NASA: More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to	 
Provide Space Station Logistics Support (18-MAY-05, GAO-05-488). 
                                                                 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space 
shuttle fleet has been key to International Space Station	 
operations. Since the grounding of the fleet in February 2003,	 
Russia has provided logistics support. However, due to the	 
limited payload capacity of the Russian space vehicles, on-orbit 
assembly of the space station stopped. In May 2004 and in	 
February 2005, NASA testified before the Congress that it had	 
assessed using alternative launch vehicles to the space shuttle  
for space station operations. NASA concluded that using 	 
alternatives would be challenging and result in long program	 
delays and would ultimately cost more than returning the space	 
shuttle safely to flight. Yet uncertainties remain about when the
space shuttle will return to flight, and questions have been	 
raised about NASA's assessment of alternatives. GAO was asked to 
determine whether NASA's assessment was sufficient to conclude	 
that the space shuttle is the best option for assembling and	 
providing logistics support to the space station.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-488 					        
    ACCNO:   A24297						        
  TITLE:     NASA: More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best	      
Alternatives to Provide Space Station Logistics Support 	 
     DATE:   05/18/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Aerospace industry 				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Logistics						 
	     Program management 				 
	     Research and development				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Satellites 					 
	     Space exploration					 
	     Economic analysis					 
	     International cooperation				 
	     Space shuttles					 
	     NASA International Space Station Program		 

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GAO-05-488

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Requesters

May 2005

NASA

 More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to Provide Space Station
                               Logistics Support

GAO-05-488

[IMG]

May 2005

NASA

More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to Provide Space Station
Logistics Support

                                 What GAO Found

NASA's 2004 assessment identified significant challenges associated with
using alternative launch vehicles for space station assembly and
operation. According to previous studies and our discussions with industry
representatives, these challenges would likely preclude using alternative
vehicles for assembly missions. However, NASA's assessment was
insufficient to conclude that the shuttle was the best option for
logistics support missions prior to the proposed retirement of the space
shuttle in 2010. NASA relied primarily on headquarters expertise to
conduct the informal assessment, and while we recognize that the extensive
experience of its senior managers is an important element in evaluating
alternatives, NASA officials did not document the proceedings and
decisions reached in its assessment. As a result, the existence of this
assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor can the conclusions be
validated.

NASA is currently evaluating responses from a September 2004 request for
information from various commercial space transportation industries that
could provide launch services to support space station operations,
following retirement of the shuttle in 2010, until the station's planned
retirement in 2016. NASA officials indicated that a commercial launch
capability to support space station operations is possible prior to the
proposed shuttle retirement in 2010, but stated that this capability would
not eliminate any of the scheduled space shuttle flights. NASA is also
re-examining its requirements for the type of scientific research to be
conducted on the space station as well as the manifest requirements of the
space shuttle. Combining the information gathered from commercial industry
and a better definition of space station and shuttle requirements, NASA
officials agree there is an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive
assessment of alternatives, especially for logistics missions late this
decade.

Source: NASA; GAO (presentation).

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
NASA's 2004 Assessment Was Based on Insufficient Knowledge for

Concluding Space Shuttle Was Best Launch Option, but

Opportunities Now Exist for More Detailed Study Conclusions Recommendation
for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 1

2 3

7 10 10 11

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II	Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

Appendix III Challenges of Using Alternative Vehicles

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

  Figures

Figure 1: Space Shuttle Endeavour Docked to the International Space
Station 4 Figure 2: International Space Station Operations Support until
2016 6

Abbreviations

AAS Alternate Access to Station
ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle
HTV H-II Transfer Vehicle
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

May 18, 2005

The Honorable Ken Calvert

Chairman

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science House of
Representatives

The Honorable Sam Brownback United States Senate

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher House of Representatives

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space shuttle
has been the primary vehicle for delivering components for assembly and
providing logistics support to the International Space Station. NASA
grounded the space shuttle fleet following the Space Shuttle Columbia
accident in February 2003, leaving the space station dependent on Russia
to provide crew rotation, crew rescue, and logistics support. However, due
to the limited payload capacity of Russian space vehicles, on-orbit
assembly of the space station has halted. NASA plans to return the space
shuttle to flight by mid 2005 and resume space station assembly and
logistics missions.

In May 2004 and again in February 2005, NASA testified before the Congress
that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles for completing
space station assembly and providing logistics support. According to NASA
officials, their assessment showed that using alternative launch vehicles
would introduce unacceptable operational risks, technical challenges, long
program delays, and would ultimately cost more than returning the space
shuttle to flight. Therefore, NASA concluded that the space shuttle's
unique capabilities provided the best available option for these missions.
Despite these testimonies, concerns have been raised about NASA's
conclusions, both within Congress and the industry. Due to the uncertainty
regarding when the space shuttle would return to safe flight and concerns
that additional flights would be needed to support assembly and logistics
operations, you asked us to determine whether NASA's assessment of
alternatives was sufficient to conclude that the space shuttle is the best
option for completing assembly and providing logistics support to the
space station.

To conduct our work, we obtained and analyzed agency documentation and
interviewed NASA officials responsible for managing the launch services,
space shuttle, and space station programs within NASA headquarters as well
as program managers at NASA centers involved in space shuttle and space
station operations. We also interviewed commercial space transportation
contractors and reviewed pertinent documentation related to expendable
launch vehicles. In addition, we reviewed NASA's request for information
for commercial space transportation services, which it issued in September
2004, and its plans for assessing the responses to this request and
follow-on activities. We conducted our work from August 2004 through April
2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
For a complete description of our scope and methodology, see appendix I.

                                Results in Brief

In early 2004, NASA performed an informal assessment of alternative launch
vehicles that was incomplete and did not provide a clearly documented
rationale to conclude that the space shuttle was the best option to
support space station operations. NASA identified significant challenges
associated with using an alternative to the space shuttle for space
station assembly, which could preclude these missions from consideration.
However, the assessment conducted by NASA did not include an analysis of
the schedule impacts or costs associated with using alternative launch
vehicles for logistics missions later this decade. While we recognize that
the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in
evaluating alternatives, NASA relied primarily on headquarters expertise
to conduct the informal assessment. NASA officials did not document the
proceedings and decisions reached in its assessment. As a result, the
existence of this assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor can
the conclusions be validated.

NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on
capabilities of alternate launch services for providing cargo launch
services to and the ability to return items from the space station.
Additionally, NASA is re-examining its requirements for the space station
and space shuttle. With this information from commercial industry and more
definitive space station requirements, NASA officials agreed that there is
an opportunity to perform a detailed analysis of alternatives to determine
if any planned space shuttle missions to perform logistics, prior to the
shuttle's retirement, could instead make use of commercial launch
services.

This report makes recommendations aimed at better positioning the agency
to determine the best available options for providing logistics support to
the space station and ensuring that NASA's current analyses of alternative
launch vehicles are comprehensive and fully documented. In written
comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our
recommendations.

                                   Background

NASA and its international partners-Canada, Europe, Japan, and Russia-are
building the space station to serve as an orbiting research facility. The
space shuttle is the primary vehicle supporting the assembly and resupply
of the station. Figure 1 shows the Space Shuttle Endeavour docked to the
International Space Station. Following the Columbia accident in February
2003, the NASA Administrator grounded the space shuttle fleet pending an
investigation into the cause of the accident. The administrator appointed
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board to determine the cause of the
accident and to make recommendations for improving the safety of the space
shuttle before it could return to flight. The board issued its report in
August 2003 with 29 recommendations for improvement-15 of which must be
implemented before the space shuttle can return to flight. NASA plans to
return the shuttle to flight in July 2005.

Figure 1: Space Shuttle Endeavour Docked to the International Space
Station

Source: NASA.

While the shuttle has been grounded, space station crew transfers and
logistics resupply have depended on Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles.1
Europe and Japan are also developing logistics cargo vehicles to support
space station operations later this decade. These Russian, European, and
Japanese vehicles are launched on expendable rockets. The European
Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), scheduled to be available for missions
to the space station in 2006, is being designed to rendezvous and dock
with the space station's Russian Service Module. The Japanese H-II
Transfer Vehicle (HTV) is scheduled to be available in 2008 and will fly
within the proximity of the space station to be caught by the station's
robotic arm before being berthed to the space station. The ATV and HTV
also carry less cargo than the shuttle.

1 Soyuz vehicles are used primarily to ferry crew to and from the station.
Progress vehicles are used to resupply and reboost the station.

Because the Russian Soyuz and Progress are the only vehicles currently
available and carry significantly less payload than the space shuttle,
operations are generally limited to transporting crew, food, potable
water, as well as propellant resupply for reboosting the space station to
higher orbits. Launches of space station assembly elements and large
orbital replacement items for maintenance have effectively ceased.

From 2000 to early 2004, NASA performed two studies that focused on the
potential use of commercial launch vehicles to provide logistics services
to the space station. In a 90-day study conducted in 2000, NASA determined
that no commercial logistics service for the space station was possible at
that time, as no launch vehicles possessed the critical capabilities
necessary to provide logistics services, including automated rendezvous
capabilities. As a result of this study, NASA decided to solicit and fund
a more detailed review of concepts designed to provide logistics services
to the space station. The Alternate Access to Station (AAS) study
contracts were awarded in July 2002, with 1-year contracts given to four
contractors. In summer 2003, these contractors presented architectures
that relied on existing domestic or international expendable launch
vehicles. In the fall of 2003, the contracts were extended, and the
contractors were asked to address larger cargo delivery capabilities and
"downmass" (e.g. returning research materials to earth) requirements were
added for the return of cargo. This study ended in January 2004 with the
contractors briefing on their study results, at which time NASA concluded
that developing a domestic capability to meet most of the space station
cargo service needs was possible within 3 to 5 years.

In January 2004, the President announced a new Vision for Exploration that
called for retiring the shuttle in 2010, requiring NASA to find an
alternative to support space station operations through 2016 by the end of
the decade. The President called for a shift in NASA's long-term focus,
envisioning that NASA will retire the space shuttle after nearly 30 years
of service as soon as assembly of the International Space Station is
completed, planned for the end of the decade, and will develop a new crew
exploration vehicle as well as launch human missions to the moon between
2015 and 2020. In essence, NASA's implementation plan holds aeronautics,
science, and other activities at near constant levels and transitions
funding currently dedicated to the space station and space shuttle
programs to the new exploration strategy as the space station and space
shuttle programs phase out. The vision also changed the space station's
on-board research focus. Originally, the space station was to be used for
conducting experiments in near-zero gravity to include life sciences
research on how humans adapt to long durations in space,

biomedical research, and materials-processing research. Under the new
vision, the research will be focused on determining the effects of long
duration space travel on humans and developing countermeasures for those
effects, with the goal that the space station research necessary to
support human explorers on other worlds would be complete by 2016. Figure
2 shows NASA's proposed plan for operational support of the space station
until 2016.

Figure 2: International Space Station Operations Support until 2016

                       Source: NASA; GAO (presentation).

  NASA's 2004 Assessment Was Based on Insufficient Knowledge for Concluding
  Space Shuttle Was Best Launch Option, but Opportunities Now Exist for More
  Detailed Study

According to program officials, NASA's 2004 informal assessment concluded
that alternative launch vehicles would present operational risks,
technical challenges, and long program delays and would cost more than
returning the space shuttle to flight, making the space shuttle the best
option for both assembly and logistics missions through the end of the
decade. According to previous studies and our discussions with commercial
industry representatives, the time involved for developing an alternate
capability would probably preclude assembly missions from consideration.
However, NASA did not have sufficient knowledge to support its conclusion
regarding logistic support missions. Specifically, NASA did not perform a
comparative cost analysis that considered the schedule impacts or
associated costs of planned space shuttle operations. Furthermore, NASA
officials did not document these informal proceedings and decisions
reached; therefore, the thoroughness of any assessment of alternatives
cannot be verified, nor can their conclusions be validated.

NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on
different ways to provide logistics services to and from the space
station. NASA's re-examination of its requirements for the space station
and space shuttle, coupled with the cost information of alternatives
obtained from commercial industry responses, provide NASA with a basis for
performing a detailed analysis of alternatives to determine if any planned
space shuttle logistics missions could be performed by or complemented
with commercial launch vehicles later this decade.

    Technical Challenges Difficult to Overcome for Assembly Missions, but Cost
    Comparison of Later Logistics Missions Insufficient

As a result of the informal assessment, NASA outlined a number of
technical challenges to using an alternate vehicle for space station
support, especially for assembly missions where the space shuttle's crew
and remote manipulator arm perform key functions. Appendix III provides a
discussion of these challenges. NASA officials stated they used the AAS
study, which concentrated solely on logistics support missions, as the
foundation for its 2004 informal assessment. In a summary of that study,
NASA reported that the AAS contractors projected the cost to develop an
alternate launch capability would be approximately $1 billion, take 3 to 5
years to develop, and require $2 to $3 billion per year for operations. We
held discussions with commercial industry representatives who concurred
with this time frame to develop an alternate capability to support space
station operation. Since a majority of the space station assembly missions
are scheduled within the next 3 years, these types of missions could
preclude the use of an alternative vehicle.

However, NASA did not have sufficient knowledge to conclude that the
shuttle was the best option for logistics missions prior to its retirement
of the shuttle in 2010. NASA officials stated that the technical
challenges for developing an alternative vehicle could be overcome, but
probably not before the 28 missions scheduled through 2010, of which 8 are
for logistics, including 5 of the last 7 missions. However, we found no
evidence of analyses performed by NASA to compare the cost and schedule
impact of using alternate launch systems with the scheduled space shuttle
program costs, to include the cost of returning the space shuttle to
flight. We recently reported that the majority of NASA's budget estimates
for returning the space shuttle to flight had not been fully developed.2
In fact, NASA officials stated that they did not compare estimated costs
for developing alternative launch vehicles against budget estimates for
the 28 space shuttle flights currently planned to support the space
station, which total more than $22 billion between fiscal year 2005 and
fiscal year 2010. In addition, NASA has also requested $1.8 billion for
crew and cargo services over the same time frame to purchase commercial
services using existing and emerging capabilities, both domestic and
foreign. In its fiscal year 2006 budget request, NASA indicated that such
commercial services are expected to be available not later than 2009 and
that these services are a key element in the future of the space station
program.

    Informal Assessment Was Not Documented

In addition to lacking sufficient knowledge with regard to the use of
alternatives for logistics missions, NASA did not document the proceedings
and decisions reached in its 2004 assessment. Specifically, the agency did
not record the processes it followed and therefore did not capture the
basis of the decisions reached. When asked about the details of the
assessment, NASA officials indicated that the informal assessment was
based primarily on the expertise within the headquarters and they did not
formally document the decision paths. While we recognize that the
extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in
evaluating alternatives, the existence of any formal assessment of
alternatives covering the entire range of missions for space station
support cannot be verified, and the agency's position on the space shuttle
being the best option cannot be validated.

2 GAO, Space Shuttle: Cost for Hubble Servicing Mission and Implementation
of Safety Recommendations Not Yet Definitive, GAO-05-34 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 19, 2004).

    NASA's Current Request for Information from Commercial Industry and
    Requirements Review Presents an Opportunity to Perform a More Detailed
    Analysis

NASA received 26 responses from a September 2004 request for information
that asked for, among other things, input from the commercial space
industry regarding capabilities and market interest for missions for
providing cargo launch services to, and the ability to return items from,
the space station. This request for information had similar
characteristics as the AAS study, which also had as its objective to
explore the development of alternative cargo "upmass" and "downmass"
support for the space station. The responses are being evaluated, and NASA
plans to seek more detailed information from the commercial launch
industry for additional study or development work in June 2005. According
to NASA officials, the responses from industry with regard to space
station logistics support have been very promising. The officials
indicated that it might be possible to have a developed and certified
capability to provide commercial cargo launch service to the space station
prior to space shuttle retirement late this decade, rather than only after
its retirement. However, we were told these services would not eliminate
any of the scheduled space shuttle flights, but only augment the
capabilities of the space shuttle.

While these responses are being evaluated and knowledge is being gathered,
NASA is also reviewing the space station research requirements and
re-examining the planned manifest for the 28 space shuttle flights in an
attempt to better align their missions to the Vision for Space
Exploration. According to NASA's fiscal year 2006 budget submission, the
agency is examining configurations of the space station that meet the
needs of the new vision and the international partners with as few space
shuttle flights as necessary.

Combining the information gathered from commercial industry and a better
definition of space station requirements, NASA officials agreed there is
an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of alternatives,
especially for the logistics missions late this decade. According to a
recent revision of NASA's internal guidance, the most important aspect of
formulating a program technical approach is conducting a thorough analysis
of alternatives.3 NASA guidance defines an analysis of alternatives as a
formal method that compares alternatives by estimating their ability to
satisfy mission requirements through an effectiveness analysis and by
estimating their life cycle costs through cost

3 NPR 7120.5C: NASA Program and Project Management Processes and
Requirements, March 22, 2005.

Conclusions

Recommendation for Executive Action

analysis. The results of these two analysis are used together to produce a
cost-effectiveness comparison that allows decision-makers to assess cost
and effectiveness simultaneously. An analysis of alternatives broadly
examines multiple elements of program alternatives (including technical
performance, risk, life cycle cost, and programmatic aspects), and is
typically an important part of the formulation studies.

NASA views a thorough analysis of alternatives as an important aspect in
the formulation of a program technical approach. While we recognize that
the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in
evaluating alternatives, NASA did not have the full breadth of knowledge
necessary to perform a comprehensive assessment of alternative launch
vehicles to enable it to conclude the space shuttle was the best option to
support space station operations. However, NASA's recent request for
information from industry offers the agency an opportunity to enhance its
knowledge of alternatives to the space shuttle for providing logistics
support for the space station and to explore the use of alternatives to
the existing space shuttle manifest currently under review. Although
alternate vehicles would not be available for missions to the space
station until later this decade and difficult to use for assembly
missions, several of the space shuttle's final flights are planned
logistics support missions that might be conducted using alternative
launch vehicles. By completing a comprehensive analysis, NASA could also
identify the feasibility and risks associated with an alternative means of
providing logistics support to the space station in case delays occur
requiring extension of the planned 2010 date. Furthermore, a comprehensive
and thoroughly documented analysis of launch requirements and launch
alternatives can provide NASA with comparative cost information and afford
the agency the opportunity to use its resources more effectively and
efficiently. This is particularly important now since the space station
and space shuttle programs will be competing for limited resources.

To better position the agency to determine the best available option for
providing logistics support to the space station, we recommend the NASA
Administrator take the following three steps:

o  	Direct current efforts to explore other space launch options to
utilize a comprehensive and fully documented assessment of alternatives
that matches mission requirements, and associated manifest, with the
launch vehicles expected to be available;

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

o  	As part of this assessment, (a) determine the development and
operation costs associated with these potential alternatives and (b)
perform a detailed analysis of these alternatives to determine the best
option for delivering the logistics cargo required for space station
operations prior to and after space shuttle retirement; and

o  	Ensure this assessment is completed before any NASA investments are
made for commercial space transportation services to the space station.

In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our
recommendations and stated that the agency seeks to fully explore space
launch options for assuring access to the space station in conjunction
with its retirement planning for the space shuttle. NASA plans to document
its acquisition strategy through a NASA Headquarters Acquisition Strategy
Meeting prior to release of a request for proposal for commercial space
station cargo services later this summer. In addition, NASA said it will
evaluate the cost and capabilities of the proposed transportation system
to meet space station and agency needs, as well as the needs of its
partners. NASA also said that its acquisition strategy will be consistent
with space station requirements, international partner agreements, and
available funding.

We are encouraged that NASA has taken steps to pursue a deliberate
alternative cargo transportation system assessment. However, NASA should
not limit documentation of this effort to the acquisition strategy
meeting, but should also document the decision paths leading up to that
event and throughout the evaluation of the transportation systems proposed
by contractors responding to NASA's request for proposals. This approach
should identify the decision makers involved and provide a fully
documented rationale of the acquisition processes as NASA analyzes all
alternatives to determine the best options for delivering the logistics
cargo for space station operations. NASA's comments are reprinted in
appendix

II.

As agreed, unless you publicly announce the contents earlier, we plan no
further distribution of this report until 15 days from its issue date. At
that time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator; the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will
also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix

IV.

Allen Li
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine whether NASA conducted a detailed assessment of alternatives
to the space shuttle for completing assembly and providing logistics
support to the International Space Station, we:

o  	Obtained and analyzed pertinent NASA documents and briefing slides
related to the International Space Station, space shuttles, and other
launch alternatives, such as Expendable Launch Vehicles, including:
European Space Agency Segment Specifications for the Automated Transfer
Vehicle; Specification for the Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle;
International Space Station Payload Integration and Assembly Sequence
specifications; Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle configurations; space
station and space shuttle status, history, and cost briefings; Return to
Flight Status Briefings; and, Alternate Access to Station briefings.

o  	Reviewed previous GAO reports on NASA, the Space Shuttle Program,
International Space Station Program, and best practices in many areas and
multiple agencies. We also reviewed reports from the Congressional Budget
Office, Congressional Research Service, Office of Management and Budget,
and the Planetary Society, and Russian Space Program.

o  	Interviewed officials responsible for managing the programs within the
Space Operations Mission Directorate at NASA headquarters, as well as
program managers at Johnson Space Center, Texas. We also interviewed NASA
officials at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, who are responsible for
processing space station payloads and integrating those payloads with the
launch vehicles. We interviewed contractors at Boeing Launch Services and
Lockheed Martin Space Systems and reviewed pertinent documentation related
to expendable launch vehicles for space station assembly and logistics
support. We also reviewed NASA's request for information related to
commercial industry interest in providing that capability and NASA's plans
for assessing responses to the request for information and follow on
activities. For this, we interviewed NASA officials within the Space
Operations Mission Directorate and at Johnson Space Center, Texas. We also
interviewed Air Force officials from the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
Program. We also received, reviewed, and analyzed follow-up written and
oral comments from several individuals at these locations and NASA's
Science Directorate.

To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials at NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Johnson Space Center, Texas; and Kennedy
Space Center, Florida. These centers were chosen because they

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

maintain primary responsibility for conducting space shuttle and space
station operations on a day-to-day basis. The offices we met with at
headquarters and each of these centers included space station program
officials, space shuttle program officials, NASA Launch Services Office,
the International Space Station Payload Processing Directorate at Kennedy
Space Center, and Space Shuttle Program Integration Office at Kennedy
Space Center. We also visited the Boeing Launch Services, Inc., in
Huntington Beach, California, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station,
Florida; Boeing Commercial Space Systems in Research Park, Huntsville,
Alabama; and Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in Littleton, Colorado,
and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida.

We conducted our work from August 2004 through April 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

Appendix III: Challenges of Using Alternative Vehicles

According to NASA officials involved in the 2004 assessment, accommodating
a transition to other launch vehicles would create significant challenges
that drive risk, schedule, and costs. NASA officials stated the space
station elements were designed and built to take advantage of the more
benign launch environment in the space shuttle's cargo bay, to be removed
and repositioned by the space shuttle's robotic arm, and then connected
together by the space shuttle crew during space walk activities. The
following outlines the major challenges NASA identified:

o  	There would be a need to develop a new process to assemble the space
station using only the space station crew and without the benefit of the
space shuttle remote manipulator arm.

o  	Using another launch vehicle would require the redesign and retesting
of space station elements already built due to the change in launch
environment. NASA officials stated the space shuttle launch environment,
with respect to vibration and g-force exerted on the payload, cannot be
duplicated on an expendable launch vehicle.

o  	A new, unique transfer vehicle would need to be developed in order to
rendezvous and dock assembly elements with the space station. For
logistics cargo support, two transfer vehicles are currently being
developed for logistics mission to support space station operations, the
European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the Japanese H-II Transfer
Vehicle (HTV). These vehicles, much like the Russian Progress vehicle,
have a limited cargo capability when compared to the space shuttle. The
ATV, scheduled to be available for missions to the space station in 2006,
is being designed to rendezvous and dock to the space station via the
Russian Service Module. The HTV is scheduled to be available in 2008 and
will fly within the proximity of the space station to be caught by the
space station's robotic arm before being berthed to the space station.

o  	A carrier to go inside the new transfer vehicle to replicate the space
shuttle attach points would need to be developed.

o  	According to these officials, in order to meet volume requirements,
the payload fairings would have to be modified from the current 5-meter to
a 6-meter version to accommodate the larger diameter payloads to the space
station during assembly missions.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Allen Li (202) 512-4841

Acknowledgments 	Staff making key contributions to this report were Jim
Morrison, James Beard, Rick Cederholm, Karen Sloan, and T.J Thomson.

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