Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections  
Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists (10-JUN-05, 
GAO-05-478).							 
                                                                 
Reports of ineligible persons registering to vote raised concerns
about state processes for verifying voter registration lists.	 
States base voter eligibility generally on the voter's age, U.S. 
citizenship, mental competence, and felon status. Although states
run elections, Congress has authority to affect the		 
administration of elections. The Help America Vote Act of 2002	 
(HAVA) sets a deadline for states to have a statewide voter	 
registration list and list verification procedures. For this	 
report, GAO selected seven states (AZ, CA, MI, NY, TX, VA, and	 
WI) to represent a range of characteristics relevant to voter	 
registrations, such as whether a statewide voter list existed	 
prior to HAVA. This report discusses how these states verify	 
voter registration eligibility; the challenges they face in	 
maintaining accurate voter lists; the progress toward		 
implementing HAVA registration requirements; and identifies	 
federal data sources that might be used to help verify voter	 
registration eligibility.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-478 					        
    ACCNO:   A26300						        
  TITLE:     Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local    
Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists	 
     DATE:   06/10/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Citizenship					 
	     Criminals						 
	     Elections						 
	     Eligibility criteria				 
	     Eligibility determinations 			 
	     Federal law					 
	     Federal records management 			 
	     Fraud						 
	     Jurisdictional authority				 
	     Records						 
	     State law						 
	     Voting records					 
	     Arizona						 
	     California 					 
	     Michigan						 
	     New York						 
	     Texas						 
	     Virginia						 
	     Wisconsin						 

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GAO-05-478

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2005

ELECTIONS

Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials Maintain Accurate
                            Voter Registration Lists

GAO-05-478

[IMG]

June 2005

ELECTIONS

Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials Maintain Accurate
Voter Registration Lists

                                 What GAO Found

The methods used in seven selected states to verify voter eligibility and
ensure accuracy of voter registration lists were varied and include
relying on registrant self attestation, return mailings, and checking
against lists of felony convictions or deceased individuals. Election
officials from the selected states described some challenges that may be
resolved when HAVA is fully implemented, such as reducing duplicates
within the state. Other challenges-identifying duplicate registrations in
other states or having insufficient information to match other data
sources with voter registration lists-may continue to be issues.

The seven states are in different phases of implementing HAVA statewide
voter registration lists and eligibility verification requirements.
Arizona implemented its statewide voter list by the January 1, 2004,
deadline, and the other six states applied for a January 1, 2006, waiver.
Of those six states, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin awarded contracts to
develop new voter lists that are designed to address HAVA requirements.
Michigan has had a statewide list since 1998, and officials believe it is
near HAVA compliant. California election officials are still considering
how to meet these HAVA requirements, and in New York, legislation was
passed in May 2005 to create the state voter registration lists.

Federal data sources have the potential to help state election officials
identify registrants who may be convicted felons or non-citizens. While
the potential number identified may be small, an election can be decided
by a few votes. Regarding felons, U.S. Attorneys are required to notify
state election officials of federal felony convictions, but the
information was not always easy for election officials to interpret or
complete. Federal jury services generally do not now, but might feasibly
be able to notify elections officials when potential jurors drawn from
local voter registration lists claim to be non-citizens.

                   Federal Juror Qualification Questionnaire

Source: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter 1

Results in Brief 4
Background 6
States Have Taken Steps to Verify Voter Registration Eligibility, but

Methods Vary by State 13
Election Officials Identified Challenges to Verify Voter Registration
Eligibility 22

The Seven States Are in Different Phases of Implementing HAVA
Statewide Voter Registration Lists and Eligibility Verification
Requirements 29

Information from Federal Sources Could Assist Election Officials
in Identifying Ineligible Felons and Non-Citizens on Voter
Registration Lists 38

Conclusions 49
Recommendations for Executive Action 50
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 50

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Appendix II	Department of Homeland Security Automated Systems That Include
Information on Non-Citizens

Appendix III	Voter Registration Fraud Allegations Identified at Selected
States and at the Federal Level

Appendix IV	Comments from the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts

Appendix V Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice 63

              Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 65

  Tables

Table 1: Seven States' Voter Registration Eligibility Qualifications 10
Table 2: Selected Activities to Help Implement HAVA Voter Registration
Requirements in Six States 30 Table 3: State Selection Factors 53

  Figures

Figure 1: Arizona Draft Voter Registration Application Requiring Proof of
Citizenship 16 Figure 2: Virginia and Wisconsin Voter Registration
Attestations Regarding Criminal Status 19 Figure 3: Process for Verifying
Voter Registration Applicant Information with SSA 35 Figure 4: Federal
Jury Qualification Questionnaire Requests Citizenship Information 41

Abbreviations

AAMVA American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
AOUSC Administrative Offices of the U.S. Courts
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOJ Department of Justice
DMF Death Master File
EAC Election Assistance Commission
FEC Federal Election Commission
HAVA Help America Vote Act
HAVV Help America Vote Verification program
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
MVA motor vehicle agency
NCOA National Change of Address
NVRA National Voter Registration Act of 1993
OIG Office of the Inspector General
QVF Qualified Voter File
SAVE Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements
SSA Social Security Administration

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

June 10, 2005

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives

The Honorable John N. Hostettler

Chairman

Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives

Reports of ineligible persons registering to vote raised concerns about
state election administration and processes for verifying voter
registration lists. In managing the voter registration process and
maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials
must balance two goals-(1) minimizing the burden on eligible persons of
registering to vote and (2) ensuring that voter lists are accurate, i.e.,
limited to those eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are
not inadvertently removed from the voter registration lists. This report
focuses on the second goal- the efforts of state and local election
officials in seven states to ensure that voter registration lists are
accurate.

In addition to this report, we also plan to issue reports this year on
other specific election issues-voter access to the polls; how the nine
states without Help America Vote Act (HAVA) waivers1 have implemented
voter registration requirements as of January 1, 2004; electronic voting
security; and the Department of Defense's implementation of the Federal
Voting Assistance Program for Overseas Military Personnel in 2004. These
reports respond to congressional requests made prior to the November 2004
election. In addition, given concerns raised about the November 2004

1While HAVA established a deadline of January 1, 2004, for states to have
a statewide voter registration list and verification procedures, it also
provided that states could request a waiver to extend the deadline to
January 1, 2006. Nine states did not request a waiver, 40 states and the
District of Columbia did request and receive waivers, and 1 state (North
Dakota) is not covered by the HAVA requirement because it does not have a
voter registration requirement for individuals voting in federal
elections.

election process, we are undertaking a broader, more comprehensive study
of election administration and processes related to the November 2004
general election. This more comprehensive study will address activities
and challenges-people, processes, and technology-associated with each
major stage of election administration to include registration, absentee
and early voting; Election Day preparation and activities, and vote
counting and certification, similar to a report we issued in October
2001.2

All states set certain eligibility requirements to register and vote.
States establish voter eligibility requirements that generally include
that the voter is at least 18 years of age on the day of the election, is
a citizen of the United States, is mentally competent, and meets state
requirements regarding felon status. Ensuring that only eligible persons
are registered to vote is an ongoing challenge for election officials and
is complicated by factors such as jurisdiction size, mobility of voters,
and community diversity. In larger jurisdictions the task of identifying
and removing registrants who have died can be substantial. For example
according to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention records, almost
300 persons died in the first week of 2005 in the city of Los Angeles.
Communities with large student or military populations must manage
registrants constantly moving in or out of a jurisdiction, and communities
with diverse populations must handle substantial numbers of new citizens
and face language challenges in communicating voter registration
requirements.

After the events surrounding the November 2000 election, HAVA was
enacted.3 It requires states, among other things, to (a) implement an
interactive computerized statewide voter registration list; (b) perform
regular maintenance by comparing the voter list against state records on
felons and deaths; (c) match applicant information on voter registration
lists with information in state motor vehicle agency's records; and (d)
match voter registration applicant information on voter registration lists
with Social Security Administration (SSA) records, as appropriate.

This report addresses current and planned voter registration processes in
seven selected states for verifying voter registration lists.
Specifically, this report answers the following questions: (1) How do
state election officials

2GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the
Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

3 Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).

verify voter registration eligibility and ensure voter registration lists
are accurate? (2) What challenges do they face in maintaining accurate
voter lists? (3) What progress have these states made toward meeting HAVA
requirements to have voter registration verification procedures? (4) What
federal data sources, other than those identified in HAVA, might be used
to help verify voter registration eligibility?

To address the first three objectives, we selected a nonprobability sample
of seven states-Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia,
and Wisconsin to represent a range of voter-registration factors. Our
selection includes states in various stages of development of their
statewide databases, variations in election administration, a range in the
percent of the population of foreign born, and is geographically diverse.
We also considered other characteristics that might affect the
implementation of HAVA, such as same day registration in Wisconsin, or New
York, with a large population who live in New York City who may not have
driver's licenses for verification. Our goal was not to target a
particular state, but rather to identify a range of issues facing states
in implementing HAVA requirements and assuring accurate voter registration
lists. In these seven states, we interviewed state election officials and
election officials in 14 local voting jurisdictions-two in each of these
states. Additional information on our scope and methodology is presented
in appendix I.

In these seven states, we also interviewed motor vehicle agency
(MVA)4officials because voters can submit voter registration applications
at MVA offices, and MVAs have a role under HAVA to assist states with
verification of voter registration information. In addition, we reviewed
relevant state voting laws, voter registration documents, and reports
related to voting processes. We interviewed officials at the SSA and
obtained documentation on how they are addressing SSA's HAVA verification
requirements. To identify potential federal data sources to verify voter
registration, we gathered information from state election and county jury
administrators, and from officials at the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC), and the Administrative Offices of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and we
reviewed relevant reports. We also obtained information on voter fraud
allegations from DOJ, from U.S. Attorneys in

4States may refer to their motor vehicle agencies by different names. For
purposes of this report, we will generically refer to them as "motor
vehicle agencies."

our selected states and from state and local election officials and
District Attorneys for the local election jurisdictions we visited. See
appendix I for additional information on our objectives, scope, and
methodology. Our work was done between January 2004 and May 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                Results in Brief

State and local election officials we interviewed in the seven states said
they use a combination of methods and information to verify voter
eligibility and ensure the accuracy of voter registration lists. These
included using computer programs that only accept registrants of an
eligible age and those who live at an address within the jurisdiction,
confirmation mailings to registrants, and information from state vital
statistics or court officials on persons who are deceased or have been
convicted of a felony.

HAVA provisions, when fully implemented, should help address some
challenges state election officials face in obtaining timely, accurate,
and complete information to identify ineligible voter registrants, but
other challenges may remain. Having a statewide voter registration list
and matching the list with state vital statistics and felon data, as
required by HAVA provisions, could reduce the number of duplicate
registrations within a state and provide more timely identification of
ineligible registrants. HAVA provisions may not affect other data
challenges, such as identifying registration duplications or deceased
individuals outside the state, or identifying non-citizens.

Progress to meet HAVA requirements in the seven states we visited varied.
One state, Arizona, implemented its statewide voter list by the January 1,
2004, deadline, and the other six states applied for and received a waiver
to defer their implementation of these provisions until January 1, 2006.
Of those six states, Michigan has a statewide list that has been
operational since 1998 and state officials believe they are near
compliance with HAVA requirements. Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin awarded
contracts to develop the voter lists intended to encompass HAVA
requirements. California and New York are working toward meeting the
January 2006 deadline, but California is still evaluating its strategy for
creating a statewide database that is HAVA compliant, and legislation
approving the creation of New York's state voter registration list was not
passed until May 2005. The extent to which states verified applicant
information with state motor vehicle agencies and compared voter lists
with state records for deaths and felons varied in that some had
agreements to verify information and some did not. As of March 2005, six
of the states we

visited still needed to sign an agreement with SSA to verify voter
registrant information against Social Security records. The seventh state,
Virginia, is not subject to this HAVA requirement because it is permitted
to require voter registrants to provide their full social security number.
This number can be used with SSA's online verification system.

We identified two federal data sources that have the potential to help
state and local election officials ensure that their voter lists are
accurate. The number of potentially ineligible voter registrants
identified by these two federal sources may be small but could be
important in determining the outcome of a close election.

First, U.S. Attorneys are, by law, to send notice to state election
officials upon conviction of felonies in federal court. State officials,
in turn, are to forward it to local election officials in the jurisdiction
where the convicted offender resides. The law does not establish a
standardized time frame or format for forwarding the federal felony
conviction information. Of the 19 U.S. Attorneys' offices covering the
seven states we visited, 16 reported that the notices were being sent to
election officials but not in a standardized format and 3 reported that
they were implementing or modifying their processes to provide this
information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts. According to
state and local election officials with whom we spoke in the seven states,
federal felony information was not always provided in a standard format or
timely, and the information was sometimes difficult to interpret, such as
the length of the sentence, or incomplete.

Second, federal jury administrator questionnaires identify individuals who
claim to be non-citizens when asked to serve as a juror in federal
district court.5 The federal district courts are not required to provide
election officials with this information, but 1 of the 14 federal district
courts we surveyed does so. One source that the federal district courts
use to draw the potential jurors' names is local voter registration lists
that should only contain names of citizens. Federal jury administrators
were mixed in their opinions on the feasibility of providing this
information, some citing staff resource constraints.

5Potential jurors for a U.S. district court are chosen by federal jury
administrators in each of the 94 district courts from a jury pool
generated by random selection of citizens' names from lists of registered
voters, or combined lists of voters and people with drivers' licenses, in
the judicial districts. The potential jurors complete questionnaires to
help determine whether they are qualified to serve on a jury. U.S.
citizenship is a qualification to be a juror.

Background

To assist state election officials in maintaining accurate voter
registration lists, we are recommending that U.S. Attorneys provide
information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts in a more
standardized format to make it easier for election officials to interpret
the conviction information, such as the length of the sentence, and help
ensure that information is complete and timely. We also recommend that the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts6 study the feasibility of sharing
certain citizenship-related U.S. district court juror information with
state election officials.

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and AOUSC for review and
comment. In their responses, officials at both DOJ and AOUSC acknowledged
the importance of maintaining accurate voter registration lists, and
agreed with our report recommendations. Sections of the report were also
provided to other federal agencies and states we visited to confirm the
accuracy of the information. Clarifications and specific technical
comments on the draft were incorporated as appropriate into the final
report.

The constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and
federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of both their
own elections and federal elections. States regulate various aspects of
the elections process, including, for example, ballot access, registration
procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of polling places,
provision of election day workers, and counting and certifying the vote.
The states in turn incur the costs associated with these activities.
Although the states are responsible for running elections, Congress has
authority to affect the administration of elections. Congress' authority
to regulate elections depends upon the type of election. With regard to
federal elections, Congress has constitutional authority over both
congressional and presidential elections. In addition, with respect to
federal, state, and local elections, a number of constitutional amendments
authorize Congress to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory
acts.

Congress has passed legislation regarding the administration of elections,
both for federal elections and in certain cases at the state level. Most
recently HAVA was enacted in 2002. HAVA established, among other

6The AOUSC is the administrative arm of the federal judiciary. The agency
provides service to the federal courts in three essential areas:
administrative support, program management, and policy development.

things: (1) a program to provide funds to states to replace punch card or
lever voting systems used in federal elections, (2) the EAC to assist in
the administration of federal elections and to otherwise provide
assistance with the administration of certain federal election laws and
programs, and (3) certain minimum election administration standards for
states and units of local government with responsibility for the
administration of federal elections. The act fixed enforcement authority
on the Attorney General to bring a civil action against any state or
jurisdiction as may be necessary to carry out the specified uniform and
nondiscriminatory election technology and administration requirements
under HAVA.7

Regarding the administration of elections, HAVA created federal mandates,
staggered deadlines for implementing these mandates, and authorized about
$3.86 billion over several fiscal years in election reform appropriations.
HAVA required that states create plans detailing how they will meet the
requirements and guidelines of the act. Among the requirements, section
303 mandated a computerized statewide voter registration list to serve as
the official voter registration list for conducting elections for federal
office in each state. States and territories were to implement a
computerized statewide voter registration database by January 1, 2004.
States could apply to the EAC by January 1, 2004, for a waiver of the
effective date until January 1, 2006. Nine states and one
territory-Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Guam-did not apply for a
waiver.

Section 303 also requires states to perform list maintenance on a regular
basis by removing ineligible voters from the voter registration list.
States are to coordinate the computerized list with state agency records
on felony status and death. In addition, states are required to verify
voter registration information. For federal elections, a voter
registration application may not be processed or accepted by a state
unless it contains the applicant's driver's license number, the last 4
digits of the social security number if there is no driver's license
number, or the state must create a unique identification number if the
voter has neither number. Certain state laws allow voter registration
applications to require the

7These sections relate to voting system standards (section 301),
provisional voting and voting information requirements (section 302),
computerized statewide voter registration list requirements, and
requirements for voters who register by mail (section 303).

applicant to provide their full social security numbers on applications.8
Voter registration information is to be matched with motor vehicle records
or social security records, depending on the information provided by the
applicant. The state motor vehicle authority must enter into an agreement
with SSA to verify the applicant information when the last 4 digits of the
social security number are provided rather than a driver's license or
state identification number. SSA must develop methods to verify the
accuracy of information provided and whether the name, date of birth, and
the last 4 digits of a social security number match SSA records, including
whether the individual is deceased.

HAVA is not the first federal legislation affecting the administration of
elections. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA),9 for
example, was enacted to establish registration procedures designed to
"increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in
elections for Federal office...," "protect the integrity of the electoral
process..." and "ensure that accurate and current voter registration lists
are maintained." NVRA contains provisions regarding what information is
sought on the voter registration application for federal elections. To
enable state election officials to assess the eligibility of the applicant
and to administer voter registration and other parts of the election
process, the act requires that the voter registration application include
a statement about each eligibility requirement to be able to vote,
specifically including citizenship. It further requires an attestation
that the applicant meets each such requirement to vote and requires the
signature of the applicant under penalty of perjury.

In addition, NVRA created requirements for how states maintain voter
registration lists for federal elections. The act requires states to keep
such voter registration lists accurate and current, such as identifying
persons who have become ineligible due to death or change of residence to
outside the jurisdiction. At the same time, the act requires list
maintenance programs to incorporate specific safeguards, for example, that
they be uniform, non-discriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting
Rights Act. The removal of registrants for non-voting or for having moved
can

8Seven states-Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia-require full social security numbers on
applications for voter registration. HAVA provides that for states using
full social security numbers on applications in accordance with section 7
of the Privacy Act of 1974, the HAVA voter registration verification
requirements are optional.

9Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).

only be done after meeting certain requirements provided in the act. The
act also allows for removal of registrants from registration lists at
their own request, when a registrant has been convicted of a disqualifying
crime, or by reason of mental incapacity where such removals are allowed
by state law.

Voter registration qualifications based on age, citizenship, criminal
status, mental competence, and residence were established in all seven
states we reviewed, except for Michigan, which does not have a mental
competency requirement. Table 1 summarizes the eligibility qualifications
in the selected states.

      Table 1: Seven States' Voter Registration Eligibility Qualifications

Age Citizenship Felon statusa

AZ 	At least 18 years U.S. citizen Felony conviction will generally old on
or before prohibit a person from being eligible the next general to
register or trigger the cancellation election of the felon's pre-existing
registration.

1st time felons otherwise eligible may reregister when discharged, or
probation is complete. With more than 1 felony conviction after an
absolute discharge, a felon must have a judge reinstate voting rights.

CA 	At least 18 years U.S. citizen A person in prison or on parole for the
of age at the time conviction of a felony is not entitled to of the next
register and cancellation of the felon's election pre-existing
registration will be

Mental competence

Not be currently declared an incapacitated person by a court of law

Not currently judged mentally incompetent by a court of law

Reside in election jurisdiction

State resident in county at least 29 days before election

California resident and registered at least 15 days prior to an election
triggered. Once the sentence is complete, including parole, a felon who is
otherwise eligible may reregister. Voting rights may also be restored by
the governor.

MI At least 18 U.S. citizen Persons confined in jail after        Michigan 
      years                       Not a state eligibility     resident and at 
      old by the               conviction and sentencing are   least a 30-day 
         next                       not disqualification             resident 
       election                eligible to register or vote.   of the city or 
                                       Prior to trial               township, 
                                or conviction and sentence,   by election day 
                                          persons             
                               confined in jail may register  
                                          at their            
                                prior address. Upon release,  
                                           person             
                               who is otherwise eligible may  
                                          register            
                                      b or reregister.        

NY 	At least 18 years old by the date of the election

U.S. citizen	Felony conviction will generally prohibit a person from being
eligible to register or trigger the cancellation of a pre-existing
registration. Felons who are otherwise eligible may register or reregister
after a pardon or restoration of rights by the governor of the state where
such conviction took place (or the President for federal felony
conviction), completing the maximum sentence of imprisonment, or when they
are discharged from parole.

Not currently judged A resident of the state incompetent by order of a and
of the county, city, court of competent judicial or village for at least
30 authority days before an election

Mental Reside in election Age Citizenship Felon statusa competence
jurisdiction

TX 	At least 17 years U.S. citizen Felony conviction will generally and 10
months prohibit a person from being eligible old to register and to
register or trigger the cancellation must be 18 to of a pre-existing
registration. Felons vote who are otherwise eligible may

reregister when their sentence has been fully discharged or have been
pardoned or otherwise released from the resulting disability to vote.

VA 	At least 18 years U.S. citizen Felony conviction will generally old by
the next prohibit a person from being eligible general election to
register or trigger the cancellation

of a pre-existing registration. Felons who are otherwise eligible may
qualify to register or reregister if their civil rights have been restored
by the governor or other appropriate authority.

WI 	At least 18 years U.S. citizen Persons convicted of a felony are old
disqualified from voting. Voting rights Have not been declared incompetent
by final judgment of a court of law

Not currently declared mentally incompetent by a court of law

Not have been found by a court to be incapable of understanding the
objective of the electoral process Be a resident of the county in which
the application for registration is made

A resident of VA and of the precinct in which he/she wants to vote and
registered no later than 29 days before the general election

A resident in an election district or ward of the state for at least 10
days before an election are restored upon completion of the term of
imprisonment, probation, or parole, or through a pardon.

Source: GAO summary of information verified by states.

aThis table may not reflect the full range of possible measures available
under state law. Other measures, such as reversals, set-asides, or pardons
may be available under specific state laws to restore civil rights for
convicted felons. In addition, this table does not reflect other
non-felony convictions, such as bribery, that may serve to disenfranchise
an individual under state laws.

b This provision of Michigan law applies not just to convicted felons who
are confined in a jail but to all persons who are confined in a jail as a
result of non-felony offenses for which they have been convicted and
sentenced.

Registering more than once is explicitly addressed in some state laws. For
example, under Virginia law, the intentional registration to vote at more
than one residence address at the same time, whether such registrations
are within Virginia or in Virginia and any other state or U.S. territory,
is prohibited.10 In New York, it is illegal to register or attempt to
register as an elector in more than one election district for the same
election, or more than once in the same election district.11 While federal
law does not explicitly prohibit being registered to vote more than once,
such as in more than one state, various federal laws could apply to
certain types of

10Va. Code Ann. S: 24.2-1004. 11NY CLS Elec. S: 17-104.

wrongful activities that might result in such multiple registrations
related to a federal election. For example, knowingly or willfully
providing false information (e.g., name, address, or period of residence)
to establish eligibility to register to vote with respect to a federal
election is prohibited.12

Voters are not now required to register in all jurisdictions in Wisconsin.
Currently, only municipalities with a population of 5,000 or more are
required to register voters.13 About 75 percent of the voting age
population lives in the municipalities that have some form of voter
registration. Voters may also register in Wisconsin on Election Day at the
polling place. Under "same-day registration" potential voters are required
to complete a registration form that includes a certification as to their
eligibility14, and present an acceptable proof of residency. The municipal
clerk for a jurisdiction is responsible for verifying that each person
allowed to vote was properly registered, and sends a postcard confirming
registration to the person, or a 1st class letter if the registration
cannot be confirmed. If the letter is undelivered or an improper address
was provided, municipal clerks are to notify the district attorney.15 In
jurisdictions without registration, the voting officials enter the full
name and address of voters on a poll list in the order they voted.

1242 U.S.C. S: 1973i(c).

13Changes made in 2003 to Wisconsin's election laws will require voter
registration in every municipality, regardless of size. This registration
requirement first applies to the 2006 spring primary election.

14Wisconsin has voters self-certify as follows: "I (name) hereby certify
that to the best of my knowledge, I am a qualified elector, having resided
at (address) for at least 10 days immediately preceding this election, and
that I am not disqualified on any grounds from voting, and I have not
voted, at this election." In addition to Wisconsin, Idaho, Maine,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wyoming allow same day registration.

15The Wisconsin Joint Legislative Audit Committee has an ongoing audit of
voter address verifications based on allegations of inappropriate election
procedures in Milwaukee to verify same day voter registration eligibility
in the November 2004 election. According to Joint Legislative Audit
Committee official, the report is due for completion by the fall of 2005.

  States Have Taken Steps to Verify Voter Registration Eligibility, but Methods
  Vary by State

State and local election officials in the seven states we reviewed
reported that specific steps are taken to verify eligibility when an
applicant applies to register and that voter registration lists are also
reviewed periodically to identify registrants who may no longer be
eligible, such as those who have moved, have been convicted of a felony,
or are deceased. Officials in the seven states use a combination of
methods, including computer programming, return mailings, and information
from state vital statistics to identify registrants who should be removed
from voter rolls. Self-attestation is included in every voter registration
application in the seven states we visited but varies by the terms used
and format of the attestation. All voter registration application forms in
the seven states we visited asked applicants to certify with their
signature that the information provided is correct and true. The forms ask
the applicant to attest to their age, citizenship, and residency. The
format asking for additional information varied in the seven states.

                              Verification of age

To determine eligibility based on age, all states we reviewed, except
Texas, required applicants to declare, swear, affirm, or attest on the
voter registration application that they meet state age requirements. In
addition, officials in Arizona, Texas, Virginia, and New York City said
that their voter registration computer system is programmed to calculate
the age of the applicant, based on the date of birth the registrant
provides, and reject applications of individuals who will be younger than
18 years of age on the day of the next election. Michigan's computer
system accepts registrations from voters who are at least 17- 1/2 years of
age; however, the names will not appear on a precinct list until the voter
has reached the age of 18. In addition, Arizona and Michigan election
officials match their voter registration applications against the state
motor vehicle agency's records to verify the information.

California's MVA procedure manual instructs clerks to "flag" voter
registration applications for election officials if they have concerns
about a voter registration applicant's age. According to the MVA manual,
if the birth date on the voter registration form does not agree with the
birth date on documentation, clerks are to note "BD" on the voter
registration form so election officials will know to verify the birth
date. However, neither of the local election officials we spoke with in
this state recalled having an application flagged by the MVA for closer
review of an applicant's age. None of the officials in other states
(excluding Wisconsin, which is not currently subject to the NVRA
requirement to register voters at motor vehicle agencies because of
certain NVRA exemption provisions for states

allowing voters to register on Election Day) reported having a policy for
motor vehicle agency clerks to share eligibility concerns.

                          Verification of citizenship

All election officials we spoke with told us that non-citizens are not
permitted to vote in elections, including non-federal elections.16
Citizenship eligibility was based on applicant self-attestation in all
seven states, with application blocks that must be checked by the
applicant specifically affirming U.S. citizenship. Five of the states
require applicants to swear, affirm, or attest that they are U.S. citizens
in addition to checking the block. In Texas applicants affirmed that they
understood giving false information is perjury and a crime under state and
federal law. In Wisconsin, applicants are to certify that they meet all
the voter registration requirements, and, according to Wisconsin state
law, the municipal clerk or board of election commissioners may require
naturalized applicants to show their naturalization certificates. New York
State election officials said that their state law entitles any voter to
challenge a person's right to vote if they think that voter is not a
citizen.

As with age, California's MVA procedure manual instructs clerks to "flag"
voter registration applications if citizenship status is in question by
writing "US" on the corner of the form. According to the manual, when
immigration documents provided to a MVA staff do not confirm citizenship,
the staff is to remind the customer of the voter registration eligibility
requirements. If the customer still desires to submit a voter registration
application, the staff places the notation on the form. No other state
that we visited has this provision. Many of the motor vehicle officials we
spoke with stated a view that it was up to state election officials to
determine a registrant's eligibility to vote, not the motor vehicle
agency, and that all applications are forwarded to election officials.

In Arizona, a ballot initiative passed in November 2004 that will require
proof of citizenship to register to vote (and identification upon voting).
The registration requirement does not apply to those who are currently
registered, or when a registrant changes their registration address within
a single county. Arizona's Secretary of State, as of March 4, 2005, was
determining which forms of identification will be acceptable as proof.

16New York state election officials said that until 2003, when the
administration of school elections was transferred to the New York City
Department of Education, non-citizens with a student in a New York City
school were allowed to vote in school board elections.

According to Arizona draft procedures released for public comment,
acceptable identification included

o  a copy of a birth certificate that verifies citizenship,

o  a copy of pertinent passport pages of a U.S. passport,

o  a copy of naturalization documents,

o  selected Bureau of Indian affairs documents, and

o  	Arizona driver's license or non operating license issued after October
1, 1996, or the equivalent government document from another state if the
agency indicates on the applicant's driver license or nonoperating license
that the person has provided satisfactory proof of U.S. citizenship.

Figure 1 shows sections of the draft proposed application requiring
citizenship information that was made available for public comment.
According to local election officials in one Arizona jurisdiction, mail
applications will not be processed without citizenship documentation. The
applicants will be sent a letter asking for documentation, and the letter
will include a list of documents that are acceptable as proof of
citizenship.

Figure 1: Arizona Draft Voter Registration Application Requiring Proof of
Citizenship

Some local election jurisdictions receive information from county jury
administrators to help identify potential non-citizens on voter
registration lists. County jury pools are drawn from a variety of sources,
which may include voter registration lists. In five of the states we
visited, county jury administrators use voter registration lists, and
potential jurors are asked to indicate citizenship status on jury service
screening questionnaires. In 4 of the 10 local jurisdictions in those five
states, election officials said they receive notification from county jury
administrators when a potential juror claimed to be a non-citizen as a
justification for being excused from jury

duty. None of the local election officials said that they receive
notifications from federal jury administrators.

In addition to the state or local election jurisdiction efforts to help
ensure registrants are eligible based on citizenship, Federal Election
Commission (FEC)17 officials noted that some federal measures have been
adopted to discourage non-citizens from registering to vote. Measures
include:

o  	possible deportation, under immigration laws, for knowingly making a
false statement about citizenship status to register;

o  	the NVRA requirement that applications list eligibility requirements
(including citizenship);

o  	the prohibition in federal law on governmental use of a voter
registration card for a federal election as proof of U.S. citizenship; and

o  	the HAVA requirement that a statement identifying eligibility
requirements, including citizenship, be included on voter registration
applications.

Nevertheless, the FEC officials noted that non-citizens may be encouraged
to register to vote because the I-9 form used to provide proof of
employment eligibility and its implementing regulations18 includes, among
other documents, the voter registration card as an acceptable document for
employment identity purposes.

    Verification of criminal status

In six of the seven states we visited, the eligibility of applicants, in
terms of criminal status, was based on the self-certification signed by
registration applicants. In Arizona, Texas, and Virginia, the application
includes language specifically certifying eligibility based on criminal
status. In New York and Wisconsin, applicants certify to a general
statement that they meet all the requirements to register for their state,
which includes a restriction based on criminal status. California uses
both specific and general attestations. Michigan applicants do not attest
to their criminal status, but voting is prohibited only for those serving
time in prison or jail.

17Prior to HAVA, the FEC's Office of Election Administration was the
federal focal point for election administration issues. This office was
transferred to the EAC as part of HAVA.

188 C.F.R. S: 274a.2-Verification of Employment Eligibility.

According to election officials, they do not accept voter registrations or
absentee ballots from prison addresses. Examples of the at testation
language used on voter registration applications are presented in figure
2.

Figure 2: Virginia and Wisconsin Voter Registration Attestations Regarding
Criminal Status

Source: Voter registration forms provided by Virginia and Wisconsin
election officials.

Officials in Arizona, California, New York, Texas, and Virginia said they
receive state court information on felony convictions to remove voter
registrants no longer eligible to vote based on a criminal conviction.
Court information on felons in these states was provided to election
officials in different formats and at different intervals. The data came
in either paper or electronic format depending on the location. State
election officials in two states said that the format varied by county
within their states. Election officials in the five states reported
receiving information at different intervals, such as weekly, monthly,
intermittently, or biannually.

State election officials in six of the seven states and 9 of the 14 local
election officials said that they received information on federal felony

convictions. Most election officials said the information was received on
a sporadic or intermittent basis, in a paper format.

Michigan election officials do not receive information from state courts
on felony convictions. Officials there told us that state felony
conviction information was not needed because they only restrict the right
to vote while the person is incarcerated. Local election officials in
Wisconsin said they do not receive state felony conviction information.
The Wisconsin state election official said that felon records are diffused
and difficult to compare with voter lists. Wisconsin plans to create a
statewide database that will consolidate criminal records from 17
different correctional databases, the state election official said.
However, the system will not be available by the January 1, 2006, HAVA
deadline, according to the state election official.

The laws in five of the states we visited (California, New York, Texas,
Wisconsin, and Arizona), for first-time felony convictions, allow felons
to gain eligibility to vote when a felony sentence is completed-which can
include time on probation, parole, payment of fines, or supervision
related to the conviction. States do not require proof that the
non-incarcerated segments of a sentence be completed, according to all of
the officials we spoke with and state regulations we reviewed in those
states.

    Verification of mental competence

Six of the seven states we visited have a state law that disqualifies
persons legally declared to be mentally incompetent or incapacitated from
registering to vote and cancels the voter's registration upon such
adjudication. Michigan's constitution has provided that the legislature
may, by law, exclude persons from voting because of mental incompetence,
but no such law has been enacted. Wisconsin limits disqualifications based
on mental incompetence to those where a court specifically determines that
the registrant is incapable of understanding the objective of the
electoral process. State and local election officials in Arizona,
California, New York, Texas, and Virginia reported that courts notify
registrars periodically when adjudications on mental incompetence are
made. Two rural jurisdictions reported that family members or caretakers
sometimes notify the registrar of mental competency adjudications. In one
Texas jurisdiction, the election official said that the court sends a
notice to the county elections office, which in turn sends a letter to the
voter confirming the voter's removal from the registration list.

Verification of residency

Officials we spoke with in the seven states said that in addition to
initially checking that an applicant resides in the jurisdiction (either
by using an automated address file or manually checking), they also use a
variety of sources to periodically verify their voter lists for
registrants who may have moved. The National Change of Address (NCOA)
list19 is used by Virginia state officials on a yearly basis and used in
at least one of the local election jurisdictions we visited in Arizona,
California, New York, and Virginia. How often the national list was
checked varied, but of the eight jurisdictions using this source, five
said they checked on an annual basis. Twice a year, New York county
election officials send their voter lists to state officials for
comparison with the NCOA list, according to a state election official.
Election officials in every state said returned mail was used, either at
the state or local election level-some on a daily basis, others
intermittently, annually, or before a major election. Ensuring that
registrants live in an election jurisdiction is generally a task for local
election officials but can be part of a statewide system, as in Michigan,
where the voter registration system electronically assigns the voter's
jurisdiction based on the address provided by the registrant. Residency is
further verified by the mailing of a non-forwardable voter identification
card to each new registrant in Michigan.20

    Identification of duplicate registrations

For duplicate registrations, election officials said that existing voter
lists are checked by election officials before adding a new registrant or
are checked periodically. In the case of Arizona, Michigan, and Virginia,
the statewide voter registration system enables jurisdictions to identify
duplicates statewide. California and Texas state election officials said
they compare local jurisdiction records and will notify local officials of
potential duplicates. New York and Wisconsin primarily check for
duplicates within the election jurisdiction. Some officials also reported
periodically checking against other data sources, noted below. Officials
reported using varying combinations of name, address, and other
identifying information collected on the application to identify existing
registrations, such as social security number in Virginia. In Michigan,

19The U.S. Post Office National Change of Address list is compiled from
change of address forms filed by individuals who have moved and want their
mail forwarded to their new address.

20In Michigan, the address for a state identification card or license and
voter registration must be the same. These files are linked to
automatically update each file of the addresses changes.

election officials demonstrated how the states voter registration file has
computer software with a search capability to identify similar names as
potential duplicates. These similar names are researched manually to
determine whether they are actually duplicates.

The data sources state and local election officials reported checking to
identify duplications and ensure that registrants reside in the election
district varied in terms of what information was used, and the frequency
of use. Sources included

o  National Change of Address List,

o  return mailings of non-deliverable mail,

o  individuals reporting an address change,

o  	notice from other election jurisdictions or state election officials
of a change, and

o  a check against state MVA records.

    Identification of deceased registrants

  Election Officials Identified Challenges to Verify Voter Registration
  Eligibility

State vital statistics offices in six of the seven states reported that
they provide data periodically-from weekly to quarterly-to election
officials to identify registrants who have died. In addition to state
vital statistics, state and local officials said they use various sources
of data to identify deceased voter registrants on their registration
lists. Data sources included

o  county Vital Statistics Office records,

o  newspaper obituaries, and

o  	miscellaneous sources, such as family members, city vital statistics
offices, funeral homes, the U. S. Postal Service, probate courts, and
MVAs.

Wisconsin local and state election officials said that state vital
statistics are not currently used to identify deceased registrants. Local
election officials said they review obituaries to identify deceased
persons.

Ensuring that voter lists are accurate is a task that has challenged
election officials across the country for some time and was also a concern
of election officials in the seven states we visited. Officials in one
jurisdiction characterized voter registration lists as dynamic and
constantly changing. In larger jurisdictions the task of identifying and
removing registrants who died can be substantial; for example, according
to Center for Disease Controls and Prevention records, almost 300 persons
died in the first week of 2005 in the city of Los Angeles. If verification
information is available to

officials at all, then quality considerations become a factor, such as the
timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of the data. Some challenges faced
by election officials, particularly identifying duplicates in other
jurisdictions within the state, may be reduced with the implementation of
the HAVA-required statewide, computerized voter registration lists; but
the data availability and quality considerations may continue to be
issues.

FEC reports have documented problems in maintaining accurate voter
registration lists. The reports are mandated by Congress to document the
impact of NVRA provisions, including provisions to ensure that voter lists
are accurate by removing those who are no longer eligible.21 The number of
states identifying problems has diminished since the NVRA was first
implemented. The FEC reported in 1998 that officials in 26 states reported
problems including duplicate registrations, inaccurate information for
matching, and the difficulty of removing names without confirmation.22 The
number of states identifying voter list maintenance challenges to FEC
dropped from 26 in 1998 to 6 states in the 2001-2002 report, with the most
commonly reported change being that states implemented or enhanced their
computerized voter registration lists.

Some of the concerns highlighted below remain problems for election
officials and may not be addressed by a statewide voter list. Based on a
national survey of local election officials, we reported in 200123 on the
challenge of continually updating and deleting information from voter
registration lists, and the concerns of election officials in obtaining
accurate and timely information to keep voter lists accurate.

Voter registration list maintenance challenges that were identified by
officials in the seven states we visited, and in the prior reports are
described below.

21Section 9 of the NVRA requires the FEC to report to Congress by June 30
of each oddnumbered year. A Report to the 108th Congress: The Impact of
the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of
Elections for Federal Office, 2001-2002, is the most recent report. HAVA
transferred responsibility for the report to the EAC.

22NVRA covers 44 states and the District of Columbia, according to DOJ. In
the 1998 FEC survey, 43 of the 45 responded. The report was silent
regarding whether similar issues existed beyond the 26 states' reporting
problems.

23GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the
Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

o  	Deceased Persons: The timeliness of death data was a concern
identified by state level election officials in all but Wisconsin and
Arizona and by local election officials in three of the jurisdictions we
visited.24 Concerns echoed many of the same issues raised in earlier
reports. For example, Texas officials said that the health data they
receive identifying deaths is about 3 to 4 months old, resulting in some
deceased voters remaining on the voter registration list possibly through
an election period. Another concern raised by a local Michigan official
was the lack of birth dates on some state death records, resulting in
difficulty identifying which voter of several with the same name actually
passed away. Identifying deaths occurring outside of the state was a
problem raised by election officials at the state and local levels in New
York, and by local officials in one Arizona jurisdiction. Local New York
officials said that when residents spend part of the year in other parts
of the country and pass away there, they may not get a record of death in
a timely manner. The 1998 FEC report highlighted this as an issue, noting
the problem of identifying residents who die outside of the state or local
jurisdiction because they may not be identified in vital statistics
reports they receive.25

o  	Citizenship: The concern for election officials we spoke with
regarding a registrant's eligibility based on citizenship was the reliance
on selfattestation. As stated by the FEC, the challenge for states is to
develop procedures that maintain the integrity of the election process
without penalizing the majority of applicants, who are law abiding
citizens.26 Two types of standard sources of identification, such as a
driver's license, state identification or social security numbers are not
useful because neither are evidence of citizenship. Other sources, such as
a passport or birth certificate more clearly indicate citizenship.
However, these sources may not be available, or conveniently at hand for
all who would like to register to vote, according to a review by election
officials in Philadelphia.27

24Officials were asked in general terms about data considerations. We did
not determine if the same issues existed in other jurisdictions if it was
not mentioned.

25Implementing the NVRA: A Report to State and Local Election Officials on
Problems and Solutions Discovered 1995-1996., Federal Election Commission,
March 1998, pp.5 -19.

26Federal Election Commission March 1998, pp 5 -25.

27Administration of Voter Registration, Qualification of Applicants and
Registrants Verification of Citizenship, March 2001, City Commissioner's
Office, Philadelphia County.

o  	Criminal Information: Criminal information is often incomplete, not
timely, or difficult to decipher. One state official and six local
election officials we visited stated concerns about the timeliness or
accuracy of the criminal information they receive for removing ineligible
persons from the voter registration list. For example, New York officials
said that the birth date on conviction notifications was sometimes not
included, which meant there could be multiple matches on the same name.
Wisconsin officials do not receive data from state courts on felony
convictions, the state and local officials in one jurisdiction said. Lack
of complete information is a concern that has been raised in jurisdictions
outside the ones we visited. For example, a recent audit of the voter list
in the City of St. Louis reported identifying over 900 possible voting
felons on the City's voters list that were not identified by city election
officials, primarily because the information they had to identify the
felons was incomplete.28Auditors reported that a primary reason so many
were not removed was that election officials only received conviction
reports from the local court and not from other sources, such as the state
or county. Other officials we interviewed stated that the information they
did receive on felony convictions, particularly from federal sources, was
not useful because it was old, had limited matching criteria, or was in
different formats and hard to decipher.

In addition to a need for more complete or useful information on
convictions, it may be difficult for election officials to determine when
a convicted felon is eligible to reregister. In five of the seven states
we visited, and many others around the country, 29 felons may reregister
after serving their sentence, which could include parole or probation if
applicable under that state's law. Arizona (for one felony conviction),
California, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin officials cancel a voter's
registration based on court notification of a felony conviction, but
officials noted that they relied on an applicant's attestation of
eligibility to reregister because no verification is required to document
the

28Board of Election Commissioners, City of St. Louis., Office of the State
Auditor of Missouri, May 26, 2004. Potential felons on the City of St.
Louis voter list were identified by matching the voter list with
convictions outside the City, based on matches of name, date of birth, and
full or partial SSN where available. Auditors noted that each instance had
to be investigated thoroughly before taking legal action or removing
registrants from the voter list.

29Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States. The Sentencing
Project, April 2005, identifies 35 states where felons may reregister
after the completion of their sentence.

completion of a felon's sentence. Arizona (for persons convicted of two or
more felonies) and Virginia require that felons have their rights restored
before they can register to vote-by a judge in Arizona after more than one
felony conviction and by the Governor in Virginia. Arizona does not
require proof of restoration. Virginia's application asks specifically if
voting rights have been restored and the date when they were restored.
Arizona officials said they looked into the feasibility of the court
system notifying the Secretary of State when someone was released from
prison, completed probation, and paid any fine or restitution. However,
all three events are not clearly defined according to these Arizona
officials, and no workable solution was found. Michigan restores voting
rights upon release from incarceration.

o  	Duplicate Registrant: Officials in 7 of the 21 state and local
election jurisdictions we spoke with had some concern with the timeliness
or accuracy of the data they receive to identify duplicate registrants or
verify registrants reside within the jurisdiction. The matching and
validation of names are complex and made more so when considering aliases
and name changes, as are matches such as "Margie L. Smith" with "Margaret
Smith" according to a Wisconsin study.30 The study estimated that even a 1
percent error rate on a match validating names, driver license numbers,
etc., could generate tens of thousands of bad matches. Officials from
several states that do not have a statewide database noted that there was
no way to identify duplicates outside their jurisdiction. New York state
election officials said there is currently no way to systematically clear
duplicates in the state. Officials rely on voters to identify if they have
registered elsewhere. This problem was documented in the review of the
City of St. Louis voter registration list, where auditors reported
identifying about 13,600 potential duplicates on voter lists in other
election jurisdictions in Missouri.31 Followup would be needed to
determine which registrations were actual duplicates.

None of the officials we spoke with reported that they check for voter
registration duplication in other states. Texas state election officials
said they only received information from other states when the other
state's application asks where the person was previously registered, the

30Project Charter: Statewide Voter Registration System prepared for the
Wisconsin State Election Board, May 15, 2003, by Virchow Krause and
Company.

31Office of the State Auditor of Missouri, May 26, 2004.

person completes that portion of the form, and the information is
forwarded to Texas. Texas does not forward information on new applicants
from other states because the Texas application only asks for prior city
and county in Texas. Local election officials in Arizona, Michigan, and
Texas said they sometimes get reports of registrants relocating from other
states. According to an EAC Commissioner in April 2005 (also the Chair for
the EAC) making statewide voter registration systems compatible would be
extremely costly, and HAVA does not address interactivity among states.32

o  	Residency of Registrants: Election officials we contacted identified a
number of challenges to ensuring voter registrants reside within an
election jurisdiction, including matching problems based on missing
information or variation in how an address is listed, no street numbers in
rural areas, new streets, redistricting, or untimely forwarding of new
addresses. Officials in one local Arizona jurisdiction said residency
issues are complex because not all the properties in the county have
addresses. In one Wisconsin jurisdiction, election officials said they may
not get notice for 4 or 5 months that a registrant within their
jurisdiction has moved to another jurisdiction and, therefore, no longer
meets the residency requirement (during this time the voter could also be
registered twice). Michigan officials are considering using a Geographic
Information System to improve their ability to identify and map eligible
addresses for specific jurisdictions. Election officials reported to the
FEC in 1998 and 2002 that the process required for removing registrants
who have moved from the jurisdiction was a problem, for example, citing
the cost of confirmation mailings and people not providing forwarding
addresses.33 Furthermore, some state officials surveyed for our 2001
report stated that matches with the Postal Service's NCOA or information
from state motor vehicle agencies had potential drawbacks, such as the
verification costs or incomplete information. For example, the NCOA files
may not identify registrants who have moved if the voter did not submit a
change of address form. In addition, according to some of these state
officials, the names of ineligible registrants remained on the list
because officials could not obtain verification required to remove them.

32EAC Commissioner and Chair Gracia Hillman, speaking at the Commission on
Federal Election Reform hearing held on April 18, 2005, at American
University, Washington, D.C.

33Federal Election Commission, March 1998, pp.5 -43; Federal Election
Commission, 20012002, pp.19 - 20.

Four local election officials believed that self-certification is
sufficient because of the penalties for falsely registering, or did not
believe that ineligible voters were of concern. State and local election
officials who we interviewed said that they have had few voter
registration fraud34 allegations pertaining to eligibility requirements.
Many of the jurisdictions we visited said that they have reported
instances of voter registration fraud allegations to appropriate agencies
for investigation. We contacted District Attorneys covering election
jurisdictions in the seven states, and they reported that they prosecuted
some cases related to ineligible registrants or voter fraud. For example,
in California, a state with an investigative unit dedicated to voter fraud
issues, 15 cases of the 108 allegations for fraudulent voter registration
opened from January 2001 to May 2004 were sent to the District Attorney
for prosecution. Of the 15 cases, the outcome had been determined in 11
cases (6 cases declined for prosecution, 5 were prosecuted and the
individuals were convicted). In four cases, the outcome is yet to be
determined. See appendix III for additional information on allegations of
voter registration fraud.

HAVA requirements for having a statewide voter registration list and
matching with other state databases are expected to improve the accuracy
of voter lists, particularly for identifying duplicates in other
jurisdictions within the state. Election officials we spoke with for our
2001 report and those we spoke with recently for this report stated that
statewide voter lists helped in solving some accuracy problems. Michigan
officials stated that when its statewide database was first created in
1998, over 600,000 duplicate voter registration records were eliminated.
Arizona local officials said that their concerns about the timeliness and
accuracy were less, now that state election officials managed the process
through the statewide voter list. For example, state Vital Statistics data
are received more frequently so that registrants who have died can be more
quickly removed. For some jurisdictions, such as those in Wisconsin that
do not receive death or felony information, the HAVA requirements to match
the statewide voter list with state records on felons and death are to
provide information not now available for removing ineligible registrants.

34Election fraud is conduct that corrupts the electoral processes for (1)
registering voters; (2) obtaining, marking, or tabulating ballots; or (3)
canvassing and certifying election results. Types of fraudulent conduct
include, among others, voting by ineligibles, voting more than once, voter
impersonation, intentional disruption of polling process either physically
or by corrupting tabulating software, or destroying ballots or voter
registrations.

Some concerns, such as timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of the data
used to match against voter lists, may continue to be issues, even after
the HAVA requirements are fully implemented. For example, the 1998 FEC
report noted that states making good faith attempts to remove from the
registry the names of persons no longer eligible to vote (e.g., deceased
persons, ineligible felons, and those who have moved) are stymied when
they receive inaccurate, incomplete, or outof-date information. These
concerns might continue with the voter registration lists as, for example,
Virginia officials stated that there is a 3-month delay in receiving vital
statistics data on deceased persons because that is how long it takes for
processing. Virginia officials also identified a need for state standards
for the exchange of information from state to state regarding voters who
move from one state to another.

Even in states with a statewide system for comparison, duplicate
registrations can be added. As one local Michigan election official
stated, if the system does not recognize that the registrant is already on
the registration list, a new voter record is created. For example, Micky
Jones and J. William Jones, Jr., might not be recognized as the same
individual. A 2003 audit by the Michigan Office of the Auditor General
identified approximately 24,000 potential duplicates in the state voter
registration list, and about 10,000 registered voters with inaccurate
birth dates. State agency officials attributed the duplicates as
registrations that remain to be verified as the result of inaccurate or
incomplete data received during the conversion of records to the state
voter list in 1998, and the federal and state requirements that must be
followed before records can be removed. Further, officials noted that tens
of thousands of duplicates from voters moving within Michigan have been
prevented by the voter registration system.

In the seven states we visited, progress varied in carrying out HAVA
requirements to (1) implement a computerized statewide voter registration
list; (2) verify voter application information with state MVA or SSA
records and (3) match the voter list with state records on deaths and
felony convictions. Six of the seven states (except Arizona) applied for a
waiver of these requirements until January 1, 2006. The six states that
applied for a waiver said they plan to meet the 2006 requirements
deadline; however, their progress varies.

  The Seven States Are in Different Phases of Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter
  Registration Lists and Eligibility Verification Requirements

    Computerized Voter Registration List Completion Closer in Some States Than
    Others

Arizona, which did not request a waiver, implemented a statewide voter
list which became operational in December 2003, prior to the HAVA January
1, 2004, deadline. Of the six states visited that requested a waiver until
2006, Michigan had a statewide voter registration database, called the
Qualified Voter File (QVF) that has been operational since 1998. According
to a state election official, Michigan has about 90 percent of the changes
in place to meet HAVA requirements. Still remaining is a change to match
QVF data to SSA data. Contracts have been awarded for development of
statewide computerized voter registration lists in Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin, with completion by the January 1, 2006, deadline as part of the
contracts. Virginia currently has a statewide database but is replacing it
to be fully compliant with all state and federal laws governing voter
registration and elections, according to the request for proposals for the
new system. States are eligible to receive federal payments to meet HAVA
requirements (which may be used to develop or modify a statewide voter
registration list) after complying with certain requirements, such as
filing a state plan and appropriating funds to match up to 5 percent of
the federal funding the state would receive. Table 2 details selected
activities that the six states are to implement related to the statewide
voter registration list.

     Table 2: Selected Activities to Help Implement HAVA Voter Registration
                           Requirements in Six States

     States we                                                 
      reviewed                                                 
that requested EAC approved    State        State issued    
       waiver     HAVA          authorized     request for     
from HAVA 2004  state plan   "matching"     proposal to      State awarded 
                   in fiscal     funds to        develop             contract 
      database     year 2004   receive HAVA computerized list     (date of    
      deadline                 funding                           contract)    
         CA           Yes          Yes       To be determined      To be      
                                                                 determined   
         MI           Yes          Yes      Not applicable                    
                                            (there will be     Not applicable
                                              no request for   
                                                proposal)      
         NY           Yes          Yes              No               No       
         TX           Yes          Yes             Yes           Yes (Oct.    
                                                                   2004)      
         VA           Yes          Yes             Yes           Yes (Mar.    
                                                                   2004)      
         WI           Yes          Yes             Yes           Yes (Nov.    
                                                                   2004)      

Source: GAO analysis.

The contracts in Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin have been designed to help
the states implement functions specified under HAVA for creating a unified
statewide voter list, as well as other functions. For example, Virginia's
contract for a new system supports the conduct of elections as well as
voter registration functions. Texas' voter registration database is to
include additional capabilities that can create jury summons, jury lists,
and track jurors and jury payments. Wisconsin's contract includes poll
worker

management requirements, including for example, poll worker training
information, certification level, and attendance.

California may not meet the HAVA voter registration list deadline,
according to the California State Auditor. A December 2004 state audit
concluded that California is at risk of failing to meet certain HAVA
requirements, for example, to provide a fully functioning statewide voter
registration database by the HAVA deadline, and questioned the use of some
HAVA funds.35 Based on the state report, the EAC initiated a special audit
in January 2005 to investigate potential misuse of HAVA funds in
California.

California's Final HAVA Plan36 identified a need to modify the existing
statewide database or establish a new database to be in compliance with
HAVA. The state issued a request for information in July 2004 to gather
information on alternatives to replace the current statewide list
"Calvoter" with a system that meets HAVA requirements. In late April 2005,
the plan was to modify the Calvoter system rather than replace it.
However, according to the state's new HAVA Coordinator, as of May 11,
2005, the new Secretary of State is revisiting the earlier HAVA plans and
evaluating the approach they will take in meeting HAVA compliance. The
administrator said they realize there is a January 1, 2006, deadline, and
the statewide database is a priority.

In New York, legislation directing the creation of a statewide voter list
was signed May 3, 2005. The next step, according to a state election
office official, is to obtain consultant services to develop a request for
proposal for a contractor to create the statewide voter list. The state
board of elections is to establish rules and regulations needed for
compliance by July 1, 2005. While state officials will give their best
effort to meeting the January 1, 2006, deadline, it will be difficult, the
official said. According to the legislation, New York's voter list will be
created by combining the existing voter lists maintained by each local
board of election into a single integrated list, and the state will update
it regularly.

35Office of the Secretary of State: Clear and Appropriate Direction Is
Lacking in Its Implementation of the Federal Help America Vote Act,
California State Auditor, December 2004, report number 2004-139.

36My Vote Counts, California's Plan for Voting in the 21st Century,.
Secretary of State, September 2003.

    Progress to Verify Voter Applications with MVA Has Been Made in Most of the
    Seven States We Visited, but Verification Has Not yet Taken Place with SSA

HAVA requires that voter registration applicants for federal elections
provide an identification number that can be matched with other records
for verification.37 Applicants are to be asked for their state driver's
license or state identification number obtained through state MVAs, or (if
an applicant does not provide either state number) the last 4 digits of
their social security number for this purpose. An eligible applicant who
does not have a state driver's license, state identification card, or a
social security card can still register to vote. In those cases, election
officials are required to assign the registrant a unique identification
number. Of the six states we reviewed that requested waivers, several have
moved forward in arranging for verification of voter registration
applicants with state MVA records. Election and MVA officials in Arizona,
Michigan, and New York have agreements for voter registration applications
to be verified with motor vehicle agency records. In Michigan, because
both functions are under the Secretary of State, the agreement is between
units within the Secretary of State's office and has been in place since
1997. Arizona election officials and the state MVA agreed in June 2002 to
verify information from voter registration applicants. Depending on how
the Arizona county decides to proceed, the entire voter list or just
information on new applicants is to be sent to the Secretary of State and
matched with MVA records on a daily basis. The match is sent back to each
county to resolve any discrepancies. Each record is to be given a code
indicating the type of follow-up needed, if any, for that voter
registrant.

In fall 2004, election officials said that New York began matching voter
registration applications under an interim process where counties send the
information for verification to the MVA. According to these officials,
when the statewide list is in operation the matching will be done by state
officials, but the results will be sent to local election officials for
resolving any discrepancies, as is the case now under the interim process.
California's HAVA Administrator said the connectivity of the statewide
database with other state agency records was part of the strategy being
considered by the Secretary of State.

Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin included matching with motor vehicle agency
records as part of their database development contracts. Texas defines the
validation of voter driver's license numbers by the MVA as a

37HAVA section 303 (a)(5)(A). Section 303 (a)(5)(B) requires state
election officials to verify the accuracy of the voter registration
application information by matching it with the state motor vehicle agency
database records.

key feature of their new system. Virginia's contract requires matching
voter applicant information with the MVA records on a real-time basis. The
MVA is 1 of 10 agencies that the Virginia system is to interface with.
Wisconsin's voter registration system contract requires the contractor to
prepare a document describing the interface strategy for matching the
voter registration list with other state agencies' data.

HAVA requires that MVAs enter into an agreement with SSA to match selected
voter registrant information with SSA records when a voter registration
applicant provides their 4-digit social security number for verification
purposes. Of the seven states we reviewed, Virginia is not subject to this
HAVA requirement because of a HAVA exemption for certain states such as
Virginia that require applicants to provide their full social security
number on their voter registration application, and the state can decide
to use SSA's online verification system.38 None of the remaining six
states have signed agreements with the SSA to verify voter applicant
information. An Arizona motor vehicle agency official said that they
expect the agreement with SSA will be signed in June 2005,39 and the
remaining five states requested a waiver from this requirement until
January 2006. A Social Security administrator reported that, as of
February 2005, only Iowa and Idaho had signed agreements.

To implement the HAVA verification requirement, SSA developed a new
program using only 4 digits. This program-called the Help America Vote
Verification program (HAVV)-receives voter registration "transactions"
through an arrangement with the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators (AAMVA). All requests from states for voter registration
verification are electronically sent to AAMVA, which then sends them to
SSA.40 For each transaction, SSA compares a voter registration applicant's
name, date of birth, and last 4-digit social security number against SSA
records. SSA records have a "death indicator" if SSA has been notified
that

38Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia require full social security numbers on voter registration
applications and the state MVAs have existing agreements with SSA for
verifying against SSA records using the complete number. The agreements
would need to be modified to reflect use for voter registration
verification purposes.

39An Arizona Department of Transportation official said the agency
computer programmers needed to implement the Memorandum of Understanding
and are working on other projects that they expect will be available in
June 2005.

40With the exception of the covered U.S. territories, such as Guam and
Puerto Rico, that do not have connections with AAMVA.

the person with that social security number is deceased. Based on the
match, a result code is assigned for the transaction, and the result is
returned to AAMVA, which forwards results to state motor vehicle agencies
who, in turn, provide the results to election officials. Only one of the
codes indicates a one-to-one match between the voter registrant
information and SSA records. However, six other codes may be generated for
the registrant indicating some combination of multiple matches with the
registrant or that the matching records indicate at least one of the
matches is deceased. Figure 3 graphically describes the HAVV process.

Figure 3: Process for Verifying Voter Registration Applicant Information
with SSA

Source: GAO analysis of SSA data.

SSA stated that there were too many variables to predict the number of SSA
verifications that might be processed, but based on the numbers in Iowa,
the only state to use HAVV as of February 2005, about 1 percent of
applicants provided the 4-digit number. The HAVV verification service is
for new voter registration applicants, not for voters already on state
voter registration rolls. Of the 7,231 voter registration transactions
sent to SSA by Iowa in 2004 for verification, 4,631 (64 percent) were
returned as "one unique match-no death indicator present," and another 14
transactions were "one unique match-death indicator." No unique match was
found for the remaining 2,586 transactions, according to SSA records.
According

to SSA, agency records and verification procedures are normally based on
using the full 9-digit social security number. When that number is paired
with specific individual information, the result is a unique match. With
only the last 4 digits of the social security number, the match results
may not be unique. Iowa officials said that the biggest problem they are
facing is that SSA is not specifying what voter information was not
matching, (i.e., was the mismatch in name, date of birth, or 4-digit
social security number). Without this information they are not able to
efficiently resolve the non-matching problems. An SSA official said that
the HAVV system is not able to provide this detail.

Most state election officials we spoke with were still determining the
process they would follow when a voter registration sent to SSA (or to
their MVA) for verification was returned with something other than one
live match (e.g., several live matches or a death indicator for the
match). In Iowa, the only state to have used the SSA verification system
as of February 2005, officials said they first tried reentering the data
with variations of the name and date of birth (i.e., Bill for William) and
ensuring numbers that can be mistaken are correct. Iowa officials said
that they send a letter to registrants asking them to clarify or come in
and reregister. Arizona and Wisconsin said that a matching protocol still
needed to be worked out, but any inconsistent or questionable matches
would be resolved by local election officials. AAMVA officials and some of
its members identified the variation in names as a factor in finding no
match with SSA records. For example, the Virginia MVA representative said
that when the MVA matched its entire driver's license database with SSA
using the full social security number, most of the 3 percent of mismatches
were women who had registered using their married name but had not changed
their name with the SSA.

SSA is to be reimbursed by the states and territories required to verify
voter applicants with SSA for certain HAVV costs, which could include, for
example development, start-up, and maintenance, as well as for voter
registration applicant verifications.41 HAVV development and start-up
costs estimated by SSA are approximately $1.3 million, and yearly
maintenance is estimated to be about $200,000. Development and ongoing
costs are divided among the entities based on the proportionate share of
national HAVA funds received by the state or territory. For verification,
SSA's current fee is $0.0062 per record. In addition, a fee for AAMVA
services is

41 42 U.S.C. S: 405(r).

to be added by AAMVA. SSA estimated HAVV development reimbursement costs
for Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin to be
approximately $25,000, $163,000, $49,000, $95,000, and $27,000,
respectively. (States that collect full social security number for voter
registration, including Virginia, are exempt from HAVV costs because they
may take advantage of existing verification programs.)

    Some States Already Meet HAVA Requirement to Match Registration List with
    State Records on Deceased Persons and Felons

Election officials in four of the states we visited-Arizona, Michigan, New
York, and Texas-foresaw no need to change their processes to meet HAVA
requirements regarding identifying registrants who are deceased.42 State
officials in all of these states but Wisconsin reported receiving State
Vital Statistics information on deceased individuals for matching against
voter lists. Arizona reported that the State Department of Health Services
provides monthly death data via computer-to-computer match of records to
the statewide voter database. Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, and
Texas state officials said the vital statistics information is forwarded
to each jurisdiction for verification. Virginia officials said that, once
the new database is in place, there will be an automated interface with
state vital statistics and with the SSA Death Master File (DMF).
Jurisdictions in Michigan receive information on deceased individuals from
the county and state vital statistics offices.

In California and Wisconsin, officials reported that the match of state
death records with the state voter registration list would be addressed
when their statewide database was complete. California is still
determining its strategy for database matching, according to a state
official. Wisconsin's request for proposal states that information from
the state vital statistics office will be integrated using a system the
state recently implemented for integrating state databases, but the
details are to be defined with input from the vendor selected to develop
the voter registration database.

To identify ineligible registrants based on felon status, New York and
Texas election officials said they already compare voter registration
records and state information on felons. Michigan election officials said
that they are in compliance because voting is restricted only for those
who are incarcerated. Arizona election officials said they receive some
felony

42HAVA requires the state to coordinate the computerized list with state
agency records on felony status and death.

  Information from Federal Sources Could Assist Election Officials in
  Identifying Ineligible Felons and Non-Citizens on Voter Registration Lists

information in a paper format now and are working with the Arizona State
Supreme Court to obtain information on felonies electronically on a weekly
basis. Similarly, Virginia has an electronic matching component in its
statewide voter registration database contract. Wisconsin officials told
us that records of felony convictions are diffused among 17 different
correctional databases with some in paper form. A state official said that
the state has plans to create a single state prison database that would be
matched against the state voter registration list, but the database might
not be complete by January 1, 2006. An election official in California
said that the connectivity of state databases with a state voter list is
part of what is currently being considered in planning for the state list.

Some federal data sources may help election officials identify ineligible
registrants. Although the number of ineligible registrants may be small,
identifying these ineligible voters may be important when an election is
close. To assist in identifying ineligible felons, federal law requires
U.S. Attorneys to notify state election officials of felony convictions in
district courts. In the district courts serving the seven states we
visited, 16 U.S. Attorney offices report sending notices to election
officials and 3 offices reported that they were implementing or modifying
their processes to provide this information on felony convictions in U.S.
district courts. According to state and local election officials with whom
we spoke in the seven states, federal felony information was not always
provided in a standard format and the information was sometimes difficult
to interpret, untimely, or incomplete. A second source to identify
ineligible voter registrants could be the federal jury administrators.
Although not required to share information with election officials, the
jury administrators could help identify potential voter registrants who
are non-citizens on the basis of information potential jurors provide when
identifying themselves as non-citizens on their jury service
questionnaire. Other federal data sources-DHS databases and SSA's Death
Master File-might identify additional ineligible voter registrants;
however, the potential is limited because of difficulties such as matching
information from these sources with voter registrant information.

U.S. Attorneys Are Under federal law,43 U.S. Attorneys are required to
give written notice of Required to Provide felony convictions in federal
district courts to the chief state election Information on Felons official
of the offender's state of residence upon conviction of the Convicted in
Federal Court offender. The law also requires the state election officials
to notify the

election officials of the local jurisdiction in which an offender resides
ofto Election Officials but federal felony convictions. In the year ending
March 31, 2004, 74,642Have Not Done So criminal defendants were convicted
and sentenced in U.S. district courts. Consistently According to the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, of the 69,023 federal offenders for whom sentencing
data were available, 59,554 were sentenced to prison in fiscal year 2003.

The U.S. Attorney notification to state officials is required to include

o  the name of the offender,

o  the offender's age and residence address,

o  the date of entry of the judgment,

o  a description of the offenses of which the offender was convicted, and

o  the sentence imposed by the court.

EOUSA provided us information on how 19 U.S. Attorneys' offices in the
seven states we visited were implementing the law, which became effective
in 1993. Sixteen of the offices reported that they were sending notices of
certain felony convictions in U.S. district courts to state election
officials. Officials in three U.S. Attorneys' offices reported that they
were implementing or modifying their processes to provide this information
on felony convictions in U.S. district courts. According to an EOUSA
official, one U.S. Attorneys' office expects to have a fully functioning
notification system in place in the future but no specific time frame was
provided. A second U.S. Attorneys' office is instituting a policy to
consistently provide conviction data, according to EOUSA. In the third
U.S. Attorneys' office, EOUSA said the support staff person assigned to
each felony case will email required information to the state election
official. This U.S. Attorneys' office reported to EOUSA that it has
modified the criminal case intake form to include the defendant's state of
residence to help ensure that the information is available upon
conviction. The same office also reported that it is now working on new
quality control procedures for case management data. When completed, a
list of felons is to be created and

43 42 U.S.C. S: 1973gg-6(g). This provision was enacted into law in 1993
in section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act.

felony conviction notices are to be sent to state election officials. In
all of the above cases no timeframe for implementation was provided.

The law does not require standardized formats or time frames for reporting
the federal felony conviction data. In the 16 U.S. Attorneys' offices that
reported sending notices to state election officials, when the information
was sent varied, for example monthly, bi-weekly (when there are a
significant number of convictions to report), bi-monthly, quarterly,
several times a year, upon receipt of the judgment and commitment order,
and 6 months from the date of sentencing or later if the case is on
appeal, according to these U.S. Attorney's office officials. What
information was sent to election officials also varied (the judgment and
commitment order or the judgment and commitment order with a notification
letter) as did the process. For example:

o  	The designated paralegal prepares a monthly printout of the required
information, which is forwarded to the responsible assistant U.S. Attorney
to produce and send the information to the appropriate state officials.

o  	The supervisory legal assistant collects judgment and commitment
orders and mails them to the appropriate state agency.

o  	The judgment and commitment order is copied and then routed to the
first assistant U.S. Attorney, who reviews the order and then sends it to
the secretary to the U.S. Attorney. The secretary forwards the judgment
and commitment order directly to the election board of the secretary of
state.

o  	The judgment and commitment orders are collated by month of
imposition, sorted for approximately 6 months, and then compared to the
appellate docket to determine whether a defendant has appealed. If the
defendant has appealed, the judgment and commitment order is retained and
periodically checked to determine the outcome of the appeal. If there is
no appeal or when the appellate process is completed, the judgment and
commitment order is sent to the state election authority for the state the
defendant claims as his or her last residence.

State and local election officials in 7 of the 14 jurisdictions we visited
told us that they had concerns about the timeliness or accuracy of the
federal felony conviction notices they received. Election officials told
us that notices are not easy for them to use, such as determining the
length of

sentence. They also said birth dates on records were sometimes missing,
which can lead to multiple matches on the same name.

    Federal Jury Administrators in the U.S. District Courts Have Information
    about Non-Citizens Taken from Voter Registration Lists That Could Be Shared
    with Election Officials

Jurors must be U.S. citizens to serve on a jury in U.S. district court.
The federal jury administrators we surveyed by phone in all 14 U.S. court
districts that cover the local election jurisdictions we visited asked
about citizenship status on questionnaires sent to prospective jurors.44
Figure 4 provides an example of a juror qualification questionnaire from
the Eastern District of Virginia.

Figure 4: Federal Jury Qualification Questionnaire Requests Citizenship
Information

Source: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia.

All of the jury administrators45 for the U.S. district courts told us they
use voter registration lists to draw names for the jury pool. Ten of the
14

44County courts commonly used the term jury services to describe the
officials responsible for jury selection, whereas U.S. district courts
generally used the term jury administrators to describe the officials
responsible for the juries, according to AOUSC officials. For the purposes
of the report, we will use the term county jury administrators for county
jurisdictions and federal jury administrators for the federal court
system.

45Potential jurors for a U.S. district court are chosen by jury
administrators in each of the 94 district courts from a jury pool
generated by random selection of citizens' names from lists of registered
voters, or combined lists of voters and people with drivers' licenses, in
the judicial districts. The potential jurors complete questionnaires to
help determine whether they are qualified to serve on a jury. U.S.
citizenship is a qualification to be a juror.

district court administrators said they use only voter registration lists,
while the other 4 use voter lists in conjunction with other sources.46

According to officials of the AOUSC, it would be under penalty of perjury
to deliberately make false statements about citizenship on the
questionnaire, although the extent to which the matter is pursued is up to
each U.S. district court. Generally, districts we surveyed did not verify
claims of non-citizenship; however, two districts verified prospective
juror claims of non-citizenship. The Eastern District of Virginia called
prospective jurors to gather verbal confirmation of citizenship status and
the Eastern District of Michigan requires that immigration documentation
be provided to verify non-citizen status.

AOUSC officials and federal jury administrators we spoke with generally
did not have exact data on the number of people called for jury service
that responded that they were non-citizens. Consequently, no information
was available from federal jury administrators in six U.S. district
courts, but federal jury administrators in eight U.S. district courts
provided either exact numbers or estimates. Of the eight district courts,
four federal jury administrators said no one had been disqualified from
jury service because they were not U.S. citizens. In the other four
district courts:

o  	a federal jury administrator in one U.S. district court estimated that
1 to 3 percent of the people out of a jury pool of 30,000 over 2 years
(about 300 to 900 people) said they were not U.S. citizens;

o  	a federal jury administrator in a second U.S. district court estimated
that less than 1 percent of the people out of a jury pool of 35,000 names
each month (less than 350 people) said they were not U.S. citizens;

o  	a federal jury administrator in a third U.S. district court estimated
that about 150 people out of a jury pool of 95,000 names over 2 years said
they were not U.S. citizens; and

46Of the remaining courts, three use both voter registration lists and MVA
records. One uses voter registration, MVA, and state identification
records. Officials in each of the four federal district courts that use
more than one source for selecting jurors stated that they can identify
from which source(s) a name is drawn. As currently configured, the jury
pool lists do not specify sources, therefore, to determine whether a name
was taken from a particular source, such as the voter registration list,
would require manually comparing the jury pool list to each source.

o  	a federal jury administrator in a fourth U.S. district court estimated
that annually about 5 people typically claimed non-citizenship in a jury
pool of about 50,000 individuals.

Of the 14 U.S. district courts contacted, only the jury administrator for
the Eastern District of Virginia provided feedback to voter registration
authorities if a prospective juror claimed not to be a U.S. citizen. Of
the 13 U.S. district courts that do not currently provide feedback, none
planned to do so in the future. However, the federal jury administrators'
opinions on the feasibility of providing this form of feedback were mixed.
For example, 7 of the 11 district officials who commented on feasibility
indicated that providing feedback to election officials regarding
noncitizens is currently possible while 4 other federal jury
administrators claimed the responsibility would be difficult due to
staffing resource constraints. According to an AOUSC official, there is no
Judicial Conference47 policy that instructs the courts to notify election
officials when it is determined that a potential juror is not a U.S.
citizen.

At the county level, some county jury administrators share information
with election officials about people who ask to be excused from jury
service because they are not U.S. citizens. Jurors for county courts are
also drawn from a variety of sources, sometimes including voter
registration lists. Other sources county officials cited for their jury
pools included state drivers' licenses, state identification cards, social
services department information, employment department information, and
state tax rolls. Similar to federal district courts, county jury
administrators determine if a person qualifies for jury service based on
citizenship by specifically asking on a form if the person is a citizen.
Jury officials in three county court jurisdictions in New York and Texas
require people who claim non-citizenship to furnish proof in the form of
immigration documents. One of those jurisdictions will allow a notarized
statement in lieu of immigration papers, and another jurisdiction would
accept a letter from an immigration attorney.

47The fundamental purpose of the Judicial Conference is to make policy
with regard to the administration of the U.S. courts. The Director of
AOUSC implements the policies of the Judicial Conference as part of the
performance of his duties as the administrative officer of the courts of
the United States.

Of the 10 locations we visited where county jury administrators48 draw the
names of potential jurors from a pool that includes names taken from voter
registration lists, five county jury administrators said they provided
feedback to election officials when a potential juror claimed not to be a
citizen as a reason to be excused from jury duty. With respect to county
jury administrators who use more than one source for their jury pool, one
county jury administrator said that she could not determine if the
potential juror was drawn from the voter registration list or the other
sources used for selection, and therefore could not provide feedback.
However, a county jury administrator for another county court in the same
state that also used multiple sources for the jury pool said they provide
feedback to election officials on all people who claim non-citizenship as
a reason to be excused from jury duty.

In one local election jurisdiction that receives feedback from county jury
administrators, election officials estimated that they have removed about
500 people who were self-identified as non-citizens during jury selection
from the voter registration lists since 2000. This jurisdiction had
889,000 registrants in 2004. For example, during 2003, the county jury
administrator for this jurisdiction had 1,693 people ask to be excused
from jury duty because they were not citizens. Of those, election
officials sent letters requesting documentation of citizenship to 413
people. As a result of the process, they removed 83 people who were
identified as noncitizens from the voter registration lists. Other
examples include:

o  	A county jury administrator for one county court estimated they
annually refer to election officials about 2,000 names of jurors who
identified themselves as non-citizens to be excused from jury duty. The
election officials in this jurisdiction said that they remove about 400 to
500 names a year from the voter registration list because the registrants
are not citizens (out of between 3 and 4 million registrants).

o  	In another county court, a county jury administrator estimated that,
annually, about 5 people at most who were drawn from the voter
registration lists (which includes about 130,000 registrants in November
2004) claim non-citizenship as a reason to be excused from jury duty.

48Jury services officials in the other four court jurisdictions in two
states-Michigan and Wisconsin-said that the jury pool is drawn only from
their state's department of motor vehicles driver's licenses and state
identification cards, and they do not use voter registration lists.

In one jurisdiction, election officials receiving jury service information
commented that they must follow up on each referral, and sometimes people
may have wrongly claimed non-citizenship in order to be excused from jury
duty. Election officials will generally mail a notification to the
registrant asking them to verify the information to remain on the voter
registration list. Those who do not reply are removed. Non-response on the
part of a registrant does not necessarily mean that they are not citizens.

    DHS Databases Contain Selected Information on Non-Citizens, but the
    Usefulness May Be Limited

Federal law provides a statutory framework that requires non-citizens
entering or residing in the United States to provide certain
identification information. This information was historically provided to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which when abolished,
had its functions transferred to various components within DHS on March 1,
2003. DHS maintains multiple databases containing information on
non-citizens within its component agencies: the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Appendix II shows examples of the
databases identified by DHS officials.

DHS officials said that the usefulness of their information to identify
noncitizens on voter registration lists may be limited because of system
constraints for commonly used data matching identifiers (such as name,
birth date, address, social security number, and alien number) that are
needed for a match and the need for law enforcement to verify the
information. For example, the matching of databases may not always be
reliable because matching on names alone may produce multiple matches on
the same name, depending on whether there is middle initial, middle name,
or simply the same common name. As an example of restrictions on usage for
data matching identifiers, DHS officials said that address information on
non-citizens in some DHS databases, which these officials believe is
important for voter registration, was not always reliable in the databases
because it was self-reported information and would require verification.
We recently reported on the limited usefulness of selfreported address
information by non-citizens in some DHS databases.49 We reported that 16
of 17 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents interviewed did not use
the change of address data in one of the DHS

49GAO, Alien Registration: Usefulness of a Nonimmigrant Alien Annual
Address Reporting Requirement Is Questionable, GAO-05-204 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2005).

databases to help locate the non-citizens as part of their investigations
because the agents said that the change of address information, which is
self-reported data, is often unreliable.

We identified two instances where DHS databases were used to help identify
non-citizens for voter eligibility purposes. In the first instance, in the
late 1990s, DHS officials noted that a match was performed between
information on non-citizens in then INS files and voter registration
records at the request of a House Committee that oversaw the results of a
California congressional election being contested. The data-matching
effort sometimes produced multiple name matches in INS databases for a
single name from the voter registration list. For example, in
documentation of the California matching effort, 1 name from the voter
registration list matched with 44 names in the INS databases. According to
DHS officials, the effort to investigate those matches was extremely labor
intensive and required immigration officials to manually pull non-citizen
records from around the world to determine the identity of the individual
from the match. DHS officials said the initial matching of the database
was unreliable because of the lack of common data identifiers, usually
only name and date of birth, and the accuracy of those identifiers. Common
names were especially problematic in producing multiple matches on the
same name. Address information, which DHS officials believe is important
for voter registration, was not always reliable in the databases on
noncitizens, as mentioned previously.

In the second instance, California state election officials said that they
tried a database-sharing pilot program with INS in the mid-1990s to
investigate allegations of ineligible voters. At the time, the state
election officials said that INS officials advised them that their data
might not be reliable for their purposes. In a letter to the House
Chairman regarding the matching of voter registration information and INS
data, the INS Commissioner wrote that the data sharing was by names and
date of birth, and there would be no match if the person's name on the
state voter registration rolls is different that what it is in the INS
system. In addition, the INS Commissioner wrote that a match does not
necessarily mean the person is not eligible to vote. According to
California state election officials, their experience confirmed that
indeed the reliability of the data was poor for their purposes and that
they could not use them.

While matching of voter registration lists with DHS databases could be
problematic, the California Secretary of State's office has been exploring
the possibility of using the DHS Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements (SAVE) program to pursue specific allegations of voter

ineligibility. The SAVE Program was developed to allow federal, state, and
local government agencies to obtain information they need on immigration
status in order to determine an applicant's or recipient's eligibility for
many public benefits. The SAVE Program also administers an employment
verification pilot program, in cooperation with SSA, to help employers
verify the work authorization of their newly hired employees. As proposed
by the California Secretary of State, the use of SAVE would involve
querying individual voter names on the basis of specific allegations or
challenges that a registered voter was a non-citizen. This proposal does
not involve matching entire voter registration lists with DHS databases.

SAVE is more inclusive than other databases (containing over 60 million
alien records) and could provide election officials the means to identify
some non-citizens; however, according to DHS officials, it has
limitations. For example, DHS officials said that the SAVE Program is set
up to query information based on the number on the alien's Arrival and
Departure Record form (I-94) or an alien's DHS assigned "A" number. It is
a webbased system, and records are normally queried one at a time,
although processing multiple records using the SAVE program is possible.
Because voter registration is limited to U.S. citizens, voter registration
records would not contain alien or form I-94 numbers. The SAVE Program can
be queried by a social security number, name, and date of birth if the
alien's "A" number or I-94 number are unknown. However, DHS officials
emphasized that the system is alien-number-driven. Also, DHS officials
opined that using the SAVE Program would require additional verification
of the person's identity, either automated or manual, as a precautionary
measure before removing a person from a voter registration list based on a
match.

To facilitate investigations of alleged non-citizens having registered to
vote, the California Secretary of State's Office has proposed accessing
the SAVE Program. An official in the State's Election Fraud Investigation
Unit saw this as a time- and effort-saving tool. Rather than contacting a
DHS agent to obtain information and waiting for a response that, according
to this official, sometimes could be months in coming, the unit could make
direct queries through the SAVE Program. DHS has provided the California
Secretary of State with a memorandum of understanding to allow this
process to proceed, but as of February 2005, California officials said
that the Secretary of State had not signed the memorandum.

    Use of SSA Database to Identify Deceased Registrants Has Matching and
    Timeliness Limitations

The DMF consolidates death records across the country and potentially
could be used by election officials to identify voters on their
registration lists that died in another state.50 While about 2.7 million
people die in the United States each year and about 2 million are SSA
beneficiaries, matching difficulties and the timeliness and completeness
of the data may lessen DMF's usefulness to election officials.

Matching voter registration records with DMF records requires that the
sets of records contain at least some of the same identifiers for an
individual. The social security number is the primary way to identify a
unique individual in SSA's databases, but only seven states allow the full
social security number to be collected for voter registration purposes.
One of the states we visited (Virginia) collects the 9-digit social
security number as part of the voter registration application, and
election officials there said that they plan to use the DMF for
verification when the statewide, computerized voter registration list has
been developed. Even without the full social security number, matching can
still be done with other identifiers in the DMF, such as name, date of
birth, or address, but problems, such as people using different names for
voter registration than on social security records, currency of addresses,
and the number of people on a national basis with similar names, may make
matching difficult. One study51 of the DMF suggested that without a
correct social security number, researchers would need to consult other
sources of mortality information.

Timeliness and completeness may also lessen the usefulness of the DMF for
identifying deceased voter registrants. According to a 2001 SSA Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) report, some states had been taking over 200
days to report.52 SSA officials told us that the information is untimely
for a number of reasons, such as manual recordkeeping or outdated computer
systems at the state level. Under SSA's ongoing Electronic Death
Registration initiative, SSA plans to receive death reports within 5 days
of

50The DMF contains over 76 million records of deceased individuals
enrolled in the U.S. Social Security program. For an individual, the DMF
record can contain the person's social security number, name, date of
birth, date of death, state or county and zip code of last payment
residence, and zip code for the lump sum payment, if the information is
available.

51Use of the Social Security Administration Death Master File for
Ascertainment of Mortality Status Population Health Metrics: 2004; 2:2,.
March 5, 2004.

52Effectiveness of the Social Security Administration's Death Termination
Process (A-09-0222023), September 2001. State and federal sources supply
some death information to SSA, but most deaths are reported to SSA by
friends, relatives, and funeral homes.

death. SSA estimates the initiative will be complete in 2012, but recent
federal legislation may provide grants for computerizing state records
that could affect SSA's ability to meet the completion date sooner. In
addition to timeliness considerations, a 2003 OIG report stated that the
completeness of the DMF is not consistent, citing research indicating
younger deceased persons were less likely to be included.53 The OIG report
further stated that the DMF does not contain every decease social security
number holder and also includes individuals who are not actually deceased.

                                  Conclusions

State and local election officials face many challenges in maintaining
accurate voter registration records. Because voter registration lists are
dynamic and constantly changing, officials turn to a variety of sources to
identify registrants who may be ineligible to vote. HAVA included
provisions directed at maintaining accurate voter registration lists that
included, among other things, requirements for states to develop a
computerized, interactive statewide voter registration list and to match
that list against other state databases and records. However, after
provisions are implemented, states will continue to face challenges to
maintain accurate voter registration lists and verifying voter
eligibility, particularly identifying out-of-state registration duplicates
and deceased registrants. Thus, the effect of HAVA's voter registration
reform initiatives is yet to be determined.

Election officials we contacted in seven selected states noted that they
experienced specific problems verifying voter registration application
information related to felony convictions and citizenship status. We found
two federal information sources that could provide election officials
information on federal felony convictions or citizenship status
requirements. The number of potentially ineligible voter registrants
identified by these two federal sources may be small but could be
important in determining the outcome of a close election. One, the U.S.
Attorneys, is already required to provide state election officials with
information about felony convictions, but the information could be
provided in a more standardized format to ensure that the information is
easier for election officials to interpret and more complete and timely.

53The Social Security Administration's Efforts to Process Death Reports
and Improve its Death Master File, January 2003, Office of the Inspector
General, Social Security Administration.

  Recommendations for Executive Action

The second information source that could help identify potential
ineligible voters is federal jury administrators. Although not required to
share information with election officials, the jury administrators could
help identify potential voter registrants who are non-citizens on the
basis of information potential jurors provide when identifying themselves
as noncitizens on their jury service questionnaire.

To assist state election officials in identifying individuals on voter
registration lists who may be ineligible to vote because of their felon or
non-citizen status, we are recommending the following two actions:

We recommend that the Attorney General direct the U.S. Attorneys to
provide information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts in a
more standardized format to make it easier for election officials to
interpret the conviction information, such as the length of the sentence,
and to help ensure information on felons is complete and timely.

We recommend that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts determine
the feasibility and steps necessary to implement a requirement that U.S.
district court jury administrators provide notice to state election
officials of potential jurors who identify themselves as non-citizens on
their jury qualification questionnaire.

                                Agency Comments
                               and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and AOUSC for review and
comment. The Director of EOUSA in her comments agreed with our
recommendation. She acknowledged that maintaining accurate voter lists is
an important goal and that an EOUSA working group has been tasked to
develop a standardized process for the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices to send
felony conviction information in the best format for use by state election
officials. AOUSC's Director agreed with our recommendation and stated that
this matter would be brought to the attention of district courts. Despite
resource shortages in the federal courts and the fact that most juror are
screened by local and state courts, the AOUSC Director acknowledged the
public interest in ensuring that non-citizens are not afforded the
privilege of voting. Written comments from AOUSC and DOJ are included in
appendices IV and V. Sections of the report were also provided to SSA,
DHS, and states we visited to confirm the accuracy of the information.
Technical comments from the federal agencies and states that we reviewed
were incorporated, as appropriate, in the report.

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days
from the date of this letter. We then plan to provide copies of this
report to
the Attorney General, Department of Justice; Director, Administrative
Office of U.S. Courts; Ranking Minority Members, House Committee on
the Judiciary and Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and
Claims; Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; Chairman and Ranking
Minority Member, House Committee on Government Reform; Chairman
and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration; and Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House
Committee on House Administration. Copies of this report will also be
made available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
me on (202) 512-8777 or at [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. GAO staff contributing to this report are listed
in
appendix VI.

William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to describe: (1) the processes in selected states to
verify that voter registration applicants met state eligibility criteria
and to help ensure that voter registration lists are accurate; (2) the
challenges officials face in maintaining voter lists; (3) the
implementation status of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) voter
registration verification procedures in selected states; and (4) potential
data sources for verifying voter registration eligibility.

We selected the following states using a non-probability sample: Arizona,
California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Our
selection of states took into consideration several voter
registrationrelated factors. We sought to select states that represented
differences in terms of the stage of development of their statewide
databases and had unique characteristics that might affect the
implementation of HAVA. For example, Wisconsin has same day registration;
Arizona has on-line voter registration; Michigan has a reputation as a
model for registration practices; and New York State may have to rely on
social security number verification procedures more than other states
because it has a large population who live in New York City and may not
have driver's licenses for verification. We also selected states to
provide geographic diversity and variation in election administration-some
administer elections at the county level and others at lower levels such
as city or townships. States also varied in the size of the immigrant
populations, of interest because of the citizenship requirement for voter
registration. Our goal was not to target a particular state, but rather to
identify a range of issues facing states in implementing HAVA requirements
and assuring accurate voter registration lists. Information from these
seven states is not generalizable to all states. Table 3 describes
characteristics in each state.

                 Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

       Table 3: State Selection Factors State Voter registration-related
                                characteristics

Arizona  o  No statewide database prior to HAVA.

o  Did not request a waiver from HAVA database and verification
requirements deadline of January 1, 2004.

o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 12.8.

o  Voter registration administered at county level.

o  Has implemented an on-line voter registration process.

California  o  	Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from
local election lists. Local jurisdictions can access entire list.

o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.

o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 26.2.

o  Voter registration administered at county level.

Michigan  o  Unified statewide database.

o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.

o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 5.3.

o  Voter registration administered at township, city, and village level.

o  Secretary of State responsible for election and motor vehicle licensing
functions.

New York  o  No statewide database prior to HAVA.

o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.

o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 20.4.

o  Voter registration administered at county level.

o  Expected higher use of social security records for registrant
verification due to fewer drivers in New York City.

Texas  o  	Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from local
election lists. Local jurisdictions do not have access to entire list.

o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.

o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 13.9.

o  Voter registration administered at county level.

Virginia  o  Unified statewide database.

o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.

o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 8.1.

o  Voter registration administered at county level.

o  May use 9-digit social security number for voter registration
verification (rather than 4 digits outlined by HAVA).

Wisconsin  o  No statewide database prior to HAVA. Some jurisdictions
currently do not maintain voter registration rolls.

o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.

o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 3.6.

o  Voter registration administered at municipal level.

o  Allows Election Day voter registration.

                                  Source: GAO.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Within each state, we selected two local jurisdictions using a
nonprobability sample. Our selection criteria included population size,
the proximity of the locations to our site visits with state election
officials, suggestions by state election officials, and proximity to a
motor vehicle office. Local jurisdictions included

o  Mariposa County, Arizona;

o  Gila County, Arizona;

o  Los Angeles County, California;

o  Yolo County, California;

o  Detroit, Michigan;

o  Delta Township, Michigan;

o  New York City, New York;

o  Rensselaer County, New York;

o  Bexar County, Texas;

o  Webb County, Texas;

o  Arlington County, Virginia;

o  Albemarle County, Virginia;

o  Madison, Wisconsin; and

o  Franklin City, Wisconsin.

To describe state voter registration processes and challenges (objectives
1 and 2), we conducted semi-structured on-site interviews with state and
local election officials, and supplemented the interviews with phone and
email updates. We are relying on testimonial evidence because most states
(all but Arizona in our sample) obtained an extension for implementing
HAVA and, therefore, data were not available to assess the status of
implementation. Our interviews included questions on registration
processes, any voter registration fraud allegations, and discussion of
challenges identified by officials in maintaining voter roll accuracy.
Because so many voter registrations originate with applications from motor
vehicle agencies, interviews were conducted with motor vehicle agency
officials in the same jurisdictions regarding their voter registration
procedures. In Michigan, where we spoke only with Secretary of State
officials, the Secretary of State's office is responsible for elections
and driver's licenses. We also reviewed current HAVA plans, relevant
reports, and documents related to the voter registration process in seven
states.

State level election officials were provided an opportunity to verify the
accuracy of information regarding their particular state. All but one
state responded.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In addition to asking state election officials about allegations of voter
registration fraud, we interviewed Department of Justice (DOJ) Criminal
Division officials, and obtained a list of election fraud active matters
from 2002-2004, filed by U.S. Attorneys and Public Integrity section
attorneys (the section that handles election issues within DOJ). We also
contacted U.S. Attorneys responsible for the states we reviewed for any
additional cases handled locally by those offices. We contacted District
Attorneys in the counties for the local election districts we visited and
asked for information regarding actions related to ineligible voter
registration. We also asked state and local election officials if they had
referred any reported incidents of voter registration fraud or
irregularities to county, state, or federal officials since January 2003.
District attorney and state and local election official reports of fraud
related to voter registration were based on the recall of the officials,
except in California, where the state fraud unit routinely catalogs
allegations and their disposition.

To describe the HAVA implementation status in the seven states (objective
3), we reviewed HAVA plans to develop a statewide voter registration
database and to verify voter registration lists against motor vehicle
agency and Social Security Administration records. We also included
questions on the status of the database and verification procedures in the
semi-structured interviews with state and local election, and state motor
vehicle officials. We interviewed and obtained documents from the Social
Security Administration on how that agency was addressing HAVA
verification requirements.

To identify potential data sources for verifying voter registration
eligibility (objective 4), we reviewed and summarized sources currently
used for verification in the selected states and localities, and discussed
potential verification sources with state and local election officials.

We then gathered additional information on the forwarding of federal
felony convictions to state election officials from the Executive Office
for U.S. Attorneys. We requested information from the 19 U.S. Attorney
Offices corresponding to the seven selected states-Arizona, California,
Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin-we visited. The 19 U.S.
Attorneys' Offices were the District of Arizona, the Central District of
California, the Eastern District of California, the Northern District of
California, the Southern District of California, the Eastern District of
Michigan, the Western District of Michigan, the Eastern District of New
York, the Northern District of New York, the Southern District of New
York, the Western District of New York, the Eastern District of Texas, the
Northern District of Texas, the Southern District of Texas, the Western

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

District of Texas, the Eastern District of Virginia, the Western District
of Virginia, the Eastern District of Wisconsin, and the Western District
of Wisconsin.

We contacted federal jury administrators by phone in the 14 U.S. court
districts that covered those same local election jurisdictions and
requested information on reporting between federal jury administrators and
election officials. The 14 district courts were: District of Arizona,
Central District of California, Eastern District of California, Eastern
District of Michigan, Western District of Michigan, Eastern District of
New York, Southern District of New York, Northern District of New York,
Southern District of Texas, Western District of Texas, Eastern District of
Virginia, Western District of Virginia, Eastern District of Wisconsin, and
Western District of Wisconsin.

We also contacted 14 county court jurisdictions by phone that covered the
same election jurisdictions and requested information on reporting between
county jury administrators and election officials. The 14 local courts
were: Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County; Gila County Superior
Court; Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County; Superior Court of
California, Yolo County; Third Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan; Eaton
County Courts; New York County Courts; Rensselaer County Courts; Texas
Office of Court Administration, Bexar County; Texas Office of Court
Administration, Webb County; 17th Judicial District of Virginia; 16th
Judicial Circuit of Virginia; Dane County Courts; and Milwaukee County
Courthouse.

We requested information on data regarding citizenship from officials in
the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services. We also reviewed selected federal and local agency reports with
relevant information.

Our work was performed between January 2004 and May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Department of Homeland Security Automated Systems That Include
Information on Non-Citizens

                                Name Description

The Computer Linked Application Information System, Version 4, is a
nationallydeployed Client-Server, workflow-driven case management system
that supports the processing of naturalization applications. Pertinent
information is uploaded to the Central Index System.

The Central Index System provides automated information on individuals of
interest and identifies the location of an alien's hardcopy A-file. It
also provides information for federal and state entitlement programs and
is a single centralized source of data for many mission functions. Data is
routinely captured in the Central Index System via daily data uploads from
the Computer-Linked Application Management Information System, Versions 3
and 4.

The Employment Authorization Document System is an antiquated stand-alone
personal computer system used to capture data at U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service field offices. In combination with Polaroid camera
pictures, it generates a standardized identification document issued to
aliens who are authorized to be temporarily employed in the U.S. Data is
electronically consolidated from the standalone devices throughout each
workweek and uploaded to the Computer-Linked Application Management
Information System, Version 3, and subsequently to the Central Index
System (see above) for nationwide terminal inquiry access.

A centralized, mainframe case tracking system that supports the
adjudication of petitions covered by the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment Act of 1986.

A centralized mainframe system that provides full case tracking and
management capability for asylum casework.

A centralized, mainframe system reengineered from the Naturalization
Application Case-processing System. It no longer takes new naturalization
applications (see Computer Linked Application Information System, Version
4), but continues to process applications for citizenship (N600), and
applications for duplicate certificates (N565).

One nationwide database of deportation and detention information that
operates on computer hardware owned by the federal government and is
accessible through the network of user terminal across the country. It
automates many of the clerical docket control functions associated with
the arrest, detention, and deportation of illegal aliens.

This database tracked juvenile aliens in the removal process. This system
is no longer used and supported. Juvenile case tracked in the Juvenile
Alien Management System had been recorded in DACS.

An internet-based system that provides tracking and monitoring
functionality, with access to accurate and current information on
nonimmigrant students and exchange visitors and their dependents and the
approved schools and designated programs sponsor in the United States that
host these individuals.

Appendix II: Department of Homeland Security Automated Systems That
Include Information on Non-Citizens

Name Description

With the implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System , this database previously utilized by legacy Immigration and
Naturalization Service fell into disuse. The data in this system has not
been updated since the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
came online. The Student and School System was official retired on
September 30, 2004, and is no longer available.

The Arrival and Departure Information System provides a Department of
Homeland Security intranet accessible web-based browser application that
correlates information from multiple sources to show the person's travel
history, current immigration status, and overstay information. The Arrival
and Departure Information System currently receives, filters, processes,
matches and stores biographic and biometric border crossing information
for all non-citizens, air and sea travelers entering and departing the
United States and status update information for aliens within the United
States.

An online, automated central repository of information designed to track
and maintain the status of all foreign visitors and immigrants. This
system provides information on arrivals and departures, to support the
controlled admission of non-immigrants to the United States through ports
of entry and to track non-immigrant departures for identifying
information.

Source: GAO summary of Department of Homeland Security information
provided by United States Citizenship and Immigration Service,
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection
officials.

a For more information on this program, see GAO, Homeland Security: First
Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but
Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004).

Appendix III: Voter Registration Fraud Allegations Identified at Selected States
and at the Federal Level

In California, the only state with an investigative unit dedicated to
voter fraud issues, 15 cases of the 108 allegations for fraudulent voter
registration opened from January 2001 to May 2004 were sent to the
District Attorney for prosecution. Of the 15 cases, the outcome had been
determined in 11 cases (6 cases declined for prosecution; 5 were
prosecuted and the individuals were convicted). In four cases, the outcome
is yet to be determined. Similarly, the California investigative unit
opened for investigation 29 allegations of non-citizens either registering
or voting, 1 case of a non-citizen voting was sent to a District Attorney
for prosecution, but the District Attorney declined it. At the federal
level, DOJ attorneys initiated at least 61 election fraud investigations
or matters (an alleged possible criminal occurrence that still has to be
investigated) from 2000 to 2003. Of those cases, 15 involved voter
registration or ineligible voters

Election officials in seven of the locations we visited reported that they
have referred reported instances of voter registration fraud allegations
to appropriate agencies, such as the District Attorney and the U.S.
Attorney for investigation. Election officials referred allegations of
voter registration fraud such as the following to the appropriate agencies
for investigation:

o  	A Texas local jurisdiction referred to the State Board of Elections an
allegation that state officials investigated where 27 people were
registered at one address. The investigation revealed that the location
was an orphanage, and the registrants were resident workers.

o  	Texas local jurisdictions reported referring to their local District
Attorney instances of (1) an individual trying to register using the names
of 42 deceased individuals, (2) the receipt of many voter registration
applications from the same address, and (3) a non-citizen who incorrectly
believed she could vote in a school board election if she was a property
owner.

o  	One Arizona local jurisdiction reported that between 1997 and 2003, 23
cases had been prosecuted by local District Attorneys or the U.S. Attorney
for election-related violations and petition forgeries. Eleven of the 23
cases were for petition forgery.

o  	Local jurisdictions in California and Michigan each reported instances
of voter registration drive irregularities such as altering or falsifying
registration forms. Election officials in California referred the matter
to

Appendix III: Voter Registration Fraud Allegations Identified at Selected
States and at the Federal Level

the Secretary of State's office for investigation and Michigan officials
referred the matter to the local county prosecutor.

o  	One New York jurisdiction reported referring an allegation made by an
ex-spouse to the U.S. Attorney that the former spouse was not a citizen.

o  	One Arizona local jurisdiction official referred to the District
Attorney an instance of a person trying to vote before being officially
sworn in as a U.S. citizen.

In deciding to investigate allegations of voter registration fraud given
the competing demands for investigative and prosecutorial resources, local
and federal prosecutors reported they take various factors into
consideration. District Attorneys in jurisdictions we visited gave various
reasons for not pursuing allegations. One District Attorney reported that
they were unable to investigate the allegations of voter registration
fraud because they could not compel a person to provide proof of
citizenship based only on an allegation. A District Attorney in another
jurisdiction reported that registration allegations are not pursued
because they are victimless and non-violent crimes. Another District
Attorney said that registration issues are not one of the county's
priorities.

District Attorneys in the local jurisdictions we visited reported
initiating matters or cases since January 1, 2004, pertaining to
ineligible persons registering to vote. Three jurisdictions reported
prosecuting one case each, two reported having matters still under
investigation, and two reported that they did not prosecute the matter.

Within the Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorneys and the Public
Integrity Section (PIN) are responsible for enforcing federal criminal
laws applicable to federal election fraud offenses, among other things.
PIN is also responsible for overseeing the U.S. Attorneys' investigations
and prosecution of federal election fraud. A senior PIN official said the
decision to pursue an allegation depends on a number of factors. When an
allegation is received, it is evaluated in terms of factors such as
quality of the witnesses, quality of evidence, historical problems in the
area, resources, coordinating with state Attorney General's office
priorities, and the priority of election crimes within the
responsibilities of the Department of Justice. U.S. Attorneys and PIN
attorneys initiated at least 61 election fraud matters, or investigations,
related to election years 2000 through 2003. Most of the 61 matters
related to elections held in 2002. (Matters were initiated in 28 states
and 1 U.S. territory and ranged from 1 to 7 matters per state/territory
over the 4-year period.) Of these election fraud matters, 15 related to
voter registration or ineligible voters.

Appendix III: Voter Registration Fraud Allegations Identified at Selected
States and at the Federal Level

According to PIN, many of the 61 matters resulted in indictments and
subsequent convictions. A PIN official told us that 43 voter registration
matters are currently under investigation and another 7 have been closed
related to the November 2004 federal election. According to the Criminal
Division, the information provided by PIN does not include all election
fraud investigations that the U.S. Attorneys have initiated because (1)
U.S. Attorneys are not required to consult with PIN for preliminary
investigations as opposed to grand jury investigations, which require
consultations; (2) PIN did not track election fraud investigations prior
to October 2002; and (3) election fraud investigations are sometimes
initiated under non-election statutes.

In addition to the PIN election fraud matters, we asked the 19 U.S.
Attorney Offices that cover the seven states we visited the number of
fraud matters or investigations they had in 2003 and 2004 relating to
ineligible voter registration. Five offices reported investigating
allegations. Three offices reported that among them there were four
ongoing investigations. One office reported that they investigated a
matter, but no prosecution arose from the investigation. Another office
reported that they declined to prosecute a number of investigations
(number not tracked) that involved aliens who registered to vote. Rather
than prosecute, they allowed administrative procedures regarding
deportation to occur.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts

Page 62 GAO-05-478 Elections

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

  Staff Acknowledgments

(440262)

William O. Jenkins, Jr., (202) 512- 8777

In addition to the contact mentioned above, Orin B. Atwater, Carla Brown,
Grace Coleman, Michele Fejfar, Daniel Garcia, Richard Griswold, Geoffrey
Hamilton, Monica Kelly, Jean McSween, Jean Orland, Emmy Rhine, Sandra
Sokol, and Linda Watson contributed to this report.

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