Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly	 
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment	 
Approach (30-JUN-05, GAO-05-540).				 
                                                                 
In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of	 
Defense (DOD) created a New Triad by significantly changing its  
definition and conceptual framework for its strategic		 
capabilities to include not only the nuclear capabilities of the 
old Triad that consisted of intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but
also the capabilities of offensive conventional strike forces,	 
active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense		 
infrastructure. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which	 
DOD has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad  
in its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and (2) developed a	 
long-term investment approach to identify and manage future	 
spending for the New Triad.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-540 					        
    ACCNO:   A28597						        
  TITLE:     Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More   
Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term	 
Investment Approach						 
     DATE:   06/30/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Future budget projections				 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     DOD Future Years Defense Program			 

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GAO-05-540

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO	Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
                            House of Representatives

June 2005

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a
                         Long-term Investment Approach

                                       a

GAO-05-540

[IMG]

June 2005

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a
Long-term Investment Approach

                                 What GAO Found

Although DOD broadened its definition of strategic capabilities during the
2001 Nuclear Posture Review and established a New Triad, it has not
developed a way to use the FYDP to identify the total amount it plans to
spend to sustain and enhance New Triad capabilities during the next few
years. The FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD
and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 years and to make
informed decisions in light of competing priorities. While DOD has
identified some New Triad spending included in the FYDP, it has not
identified all associated spending. GAO's notional analysis of New
Triad-related programs in the FYDP through 2009 shows that overall
spending could be significantly greater than DOD's limited analyses have
identified to date. According to DOD officials, DOD has not fully
identified spending in the FYDP because of the diversity and broad scope
of the concept. A mechanism for aggregating FYDP data, known as a "virtual
major force program," could help DOD address these obstacles and provide
the Secretary of Defense and Congress with better visibility into overall
DOD spending plans for the New Triad.

DOD also faces long-term affordability challenges in funding the New
Triad. However, it has not developed an overarching and integrated
long-term investment approach to identify the projected resource
requirements and funding timelines to acquire and sustain New Triad
capabilities beyond the period of time covered by FYDP. Long-term capital
investment planning is an important tool to help organizations establish
priorities and develop future budgets. DOD is likely to face significant
affordability challenges in the long term in deciding the mix of nuclear
and conventional capabilities needed to implement the vision of the New
Triad, as existing nuclear weapons platforms begin to reach the end of
their lives within the next 15 years and missile defense capabilities are
expanding. While DOD has identified some near-term investments, its
investment plans are incomplete and it lacks a comprehensive strategy for
developing a long-term plan.

     Transformation of U.S. Strategic Capabilities United States Government
                             Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in

the FYDP DOD Lacks an Overarching and Integrated Long-term Investment

Approach for Acquiring and Sustaining New Triad Capabilities Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments

1 3 5

11

20 25 27 28

Appendixes                                                              
                Appendix I:        U.S. Strategic Command Missions         29 
               Appendix II:             Scope and Methodology              31 
                             GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and   
              Appendix III:                   Projected                    
                            Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years  
                                               Defense                     
                                               Program                     34 
              Appendix IV:      GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments      41 

Tables        Table 1: New Triad Weapons Systems and Capabilities        7 
              Table 2: GAO Notional Analysis of Projected Spending for New 
                       Triad Program Elements in the FYDP for Fiscal Years 
                                      2004-2009                            16 
                      Table 3: U.S. Strategic Command Missions             29 
           Table 4: GAO's Categorization of New Triad-Related FYDP Program 
                                      Elements                             36 
              Table 5: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Major Force 
                          Program Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009 37 

Figures Figure 1: Figure 2:       The New Triad Comparison of New        5 
                                     Triad-Related Program Elements        
                                   Identified in DOD and GAO Analyses      15 
                     Figure 3:   Projected Spending for the New Triad by   
                                                 Primary                   
                                Appropriation Category, Fiscal Years 2004  
                                                 through                   
                                                  2009                     39 
                     Figure 4: Projected Spending for the New Triad by DOD 
                                Organizations, Fiscal Years 2004 through   40 
                                                  2009                     

Contents

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
FYDP Future Years Defense Program
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

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A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

June 30, 2005

The Honorable Terry Everett
Chairman
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
Ranking Member
Strategic Forces Subcommittee
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,1 the Department of Defense
(DOD) presented a conceptual framework for transforming U.S. strategic
capabilities.2 The review proposed that the United States move away from
depending heavily on nuclear weapons and instead bring together the
capabilities of nuclear and conventional offensive strike forces, active
and
passive defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure, to create a
New
Triad to achieve the desired strategic effects. Enhanced command and
control, planning, and intelligence capabilities would also support the
New
Triad. The review stated that the synergism achieved through the
integration of nuclear and conventional offensive strike and defensive
capabilities would provide the President and Secretary of Defense with a
broad array of military options to better address the spectrum of
potential
opponents and contingencies that may arise in the coming decades.

1 In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001
(Pub. L. No. 106-398), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the
Secretary of Energy, to "conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear
posture of the
United States for the next 5 to 10 years". The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review
was the second
post-Cold War review of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The first one was
conducted in 1994.

2 Strategic capabilities are those required to conduct strategic missions,
which are
operations directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy
targets with the
purpose of progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's
capacity and will to
make war. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are
designed to have a
long-range rather than an immediate effect on the enemy and its military
forces. There may
be times, however, when strategic capabilities need to produce timely
effects.

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review also concluded that new defense
initiatives and investments would be required to transform U.S. strategic
capabilities and realize the full potential of the New Triad. The Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP), a DOD centralized report consisting of
thousands of program elements3 that provides information on DOD's current
and planned out year budget requests, is one of DOD's principal tools to
manage the spending for its transformation of strategic capabilities. The
FYDP provides visibility over DOD's projected spending and helps inform
DOD and Congress about resource data relating to identifying priorities
and trade-offs.

DOD is transforming its strategic capabilities at a time when it is also
faced with fiscal challenges brought about by ongoing military operations
and other major initiatives to transform the way it prepares to fight and
win wars. In our February 2005 report entitled 21st Century Challenges:
Reexamining the Base of Government, we concluded that the magnitude of
funding and potential for current investments and operations to turn into
long-term financial commitments are prompting real questions about the
affordability and sustainability of the rate of growth in defense
spending.4 We also observed that the role, size, and structure of forces
and capabilities comprising the strategic triad are key issues that may
need to be assessed in view of the new security and fiscal environment.

At your request, we reviewed the progress made by DOD in determining and
allocating resources needed to implement the New Triad today and in the
future. Specifically, you asked us to determine the extent to which DOD
has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its FYDP
and (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and manage
future investments needed to achieve the synergistic capabilities
envisioned for the New Triad.

3 Program elements are the primary data elements in the FYDP that
generally represent organizational entities and their related resources.
They represent descriptions of the various missions of DOD and are the
building blocks of the FYDP, and they may be aggregated in different ways,
including to show total resources assigned to a specific program, and to
identify selected functional groupings of resources.

4 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). This report
presents illustrative questions for policymakers to consider across major
areas of the budget and federal operations as they carry out their
responsibilities.

To obtain information on DOD's efforts to identify projected spending and
develop future investment strategies for the New Triad, we reviewed
documents and interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps
headquarters, and the U.S. Strategic Command. We also conducted a notional
analysis to identify projected spending for the New Triad by analyzing
resource data for program elements related to the New Triad included in
the FYDP prepared to support the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
submission to Congress. The results of our notional analysis are not meant
to provide a definite accounting of the projected New Triad spending
included in the FYDP but rather to illustrate an approach that could be
used to align the concepts and capabilities of the New Triad with program
elements in the FYDP.5 We did not analyze resource data from the FYDP
prepared to support the President's fiscal year 2006 budget submission
because the data were not yet available during our review. In conducting
our analysis, we determined that the automated FYDP data were sufficiently
reliable for meeting our objectives. Additionally, we compared DOD's
investment planning actions for the New Triad against the best practices
identified for leading capital decision making to determine the extent
that DOD has followed these practices. We conducted our review from
December 2003 through April 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. See appendix II for a more complete
description of our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief	Although DOD established its New Triad in 2001, it has
not developed a way to fully identify projected spending for New Triad
programs in its FYDP. In light of the challenges DOD faces in transforming
strategic capabilities in the current fiscal environment, decision makers
need to have the best and most complete data available about the resources
being allocated to the New Triad. Although DOD has identified some
spending related to the New Triad in the FYDP, our notional analysis of
such spending included in the FYDP through 2009 indicates that overall
spending for the New Triad could be much greater than DOD's limited
analyses have identified. DOD has not fully identified New Triad spending

5 In conducting our analysis we relied on DOD's definitions of New Triad
capabilities to determine the relevant program elements in the FYDP that
were aligned with those capabilities. However, we made certain assumptions
about how to make these linkages, such as the extent to which capabilities
provided by program elements were dedicated to New Triad missions.

because the diversity and scope of the New Triad and ambiguity of the
concept make it difficult for DOD officials to reach agreement on a
complete list of programs, according to DOD officials. Additionally, the
current FYDP structure does not readily identify and aggregate New Triad
spending. A mechanism to aggregate FYDP spending, known as a "virtual
major force program," has been used by DOD to identify space funding and
could be beneficial in tracking New Triad funding, according to some DOD
officials including the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. Without
some mechanism to aggregate funding associated with the New Triad, DOD
will be limited in its ability to guide and integrate New Triad spending.

Despite the long lead time generally needed to develop and acquire new
systems and the need to consider long-term affordability issues, DOD has
not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach
for acquiring new capabilities and replacing some or all of its aging
systems that provide New Triad capabilities. Best practices show that
long-term capital planning is needed to help organizations define
direction, establish priorities, and plan future budgets. While DOD has
identified some near-term investments, its investment plans are incomplete
because some key capabilities for the New Triad have not been fully
assessed in context of the New Triad and long-term replacement of key
platforms have not been assessed in the context of the new security
environment and DOD-wide affordability challenges. Although DOD recognizes
the need for a long-term investment approach, it has not begun to develop
one because its concepts for nonnuclear strike and missile defense are not
fully mature. However, delaying the preparation of a long-term investment
approach puts DOD at risk of not developing an affordable strategy.
Additionally, DOD and Congress will not have sufficient information to
effectively determine future investment costs, the priorities, and
trade-offs needed to sustain New Triad implementation. While we agree that
some concepts are continuing to evolve, and that new systems are still
under development, we do not believe that these circumstances preclude DOD
from beginning to plan for the future of the New Triad. As new information
becomes available, we would expect to see adjustments in DOD's plans-that
is the nature of long-term planning.

We are making recommendations designed to provide greater visibility of
the projected spending and future investments for DOD's efforts to create
the New Triad and acquire future capabilities. On April 28, 2005, we
provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. As of the
time this report went to final printing, DOD had not provided comments as
requested.

Background	In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD significantly expanded
the range of strategic capabilities to include not only the old Triad,
which consisted of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also
conventional and nonkinetic offensive strike and defensive capabilities.
The review also called for revitalizing the U.S. research and development
and industrial infrastructure that would develop, build, and maintain
offensive forces and defensive systems and be capable of responding in a
timely manner to augment U.S. military capabilities when necessary.
According to DOD, the three legs of the New Triad-offensive strike, active
and passive defenses, and responsive infrastructure-are intended to be
supported by timely and accurate intelligence, adaptive planning, and
enhanced command and control capabilities. Figure 1 shows the three legs
of the New Triad and its supporting elements.

Figure 1: The New Triad

Source: 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.

Note: ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs =
submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

DOD concluded in the 2001 review that while nuclear weapons will continue
to play a critical role in defending the United States, the combination of
capabilities included in the New Triad would increase the military options
available to the President and Secretary of Defense and allow for the
development of responsive, adaptive, and interoperable joint forces that
could be employed in a wider range of contingencies. DOD's review
indicated that the additional capabilities provided by the New Triad would
partially mitigate the effects of any reductions in the number of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads that are planned through
2012.6 Table 1 shows the weapons systems and capabilities that make up the
New Triad.

6 The Nuclear Posture Review states that the United States plans to reduce
its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a range between
1,700 to 2,200 warheads by 2012. This warhead range and the year the goal
is to be reached are also set forth in the May 2002 Moscow Treaty between
the United States and Russia. An operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warhead is one that is fully ready for use and is either mated on or
allocated to an operational delivery system, such as a ballistic missile
or strategic bomber.

Table 1: New Triad Weapons Systems and Capabilities

Leg Element Weapon system or capability

Offensive strategic strike Nuclear strike  o  Intercontinental ballistic
missiles

o  Submarine-launched ballistic missiles

o  Strategic bombers

o  Nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (held in reserve)

Nonnuclear strike  o  Advanced conventional weapon systems

o  Offensive information operations

o  Special operations forces

Defenses Active defense  o  Ballistic missile defenses

o  Air defenses

Passive defense Measures that:

o  Reduce vulnerability through mobility, dispersal, redundancy,
deception, concealment, and hardening

o  Warn of imminent attack

o  Support consequence management activities

Responsive infrastructure	Research and development and  o  Research
facilities industrial infrastructure  o  Manufacturing capacity

o  Skilled personnel

Elements that support the New Triad:

o  Adaptive planning

o  Enhanced command and control

o  Timely and accurate intelligence

Source: Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress, 2002,
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense.

In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD indicates that new initiatives and
investments would be required to achieve a mix of new or improved
capabilities that compose the offensive, defensive, and responsive
infrastructure legs and supporting command and control, intelligence, and
adaptive planning elements of the New Triad. In particular, the review
found that major investment initiatives would be needed in the areas of
advanced nonnuclear strike, missile defenses, command and control, and
intelligence. DOD also plans to improve existing New Triad-related
capabilities by modernizing existing weapon systems and enhancing the
tools used to build and execute strike plans to provide more flexibility
in adapting or developing military options during crises. An Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics official in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense told us that DOD intends to partially address near-term
affordability issues for the New Triad by enhancing capability
characteristics of current weapon systems, such as range, and leveraging
capabilities already in development. In March 2003, DOD published a
Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan that is intended to identify
initiatives for developing

the New Triad and institutionalizing the Nuclear Posture Review.7 DOD
plans to implement the New Triad concept and many of the capabilities
identified by the Nuclear Posture Review by 2012. However, DOD states that
further investments are likely to be needed beyond that time frame as
existing nuclear platforms age, such as the Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missile system,8 and follow-on nuclear weapon systems are
proposed.

The Nuclear Posture Review also states that DOD should conduct periodic
assessments to determine its progress in developing and integrating
capabilities for the New Triad. Specifically, these strategic capability
assessments are to review the (1) progress to date in reducing the number
of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, (2) state of the
security environment, and (3) progress made in the development of the New
Triad. An assessment team, which included representatives from DOD and the
Department of Energy, completed its first Nuclear Posture Review strategic
capability assessment and associated report in April 2005. An Office of
the Secretary of Defense official told us that DOD plans to update its
first assessment in the fall of 2005 to support the department's conduct
of the Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD intends to conduct subsequent
assessments about every 2 years through 2012.

Many DOD organizations, including the Joint Staff, military services,
combatant commands, and defense agencies, and the Department of Energy,
have responsibilities for implementing various aspects of the New Triad.
These responsibilities are broadly defined in relevant New Triad
implementation and guidance documents. Within the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, two organizations have key responsibilities for overseeing and
managing the New Triad implementation efforts:

o 	The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible
for developing the policy and guidance to implement the 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review and for establishing an organizational framework for
coordinating New Triad initiatives within DOD.

7 The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan is intended to provide
general guidance for developing several key New Triad capabilities,
including advanced nonnuclear strike and ballistic missile defenses, and
for modernizing and extending the service lives of existing strategic
nuclear platforms.

8 DOD plans to extend the service life of the Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missile system until 2020.

o 	The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics is responsible for providing oversight for the
development and deployment of New Triad capabilities.

The U.S. Strategic Command also has a significant role in implementing the
New Triad and supporting its missions. In addition to its responsibilities
for strategic nuclear deterrence and military space operations missions,
the command was assigned several new missions related to the New Triad in
January 2003. These missions are: global strike; integrated missile
defense; DOD information operations; and command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In January
2005, the Secretary of Defense also assigned the command responsibility
for the mission of combating weapons of mass destruction. Appendix I
provides additional information about the U.S. Strategic Command's
missions.

Additionally, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for assembling and distributing
the FYDP, which DOD uses to formulate the estimated projected resources
and proposed appropriations to support DOD programs, projects, and
activities, including those related to the New Triad. The office is also
responsible for coordinating with DOD components any proposed changes to
the FYDP's structure, such as updates to existing program element titles
and definitions. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) has responsibility for the annual budget justification
material that is presented to Congress. These offices work collaboratively
to ensure that the data presented in the budget justification material and
the FYDP are equivalent at the appropriation account level.

The FYDP is a report that resides in an automated database, which is
updated and published at least 3 times a year to coincide with DOD's
internal budget development activities and annual budget submission to
Congress. It provides projections of DOD's near and midterm funding needs
and reflects the total resources programmed by DOD, by fiscal year. The
FYDP includes data on estimates for the fiscal year reflected in the
current budget request and at least 4 subsequent years.9 Both detailed
data and a summary report are generally provided to Congress with DOD's
annual budget submission.

9 The FYDP submitted with DOD's fiscal year 2005 budget includes data
through fiscal year 2009.

The FYDP is used as a source of data both for analysis and as an input to
alternative ways of displaying and portraying actual and programmed
resources. It contains data related to the forces, manpower, and total
obligation authority for each program element. The FYDP is organized into
11 major force program categories, comprising combat forces and support
programs, which are used as a basis for internal DOD program review. The
major force program categories include strategic forces, general-purpose
forces, research and development, and special operations forces. The FYDP
is further arranged according to the appropriation structure utilized by
Congress to review budget requests and enact appropriations, which
includes major appropriation categories for procurement; operation and
maintenance; military personnel; research, development, test, and
evaluation; and military construction. Therefore, the FYDP's structure
serves the purpose of crosswalking DOD's internal review structure with
the congressional review structure.

In 2003, DOD began implementing the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process to identify improvements to existing
capabilities and guide development of new capabilities from a joint
perspective that recognizes the need for trade-off analysis. The new
process is designed to provide an approach to defense planning that looks
at the broad range of capabilities to address contingencies that the
United States may confront in the future. When fully implemented, JCIDS is
intended to provide an enhanced methodology utilizing joint concepts that
will identify and describe existing or future shortcomings in capabilities
and identify integrated solutions that meet those capability needs. The
system is also expected to provide better linkage to the acquisition
process and improve prioritization of validated joint warfighting
capability proposals. Specifically, it is intended to provide a broader
review of proposals than did the previous planning process by involving
additional participants, including the combatant commands, early in the
process. The analyses conducted during the process are to result in a set
of potential solutions, including additional resources or changes to
doctrine and training designed to correct capability shortcomings. These
solutions are then incorporated into roadmaps that show the resource
strategies to develop and acquire the needed capabilities.

  DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in the FYDP

DOD has not fully identified the projected spending for New Triad in the
FYDP to date. In light of the challenges DOD faces in transforming
strategic capabilities, decision makers need to have the best and most
complete data available about the resources being allocated to the New
Triad in making decisions on the affordability, sustainability, and
trade-offs among the efforts to develop and acquire capabilities. The FYDP
is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD and Congress
about resource data relating to these efforts. While DOD has identified
some New Triad spending in its analyses and in relevant New Triad
documents, our notional analysis of New Triad-related program elements
indicates that overall projected spending for the New Triad through fiscal
year 2009 could be much greater when other program elements that provide
New Triad capabilities are considered. Additionally, the current FYDP data
structure does not expressly identify and aggregate New Triad program
elements that would allow identification of New Triad spending, and the
program elements included in the FYDP's existing major force program
category for strategic forces do not fully capture the broader range of
strategic capabilities that were envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review.
DOD does not plan to develop a complete and approved inventory of New
Triadrelated program elements in its FYDP because DOD officials believe
that it is difficult to reach agreement on the program elements to be
included in such an inventory. However, an inventory of New Triad-related
program elements that provides a more complete and clear identification of
the projected spending currently planned for the New Triad could help DOD
and Congress make decisions on the affordability and spending needed for
programs to develop and acquire New Triad capabilities.

    DOD Has Not Fully Aligned Projected Spending with New Triad Capabilities

While DOD has identified some program elements related to the New Triad in
documents and internal reviews, it still has not fully identified
projected spending associated with the New Triad. DOD documents related to
the New Triad, including the Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Posture
Review Implementation Plan, and the Secretary of Defense's fiscal year
2002 Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress, broadly
describe the capabilities of the New Triad and indicate the range and
types of activities and weapon systems that provide these capabilities.
DOD has also identified and directed resources for some New Triad
programs. For example, as the Nuclear Posture Review was being completed
in late 2001, DOD issued guidance for preparing its fiscal year 2003
budget that identified 12 initiatives that were considered key to
developing the New Triad, such as programs to provide capabilities to
defeat hard and deeply buried targets.10

In anticipation of a potential requirement to identify New Triad program
elements in the FYDP, DOD's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
conducted an analysis in 2003 that identified a list of 188 FYDP program
elements, which accounted for about $186.7 billion in then-year dollars of
projected spending for fiscal years 2004 through 2009.11 The office
identified another $17.4 billion for programs and activities that are not
readily identifiable in the FYDP,12 bringing the total to about $204.1
billion. However, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation officials told
us that the analysis included only those program elements that supported
the initiatives identified in DOD's programming guidance or otherwise
clearly provide New Triad capabilities. The officials said that the list
of programs identified in this analysis was never agreed upon and approved
within DOD and there are no current plans to update the analysis.

10 Hard and deeply buried targets are structures ranging from hardened
surface bunker complexes to deep, underground tunnel facilities, which are
used to conceal and protect critical leadership, military, and industrial
personnel; weapons; equipment; and activities that constitute serious
threats to U.S. security. These structures are typically large, complex,
and well concealed, incorporating strong physical security, modern air
defenses, protective siting, multifaceted communications, and other
important features that make many of them survivable against existing
conventional methods of attack.

11 All projected spending associated with the New Triad is expressed as
total obligation authority in then-year dollars and is current as of the
budget submitted to Congress for fiscal year 2005.

12 These programs and activities include special access programs, weapons
systems, and other activities that are not identifiable with discrete
program elements.

Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that the team
conducting the first strategic capability assessment for the New Triad
performed a subsequent survey of current program elements in the FYDP to
determine the capabilities these program elements would provide for the
New Triad by 2012. An Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation official
said that the survey included all of the program elements on their list.
However, the official did not know whether the survey identified any
additional program elements.

In addition to DOD's projected spending in the FYDP for the New Triad, the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration identified
$41.7 billion for nuclear weapons activities for fiscal years 2004 through
2009 in its Future Years Nuclear Security Program prepared for the fiscal
year 2005 President's budget submission. This agency is responsible for
maintaining the infrastructure to support nuclear weapons capabilities,
including the refurbishment and service-life extension of currently
deployed nuclear warheads.

    New Triad Spending Could be Much Greater Than DOD Has Currently Identified

DOD's analyses of FYDP program elements did not include many of the
program elements that make up several capabilities identified for the New
Triad in the Nuclear Posture Review, such as special operations and
intelligence, or those that provide capabilities that are needed to
perform New Triad missions but also have wider military applications. If
these additional program elements are considered, the overall projected
spending for the New Triad could be much greater than DOD has currently
identified in New Triad-related documents and in either of the analyses
conducted by its Office of Program Evaluation and Analysis or strategic
capability assessment team.

We conducted a notional analysis to identify any additional spending for
New Triad-related program elements included in the FYDP. Our notional
analysis considered a broader range of FYDP program elements than either
of the analyses conducted by DOD's Office of Program Evaluation and
Analysis or strategic capability assessment team and included many
elements that provide capabilities for conducting New Triad missions, but
also have wider military applications, such as communications,
intelligence, and special operations program elements. Using available DOD
definitions of New Triad capabilities, we reviewed each of the FYDP's
4,725 program elements to determine to what extent the elements provided
capabilities needed for New Triad missions. We further distinguished the
program elements we identified as being fully dedicated

to the missions of the New Triad or not fully dedicated to the New Triad
because the capabilities provided by these latter program elements could
be used in a wider range of military applications than just for the New
Triad.

Compared to the 188 program elements and $204.1 billion in then-year
spending for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 identified by the Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation, our notional analysis identified a total
of 737 program elements in the FYDP that are aligned with New Triad
capabilities, with a total associated spending of $360.1 billion over the
same period, or about $156.0 billion more than the DOD analysis.13 Of the
737 program elements that we identified, 385 program elements provide
capabilities that would be fully dedicated to New Triad missions, such as
program elements for weapons of mass destruction defense technologies and
for the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization. The other 352
program elements we identified provide capabilities, such as special
operations, that would be used in conducting New Triad missions but could
also be used for other military missions. Figure 2 shows the number of New
Triad program elements identified by the Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation and the number of additional program elements identified in
GAO's analysis.

13 Of the 737 program elements we identified, 271 did not have any
resources assigned to them for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 at the time
the President's 2005 budget was released. However, these program elements
remain active in the FYDP, and therefore may have spending associated with
them in the future.

Figure 2: Comparison of New Triad-Related Program Elements Identified in
DOD and GAO Analyses

                       Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

aIn its analysis, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation determined
that the capabilities provided by about 7 of the 188 program elements it
had identified, or 4 percent, were not fully dedicated to the New Triad.
However, using the criteria we developed for our analysis, we determined
that all 188 program elements were fully dedicated.

Of the $360.1 billion we identified in projected spending for the New
Triad, $231.8 billion was for programs that are fully dedicated to the New
Triad and $128.3 billion for programs that are not fully dedicated.14 As
table 2 shows, we broke out the spending into the New Triad's four
capability areas-offensive strike; active and passive defenses; responsive
infrastructure; and command and control, intelligence, and planning-and
created a fifth area for program elements that supported more than one
capability area. Our notional analysis shows that projected spending for
offensive strike and enhanced command and control, intelligence, and
planning capability areas almost doubles when program elements that are
not fully dedicated to the New Triad are included. The offensive strike
capability area represents the largest amount of the projected spending,
$156.0 billion in then-year dollars, and the command and control,
intelligence, and planning capability area is next with $108.0 billion in
projected spending. Together, these two capability areas account

14 For not fully dedicated program elements, we included all projected
spending for the elements in our analysis and we did not attempt to assign
any specific portion of the spending to the New Triad.

for 73 percent, or about $264.0 billion, of the $360.1 billion total
projected spending identified in our analysis. Most of the $86.3 billion
of projected spending for the active and passive defenses capability area
is in the fully dedicated category. Appendix III provides additional
information on the results of our analysis.

Table 2: GAO Notional Analysis of Projected Spending for New Triad Program
Elements in the FYDP for Fiscal Years 2004-2009

          Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars

                                     Projected       Projected 
                                      spending        spending 
                                   for program     for program          Total 
                                                                    projected 
                                elements fully elements not      spending for 
                                               fully                      New 
                     New Triad    dedicated to    dedicated to  Triad program 
                                           the             the 
              capability areas       New Triad       New Triad       elements 
              Offensive strike           $82.4           $73.6         $156.0 
            Active and passive            85.2             1.1           86.3 
                      defenses                                 
                    Responsive             1.3             0.1 
               infrastructurea                                 
                   Command and            56.6            51.4          108.0 
        control, intelligence,                                 
                  and planning                                 
           Multiple capability             6.3             2.1 
                        areasb                                 
                         Total          $231.8          $128.3         $360.1 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding.

aSpending amounts do not include $41.7 billion from fiscal years 2004
through 2009 in the Department of Energy's Future Years Nuclear Security
Program for nuclear weapons activities.

bProjected spending associated with program elements that support more
than one New Triad capability area.

Officials with Program Analysis and Evaluation, Policy, and Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the U.S. Strategic Command stated that the methodology we used for our
notional analysis was reasonable. Officials from the Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation and from U.S. Strategic Command told us that the
program elements we identified were consistent with the capabilities
defined for the New Triad. Officials from the Office of Program Analysis
and Evaluation also said that our analysis used a more systematic approach
in identifying New Triad-related program elements included in the FYDP

than was followed in DOD's analyses. The officials added that when they
were compiling their own analysis of New Triad-related program elements,
many of the documents that GAO used to identify relevant programs had not
yet been published. Therefore, while DOD did not include many program
elements that are not fully dedicated to the New Triad in their analyses,
the officials told us that it was not unreasonable to include those
program elements in our analysis. As our notional analysis shows,
including these program elements not only provides greater transparency of
the projected spending for the New Triad in the FYDP but also identifies
many additional program elements that provide capabilities necessary for
carrying out New Triad missions.

    New Triad Spending Is Not Readily Identified in the FYDP's Structure

While the FYDP is a report that provides DOD and Congress with a tool for
looking at future funding needs, the current FYDP structure does not
readily identify and aggregate New Triad-related program elements to
provide information on current and planned resource allocations-including
spending changes, priorities, and trends-for the New Triad. In conducting
our analysis of FYDP program elements, we observed that DOD has not
created any data fields in the FYDP's structure that would expressly
identify program elements as being relevant to the New Triad. According to
DOD Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, there is no plan to modify
the data fields in the FYDP structure to allow the ready identification of
New Triad program elements and associated spending because they have not
received direction to do so. Additionally, these officials told us that if
DOD were to modify the FYDP structure to allow such identification, it
would need to develop an approved list of existing New Triad program
elements to allow capture of these elements in the data fields.

Additionally, as we have reported in the past, the FYDP's 11 major force
program categories have remained virtually unchanged since the 1960s.15
Our notional FYDP analysis indicates that the FYDP's definition of the

15 GAO, Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve
Transparency of DOD's Projected Resource Needs, GAO-04-514 (Washington,
D.C.: May 2004). This report also discusses a number of other limitations
in the FYDP. For example, the FYDP's current usefulness is limited in
providing Congress visibility over the implementation of the
capabilities-based defense strategy and associated risk management
framework, important 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review initiatives. We made
recommendations aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the FYDP,
including: (1) aligning the program elements in the FYDP to defense
capabilities needed to meet the defense strategy and the dimensions of the
risk management framework and (2) reporting funding levels in its summary
FYDP report to Congress.

existing major force program for strategic forces16-one of the key major
force program categories associated with the New Triad-does not fully
capture the projected New Triad spending for the broader range of
strategic capabilities that are envisioned for the New Triad in the
Nuclear Posture Review. We determined that only $55.6 billion, or about 15
percent of the $360.1 billion of projected spending that we identified in
our notional analysis of FYDP program elements, is associated with the
FYDP's strategic forces major force program category, which largely
captures projected spending on offensive nuclear capabilities. The
remaining $304.6 billion is dispersed among the other 10 major force
programs. For example, program elements for the Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile, which is an autonomous, stealthy, long-range,
conventional, air-to-ground, precision cruise missile designed to destroy
high-value, well-defended fixed or moveable targets, and the Patriot
missile defense system, which contributes to the defense leg of the New
Triad, are included in the FYDP's general-purpose forces major force
program. Similarly, intelligence-related program elements for hard and
deeply buried targets and to support U.S. Strategic Command are part of
the FYDP's command, control, communications, and intelligence major force
program.

In the past, DOD created new aggregations of program elements and changed
the FYDP's structure as decision makers needed information not already
captured in the FDYP. For example, a recent aggregation allows data that
relate to every dollar, person, and piece of equipment in the FYDP to be
identified as being in either a force or infrastructure category. DOD has
also made it possible to identify program elements in the FYDP that are
related to activities to capture the resources associated with specific
areas of interest, such as space activities. In 2001, DOD established a
"virtual major force program" for space to increase the visibility of
resources allocated for space activities. This is a programming mechanism
that aggregates most space-unique funding by military department and
function

16 The FYDP defines strategic forces as those organizations and associated
weapon systems whose force missions encompass intercontinental or
transoceanic intertheater responsibilities. Program elements in the
strategic forces major force program include strategic offensive forces,
such as those related to intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and strategic defensive forces, such as ballistic missile
early-warning systems.

crosscutting DOD's 11 existing major force program categories.17 The
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, who has key responsibilities for
implementing the New Triad, told us that creating a virtual major force
program for the New Triad could help align New Triad capabilities with the
projected spending in the FYDP, identify responsible organizations, reduce
ambiguity of the New Triad concept, and provide better visibility and
focus for DOD efforts to develop and acquire New Triad capabilities. The
Commander suggested that it could be necessary to create more than one
virtual major force program, possibly one for each of the New Triad legs,
because of the diversity and scope of New Triad capabilities. Some Office
of the Secretary of Defense officials also told us that creating a virtual
major force program could provide Congress with more visibility of DOD's
efforts underway to develop the capabilities needed for the New Triad.
Until such time as a tool such as a virtual major force program becomes
available that can capture and categorize the projected spending for the
New Triad in the FYDP, we believe that DOD will be limited in its ability
to guide and direct all its efforts to develop, acquire, and integrate New
Triad capabilities and Congress will not have full visibility of the
resources being allocated.

    DOD Lacks a Plan to Fully Identify New Triad Spending

DOD has not established a requirement to develop a complete and approved
list of the program elements included in the FYDP that are associated with
New Triad spending. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us
that DOD has not established such a requirement because the diversity and
scope of the New Triad make it difficult for DOD officials to reach
agreement on a complete list of programs. They also told us that because
the New Triad is an ambiguous concept, the program elements included in
such a list would change as the New Triad evolves and becomes better
defined.

However, without a complete and approved DOD list of New Triad program
elements included in the FYDP, there is some uncertainty about the total

17 We have issued several reports addressing DOD's progress in creating
its virtual major force program for space. See: GAO, Technology
Development: New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy Provides Basis
for Optimizing Investments, but Future Versions Need to Be More Robust,
GAO-05-155 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005); Defense Space Activities:
Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further Management Actions Needed,
GAO-03-379 (Washington, D.C.: April 2003); and Military Space Operations:
Planning, Funding, and Acquisition Challenges Facing Efforts to Strengthen
Space Control,

GAO-02-738 (Washington, D.C.: September 2002).

range of programs and projected spending that are being pursued to achieve
New Triad capabilities. It also will be difficult for Congress to assess
DOD's progress in achieving the goals identified in the Nuclear Posture
Review without having complete information on the resources being spent or
needed in the future to meet those goals. Additionally, the broad scope of
the New Triad concept and large number of organizations with New
Triad-related spending responsibilities makes it even more important to
have complete information available on the projected spending being
provided for each of the New Triad capability areas and for each of the
many organizations developing and acquiring New Triad capabilities. For
example, our notional analysis identified as many as 23 defense
organizations, including the military services, offices within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, several combatant commands,
and defense agencies, with FYDP spending related to the New Triad. Office
of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that having an approved
program list would promote a common understanding of the New Triad and
benefit future department program reviews. Additionally, an Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation official told us that an approved program
list would aid DOD in making resource decisions for the New Triad. In
preparing DOD's fiscal year 2006 budget, the official told us that an
approved list of programs would have made it easier to evaluate the
effects of programming changes proposed by the military services on
capabilities being acquired for the New Triad.

  DOD Lacks an Overarching and Integrated Long-term Investment Approach for
  Acquiring and Sustaining New Triad Capabilities

While several New Triad documents and DOD's recent strategic capability
assessment identify investment needs through 2012, DOD's near-term
investment direction is incomplete. Additionally, DOD has not yet
developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach to
identify and plan investments needed to acquire and sustain capabilities
for the New Triad. A long-term investment approach is an important tool in
an organization's decision-making process to define direction, establish
priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions
needed to achieve goals. Although DOD recognizes the need for a long-term
investment approach, it does not plan to develop one until nonnuclear
strike and missile defense concepts are mature. DOD has not identified a
specific date for when this will occur. The new JCIDS process could
complement any long-term investment approach developed for the New Triad
by providing additional analysis and discussions to support New Triad
investment and the development of a plan.

    Long-term Investment Approach Is a Useful Tool to Establish Priorities

In our past reporting on leading capital decision-making practices,18 we
have determined that leading organizations have decision-making processes
in place to help them assess where they should invest their resources for
the greatest benefit over the long term. These processes help an
organization determine whether its investments are the most cost
effective, support its goals, and consider alternatives before making a
final selection. A long-term investment approach is an important tool in
an organization's decision-making process to define direction, establish
priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions
needed to achieve goals. Our analysis of several investment plans showed
that such an approach includes information on future investment
requirements, projected resources, investment priorities and trade-offs,
milestones, and funding timelines, and is intended to be a dynamic
document, which would be updated to adapt to changing circumstances.

In the past, DOD has developed and maintained long-term investment
planning documents for major defense capabilities-such as the Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027 and the "Bomber Roadmap"-to provide
senior decision makers options in the development of broad strategies that
will define future DOD force structure and help with the resource
allocation process.19 In 2003, DOD also published an Information
Operations Roadmap, which supports collaboration of broad information
operations efforts and endorses the need for the department to better
track information operations investments.

DOD's Near-term As noted earlier, Office of the Secretary of Defense
officials told us that Investment Direction for the New Triad
documents-including the Nuclear Posture Review, Nuclear New Triad Is
Incomplete Posture Review Implementation Plan, and the first strategic
capability

assessment-identify some of the near-term investments needed to provide

18 GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making,
GAO/AIMD-99-32 (Washington, D.C.: December 1998).

19 DOD, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, Office of the
Secretary of Defense
(Washington, D.C.: December 2002). Also see GAO, Force Structure: Improved
Strategic
Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342
(Washington, D.C.: March 2004). For information on the "Bomber Roadmap",
see
GAO, Operation Desert Storm: Limits on the Role and Performance of B-52
Bombers in
Conventional Conflicts, GAO/NSIAD-93-138 (Washington, D.C.: May 1993) and
Strategic
Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex, Time-Consuming,
and
Costly, GAO/NSIAD-93-45 (Washington, D.C.: February 1993).

capabilities for the New Triad. However, this investment direction is
incomplete and does not address long-term affordability challenges that
DOD may be faced with in sustaining and developing new capabilities to
implement the New Triad. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told
us that the strategic capability assessment provides a near-term
investment approach by identifying priorities for focusing resources to
keep investment efforts on track to reach New Triad implementation goals
for 2012. According to the officials, the team conducting the strategic
capability assessment developed a list of capabilities that were needed in
key areas, such as strategic strike and missile defense, from the Nuclear
Posture Review's vision of the New Triad. The team then reviewed current
operation activities, acquisition programs of record, and a potential
range of new technologies to determine any capability shortcomings. Based
on this review, the assessment team was able to determine whether
initiatives to develop New Triad capabilities in the key areas were (1)
met or on track to be satisfied by 2012; (2) on track, but would not be
met by 2012; or (3) not on track to be met by 2012 unless additional
funding was provided. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us
that by determining the status of meeting capabilities in each of the key
areas, DOD would be able to better prioritize future investment decisions
for the New Triad.

However, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy officials
acknowledge that the first strategic capability assessment provides only a
limited, near-term investment approach for the New Triad. These officials
told us that the assessment did not review and assess some key
capabilities of the New Triad, such as cruise missile defense, information
operations, and passive defense, and may not have fully surveyed existing
capabilities in the areas that were included in the assessment. Further,
it does not address the potential for further investments to replace one
or more existing nuclear platforms that will approach the end of their
useful lives. These officials told us that they expect future strategic
capability assessments to include New Triad key areas not reviewed in the
first assessment. Additionally, Office of the Secretary of Defense
officials told us that while the assessment's recommendations are not
binding on DOD programming and budgeting decisions, the assessment was
used during the department's last program review in developing the fiscal
year 2006 defense budget.

DOD, in its 2003 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, called for
the creation of an overarching strategic planning document for the New
Triad that would establish the strategies and plans for developing new
strategic capabilities to meet national security goals stated in the
Nuclear

Posture Review. The plan also was to provide broad guidance for
integrating the elements of the New Triad as new capabilities came on line
and for the development of future forces, supporting systems, planning and
the creation of a responsive infrastructure. However, Office of the
Secretary of Defense Policy officials told us that while a draft plan was
prepared, they decided not to circulate the draft for comments because
they believed the results of the first strategic capability assessment
would result in too many changes to the plan. Instead, the officials told
us that the strategic capability assessment process would develop the
strategy, plans, and guidance that were to be provided by the plan.

    DOD Does Not Plan to Develop a New Triad Long-term Investment Approach Until
    Concepts Mature

In its Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, DOD states a need for a
long-term investment strategy for the New Triad, and according to the
plan, intends to conduct a study to evaluate options for preparing an
integrated, long-term investment strategy for strike capabilities,
defensive capabilities, and infrastructure when nonnuclear strike and
missile defense concepts are mature. Policy and Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us
that there are several concepts related to New Triad capabilities being
developed, including the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept and
concept and operational plans for global strike and integrated ballistic
missile defense. The officials told us that once nonnuclear strike and
missile defense concepts are developed, specific programs could be better
identified to implement these concepts, including new programs to develop
capabilities that do not currently exist. These officials told us that
they recognize the importance of a long-term investment approach for the
New Triad to provide a basis for decisions on resources for future
capabilities initiatives. However, they do not believe the development of
the nonnuclear strike and missile defense concepts are far enough along to
begin the study leading to development of a long-term investment strategy.
These officials did not provide us with an estimate for when these
concepts would be considered sufficiently mature to begin the study.

While we agree that some concepts are continuing to evolve, and that new
systems are still under development, we do not believe that these
circumstances preclude DOD from beginning to plan for the future of the
New Triad. For example, although DOD is still developing concepts for
missile defense, it is planning to spend billions of dollars over the next
several years to develop a range of missile defense capabilities. As new
information becomes available, we would expect to see adjustments in

DOD's plans-that is the nature of long-term planning. Further, without the
context of a long-term investment approach for acquiring new capabilities
and replacing some or all of its aging systems that provide New Triad
capabilities, DOD will continue to invest billions of dollars on
capabilities that will affect the long-term composition of the New Triad.
DOD is likely to face significant affordability challenges in the long
term as some existing nuclear weapons platforms begin reaching the end of
their expected service lives within the next 15 years and as missile
defense capabilities are expanding. Given the length of time to develop
and acquire capabilities for the New Triad and the need to consider
long-term affordability issues, DOD is also at risk of not considering the
best approaches to developing and sustaining capabilities needed to
provide the broad range of military options for the President and
Secretary of Defense that are envisioned for the New Triad. DOD is further
at risk of not effectively integrating the wide range of diverse New Triad
capabilities as they are developed and being able to effectively determine
future investment costs and the priorities and trade-offs needed to
sustain New Triad implementation. In our February 2005 report addressing
the challenges that the nation faces by its growing fiscal imbalance in
the 21st century, we stated that DOD's current approach to planning and
budgeting often results in a mismatch between programs and budgets and
that DOD does not always fully consider long-term resource implications
and the opportunity cost of selecting one alternative over another.20

    JCIDS Process Could Complement Any Long-term Investment Approach

The new JCIDS process could play a role in any long-term investment
approach that is eventually prepared for the New Triad by providing a
forum for additional analyses and assessments to support New Triad
investment decisions and ensure that those decisions are in concert with
DOD's overall investment priorities. The JCIDS process is intended to
provide a means to ensure that new capabilities are conceived and
developed in a joint warfighting context. The process intends to (1) focus
on achieving joint operational capabilities rather than on individual
weapon systems and (2) provide a systematic means to identify capability
gaps, propose solutions, and establish roadmaps for future investments to
acquire needed capabilities. Capability assessments, developed through the
process, are designed to have a long-term focus, consider a wide range of
potential materiel and nonmateriel solutions across the military services,

20 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).

analyze trade-offs among different solutions, and identify areas where
existing capabilities are redundant or excessive. The process offers
proposed solutions that are intended to be integrated and prioritized and
would eventually be incorporated into resource roadmaps that show the
investment strategies to develop and acquire the needed capabilities.

JCIDS also intends to involve the combatant commanders early in the
decision-making process to provide a strong warfighter perspective in
identifying capabilities and resource priorities. The U.S. Strategic
Command has created mission capabilities teams within its Capability and
Resource Integration Directorate that closely align its missions with the
JCIDS process to strengthen its ability to more effectively advocate for
the capabilities needed to perform its missions. The Commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command told us that his intent is for these teams to play an
active role in identifying and developing New Triad capabilities.

New Triad capabilities span most of the functional areas established in
the JCIDS process, including command and control and force application.
Officials in the Joint Staff's Office of Requirements Assessment told us
that the JCIDS process does not currently identify and track joint
warfighting capabilities as capabilities for the New Triad and Office of
the Secretary of Defense officials told us that there are no efforts at
this time to crosswalk the JCIDS' joint warfighting capabilities with the
New Triad. However, Joint Staff officials said that organizations with New
Triad responsibilities, such as the U.S. Strategic Command, do participate
in the working groups and other activities throughout the JCIDS process to
ensure that their equities are addressed. The JCIDS process could provide
benefits to defense planning, but because the process is still very early
in its development it is unclear whether or how DOD plans to use JCIDS to
address its New Triad investments.

Conclusions	It is important for DOD and congressional decision makers to
have the most complete accounting possible of the projected spending
planned for the New Triad over the next several years as they deliberate
the budget. Until DOD reaches agreement on the program elements that
comprise New Triad spending in its FYDP, and creates a way to aggregate
spending, neither defense officials nor Congress will have visibility over
all of the projected spending planned in the near-term for the New Triad.
Importantly, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, who has been
assigned significant responsibilities for coordinating and integrating New
Triad capabilities from a warfighter perspective, will not have the
resource

visibility needed to effectively carry out this new role. This information
is needed to accurately assess the affordability of the various activities
and weapon systems that make up the New Triad, and to make timely and
informed decisions on the funding required to develop, acquire, and
integrate the wide range of diverse New Triad capabilities.

Moreover, without an overarching and integrated long-term investment
approach for the New Triad, information on affordability challenges,
future funding priorities, and requirements beyond the current FYDP is not
fully known. While DOD believes it is still too early to develop a
long-term investment approach, further delaying the start of this effort
puts the department at risk of not developing and acquiring capabilities
for the New Triad when needed. As a result, the President and Secretary of
Defense can not be assured that DOD has the broad range of military
options envisioned in the New Triad. Although New Triad concepts are
continuing to evolve and mature, laying the foundation now for a long-term
investment approach would provide DOD with an additional planning tool for
future development of the New Triad concept-a tool that could be
continuously improved and updated as better information becomes available
and as changing security and fiscal circumstances warranted. The need for
such an approach becomes increasingly important as existing nuclear
platforms begin approaching the end of their useful lives and decisions to
replace one or more of the platforms are required. Additionally, without
such an approach, decision makers lack information on projected costs,
spending priorities and trade-offs, resource requirements, and funding
timelines in making decisions on the spending commitments needed to
sustain New Triad implementation. Further, without a long-term investment
approach, the large number of New Triad stakeholders, such as the military
services, defense agencies, and combatant commands, will lack the
direction and focus they need to effectively prepare future funding plans
to develop, acquire, and integrate the capabilities. Lastly, while the new
JCIDS process is intended to provide a better approach to identifying
solutions to capability shortcomings and strengthen the role of combatant
commanders in making decisions on capability investments, it is yet
unclear how the process will be used to specifically support investment
decisions for the New Triad.

  Recommendations for Executive Action

To strengthen DOD's implementation of the New Triad and provide greater
transparency of resources that are being applied to developing, acquiring,
and sustaining the needed capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense take the following four actions:

o 	Direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in
consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to (1)
develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program elements in
the FYDP, which support activities for developing, acquiring, and
sustaining New Triad capabilities; (2) modify the FYDP to establish a
virtual major force program for the New Triad by creating new data fields
that would clearly identify and allow aggregation of New Triad-related
program elements to provide increased visibility of the resources
allocated for New Triad activities; and (3) report each year the funding
levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the department's
summary FYDP report to Congress. The Secretary of Defense should direct
that these three actions be completed at or about the time when the
President's budget for fiscal year 2007 is submitted to Congress.

o 	Direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to develop an overarching and integrated
long-term investment approach for the New Triad that provides decision
makers with information about future joint requirements, projected
resources, spending priorities and trade-offs, milestones, and funding
timelines. As part of developing and implementing this approach, DOD
should leverage the analyses, assessments, and other information prepared
under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process.
The Secretary of Defense should direct that development of a long-term
investment approach be completed in time for it to be considered in the
department's preparation of its submission for the President's budget for
fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and be updated, as needed, to adapt to changing
circumstances.

Agency Comments	On April 28, 2005, we provided a draft of this report to
DOD for review and comment. As of the time this report went to final
printing, DOD had not provided comments as requested. However, DOD did
provide technical changes, which have been incorporated in this report as
appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make
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available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-4402.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members who
made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Janet A. St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management

Appendix I

                        U.S. Strategic Command Missions

U.S. Strategic Command has a significant role in implementing the New
Triad, advocating for the development of New Triad capabilities, and
supporting its missions. It derives these responsibilities from missions
assigned by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Table 3 describes
U.S. Strategic Command's current missions.

                    Table 3: U.S. Strategic Command Missions

Mission Description Basis of authority

Strategic deterrence  o  Plan, target, and employ during wartime Assumed
the mission in June 1992 from the intercontinental ballistic missiles,
disestablished Strategic Air Command and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff bombers.

a

Military space operations  o  Develop desired characteristics and Change 1
of the Unified Command Plan, capabilities; effective July 2002

o  Plan, advocate, and conduct military space operations; and

o  Serve as the single point of contact for military space operational
matters.

Global strike  o  Provide integrated global strike Change 2 of the Unified 
                                             planning           Command Plan, 
                   and command and control support to effective January 2003  
                       deliver rapid, extended-range, 
                                            precision 
                        kinetic and nonkinetic (e.g., 
                                          elements of 
                    space and information operations) 
                                              effects 
                  in support of theater and national  
                             objectives.              

Integrated missile defense  o  Advocate desired global missile defense and
missile-warning characteristics and capabilities for active and passive
ballistic missile defenses for all combatant commands; and

o  Provide centralized planning, coordination, and integration of global
ballistic missile defenses, missile warning systems, and battle
management, command control, communications, and intelligence system and
architecture.

Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, effective January 2003

DOD information operations  o  Integrate and coordinate DOD information
Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, operations (including computer
network effective January 2003 attack, computer network defense,
electronic warfare, operations security, military psychological
operations, and military deception) across geographic areas of
responsibility.

                   Appendix I U.S. Strategic Command Missions

                         (Continued From Previous Page)

Mission Description Basis of authority

Command, control, communications,  o  Plan, integrate, and coordinate
Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and intelligence, surveillance, and
effective January 2003
reconnaissance reconnaissance in support of strategic and

global operations, as directed; and

o  Task and coordinate command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in support of
strategic force employment, including global strike, missile defense, and
associated planning.

Combating weapons of mass destruction  o  Plan, integrate, and synchronize
DOD efforts with the efforts of other agencies;

o  Integrate other U.S. Strategic Command capabilities (e.g., global
strike) and provide operational support to other combatant commands and
organizations conducting combating weapons of mass destruction missions;

o  Synchronize DOD operations for combating weapons of mass destruction
with the intelligence community;

o  Advocate desired capabilities for combating weapons of mass
destruction;

o  Sponsor relevant joint doctrine; and

o  Provide military representation to U.S. national and international
agencies.

Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, effective January 2005

Source: Unified Command Plan

Note: Change 1 and Change 2 incorporated), April 20, 2002, and Memorandum
from the Secretary of Defense, January 6, 2005, designating
responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction to Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command.

aThe Unified Command Plan is a classified document approved by the
President, published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
addressed to the commanders of combatant commands. It establishes the
combatant commands, identifies geographic areas of responsibility, assigns
primary missions, defines authority of the commanders, establishes command
relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of combatant command.

Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has fully
identified projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Years
Defense Program (FDYP), we reviewed key DOD documentation to identify and
define the New Triad's capabilities and determine whether DOD had
identified specific, related programs in the FYDP.

Specifically, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents on the New
Triad, including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Posture
Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense's fiscal year 2002
Annual Defense Report, the Defense Science Board's February 2004 report,
Future Strategic Strike Forces, briefings by DOD officials, and relevant
programming guidance. We also obtained the results of an analysis
performed by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation that identified
New Triad spending in the FYDP, and discussed the purpose, scope,
methodology, and limitations of the analysis with officials from this
office. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, including officials from the Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, the Office of Strategic
and Space Programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the
Office of the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Matters, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. We also interviewed officials from the Joint
Staff, U.S. Air Force headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps headquarters, and
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration to
gain an understanding of their role in implementing the New Triad. We met
with officials of the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, to
discuss the command's missions that are relevant to the New Triad.

As part of our effort to determine the extent to which DOD has identified
the projected spending for the New Triad in its FYDP, we performed our own
notional analysis of the FYDP to identify resources associated with the
New Triad. In doing so, we examined the FYDP's structure and related
documentation to determine whether the FYDP was designed to capture
information that would identify specific program elements as being related
to the New Triad. We met with relevant DOD officials to discuss our
approach, and reviewed the analysis performed by the Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation. We also reviewed prior GAO work to gain a better
understanding of whether the FYDP has been modified to allow for new
program element aggregations. In performing our analysis, we assessed the
reliability of the FYDP data by (1) performing electronic testing of
required data elements, (2) reviewing existing information about the data
and the system that produced them, (3) interviewing a knowledgeable DOD
official

Appendix II Scope and Methodology

about the data, and (4) reviewing data reliability tests on these data
previously performed by GAO. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. Additional details about how we
performed our notional analysis are presented in appendix III.

To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a long-term investment
approach to identify and manage future investments needed to achieve the
synergistic capabilities envisioned for the New Triad, we interviewed
officials and reviewed key documentation to determine whether DOD has
taken steps to develop and follow such an approach. Specifically, to
identify best practices for a long-term investment approach, we reviewed
relevant GAO reports, and identified and reviewed investment approaches of
other organizations. We then compared DOD's approach for the New Triad
against these elements that we had identified in other organizations to
determine the extent to which DOD had these elements in place. In
addition, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents, including the 2001
Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan,
the Secretary of Defense's fiscal year 2002 Annual Defense Report, the
Defense Science Board's February 2004 report, Future Strategic Strike
Forces, briefings provided by DOD officials, and relevant programming
guidance to identify investments and investment priorities in building New
Triad capabilities. We also met with officials from the Joint Staff's
Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments to discuss the
development and implementation of the department's new Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System, and to determine whether the New
Triad's plans for achieving desired capabilities were aligned to this new
system.

Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, including officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, the Office of Strategic and Space
Programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Office of
the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, and
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S.
Air Force headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps headquarters, and the Department
of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration to gain their
perspectives. In addition, we visited the headquarters of the

Appendix II Scope and Methodology

U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, and met with command officials
to discuss investments needed to acquire capabilities and implement the
command's missions.

Our review was conducted between December 2003 and April 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix III

GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected Spending on the New Triad
in the Future Years Defense Program

To determine how much the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend on
the New Triad, we performed a notional analysis of the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) to identify programs and projected spending
associated with New Triad capabilities. This analysis identifies 737
program elements that are either "fully dedicated" or "not fully
dedicated" to the New Triad. "Fully dedicated" program elements provide
capabilities that primarily execute or support New Triad missions, whereas
"not fully dedicated" program elements provide capabilities that have
wider military application than just the New Triad.

Our notional analysis is based on certain assumptions, which we considered
to be relevant and reasonable, about how to align New Triad capabilities
to FYDP program elements. For example, we assume that:

o 	All program elements in the FYDP that are not defined as "historical"
are currently active and valid for analysis, even though there may not be
any spending currently associated with the program elements over the
fiscal years 2004 through 2009 time frame.

o 	Certain FYDP field values, or combinations of values, can be used to
identify groups of program elements as being related to the New Triad. For
example, certain combinations of Force and Infrastructure Codes and
Defense Mission Codes can be used to identify particular New Triad
capabilities.

To ensure that our assumptions were reasonable, we discussed our overall
approach with budget experts at GAO and the Congressional Budget Office
and with DOD officials. Generally, these officials agreed with our
approach to identify the projected spending associated with the New Triad
included in the FYDP. However, DOD officials cautioned that identifying
program elements that are not fully dedicated to the New Triad can be
difficult because of the subjectivity required in deciding on the extent
to which a program element provides capabilities for the New Triad.
Therefore, our notional analysis suggests a methodology that can be used
to conduct a comprehensive accounting of the spending plans for the New
Triad, and is not meant to provide a definitive accounting of projected
New Triad spending. We recognize that the assumptions we made are
subjective, and that other analyses to identify projected spending on New
Triad capabilities in the FYDP may use different assumptions and obtain
somewhat different results.

 Appendix III GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected Spending on
               the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program

  Our Methodology for
  Identifying FYDP
  Program Elements
  Related to the
  New Triad

To identify DOD's definitions of the four New Triad capabilities-offensive
strike; active and passive defenses; responsive infrastructure; and
command and control, intelligence, and planning-we used relevant DOD
documentation, such as the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear
Posture Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense's fiscal year
2002 Annual Defense Report, and the Defense Science Board's February 2004
report, Future Strategic Strike Forces. We compared these capability
definitions with information about each of the 4,725 FYDP program
elements1 we reviewed. When we determined that a program element was
related to one or more of the New Triad's capabilities, we categorized it
according to the particular capability that it supported.

We then determined whether the program elements that we identified were
either fully dedicated or not fully dedicated to the New Triad. In making
this determination, we assumed that all of the program elements identified
in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation analysis were fully
dedicated to the New Triad. Table 4 summarizes the criteria we used to
identify and categorize program elements that are linked to the New Triad.

1 FYDP resources fall into three broad categories-total obligation
authority, manpower, or forces-that are identifiable by resource
identification codes. In our review of the FYDP's structure, we identified
4,725 unique, active program elements associated with total obligation
authority resource identification codes.

 Appendix III GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected Spending on
               the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program

    Table 4: GAO's Categorization of New Triad-Related FYDP Program Elements
    Description Fully dedicated program elements Not fully dedicated program
                                    elements

Offensive strike

Kinetic (e.g., advanced conventional and  o  All relevant program elements
identified in GAO-identified program elements that
nuclear) and nonkinetic (e.g., information the Office of Program Analysis
and mainly support special operations,
operations) systems that provide the ability Evaluation analysis.
cryptology, and certain counterintelligence
to rapidly plan and deliver limited-duration  o  Additional program
elements, identified by capabilities.
and extended-range attacks to achieve GAO, that provide or support
conventional,
precision effects against highly valued nuclear, and information
operations strike
adversary assets. Includes special capabilities.
operations capabilities.

                          Active and passive defenses

Programs designed to defend the U.S.  o  All relevant program elements
identified in GAO-identified program elements that
homeland, allies, and forces abroad. Active the Office of Program Analysis
and mainly provide headquarters support and
defenses include (1) ballistic and cruise Evaluation analysis. certain
counterdrug activities.
missile defense capabilities and (2) air  o  Additional program elements,
identified by
defenses. Passive defenses include GAO, that provide or support missile
measures that reduce vulnerability through defenses, defense of U.S.
airspace, and
mobility, dispersal, redundancy, deception, passive defenses, particularly
concealment, and hardening; warn of consequence management activities.
imminent attack; and support consequence
management activities.

                           Responsive infrastructure

Programs that address the ability of the U.S.  o  All relevant program
elements identified in GAO-identified program elements that
technology base to deal with or hedge the Office of Program Analysis and
support activities at key facilities that
against uncertainties in the nature and Evaluation analysis. support or
execute New Triad-related
timing of potential strategic threats, the  o  Additional program
elements, identified by missions.
capability of the technology and industrial GAO, that support the upkeep
of important
base to respond in a timely manner, and the test ranges and facilities.
adequacy and responsiveness of science
and technology programs related to possible
future strategic capabilities.

                Command and control, intelligence, and planning

Programs that (1) provide or support  o  All relevant program elements
identified in GAO-identified program elements
nuclear, national, and global military the Office of Program Analysis and
supporting a broad range of command and
command and control systems, including Evaluation analysis. control,
intelligence, surveillance, and
key communications infrastructure and  o  Additional program elements,
identified by reconnaissance capabilities at the national
platforms; (2) provide "exquisite" intelligence GAO, that historically
provided nuclear level, including space-, air- and ground
of an adversary's capabilities; and command and control capabilities.
based surveillance and reconnaissance
(3) support adaptive planning. platforms.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation.

We then used the FYDP data to identify the projected spending associated
with these program elements for fiscal years 2004 through 2009, and
expressed our results in then-year dollars. The data for the projected
spending are current as of the President's budget submission to Congress
for fiscal year 2005.

 Appendix III GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected Spending on
               the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program

  Projected New Triad Spending by FYDP Major Force Program

The FYDP's strategic forces major force program, one of 11 major force
programs in the FYDP, includes $55.6 billion in then-year dollars for the
New Triad for fiscal years 2004 through 2009, or 15 percent of the $360.1
billion of total spending that we identified. The offensive forces and
weapons systems in this program are primarily nuclear-focused. As
indicated in table 5, the remaining $304.6 billion, or 85 percent of the
projected spending that we identified, is dispersed among 7 of the
remaining 10 major force programs in the FYDP. The command, control,
communications, and intelligence program accounted for the largest share
of New Triad-related spending-$133.5 billion, or 37 percent of the
projected spending that we identified. We did not identify any projected
spending on the New Triad in major force programs for central supply and
maintenance; training, medical, and other general personnel activities;
and support of other nations.

Table 5: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Major Force Program
Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009

          Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars

Major force program
category/Illustrative program Total projected spending for
elements New Triad program elements Percent

Strategic Forces $55.6

o  B-52 Squadrons

o  Minuteman Squadrons

o  Service Support to U.S. Strategic Command

General Purpose Forces 29.7

o  Tomahawk Cruise Missile

o  Tomahawk and Tomahawk Mission Planning Center

o  Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

                               Command, Control,      133.5                37 
                             Communications, and                 
                                    Intelligence                 
                       o  E-4B National Airborne                 
                               Operations Center                 
                   o  U.S. Army Space Activities                 
                       o  Defense Reconnaissance                 
                              Support Activities                 

Appendix III GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected
Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program

(Continued From Previous Page)

          Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars

Major force program
category/Illustrative program Total projected spending for
elements New Triad program elements Percent

Mobility Forces 3.5

o  Special Operations Forces

Guard and Reserve Forces 4.8

o  B-52 Squadrons, Air Force Reserve

o  F-16 Air Defense Squadrons, Air National Guard

Research and Development 98.2

o  Army Missile Defense Systems Integration

o  Space-based Radar

o  Next Generation Bomber

                     Central Supply and Maintenance n/a n/a

Training, Medical, and Other n/a n/a General Personnel Activities

                   Administration and Associated      0.9                  <1 
                                      Activities                
                     o  Management Headquarters,                
                          Missile Defense Agency                

                        Support of Other Nations n/a n/a

Special Operations Forces 33.8

o  Psychological Operations Activities, Active Army

o  Joint Special Operations Forces Intelligence Activities

                                Total $360.1 100

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Total projected spending does not add to $360.1 billion and total
percent does not add to 100 due to rounding.

 Appendix III GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected Spending on
               the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program

Projected New Triad We analyzed the $360.1 billion of projected spending
associated with the

New Triad based on primary appropriation category, as illustrated
inSpending by Primary figure 3. We determined that the largest amount of
projected spending is for Appropriation research, development, test, and
evaluation funding, which accounts for Category $141.8 billion or 39
percent of the $360.1 billion in projected spending that

we identified. We identified $111.0 billion in projected spending for
operation and maintenance appropriations, or 31 percent of the total
spending that we identified.

Figure 3: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Primary Appropriation
Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009

Procurement $63.5 billion

Research, development, test, and evaluation $141.8 billion

Military personnel $41.2 billion

Military construction $2.6 billion

Operation and maintenance $111.0 billion

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars.

 Appendix III GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected Spending on
               the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program

  Projected New Triad Spending by DOD Organizations

Defensewide programs, including programs managed by the Missile Defense
Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and intelligencerelated
defense agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, account for 50
percent of the $360.1 billion of projected spending that we identified as
being associated with the New Triad. Spending for Missile Defense
Agency-related program elements totals $53.1 billion during fiscal years
2004 through 2009 and is greater than the spending we identified for
either the departments of the Army or Navy. As shown in figure 4, among
the military departments the Air Force accounts for the largest share of
New Triad spending-$112.9 billion, or 31 percent of the $360.1 billion
that we identified for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. Spending by the Air
Force, Army, and Navy includes service support for defense agencies and
combatant commands, such as the U.S. Strategic Command.

Figure 4: Projected Spending for the New Triad by DOD Organizations,
Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009

Navy $39.4 billiona

Defensewide $179.9 billion

Army $27.9 billion
Air Force $112.9 billion

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars.
aIncludes Marine Corps.

Appendix IV

                     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402

Acknowledgments 	In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R.
Jaffe, Mark J. Wielgoszynski, David G. Hubbell, Kevin L. O'Neill, Julie M.
Tremper, and Renee S. McElveen made key contributions to this report.

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