialized Groups
among the representative agencies. The interagency group has continued to
meet monthly to determine which lessons learned from Athens might be
applicable to the Turin Games. At a recent meeting, nearly 60 U.S.
officials discussed intelligence reports, logistics planning, and the
development of an interagency joint operations-and-intelligence center, as
well as the identification of funding sources for logistics, such as
lodging, communications, and transportation.
The U.S. support for the Athens Games also demonstrated the importance of
designating key individuals to serve as point persons for logistics and
message development. As part of its coordinated approach in Athens, the
U.S.
Embassy designated individuals to be responsible for
political, security, and logistics arrangements. Athens- and
Washington, D.C.-based officials told us this strategy worked
well, and recommended its future use. The clear establishment
of U.S. roles and responsibilities-including a single U.S.
contact to Greece-helped Greece avoid a barrage of separate
requests for assistance from U.S. agencies, while also
minimizing overlap among and overreach by participating U.S.
agencies. As the U.S. focal points for the host government
and the public, these individuals may be further tasked, as
was the case in Athens, with crafting and ensuring a
consistent message and setting consistent expectations for
the host country and multilateral community regarding planned
U.S. participation efforts. This also proved useful in
Athens, U.S. officials told us. This lesson is being applied
to Turin through State's appointment of an Olympic Security
Coordinator in November 2004. This coordinator in Turin is
acting as a focal point for contacts with the host government
and will work with the Consul General in Milan to develop and
communicate coordinated messages. Maintaining a U.S.
government message for Turin that is consistent, clear, and
targeted-as was done in Athens-is designed to avert possible
confusion by the government of Italy on which U.S. agency to
speak with to obtain certain capabilities. The strategy will
also help ensure that U.S. citizens and interests receive a
consistent message on security or other critical issues.
U.S.
support for the Athens Games demonstrated the importance of
working through formalized multilateral mechanisms and other
bilateral and specialized channels to avoid duplication of effort
and ensure a smooth and politically sensitive operation. Host
country and U.S. officials credited the Olympic Security Advisory
Group with providing capabilities and specialized support to the
government of Greece from its seven member nations and other
nations, including Czech Republic, which provided
Application of Lessons Learned also includes Specific Projects and
Strategies
weapons of mass destruction response capabilities. Where possible, such
multilateral efforts should be employed in the future to vet host country
requests, provide multilateral assistance in a coordinated manner, and
avoid duplication of effort among contributing countries, U.S. officials
told us.
Officials who worked on the Athens Olympics also suggested working closely
with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the U.S. Olympic Committee
(USOC), and local organizing committees early to ensure adequate numbers
of credentials with proper access rights are granted to
U.S. officials. The host country typically provides just four credentials
for officials from each participating country. Given the hundreds of U.S.
personnel on the ground to support the Athens Games, U.S. officials worked
with the local organizing committee over many months to secure the
necessary credentials for access to the Olympic Village and venues. U.S.
officials stated that the IOC needs to adjust the security framework for
post-September 11 Olympics, including reassessing the issuance of
credentials for security support personnel. The multilateral Olympic
Security Advisory Group provided feedback on this issue to the IOC at the
conclusion of the Athens Games, and USOC officials stated that further
discussion is planned with the IOC at future meetings.
This lesson is being applied to Turin through U.S. officials' extensive
cooperation with local organizing committees and government of Italy
security officials, extending back to a formal security coordination
conference in Milan in October 2004, which included personnel from State,
DOJ, DHS, and DOD. The U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator has forged a
close relationship with the Turin-based government of Italy Olympics
security strategy official, and continues to work with him on a regular
basis to ensure that detailed plans are executed appropriately. Further,
key U.S. officials have also begun communicating early with the local
organizing committee to ensure adequate numbers of credentials are
provided with appropriate access for U.S. personnel at Olympic venues.
The Athens lessons learned applied for the Turin Games also include
more-detailed strategies and projects, highlights of which include the
following:
o In Athens, U.S. support was somewhat decentralized, utilizing multiple
operations centers for various functions, such as intelligence and athlete
support, which officials said was challenging. Therefore, in Turin, U.S.
agencies plan to better centralize resources by collocating intelligence
and interagency operations centers, as well as by developing a dedicated
U.S. Support for Turin Games Faces Additional Challenges
Web site that will allow Americans to readily access helpful information,
such as how to replace lost passports and locate English-speaking
pharmacies.
o In Athens, some agencies struggled to identify funding sources to make
advance payments on housing and logistics needs. For Turin, State is
leveraging funds internally to make deposits on hotels, and agencies
will be responsible for identifying and securing funding for
logistics, such as lodging, communications, and transportation.
o Italy did not participate in the Olympic Security Advisory Group for
the Athens Olympics, which U.S. and Greek officials credited with
enhancing coordination and collaboration multilaterally. However,
Italy may be creating its own multilateral advisory group.
o In Athens, State's Diplomatic Security agents encountered problems
obtaining unlimited access to all venues. In Turin, the Olympic
Coordinator is working with the USOC on a plan to better deploy U.S.
agents.
In planning for the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy, winter
conditions and weather present a host of new and different challenges for
U.S. security assistance. Winter Olympics are typically one-third the
scale of the Summer Olympics, but venues are spread out over more land.
Whereas the 2004 Summer Olympics were mostly centered in and around the
Greek capital city, where the United States had a large embassy presence
and infrastructure in place to provide administrative and logistical
support for the U.S. security efforts, the 2006 Winter Games are located
in the remote northwest corner of Italy. The nearest U.S. presence is the
consulate in Milan, about a 90-minute drive from Turin. One Olympic
Village will be in Turin, and two will be located in mountain towns up to
60 miles away, where certain sports-such as bobsled, luge, skiing, and
snowboarding- will be located. Locating suitable lodging for U.S. security
and support personnel near key venues is proving challenging.
On-the-ground security details could prove problematic, as spectators
wearing bulky winter apparel will hope to enter the venues with minimum
wait outside in the cold, and traffic may clog roads leading to mountain
venues. Figure 3 presents images of some of the roads leading to mountain
venues, one of the venues to be used for the Olympics, and one of the
three Olympic Villages that will house athletes.
Figure 3: Turin Olympics Mountain Venues
Source: GAO.
Top row: Mountain roads to Sestriere, Italy. Bottom row: Snowboarding
venue in Bardonecchia, Italy; Olympic Village under construction in
Sestriere (February 2004).
U.S. Role for Beijing Games Still Unclear
The threat framework surrounding the 2006 Winter Olympics remains largely
the same. Italy has partnered with the United States in the war on terror,
including the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and al Qaeda has named
Italy as a target. In addition, Italy faced difficult security challenges
at other major events, such as the meeting of the Group of Eight in Genoa
in 2001, at which activists clashed violently with Italian police forces,
and for the funeral of Pope John Paul II in April 2005.
Since Turin is located approximately 90 minutes from the nearest U.S.
Consulate in Milan, a temporary U.S. post is being created in Turin.
Opened in April 2005, this office will house the Olympic Security
Coordinator, the Olympic Coordinator for logistics, the FBI liaison, and
locally hired support staff. The consulate had to obtain special
permission to hire local staff in Turin and secure more than $235,000 for
the office space lease and security upgrades. In addition, the office had
to be fully furnished and outfitted to support the needs of the staff,
including furniture, supplies, computers, and telephone and fax lines. At
the time of our visit in February 2005, the Milan Consul General stated
that the Embassy in Rome had worked to make funding for the staff and
infrastructure available from its own funds, but that those funds would
need to be reimbursed by State and other agencies. At the interagency
group meetings, State reminds other agencies to identify funding for their
support and release it to State for immediate use to secure logistics
support, such as contracting for lodging and transportation. State does
not have a "major events" fund, so no monies have been budgeted for
Olympics-related support. Other agencies indicated similar constraints and
lack of advance budgeting for Olympics security assistance.
While U.S. agencies are focusing on the 2006 Winter Olympics, they are
beginning to assess potential roles for U.S. security assistance for the
2008 Summer Games in Beijing, China. These plans are still in the early
stages, although State expects that the U.S. mission in Beijing will
appoint both an Olympic Coordinator and an Olympic Security Coordinator by
the fall of 2005 to allow them to participate in the U.S. assistance for
the Turin Games. State officials have received tentative inquiries from
Chinese officials regarding Olympics security issues. However, the United
States has not assessed China's security plans for the 2008 Olympics, and
officials at key agencies stated they are uncertain about the extent of
assistance China may request or permit from outside sources.
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland
Agency Comments
Security, and State and to the Attorney General for their review and
comment. The departments orally concurred with the content of the report
or had no comments. Technical comments provided by the departments were
incorporated, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Attorney General. We will
also make copies available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or [email protected]. A GAO
contact and key contributing staff are listed in appendix II.
Jess T. Ford Director, International Affairs and Trade Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To fulfill our objectives in identifying U.S. security strategies in
supporting the 2004 Summer Olympics, the various roles of the U.S.
agencies involved, and the lessons they learned in supporting the
Olympics, we interviewed officials at the Departments of State (State),
Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE)
and at certain intelligence agencies, and conducted fieldwork in Athens,
Greece. At all of the agencies, we obtained and reviewed all available
operations plans and after-action reports. At State, we interviewed
officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Counterterrorism office,
Overseas Security Advisory Council, and Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs, as well as the Olympic Security Coordinator. At DOJ, we
interviewed officials in the Criminal Division; Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), including an agent who was temporarily assigned to Greece during
the Games. At DHS, we met with officials in the Transportation Security
Administration, Secret Service, Coast Guard, and Federal Air Marshal
Service. At DOD, we spoke with officials in the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, European Command, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, as
well as the former Defense Attache for the Athens Embassy. At DOE, we
interviewed an official who was deployed to Greece with the State-led
Foreign Emergency Support Team. During our fieldwork in Athens in November
2004, we interviewed key U.S. officials such as the Ambassador, Deputy
Chief of Mission, Senior Regional Security Officer, Legal Attache, Public
Affairs Officer, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attache, the head of
the Political section, officials in the Defense Attache Office and
Consular section, and an intelligence officer. In addition, we obtained
and reviewed key documents, including operational plans, after-action
reports, planning manuals and timelines, and assessments. We interviewed
four Greek officials identified by the Embassy as key to the Olympics
process in order to assess the Greek receptivity to U.S. assistance
provided and any lessons that can be applied to providing support to host
governments of future Olympics. These individuals were the former head of
the Greek police force, who had overall responsibility for the Greek
Olympics security strategy; the official who was in charge of the Greek
tactical operations center and who is now the head of the Greek police
force; and the individual who was in charge of the crisis management
systems during the Olympics. Finally, we interviewed one Greek-American
who was the Deputy General Manager for Security for the local Athens
Olympic Organizing Committee.
To determine cost estimates of U.S. security support to the Athens Olympic
Games, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI) to survey
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
agencies identified as contributing to the U.S. effort. A draft DCI was
pretested on two federal agencies. In October 2004, GAO sent the revised
DCI to the agencies identified by State in June 2004 as supporting the
U.S. security assistance effort,1 and obtained 17 responses. Our DCI asked
agencies to tell us how they collected and tracked the data on costs. We
conducted follow-ups with agencies to clarify data collection issues based
on the responses we received. GAO notes that not all agency components
collect and track data in a consistent manner. Furthermore, the DCI did
not attempt to gather information on the costs of personnel salaries,
which are presumed to be a significant outlay for the agency components
involved.2 We determined that the data are sufficiently reliable to be
reported in aggregated form, rounded to millions, as estimated cost
outlays and by category of expenditure, but not in precise, detailed form.
To assess how lessons learned in supporting Greece are being applied to
future Games, particularly the 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, we
gathered information from the various agencies identified above, reviewed
operations plans and budget requests, attended meetings of the
State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., and conducted
fieldwork in Rome, Milan, Turin, and mountain areas of Italy. During our
fieldwork, we interviewed key U.S. officials in Rome, including the
Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Senior Regional Security Officer,
Financial Management Officer, Information Management Officer, Consul
General, intelligence officers, officials in the Office of Defense
Cooperation, Political section, and Legal Attache office. In addition, we
interviewed the Italian Minister of Public Order in the Ministry of the
Interior to assess the way in which the United States has presented offers
of assistance for the Turin Games to the government of Italy. In Milan, we
interviewed the Consul General, Acting3 Olympic Coordinator (for
logistics), Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Secret Service Attache, and
others involved in providing logistical support, including contracting for
cellular phones and transportation services for the U.S. personnel working
on the Olympics. In Turin, we interviewed the Olympic Security Coordinator
and the FBI liaison, visited the then-proposed site for the logistical
support
1We did not survey a few agencies that State did not identify; these
agencies were reported to have incurred some small costs.
2GAO identified four State personnel positions that were created
specifically for Olympics and requested cost data from State for those
positions only, which is included in this report.
3The official Olympic Coordinator began working in Turin, Italy, in April
2005.
Page 28 GAO-05-547 Olympic Games Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
office established in April 2005, and the site of the planned interagency
joint operations and intelligence center. We also visited a number of the
Olympics venues in the city of Turin, including the ice skating pavilion,
hockey venues, the stadium for the opening and closing ceremonies, the
location of the medals ceremonies, and the site of the Olympic Village.
Finally, in order to understand the challenges associated with providing
security support to far-flung Olympics venues, we traveled to the two
mountain locations of the other Olympics Villages and the locations of the
alpine skiing venue and the snowboarding venue. U.S. officials also
provided us with information on their early plans to support the Beijing
Olympics in 2008. We also interviewed two officials at the U.S. Olympic
Committee for their perspective on U.S. government security assistance to
foreign-based Olympics.
We conducted our work from October 2004 to May 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Diana Glod, (202) 512-8945
GAO Contact
In addition to the individual named above, Sharron Candon, Michelle
Staff
Munn, Andrea Miller, Melissa Pickworth, Joe Carney, and Martin de Alteriis
made key contributions to this report.
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