Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to
Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges (10-JUN-05,	 
GAO-05-534).							 
                                                                 
Military training ranges are important national assets and play a
critical role in preparing military forces for their wartime	 
mission. The Department of Defense (DOD) has reported for years  
that it faces increasing difficulties in carrying out realistic  
training at its ranges due to various constraints. While	 
encroachment issues have had high visibility within DOD and the  
Congress, much less attention has been given to the overall	 
conditions of training ranges, which can also have an adverse	 
impact on training activities. This report, prepared under the	 
Comptroller General's authority, discusses (1) the condition of  
military training ranges and their impact on training activities,
and (2) what factors are affecting DOD's progress in improving	 
training range conditions.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-534 					        
    ACCNO:   A26331						        
  TITLE:     Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority  
Needed to Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges	 
     DATE:   06/10/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Facility maintenance				 
	     Military facilities				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military training					 
	     Evaluation 					 
	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review			 

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GAO-05-534

United States Government Accountability Office

                     GAO Report to the Secretary of Defense

June 2005

MILITARY TRAINING

 Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve Conditions of Military
                                Training Ranges

GAO-05-534

[IMG]

June 2005

MILITARY TRAINING

Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve Conditions of Military
Training Ranges

                                 What GAO Found

GAO's visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD's own assessments
show that ranges are deteriorating and lack modernization. This adversely
affects training activities and jeopardizes the safety of military
personnel. To ensure readiness, servicemembers must have access to capable
ranges-a key DOD transformation goal-that enables them to develop and
maintain skills for wartime missions. However, GAO observed various
degraded conditions at each training range visited, such as malfunctioning
communication systems, impassable tank trails, overgrown areas, and
outdated training areas and targets. Whenever possible, the services work
around these conditions by modifying the timing, tempo, or location of
training, but officials have expressed concern that workarounds are
becoming increasingly difficult and costly and that they compromise the
realism essential to effective training. Without adequate ranges, DOD
compromises the opportunity to achieve its transformation goal and assumes
the risk that its forces will be less prepared for missions and subjected
to hazards.

DOD's progress in improving training range conditions has been limited and
is partially attributable to a lack of a comprehensive approach to ensure
that ranges provide the proper setting for effectively preparing its
forces for warfare. First, while the services have individually taken a
varying number of key management improvement actions, such as developing
range sustainment policies, these actions lack consistency across DOD or
focus primarily on encroachment without including commensurate efforts on
other issues, such as maintenance and modernization. Second, even though
the services cannot precisely identify the funding required and used for
their ranges, identified range requirements have historically been
inadequately funded, as evidenced by conditions GAO saw, and inadequately
addressed. Service officials identified a variety of factors that have
exacerbated funding limitations, such as ranges having a lower priority in
funding decisions. Third, although DOD policy, reports, and plans have
either recommended or required specific actions, DOD has not fully
implemented such actions.

GAO's Analysis of DOD's Management Actions for Improving Training Range
Conditions

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

OSD                                                                                                                      
  Army                                                                              assessment                          
  Navy      Policy              Strategic        M                                  conditions eb-basedrangeinformation 
Marine Sustainable rangeprogram orimplementation groups RangerequirementsSystematic        and        management system N/A
 Corps                          plan                                                 impacts W         Localrange plans 
Air                                                                                     N/A                          
 Force                                                                                                                  

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Degraded Conditions at Military Training Ranges Adversely Affect

Training Activities Various Factors Affect DOD's Progress in Improving
Training

Range Conditions Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency
Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      3 6

10

20 34 35 37

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II	Key Management Elements of a Comprehensive Approach for
Managing Training Ranges

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products

  Table

Table 1: Identified Condition Deficiencies at Training Ranges We Visited

  Figures

Figure 1: Deteriorated Training Areas at Fort Hood 12 Figure 2: Tank Stuck
in Mud at Fort Stewart Due to Lack of Hardened Crossing 14 Figure 3:
Degraded Conditions at the Southern California Offshore Range 15 Figure 4:
Comparison of a Degraded Camp Lejeune Training Area

with a Better Maintained and Modernized Area at

Fort Bragg 17

                      Page i GAO-05-534 Military Training

Figure 5: GAO's Analysis of DOD's Management Actions for

Improving Training Range Conditions 21 Figure 6: Mock Airfield at the
Fallon Range Training Complex 26

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
MOUT Military Operations on Urban Terrain
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

                      Page ii GAO-05-534 Military Training

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

June 10, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The success of our military forces in combat is directly linked to the
effectiveness of their training beforehand. A fundamental military
readiness principle is that the military must train as it intends to
fight, and military training ranges provide the primary means to
accomplish this principle.1 However, Department of Defense (DOD) officials
have reported for years that they face increasing difficulties in carrying
out realistic training at their ranges due to a variety of constraints,
such as those resulting from encroachment.2 While encroachment issues have
had high visibility within the department and the Congress, much less
attention has been given to other training range constraints, such as
those resulting from inadequate maintenance and modernization, which also
has an adverse impact on training activities. DOD's 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report states that one of the basic tenets needed to meet
its training transformation goal is to reverse the erosion of DOD's
training range infrastructure and ensure that ranges are sustainable,
capable, and available. Because of the criticality of sustainable and
capable training ranges to meeting the training needs of its military
forces, it is imperative that the department addresses the full range of
constraints that impact its training ranges.

1 We use the term "training ranges" to collectively refer to airspace used
to conduct training, live-fire and nonlive-fire and impact areas, ground
maneuver areas, sea ranges (above or below the surface), and other
operating areas.

2 DOD defines "encroachment" as the cumulative result of any and all
outside influences that inhibit normal training and testing. DOD initially
identified the following eight encroachment factors: endangered species
and critical habitat, unexploded ordinance and munitions constituents,
competition for frequency spectrum, protected marine resources,
competition for airspace, air pollution, noise pollution, and urban growth
around installations. Some of the emerging factors to be worked in the
future are space, overseas ranges, water use, resource extraction, and
civilian access.

This report, with its focus on military training range conditions,3 is one
in a series of our reports in recent years that have addressed risks
associated with the department's support infrastructure management. We
initially identified DOD support infrastructure as a high-risk area in the
federal government in 1997 and, in our latest high-risk series report,4 we
pointed out that we continue to believe that it remains a high-risk area.
Our reports on overall infrastructure conditions have frequently cited the
underfunding of maintenance and repairs, resulting in deteriorating
facilities. For the most part, our prior training range reports have
focused on encroachment rather than issues such as appropriate range
maintenance or modernization. A common theme in these reports has been the
need for more comprehensive planning to include, for example, clearly
establishing goals and milestones for tracking progress in addressing
issues, identifying the funding needed to accomplish tasks, and assigning
responsibility for managing and coordinating departmental efforts.

In view of the department's responsibilities to ensure the long-term
viability and utility of its training ranges as critical national assets
to meet the defense mission, we undertook this review to more closely
examine training range conditions related to the maintenance and
modernization of its ranges. We performed our work on the basis of the
authority of the Comptroller General to evaluate U.S. governmental
programs and are reporting the results to you because of your overall
responsibilities as Secretary of Defense.5 This report discusses (1) the
current conditions of military training ranges and their impact on
training activities and (2) what factors are affecting DOD's progress in
improving training range conditions.

In performing our work, we collected and analyzed training range-related
information from officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), the Joint Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, and the
headquarters and selected major commands of the military services. We also
visited eight active component training ranges located in the

3 In this report we use the term "condition" to refer collectively to the
physical features of DOD's training ranges that rely on routine
maintenance (e.g., roads and tank trails) as well as range capabilities to
provide for modernized and realistic training environments (e.g.,
automated threat emitters, automated targets, and urban training
facilities).

4 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).

5 31 U.S.C. S: 7 17(b)(1).

  Results in Brief

continental United States between June and October 2004 to observe
training range conditions and discuss training impacts and actions taken
to improve range conditions.6 These ranges were selected by identifying
the major training ranges for each service and seeking input from service
range officials as to which ranges could best address our audit
objectives. We also reviewed relevant DOD studies and audit reports
addressing military training range condition and funding issues. From our
review of these data and discussions with DOD officials, we believe that
the data presented are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. We conducted our work from August 2003 through March 2005 in
completing this report as well as fulfilling congressionally mandated
reporting requirements dealing with training range issues.7 This work was
completed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is
included in appendix I.

Our visits to eight major training ranges between June and October 2004,
along with DOD's own assessment, show that military training ranges are in
varying degrees of degradation or lack necessary upgrades to meet current
training needs, a condition that, in turn, adversely affects training
activities and jeopardizes the safety of the military personnel using
them. Whenever possible, servicemembers work around the degraded
conditions by modifying the timing, tempo, or location of the training,
but defense officials have expressed concern that these workarounds are
becoming increasingly difficult and costly and that they compromise the
realism essential to effective training. To ensure military readiness,
servicemembers must have access to sustainable and capable training
ranges-a key transformation goal-that enable them to develop and maintain
their skills for wartime missions. However, we observed degraded
conditions and limitations at each of the ranges we visited.

6 Range locations included training areas at Fort Hood, Texas; Fort
Stewart, Georgia; the Southern California Offshore Range, California;
Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp
Pendleton, California; Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada; and the
Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona.

7 Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 required OSD to report to the Congress in 2004 on a
comprehensive plan to address training range constraints with annual
updates through 2007 and for GAO to evaluate each of these reports. See
GAO, Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully
Address Congressional Reporting Requirements, GAO-04-608 (Washington,
D.C.: June 4, 2004). We expect to complete a separate assessment of DOD's
2005 update after it is submitted to the Congress.

Collectively, these conditions included malfunctioning communication
systems, impassable tank trails and roads that jeopardize safety,8
training areas that were overgrown, inadequate number of automated
targets, and outdated training areas and targets. At Fort Hood, erosion of
the tank trails was such that tanks and other vehicles could not safely
maneuver from one training area to another. DOD studies have recognized
that training ranges are deteriorating. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report, for example, stated that an aging training range
infrastructure has suffered from underlying neglect and is in need of
sustainment efforts and recapitalization. 9 Similarly, a number of service
studies have reported degraded conditions. For example, a recent Navy
study on the Southern California Offshore Range pointed out that, while 90
percent of the minimum antisubmarine warfare training requirements were
being met, current range resources did not provide optimal training for
over 60 percent of the skills needed for a wartime environment.10 Without
adequately maintained and modernized ranges, the department not only
compromises the opportunity to achieve its transformation goal of
sustainable and capable training ranges but also assumes the risk that its
forces will be less prepared for its missions and subjected to safety
hazards.

While DOD has taken some actions designed to improve the conditions of its
training ranges, progress has been limited, due in part to the lack of a
comprehensive approach to improving them and ensuring that these ranges
provide the proper setting for effectively preparing its forces for
warfare. Specifically, a comprehensive approach should include several key
elements, such as the following: well-defined policies that address all
factors impacting range sustainability; servicewide plans that guide the
timely execution of range sustainability actions; range requirements that
are geared to meet both service and joint needs; adequate management of
range funding; and a commitment to the implementation of this approach.
While OSD and the services have individually taken a number of key actions
to varying extents, such as developing policy and establishing working
groups for range sustainment, these actions are incomplete,

8 Tank trails are unpaved roads that allow units to travel to and from
their motor pools to training areas safely and reduce negative impacts to
the environment.

9 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 30, 2001).

10 CNA, Assessing Training Range Capabilities: Application of a Range
Resource Approach to SoCal ASW Training (Alexandria, Va.: November 2004).

focusing primarily on encroachment; fail to incorporate all relevant
officials; or lack consistency. Further, even though the services cannot
identify precisely the funding required-or allocated-to maintain and
modernize their ranges, available information indicates that identified
training range requirements have historically not been adequately funded.
For example, according to training range data from Fort Stewart, the
installation's training range accounts were funded approximately 44
percent for fiscal years 1998 through 2002. Similarly, Camp Pendleton data
indicated that the primary range accounts were funded approximately 13
percent during fiscal years 1998 and 2002.11 Service officials identified
a variety of factors that contributed to or exacerbated funding
limitations, such as ranges being a lower priority in funding decisions.
Additionally, although DOD policy, reports, and plans have either
recommended or required specific actions, OSD and the services have not
fully implemented such actions. For example, although the Senior Readiness
Oversight Council in 2001 required the services,12 working with OSD, to
prepare a prioritized list of range sustainment and upgrade programs and
estimated costs for potential inclusion in the upcoming budget, the list
was never developed or submitted for potential funding opportunities.
Defense officials could not provide us with an explanation as to why no
appropriate action was taken. Without a fully implemented comprehensive
approach, DOD will be unable to ensure that it achieves the goals of its
training transformation initiative or to ensure the long-term viability of
its training ranges. Furthermore, the Congress will not be in a position
to fulfill its oversight role.

11 For the purpose of this report, Fort Stewart's and Camp Pendleton's
funding information include operations and maintenance funds, and do not
include military construction funding. Fort Stewart's range account also
does not include facility sustainment funds.

12 The Senior Readiness Oversight Council advises the Secretary of Defense
on matters pertaining to DOD readiness, oversees readiness-related
activities, provides recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on
readiness policy matters, and provides reports on current and projected
readiness issues.

Background

We are making recommendations to you that are intended to improve the
conditions at military training ranges. These recommendations are focused
on the need for a more comprehensive approach for addressing training
range deficiencies to ensure that ranges are sustainable and modernized,
to provide for more realistic training, and to achieve DOD's
transformation goals. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed
with our recommendations, stating the department and military services are
or will be taking steps to implement them. The department also provided
technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.

DOD's ranges are used primarily to test weapon systems and train military
forces; some ranges are used for both testing and training purposes, while
others are limited to one use or the other. These ranges represent
important national assets for the development and sustainment of U.S.
military forces. This report focuses primarily on ranges used for training
purposes. DOD requires ranges for all levels of training to include
airspace for air-to-air, air-to-ground, drop zone, and electronic combat
training; live-fire ranges for artillery, armor, small arms, and munitions
training; ground maneuver ranges to conduct realistic force-on-force and
live-fire training at various unit levels; and sea ranges to conduct
surface and sub-surface maneuvers for training. In a February 2004 report
to the Congress,13 DOD identified 70 major active-component training
ranges in the continental United States-the Army has 35, the Navy 13, the
Marine Corps 12, and the Air Force 10.14 The report also identified
several National Guard, Reserve, and smaller training ranges.

Readiness Reporting for The Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness Defense Infrastructure to develops policies,
plans, and programs to ensure the readiness of military Include Training
Ranges forces and provides oversight on training issues. The Secretaries
of the

military departments are responsible for training personnel and for
maintaining their respective training ranges and facilities. Until recent
years, DOD had no readiness reporting system in place for its defense

13 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and
Readiness, Implementation of the Department of Defense Training Range
Comprehensive Plan

(Washington, D.C.: February 2004).

14 In this report, we refer to major training ranges as those that the
services either identified as "primary" training ranges or those ranges
used by major service combat commands, such as the Army's Forces Command.

installations and facilities, including training ranges. In fiscal year
2000, DOD reported to the Congress for the first time on the readiness of
its defense infrastructure as an integral element of its overall Defense
Readiness Reporting System. At the core of the system is a rating
classification, typically referred to as a "C" rating. The C-rating
process is intended to provide an overall assessment for each of nine
facility classes (e.g., "operations and training" and "community and
housing") on a military installation. Training ranges fall within the
operations and training facility class. While the services provide overall
assessments by facility class, they may not always provide detailed
separate ratings for installation assets, such as training ranges, within
a class. With respect to training ranges, the Army and Marine Corps have
data that provide C-ratings for their ranges, but the Navy and Air Force
do not. The definitions for C-ratings are as follows:

o  	C-1-only minor facility deficiencies with negligible impact on
capability to perform missions;

o  	C-2-some deficiencies with limited impact on capability to perform
missions;

o  	C-3-significant facility deficiencies that prevent performing some
missions; and

o  	C-4-major facility deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission
accomplishment.

Although we have previously reported concerns about the consistency and
quality of the services' approaches to completing these assessments, their
assessments nonetheless have shown a large portion of DOD facilities
across all classes of facilities, which include training ranges, being
rated either C-3 or C-4.

DOD's Training To effectively support the needs of combatant commanders in
the new

Transformation Initiative 	strategic environment of the 21st century, DOD
has undertaken a transformation initiative to change the way it conducts
training by preparing military forces to learn, improvise, and adapt to
constantly changing threats as they execute military doctrine.15 The joint
national training capability is one of three capabilities of this
initiative and calls for

15 We are completing a separate report that provides an overview of the
training transformation program and the challenges the department faces in
its implementation.

the development of a live-virtual-constructive training environment.16 To
meet this effort, defense planning guidance required OSD, in collaboration
with the military services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Forces
Command, to develop a plan to transform military training to, among other
things, ensure that training ranges and devices are modernized and
sustainable. The Training Transformation Implementation Plan, which
identifies DOD's vision, goals, and milestones, was initially issued in
June 2003 and subsequently updated in June 2004.17 Under the joint
national training capability, DOD recognized the need for sustainable and
modernized ranges and stated that range capabilities, such as
instrumentation for the operating platforms, and modern range
infrastructure are necessary to create the training environment, capture
realistic ground situations, assess activity and performance, and promptly
provide feedback to the training audience and serve as the foundation for
the joint national training capability.

    Prior GAO Reports on Training Ranges

In recent years, we have reviewed and reported on constraints,
particularly those related to encroachment, on military training ranges. A
brief summary on those reports follows:

o  	In June 2004, we reported that DOD's training range report to the
Congress, which was mandated by section 366 of the Bob Stump National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, did not provide a
comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations
on the use of military lands, marine areas, and air space that are
available in the United States and overseas for training.18 We also
reported that

DOD's training report did not fully identify available training resources,
specific training capacities and capabilities, and existing training
constraints; fully assess current and future training requirements; fully
evaluate the adequacy of current resources to meet current and future
training range requirements in the United States and overseas; or include
a comprehensive plan with quantifiable goals or milestones to measure
progress, or projected funding requirements needed to implement the

16 A live-virtual-constructive training environment is one that integrates
training ranges with simulators to support joint training objectives at
single or multiple locations.

17 Department of Defense, Training Transformation Implementation Plan
(Washington, D.C.: June 2004).

18 GAO, Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully
Address Congressional Reporting Requirements, GAO-04-608 (Washington,
D.C.: June 4, 2004).

plan. In response to our recommendation calling for a comprehensive plan
to fully address training constraints, DOD stated that the services had
initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it considered to be
evolutionary, and disagreed with our implication that DOD has not executed
a comprehensive program to improve the sustainability of its ranges.

o  	In September 2003, we reported that through increased cooperation DOD
and other federal land managers could share the responsibility for
managing endangered species on training ranges.19

o  	In February 2003, we also reported that while the amount of money
spent on facility maintenance has increased, the amounts have not been
sufficient to halt the deterioration of facilities, which include training
ranges.20 In addition, we also reported a lack of consistency in the
services' information on facility conditions, making it difficult for the
Congress, DOD, and the services to direct funds to facilities where they
are most needed and to accurately gauge facility conditions.

o  	In April 2002, we reported that troops stationed outside of the
continental United States face a variety of training constraints that have
increased over the past decade and are likely to increase further.21 In
June 2002, we

reported on the impact of encroachment on military training ranges inside

the United States with similar findings to those of the April 2002
report.22 In both reports, we stated that impacts on readiness were not
well documented. In addition, we testified before the Congress twice on
these issues-in May 2002 and April 2003.23

19 GAO, Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase
Interagency Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training Ranges,
GAO-03-976 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2003).

20 GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and
Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities,
GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2003).

21 GAO, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not
Reflected in Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2002).

22 GAO, Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-02-614 (Washington, D.C.: June 11,
2002).

23 GAO, Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on
Training Ranges Still Evolving, GAO-03-621T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2,
2003); and Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-02-727T (Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2002).

  Degraded Conditions
  at Military
  Training Ranges
  Adversely Affect
  Training Activities

See the Related GAO Products section at the end of this report for a more
comprehensive list of our products related to the issues discussed in this
report.

Our visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD's own assessments,
show that military training ranges have been generally deteriorating over
time and lack modernized capabilities. These degraded conditions have
adversely affected training, placed the services at risk of not meeting
DOD's transformation goals, and jeopardized the safety of military
personnel who use the ranges. Without adequately maintained and modernized
ranges, the department not only compromises the opportunity to achieve its
training transformation goal of sustainable and capable training ranges
but also assumes the risk that its forces will be less prepared for its
missions and subjected to safety hazards.

Deficiencies Observed at Table 1 shows the wide variety of identified
degraded conditions or lack of

Training Ranges We Visited 	upgrades to meet current training needs at the
ranges that we visited. The degraded conditions comprise both (1) those
physical features of a training range that are subject to maintenance
(e.g., tank trails and roads) over time and (2) those capabilities that
are desirable for a modernized training range (e.g., automated threat
emitters, automated targets, urban training facilities). Following the
table is a discussion of degraded conditions that we observed.

Table 1: Identified Condition Deficiencies at Training Ranges We Visited

            Training range C-ratings (2004) Identified deficiencies

Fort Hood, Tex. C-2 	Degraded tank trails and training areas; shortages in
sniper, multipurpose machine gun, and designated marksman ranges;
inadequate number of tank video feedback systems; Military Operations on
Urban Terrain (MOUT) training facility not conducive to addressing current
threats.

Fort Stewart, Ga. C-3 	Eroded tank trails; inadequate electrical wiring
and convoy range; MOUT training facility does not reflect current threats;
no hygiene facilities.

Southern California Offshore Not rated Nonworking undersea communication
system; degraded roads; inadequate Range, Calif. pier; insufficient
mooring buoys and floating docks; no instrumented shallow water training
range; insufficient and inadequate communication systems; shortage of
realistic threats and targets.

Fallon Range Training Not rated Electronic warfare range lacks density and
               current capabilities, and parts for Complex, Nev.

current equipment are becoming obsolete; insufficient hard targets that
could take multiple hits; insufficient time-sensitive and moving targets.

Camp Lejeune, N.C. C-3 	Overgrown vegetation; unmarked firing lanes;
insufficient automated ranges; no instrumented feedback and scoring
systems, multipurpose machine gun range, or convoy range; insufficient
grenade ranges and elevated shooting positions; MOUT training facility is
small and not conducive to addressing current threats.

Camp Pendleton, Calif. C-2 	Overgrown vegetation; range is in flood plain
and lacks emergency access; inadequate hygiene facilities; inadequate or
lacking target maintenance and storage facilities, elevated firing points,
bullet containment, and turning and moving targets; insufficient automated
targets; MOUT training facility not conducive to addressing current
threats.

Nellis Test and Training Not rated MOUT training facility lacks
appropriate density of buildings and scoring and Range, Nev. feedback
capabilities; insufficient surface-to-air missile threat systems and
opposition forces.

Barry M. Goldwater Not rated Inadequate or lacking MOUT training           
         Range,                 facilities, remote feedback site and          
         Ariz.                  capability, targets and scoring system on     
                                live-fire ranges, remote laser                
                                system, real-time or updated imagery of       
                                range, drop zone, emergency                   
                                landing training airstrip, target             
                                identification area, and diversity of         
                                realistic                                     
                                      targets; electronic warfare range lacks 
                                     density and current threat capabilities, 
                                and parts for current equipment are becoming  
                                obsolete; inadequate                          
                                communication systems; obsolete and           
                                insufficient recording systems for            
                                        feedback on Army helicopters.         

Source: GAO observations and analysis of DOD data.

Note: The C-rating in general represents the composite rating for all
training areas on these ranges, as the condition of individual training
areas may vary. However, because the Army considers range conditions and
property replacement values in assigning its C-ratings and some training
areas do not have replacement values, these training areas are not
factored into the overall C-rating. The Navy and Air Force do not annually
assess the condition of their ranges.

Fort Hood, Texas	While the overall C-rating of the Fort Hood ranges in
2004 was C-2, 53 percent of the assessed training areas were identified by
installation officials as having significant (C-3) or major (C-4)
deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission accomplishment. According
to Army

officials, the condition of Fort Hood's training ranges is understated
because the overall C-rating does not include all assessed training areas.
In addition, training range officials identified 364 (91 percent) of the
400 miles of their tank trails, which are not rated under training areas,
as unusable or hazardous because of deteriorated conditions (see fig. 1).
As a result, units typically detoured onto paved, public roads to travel
to and from training areas causing road damage and creating safety hazards
to the public who use the roads.

               Figure 1: Deteriorated Training Areas at Fort Hood

                             Fort Stewart, Georgia

In addition, the urban training facilities were outdated, having been
designed for Cold War scenarios that are not applicable to current
military operations. For example, the facilities at Fort Hood resemble
European villages with narrow streets. But in current military operations,
tanks and other military vehicles patrol Middle Eastern settings and
downtown cities. Also, while entrances to these European homes at Fort
Hood are immediately off the road and easily accessible, homes in the
Middle East are generally protected by tall, gated walls and designed
around a courtyard, making soldiers more vulnerable to enemy fire before
entering a home.24

While the overall C-rating of the Fort Stewart ranges in 2004 was C-3, 60
percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials as
having major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission
accomplishment. In addition, range officials and units told us that the
convoy training area limits soldiers to shoot out of only one side of a
vehicle during ambush training exercises, although soldiers stated that in
actual military operations they could be attacked from multiple
directions. The range also lacks urban training facilities that accurately
reflect the needs of current military operations, such as Middle
Eastern-style building facades. A range official further stated that most
of their ranges lack running water and therefore do not have functioning
restrooms or showers, which leads to delays and inefficient use of
training time. Similar to Fort Hood, the range also has deteriorated
training areas that pose difficulties in maneuvering vehicles during
training events (see fig. 2).

24 We are completing a separate review of DOD's strategy for training
forces to conduct urban operations, the incorporation of current
operations lessons learned into recent training, and the challenges faced
in implementing this training.

Figure 2: Tank Stuck in Mud at Fort Stewart Due to Lack of Hardened
Crossing

Source: Directorate of Public Works, Ft. Stewart, Ga.

A tank sinks into local vegetation due to lack of hardened crossing sites
on training areas.

Southern California Offshore There are numerous identified deficiencies at
this range-a primary site

Range, California 	for West Coast Navy units to train before
deploying-that adversely affect the quantity and quality of training
activities. Range and submarine squadron officials told us that a major
deficiency is the malfunctioning of the undersea training area's
communications system, which effectively reduces the available training
area to the southern portion of the range (see fig. 3).

Figure 3: Degraded Conditions at the Southern California Offshore Range

Unusable portion of underwater training area

Usable portion of underwater training area

Gunnery exercises and bombing exercises training area

Laser training area Source: GAO image based on information provided by the
Southern California Offshore Range office.

This situation is further exacerbated because the southern portion of the
undersea training area overlaps with surface ship training areas, and so
concurrent training cannot be conducted. Range officials stated that this
and other deficiencies could also impede their ability to meet the
increased demand created by the Navy's revised ship deployment cycle,

Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada

which requires more carrier groups to be deployable at a given time.25
Moreover, the range does not have an instrumented shallow-water
capability. A recent study on the range's capabilities for antisubmarine
warfare found that current range resources are sufficient to meet 90
percent of the minimally required training tasks. However, the study found
that the range does not provide a realistic training environment for 19
(63 percent) of 30 Navy training skills, primarily due to the lack of a
shallowwater instrumented training range.26 The range also lacks adequate
support capabilities, such as piers, docks, and mooring buoys. For
example, although range officials stated that current fleet requirements
necessitate a minimum of eight mooring buoys, only two are in satisfactory
condition. As a result, these buoys are rarely available, which leads to
reduced training support and costly workarounds, such as travel to
alternate locations for the night. In addition, the lack of mooring or
docking capabilities has also resulted in damaged military property and
canceled training events. Range officials and users cited other
deficiencies, including an inadequate number and types of targets,
electronic warfare capabilities, and tracking systems for aircraft, as
well as the lack of a dependable secure high-capacity communication
system. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Navy stated that it
is currently funding efforts to establish dedicated shallow water training
ranges on both coasts. However, during our review, Navy officials
acknowledged that the west coast range will not be established until the
service addresses more restrictive environmental requirements and other
anticipated obstacles on the east coast.

Pilots and training range officials stated that the Fallon Range Training
Complex lacks adequate systems to replicate current threats and targets.
It lacks advanced surface-to-air missile threat systems and has an
inadequate concentration of electronic warfare systems. As a result, the
quality of training is adversely affected. Furthermore, because
replacement parts for the current electronic warfare systems are becoming
obsolete, the systems are becoming difficult to maintain. In addition, the
range has an insufficient number of targets, particularly time-sensitive
and moving targets, to reflect the current threat.

25 We are performing a separate review of the Navy Fleet Response Plan,
which assesses, among other things, the geographic combatant commanders'
ability to meet their warfighting objectives.

26 CAB D0010901.A2.

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

While the overall C-rating of the Camp Lejeune ranges in 2004 was C-3, 12
percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials as
having major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission
accomplishment. We observed several training areas with overgrown
vegetation that obstructed the visibility of targets and range boundary
markers, thereby precluding the use of highly explosive ammunition for
safety reasons. This condition also diminished the trainers' ability to
accurately observe the Marines' shooting proficiency. Some training areas
also lack marked firing lanes, and only 5 of the 120 live-fire training
areas had automated targets, thereby limiting the amount of training time
available since Marines must set up and take down targets as a workaround
(see fig. 4).

  Figure 4: Comparison of a Degraded Camp Lejeune Training Area with a Better
                  Maintained and Modernized Area at Fort Bragg

Source: GAO graphic based on information from the Training Range
Management Division, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Camp Pendleton, California

Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada

Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona

Similar to the conditions found at Fort Hood and Fort Stewart, the urban
training facilities were outdated and the range lacks an area to conduct
training for soldiers on convoy operations. Consequently, soldiers either
have to travel to other ranges to receive such training, which increases
training costs and the amount of time soldiers are away from their
families, or soldiers remain at their primary ranges and may be less
prepared for the conditions they will face in combat.

While the overall C-rating of the Camp Pendleton ranges in 2004 was C-2,
24 percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials
as having significant (C-3) deficiencies that precluded accomplishment of
some missions. Although encroachment is the primary problem for this
range, several other deficiencies also affect its training and safety. For
example, the range lacks a sufficient number of automated targets to
provide feedback for users. In addition, one of the primary training areas
is located in a dry riverbed lacking emergency escape routes, where range
officials told us one Marine had drowned when it flooded. The training
areas used by Navy special operation units have overgrown vegetation; are
inadequately constructed to meet requirements and safety conditions; and
lack target maintenance and storage facilities, bullet containment walls,
turning and moving targets, and hygiene facilities. A lack of running
water also creates a financial burden for the range office, which, as a
costly workaround, must consequently rent temporary restroom structures.
In addition, helicopter pilots stated that the range lacks needed
mountaintop targets for them to train against threats from an elevated
position.

Although range officials stated that the Nellis Test and Training Range is
the most capable in the Air Force, we were told about and observed several
deficiencies that affect training, including an insufficient concentration
of buildings to replicate an urban environment, inadequate scoring and
feedback capabilities, and a lack of specific urban-setting target sets.
The range also lacks a sufficient number of opposition forces for training
exercises and advanced surface-to-air missile threat systems, which
adversaries currently own and operate.

Pilots and training range officials told us that the Barry M. Goldwater
Range lacks moving targets, camouflaged or concealed targets, enemy
targets embedded within friendly forces and the civilian population, cave
entrances, time-sensitive targets, and strafing pits at specific tactical
locations, which are necessary to provide users with a more realistic
training experience. It also lacks scoring and feedback capability in the
live-fire training areas. Without a scoring system and targets, pilots
must shoot at barren mounds of dirt, which diminishes their ability to
obtain

feedback on the proficiency of their attack. The range lacks the
capability to provide remote site feedback, thus diminishing the amount of
training and personal time available to pilots who must as a workaround
travel to another base to receive this feedback. It lacks an adequate
concentration of electronic warfare systems, and the systems it has are
becoming difficult to maintain as replacement parts become obsolete. Also,
its communication system is inadequate.

    Deficiencies Identified by DOD Studies

DOD is aware of training range deficiencies, having issued a number of
studies over the past 10 years that identify these training range
deficiencies. For example, DOD's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
states that unique American training superiority is eroding from
underlying neglect and needs support in sustainment and recapitalization,
particularly as evidenced in the aging infrastructure and instrumentation
of DOD's training ranges.27 The Navy has completed a number of studies
over the years that identify deficiencies at specific ranges. For example,
in 1995 it issued a tactical training range roadmap identifying
deficiencies at each of its ranges. Many of these deficiencies still
exist, such as inadequacies of shallow-water ranges and of realistic
targets. In September 2001, the Navy assessed its ranges and identified
several deficiencies, including inadequate instrumentation at some of its
most critical ranges.28 In September 2000, it completed a range needs
assessment on 19 air-toground ranges and identified degraded range
conditions and a lack of capabilities.29 A 2003 Air Force assessment of
its training ranges found infrastructure deficiencies at 90 percent of its
ranges, attributable to age and limited funding.30 The assessment
considered the deficiencies significant at 24 of its 32 training ranges.
While the Army and the Marine Corps have not issued composite studies on
the deficiencies of their ranges, they have conducted overall annual range
assessments as part of the readiness reporting system and identified
deficiencies as well. Further,

27 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.

28 Department of the Navy, Fleet Ranges to Readiness Study (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 30,

2001) (Unpublished).

29 Department of the Navy, Department of Navy Range Needs Assessment:
Air-to-Ground

Ranges (Washington, D.C., September 2000).

30 U.S. Air Combat Command, Combat Air Forces: Training Ranges and Air
Space Mission Support Plan FY 2003 (Langley Air Force Base, Va.: October
2003).

  Various Factors Affect DOD's Progress in Improving Training Range Conditions

the Navy and Marine Corps have identified a number of deficiencies at
their ranges while developing local range complex management plans.

While OSD and the military services have undertaken a number of management
actions that could improve the conditions of their training ranges,
progress in overall improvements has been limited, due in part to the lack
of a comprehensive approach to manage their training ranges.

Specifically, a comprehensive approach should include, at a minimum,
several key elements, such as well-defined policies that address all
factors impacting range sustainability; plans that guide the timely
execution of range sustainability actions; and range requirements that are
geared to meet both service and joint needs. Further, while the military
services lack adequate and easily accessible information that could
precisely identify training range maintenance and modernization funding,
available information indicates that identified training range
requirements have historically not been adequately funded. Additionally,
OSD and the services have not fully implemented specific actions
identified in their policy, management guidance, reports, and plans for
improving training range conditions. Without a fully implemented
comprehensive approach, OSD and the services will not be able to ensure
the long-term viability of their training ranges, nor their ability to
meet transformation goals, nor will the Congress be in a position to
fulfill its oversight role.

    OSD and the Services Have Taken Limited Range Improvement Actions, but a
    Comprehensive Approach Is Lacking

OSD and the military services have collectively taken a number of steps
that are designed to improve the conditions of training ranges at the
service and local range level. For example, to varying extents, the
military services have developed policies for training range sustainment,
developed service-specific plans, established working groups to coordinate
efforts among multiple organizations, defined range requirements, assessed
conditions, developed Web-based systems to share information within and
among OSD and the services, and developed local range management plans.
While these key actions comprise elements of a comprehensive approach to
training range sustainment, they have focused primarily on encroachment,
or they have not been consistently implemented among the services, or they
have not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of all officials.
Our analysis of the status of OSD's and the services' management actions
taken to improve range conditions is shown in figure 5.

  Figure 5: GAO's Analysis of DOD's Management Actions for Improving Training
                                Range Conditions

                                                     Systematic                   
              Strategic or                           assessment Web-based         
              implementation                         of range   range             
              plan           Multilevel              conditions information Local
              Sustainable     working      Range     and        management  range
       Policy range program    groups   requirements impacts    system      plans
OSD                                                                            
  Army                                                                      
  Navy                                                                      
Marine                                                  N/A                  N/A
 Corps                                                                      
Air                                                                      
 Force                                                                      

N/A Not applicable Action not taken

Action taken but could be improved

Action satisfactorily taken

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

o  	Policy-While OSD promulgated a DOD range sustainment policy in 2003,
that policy primarily focuses on external encroachment factors that impact
training and does not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of
several DOD commands that either provide oversight or are impacted by the
conditions of the ranges.31 Specifically, the policy does not clearly
define the maintenance and modernization responsibilities of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment and Special
Operations Command. Consequently, these organizations lack appropriate
assignment of responsibility and accountability for the military training
range improvements they oversee or manage. According to service officials,
the Army and Marine Corps are finalizing draft revisions of their range
sustainment policy, and the Air Force only recently started revising its
policy. Navy officials stated that the service has not yet developed a
policy to implement DOD's 2003 policy or to clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of the multiple Navy organizations responsible for
maintaining and modernizing its training ranges.

31 Department of Defense Directive, Sustainment of Ranges and Operating
Areas (OPAREAs), 3200.15 (Washington, D.C.: April 2003).

o  	Range sustainment programs-As shown in table 2, OSD and some of the
services have initiated specific range sustainment programs to integrate
their individual components and commands.32 The Army has developed such an
integrated program that incorporates the multiple facets of range
sustainment, including maintenance and modernization, and includes
involvement of all responsible officials. OSD and the Navy have
established similar programs, but their programs focus primarily on
encroachment issues and not on other factors that impact training, such as
the maintenance and modernization of ranges. The Marine Corps has taken
multiple sustainment initiatives, but has not named their efforts as a
program.

o  	Strategic or implementation plans-Although DOD has developed strategic
plans in other areas, such as the 2004 Defense Installations Strategic
Plan and Training Transformation Strategic Plan, to guide the services
with goals and milestones, it has not developed a comprehensive strategic
plan for the long-term viability of its military training ranges. In June
2004, we reported that DOD's training range report to the Congress, which
was mandated by section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, did not, among other things,
provide a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by
limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and air space that
are available in the United States and overseas for training.33 In
response to our recommendation calling for a comprehensive plan to fully
address training constraints, along with quantifiable goals and milestones
for tracking planned actions and measuring progress, DOD stated that the
services had initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it
considered to be evolutionary, and disagreed with our implication that DOD
has not executed a comprehensive program to improve the sustainability of
its ranges. Defense planning guidance has mandated DOD to develop a plan
to ensure that training ranges are sustainable, but the plan addressed
only encroachment issues impacting military training ranges. Similarly,
the 2004 Defense Installations Strategic Plan identifies and provides
goals for addressing encroachment factors impacting DOD's training ranges,
but not for other issues that affect the quality of training, such as
range

32 In this report, we refer to a sustainable range program generically as
a collective effort that integrates the initiatives designed to ensure the
long-term viability of military training ranges. Such a program should
address the maintenance, modernization, environment, and encroachment
issues related to the ranges.

33 GAO-04-608.

maintenance and modernization.34 The absence of such a plan could
adversely impact DOD-wide initiatives, such as the joint national training
capability and the overseas rebasing of forces to the United States.
Furthermore, lacking a comprehensive DOD strategic plan, none of the
services has developed implementation plans of their own. The Army and Air
Force have developed documents on their sustainable range programs, but
they do not provide specific goals or milestones that the services can use
to measure their progress in meeting their vision and overall goals for
ensuring the long-term viability of their ranges. While the Navy has taken
several actions under its sustainable range program, it still lacks a plan
with specific goals, milestones, funding sources and amounts, defined
roles and responsibilities, and other critical components of a strategic
plan.

o  	Multilevel integrated working groups-OSD and most of the services have
developed formal sustainable range working groups at multiple levels that
are intended to address training range constraints, since range viability
is dependent on a number of fragmented organizations within OSD and the
services. For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established a
multilevel DOD-wide working group, which includes representatives from the
services and some of the other OSD offices.35 However, the working group
does not include a representative from Special Operations Command,
although they are responsible for and impacted by the maintenance and
modernization of military training ranges. Also, both the DOD-wide and
Navy headquarters-level sustainable range working groups are primarily
focused on encroachment issues and not on other issues that impact ranges
and training, such as maintenance and modernization. For example, the
Navy's southwest regional range director stated that his primary
responsibility is encroachment and munitions cleanup, and that he has not
been assigned or been provided the resources to address the maintenance
and modernization of ranges in his region. Also, on the basis of our
discussion with officials, we noted that only the Marine Corps' and Air
Force's working groups included all

34 Department of Defense, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, 2004 Defense Installations Strategic Plan
(Washington, D.C.: September 2004).

35 In December 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
formation of the Defense Readiness and Range Initiative Integrated Product
Team to act as DOD's coordinating body to address encroachment. The team
consists of an overarching integrated product team and a working
integrated product team. The overarching team is primarily responsible for
strategic planning, while the working team is the staff-level working body
that supports the overarching team.

relevant organizations, such as special operations units, which have an
interest in having maintained and modernized ranges.

o  	Range requirements-The Navy and Marine Corps have begun to identify or
have identified specific requirements or capabilities needed for their
ranges, which could be used for budgeting purposes as well as assessing
training range deficiencies. In addition, the Navy has linked and the
Marine Corps is in the process of linking its training requirements to
these range requirements so that the services can identify specific
training standards that are impacted by the conditions of a specific
training area. However, only the Navy's draft range requirements document
links its ranges to special operations and joint training requirements to
show the potential impact on the special operation units' or combatant
commanders' needs, which is a key objective of DOD's training
transformation initiative. Also, none of the range requirement documents
identify range support facility needs, although facility conditions
directly impact the quantity and quality of training provided and the
level of safety on the ranges.

o  	Systematic assessment of range conditions and impacts-At the time of
our review, we found that none of the services regularly assessed the
conditions of their ranges, including whether the ranges are able to meet
the specific training requirements of the service and combatant
commanders. While the Army and Marine Corps annually assessed the physical
condition of their training ranges, the services do not assess the
capabilities of the ranges or any impacts to training. While the Army's
assessment contained clearly defined criteria, local training range
officials stated that because the criteria are revised regularly,
comparing assessments across years is impossible. In addition, the overall
assessment of Army training ranges does not accurately reflect the
condition of all training areas on the range since it does not include the
condition of a number of training areas. Also, according to service
officials, both the Army's and Marine Corps' assessments are conducted by
public works officials who do not have the background or specific
knowledge of range infrastructure, as opposed to training range officials
or training unit representatives. In addition, local officials stated that
the Marine Corps' assessment is highly subjective and does not provide the
evaluator with specific criteria. While the Navy and Air Force do not
routinely conduct annual assessments of their training ranges, the Air
Force does perform assessments from time to time and the Navy has
completed some one-time assessments on their ranges while developing local
range complex management plans. We also found that none of the services
regularly assess the impacts to training, and none of the services have
linked their funding resources to the results of the assessments.

o  	Web-based range information management system-DOD reports and
officials have increasingly called for a range information management
system that would allow range offices and users to share information
within and across the services. Such a Web-based system would include best
practices, lessons learned, a scheduling tool, policies, points of
contact, funding information, and range conditions and capabilities. Local
range offices have undertaken a number of initiatives to ensure that their
ranges remain viable while trying to minimize the negative impact on
training, but they often lack an effective mechanism for sharing these
initiatives with other organizations. For example, the range officials at
the Fallon Range Training Complex routinely obtained targets and training
structures at no cost from the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service
to enhance their training capability,36 but other training offices we
visited were having difficulty obtaining these items or were paying for
the items they were able to obtain. For example, figure 5 shows a mock
airfield that was constructed at the Fallon Range out of materials
obtained from the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service.

36 The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service manages the DOD surplus
property sales program and disposes of excess property received from the
military services.

Figure 6: Mock Airfield at the Fallon Range Training Complex

Source: Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona, Calif.

The Marine Corps has an active, centralized training range Web site to
provide information to units and ranges across the world, including
related service regulations, general and detailed information about each
of its ranges, and training range points of contact. The Web site also
allows units from any service to schedule their training events remotely,
and provides them with a map of each training range including photographs
and, in some instances, video footage to assist them in scheduling and
designing their training events. However, to date, the Marine Corps has
not used its Web site to exchange information, such as lessons learned and
best practices, between and among training range offices and military
units. Meanwhile, the Army has developed an initial Web site that provides
similar, but more limited, information about its sustainable range
program.

The Air Force has also established a training range Web site to share
information about its training ranges, but it has remained nonfunctional,
since the service did not enter information into the site. The Air Force's
Air Combat Command is developing a separate training range information
management system. While a cognizant command official stated that the
command plans on adding a chat room feature to exchange information, the
official stated that the system might not be Web-based, so the information
would not be available to other range offices or units within and across
the services. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the
Air National Guard is in the process of developing a Webbased range
scheduling system that could meet some of the service's needs, but
additional funding is needed to complete this effort. While Navy reports
and officials recognize the need for a servicewide training range
management system, the service has not developed such a system. However,
the Southern California Offshore Range has its own management system that
is used for scheduling, identifying specific training requirements for
each training event, documenting reasons why training is modified or
canceled, tracking training range utilization rates by specific units, and
recording maintenance issues and resolutions. In addition, the system
allows the range office to compute the costs of training each unit using
specific training requirements and warfare areas.

o  	Local range complex management plans-The Navy and Marine Corps have
started to develop local range complex management plans for their training
ranges, which, among other things, provide descriptions of the training
ranges, a strategic vision for range operations, and recommendations for
environmental planning; identify and analyze required capability
shortfalls derived from fleet training needs; and include an investment
strategy to address these deficiencies. Although most of the Navy's and
Marine Corps' local range offices have started to develop plans with
investment strategies, these strategies are not linked to any service
investment strategies. Also, due to funding expectations, current needs
have been pushed out 20 years. Consequently, today's training requirements
are being met with yesterday's ranges and tomorrow's training requirements
will be met with today's ranges. Further, six of the Marine Corps' range
complex management plans, including two of the service's most significant
training ranges, are currently unfunded. In addition, the Army and Air
Force ranges we visited have outdated plans. The Army recently started
developing standardized local range plans and the Air Force is creating a
management system to develop plans for its ranges. However, the system is
not scheduled to be operational until 2007. While these key actions
comprise elements of a comprehensive approach to training range
sustainment, they have focused primarily on

encroachment, have not been consistently implemented among the services,
or have not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of all
officials. Such an approach should include, at a minimum, several key
elements, such as an overall comprehensive strategic plan that addresses
training range limitations, along with quantifiable goals and milestones
for tracking planned actions and progress. Other key elements include
welldefined policies that address all factors impacting range
sustainability, servicewide plans that guide the timely execution of range
sustainability actions, range requirements that are geared to meet both
service and joint needs, and a commitment to the implementation of this
approach. (See app. II for a more comprehensive list of what we consider
to be key managerial elements of a comprehensive approach).

    Services Have Not Adequately Funded Training Range Maintenance and
    Modernization

Available Data Reflect Funding Shortages for Range Requirements

Various documents and training range officials report that training range
requirements have not been adequately funded historically to meet training
standards and needs. According to service officials, a variety of
factors-such as ranges having a lower funding priority amid competing
demands-have contributed to or exacerbated funding limitations. However,
the military services lack adequate and easily accessible information that
could precisely identify the required funding and track what is allocated
to maintain and modernize its ranges.

Available data indicate that funding for training ranges has historically
been insufficient to meet range requirements. For example, the 2003
Special Operations Command report on training ranges states that ranges
are inadequately funded for construction, maintenance, repairs, and
upgrades.37 In addition, a 2001 Navy range study states that both range
operation funds and base operation funds, which also support range
sustainment, were not adequate, thus adversely impacting utilization of
the Navy's ranges.38 A 2004 Naval Audit Service report also found that
Navy range accounts were not being adequately funded and thus were
dependent on funds from other accounts.39 Further, funding information
provided by training range officials during this review showed that
funding has not adequately met their requirements. For example, Fort
Stewart

37 U.S. Special Operations Command, Tiger Team Report: Global Special
Operations Forces Range Study (MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.: Jan. 27,
2003).

38 Fleet Ranges to Readiness Study.

39 Naval Audit Service, Navy Range Operations Support Funding, N2004-0061
(Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2004).

training data indicated that the installation's training range maintenance
account was funded approximately 44 percent for fiscal years 1998 through
2002. Similarly, Camp Pendleton data revealed that the overall identified
range needs were funded approximately 13 percent from fiscal years 1998
through 2002. DOD reports and officials identified the following as
factors in the funding shortages:

o  	Training ranges typically have a lower funding priority than many
other installation activities. Specifically, training ranges do not
compete well for funding against other installation activities that are
more visible or related to quality-of-life issues, such as gymnasiums,
child care centers, and barracks, and consequently training funds are
often reallocated from the range to support other base operations
programs.40 For example, the 2003

Air Force training range assessment stated that critically needed
sustainment funds for ranges were often diverted to fund other base
requirements identified as more pressing.41

o  	Service officials identified a number of organizational structure
issues that exacerbate the extent to which training range requirements are
prioritized and funded. While OSD's and the services' training range
offices are located in an operations directorate, this directorate does
not prioritize or fund base programs that provide resources for the
sustainment, restoration, and modernization of DOD infrastructure
(including ranges). Recognizing this as an issue, the Navy recently hosted
a conference to address the fragmented management for budgeting and
allocating funds to ranges. During the meeting, Navy officials agreed to
20 specific actions that could be taken to minimize future funding issues.
Also, while local range personnel are responsible for maintaining and
modernizing ranges, some of these offices are not directly linked to the
command that prioritizes installation resources. For example, the range
office at the Southern California Offshore Range, which is an operational
unit, is not organizationally aligned with the installation management
organization that prioritizes sustainment funds for San Clemente Island.
In addition, although the majority of the Southern California Offshore
Range's exercises are fleet operations and not air operations, the range
office is aligned under a naval air command and not the fleet command.

40 Our recently completed review of the management and funding of base
operations and facilities support illustrates how funds designated for one
activity are redesignated for other activities and the potential adverse
effects on operations and training.

41 Combat Air Forces: Training Ranges and Air Space Mission Support Plan
FY 2003.

In addition, the relative position of training ranges in the
organizational framework affects the extent to which training range
requirements are prioritized and funded. Specifically, while some local
range offices report directly to the senior mission commander that
prioritizes funding resources, other range offices report to offices
several echelons below the commander. For example, the Air Force's Air
Warfare Center commander stated that since the range office for the Nellis
Test and Training Range is an Air Force wing, it has the same opportunity
to identify its requirements and deficiencies to him as have the other
wings at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Conversely, although the Fallon
Range Training Complex range office used to report directly to the Naval
Strike and Air Warfare Center commander, who sets funding priorities and
requirements, the range office has since been aligned to a lower echelon
position, thus placing the office at a less advantageous position in
having its requirements and deficiencies identified as priorities.

o  	A lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities can also result
in overlooked training range requirements as well. Specifically, several
training range officials stated that the Navy's regional installation
support structure lacks clearly defined roles and responsibilities for
each of the program directors within the structure, which results in
overlooked requirements at its training ranges. For example, because the
Southern California Offshore Range is only a portion of the San Clemente
Island in the Pacific Ocean, there are multiple officials responsible for
the different operations occurring on the island, including training
ranges, port, airfield, environmental, facilities, information technology,
and safety. However, according to training range officials, deficiencies
on the island are overlooked because the Navy has not issued guidance
providing clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each of these
program directors. Specifically, training range officials stated that they
are unable to obtain funds to maintain or modernize support facilities on
the island, such as the pier and roads, because program managers either
tend to view the entire island as a training range and therefore not their
responsibility or to view it as not one of their top priorities, since the
adverse impact on their primary missions is relatively limited.
Nevertheless, the condition of these support facilities directly impacts
range activities.

o  	Various documented reports and testimonies of cognizant officials
suggest that range needs are understated to the Congress due to the
following factors: (1) installation real property inventories, which are
used to calculate the installations' sustainment funding requirements, do
not contain complete and accurate information needed to compute
requirements; (2) commands typically understate range needs because they
have come to expect lower funding amounts; and (3) ranges may

receive supplemental funding from units to help maintain conditions. For
example, the 2003 Special Operations Command training range report found
that Army installations had incorrectly categorized their range facilities
built with operations and maintenance funds as multipurpose ranges, which
are considered less costly to maintain than those specially targeted for
the command. Therefore, these installations underbudgeted for the
maintenance and repair of these facilities. In addition, Marine Corps
officials stated that they recently updated their installation real
property inventories and discovered numerous discrepancies that had
resulted in understatement of their ranges' needs. Also, officials at Fort
Hood stated that 30 percent of its tank trails are not included in its
real property records because the tank trails do not meet military
construction standards. As a result, Fort Hood is unable to obtain
sufficient funds to either sustain or improve the tank trails to an
acceptable standard and add them to the real property inventory. Further,
officials stated that commands understate range funding requirements
because they have come to expect lower funding levels. For example,
officials at Fort Hood stated that although their range modernization
funding requirements totaled at least $8 million, they had programmed and
budgeted for only $4 million. Also, the requirements and budget documents
at the Southern California Offshore Range office showed that the range's
requirements were understated by about 30 percent for fiscal years 2005
through 2007. Consequently, range officials stated that even if this
amount were fully funded and not transferred to other accounts, their
needs would be unmet. Since the range has a management system that
captures the cost to train units on the range, the office reported that
they would have to cancel operations due to a lack of funds in May of each
year, or eliminate all command and control and battle group exercises,
including 20 already scheduled significant training events. In addition, a
2004 Naval audit found that the regular transfer of funds from units to
training ranges resulted in understated requirements and senior Navy
management, DOD officials, and the Congress not having important
information needed to efficiently and effectively manage and fund Navy
programs identified by the Congress as significant to readiness.42

o  	The services do not link funding for their training ranges to range
conditions, capabilities, impacts on training, or utilization. For
example, while the number of training hours on the Southern California
Offshore Range increased by 153 percent between fiscal years 1998 and
2001, range funding data reflect that funding increased by less than 10
percent. As a

42 N2004-0061.

result, range officials told us that the training range requirements
continued to be underfunded, conditions continued to deteriorate, and the
capabilities continued to be lacking.

o  	Service officials across all commands lack adequate knowledge and
training about the various resources available for range maintenance and
how modernization impacts funding levels. For example, very few of the
training range officials that we met during our review were aware of
sustainment funds that were generated by the range property in the
installation's real property inventory systems.

o  The services lack clearly defined range requirements that distinguish

Services Lack the Capability to Accurately Capture Training Range
Requirements and Funding Levels

special operations-specific range needs and servicewide range needs, which
results in confusion between which organization is responsible for funding
range maintenance and modernization. Specifically, the 2003 Special
Operations Command training range report stated that when Special
Operations Forces are the primary users of a range funded with service
dollars, disagreement sometimes arises over responsibility for maintenance
costs. Consequently, there needs to be better clarification of what
comprises Special Operations-specific facilities and what comprises
service-common facilities.

We found, and DOD recognizes, that the services lack the capability to
accurately and easily capture training range funding information. DOD's
sustainable range working group officials told us that the services were
unable to easily and precisely identify their funding requirements,
funding levels, and trends in expenditures on an annual basis.
Consequently, the group developed a subcommittee in 2004 to begin
addressing this issue. Also, the 2004 Naval audit on range operations
funds found that the lack of a range management system resulted in
problems related to the visibility of the amount and use of funds being
provided.43 Further, while training range officials for each of the
services stated that they could identify some training range requirements
or funding amounts, none were able to identify all of the funds that their
ranges need and receive. For example, while the Army was able to identify
its range operations requirements and funding levels, it was unable to
identify its range sustainment requirements and funding levels. Officials
in these range offices stated that they should have the ability to
accurately identify all funding provided to their ranges if they are going
to be effective program sponsors. Local training range officials were also
unable to identify all their funding requirements and

43 Ibid.

levels. They noted that a centralized system would provide a mechanism for
service headquarters officials to identify funding requirements and at the
same time relieve them of the burden of responding to constant requests
for information.

    OSD and the Services Have Not Fully Implemented Previously Recommended
    Actions

Although policy, management guidance, reports, and plans have either
recommended or required specific actions, OSD and the services have not
fully implemented these previously recommended actions. For example,
although DOD's sustainable range policy requires OSD to, among other
things, provide oversight of training ranges and ensure that DOD-level
programs are in place to protect the future ability of DOD components to
conduct force training, a cognizant OSD official told us that OSD believes
it should be a facilitator rather than a provider of oversight. Without
adequate oversight, DOD-level initiatives, such as transformation efforts,
could be jeopardized. In addition, OSD has not established a means to
assess the readiness benefits of range sustainment initiatives, as
required by the policy. In response to DOD guidance stating that DOD was
to reverse the erosion of its training range infrastructure and ensure
that ranges are sustainable, capable, and available, the Senior Readiness
Oversight Council required the services, working with OSD, to prepare a
prioritized list of range sustainment and upgrade programs and estimated
costs for potential inclusion in the fiscal year 2003 budget. However, the
list was never developed and submitted for potential funding
opportunities. Defense officials could not provide us with an explanation
as to why no appropriate action was taken. In addition, the 2003 Special
Operations Command training range report identified a number of
recommendations that could improve the conditions of training ranges units
within the command use.44 For example, the report stated that all special
operations' components need to create master range plans that address
their current and future range issues and solutions; identify and validate
training requirements as well as facilities available and needed; and
define acceptable limits of workarounds. However, according to a
knowledgeable defense official, these recommendations have not been
implemented to date because of resource shortages. Also, in July 1995, the
Navy issued a tactical training range roadmap that, among other things,
applied training requirements to training range capabilities and
identified deficiencies to produce an investment plan for training range
development. Although the plan stated that it should be updated

44 Tiger Team Report: Global Special Operations Forces Range Study.

Conclusions

biannually to remain current and accurately reflect fleet training
requirements and associated instrumentation needs, the Navy has not
updated the plan since that time. Without a commitment to implementation,
it is unlikely that the OSD and the services will be able to ensure the
success of their transformation efforts and long-term viability of their
training ranges.

DOD training ranges are important national assets that have not been
adequately maintained or modernized to meet today's needs. While DOD has
undertaken a number of actions in an effort to maintain and modernize its
training ranges, it lacks a comprehensive approach to address range
issues. We have previously recommended and continue to believe that DOD
needs an overall strategic plan that identifies specific goals, actions to
be taken, milestones, and a process for measuring progress and ensuring
accountability. In turn, each service needs to develop a comprehensive
implementation plan if deteriorating conditions are to be abated and
overall training capabilities improved to meet today's and tomorrow's
requirements. Similarly, OSD and the services have issued policies,
conducted studies containing recommendations, identified range officials
at various command levels, and developed working groups. However, not all
relevant officials are included, their roles and responsibilities are not
clearly defined, the policies and recommendations have been ignored or
only partially implemented, and several of these actions focus only on
external encroachment issues. DOD needs to ensure that OSD's comprehensive
strategic plan, the services' implementation plans, DOD's training
transformation plan, DOD policies, and identified recommendations include
all relevant officials, clearly define their roles and responsibilities,
comprehensively address all sustainability issues, including the
maintenance and modernization of military training ranges, and are fully
implemented to ensure the long-term viability of these national assets.
Although military training ranges are generally in degraded condition,
which adversely affects the quantity and quality of training and safety of
the users, the military services do not accurately and systematically
assess their ranges, including whether the ranges are able to meet the
specific training requirements of the service and combatant commanders.
Without systematically assessing the conditions of their ranges, the
services cannot accurately identify the ranges where the conditions
negatively impact training and need improvements, the best locations for
training, or which training ranges best meet the needs of DOD's training
transformation plan and of service and combatant commanders. Although
local training range officials have undertaken a number of initiatives to
ensure that their ranges remain viable while trying

to minimize negative impact on training, the services have not provided
these officials or military units with a Web-based range information
management system. Without such a system, the range offices are unable to
share best practices and lessons learned within and across the services
and military units are unable to identify which ranges best meet their
needs.

Various documents and training range officials report that training range
requirements have historically not been adequately funded to meet training
standards and needs. Without appropriate attention and adequate funding,
the services will be unable to meet DOD's transformation goals and ensure
the long-term viability of their ranges. The military services do not have
the capability to accurately and easily identify the funding amounts
needed or provided for maintaining and modernizing their ranges. Without
this capability, the military services are constrained in their ability to
accurately plan, program, and budget for the maintenance and modernization
of their training ranges; provide complete and accurate information to the
Congress for appropriation and legislative decision making; and obtain
this information without constant requests for information from multiple
officials at different commands. A variety of factors, such as ranges
having a lower priority in funding, contributes to or exacerbates funding
limitations. Without addressing these and other factors, training range
conditions will continue to degrade.

We have previously recommended that OSD develop an overall comprehensive
strategic plan for its training ranges that addresses training range
limitations, along with quantifiable goals and milestones for tracking
planned actions and progress.45 In response to our recommendation, DOD
stated that the services had initiated a comprehensive planning process,
which it considered to be evolutionary, and disagreed with the implication
that DOD has not executed a comprehensive program to improve the
sustainability of its ranges. However, our work has shown that this
recommendation still has merit and should be addressed because it is
fundamental to the comprehensive approach for managing training ranges
that we are advocating.

  Recommendations for Executive Action

45 GAO-04-608.

We are making other recommendations to you as follows:

o  Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to:

o  	Update DOD Directive 3200.15 to broaden the focus of the policy to
clearly address all issues that affect the long-term viability of military
training ranges; and clearly define the maintenance and modernization
roles and responsibilities of all relevant DOD components, including the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, Joint
Forces Command, and Special Operations Command.

o  	Broaden the charter of the DOD-wide working group, the Sustainable
Range Integrated Product Team, to address all issues that could affect the
long-term viability of military training ranges; and include all DOD
components that are impacted by range limitations.

o  	Update DOD's training transformation plan to address all factors that
could impact the sustainability of military training ranges and not just
external encroachment issues.

o  	Direct the Secretaries of the Military Services to implement a
comprehensive approach to managing their training ranges, to include:

o  	A servicewide sustainable range policy that implements the updated DOD
Directive 3200.15 and clearly defines the maintenance and modernization
roles and responsibilities of relevant service officials at all levels.

o  	A servicewide sustainable range implementation plan that includes
goals, specific actions to be taken, milestones, funding sources, and an
investment strategy for managing their ranges.

o  	Defined training range requirements and a systematic process to
annually assess the conditions of training ranges and their consequent
impact on training, including whether the ranges are able to meet the
specific training requirements of the service and combatant commanders.

o  	A Web-based range information management system that allows training
range officials at all levels to share information, such as range
conditions and their impact on training; funding sources, requirements and
expenditures; and local range initiatives.

o  	Regularly developed strategies to address the factors contributing to
funding shortages for ranges, including the reassessment of funding
priorities for maintaining and modernizing ranges relative to other needs.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Readiness agreed with our recommendations,
stating the and Our Evaluation department and military services are or
will be taking steps to implement them.

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense's comments are included in this
report in appendix III. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which
we incorporated as appropriate.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit
a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on
Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A
written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made
more than 60 days after the date of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and it will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581 or [email protected]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. Mark A. Little, James R.

Reifsnyder, Patricia J. Nichol, Tommy Baril, Steve Boyles, and Cheryl A.
Weissman were major contributors to this report.

Sincerely yours,

Barry W. Holman, Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the conditions of military training ranges and their
consequent impact, we collected and analyzed training-range-related
information from officials within the headquarters and selected major
commands of the military services. We also visited eight major active
component training ranges situated at various locations in the continental
United States-Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Stewart, Georgia; Southern California
Offshore Range, California; Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada; Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton, California; Nellis Test and
Training Range, Nevada; and the Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona-to
observe training range conditions and discuss consequential impacts.1
These ranges were selected by identifying the major training ranges for
each service and seeking input from service range officials as to which
ranges could best address our audit objectives. During our visits we met
with installation officials, range managers, and units that use the
ranges. We also reviewed relevant DOD studies and audit reports
identifying the conditions of military training ranges.

To assess the progress the department has made in improving training range
conditions, we discussed and reviewed information relating to training
range initiatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, and the headquarters and
selected major commands of the military services. We also examined key
documents related to the funding of training ranges including associated
funding requirements and funding allocations. In addition, we reviewed
prior GAO reports and internal service audits addressing funding issues
for military facilities, including training ranges.2 We also obtained and
reviewed range-related information from range officials of each of the
eight installations that we visited. Further, we toured the training areas
or support facilities at each of the ranges we visited to observe
initiatives implemented by local range offices to improve the condition or
capability of their ranges. Although we found

1 While we did not specifically include National Guard, Reserve, and
smaller training ranges in the scope of this review, based on discussions
with DOD officials and reviews of relevant studies and audit reports many
of the conditions and issues discussed in this report apply to them as
well.

2 GAO, Military Infrastructure: Real Property Management Needs
Improvement, GAO/NSIAD-99-100 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 1999); and
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic
Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities,
GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.19, 2003); U.S. Army Audit Agency, Range
Sustainment, A-2003-0434-IME (Alexandria, Va.: Sept. 9, 2003); and Naval
Audit Service, Navy F/A-18 Combat Aviation Training, N2003-0039
(Washington D.C.: Mar. 31, 2003).

limitations in the availability of certain data, we believe the available
data gathered are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report
based on our discussions with OSD and military service officials and our
review of the prior GAO reports and internal service audits.

  Organizations and Units Visited or Contacted for This Review

Office of the Secretary of Defense

o  	Office of the Director of Readiness and Training, Office of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness

o  	Office of Installations Requirements and Management, Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment

Combatant Commands

o  Chief of Staff, Joint Forces Command

o  	Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office, Joint
Forces Command

o  	Joint Training Policy and Validation Division, Special Operations
Command

Army

o  	Training Directorate, Training Simulations Division, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff

o  Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management

o  Installation Management Agency-Headquarters

o  Installation Management Agency-Southeast Region

o  Installation Management Agency-Southwest Region

o  Forces Command

Navy

o  	Navy Fleet Training Branch, Fleet Readiness Division, Fleet Readiness
and Logistics, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

o  Operating Forces Support Division, Chief of Naval Installations

o  Live Training Ranges Office, Fleet Forces Command

Marine Corps

o  	Range and Training Area Management Division, Training and Education
Command

Air Force

o  Office of the Director of Ranges and Airspace, Air and Space Operations

o  Air Combat Command

o  Air Education and Training Command

Fort Hood, Texas

o  Garrison Commander, Fort Hood

o  Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, III Corps

o  Headquarters Company, 4th Infantry Division

o  8th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Division

o  16th Field Artillery, 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry Division

o  Headquarters Company, 1st Cavalry Division

o  3rd Air Support Operations Group (U.S. Air Force)

o  Directorate of Plans, Training and Security

o  Directorate of Public Works

o  Range Division, Directorate of Plans, Training and Security

o  Garrison Resource Management Office

Fort Stewart, Georgia

o  Deputy Garrison Commander, Fort Stewart

o  64th Armored Regiment, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry
Division

o  Headquarters Company, 3rd Infantry Division

o  Training Division, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization an
Security

o  Directorate of Public Works

o  Garrison Resource Management Office

Southern California Offshore Range, California

o  	Commodore, Submarine Squadron 11, Commander Submarine Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet

o  Training and Readiness Department, 3rd Fleet

o  Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Pacific

o  Naval Special Warfare Command

o  	Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility Detachment Southern
California Offshore Range

o  Commander Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light Wing, Pacific

o  Public Works Office, Naval Base Coronado

Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada

o  Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Fallon

o  	Program Manager of Ranges, Navy Region Southwest, Chief of Naval
Installations

o  N5 Strike Department, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center

o  	Training Range Branch, N5 Strike Department, Naval Strike and Air
Warfare Center

o  Comptroller, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

o  Commanding General, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune

o  Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations

o  Range Development Division

o  Training Resources Management Division

o  Modeling and Simulation Division

o  School of Infantry

o  Special Operations Training Group

o  2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force

o  Weapons and Field Training Battalion

o  Office of the Comptroller, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune

o  	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Environment
Department

Camp Pendleton, California

o  Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations

o  Range Operations Division

o  Training Resources Management Division

o  School of Infantry

o  1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force

o  	Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force

o  Special Operations Training Group

Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada

o  Commanding Officer, Air Warfare Center

o  98th Range Wing, Air Warfare Center

o  	414th Combat Training Squadron, 57th Operations Group, 57th Wing, Air
Warfare Center

o  	57th Operations Support Squadron, 57th Operations Group, 57th Wing,
Air Warfare Center

Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona

o  56th Fighter Wing

o  944th Fighter Wing

o  56th Fighter Wing Range Management Office

o  56th Operations Group, 56th Fighter Wing

o  355th Operations Group, 355th Wing

o  162nd Fighter Wing Operations Group, Arizona Air National Guard

o  563rd Rescue Group, Air Force Special Operations Command

o  Western Army National Guard Aviation Training Site

We conducted our work from August 2003 through March 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Key Management Elements of a Comprehensive Approach for Managing
Training Ranges

The flow chart below depicts what we consider to be the defense
organizational roles and responsibilities needed to implement a
comprehensive approach for managing training ranges.

Source: GAO.

a

These documents should identify, at a minimum, specific actions,
quantifiable goals, and milestones to measure progress, projected funding
requirements and sources, and clear assignment of responsibility.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products

Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully Address
Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608. Washington, D.C.: June
4, 2004.

DOD Operational Ranges: More Reliable Cleanup Cost Estimates and a
Proactive Approach to Identifying Contamination Are Needed. GAO-04-601.
Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.

Military Munitions: DOD Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Approach for
Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites. GAO-04-147. Washington, D.C.: December 19,
2003.

Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase Interagency
Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training Ranges. GAO-03-976.
Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management
Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and
Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.

Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on Training
Ranges Still Evolving. GAO-03-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic
Planning Needed to Improve Condition of Military Facilities. GAO-03-274.
Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Most Recruit Training Barracks Have Significant
Deficiencies. GAO-02-786. Washington D.C.: June 13, 2002.

Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment
on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2002.

Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment
on Training Ranges. GAO-02-727T. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in
Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.

Related GAO Products

Defense Budget: Analysis of Real Property Maintenance and Base Operations
Fund Movements. GAO/NSIAD-00-87. Washington, D.C.: February 29, 2000.

Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.S. Forces for
Combat in Urban Areas. GAO/NSIAD-00-63NI. Washington, D.C.: February 25,
2000.

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