Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to
Implement and Fund Modular Forces (16-MAR-05, GAO-05-443T).
Modularity is a major restructuring of the entire Army, involving
the creation of brigade combat teams that will have a common
design and will increase the pool of available units for
deployment. The Army is undertaking this initiative at the same
time it is supporting the Global War on Terrorism, and developing
transformational capabilities such as the Army Future Combat
Systems. To achieve modularity, the Army currently estimates it
will need $48 billion. The Department of Defense's (DOD) request
for fiscal year 2005 supplemental funds includes $5 billion for
modularity. The Army plans for another $5 billion to be funded
from fiscal year 2006 supplemental funds and the remaining $38
billion from DOD's annual appropriation from fiscal years 2006
through 2011. Our testimony addresses: (1) the Army's goals and
plans for modularity, (2) challenges the Army faces in staffing
and equipping its modular combat brigades, (3) key decisions that
could affect requirements, and (4) the Army's cost estimates and
funding plans. This testimony is based on ongoing GAO work
examining Army modularity plans and costs. Our work has been
primarily focused on the Army's active forces.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-443T
ACCNO: A19537
TITLE: Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans
to Implement and Fund Modular Forces
DATE: 03/16/2005
SUBJECT: Armed forces reserves
Army personnel
Combat readiness
Defense capabilities
Defense contingency planning
Military intelligence
Military training
Strategic planning
Federal funds
Future budget projections
Blue Force Tracker
Global War on Terrorism
Joint Network Node System
Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance
System
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GAO-05-443T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery Expected at time 2:30 p.m. EST Wednesday, March
16, 2005
FORCE STRUCTURE
Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement and Fund Modular Forces
Statement of Sharon Pickup
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Janet St. Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
A
GAO-05-443T
[IMG]
March 16, 2005
FORCE STRUCTURE
Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement and Fund Modular Forces
What GAO Found
The Army has embarked on a major initiative to create modular units to
better meet the near-term demand for forces and improve its capabilities
to conduct full-spectrum operations. Modularity is a major undertaking
because it affects both the active and reserve components as well as
combat and support forces. Successfully implementing this initiative will
require many changes such as new equipment and facilities, a different mix
of skills among Army personnel, and significant changes to training and
doctrine. By the end of fiscal year 2006, the Army plans to reorganize its
10 active divisions, expanding from 33 brigades to 43 modular brigade
combat teams, and by fiscal year 2010, create new types of command
headquarters. The Army has completed or is in the process of establishing
modular brigades in four of its active divisions.
While the Army has made progress in establishing modular brigades, it is
likely to face several challenges in providing its new modular units with
some required skilled personnel and equipment that are needed to achieve
planned capabilities. For example, the Army has not provided its new
modular brigades with required quantities of critical equipment such as
unmanned aerial vehicles, communications equipment, and trucks because
they are not currently available in sufficient quantities. Moreover, it
may take years to meet increased requirements for critical skills such as
military intelligence analysts because they are in high demand and take
years to train. In addition, the Army has not yet made a number of key
decisions that could further increase requirements for equipment and
personnel. First, the Army has not yet decided whether to recommend an
increase in the number of active brigade combat teams from 43 to 48. Also,
it is assessing the costs and benefits of adding one more combat maneuver
battalion to its new modular brigades. Finally, the Army has not yet
finalized the design of higher echelon and support units. Until designs
are finalized and key decisions are reached, the Army will not have a
complete understanding of the equipment and personnel that are needed to
fully achieve its goals.
The costs associated with modularizing the entire Army are substantial,
continuing to evolve, and likely to grow beyond current estimates. As of
March 2005, the Army estimated it will need about $48 billion to fund
modularity-representing an increase of 71 percent from its earlier
estimate of $28 billion in 2004. However, this estimate may not reflect
all potential costs, such as for fully equipping the modular force as
designed. Also, if the Army decides to add additional brigades or make
other design changes, additional costs may be incurred. Furthermore, some
costs are uncertain. For example, it will be difficult for the Army to
determine facility requirements and related costs until DOD finalizes
plans for restationing forces from overseas. Until the Army provides a
better understanding of the requirements and costs associated with
modularity, DOD will not be well positioned to weigh competing priorities
and make informed decisions nor will the Congress have the information it
needs to evaluate funding requests.
United States Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss our ongoing work on the Army's
modular force initiative. The Army considers modular force transformation
to be the most extensive reorganization of its force since World War II,
requiring large investments in personnel and equipment to restructure its
force, now organized in divisions, to a modular brigade-based force.
Because the Army is undertaking this effort while executing the Global War
on Terrorism and developing other new capabilities such as the Future
Combat Systems, the Department of Defense (DOD) may face some longterm
affordability challenges as it moves forward with these and other
initiatives. In other testimony today, we will address our ongoing work on
Future Combat Systems.1
As part of this hearing, you asked us to discuss our preliminary
observations based on our ongoing work that focuses on the Army's
implementation and challenges of achieving a modular force, and the cost
implications of this major initiative. Specifically, our testimony today
will address (1) the Army's goals for modularity and its plan for carrying
out this reorganization, (2) potential challenges the Army may face in
staffing and equipping brigades that are being created from the Army's
existing division-based force, (3) key decisions that could further affect
modularity requirements, and (4) the Army's cost estimates for modularity
and its plan for funding these costs.
The information we will discuss on modularity is based on our preliminary
work focusing on the active Army. We plan to issue a report later this
year. To address Army implementation plans and costs, we conducted
interviews with and reviewed documents from the Army Staff, the Army
Budget Office, U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency. In
addition, we visited the 3rd Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne
Division, which are among the first active combat divisions to undergo
modular conversion.
We conducted our work from August 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
1 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and
Prospects for Success, GAO-05-428T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).
Summary While the Army has made progress in establishing modular
brigades, it is likely to face several challenges in providing its new
modular units with some required skilled personnel and equipment that are
needed to achieve planned capabilities. For example, the Army has not
provided its new modular brigades with required quantities of critical
equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles, communications equipment, and
trucks because they are not currently available in sufficient quantities.
Moreover, it may take years to meet increased requirements for critical
skills such as military intelligence analysts because they are in high
demand and take years to train. In addition, the Army has not yet made a
number of key decisions that could further increase requirements for
equipment and personnel beyond those that have been identified by the Army
to date. First, the Army has not yet decided whether to recommend to the
Secretary of Defense an increase to the number of active brigade combat
teams from 43 to 48. Also, it is refining its analysis of design
requirements and assessing the costs and benefits of adding one more
combat maneuver battalion to its new modular brigades. Finally, the Army
has not yet finalized the design of higher echelon and support units.
Until designs are finalized and key decisions are reached, the Army will
not have a complete understanding of the equipment and personnel that are
needed to fully achieve its goals for a more capable modular force.
The costs associated with modularizing the entire Army are substantial,
continuing to evolve, and likely to grow beyond current estimates. As of
March 2005, the Army estimated it will need a total of about $48 billion
to fund modularity-representing an increase of 71 percent from its earlier
estimate of $28 billion in 2004. Our preliminary work suggests that this
revised estimate may still not reflect all potential costs, including
fully equipping the modular force as designed. Also, if the Army decides
to add additional brigades or maneuver battalions to the modular force, as
it is considering, it may incur additional costs. Furthermore, some costs
are uncertain. For example, it will be difficult for the Army to determine
facility requirements and related costs until DOD finalizes plans for
restationing forces from overseas. Until the Army provides a better
understanding of the requirements and costs associated with modularity,
DOD will not be well positioned to weigh competing priorities or make
informed decisions and the Congress will not have all the information it
needs to evaluate funding requests for modularity.
Army Modularity Is a Significant Undertaking
The Army's modular force initiative, which has been referred to as the
largest Army reorganization in 50 years, encompasses the Army's total
force--active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve-and directly affects
not only the Army's combat units, but related support and command and
control. Restructuring its units is a major undertaking and requires more
than just the movement of personnel or equipment from one unit to another.
The Army's new designs are equipped and staffed differently than the units
they replace. Therefore, successful implementation of this initiative will
require many changes such as new equipment and facilities, a different mix
of skills and occupational specialties among Army personnel, and
significant changes to training and doctrine.
The foundation of Army modularity is the creation of brigade combat
teams-brigade-sized units that will have a common organizational design
and will increase the pool of available units for deployment. The Army
believes a brigade-based force will make it more agile and deployable and
better able to meet combatant commander requirements. Not only does the
Army expect to produce more combat brigades after its restructuring, it
believes the brigades will be capable of independent action by the
introduction of key enablers, such as enhanced military intelligence
capability and communications, and by embedding various combat support
capabilities in the brigade itself instead of at a higher echelon of
command. The Army's goal is for each new modular brigade combat team,
which will include about 3000-4000 personnel, to have at least the same
combat capability as a brigade under the current division-based force,
which ranges from 3000 to 5000 personnel.2 Since there will be more combat
brigades in the force, the Army believes its overall combat capability
will be increased as a result of the restructuring, providing added value
to combatant commanders.
By the end of fiscal year 2006, the Army plans to reorganize its 10 active
divisions, expanding from the current 33 to 43 modular, standardized
brigade combat teams and creating new types of command headquarters to
replace the current division headquarters structure. According to Army
officials, this is a very quick pace for a restructuring of this
magnitude. The Army has already begun the conversion with 4 divisions: the
3rd Infantry
2 The Army's plan calls for three variants of the modularized brigade
combat team. The infantry variant will have about 3300 personnel, the
armored variant 3700 personnel, and the Stryker variant 4000 personnel.
and the 101st Airborne Divisions, which we have visited, the 4th Infantry
Division which we plan to visit this spring, and the 10th Mountain
Division. The 3rd Infantry Division has redeployed back to Iraq in its new
configuration, and the 101st is scheduled to redeploy later this year.
The Army's organizational designs for the brigade combat teams have been
tested by its Training and Doctrine Command's Analysis Center at Fort
Leavenworth against a variety of scenarios and the Army has found the new
designs to be as effective as the existing brigades in modeling and
simulation. During the next few years, the Army plans to collect lessons
learned from deployments and major training exercises and make appropriate
refinements to its unit designs, equipment requirements, and doctrine.
By fiscal years 2009-10, the Army plans to complete the creation of
modular, standardized supporting brigades as well as a reorganization of
its Corps and theater-level command and support structures. Ninety-two
support brigades and five higher echelon headquarters will be included in
this initiative-yet another indication of the far-reaching nature of the
Army's modularity plan.
Although our work has focused on the active component, restructuring of
the reserve component into modular units will also be a major undertaking.
The Army plans to convert the National Guard's existing 38 brigades into
34 modular brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2010. However, the Army is
considering accelerating this schedule, according to Army officials. In
addition, the Army Reserve will have to realign its support units in
accordance with new modular designs. Like the active component, the
reserves will have to manage these conversions to the new modular
organizations while continuing to provide forces to Iraq.
Because of the high degree of complexity associated with establishing a
modular force while managing deployments to ongoing operations, the Army
has developed a number of plans and processes, such as the Army Campaign
Plan3 and has held periodic meetings within the Army headquarters and its
components and major commands, to manage these
3 The Army Campaign Plan, dated April 12, 2004, and updated October 27,
2004, guides the planning, preparation, and execution of the restructuring
of the Army into a brigade-based modular force.
changes. The Army's senior leadership is playing a key role in these
processes.
Army May Face Challenges in Staffing and Equipping Modular Brigade Combat
Teams
The Army is likely to face a number of challenges in fully staffing and
equipping modular combat brigades as designed. Although somewhat smaller
in size, the new modular brigades are expected to be as capable as the
Army's existing brigades because they will have different equipment, such
as advanced communications and surveillance equipment, and a different mix
of personnel and support assets. Although the Army has an approved and
tested design for the new modular brigades, it has also established a
modified list of equipment and personnel that it can reasonably expect to
provide to units undergoing conversion based on its current inventory of
equipment, planned procurement pipelines, and other factors such as
expected funding. The Army expects to use this modified list of equipment
and personnel to guide the conversion of existing divisions to modular
brigades for the foreseeable future. Our preliminary work indicates
significant shortfalls in the Army's capacity to equip and staff units,
even at modified levels.
For example, according to Army officials, modular brigade combat teams
will require additional soldiers in personnel specialties such as military
intelligence, truck drivers, civil affairs, and military police to achieve
the planned capability. Military intelligence is one of the most critical
of these specialties because military intelligence enables brigade combat
teams to conduct 24-hour combat operations, cover highly dispersed
battlespaces, and increase force protection. According to Army officials,
the Army needs to add 2800 military intelligence specialists by the end of
fiscal year 2005 to meet near-term military intelligence shortages.
Moreover, the Army needs an additional 6200 military intelligence
specialists through fiscal year 2010 to meet modular force requirements.
Providing additional military intelligence specialists, particularly at
the more senior levels, may take several years because of the extensive
training required. At the time of our visit, the 3rd Infantry Division's
four brigade combat teams each had less than 50 percent of their military
intelligence positions filled. Although the Army was later able to fill
the division's needs by reassigning military intelligence specialists from
other units prior to its deployment to Iraq in January 2005, many of these
soldiers were redeployed after just having returned from overseas.
Moreover, transferring soldiers from other units may make it more
difficult for the Army to fill positions in the remaining divisions
scheduled to be restructured. We are continuing to follow up on Army
actions to address these shortages.
Similarly, modular brigade combat teams require significant increases in
the levels of equipment, particularly command, control, and communications
equipment; wheeled vehicles; and artillery and mortars. Examples of
command, control, and communications equipment that are key enablers for
the modular brigade combat teams include advanced radios, Joint Network
Node systems, ground sensors such as the Long-Range Advanced Scout
Surveillance System, and Blue Force Tracker, among others. This critical
equipment makes possible the joint network communications, information
superiority, and logistical operations over a large, dispersed battlespace
in which modular forces are being designed to effectively operate.
Although the Army has some of this equipment on hand, the levels being
fielded to brigade combat teams are well below the levels tested by the
Training and Doctrine Command. As a result, officials from both divisions
we visited expressed concern over their soldiers' ability to train and
become proficient with some of this high-tech equipment because the
equipment is not available in sufficient numbers.
Moreover, it is not clear yet how the Army plans to bring brigades that
have already undergone modular conversion up to Training and Doctrine
Command tested levels of personnel and equipment following their
deployments. For example, the design requires a division with four modular
brigade combat teams to have approximately 28 tactical unmanned aerial
vehicle systems. These systems provide surveillance and reconnaissance for
soldiers on the battlefield and enable them to more safely carry out their
missions. However, because of current shortages, the 3rd Infantry Division
and the 101st Airborne Division are only authorized to have 4 systems, and
at the time of our visits, the 3rd Infantry Division had 1 and the 101st
Airborne had none on hand. The Army requested funding for only 13 of these
systems in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriation request to the
Congress; thus, it remains unclear as to when the 3rd Infantry Division or
the 101st Airborne Divisions will receive their full complement of
tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems. Also, the Army may continue to
provide other divisions undergoing conversion with limited quantities that
fall short of the design requirement.4
4 We recently testified that DOD needs a strategic plan to guide all UAV
development and fielding efforts, which would include UAVs needed for
modularity. See GAO, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and
Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges, GAO-05-395T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2005).
Army Faces a Number of Key Decisions That Could Affect Modular Force
Requirements
According to Army modularity plans, the Army is continuing to assess its
requirements and may make some key decisions in the future that will
affect the size and composition of the modular force as well as its cost.
First, the Army's Campaign Plan calls for a potential decision by fiscal
year 2006 on whether to create 5 additional modular brigade combat teams.
Adding 5 brigades would provide additional capability to execute the
defense strategy but would require additional restructuring of people and
equipment. Second, according to the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, the
Army is evaluating whether to add a third maneuver battalion to brigade
combat teams in fiscal year 2007 to prepare for the fielding of the Future
Combat Systems Units of Action, which are designed with three maneuver
battalions. Additionally, according to the Army's Training and Doctrine
Command, early testing demonstrates that brigade combat teams with three
maneuver battalions offer distinct advantages over two battalion
formations because they provide robust, flexible, full-spectrum
capability. The command is conducting additional analysis to assess the
value and cost of adding a third combat maneuver battalion to the modular
brigade combat teams. If the Army later decides to add a battalion to some
or all of the 43 or potentially 48 modular brigade combat teams, it will
need to assign thousands of additional soldiers and field additional
equipment.
The Army also faces a number of decisions in finalizing its plans for
creating modular support brigades. Modular support brigades that will
replace the current division-based combat service and support structure
are not scheduled to be fully in place until fiscal years 2009-10. The
Army has finalized the designs and requirements for three of the five
types of support brigades, but has not yet made final design decisions for
the other two. The support brigades are key components of the Army's
concept of modular forces being more responsive and expeditionary than
current forces. Until the modular support brigades are fully organized,
equipped, and functional, the Army's modular forces would not have these
capabilities, and in the interim, combat service and combat service
support would need to be provided by existing division-based support
organizations. This means that for some time to come, even as the Army
makes progress in achieving greater uniformity across the force, there
will be a number of variations in the size and capability of available
support units. Also, as with the decision to add additional battalions,
until the Army completes all of its force structure designs for support
brigades, it will not have a total picture of its personnel and equipment
requirements.
Finally, by fiscal year 2010 the Army plans to complete a reorganization
of its corps and theater-level command and support structure. The Army's
plans would eliminate an entire echelon of command, moving from four
levels to three and freeing additional personnel spaces that can help meet
some of its modular force personnel requirements. While the Army expects
to achieve efficiencies resulting from the reduction of command and
support structures, their magnitude is not yet known and they may not be
realized for several years. Moreover, while potentially somewhat more
efficient, the new command-level designs are likely to require new
command, control, and communications equipment to enable them to function
in their updated roles, such as providing the basic structure for a joint
headquarters.
Cost Estimates for Fully Implementing Modularity Have Increased Significantly
and Are Still Evolving
The costs of modularity are substantial and are likely to grow. Since
2004, the Army's cost estimates have increased significantly. In January
2004, the Army estimated that increasing the number of active modular
brigade combat teams from 33 to 48 would cost $20 billion from fiscal
years 2004 through 2011 based on a "rough order of magnitude estimate." As
of July 2004, the Army added $8 billion to address costs for reorganizing
the reserve component, bringing the total estimated cost for reorganizing
the entire force to $28 billion. Our preliminary work highlighted several
limitations in this estimate. For example, the July 2004 estimate:
o included costs of adding 15 light infantry brigades for the active
component to bring the total number of active brigades to 48, but these
costs were based on the current brigade structure, not the tested modular
design;
o did not take into account the costs for upgrading existing active
brigades, or other support and command elements; and
o accounted for construction of temporary, relocatable facilities, but
did not allow for permanent upgrades to facilities or increases to other
services provided at Army installations to accommodate the increase in
modular units.
As of March 2005, the Army has revised its earlier estimate, now
estimating that modularity will cost a total of $48 billion from fiscal
years 2005 through 2011-an increase of 71 percent over its earlier $28
billion estimate. According to the Army, this estimate includes costs for
a total of 43 active component brigades-covering upgrades to the existing
33 brigades and
the creation of 10 new brigades-as well as 34 brigades in the reserve
component. During our preliminary work we discussed and obtained summary
information on the types of cost and key assumptions reflected in the
Army's estimates. However, we were unable to fully evaluate the estimates
because the Army did not have detailed supporting information.
According to Army officials, the Army used the modular design, which has
been informed by combat operations in Iraq, as the basis for developing
the March 2005 revised estimate. They noted the estimate includes costs
for the creation of new brigades as well as upgrades to existing brigades,
costs for support and command elements, and costs for permanent
facilities. However, unlike the original estimate, the current estimate
does not include any personnel costs. According to Army officials, an
increase in personnel endstrength is needed to simultaneously conduct
operations and reorganize into a modular force. They told us these costs
were excluded from the current estimate because it was difficult to
differentiate between endstrength increases associated with conducting
operations and those needed for modularity.
Based on our preliminary review of the Army's revised estimate and
potential costs associated with modularizing the active component, we
believe there are certain factors that could affect the overall cost for
modularity, including some that will likely make it grow higher than the
current estimate of $48 billion.
o First, the Army's current cost estimate does not use the tested design
as the basis for determining equipment costs. Rather, the estimate
reflects costs for a lesser amount of equipment than called for in the
tested design. According to Army officials, they estimated equipment costs
in this manner because some equipment is not currently available or in
production in sufficient quantities to meet modularity requirements.
o Second, if the Army decides to add 5 brigade combat teams to the
current plan and/or an additional maneuver battalion to some or all
brigades, the cost for modularity will increase significantly. For
example, each modular brigade combat team, under the current design, would
require 3,300 to 3,700 soldiers, for a potential total of up to 18,500
soldiers. While at least some of these personnel requirements could be
offset with existing force structure, it is unclear how many additional
soldiers, if any, would be needed. Nonetheless, adding these brigades to
the force structure would add costs for equipment, facilities, and
training.
o Finally, the Army's current cost estimate includes costs for permanent
facilities needed to accommodate the modularized brigade combat teams.
However, according to Army officials, plans for constructing facilities
are uncertain because of pending decisions related to the Base Realignment
and Closure process and the planned restationing of forces from overseas.
The Army anticipates obtaining funds to pay for this restructuring through
supplemental and annual appropriations. To cover the $48 billion estimate,
current DOD budget plans indicate the Army would receive a total of $10
billion from supplemental appropriations in fiscal years 2005 and 2006,
and a total of $38 billion from DOD's annual appropriation for the period
of fiscal years 2006 through 2011.5 As part of our ongoing work, we will
continue to review the Army's estimates, cost implications, and funding
plans for modularity.
Concluding Remarks The Army views modularity as critical to improving the
combat and support capability of its forces. Restructuring the entire
force while continuing to support ongoing operations poses significant
challenges and will require substantial funds. The magnitude of achieving
modularity, coupled with other ongoing major transformation initiatives,
raises long-term affordability issues for DOD. Until the Army more fully
defines the requirements and potential costs associated with modularity,
DOD will not be well positioned to weigh competing priorities and make
informed decisions, and the Congress will not have all the information it
needs to evaluate funding requests for modularity.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes our prepared
remarks. We would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
5 The annual appropriations totaling $38 billion include $13 billion that
the Army reallocated from other programs.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
(350683)
For future questions about this statement, please contact Sharon Pickup at
(202) 512-9619, Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402, or Gwendolyn Jaffe at
(202) 512-4691. Other individuals making key contributions to this
statement include Margaret Best, Alissa Czyz, Kevin Handley, Joah
Iannotta, Harry Jobes, Joseph Kirschbaum, Eric Theus, Jason Venner, and J.
Andrew Walker.
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