    Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest
    Differences in Sector Performance (22-JUL-05, GAO-05-435).

    The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of the U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP) agency, a part of the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS), aims to apprehend persons who illegally
    enter the United States between official ports of entry,
    including potential terrorists, aliens, and contraband smugglers,
    thereby deterring or stopping illegal activity. The Patrol
    operates permanent and tactical (temporary) interior traffic
    checkpoints on major and secondary U.S. roads, mainly in the
    southwest border states where most illegal entries occur, as part
    of a multi-layer strategy to maximize detection and apprehension
    of illegal entrants. This report addresses (1) the role of
    interior checkpoints in the Patrol's strategy; (2) what is known
    about checkpoint costs and benefits; and (3) how checkpoints are
    evaluated and what performance measures indicate regarding their
    effectiveness.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-435
        ACCNO:   A30778
      TITLE:     Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints
    Suggest Differences in Sector Performance
         DATE:   07/22/2005
      SUBJECT:   Border control
    	     Border patrols
    	     Border security
    	     Counterterrorism
    	     Homeland security
    	     Immigration
    	     Law enforcement
    	     Performance measures
    	     Smuggling
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Cost analysis

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    GAO-05-435

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

                           Report to Congressional Requesters

    July 2005

    BORDER PATROL

    Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance

    GAO-05-435

    [IMG]

    July 2005

    BORDER PATROL

    Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance

                                     What GAO Found

    The Border Patrol operates 33 permanent traffic checkpoints in 8 of its 9
    sectors in the southwest border states, supported by tactical checkpoints.
    While permanent checkpoints have the advantage of physical infrastructure,
    tactical ones have the mobility to block routes used to evade permanent
    ones and to respond to intelligence on illegal activity. A third type of
    checkpoint operates in the Tucson, Ariz., sector, where the Patrol has
    been legislatively prohibited from funding construction of checkpoints
    since fiscal year 1999. This restriction has prevented checkpoint
    construction. The Patrol also began closing or relocating checkpoints in
    the sector every 7 days at the instruction of congressional staff in June
    2002, and was legislatively required to relocate checkpoints on the same
    schedule in FY 2003 and 2004, and an average of once every 14 days in FY
    2005. Three of six checkpoints in the sector had to close for 7/14 days,
    as safety considerations made it too hazardous to relocate them.

    Local law enforcement and business and community leaders we interviewed
    from communities near interior traffic checkpoints said that benefits
    resulting from checkpoint operations included reductions in crime and
    vandalism. Although a few cited traffic delays, most were supportive of
    checkpoint operations. However, some others were concerned about the
    impact of the checkpoints on traffic congestion and quality of life in
    their communities.

    The Border Patrol does not routinely evaluate the effectiveness of
    checkpoint operations, or their costs. The Patrol includes limited
    traditional performance measures in its Performance and Annual Report,
    such as apprehensions and contraband seized. GAO developed an apprehension
    per agent work year measure to assess performance. The data suggest that
    the performance of the Tucson sector interior checkpoints dropped starting
    in FY 2002, and more in FY 2003, after the Border Patrol began relocating
    or closing them on a regular basis. Three other sectors we visited that
    did not have to relocate or close checkpoints experienced no comparable
    decrease in apprehensions per agent work year during the same time period.
    Other factors not measured or accounted for might also have contributed to
    these outcomes, but the Border Patrol's limited measures do not capture or
    assess them. A broader range of performance measures, when considered with
    other indicators, could be useful to CBP and the Congress as they consider
    ways to improve the effectiveness of interior traffic checkpoints and
    border security efforts.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

    Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    Permanent and Tactical Checkpoints Have Different but

    Complementary Roles in the Border Patrol Strategy
    Benefits and Costs of Traffic Checkpoints Are Difficult to Quantify,
    but Some Examples Are Available
    The Lack of Systematic Evaluation Limits the Border Patrol's

    Ability to Allocate Resources Based on Need
    Conclusions
    Recommendations for Executive Action
    Agency Comments

    1

    5 10

    15

    29

    38 46 47 47

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    Appendix II San Diego Sector Profile

    Appendix III Tucson Sector Profile

    Appendix IV Laredo Sector Profile

    Appendix V McAllen Sector Profile

    Appendix VI	Comments from the Department of Homeland
    Security 83

    Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 85

    Table

    Table 1: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoints Schedule to Conform to
    Legislative Language

    Figures

    Figure 1: Topography and Road Systems along the Southwest Border 11

    Figure 2: Total Apprehensions of Illegal Immigrants at All Locations in
    Each Southwest Border Patrol Sector in Fiscal Years 2001-2004 13

    Figure 3: IAFIS Fingerprint Screen and Reading Machine at the I-5 San
    Clemente, California, Checkpoint 18 Figure 4: VACIS Machine Examining a
    Vehicle at the I-15 Temecula, California, Checkpoint 19 Figure 5: VACIS
    Monitor Display, I-5 Checkpoint, Temecula, California 20 Figure 6: Vehicle
    Lift at the I-35 Checkpoint, North of Laredo, Texas 21 Figure 7: Tactical
    Checkpoint at Sandia Creed Road, near Temecula, California 23 Figure 8:
    Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoint at KP 42 on I19, Near Tubac, Arizona
    29

    Figure 9: Apprehensions per Agent Work Year in the Tucson, San Diego,
    Laredo and McAllen Sectors, Fiscal Years 20012004 41

    Figure 10: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the San Diego

    Sector 56 Figure 11: Permanent Checkpoint on I-5, South of San Clemente 57
    Figure 12: Aerial Photo of Checkpoint on I-5 South of San Clemente 58
    Figure 13: Tactical Checkpoint at Sandia Creek Road, near

    Temecula, California 62 Figure 14: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in
    the Tucson Sector 65 Figure 15: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoint on
    I-19 near KP 42 67 Figure 16: Nonpermanent Checkpoint on State Highway 85
    near Ajo, Arizona 68 Figure 17: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the
    Laredo Sector 71 Figure 18: Permanent Checkpoint North of Laredo, Texas,
    on I-35 72

    Figure 19: Permanent Checkpoint on State Highway 359 Near

    Hebbronville, Texas 74 Figure 20: Aerial View of Highway 359 Checkpoint,
    Texas 75 Figure 21: Architectural Drawing of the New I-35, Texas,

    Permanent Checkpoint 76 Figure 22: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in
    the McAllen,

    Texas Sector 79 Figure 23: Checkpoint Inspection Area, U.S. Highway 281,
    near

    Falfurrias, Texas 82

    Abbreviations

    ATV all-terrain vehicle
    CBP Customs and Border Protection
    DHS Department of Homeland Security
    FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
    GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
    IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
    INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
    KP kilometer post
    PAL pre-enrolled access lane
    SR state route

    VACIS Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

    July 22, 2005

    The Honorable Christopher Cox
    Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Harold Rogers
    Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security
    Committee on Appropriations
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Ken Calvert
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Darrell Issa
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Jim Kolbe
    House of Representatives

    The U.S. Border Patrol, now part of the Department of Homeland
    Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, has
    as its primary mission the detection and apprehension of terrorists and
    their weapons, and a traditional mission of preventing illegal aliens and
    contraband smugglers from entering the United States, both at the land
    borders between ports of entry and inside the United States. According to
    the Border Patrol, its operations are intended to apprehend illegal
    entrants; deter potential illegal immigration, smuggling, or terrorism,
    through such apprehensions; and present a high-profile presence along our
    nation's borders. On the southwest border, where the majority of illegal
    immigration into the United States occurs, the Border Patrol aims to
    accomplish its mission through what it describes as an integrated,
    multilayered border enforcement strategy. Along the border, between
    official ports of entry,1 are the first two layers, consisting of a first
    called

    1Ports of entry are those official locations along the international
    border, as well as at U.S. international airports and seaports, where
    persons seeking entry into the United States go through passport control
    and customs inspection. The Office of Field Operations of U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection operates the nation's 317 ports of entry. The Border
    Patrol is responsible for border security between the ports of entry. See
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and Annual Report, Fiscal
    Year 2004, p.11 and p.12.

    line watch and a second, called line patrol. Together, these are where the
    majority of the nation's 10,800 U.S. Border Patrol agents are deployed,
    with agents positioned along the border line or somewhat farther back but
    still generally in visible proximity to the border, primarily in
    well-marked four-wheel-drive vehicles, to maintain a high profile to
    deter, turn back, or arrest anyone attempting to illegally enter the
    country. The line patrol layer consists of smaller contingents of agents
    deployed behind the line watch units to provide direct support of the line
    watch units. Given the 1,950-mile U.S.-Mexican border, the Border Patrol
    states that it does not have the personnel to patrol all of it
    simultaneously and therefore allocates personnel based on a combination of
    intelligence information about potential threats from terrorists and
    contraband smugglers, as well as on the estimated volume of illegal
    entries. In addition, a third layer of enforcement is composed of interior
    traffic checkpoints at which Border Patrol agents monitor and stop
    vehicles at checkpoints-both permanent and tactical (temporary)-on major
    U.S. highways and secondary roads that are generally 25 to 75 miles inland
    from the border. This permits them to be far enough inland to detect and
    apprehend potential terrorists and illegal aliens attempting to travel
    farther into the interior of the United States after evading detection at
    the border, but that are close enough to the border to potentially control
    access to major population centers. The permanent interior traffic
    checkpoints are locations that generally have large, tollbooth-like
    structures at which agents may stop vehicles for visual inspection, and to
    decide whether a more thorough inspection of the vehicle and its occupants
    is warranted. There are 33 such permanent interior traffic checkpoints in
    the southwest border states, and one in northern New York state. The
    tactical checkpoints, the number and location of which may change daily,
    respond to intelligence on changes in illegal activity routes and
    generally consist of a few vehicles, portable water tanks, traffic cones
    and signs, and a mobile trailer. The permanent checkpoints are intended to
    apprehend illegal entrants and contraband, and through the perception of
    potential apprehension, to deter illegal entrants from using major
    highways or roads. Permanent checkpoints have supporting infrastructure
    and procedures intended to reduce the ability of illegal entrants from
    circumventing the checkpoints; these include remote video surveillance,
    electronic sensors, and agent patrols.

    With permanent checkpoints on major routes, the Border Patrol seeks to
    cause illegal entrants to use less traveled secondary roads on which they
    are more visible, and where less traffic permits stopping a much higher
    percentage of transiting vehicles than on interstates, as well as
    questioning vehicle occupants, adding to the costs of smuggling or transit
    time, as well as to the likelihood of being detected and apprehended.

    In addition to the use of agents to maintain surveillance along the border
    between official ports of entry, and inland at the interior checkpoints,
    the Border Patrol carries out its mission by responding to electronic
    sensor alarms and aircraft sightings, interpreting and following tracks,
    and patrolling in a wide variety of modes, including using horses,
    helicopters, small aircraft, patrol boats, off-road all-terrain vehicles
    (ATVs), and mountain bikes. These agents and their modes of operation are
    deployed as an integrated strategy in which agents can be shifted daily
    among line watch, line patrol, and interior checkpoint operations, as well
    as other duties, to respond to changes detected in the tactics and routes
    of those attempting to enter the United States illegally.

    With the continued influx of illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexican
    border, contraband smuggling, and ongoing threats of terrorism and weapons
    of mass destruction potentially entering the country, you expressed
    interest about the operations of the Border Patrol's permanent and
    tactical traffic checkpoints in the southwest border states within the
    context of overall border security. To address your interests, this report
    focuses on

    o  	how the Border Patrol uses permanent and tactical checkpoints in the
    southwest border states as part of its strategy to detect and apprehend
    potential terrorists, illegal immigrants, and contraband smugglers, and to
    deter potential future violators through the likelihood of apprehension,
    as well as to cause them to avoid permanent checkpoints on major routes
    and take less traveled secondary roads on which they would more likely be
    apprehended at tactical checkpoints;

    o  	what is known about the costs and benefits of interior traffic
    checkpoint operations, including their impact on local law enforcement and
    local communities, as well as in terms of the amount of contraband seized
    and illegal entrants and potential terrorists apprehended; and

    o  	what data and performance measures are used by the Border Patrol to
    evaluate interior traffic checkpoint operations, in terms of their overall
    effectiveness in meeting agency mission goals and how might Border Patrol
    data be used to develop additional measures of productivity and
    effectiveness.

    However, this report does not address some of the larger issues
    surrounding illegal immigration into the United States, such as the
    disparities in average daily wages between Mexico and the United States,
    and the incentives created by these disparities for illegal immigration,
    as

    well as the difficulties of neutralizing such disparities through work
    site

    2

    enforcement. We have elsewhere addressed some of these issues. In
    addition, although deterring illegal immigration through the likelihood of
    detection and apprehension is a goal of the Border Patrol, we did not
    attempt to measure the deterrent effect of the Border Patrol's operations,
    as this would have required, among other things, opinion surveys of
    Mexican citizens and potential contraband smugglers.

    To address these objectives, we reviewed Border Patrol documents, reports,
    manuals, and guidance concerning border strategy and checkpoint
    operations, as well as CBP's annual performance reports.3 We interviewed
    Border Patrol officials at CBP headquarters in Washington, DC. We also
    interviewed Border Patrol sector headquarter officials and observed
    operations at checkpoints in the San Diego, California; Tucson, Arizona;
    Laredo, Texas; and McAllen, Texas, Border Patrol sectors. (The other 5
    southwest border sectors are El Centro, California; Yuma, Arizona; El
    Paso, Texas; Marfa, Texas; and Del Rio, Texas. In addition to these 9
    southwest sectors, the remainder of the country is divided into 11
    additional sectors by the Border Patrol.)

    The 4 sectors we visited were selected to provide a substantial range in
    the size and types of interior checkpoint operations; estimated volume of
    illegal annual immigration; volume of vehicular traffic transiting
    checkpoints; topography and density of road networks; presence or absence
    of large urban areas on or near the border, on both the U.S. and Mexican
    sides; and types of checkpoints (permanent and tactical).4 Since we were
    unable to observe all operating conditions at all times, the conditions we
    describe are therefore based on available documentation and observations
    from our site visits only. (See app. I for further discussion of the range
    of conditions among these sectors.)

    2See, for example, GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Addressing
    Management Challenges That Face Immigration Enforcement Agencies,
    GAO-05-664T (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2005). See also GAO, Immigration
    Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration Enforcement Objectives and
    Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements,

    GAO-05-66 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004).

    3For example, see U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and
    Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2004, and the same for fiscal year 2003.

    4The Tucson sector has checkpoints that are neither permanent nor tactical
    as operated by the Border Patrol in other sectors, because of varying
    legislative restrictions that started in fiscal year 1999. These
    differences are explained in greater detail below.

      Results in Brief

    We also interviewed local law enforcement, business, and community leaders
    in communities near interior traffic checkpoints with regard to the impact
    of the checkpoints. Because these places were selected using a
    nonprobabilistic method, the results from our site visits cannot be
    generalized to other locations and checkpoints. To assess the reliability
    of the Border Patrol's data, we talked with agency officials at both
    Washington, D.C., headquarters and at some Border Patrol stations in the
    field about data quality control procedures, including methods by which
    data are checked and reviewed internally for accuracy and consistency. We
    determined that the Border Patrol utilizes processes and checks that
    provide reasonable assurance that the data recorded on apprehensions, work
    hours, and contraband seizures are accurate and sufficiently reliable for
    the purposes of this report. We conducted our work from September 2004 to
    May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards. Additional details on our scope and methodology can be found in
    appendix I. Detailed information on the four Border Patrol sectors that we
    visited can be found in appendixes II through V.

    Interior traffic checkpoints function as part of the Border Patrol's
    multilayered enforcement strategy, to increase the likelihood of detecting
    potential terrorists, illegal immigrants, and smugglers who have crossed
    the border and evaded patrols at and near the border. By increasing the
    possibility of apprehension, the Border Patrol seeks to enhance national
    security and to enforce existing immigration and contraband smuggling
    laws, thereby deterring potential future illegal entrants from crossing
    the border. The Border Patrol operates 33 permanent interior traffic
    checkpoints in 8 of its 9 sectors along the southwest border. In all
    sectors except Tucson, permanent checkpoints are supported by additional
    tactical checkpoints. Permanent checkpoints may operate 24 hours a day, 7
    days a week, with their infrastructure supporting access to computers and
    technology, buildings with detention facilities, shade and water for
    canines, paved shoulder areas with sufficient space for vehicle lift
    equipment essential to inspecting underneath vehicles, as well as the
    space required for gamma-ray machines that examine other vehicles. The
    number and location of tactical checkpoints can change on a daily basis,
    depending on a combination of available resources and intelligence about
    illegal entrants' routes, which the Border Patrol uses to decide where to
    set up tactical checkpoints.

    In the Tucson sector, however, Congress has prohibited the construction of
    checkpoints since fiscal year 1999. Since the sector had no permanent
    checkpoints prior to the prohibition-and used portable equipment to

    establish checkpoints that moved infrequently, but that also had no
    permanent structures5-the effect of the legislative language was to

    prevent construction of permanent checkpoints. Moreover, starting in June
    2002, at the instruction of congressional staff, and beginning in fiscal
    year 2003 to comply with legislative language, the Border Patrol has been
    relocating or closing checkpoints in the Tucson sector on a regular basis-
    at least once every 7 days in the last quarter of fiscal year 2002, and in
    fiscal years 2003 and 2004. In fiscal year 2005, the legislative language
    was less restrictive, requiring relocating Tucson sector checkpoints "at
    least an average of once every14 days." The Border Patrol has implemented
    that language by keeping one checkpoint in the sector open for 14 days,
    closed for 8 hours, and then reopened for 14 days, while other checkpoints
    are maintained on varying schedules that the Patrol believes to be in
    conformity with the law. The result of these legislative restrictions in
    the Tucson sector has been that the Border Patrol operates what we refer
    to as nonpermanent checkpoints that are hybrids of permanent and tactical
    but that lack the logistical, communication, and other capabilities
    provided by the physical infrastructure of permanent checkpoints or the
    flexibility of tactical checkpoints. In the Tucson sector, according to
    Border Patrol officials, the lack of permanent infrastructure, in
    combination with the mandated relocation on a regular basis, results in
    closure at 3 of 6 sector checkpoints because of an inability to find an
    alternate location that meets safety requirements for adequate shoulder
    areas and advance notice to vehicles that they are approaching a
    checkpoint. To support these nonpermanent checkpoints, the Tucson sector
    operates tactical checkpoints periodically, as occurs in other sectors
    with permanent checkpoints.

    Some benefits of interior traffic checkpoints are more easily quantified
    than others, but a lack of data makes it difficult to estimate both the
    direct costs of interior traffic checkpoints, resulting from labor and
    overhead, or indirect costs, such as delays caused to commuters or
    commercial shippers. Quantifiable benefit data include such measures as
    apprehensions of persons in violation of immigration laws and the
    detection and seizure of illegal drugs and other contraband. For example,
    in fiscal year 2004, interior checkpoints in the 9 southwest sectors, with

    5According to the Border Patrol, it used a combination of roving patrols
    and temporary checkpoints that remained at the same location for long
    periods but that did not have permanent infrastructure. The Border Patrol
    stated that it was not until the late 1990s that traffic volume and
    illegal immigration reached a level where it felt that permanent
    checkpoints were necessary to address the sector's needs.

    about 10 percent of total Border Patrol personnel in those sectors
    assigned to these checkpoints, accounted for the detection and
    apprehension of over 96,000 illegal aliens, about 8 percent of the total
    apprehensions by the Border Patrol that year. In addition, interior
    traffic checkpoint operations in the 9 southwest sectors seized 418,102
    pounds of marijuana and 10,853 pounds of cocaine in fiscal year 2004, or
    about 31 percent of the marijuana and about 74 percent of the cocaine
    seized nationally by the Border Patrol. Less quantifiable were the
    benefits cited by most local law enforcement, business, and community
    leaders we interviewed, who spoke positively of reductions in crime and
    vandalism by smugglers and illegal aliens. As for the cost of checkpoint
    operations, the Border Patrol did not maintain the costs of checkpoints,
    either individually or collectively, in readily accessible databases.6
    Data were also not available on some indirect costs, such as those
    associated with traffic delays and congestion. For example, professional
    organizations that monitor traffic, such as the Automobile Club of
    Southern California, American Trucking Associations, the California
    Highway Patrol, and the California Department of Transportation, do not
    report problems for commuters, commercial shippers, or tourists resulting
    from interior checkpoints on major traffic arteries in the sectors we
    visited. Literature searches and information requests did not produce
    data, studies, or reports on traffic, business costs, or crime rates that
    reported or systematically analyzed either benefits or adverse effects.
    Traffic congestion and backups do occur at some of the checkpoints on
    major highways, but at several we visited we observed that traffic is
    monitored, with operations ceasing and traffic "flushed" to normal flows
    whenever agents determined wait time to be excessive. For example, the
    Temecula, California, I-15 checkpoint guidance states that agents should
    not permit a backup exceeding a certain approximate distance and certain
    approximate number of minutes'

    7

    wait. The costs to commuters and commercial traffic that may occur from
    delays at the checkpoints could not be calculated, since no data are
    available on the number of commuters delayed annually at the 33 permanent
    southwest checkpoints, the length of the delays, the salaries of those
    delayed, or economic losses to commerce that may have resulted from
    traffic delays. Furthermore, costs are difficult to calculate since the

    6Cost data we obtained on interior checkpoints had to be collected through
    data requests to each sector, and were not available for permanent versus
    tactical checkpoints.

    7Because of the sensitivity of some operational guidance, the Border
    Patrol requested that we not provide precise numbers.

    Border Patrol does not routinely maintain data on the costs of operating
    checkpoints.

    Performance measures of how well a government agency carries out its
    mission are essential to annual assessment and improvement, not least
    because such measures help management identify problems and allocate
    resources to solve them. However, we found that the Border Patrol does not
    systematically evaluate the effectiveness of interior checkpoint
    operations. CBP annually prepares and sends to the Congress a Performance
    and Annual Report. In these reports, CBP uses traditional measures of law
    enforcement performance-including numbers of apprehensions and amount and
    type of contraband seized-to report on Border Patrol performance. In the
    two most recent annual reports, no data or analysis are cited with regard
    to the performance of interior checkpoints. These reports would be more
    useful to CBP and the Congress if they included additional measures to
    compare interior checkpoints' effectiveness with that of line watch and
    line patrol operations. This could help to ascertain whether the personnel
    and equipment resources allocated to differing layers in the multilayered
    strategy are right- sized. Traditional measures do not take into account
    inputs such as labor and overhead costs, thereby making it difficult to
    determine if one sector, or type of checkpoint, is more cost effective
    than others. For example, knowing that more illegal immigrants are
    apprehended in one sector than in another does not tell managers if that
    is a result of having more agents on the line or at more interior
    checkpoints in that sector compared with others. Alternatively, it does
    not provide information on whether the apparent success in apprehensions
    is more a function of a large volume of attempted entries than better
    agent work or positioning of checkpoints, relative to other sectors.

    Using available data, we developed two performance measures to supplement
    the traditional law enforcement measures used by the Border Patrol. These
    two measures alone do not exhaust the potential ways in which checkpoint
    operations could be assessed, and should not be considered in isolation
    from the broader context of the multilayered strategy, as well other
    factors that could affect checkpoint and line watch/line patrol
    operations, such as the volume of illegal immigration into a sector. With
    these caveats in mind, we compared data on the performance of interior
    checkpoints in the Tucson sector with those in the three other sectors we
    visited in terms of apprehensions per agent work

    year, and costs per apprehension, based on an average work year cost.8 We
    found that while checkpoint performance, as measured by apprehensions per
    agent work year, varied among sectors and by fiscal years, a substantial
    drop started in the Tucson sector in fiscal year 2002, when the Border
    Patrol began to routinely relocate or close its checkpoints every 7 days,
    starting in June 2002, with another substantial drop in fiscal year 2003,
    when statutory language went into effect. In contrast, comparable
    decreases in checkpoint performance data did not occur in the 3 other
    sectors we visited, which were not required to relocate or close
    checkpoints every 7 days in the last quarter of fiscal year 2002, or in
    fiscal years 2003 and 2004 (14 days on average in fiscal year 2005). At
    the same time, it is important to recognize that there may be other
    factors that affected this performance measure that we were unable to
    measure or of which we were unaware. While the two performance measures we
    developed are some of many possibilities to assess effectiveness, Border
    Patrol officials told us that they found the two measures potentially
    useful as tools for making allocation decisions, in conjunction with other
    data and information.

    To better gauge the effects of border control efforts, and in order to
    more effectively manage and allocate resources, we are recommending that
    the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection develop performance
    measures for the Border Patrol in addition to its traditional ones, of the
    productivity and effectiveness of interior checkpoints. We are also
    recommending that the Commissioner include in CBP's Performance and Annual
    Report data and analysis provided by the additional performance measures
    on the performance of interior checkpoints and what might be done to
    improve their effectiveness. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS
    agreed with the recommendations and stated that CBP is taking steps to
    implement them.

    8Work years are total hours charged by agents to work at a given location,
    divided by 2080 (a 40-hour week times 52 weeks). Costs of apprehensions
    per agent work year were calculated by dividing the average nationwide
    fiscal year 2004 salary of a Border Patrol agent ($53,000) by the number
    of apprehensions per work year reported for checkpoints, such as 191
    apprehensions per work year in fiscal year 2004 at interior checkpoints in
    the San Diego sector. In this instance, $53,000 divided by 191 produced a
    cost per apprehension of $277.

    Background

    U.S. Customs and Border Protection, a component of the Department of
    Homeland Security, has the primary responsibility for securing the
    nation's borders. The U.S. Border Patrol is the uniformed enforcement
    division of CBP responsible for border security between designated
    official ports of entry into the country. According to the Border Patrol,
    its priority mission since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
    has been to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the
    United States between official ports of entry. In addition, the Border
    Patrol has a traditional mission of preventing illegal aliens, smugglers,
    narcotics, and other contraband from entering the country, as these
    activities directly affect the safety and security of the United States.
    Border Patrol agents generally report to Border Patrol stations and
    substations in each of these sectors at the start and end of their
    workdays; these stations function much as police stations do for police
    personnel around the country. The number of stations and substations
    varies widely by sector.9

    The Border Patrol's fiscal year 2005 budget was about $1.4 billion. As of
    March 2005, the Border Patrol had 10,817 agents nationwide; 6,129 (57
    percent) were located in the 9 Border Patrol sectors along the southwest
    border. About 10 percent of the Border Patrol's agents nationwide are
    assigned to interior traffic checkpoints in the southwest border sectors,
    according to the Border Patrol.

    Permanent and tactical interior traffic checkpoints are generally located
    on major and secondary roads, usually 25 to 75 miles inland from the
    border. These interior checkpoint locations are chosen by the Border
    Patrol to maximize the likelihood that illegal entrants who have managed
    to evade border defenses and patrols will have to pass through the
    checkpoints in order to get to major U.S. population centers. Although
    tactical checkpoints are mobile and may move daily or weekly, as needed,
    they must provide adequate advance notice to motorists that a checkpoint
    has been set up and is in operation. This is typically done by using
    orange traffic cones and large, visible signs positioned in advance of the
    checkpoint location. Permanent checkpoints, by virtue of their

    9According to the Border Patrol, Border Patrol stations are responsible
    for a specific geographic area within a sector. Substations are
    responsible for a geographic area within a station's area of
    responsibility. Stations are composed of a minimum of one
    patrol-agentin-charge, one or more supervisory Border Patrol agents,
    numerous Border Patrol agents and support staff and associated equipment
    required to carry out their duties. Substations report to the parent
    station. Stations, in turn, report to the sector chief patrol agent.

    permanence and large traffic signs, meet these criteria for advance notice
    and visibility.

    Figure 1 shows the topography, interstate highways, and some major
    secondary roads along the southwest border.

            Figure 1: Topography and Road Systems along the Southwest Border

    Major interstate road
    State road
    Desert areas
    Mountain ranges

    Source: GAO.

    Note: The U.S.-Mexican border is denoted by the black line that starts at
    the far left in San Diego, California, and that moves to the far right,
    ending at Brownsville, Texas.

    The legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Border Patrol
    began implementing a strategy called Operation Hold-the-Line in 1993, to
    incrementally increase control of the Southwest border in four phases by

    making it so difficult and costly for aliens to attempt illegal entry that
    fewer individuals would try.10 The four-phased approach involved adding
    resources along the Southwest border, starting with the areas that had the
    highest known levels of illegal alien activity, which at that time were
    the San Diego, California; El Paso, Texas; and McAllen, Texas, regions.11
    Although INS accomplished its goal of shifting illegal alien traffic away
    from these areas, the shift was achieved at a cost to both illegal aliens
    and

    12

    INS. In particular, rather than being deterred from attempting some
    illegal entry, many aliens have instead risked injury and death by trying
    to cross mountains, deserts, and rivers, primarily in Arizona and in
    particular in the Tucson sector. These conditions, which the Border Patrol
    said continue to the present day, prompted INS and now CBP to warn aliens
    about the dangers of crossing illegally, as well as to establish
    search-andrescue units.

    In effect, and contrary to the expectations of INS, the strategy led to a
    significant increase in illegal immigration through the Tucson sector,
    despite its topography and climate, as indirectly measured by total
    apprehensions, which increased nearly sevenfold in this sector over the
    period of fiscal years 1993 to 2000. In contrast, during the same period,
    total apprehensions for the eight other southwest sectors combined
    decreased by about 28 percent. The largest single decrease was in the San
    Diego sector, where apprehensions fell by almost three-fourths over
    19932000.

    Nationwide, Border Patrol apprehensions at all locations (including on the
    border, near the border, and at interior checkpoints) of illegal aliens
    over the last 4 years have varied from about 1.3 million in fiscal year
    2001, to 955,000 in fiscal year 2002, 931,000 in fiscal year 2003, and
    over 1.1 million in fiscal year 2004. Figure 2 shows the total annual
    apprehensions of illegal immigrants at all locations in each of the 9
    southwest Border Patrol sectors reported for fiscal years 2001 to 2004.

    10U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and Annual Report,
    Fiscal Year 2003,

    p. 43.

    11U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and Annual Report,
    Fiscal Year 2003,

    p. 42 and p. 43.

    12GAO, INS' Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain
    after Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2001).

    Figure 2: Total Apprehensions of Illegal Immigrants at All Locations in
    Each Southwest Border Patrol Sector in Fiscal Years 2001-2004

    Apprehensions

    600,000

    500,000

    400,000

    300,000

    200,000

    100,000

    0

     San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, Marfa, Del Rio, Laredo, McAllen,
                   Calif. Calif. Ariz. Ariz. Tex. Tex. Tex. Tex. Tex.

    Sector

    Fiscal year 2001

    Fiscal year 2002

    Fiscal year 2003

    Fiscal year 2004

    Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

    As shown, the Tucson sector has had the largest numbers of apprehensions
    since fiscal year 2001, which Border Patrol officials attribute in part to
    the legacy INS's strategy to deter illegal entry between the official
    ports of entry in the sectors that had the highest estimated illegal
    immigration in the early and mid-1990s, the San Diego, California, and the
    Texas sectors of El Paso and McAllen.13 It is apparent that in recent
    years far more apprehensions of illegal aliens have occurred in the Tucson
    sector than in the 8 other sectors.

    When establishing checkpoints, the Border Patrol must take into account
    court decisions ruling on the parameters of immigration officers'
    authority

    13U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and Annual Report,
    Fiscal Year 2003,

    p. 43.

    to conduct inquiries concerning illegal aliens. The legal authority of
    immigration officials to establish permanent checkpoints and stop vehicles
    transiting through them has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in

                                           14

    United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. The Supreme Court ruled that government
    officials may stop vehicles at permanent interior checkpoints for brief
    questioning of the driver and passengers without reasonable suspicion. The
    Court held that it was constitutional for the Border Patrol, after
    routinely stopping or slowing automobiles at a permanent checkpoint, to
    refer motorists selectively to a secondary inspection area for questions
    about citizenship and immigration status on the basis of criteria that
    would not sustain a roving patrol stop.15 The Court determined that the
    constitutional interests of motorists at these checkpoints were not
    violated, for a number of reasons. It found that the checkpoints, with
    flashing lights and warning signs, provided advance notice to motorists of
    an official roadblock that was applicable to all motorists.16 Motorists
    were not taken by surprise, as they knew, or could find out, the location
    of the checkpoints. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the regular
    manner in which established checkpoints were operated was visible evidence
    that the stops were duly authorized.17

    An organization that specializes in immigration issues has estimated that
    the number of people who have successfully entered the United States
    illegally has averaged roughly half a million per year since 1990 and that
    the number of illegal aliens residing in the United States has grown in
    recent years from about 8.4 million in April 2000 to about 11 million in
    March 2005.18

    14428 U.S. 543 (1976).

    15A roving patrol stop is a stop by an agent who patrols in a vehicle but
    who is not assigned to a particular location.

    16One of the checkpoints was functional only about 70 percent of the time
    because of personnel shortages. 428 U.S. 543, 554.

    17There are a number of court decisions concerning the use of permanent
    and temporary checkpoints, as well as roving patrols. In United States v.
    Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Supreme Court ruled that under
    the Fourth Amendment, except at the border or its functional equivalents,
    officers on roving patrols may stop vehicles only if "specific articulable
    facts" give rise to suspicion.

    18Pew Hispanic Center, Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the
    Undocumented Population, February 21, 2005. Given that these estimates are
    provided for background purposes, we did not assess their reliability.

      Permanent and Tactical Checkpoints Have Different but Complementary Roles in
      the Border Patrol Strategy

    The Border Patrol uses permanent and tactical checkpoints in 8 of its 9
    southwest sectors as part of a multilayered enforcement strategy to deter
    and defend against potential terrorists and their weapons, contraband
    smugglers, and persons who have entered the country illegally.19
    Corresponding to their different roles in the Border Patrol's enforcement
    strategy, permanent and tactical checkpoints have different capabilities.
    Permanent checkpoints have the advantage of physical infrastructure, which
    provides a wide range of logistical, communication, suspect questioning
    and detention, and equipment deployment and storage capabilities, as well
    as adequate shade and cages for canines. Tactical checkpoints have the
    advantage of mobility, which gives the Border Patrol the capability to
    respond quickly to emerging trends, intelligence, or national security
    threats. According to the Border Patrol, permanent checkpoints are most
    effective when supplemented by tactical checkpoints, which are generally
    used on secondary roads to cut off access to those seeking to evade
    permanent checkpoints on major arteries.

    This is not the case in the Tucson sector, where legislative language has
    prohibited the construction of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999.
    Moreover, starting in mid-2002, and through fiscal year 2004, the Border
    Patrol relocated or closed checkpoints in the Tucson sector on a regular
    basis, such as at least once every 7 days. The result has been a sector of
    nonpermanent checkpoints that lack the advantages of either permanent or
    tactical checkpoints, and which the Border Patrol states have degraded the
    Border Patrol's ability to fulfill its mission in the Tucson sector.

    Permanent and Tactical Checkpoints Each Have a Role in the Border
    Enforcement Strategy

    The Border Patrol uses interior traffic checkpoints as a third layer of
    defense and deterrence against potential terrorists and their weapons,
    contraband smugglers, and persons who have entered the country illegally.
    According to the Border Patrol, permanent and tactical checkpoints are
    part of an integrated, multilayered enforcement strategy intended to
    achieve two key law enforcement objectives: (1) to increase the likelihood
    of detection and apprehension of illegal entrants of all types, and
    thereby to deter other potential illegal entrants from attempting to enter
    the country, who might otherwise believe that successfully crossing the
    border would mean that there were no further barriers to them, and (2) to

    19As noted previously, varying legislative restrictions since fiscal year
    1999 on the Tucson sector have affected funding and operations of its
    checkpoints.

                             Role of Permanent Checkpoints

    deter illegal entrants from transiting through permanent checkpoints on
    major roadways, through fear of detection, and thereby to cause them to
    use less traveled secondary roads on which the Border Patrol is able to
    stop all or almost all vehicles (because of much lower traffic volume),
    making illegal entrants more visible and easier to detect and apprehend.20

    Procedures at both permanent and tactical checkpoints involve slowing or
    stopping traffic as vehicles proceed through the checkpoint. As traffic
    slows, Border Patrol agents use visual cues and canines trained to locate
    drugs and hidden persons to determine whether to wave the vehicle through,
    or stop the vehicle, question the occupant(s), and determine whether a
    more thorough secondary inspection is required.

    Permanent checkpoints are placed at locations that are intended to
    maximize the chances to detect illegal immigrants and smugglers who have
    crossed the border illegally and who are seeking to reach large population
    centers, such as Los Angeles, California, or Phoenix, Arizona. Where
    possible, according to the Border Patrol, permanent checkpoints are placed
    after several highways or roads join, so that anyone intending to exit the
    area into the interior of the country must transit them. Permanent
    checkpoints' physical infrastructure gives them different capabilities
    than tactical checkpoints. For example, permanent checkpoints facilities
    are equipped with technology and computers connected to national law
    enforcement databases to help identify suspects, research criminal
    histories, and cross check terrorist watch lists. They also offer greater
    physical safety to those working at them, by virtue of better signage,
    lighting, and larger shoulder areas to stand out of the way of traffic,
    and many of them are paved and have protective concrete barriers. In
    addition, permanent checkpoints have supporting infrastructure and
    procedures intended to reduce the ability of illegal entrants from
    circumventing the checkpoints. These include remote video surveillance,
    electronic sensors, and agent patrols in the vicinity of the checkpoints.

    20The Border Patrol refers to both these intended effects as
    deterrence-that is, deterrence of illegal entry into the United States
    from Mexico, and deterrence of illegal entrants from using high-volume
    highways where they can more easily blend into thousands of vehicles
    transiting permanent checkpoints. We have chosen to use this terminology
    as the Border Patrol uses it.

    Among the resources that are generally found at permanent checkpoints are:

    o  	Computers hardwired into national law enforcement databases, such as
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Integrated Automated
    Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) system, to provide identity
    checks. Figure 3 shows a fingerprint reading machine at a permanent
    checkpoint as it scans a fingerprint and then transmits the information to
    a centralized database via high-speed communications primarily available
    through a hardwired, secure line.21

    21According to the Border Patrol, it is seeking to field a vehicle that
    carries equipment capable of securely transmitting data. However, the high
    cost of the vehicles, at about $114,000 each, and technological
    difficulties have slowed this program. In addition to the initial purchase
    cost, there is also a recurring expense for satellite time that is
    estimated at $12,000 per month per link. In comparison, the average cost
    of installing permanent hardline database access in a facility is $30,000,
    with an estimated recurring monthly expense of $3,000 for T-1 line access.

    Figure 3: IAFIS Fingerprint Screen (at left) and Reading Machine (at
    right) at the I-5 San Clemente, California, Checkpoint

    Source: GAO.

    o  	Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) machines that use gammaray
    technology to examine the contents of vehicles, including trucks. As
    figure 4 shows, this equipment is substantial in size and requires an
    offroad area sufficient to permit its safe operation without interfering
    with traffic flow. The VACIS truck moves its arm over the subject vehicle,
    producing a color display of the interior that is visible on a color
    monitor inside the truck. Figure 5 shows how a car appeared on the
    monitor; the actual display is in color.

    Figure 4: VACIS Machine Examining a Vehicle at the I-15 Temecula,
    California, Checkpoint

    Figure 5: VACIS Monitor Display, I-5 Checkpoint, Temecula, California

    Source: GAO.

    o  Electrical and water utilities

    o  	Permanent tollbooth-like structures that provide cover from the
    weather, including shade for agents and canines

    o  	Buildings with room for processing and detention of persons suspected
    of smuggling or other illegal activity

    o  	Permanent, large communication towers that permit radio communication
    to other Border Patrol facilities and national law enforcement authorities

    o  Permanent lighting for night and poor weather conditions

    o  	Vehicle lifts to raise vehicles to inspect under them, and the area
    required for the lifts, as shown in figure 6.

                              Role of Tactical Checkpoints

    Figure 6: Vehicle Lift at the I-35 Checkpoint, North of Laredo, Texas

    Source: GAO.

    Tactical checkpoints are intended to supplement permanent ones by
    monitoring and inspecting traffic on secondary roads that can be used to
    evade the permanent checkpoints. For example, the Temecula permanent
    checkpoint in the San Diego sector maintains up to eight tactical
    checkpoints to inspect vehicles traveling on back roads in the hills
    around the permanent checkpoint on I-15. Tactical checkpoints are intended
    to be mobile and set up for short-term use only. They are relocated by the
    Border Patrol in order to respond to intelligence on changing patterns of
    contraband smuggling and routes being used by illegal aliens. According to
    the Border Patrol, the combination of permanent and supplemental tactical
    checkpoints is intended to both detect persons who have entered the
    country illegally and to increase the chances of detecting and
    apprehending contraband smugglers and illegal aliens who seek to avoid
    permanent checkpoints and instead use less traveled routes. On these less
    traveled routes, with comparatively low traffic volume of as little as a
    few

    hundred vehicles daily, the Border Patrol is able to stop every car and
    closely observe the occupants, as well as question them.22 This increases
    the likelihood of detecting illegal entrants, while on heavily traveled
    highways, only a small percentage of vehicles can be subjected to this
    level of inspection, in order to avoid creating long traffic delays.

    In contrast to the resources that are typically deployed at permanent
    checkpoints, tactical ones, by virtue of their mobility, do not have large
    fixed facilities or hardwired communications. They do, however, offer the
    element of flexibility, by virtue of their mobility. Tactical checkpoints
    generally consist of a few Border Patrol vehicles, used by agents to drive
    to the location; orange cones to slow down and direct traffic; portable
    water supply; a cage for canines (if deployed with the checkpoint);
    portable rest facilities; and warning signs. Some may also have portable
    lighting, if operated at dusk or night. If persons are detained at a
    tactical checkpoint, some of the agents must leave the checkpoint to
    transport them back to a Border Patrol station for positive
    identification. Our observations of tactical checkpoints showed that most
    equipment has to be towed or carried to the checkpoint for it to operate,
    and then has to be removed when it relocates. According to the Border
    Patrol, this increases wear and tear on the equipment and absorbs time to
    hitch up, tow, set up, dismantle, and tow the equipment back to a Border
    Patrol station or to an alternate tactical checkpoint. Figure 7 shows a
    tactical checkpoint on Sandia Creek road, in a rural area near Temecula,
    California, that was used to supplement the permanent checkpoint on I-15.

    22For example, a daily average of 122,000 vehicles go through the I-15
    checkpoint near Temecula, California, while Border Patrol data for the 8
    tactical checkpoints that support the permanent one on I-15 show average
    daily volume ranging from about 100 to about 800 vehicles.

    Figure 7: Tactical Checkpoint at Sandia Creek Road, near Temecula,
    California

    Source: GAO.

    While the changing locations of tactical checkpoints would appear to offer
    the potential element of surprise, we were told by the Border Patrol that
    the smugglers of aliens and contraband could use cell phones and
    communications networks to alert confederates of the presence of
    checkpoints within minutes of their being relocated. The Border Patrol
    provided us with information that confirmed that smugglers of aliens and
    contraband observed some checkpoints and reported on their activities to
    their confederates. According to the Border Patrol, smugglers know within
    minutes about the closure of a checkpoint.

    Legislative Restrictions on the Tucson Sector

    For fiscal years 1999-2004, annual appropriations acts made no funds
    "available for the site acquisition, design, or construction" of any
    Border Patrol checkpoint in the Tucson sector.23 Since the Tucson sector
    had no permanent checkpoints at the time the prohibition was first
    imposed, the effect of this restriction was that no permanent checkpoints
    could be planned or constructed in this sector. According to the Border
    Patrol, it used a combination of roving patrols and temporary checkpoints
    in the sector that remained at the same location for long periods but did
    not have permanent infrastructure. This arrangement was adequate, the
    Border Patrol stated, until the late 1990s, when the volume of illegal
    entrants into the sector increased substantially as its overall strategy
    to greatly reinforce the border in urbanized areas took effect in San
    Diego, California; El Paso, Texas; and McAllen, Texas.

    The fiscal year 2003 and 2004 Appropriations Acts also added a provision
    requiring that the checkpoints in the Tucson sector be relocated "at least
    once every 7 days in a manner designed to prevent persons subject to
    inspection from predicting" their location. Since permanent checkpoints
    could not be built under these restrictions, and temporary ones had to be
    relocated at least once every 7 days, the checkpoints functioned as
    hybrids, or what we refer to as nonpermanent checkpoints that had neither
    the advantages of the physical infrastructure typical of permanent ones
    nor the flexibility of tactical checkpoints to respond to intelligence

    24

    information. Such checkpoints do not have permanent infrastructure and
    hence lack the multiplicity of capabilities typically associated with
    permanent checkpoints in other sectors. At the same time, they also do not
    have tactical flexibility because they are generally kept at the same
    locations, which have been chosen by the Border Patrol in part for both
    safety and legal considerations. The checkpoint locations need to have
    adequate shoulder space on which to place the equipment needed to maintain
    the checkpoint, such as a small trailer, water tanks, portable lights and
    generators, as well as space to conduct secondary inspections of

    23Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
    1999, P.L. 105277 (1998); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, P.L.
    106-113 (1999); Appropriations for the District of Columbia, 2001, P.L.
    106-553 (2000); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
    Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, P.L. 107-77
    (2001); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, P.L. 108-7 (2003);
    Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, P.L. 108-90
    (2003); and Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L.
    108-334 (2004).

    24The rest of this report refers to these hybrid checkpoints in the Tucson
    sector as nonpermanent checkpoints.

    vehicles ordered to pull over. The locations also need to have sufficient
    space to place signs in advance of the checkpoint to notify vehicles of
    the checkpoint's location (to comply with legal decisions) and cannot be
    placed after or around sharp curves that might force vehicles to come to a
    sudden stop upon notice of the checkpoint. In addition, the checkpoint
    locations are chosen by the Border Patrol to maximize the likelihood that
    illegal entrants would have to transit through them in order to move
    northward. Depending on the criticality of their original location in
    terms of road networks and smuggling routes, relocating these checkpoints
    can reduce their effectiveness in monitoring vehicular traffic. (See app.
    III, fig. 14, for a map of the sector and its checkpoints.) To support
    these nonpermanent checkpoints, the Tucson sector operates tactical
    checkpoints periodically, as occurs in other sectors with permanent
    checkpoints.

    The fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act limited the funding prohibition to
    only construction, thus allowing the use of funds for site acquisition and
    design. Further, this act directed CBP to conduct a study of locations for
    proposed permanent checkpoints within the Tucson sector.25 In addition,
    the 2005 Act changed the requirement to relocate checkpoints to "at least
    an average of once every 14 days." According to the Border Patrol, the
    phrase "an average" gave it more flexibility in determining checkpoint
    operating schedules than the previous years' requirement of "at least once
    every 7 days." As a result, in fiscal year 2005, the Patrol operates the
    checkpoint on I-19 for 14 days, closes it for 8 hours, and then reopens it
    for 14 days. In addition, the Patrol has kept the checkpoint at the more
    northern kilometer post (KP) 42 location, because, it stated, moving it
    south to the KP 25 location every 7 days had permitted illegal immigrants
    to wait until KP 42 closed, and to then move north. At other checkpoints
    in the Tucson sector, the Patrol has maintained varying opening and
    closing schedules, which it stated were in conformity, in its view, with
    the "average of once every 14 days" language.26

    25Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-334
    (2004). The act calls for a plan for expenditure that includes location,
    design, costs, and benefits of each proposed permanent checkpoint. This
    study was submitted by CBP to the committee in April 2005.

    26We did not verify whether these schedules are carried out as stated.
    However, we did obtain copies of the records maintained by the Tucson
    sector that record the times that the I-19 and other Tucson checkpoints
    have been opened and closed.

    However, as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, the fiscal
    year 2006 appropriations bill would restore the 7-day relocation
    requirement. Also, it provides that no funds may be used for site
    acquisition, design, or construction of permanent checkpoints in this
    sector.27

    The Tucson Sector's Nonpermanent Checkpoints Have Additional Limitations

    Prior to the implementation of INS's southwest border strategy in 1993,
    the Tucson sector had a smaller volume of illegal alien traffic relative
    to the San Diego and El Paso sectors, as indirectly measured by
    apprehensions. In fiscal year 1993, the Tucson sector had less than
    one-fifth as many apprehensions as the San Diego sector, and less than
    one-third those in the El Paso sector. As the strategy unfolded, the San
    Diego and El Paso sectors became more difficult for illegal aliens to
    cross, while the volume of illegal traffic in the Tucson sector increased
    nearly sevenfold over the period of fiscal years 1993-2000, as measured
    indirectly by sectorwide apprehensions. This increase in illegal activity,
    as well as a general increase in legitimate vehicular traffic, led the
    Border Patrol to consider a more permanent presence for checkpoints in the
    Tucson sector, where it had previously operated only tactical checkpoints,
    to provide the range of facilities offered by permanent checkpoints.

    The Border Patrol started implementing the 7-day relocation requirement in
    June 2002, as noted above. Patrol officials told us that where feasible,
    taking safety and operational strategy into account, they alternated the
    sites of nonpermanent checkpoints along the same route in the Tucson
    sector. The Border Patrol was able to establish nonpermanent checkpoints
    among alternate sites on two such routes. However, for 3 of the 6
    checkpoints in the sector, safety factors precluded use of other locations
    on the same route, and the Border Patrol closed the checkpoints for 7
    days. (One checkpoint of the 6 closes each night and is replaced with
    roving vehicle patrols, because of the very sparse population of the
    region in which it is located.)28 The 7-day relocation rule was changed to
    "at least

    27Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, H.R. 2360,
    109th Cong. (Reported out of the House Appropriations Committee May 13,
    2005.)

    28Because we made site visits to checkpoints only at specific times during
    one trip to this sector, and did not remain at these locations for days or
    longer, we did not verify whether the Border Patrol did, in fact, relocate
    or close its checkpoints on the schedule described to us.

    an average of once every 14 days" in fiscal year 2005 appropriations
    legislation.29

    The Border Patrol told us that it did not seek to evade compliance with
    the intent of the relocation rule by opening an alternative checkpoint
    just a short distance from the first one, or by closing for just a few
    hours. It did attempt to close and open for a few days at a time, they
    said, to try to confuse illegal aliens and contraband smugglers. However,
    officials stated that this was not productive, as the smugglers monitored
    the checkpoint activities so closely. According to Border Patrol
    officials, the funding prohibition on constructing checkpoints in the
    Tucson sector, in combination with the mandated relocation on a regular
    basis, allows smugglers and illegal aliens to further their entry into the
    United States with reduced interdiction risk. Table 1 shows the variations
    followed by the Border Patrol in operating the nonpermanent checkpoints in
    the Tucson sector.

         Table 1: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoints Schedule to Conform to
                                  Legislative Language

      Checkpoint Open, Closure, and Relocation Schedule to Conform to Legislative
                                        Language

    A Opens when port of entry south of location is open and closes every
    night

    B 	Opens and closes for periods of time to comply with legislative
    language Does not relocate because there is no safe alternate location

    Opens and closes for periods of time to comply with legislative language
    Does not relocate because there is no safe alternate location

    D Checkpoint alternates between KP 42 and KP 25

     E Checkpoint alternates among 3 identified locations along state route (SR) 82
                                        or SR 83

    F 	Opens and closes for periods of time to comply with legislative
    language Does not relocate because there is no safe alternate location

    Source: Border Patrol.

    According to Border Patrol officials, contraband smugglers and illegal
    aliens typically wait until they learn from confederates that a checkpoint
    is in the process of being relocated or has been closed, and then use this
    downtime to further their illegal entry. Border Patrol officials told us
    that in today's environment, they are up against increasingly
    sophisticated smugglers who use radios, cell phones, global positioning
    systems, and

    29Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-334
    (2004).

    other high-technology equipment to watch agents' movements and alert each
    other when checkpoints are moved or closed.

    On highway I-19, the interstate highway that runs from Nogales, Arizona,
    on the border, directly north to Tucson, the Border Patrol alternated
    between two locations for nonpermanent checkpoints, at KP 42 and at KP 25,
    at congressional staff instruction (for the last quarter of fiscal year
    2002), and then in conformity with the legislative restrictions for fiscal
    years 2003 and 2004. When the northern one (KP 42) was open, however, the
    Border Patrol told us that illegal aliens and smugglers who had made it
    over the border then waited in communities south of it, but north of KP
    25. (See app. III, fig. 14 for a sector map that shows these locations.)
    When the checkpoint at KP 42 closed and moved down to KP 25, the illegal
    entrants who waited north of KP 25 (but south of KP 42 while open) were
    able to move with reduced interdiction risk, because there was no longer a
    checkpoint north of them. In fiscal year 2005, as noted above, the Border
    Patrol has maintained the checkpoint at the more northern KP 42 location,
    to reduce the potential for illegal entrants taking advantage of the
    relocation that occurred in previous years. In addition, the checkpoint is
    kept open for 14 days, then closed for 8 hours, and then reopened for 14
    days. The Border Patrol stated that it believes that this schedule
    conforms to the fiscal year legislative language that requires that Tucson
    sector checkpoints be relocated an average of at least once every 14 days.

    Border Patrol officials told us that without the infrastructure typical of
    the Patrol's permanent checkpoints in others sectors, the Tucson sector
    cannot perform the full range of enforcement functions. For example,
    without access to national databases, suspects detained at the sector's
    nonpermanent checkpoints cannot be readily identified and must be
    transported by an agent or agents to a Border Patrol station with database
    access, in order to determine if the persons should be detained. Further,
    the nonpermanent Tucson checkpoints lack paved, adequately large, level,
    off-road shoulder areas to deploy vehicle lifts or VACIS trucks required
    to examine underneath and inside vehicles. According to the Border Patrol,
    because detention facilities at these checkpoints are small rooms in
    mobile trailers, with weak internal doors and locks, they can be
    insufficient in size and security. (See photo in fig. 8.) Upon
    apprehension of a suspect or suspects, Border Patrol agents from the
    checkpoint must transport them to a station with adequate facilities for
    detention and processing, as would be found at typical permanent
    checkpoints elsewhere. The Border Patrol stated that sending an agent or
    agents to a station with suspects is an inefficient use of personnel and
    can cause the nonpermanent checkpoint to close because of personnel
    shortages.

    Figure 8 shows photographs of the nonpermanent checkpoint operated on I-19
    in the Tucson sector at KP 42, with limited facilities, located under an
    overpass to provide shelter from sun and weather, and lacking a paved
    shoulder for vehicles pulled over for further inspection.

     Figure 8: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoint at KP 42 on I-19, Near Tubac,
                                        Arizona

                                      Source: GAO.

                                 Benefits and Costs of

      Traffic Checkpoints Are Difficult to Quantify, but Some Examples Are Available

    Although total apprehensions and contraband seizure data are available for
    interior checkpoints, some of the benefits-such as deterrence of potential
    contraband smugglers or of persons contemplating illegal entry into the
    United States-and costs of traffic checkpoints are difficult to quantify
    because deterrence is difficult to measure and cost data are not
    maintained separately by the Border Patrol for permanent or tactical
    checkpoints. Studies or reports on checkpoint benefits and costs have also
    not been performed by the Border Patrol. Of the less quantifiable benefits
    that can be described, we were told that intelligence debriefings of
    apprehended aliens and smugglers testify to the deterrent effects of
    interior checkpoints. In addition, local citizens and community groups
    with whom we met who live near or in the vicinity of interior checkpoints
    are generally supportive. However, this support is not universal.

    Apprehensions and Drug The most readily available data on the benefits of
    interior checkpoints are

    Seizure Benefits 	the drug seizure and apprehension data recorded by the
    Border Patrol on a daily basis at its checkpoints and stations. In fiscal
    year 2004, for example, the Border Patrol reported that the southwest
    interior checkpoints, which were staffed by about 10 percent of Border
    Patrol agents in those sectors, were responsible for 96,000 illegal alien
    apprehensions, or 8 percent of all Border Patrol apprehensions, and for
    seizure of 418,102 pounds of

    marijuana and 10,853 pounds of cocaine in fiscal year 2004, or about 31
    percent of the marijuana and about 74 percent of the cocaine seized
    nationally by the Border Patrol.

    In addition to the benefits of seizing contraband, and mitigating the
    smuggling of humans, there were at least six incidents reported to us
    where individuals with suspected ties to terrorism were identified when
    transiting a Border Patrol interior checkpoint and appropriate actions
    were coordinated with the FBI.30

    Deterrence and Some Other Potential Benefits of Traffic Checkpoints are
    Difficult to Quantify

    Intelligence debriefings of smugglers and illegal aliens and reports of
    increased smuggling costs provide some evidence of checkpoints' deterrent
    effect. Information from debriefings suggests that interior checkpoints
    deter some persons from attempting to go through them, and also push them
    into rural areas that are more difficult to transit and where they are
    more easily identifiable among a lower volume of traffic. In addition, the
    presence of effective checkpoints can contribute to increased smuggling
    costs, also possibly serving as a deterrent, according to the Border
    Patrol. In the San Diego sector, for example, we were told by the Border
    Patrol that smuggling fees charged to Mexicans and others had increased
    fivefold in recent years (to about $1,500 per person), because of the
    perceived difficulty of breaching border defenses and of transiting
    through interior checkpoints undetected. It is difficult, however, to
    separate out the contribution to deterring potential illegal entrants from
    entering the United States of increases in smuggling fees that are due to
    better line watch and line patrol border operations versus those cost
    increases that could be attributed to vigilance at interior checkpoints.
    (We did not validate the Border Patrol's statements with regard to
    increased smuggling fees.)

    Evidence for the deterrent effects of checkpoints was reported in a 1995
    INS study which found that that smugglers and illegal aliens adjust their
    transit routes because they are well aware when checkpoints are open and
    closed.31 The 1995 study reported on a test of interior checkpoint
    operations in which the permanent checkpoint on I-5, near San Clemente,

    30Border Patrol personnel informed us that the term "appropriate actions"
    is intentionally vague because of the sensitive nature of this
    information.

    31Office of Policy and Planning, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
    U.S. Department of Justice, Evaluation of Traffic Checkpoints at San
    Clemente and Temecula, June 1995.

    California, was closed several times, in order to determine the impact of
    the checkpoint on I-15, near Temecula, California. The latter is located
    inland on a parallel major north-south highway, and about as far north of
    the border as the checkpoint on I-5. (See app. II, fig. 10, for a map of
    this sector that shows the location of these checkpoints.) The study
    reported that when the I-5, San Clemente checkpoint was closed,
    apprehensions at the I-15 Temecula checkpoint fell sharply-there was a 50
    percent decline in 1 month. According to the study, this demonstrated that
    illegal entrants became aware of the closure and therefore chose the I-5
    San Clemente route with no checkpoint, while avoiding the I-15 Temecula
    route with an operating checkpoint. The Border Patrol told us that this
    demonstrated the interdependence of various checkpoints operations and
    that illegal entrants were, in fact, deterred from transiting routes with
    checkpoints when unmonitored alternatives are available. This study,
    however, did not address whether the checkpoints completely deter any
    aliens from entering the country.

    As additional illustrations of the potential effects of interior
    checkpoints, Temecula station officials described the following operations
    that in their view appeared to confirm that illegal aliens had changed
    their intended routes in order to avoid the checkpoints at Temecula and
    San Clemente:32

    o  	San Diego sector intelligence analysts determined that illegal alien
    smugglers were avoiding the permanent Border Patrol interior checkpoints
    on the highways at San Clemente (I-5) and Temecula (I15). Instead, they
    were taking a circuitous route from the San Diego area to eastern
    California and western Arizona, and then turning north on secondary
    highways without checkpoints to make their way to Los Angeles. In response
    to this intelligence, the Temecula station set up an August 2004 3-day
    traffic observation operation along I-10 between Los Angeles and Arizona.
    During the operation, Border Patrol agents stopped 30 suspect vehicles,
    and apprehended 134 illegal aliens. Border Patrol officials confirmed the
    earlier intelligence that illegal aliens were utilizing the I-10 route,
    without checkpoints, to avoid checkpoints on I-5 and I-15. The officials
    believe that this demonstrated the effectiveness of the permanent I-5 and
    I-15 interior checkpoints as deterrents that cause illegal entrants to
    seek out less traveled, unmonitored alternative routes, even if longer in
    distance and time required to reach major U.S. cities.

    32We did not confirm these operational results or the benefits claimed by
    officials.

    o  	On May 3, 2004, three vans ran (transited without stopping despite
    orders to do so) the Otay Mesa port of entry near San Diego, and two vans
    proceeded north on I-15 (one was stopped near the port of entry). Temecula
    station officials were alerted to the fleeing vans and were notified that
    to avoid the checkpoint on I-15, the vans had turned onto a secondary road
    that roughly paralleled the interstate. Four tactical checkpoints were
    operating in the area, and the vans were stopped by agents at two of these
    checkpoints. A total of 48 illegal aliens were arrested. According to
    Temecula station officials, this incident showed that (1) illegal alien
    smugglers know that the permanent checkpoints such as the one on I-15 are
    to be avoided if possible, and (2) tactical checkpoints on secondary roads
    are valuable and effective for apprehending aliens attempting to
    circumvent checkpoints on major highways.

    o  	Temecula station officials described another operation as an example
    of checkpoint deterrence effectiveness. On the basis of intelligence,
    Temecula station intelligence analysts concluded that smugglers of illegal
    aliens had altered their entry routes to avoid the significant Border
    Patrol presence in the San Diego sector. These altered entry routes
    included the use of I-40 westbound to enter the greater Los Angeles area;
    the Border Patrol did not have checkpoints or a constant presence on
    westbound I-40. In response to this intelligence, the Temecula station
    conducted a traffic observation operation with multiple marked patrol
    vehicles on I-40 over a period of 3 days in November 2004, to interdict
    alien smugglers using the westbound I-40 corridor to circumvent the
    permanent checkpoints on I-5 and I-15. The I-40 operation was conducted
    shortly after a Border Patrol I-10 operation with the expectation that
    smugglers would use I-40 to avoid I-10. The Border Patrol operation found
    7 vehicles with 77 illegal aliens. Of these, 60 had entered the country
    east of the San Diego sector, circumventing the I-5 and I-15 checkpoints.
    According to Temecula station officials, this confirmed that I-40 is a
    major smuggling route and that the permanent checkpoints on I-5 and on
    I-15 serve as deterrents to at least some illegal traffic, as intended.

    Most Local Community Leaders We Contacted See Traffic Checkpoints as
    Benefiting their Communities

    Local law enforcement, business, and community leaders near interior
    traffic checkpoints in Temecula, California, in the San Diego sector, and
    Nogales, Arizona, in the Tucson sector, that we interviewed told us that
    in their view, the checkpoints and the presence of Border Patrol agents
    were of considerable benefit to their communities. However, in the small
    community of Tubac, Arizona, we found local criticism of interior traffic
    checkpoints.33 Since we did not conduct a comprehensive survey of all
    communities in the vicinity of all 33 permanent checkpoints in the
    southwest border states, our findings are limited to the views of the
    local citizens and law enforcement officials with whom we met in the
    communities we visited, as well as statements by the Border Patrol with
    regard to their relationships with local communities near checkpoints. We
    did not confirm the views expressed by these citizens and officials, as
    little data were available relating directly to their statements.

    Officials representing the city of Temecula, California, the Temecula
    Police Department, and the Chamber of Commerce, for example, all said that
    the nearby I-15 traffic checkpoint and Border Patrol presence benefit
    their community.34 The checkpoint has the second greatest average daily
    volume of vehicular traffic among the Border Patrol's checkpoints, with
    about 122,000 vehicles passing through the checkpoint location daily. City
    and police officials said that having the checkpoint in operation means
    that illegal aliens and drug smugglers are intercepted and taken off the
    streets, reducing crime and vandalism. One city official also said that
    traffic problems with the checkpoint have been minimal, and that the city
    has received very few calls complaining about the checkpoint and what
    amount to minimal delays when the checkpoint is operating and checking
    traffic. The official said that the majority of the calls that the city
    received were before September 11, 2001, and very few calls had been
    received since then. The President of the Temecula Chamber of Commerce
    conducted an informal survey of member businesses, and only one business
    mentioned that some employees said that the checkpoint

    33The interior checkpoint near Temecula is the one on I-15. The interior
    checkpoint near Tubac and Nogales, Arizona, is the one that alternated
    between a road location designated as KP 25 and KP 42 on I-19. Tubac is
    located just off I-19, near KP 42. According to the Border Patrol, the KP
    designations stem from a time when the metric system was being proposed as
    an alternative to the English system of measurement.

    34Temecula, California had an estimated 2004 population of about 82,000.
    It is in Riverside county, the fifth most populous in California, with
    1.87 million persons in 2004. These and other population data were
    obtained from the U.S. Census, 2000, or later updates on the U.S. Census
    Web site, if available.

    operations occasionally delayed their commute to or from work. Overall,
    the Chamber President concluded that the checkpoint is not a concern to
    the community.

    The Santa Cruz County Attorney from Nogales, Arizona, told us that the
    Border Patrol and its checkpoints were among the best protections for
    fighting illegal alien traffic and local crime, with a side benefit of
    detecting drunk drivers on their way back from Mexico. According to this
    official, the I-19 checkpoint between Nogales and Tucson was a major
    benefit to the community because it was saving lives, apprehending illegal
    aliens, and arresting drug smugglers. The official also stated that, in
    her opinion, the checkpoints are effective in apprehending drug violators
    out of proportion to the resources deployed at the checkpoints and voiced
    the view that permanent checkpoints were better than tactical ones.

    In contrast to the generally positive view of the benefits resulting from
    the Border Patrol checkpoints from others that we interviewed, the
    president of a local civic association from Tubac, Arizona (population
    949), located between Nogales and Tucson near the I-19 nonpermanent Tucson
    sector checkpoint at KP 42, told us that he believed the checkpoint was
    disruptive to the community and was not effective because illegal aliens
    were circumventing the checkpoint and passing through the community. He
    said that the checkpoint had affected home sales and housing values, and
    that most local residents were strongly opposed to having a permanent
    checkpoint built near them on I-19, because of fears about the impact on
    traffic congestion and overall quality of life. We were also told by
    congressional staff that the overwhelming majority present at April and
    July 2005 community meetings in Tubac had voiced opposition to the
    possibility of a permanent checkpoint on I-19 near Tubac.

    Traffic Congestion at Checkpoints Does Not Appear to Be a Large Problem
    but May Involve Some Costs

    The Border Patrol Handbook states that checkpoint operations should be
    suspended if there is "too much traffic congestion" and does not further
    define this. However, some sector checkpoints have more precise guidance
    pertaining to a specific distance or length of time traffic will be
    permitted to back up. Agents said they know from experience the amount of
    wait time that is created by how far back from the checkpoint the lines of
    vehicles extend. The maximum delays that we observed appeared not to
    exceed the restrictions defined by the checkpoint guidance prepared by

    certain sectors.35 This was the case, for example, at I-5 near San
    Clemente, which has the single greatest daily volume of traffic in the
    country (about 144,000 vehicles per day) among interior Border Patrol
    checkpoints, and at I-15 near Temecula, the next highest, with about
    122,000 vehicles daily. At the times we visited, at both locations, we
    observed that the agents temporarily stopped checkpoint inspections when
    estimated delays exceeded guidelines. Traffic was then "flushed" and
    permitted to flow through until there was no line of waiting vehicles.
    Screening operations were then resumed. We also observed during our visit
    to the San Clemente checkpoint, traffic flow in the opposite southerly
    direction, where there is no checkpoint, sometimes was heavier and slower
    than on the side with the ongoing checkpoint operation.

    Moreover, of the more than 400 statewide cameras maintained by the
    California Department of Transportation to monitor traffic, none are at
    either the Temecula or San Clemente checkpoints, according to the
    department. In response to our questions, the department stated that it
    had not received reports in recent years on congestion or related problems
    at either the I-5 or I-15 checkpoints, and it had not conducted studies of
    the checkpoints.

    We contacted several other organizations that monitor traffic congestion
    as part of their work, such as the Automobile Club of Southern California,
    and the California Highway Patrol, to ask if they had received complaints
    about the San Clemente or Temecula checkpoints in California, or had
    observed actual traffic backups at these checkpoints. We also asked the
    American Trucking Associations if it had received complaints from
    commercial shippers about checkpoints in the southwestern states. None of
    these organizations cited complaints in recent years about these
    checkpoints.

    In addition, an official of an organization that promotes economic
    development in Laredo, Texas, and who is active in monitoring the impact
    on traffic of the checkpoint on I-35 north of Laredo, stated that traffic
    delays were minimal even at the I-35 checkpoint, and that anyone living on

    35According to the Border Patrol, sectors do not issue or direct specific
    traffic control policy for individual checkpoints other than the national
    "general" policy. Most sectors have required stations to develop specific
    traffic control guidelines for each checkpoint. These guidelines are often
    in the traffic control plan of the checkpoint permit or memo form. The
    rationale, according to the Border Patrol, is that every checkpoint is
    different and requires different guidelines.

    or near the border is familiar with the checkpoints as a fact of life. He
    believed that commercial truckers build in potential travel delays, which
    are longer for commercial vehicles than for cars, into their cost of doing
    business and transit times. He noted that even during rush hours, he
    believed that trucks did not wait more than an average of about 20 minutes
    maximum, based on what he had observed in recent years. Cars are delayed
    considerably less, averaging perhaps a 5-minute delay in rush hour, he
    stated. We observed this checkpoint, and delays appeared not to exceed 5
    minutes at the time we visited, based on the time that it took for cars at
    the back of the line to transit through the checkpoint.

    At the tactical checkpoint on I-19 between Nogales and Tucson, Arizona, we
    saw minor traffic backups of not more than about a half dozen vehicles at
    any time over the course of about 1 hour. We were told that this was
    typical for this time of year; delays did not last more than 2 or 3
    minutes for vehicles transiting the checkpoint during our site visit.
    However, the Border Patrol also told us that when truck traffic is
    particularly heavy during the spring harvest season, pulling trucks over
    to the side of the road to inspect them can create backups that cause
    safety problems and delays for the truck drivers.

    We also observed traffic patterns at permanent checkpoints on I-35 north
    of Laredo and on U.S. highway 281 at Falfurrias, Texas, both major
    highways, and at a permanent checkpoint at Hebbronville, Texas, on a
    secondary road between Falfurrias and Laredo. Although traffic backups
    occurred on occasion at these locations, we were told that they generally
    did not last more than a few minutes, as additional agents or lanes are
    added to reduce delays. During our visit, Border Patrol agents appeared to
    be monitoring the amount of traffic waiting in line, which caused less
    than about 5 minutes' wait time, and usually less. Agents told us that if
    traffic backs up, they add extra agents to the inspection lanes, and may
    open

    36

    additional lanes as well. At some holiday periods, however, we were told
    delays can reach 20 to 30 minutes. The volume of traffic at the Texas
    checkpoints we observed was much lower than that on I-5 and I-15 in
    California, permitting what amounts to a near 100 percent check of
    transiting vehicles, according to the Border Patrol. This is feasible when

    36At all three of these permanent checkpoints in Texas, there are paved
    shoulder areas with multiple lanes to funnel traffic away from the actual
    highways. This not only permits separating the commercial trucks from
    passenger vehicles, but also makes the entire inspection process safer for
    everyone, as there are fewer backups onto the highways, according to
    Border Patrol officials.

    average daily traffic volume is about 13,700 vehicles, as is the case at
    the Laredo, Texas, checkpoint, compared with more than 120,000 at I-15,
    near Temecula, California, or over 140,000 at I-5, near San Clemente,
    California.

    Costs of Operating Checkpoints are Not Routinely Maintained

    Border Patrol officials told us that costs of operating the permanent and
    tactical checkpoints are not routinely or systematically maintained or
    reported because checkpoints are integral and interdependent parts of the
    multilayered enforcement strategy. As such, permanent and tactical
    checkpoints are supported with facilities, personnel, equipment, and
    canines, for example, and by their associated stations, which in turn are
    supported by the sector as a whole. Tactical checkpoints in particular are
    often set up specifically to support the permanent ones, often on a
    changing daily basis. Agent manpower levels may also vary at both the
    permanent and the tactical checkpoints, depending on how the Border Patrol
    decides on a given day to best allocate personnel resources, in response
    to traffic volume, intelligence on illegal entrant routes, and other
    factors, such as weather. For example, the permanent checkpoint at I-15
    Temecula is supported by up to eight tactical checkpoints that are set up
    as needed, based on intelligence data on illegal alien traffic on the
    sector's secondary roads.

    The costs of one tactical checkpoint versus another are not readily
    separable, except perhaps the personnel costs, and even then, those could
    vary over a period of hours, according to Border Patrol officials. A
    question that the Border Patrol officials asked and which has no easy or
    standard answer was "If an agent must transport arrested aliens or
    smugglers to a station headquarters, should his/her salary be counted as
    part of the roadside checkpoint, or the station headquarters support?"

    Even considering these obstacles to checkpoint cost comparisons, we asked
    Border Patrol officials whether they could supply us with individual
    checkpoint operating costs to include facilities, equipment, personnel,
    and any other costs. Border Patrol officials queried the sectors and
    stations at the locations we visited and asked whether cost data could be
    assembled. The sectors and stations responded with what cost data they
    could locate, but it was not possible to obtain similar data from each
    location, and the data provided would not be reliable enough to present
    any meaningful statistics concerning costs of operating interior traffic
    checkpoints.

      The Lack of Systematic Evaluation Limits the Border Patrol's Ability to
      Allocate Resources Based on Need

    In reviewing Border Patrol reports, and in discussions with Border Patrol
    officials, we found that the Border Patrol has not systematically
    evaluated the effectiveness of interior checkpoint operations. The Border
    Patrol does gather and report traditional law enforcement data, including
    the number of apprehensions, historical apprehension trends, and weight
    and type of contraband seized, but could not provide us with reports or
    analyses that assessed the performance of one sector compared to another,
    or of interior checkpoints compared with line operations. Thus, the Border
    Patrol does not have analyses based on inputs (costs), such as agent work
    years, divided into outputs, such as apprehensions or contraband seized,
    that could help measure effectiveness or productivity and that could
    therefore also be used in making decisions about how best to allocate
    resources. The Border Patrol stated that it has not evaluated the
    effectiveness of its interior checkpoints largely because checkpoints are
    part of a multilayered enforcement strategy and cannot be easily separated
    for evaluation purposes. Furthermore, officials stated that because such
    outcomes as deterrence are difficult to measure (i.e., estimating how many
    crimes or illegal entries were deterred before they happened), the Border
    Patrol has chosen to rely on the types of data cited above to gauge
    effectiveness.

    A key component to assessing unit operations is the development of
    performance measures. We have previously reported on the need for federal
    agencies to develop performance measures of their programs and to use such
    measures to improve their performance, as well as to be in compliance with
    the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).37 As we noted,
    under the act, "every major federal agency must now ask itself some basic
    questions: What is our mission? What are our goals and how will we achieve
    them? How can we measure our performance? How will we use that information
    to make improvements? GPRA forces a shift in the focus of federal
    agencies-away from such traditional concerns as staffing and activity
    levels and toward a single overriding issue: results. GPRA requires
    agencies to set goals, measure performance, and report on their
    accomplishments."38

    37P.L. 103-62.

    38GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
    Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996),
    p. 1. See also, Program Evaluation: Studies Helped Agencies Measure or
    Explain Program Performance

    GAO/GGD-00-204 (Washington, D.C.: September 2000).

    Organizations use performance measures to help demonstrate the level of
    progress in achieving results, to inform decision makers, and to hold
    managers accountable. To better articulate a results orientation,
    organizations create a set of performance goals and measures that address
    important dimensions of program performance. Establishing and using
    performance measures for checkpoint operations and other strategy
    components would allow the Border Patrol to help assess the comparative
    success of each checkpoint in addressing program goals as well as
    checkpoints generally in comparison with line and patrol operations. A
    comparison of the effectiveness of each sector, using performance
    measures, would permit the Border Patrol to more meaningfully assess the
    success of its overall strategy than does a count of total apprehensions
    or contraband seizures. Without knowing how much effort produced an
    outcome-in this case, apprehensions or contraband seizures-it is difficult
    to know if one sector or region is performing better than another (on a
    per input basis). With such knowledge, more effective management
    strategies can be devised, if needed, to better allocate agency resources,
    in conjunction with other data and information.

    We acknowledge that developing performance measures applied to all
    checkpoints can be challenging for the reasons stated by Border Patrol
    officials. Nevertheless, it is important that the Border Patrol develop
    performance measures to gauge success in meeting strategic goals and that
    these measures go beyond the traditional output data it currently uses to
    indicate the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts.

    Available Data Suggest That Legislative Restrictions on the Tucson Sector
    Reduced the Performance of Its Interior Checkpoints

    Although the Border Patrol told us that the legislative restrictions on
    funding for construction of checkpoints in the Tucson sector, combined
    with the requirement to relocate checkpoints on a 7- or 14-day schedule,
    had reduced their effectiveness, it did not have a data-based analysis to
    support these statements. It did have data, by sector, on apprehensions of
    illegal entrants at interior checkpoints and for line watch/line patrol,
    as well as for work hours charged at interior checkpoints and line
    watch/line patrol. (Agent work hour data have not been maintained by the
    Border Patrol for tactical checkpoints versus permanent ones and were
    therefore not available.) To test the feasibility of developing additional
    measures of performance that would address these concerns, we used Border
    Patrol data to measure apprehensions per agent work year and cost of
    apprehensions per agent work year. Such measures might help to determine
    if the available data support the Border Patrol's statements on the impact
    of the legislative restrictions on the Tucson sector's interior
    checkpoints effectiveness.

    In applying the apprehension per agent work year measure,39 we compared
    the performance of the Tucson sector interior checkpoints over the period
    of fiscal years 2001-2004 with those of the interior checkpoints in the
    three other sectors we visited. We limited the comparison to these four
    sectors because a considerable amount of the work hour data had to be
    collected by the Border Patrol through data calls, which placed a time
    burden on those collecting the data for us. We examined the data starting
    with fiscal year 2001, the last year for which the impact of the terror
    attacks of September 11 were largely not felt on illegal immigration,40
    through fiscal year 2004, the last year for which data were available at
    the time of this report. Throughout this period as well, no funding had
    been permitted for construction of checkpoints in the Tucson sector.

    Our analysis of Border Patrol data suggest that, as measured in
    apprehensions per agent work year, the restrictions in the Tucson sector
    may have had a negative impact on the performance of its interior
    checkpoints, starting at about the time the sector implemented direction
    from congressional staff to relocate checkpoints every 7 days, in
    comparison with the three other sectors we visited, where no comparable
    decline in effectiveness occurred during the same time period. 41
    According to the Border Patrol, its records show that it began relocating
    the Tucson sector's checkpoints every 7 days in June 2002, which meant
    closing some of them, as explained previously.

    Figure 9 shows the apprehensions per agent work year at interior
    checkpoints for each of the four sectors we visited, for fiscal years
    20012004, and the apprehensions per agent work year for line patrol/line
    watch along the border.

    39As noted above, work years are total hours divided by 2,080 (a 40-hour
    week times 52 weeks). Apprehensions per work year were calculated by
    dividing the number of agent hours at interior checkpoints and at line
    watch/line patrol work by 2,080. The resulting calculation of work years
    was then divided by the number of apprehensions attributed to line
    watch/line patrol and interior checkpoints, to calculate apprehensions per
    work year.

    40According to the Border Patrol, all southwest sectors experienced
    varying declines in illegal entries after the attacks of September 11 as a
    result of fears about enhanced U.S. security. However, since less than 3
    weeks remained in fiscal year 2001 after the attacks, most of the impact
    would appear in fiscal year 2002 data, which started October 1, 2001.

    41We used the measure of apprehensions per agent work year in order to
    control for the number of hours worked. This meant, for example, that if a
    sector had 100 agent work years charged in a given year and 100
    apprehensions, that the level of productivity or cost effectiveness was
    the same as in another sector with 10 agent work years charged, and 10
    apprehensions.

    Figure 9: Apprehensions per Agent Work Year in the Tucson, San Diego,
    Laredo and McAllen Sectors, Fiscal Years 2001-2004

    Tuscon sector

                                    San Diego sector

    Apprehensions Apprehensions 600 600

    521

    500 500

    400 400

    300 300

    200 200 191

    100 100

    00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 Fiscal year Fiscal year

    Laredo sector McAllen sector

    Apprehensions Apprehensions 600 600

    500 500

    400 400

            300                           300                  260            272
            200            189            200
            100                           100
             0                             0

                        2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004

    Fiscal year Fiscal year

    Line/patrol Interior checkpoint

                      Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.

    Notes: Line/Patrol refers to line watch and line patrol Border Patrol
    operations, based on agent work hours charged by Border Patrol agents to
    those activities. Interior Checkpoint refers to work hours charged by
    agents for work at interior checkpoints-permanent and tactical in the San
    Diego, McAllen, and Laredo sectors; and nonpermanent in the Tucson,
    Arizona, sector.

    Figure 9 shows that apprehensions per agent work year at the Tucson sector
    interior checkpoints fell 48 percent from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year
    2002, when the 7-day relocation procedures were put into effect, with
    about 4 months remaining in the fiscal year. This was followed by a 77
    percent decrease from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2003, when the 7-day
    relocation requirement was in effect for the entire fiscal year. The
    overall decrease from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2003 was about 88
    percent, in the Tucson sector. Apprehensions per agent work year rose from
    fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004, but the 2004 level was 77 percent
    below the fiscal year 2001 level. In contrast to these performance
    measures for the Tucson sector interior checkpoints, apprehensions per
    agent work year for same period at the interior checkpoints in the three
    other southwest sectors (San Diego, California; Laredo, Texas; and
    McAllen, Texas) we visited-that were not subject to the funding
    restrictions or the relocation requirements-either stayed at about the
    same level over this period or

    42

    increased somewhat.

    During fiscal year 2001 to 2002, when Tucson apprehensions per agent work
    year fell 48 percent, apprehensions per agent work year fell less than 2
    percent in the San Diego sector, decreased about 19 percent in the Laredo
    sector, and decreased about 12 percent in the McAllen sector. The Border
    Patrol attributed the drop in apprehensions in these and other sectors in
    this period to a general decrease in illegal border crossings after
    September 11 but attributed the greater decline in the Tucson sector to
    relocating the Tucson checkpoints on a regular 7-day basis, starting in
    June 2002. Border Patrol officials told us that they were not aware of any
    other changes or factors that would have caused the reduction in Tucson
    compared with other sectors other than the combination of the funding
    restrictions and the 7-day relocation requirement.

    Moreover, apprehensions per agent work year at interior checkpoints in the
    Tucson sector fell by about 77 percent from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal
    year 2003, while they either remained about the same or increased (more
    than doubling in San Diego) in that period in the other three sectors. In
    the San Diego sector, interior checkpoint apprehensions per agent year
    increased about 60 percent from 2003 to 2004 and were almost four times
    the 2002 level (versus Tucson, where the 2004 level was 55 percent below

    42GAO did not validate the data provided by the Border Patrol on
    apprehensions, drug seizures, or vehicle counts. However, we did determine
    that the Border Patrol utilizes processes and checks that provide
    reasonable assurance that the data recorded for apprehensions and drug
    seizures are accurate.

    the 2002 level). In the McAllen and Laredo sectors, there was almost no
    difference in checkpoint apprehension rates between 2003 and 2004. The
    Border Patrol believes that the differences between the Tucson sector and
    others with regard to interior checkpoint performance are in large part
    the result of the requirement to relocate checkpoints every 7 days at that
    time. Border Patrol officials stated that the smugglers can easily
    determine when the tactical or nonpermanent checkpoints in any location
    must relocate or close and are therefore able to evade them by waiting
    until they move or close, and a potential vulnerability in border security
    has been created.

    It is important to note that we did not evaluate all the factors that
    might have contributed to the differing performance results between Tucson
    interior checkpoints and those in the other three sectors. There could
    have been other factors beyond the restrictions on construction of
    checkpoints and the requirement to relocate every 7 days that affected
    checkpoint performance, such as the unknown number of persons attempting
    entry into a sector, varying topographic conditions and road networks, and
    the fees charged by smugglers to smuggle illegal immigrants into the
    United States. Nevertheless, while there may have been other factors that
    affected the performance of interior checkpoints in the four sectors, the
    data in figure 9 should not be overlooked when considering the results or
    impacts of policy or management directives.

    In the second performance measure, we converted the apprehensions per
    agent work year into costs of apprehensions per work year, or cost per
    apprehension.43 We then compared interior checkpoints cost per
    apprehension (per work year) with costs per apprehension (per work year)
    for line watch and line patrol operations. We were unable to develop costs
    per apprehension at permanent versus tactical checkpoints because
    individual checkpoint cost data are not maintained by the Border Patrol.
    In addition, this measure is based on agent labor costs at interior
    checkpoints and line watch/line patrol and does not include overhead
    costs, such as those for equipment, training, buildings, canines, and so
    forth. Converting the fiscal year 2004 apprehension data into cost per
    apprehension (per work year), apprehensions in the San Diego sector at

    43Costs of apprehensions per work year were calculated by dividing the
    average cost of an agent work year in fiscal year 2004, $53,000, by the
    number of apprehensions per work year reported for checkpoints, such as
    191 apprehensions per work year in fiscal year 2004 at interior
    checkpoints in the San Diego sector. In this instance, $53,000 divided by
    191 produced a cost per apprehension per work year of $277.

    the border (line watch/line patrol) cost $384 per apprehension, and about
    $277 per apprehension at the interior checkpoints (both permanent and
    tactical). In the Tucson sector, for the same fiscal year, border
    apprehensions cost $126 each per work year, and interior checkpoint
    apprehensions cost $445 each.

    These ranges of cost per apprehension (per work year) are not, however,
    necessarily reflective of agents at one checkpoint or in one sector
    working harder or more effectively than those in another sector and must
    be considered in the context of the Border Patrol's integrated,
    multilayered strategy, which seeks to deter illegal entrants through the
    perceived risk of apprehension. Thus, a permanent checkpoint with a
    substantial infrastructure may have many agents, such as at I-5 near San
    Clemente (with about 100 agents assigned to the location) but may have
    comparatively few apprehensions-because it has successfully deterred
    potential illegal entrants. In Temecula, California, agents are required
    to monitor alternative routes through the hills around the I-15 permanent
    checkpoint. Again, many agents may be required, but few apprehensions may
    occur, if illegal entrants are deterred to alternative routes, such as the
    circuitous I-10 route previously described. In contrast, a sector with
    many illegal entrants, such as Tucson, may effect many apprehensions
    because of the volume of illegal entrants, seemingly showing border cost
    per apprehension to be much lower than in San Diego. Yet the reality is
    that the long-term legacy INS and now CBP strategy of closing off the
    easiest routes (in San Diego, El Paso, and McAllen), has led to the high
    volume in the Tucson sector. Therefore, cost per apprehension or any other
    single performance measure cannot be used without taking into account the
    overall strategy.

    While a performance measure such as cost per apprehension can provide some
    information on cost-effectiveness, several additional caveats exist.
    First, regarding the output measured in the denominator (i.e., the number
    of apprehensions per agent work year, such as 191 for San Diego in fiscal
    year 2004), some apprehensions may be considered more important to the
    agency than others. For instance, apprehending a drug smuggler or a
    terrorist might be considered more important than apprehending an illegal
    alien job seeker. Second, regarding the cost of inputs measured in the
    numerator (e.g., the $53,000 annual average agent nationwide salary),
    numerous cost measures can exist. The most easily applied is often the
    variable cost of labor that is used above and which may require
    estimation. Other input costs may exist but may be difficult to assign to
    a given apprehension, since not only are indirect overhead costs involved
    (e.g., training, equipment, infrastructure, canines), but also such costs
    as the

    differing salaries of multiple agents, if more than one was involved in
    the apprehension; the time used up by each different agent; and the
    processing costs, which can vary by suspect, depending on whether the
    person is already in a national database or cannot be identified.

    Additional Performance Measures Could Help Guide Management Decision
    Making

    The two performance measures we developed would not alone fully assess or
    explain relative success among sectors, and in developing performance
    measures for checkpoints, a number of factors would need to be considered.
    For example, in comparing the apprehensions per agent work year and cost
    per apprehension for the adjacent McAllen and Laredo sectors, considerable
    differences appear, with McAllen checkpoints apprehending far more illegal
    aliens per agent work year than Laredo. Converted into cost per
    apprehension, these data show that for fiscal year 2004, in the Laredo
    sector, the cost per apprehension for line watch/line patrol was $411,
    while the cost per apprehension at checkpoints was $930 each. For McAllen,
    the cost per apprehension at line/patrol was $609, while the cost at the
    checkpoints was $195 per apprehension.

    Taken alone, and without additional information about conditions in these
    sectors, these costs per apprehension are not necessarily a useful guide
    to management decisions about resource allocation. As Border Patrol
    officials told us, several factors are believed to contribute to the
    differences in apprehension patterns between McAllen and Laredo sectors.
    These include the topography, availability of egress routes, staff
    deployment, and varying expedited removal programs. Further, the McAllen
    sector includes two major Mexican cities adjacent to its border with a
    combined population of about 2 million people and an infrastructure that
    facilitates potential illegal entrants. These factors provide context to
    the analysis and underscore the importance of the Border Patrol developing
    a range of performance measures that can adequately account for
    differences among sectors and provide decision makers with reliable
    indicators of success.

    The usefulness of these measures notwithstanding, other performance
    measures and relevant factors would also be useful in assessing the
    effectiveness of checkpoints relative to other elements of the
    multilayered strategy. Some available information, beyond apprehensions
    and contraband seized, could help the Border Patrol make more informed
    decisions about where its operations are most effective and how best to
    allocate resources to make needed improvements. For example, the Border
    Patrol could consider the cost of smuggling charged to illegal immigrants
    as a measure of its overall effectiveness. Additionally, the

    Conclusions

    Border Patrol could consider the number of apprehensions or contraband
    seizures per the number of vehicles sent to secondary inspection as a
    measure of effectiveness. There are likely other measures that could use
    existing or easily gathered data to help measure effectiveness across the
    range of Border Patrol line watch, line patrol, and interior traffic
    checkpoint activities. These kinds of performance measures can aid in
    making resource allocation decisions, provided again that such decisions
    are made with reasonable knowledge of other conditions present in a given
    sector or region.

    It is unlikely that either the first two lines of border defense, line
    watch and line patrol, or the interior traffic checkpoints, another layer
    of defense, will ever be 100 percent effective in catching all smugglers
    or aliens illegally entering the United States. This is the case given the
    1,950 mile southwest border, the number of personnel and the cost required
    to cover all of this area, the continuing sophistication of smugglers
    using modern technology to observe and evade the Border Patrol's
    enforcement efforts, and the differences in wages, job opportunities, and
    perceived life opportunities between Mexico and the United States.
    However, the Border Patrol's interior traffic checkpoints-both permanent
    and tactical-have distinct functions in its integrated, multilayered
    strategy intended to detect and deter potential terrorists, illegal
    immigration, and contraband smuggling into the United States. While the
    permanent checkpoints are the anchors of this part of the strategy, the
    tactical checkpoints reinforce the permanent ones at those locations where
    smugglers, illegal aliens, or terrorists can use secondary roads to avoid
    the permanent checkpoints, and when intelligence can help direct
    redeployment of tactical checkpoints to counter new infiltration routes.
    Working in tandem, the interior checkpoints combine the high-technology
    capabilities and detention, processing, and inspection facilities of the
    permanent checkpoints with the element of flexibility that tactical
    checkpoints can offer.

    Trying to measure the effectiveness of its border enforcement deterrence
    strategy has been a long-standing challenge for legacy INS and now CBP and
    the Border Patrol. As many illegal aliens and contraband smugglers
    continue to evade the border defenses, the need to measure effectiveness
    and allocate scarce resources grows in significance. In its Performance
    and Annual Report, CBP uses traditional law enforcement effectiveness
    measures, such as numbers of apprehensions and contraband seizures to
    describe the Border Patrol's performance. While these measures serve as
    worthwhile indicators, the annual reports do not compare the

    effectiveness of line watch and line patrol with the effectiveness of
    interior traffic checkpoints. These traditional measures also do not
    delineate the performance of permanent, tactical, and nonpermanent
    checkpoints. In contrast, performance measures that take inputs and
    outputs into account, such as agent work years divided by apprehensions,
    provide a basis for helping make decisions about how best to allocate
    agency resources, in conjunction with other information and data. Such
    measures can also help identify trends that might otherwise not be
    apparent using traditional data, as shown by our analysis of the data on
    performance of the Tucson sector nonpermanent interior checkpoints
    compared with the performance of other sectors. Apprehension data alone
    would not have shown the trend of the decrease in apprehensions per agent
    work year that occurred at the Tucson sector checkpoints, starting at
    about the same time the 7-day relocation requirement went into effect,
    while no comparable decrease occurred in the three other sectors without
    the requirement.

    Moreover, apprehensions per agent work year, and the cost per
    apprehension, along with information on many other relevant factors, could
    provide useful trend information on the relative cost efficiency of these
    components of the multilayered enforcement strategy. Other measures of
    performance and effectiveness might also be developed using existing or
    easily gathered information to assess checkpoint operations and
    performance, as well as other border enforcement activities. This
    information could also be useful to the Congress as it considers ways to
    improve the effectiveness of checkpoints and border security efforts.

    To better gauge the effects of border control efforts, we recommend that
    the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection

    o  	develop additional performance measures for the Border Patrol for the
    productivity and effectiveness of interior checkpoints, such as
    apprehensions per agent work year and cost per apprehension, and

    o  	include in CBP's Performance and Annual Report data and analysis
    provided by the additional performance measures on the performance of
    interior checkpoints and what might be done to improve their
    effectiveness.

      Recommendations for Executive Action

    Agency Comments 	We requested comments on a draft of this report from the
    Secretary of Homeland Security. In its response, DHS said the report is
    factually correct, agreed with our recommendations, and stated that CBP is
    taking steps to implement them. With regard to our first recommendation,
    that

    the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection develop performance
    measures for the Border Patrol in addition to its traditional ones, for
    the productivity and effectiveness of interior checkpoints, DHS stated
    that CBP is in the process of developing such measures for the Border
    Patrol for fiscal year 2006 and that one or more of the performance
    measures will gauge the effectiveness of checkpoints. DHS stated that CBP
    will consider our suggestions when developing these measures. With regard
    to our second recommendation, that CBP include in its Performance and
    Annual Report data and analysis provided by the additional performance
    measures on the performance of interior checkpoints, and what might be
    done to improve their effectiveness, DHS stated that once the performance
    measures for fiscal year 2006 for the Border Patrol are implemented and
    the data are tracked, CBP will publish the information in its Performance
    and Annual Report.

    DHS's comments are reprinted in appendix VI. DHS also offered technical
    comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of
    Homeland Security and interested congressional committees. We will also
    make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
    be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me
    at (202) 512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of
    Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
    of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are
    listed in appendix VII.

    Richard M. Stana
    Director, Homeland Security

    and Justice Issues

                           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    To address our objectives, we examined and analyzed Border Patrol
    documents, reports, manuals, and guidance concerning border strategy and
    checkpoint operations. We interviewed cognizant Border Patrol officials at
    Washington, D.C. headquarters, officials in four sector offices, and
    personnel at selected permanent and tactical checkpoints. We visited
    sector headquarters, stations, and interior traffic checkpoints in four
    Border Patrol sectors-San Diego, California and Tucson, Arizona, and two
    in southeastern Texas, Laredo and McAllen. In total, we visited three
    sector headquarter offices, seven stations, five permanent checkpoints,
    and three tactical checkpoints. Sector offices and interior checkpoints we
    visited had one or more of the following characteristics:

    o  offices that oversee permanent or tactical checkpoints, or both, to

    obtain information about both types,  o  permanent, nonpermanent, and
    tactical checkpoints with high, medium or low vehicular traffic volume,

    o  	permanent, nonpermanent, and tactical checkpoints with high, medium or
    low estimated smuggling volume (either aliens or contraband, or both), and

    o  	checkpoints that varied in terrain, with some situated with little
    peripheral area to evade the checkpoint and others situated so that
    patrols must be set up to prevent end runs.

    We visited and observed operations at the following Border Patrol sectors,
    which were selected to provide a range in type and size of operation:

    o  	Border Patrol stations and checkpoints in the Tucson, Arizona, sector
    where only nonpermanent checkpoints are permitted under current law, and
    because that sector has the most annual apprehensions of illegal
    immigrants. Also, we wanted to compare the operations of the Tucson sector
    interior checkpoints with the operations of tactical and permanent ones
    elsewhere.

    o  	Permanent and tactical checkpoints in the San Diego, California,
    sector because it contains two permanent ones with high volume-Temecula
    and San Clemente-and two requesters asked that these be included in a
    broader study of the effectiveness of all interior traffic checkpoints.

    o  	Permanent checkpoints in Texas at Falfurrias and Hebbronville, and on
    I-35, north of Laredo, as well as Border Patrol stations in Falfurrias and
    Hebbronville. The former is in the McAllen sector, while the latter is in
    the Laredo sector.

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    o  	Ports of entry at San Diego, California; Douglas, Arizona; and Laredo,
    Texas. We did so in order to better understand the differences between the
    operations of these ports of entry at the international border and the
    operations of the interior traffic checkpoints.

    Via helicopter, we observed the terrain and Border Patrol activities along
    a 60-mile section of the international border, from San Diego inland and
    along approximately 200 miles of the border in the Tucson sector, from Ajo
    to Douglas, Arizona.

    The four sectors we visited were selected to provide a substantial range
    in the size and types of interior checkpoint operations; estimated volume
    of illegal annual immigration; volume of vehicular traffic transiting
    checkpoints; topography and density of road networks; presence or absence
    of large urban areas on or near the border, both on the U.S. and Mexican
    sides; and types of checkpoints (permanent, nonpermanent, and tactical).
    As we were told by the Border Patrol in deciding which sectors and
    checkpoints to visit, and as we found during our site visits, these four
    sectors contained a wide variety of operating conditions. For example, the
    San Diego sector's permanent checkpoint near San Clemente on I-5 has the
    highest volume of average daily vehicle traffic among the Border Patrol's
    33 permanent checkpoints on the southwest border, while those north of
    Laredo, Texas, and at Falfurrias, Texas, average daily traffic volume
    about one-tenth that amount. Some of the tactical checkpoints we visited
    have average daily traffic volume that is only about one-hundredth that of
    San Clemente/I-5-that is, 1,500 vehicles or less daily, according to the
    Border Patrol and based on our observations during site visits. Similarly,
    there were substantial variations in the estimated numbers of illegal
    immigrants entering these sectors over the last several years, and wide
    differences in topography, with some being comparatively mountainous and
    others being comparatively flat. The Laredo and McAllen sectors have the
    Rio Grande as a natural barrier during the winter months to illegal
    immigration, while the Tucson sector has a flat desert at the border that
    is easily crossed. Some sectors have permanent checkpoints, such as at
    Temecula, California, that must be supplemented with tactical checkpoints,
    because of substantial secondary road networks around the permanent
    checkpoint. Others, such as McAllen, have no alternative secondary roads
    available to evade the permanent checkpoints on the limited north-south
    highways. Some sectors, such as San Diego and Laredo, have large U.S. and
    Mexican urban areas on or very near the international border, while
    others, such as Tucson, have only a few much

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

                                           1

    smaller cities on either side at the border. In choosing these sectors,
    which are located in three of the four southwest border states
    (California, Arizona and Texas, but not New Mexico) we sought and found a
    wide range of conditions that appear to reasonably represent the range of
    operating conditions faced by the Border Patrol across the Southwest.
    However, it is also the case that we were unable to observe all operating
    conditions at all times and that the conditions we describe are therefore
    based on available documentation and observations at our site visits only.

    We also interviewed selected officials in communities near some of the
    interior checkpoints, including local law enforcement and community
    officials, selected community leaders, citizens, and owners of local
    businesses. These included the communities of Temecula, California;
    Nogales, Arizona; Laredo, Texas, and the small town of Tubac, between
    Nogales and Tucson, Arizona. Because these places and persons were
    selected using a nonprobabilistic method, the results from our site visits
    cannot be generalized to other locations, checkpoints, local officials, or
    citizens.

    We contacted organizations that could be expected to monitor traffic
    congestion as part of their work, including the Automobile Club of
    Southern California, the American Trucking Associations, the California
    Department of Transportation, and the California Highway Patrol. We asked
    these organizations for reports, studies, or information on traffic
    congestion at selected interior traffic checkpoints we had visited, in
    particular those with high daily vehicle volume.

    To assess the reliability of the Border Patrol's data on apprehensions,
    contraband seizures, and work hours, we talked with agency officials at
    both Washington, D.C., headquarters and some Border Patrol stations in the
    field about data quality control procedures, including methods by which
    data are checked and reviewed internally for accuracy and consistency. We
    also obtained and reviewed relevant documentation. We

    1For example, according to the U.S. Census, the city of San Diego,
    California, had an estimated population of 1.26 million in 2004, while San
    Diego County had an estimated population of 2.9 million in 2004. The city
    of Tijuana, Mexico, on the Mexican side of the border from San Diego, had
    an estimated population in 2000 of 1.2 million. In contrast, the city of
    Nogales, Arizona, which is located on the border with Mexico in the Tucson
    sector, had an estimated population of 21,000, and the county in which it
    is located had an estimated 41,000. Directly opposite Nogales, Arizona,
    the city of Nogales, Mexico, had an estimated population of 159,000 in
    2000. The Mexican city of Nuevo Laredo, opposite the city of Laredo,
    Texas, had an estimated population of more than 650,000.

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    determined the data on apprehensions, contraband seizures, and work hours
    were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. However, we
    agreed with Border Patrol officials that the data on costs of checkpoints
    were not sufficiently reliable to be used.

    To determine whether available Border Patrol data could be used to measure
    the performance of interior checkpoints compared with the performance of
    operations on the border (line patrol and line watch), both within and
    among Border Patrol sectors, we developed two measures of
    performance-apprehensions per agent work year and cost of apprehensions
    per agent work year. We chose to do this because the Border Patrol uses
    only traditional law enforcement measures to report on its performance,
    including apprehensions and amount and type of contraband seized. These
    are not assessed relative to the inputs (agent labor, overhead costs) that
    went into achieving them and therefore do not provide a guide on how to
    better allocate agency resources.

    To develop our first performance measure, apprehensions per agent work
    year, we obtained data from the Border Patrol for each of the four sectors
    we visited on the total number of agent work hours recorded as charged by
    agents who work at interior checkpoint operations, and for line watch and
    line patrol. (Line watch and line patrol operate very closely together on
    the border, and data are not recorded separately for them by the Border
    Patrol.) We were unable to perform an apprehensions per agent work year
    analysis for permanent or tactical checkpoints because data on agent hours
    charged to individual checkpoints are not recorded. That is, while work
    records are kept for hours charged by agents at interior checkpoints, the
    records do not distinguish between hours charged at permanent checkpoints
    versus those charged to tactical checkpoints in the same sector.

    Using the data charged to interior checkpoints and line watch/line patrol
    for each sector, we then divided these total hours by 2,080, which is the
    total number of hours in a standard work year of 52 weeks, and 40 work
    hours per week. (The Border Patrol work year is the same as that of the
    rest of the U.S. government.) The total agent work hours at checkpoints in
    a given sector, divided by 2,080, produced a data point that we called
    agent work years. Thus, if 2,080,000 hours were charged, the work year
    total would have been 1,000 work years-2,080,000 divided by 2,080.

    To calculate what we term apprehensions per agent work, we then took the
    data we had obtained on the number of apprehensions that occurred at
    interior checkpoints in each sector in a given fiscal year and divided
    that

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    number by the agent work year calculation. For example, if 10,000
    apprehensions occurred at interior checkpoints in a sector, and 2,000
    agent work years had been recorded as having been worked at those
    checkpoints, the apprehensions per agent work year were 5 (10,000
    apprehensions divided by 2,000 work years). Of course, this did not
    include the work of support personnel that contribute indirectly to the
    outcome of apprehensions.

    Our second measure was cost per apprehension, with apprehension actually
    being apprehension per work year, to control for the known input of agent
    work years.

    We chose this measure because a question that is frequently, if not almost
    universally, asked about government programs, is, "What is known about
    their cost effectiveness?"2 One potential measure of such cost
    effectiveness for the Border Patrol would be how much did it cost to
    apprehend a single person in one sector, compared with other sectors?
    While this measure and others should not be taken in isolation as further
    guides to management decisions, knowledge of the basic costs of an
    agency's key outcomes (such as apprehensions of illegal entrants) per unit
    of input (agent labor costs) can be part of the basis for improved
    allocation of resources. Of course, it would be even better if the full
    costs of all the inputs were known, such as infrastructure overhead, but
    these were not available. Therefore, we used data that were available as a
    method of illustrating how cost effectiveness measures could be more fully
    developed by the Border Patrol.

    To calculate cost per apprehension per agent work year, we divided the
    outputs by the inputs-in this case, the data on apprehensions per work
    year (e.g., 521 in Tucson in fiscal year 2001) divided by the average cost
    of an agent work year in fiscal year 2004, which the Border Patrol stated
    was $53,000, or the nationwide average for the GS-11, step 2, rank. This
    was described as the national average for Border Patrol agents; of course,
    it is an average for all agents, and does not reflect variations in cost
    of living

    2See, for example, GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of
    the Federal Government, GAO-05-325SP, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005) p.15.
    Cost-effectiveness may be defined as achievement of a particular objective
    at the least cost. A cost-effectiveness approach is useful where there is
    a specific required outcome but that outcome cannot be quantified in
    monetary terms whereas costs can be estimated. Average cost is consistent
    with information for Border Patrol checkpoints, where the costs of labor
    (inputs) are available, and one of the outcomes, apprehensions, is not
    readily quantifiable in monetary terms.

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    adjustments, or for the true wider range of all Border Patrol salaries. We
    used the $53,000 average work year cost for all calculations for the
    period covering fiscal years 2001-2004 and did not adjust the work year
    cost for inflation. Our goal was again to show what the approximate cost
    per apprehension had been and how this measure could serve as a resource
    allocation tool, along with other information and data.

    We conducted our work from September 2004 to May 2005 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

                         Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile

                                Geography of the Sector

    The San Diego sector's area of responsibility includes all of San Diego
    County and substantial portions of Orange and Riverside counties in
    California, covering more than 7,000 square miles and 60 miles of
    international border with Mexico. The San Diego sector encompasses coastal
    beaches and expansive mesas to coastal and inland mountains, rugged
    canyons, and high desert. Over half of the border in this sector consists
    of mountains, but there are also lesser amounts of rolling brushland,
    urban hilly terrain, canyons, farmland, flat desert, and flat urban
    terrain. Directly to the south of San Diego lie the Mexican cities of
    Tijuana and Tecate, Baja California-with a combined population of more
    than 2 million. For decades, this area was the preferred corridor for
    illegal immigration because of the highly populated neighborhoods north
    and south of the border.

    Organizational Structure of the Sector

    At the time of our September and December 2004 visits, the sector was
    headed by a chief patrol agent, had seven Border Patrol stations, and
    1,634 agents on duty. The sector used four-wheel-drive vehicles, police
    sedans, and vans to patrol between two parallel fences that were
    constructed along the border, stretching about 16 miles inland from the
    Pacific Ocean. In addition, the sector uses all-terrain vehicles (ATVs),
    helicopters, mountain bikes, and horses to patrol border areas. Seismic
    sensors are also used to identify where smugglers and illegal aliens are
    attempting to cross the border between the official ports of entry.

    The sector has 4 permanent interior traffic checkpoints and up to 11
    tactical checkpoints, which are operated on an as-needed basis (see fig.
    10). The two busiest permanent checkpoints in the sector are the ones
    located (1) on northbound I-5, south of San Clemente, about 68 miles from
    the border, and (2) on northbound I-15, near Temecula, also located about
    68 miles from the border.

    Most of the tactical checkpoints in the San Diego sector are operated by
    the Temecula station, which can field up to 8 tactical checkpoints located
    on a network of secondary state highways leading roughly northwest from
    the eastern San Diego area toward Los Angeles, and paralleling or
    intersecting the major I-15 interstate highway. According to Border Patrol
    officials, secondary roads make it possible for smugglers and illegal
    aliens to try to circumvent the I-15 Temecula checkpoint by taking side
    roads, unlike the San Clemente I-5 checkpoint, which has no surrounding
    secondary roads. Figure 10 shows the approximate location of the permanent
    checkpoints, on I-5 (San Clemente) and on I-15 (Temecula), as

    Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile

    well as some of the approximate locations used for tactical checkpoints,
    not all of which operate simultaneously.

    Permanent checkpoints

    Tactical checkpoints Source: Border Patrol.

                         Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile

    Overview of Checkpoint Operations

    We observed that the operations and physical layout of the two permanent
    checkpoints at San Clemente and Temecula were largely similar, and
    although the local geography differs somewhat, both checkpoints are
    situated at locations with high surrounding hills or other barriers (e.g.,
    the ocean at the I-5 checkpoint), making it difficult to simply drive
    around the checkpoints.

    The I-5 checkpoint south of San Clemente has four traffic lanes, and
    Border Patrol agents stand between the lanes to screen traffic (see fig.
    11). Trucks pass through the adjoining weigh station, where they too are
    screened.

    Source: GAO.

    The I-15 checkpoint near Temecula is similar to the one south of San
    Clemente, in terms of the Border Patrol agents having to monitor multiple
    lanes of traffic on a very busy highway. A major difference is that
    secondary roads south of the checkpoint offer alternative routes for
    persons to try to evade the I-15 Temecula checkpoint.

    Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile

    According to Border Patrol officials, it is difficult for smugglers and
    illegal aliens to avoid the San Clemente I-5 traffic checkpoint because it
    is located in a physically constricted area between high hills on the
    right (facing north) and the ocean on the left, with no readily accessible
    side roads for miles prior to the checkpoint, because the Marine Corps'
    Camp Pendleton borders it on the east. To circumvent the checkpoint,
    smugglers and illegal aliens must either go through a state park, where
    there are state park police, or through the hilly terrain of Camp
    Pendleton, where there are military police, according to the Border Patrol
    officials. Vehicles are observable for at least a mile south from cameras
    at the checkpoint, so that those attempting to improperly enter Camp
    Pendleton would be visible to the Border Patrol.

    Figure 12 shows an aerial photo of the I-5 checkpoint, with the hills in
    Camp Pendleton on the side of the checkpoint area to the upper right, and
    the ocean to the lower left of the checkpoint, making evasions of the
    checkpoint difficult.

    As of November 2004, the San Clemente station was staffed with a
    patrolagent-in-charge and approximately 100 Border Patrol agents. The

    Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile

    Temecula station was also staffed by a patrol-agent-in-charge and had
    approximately 127 agents.

    During our visit to the I-5 checkpoint, we observed agents performing
    traffic checks (i.e., screening vehicles) by staffing positions on the
    highway. We observed two agents standing between the lanes of the
    northbound I-5 traffic; each was responsible for screening vehicles that
    approached him or her.

    We were told that agents look for visual clues that could indicate drug or
    alien smuggling, as occurred in an incident we observed. During our visit,
    an agent told us that on the basis of such visual clues, he sent a vehicle
    to secondary inspection, where all passengers were later identified as
    illegal aliens.

    In another lane, closest to the center of the freeway, was a Pre-Enrolled
    Access Lane (PAL) which permitted vehicles to use an electronic
    transponder to move through more quickly than the normal traffic lanes.
    (Obtaining a transponder requires passing a background investigation; San
    Clemente is the only U.S. checkpoint with such a lane.) However, an agent
    was also positioned at the PAL lane, and during the period we were there,
    a vehicle that attempted to go through it without a transponder was
    ordered into secondary inspection, where it was determined that the
    occupants were illegal aliens.

    The I-5 checkpoint also performs checks on buses, which are to stop at the
    checkpoint, and on trucks, which are to transit the adjoining weigh
    station. The Border Patrol also screens trucks at that point, at times
    using the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) machines, which use
    gamma-ray technology to examine the contents of vehicles.

    At the checkpoints, all suspected smugglers or illegal aliens are
    fingerprinted using the Automated Biometric Identification system and a
    law enforcement check is run on their fingerprints through the FBI's
    Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). If persons
    are determined to be undocumented aliens or are wanted for other offenses,
    detention facilities are available at the checkpoints.

    Border Patrol officials said that having the ability to perform
    fingerprint and law enforcement checks at the checkpoints enables them to
    quickly determine if detained persons are illegal aliens or have
    outstanding criminal complaints pending against them. Border Patrol
    officials told us that they had been conducting a project to identify the
    numbers of illegal

                         Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile

    aliens with criminal records that had been apprehended in areas around the
    Temecula and San Clemente checkpoints. For example, after matching
    fingerprints with IAFIS during a 6-week period from August to September
    2004, they found that 157 illegal aliens with criminal records had been
    apprehended by Temecula Border Patrol agents. These illegal aliens had
    criminal records that included assault, burglary, and immigration
    offenses. Overall, during the 6-week period, 28 percent of Temecula's and
    22 percent of San Clemente's apprehensions were illegal aliens with
    criminal records.

                                     Traffic Impact

    The Border Patrol regards the I-5 and I-15 checkpoints as 24-hour
    checkpoints, closing them generally only for safety reasons. However, as
    we observed when we visited the two checkpoints, heavy traffic volume may
    preclude screening every northbound vehicle. As noted above, the I-5
    checkpoint south of San Clemente is the busiest interior traffic
    checkpoint in the nation, with approximately 144,000 vehicles passing
    through daily, while the Temecula I-15 checkpoint ranks second, with
    approximately 122,000 vehicles daily. However, as we observed, and as San
    Clemente and Temecula checkpoint officials told us, when traffic backs up,
    the traffic checks are suspended and traffic is "flushed" through the
    checkpoint.

    Agents said that they know from experience how long a wait period traffic
    backups are likely to produce, and that they keep a close watch on how
    long the line has become. During our visit, we observed that Border Patrol
    agents monitored traffic and took action to avoid creating major traffic
    delays at these checkpoints.

    Since the Border Patrol agents may suspend their operations to avoid
    creating lengthy traffic delays, actual time that the agents stand out on
    the highway lanes and visually inspect traffic varies. Checkpoint records
    showed that at the I-5 checkpoint south of San Clemente, traffic was
    screened only about 36 percent of the time in fiscal year 2004, a
    reduction from about 57 percent in fiscal year 2003 and about 63 percent
    in fiscal year 2002. Temecula checkpoint traffic was screened only about
    42 percent of the time in fiscal year 2004, down from about 63 percent of
    the time in fiscal year 2003. Border Patrol officials attributed these
    declines to a combination of insufficient staffing levels at the stations
    and the need to avoid imposing long traffic waits on the public. According
    to Temecula station officials at the time of our September 2004 visit,
    they had received no complaints for at least several months about traffic
    delays.

                         Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile

                                Checkpoint Capabilities

    We observed that the permanent checkpoints at San Clemente and Temecula
    had a range of capabilities to monitor and inspect vehicles and their
    occupants. These included

    o  	concrete side aprons off the highway to permit more intensive
    secondary inspections,

    o  cages and shade for canines,

    o  	surveillance cameras for monitoring activities at the checkpoint and
    traffic backup,

    o  computers with hardline communications,

    o  detention facilities for holding smugglers and illegal aliens, and

    o  	concrete side aprons with their own traffic lane to permit trucks to
    line up for VACIS gamma-ray inspections.

    Tactical Checkpoints Supplement Permanent Ones

    In addition to manning the permanent checkpoints, the Border Patrol
    routinely sets up tactical checkpoints to reduce the chances of persons
    evading the permanent ones by using secondary roads. In particular, the
    Temecula checkpoint has eight locations where tactical checkpoints are
    established as needed based on intelligence on illegal immigration or
    related activity. We observed a tactical checkpoint on Sandia Creek road,
    south and west of the I-15 checkpoint, in a back hill rural area that had
    little traffic, but where the secondary road network could allow for
    evading checkpoints on the main highway (see fig. 13). At this tactical
    checkpoint, agents stopped each vehicle and talked to drivers and
    passengers; in contrast, at permanent checkpoints with heavy traffic
    volume, most vehicles are not stopped but are observed as they move slowly
    through the checkpoint lanes.

    Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile

    Source: GAO.

                          Appendix III: Tucson Sector Profile

    Geography and Organization of the Sector

    The Tucson, Arizona, sector's area of responsibility runs 261 miles along
    the U.S.-Mexico border from New Mexico to the Yuma County, Arizona, line;
    it is 90,530 square miles in area. The sector encompasses national
    parkland and parts of the Tohono O'odham Indian reservation, and its
    environment is like that of much of the southwest border-the terrain is
    inhospitable, consisting of mountains, flat desert, rolling brushland, and
    canyons. Summer temperatures can reach an average daily high of 100 to 110
    degrees, and lack of shade for vast stretches of the border and inland
    areas can pose severe health hazards to those attempting to walk across
    the area.

    Most of the border in this sector is delineated by cattle fences and
    border markers, with little effective fencing of any kind, according to
    Border Patrol officials. Cattle fences can prevent cattle from crossing
    the border, but they are not designed or intended to prevent people from
    doing so, as they are essentially strands of wire with large gaps between
    them and are easily pushed apart, according to the officials. Agents
    patrol the border by truck, aircraft, horseback, ATVs, and bicycles and on
    foot; maintain traffic checkpoints along highways leading from border
    areas; and conduct antismuggling investigations.

    At the time of our October 2004 visit, the sector was headed by a chief
    patrol agent and staffed by 2,100 Border Patrol agents deployed throughout
    the sector from eight Border Patrol stations.

    Overview of Sector Border Patrol operations in the Tucson sector have been
    the subject of

    Operations 	legislative direction since fiscal year 1999; this direction
    applied to no other Border Patrol sector. For fiscal years 1999-2004,
    annual appropriations acts made no funds "available for the site
    acquisition, design, or construction" of any Border Patrol checkpoint in
    the Tucson sector.1 Since the Tucson sector had no permanent checkpoints
    in fiscal

    1Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999,
    P.L. 105277 (1998); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, P.L. 106-113
    (1999); Appropriations for the District of Columbia, 2001, P.L. 106-553
    (2000); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
    Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, P.L. 107-77 (2001);
    Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, P.L. 108-7 (2003);
    Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, P.L. 108-90
    (2003); and Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L.
    108-334 (2004).

    Appendix III: Tucson Sector Profile

    year 1999 (or before), the effect of this legislative language was that no
    permanent checkpoints could be planned or constructed in this sector.2

    To comply with the congressional ban on funding for permanent checkpoints,
    and the congressional requirement to relocate checkpoints after a
    specified period of days, the Border Patrol told us that the sector
    maintains what we term nonpermanent checkpoints that, when open, are
    generally at the same locations, with the exception of one on I-19, from
    June 2002 through fiscal year 2004, and another on state highway 83. On
    I19, a major north-south interstate highway that runs from Nogales on the
    border north to Tucson, about 70 miles away, nonpermanent checkpoints were
    alternated between KP 42 and KP 25, 17 kilometers further south, from June
    2002 through the end of fiscal year 2004. Starting in fiscal year 2005,
    the Border Patrol kept the checkpoint at the KP 42 location to preclude
    illegal entrants from taking advantage of its being moved southward to KP
    25, as had regularly occurred. The checkpoint is kept open for 14 days,
    closed for 8 hours, then reopened for 14 days, and so forth, according to
    the Border Patrol. The Border Patrol states that it believes that this
    schedule conforms to the fiscal year 2005 legislative language requiring
    that Tucson sector checkpoints relocate "at least an average of once every
    14 days." Other checkpoints in the sector have been opened and closed on
    varying schedules in fiscal year 2005, but those schedules also conform to
    the law, according to the Border Patrol. To support these nonpermanent
    checkpoints, the Tucson sector operates tactical checkpoints periodically,
    as occurs in other sectors with permanent checkpoints. The tactical
    checkpoints function the same way as tactical ones in other sectors with
    permanent checkpoints.

    Figure 14 shows the sector and the approximate locations at which
    nonpermanent checkpoints may be located when open.

    2According to the Border Patrol, it used a combination of roving patrols
    and temporary checkpoints that remained at the same location for long
    periods but did not have permanent infrastructure.

                          Appendix III: Tucson Sector Profile

    Nonpermanent checkpoints

    Source: Border Patrol.

    According to the Border Patrol, it also alternates among three sites for
    checkpoints on state highway 83. (The approximate locations are shown as
    83C MP54, 83C, and 82 in fig. 14). Because of safety issues, the
    nonpermanent checkpoints designated as SR 90, 80C and highway 191 do not
    have alternative sites. They are kept open for the legislatively permitted
    length of time, and then closed, according to the Border Patrol. Another
    checkpoint is open and closed about the same hours as a port of entry
    south of it on the border. However, the Border Patrol monitors sector
    night traffic with various means, such as roving patrols; these are
    sufficient, they told us, given the very light traffic in the sector at
    night.

                          Appendix III: Tucson Sector Profile

                                 Checkpoint Operations

    We observed the operations of the nonpermanent checkpoint on I-19, the
    north-south interstate highway that runs from Nogales on the border north
    to Tucson, about 70 miles away. According to Border Patrol officials, only
    limited routes are available to circumvent the I-19 checkpoint, primarily
    by driving or walking across countryside that can make smugglers or aliens
    relatively visible, because of vehicles raising dust in their wake. In
    fiscal year 2003, an average of over 15,000 vehicles passed through the
    I-19 checkpoint daily, including many commercial trucks, especially during
    produce season, according to the officials.

    The I-19 nonpermanent checkpoint consisted of a trailer, portable
    generators, water, and rest room facilities that were towed in; traffic
    warning signs; and orange traffic cones to designate the checkpoint area
    and to slow vehicles down to be inspected. At the time of our visit, the
    I19 checkpoint was located next to an overpass to provide some protection
    from the elements, since there was no canopy as is typically found at
    permanent checkpoints we visited in other sectors. Border Patrol officials
    also said that only two locations along I-19 are appropriate for
    checkpoint operations because of space and safety considerations. From
    June 2002 through the end of fiscal year 2004, the I-19 checkpoint was
    alternated between these two locations, at KP 42 and KP 25, relocating
    every 7 days. During fiscal year 2005, the checkpoint location has been
    maintained only at the northern location, as noted above, and is open for
    14 days, then closed for 8 hours, and then reopened for 14 days.

    At the I-19 checkpoint locations, the Border Patrol has three lanes of
    northbound traffic to screen-two highway lanes and an off-ramp. The
    operation, consisting of Border Patrol agents and canines, was run out of
    a trailer, with a small detention room inside it, and a stand-alone
    computer not connected externally. There was no hardwired computer access
    to databases to check fingerprints or to validate identities through other
    law enforcement databases. Therefore, according to Border Patrol agents,
    they can process some reports on the computer but have to save information
    to a diskette and take it back to the station for further processing.
    Similarly, processing and fingerprinting of suspects must wait until the
    suspects are transported to a Border Patrol station with hardwired
    computers.

    During summer months, we were told, the temperature can reach about 130
    degrees on the heated tarmac of the highway; as a result, canine
    performance and endurance are limited.

    Appendix III: Tucson Sector Profile

    According to the Border Patrol, equipment that must be relocated when the
    I-19 and other checkpoints are moved includes a minimum of 3 light
    generator plants; 1 generator; 1 portable toilet; 20-100 traffic cones;
    and 5 or more signs, showing "Stop," "Checkpoint Ahead," "Reduce Speed,"
    and similar warnings. In addition, the standard minimum deployment would
    be one processing trailer and detention area, two or more marked vehicles
    and a water trailer.

    The I-19 checkpoint at KP 42 had little area off-road to conduct secondary
    inspections, and that area consisted of dirt along the side of the
    highway. Border Patrol officials told us that to comply with legislative
    restrictions, they were unable to install anything that could be
    considered to create a permanent infrastructure, such as water lines,
    electricity, buried communication lines or towers, and buildings. Figure
    15 shows the I-19 nonpermanent checkpoint near KP 42.

    Source: GAO.

                          Appendix III: Tucson Sector Profile

    Checkpoint on State We also observed the nonpermanent checkpoint on state
    highway 85, near Highway 85 Near Ajo, Ajo, Arizona. According to Border
    Patrol officials, this checkpoint is Arizona located just south of where
    state highways 85 and 86 merge, both coming

    from the south, in order to ensure that all vehicles traveling north must
    go through the checkpoint. Only about 1,100 vehicles transit this
    checkpoint daily, we were told. As with the I-19 checkpoint, there were
    only limited portable equipment capabilities at the Ajo checkpoint. There
    was no overpass to provide shade. The Ajo checkpoint is shown in figure
    16.

                                      Source: GAO.

                           Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile

                                Geography of the Sector

    The Laredo, Texas, Border Patrol sector covers 110,000 square miles, 116
    counties or parts of counties extending north to the Oklahoma border, and
    approximately 171 river miles of common border with Mexico. The sector's
    eastern border is the McAllen sector, its southern border is the Rio
    Grande, and its western border is the Del Rio sector. The sector's
    international border represents about 10.6 percent of the southwest
    border, and includes the International Falcon Reservoir, sometimes called
    Falcon Lake, a 120-square-mile body of water that was formed by damming
    the Rio Grande in 1953. The southwestern side of the lake is controlled by
    Mexico, the northeastern side by the United States, with the international
    border running down an imaginary line through the middle.

    The sector's diverse economic base includes portions of the Rio Grande
    Valley, with large, privately owned cattle ranches, other agribusiness,
    and a large volume of goods from Mexico that are trucked through the
    Laredo ports of entry into the United States, and which are then stored in
    warehouses while awaiting inspection and transfer into trucks for
    transport to the rest of the United States. According to Border Patrol
    officials, Laredo is one of the busiest commercial ports of entry in the
    United States. The sector landscape generally consists of rolling
    brushland, reservoirs, farmland, and urban flatland, with the more rural
    sections being fairly flat but also having dense undergrowth that can
    impede persons such as smugglers or illegal aliens attempting to walk
    offroad, according to Border Patrol officials.

    Organizational Structure of the Laredo Sector

    At the time of our January 2005 visit, the sector was headed by a chief
    patrol agent and staffed with 981 Border Patrol agents, deployed
    throughout the sector from eight Border Patrol stations. The sector had
    ATVs, helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, and patrol boats; the last are
    used to patrol the International Falcon Reservoir. The patrol boats are
    not used for Rio Grande patrol, but jet skis are used for swift water
    river rescues, according to Border Patrol officials. Approximately 80
    canines are also assigned to traffic screening operations at the sector's
    checkpoints.

    The sector has five permanent checkpoints that screen traffic 24 hours a
    day, 7 days a week, generally closing only for safety reasons, and
    utilizes up to six tactical checkpoints that are opened on an as-needed
    basis, according to Border Patrol officials. We visited two permanent
    checkpoints in the sector, on two-lane state highway 351, in the vicinity
    of Hebbronville, and on I-35, the major north-south interstate highway
    leading to and from Laredo and San Antonio. We also visited the
    construction site of a new, replacement permanent checkpoint for the

    Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile

    existing one on I-35, about 10 miles north of the current location. That
    new checkpoint is scheduled to open in August 2005, according to Border
    Patrol officials.

    There are more secondary roads in the Laredo sector than in the
    neighboring McAllen sector; as a result, the Border Patrol maintains more
    permanent checkpoints and also utilizes tactical checkpoints. According to
    Border Patrol officials, tactical checkpoints are used during certain
    times of the year, depending on factors such as increases in traffic on
    secondary roads, and local, state, or national events being conducted in
    the area. The sector's permanent and tactical checkpoints are
    strategically placed on roads and highways and at junctions that permit
    monitoring and inspection of vehicles leaving the border area, according
    to the officials (see fig. 17).

    Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile

    Permanent checkpoints

    Tactical checkpoints

    Source: Border Patrol.

    Note: The location shown on highway 83 is a proposed checkpoint;
    therefore, there are five current permanent checkpoints.

    According to the Border Patrol, traffic checkpoint operations are
    generally supported by local ranchers, who permit the Border Patrol to
    enter their fenced property. The ranchers also permit the Border Patrol to
    place sensors at locations that could be favored by smugglers, according
    to Border Patrol officials.

                           Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile

    Checkpoint Operations 	We observed the operations of two permanent
    checkpoints in the Laredo sector; on I-35, about 15 miles north of Laredo,
    and another on state highway 359 between Falfurrias in the McAllen sector
    and Laredo. As was the case with other checkpoints we visited in this and
    the McAllen sector, the checkpoints had a tollbooth-like area with at
    least two traffic lanes, one reserved for passenger cars and trucks, and
    the other for commercial trucks and buses (see fig. 18).

    Source: GAO.

    At the time of our visit, the I-35 checkpoint was staffed with one
    supervisor, six agents, and canines. The facility consisted of a trailer
    that contained IAFIS fingerprinting equipment, three holding areas for
    apprehended illegal aliens, and video cameras (including infrared for
    nighttime use) to monitor activities in and around the checkpoint. Border
    Patrol agents told us that I-35 vehicle traffic wait time has not been
    more than 20 to 30 minutes, and generally takes place around 2:00 p.m. We
    observed a lift that could be used to inspect under vehicles, but did not
    observe trucks being examined by gamma ray equipment. We asked whether
    VACIS equipment was available to screen trucks with gamma ray

    Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile

    as we had seen at other checkpoints, and the agents told us that VACIS
    trucks were not permanently located at the checkpoint but are made
    available periodically by the official port of entry if they are
    requested.

    As was the case for checkpoints in the McAllen sector, those in the Laredo
    sector are directed to inspect every vehicle that is proceeding northward,
    according to Border Patrol officials. Because there are few north-south
    roads in the sector, an absence of secondary roads to go around the
    checkpoints, and manageable volume of traffic, it is possible to screen
    all vehicles transiting the checkpoints, according to Border Patrol
    officials. As we observed, each vehicle was sniffed by a canine, and
    occupants were questioned by a Border Patrol agent. We were told that the
    agents are able to process a vehicle on average in about 9 seconds. The
    checkpoint at I-35 averages about 13,600 transiting vehicles daily,
    according to the Texas Department of Transportation; of these, about 36
    percent are trucks.

    Border Patrol agents at the highway 359 checkpoint outside of Hebbronville
    (see fig. 19) told us that they had recently apprehended a number of
    "brush walkers," illegal aliens who had been walking through the brush
    surrounding the checkpoint to evade apprehension at the checkpoint. The
    agents said that smugglers will drop off a load of aliens just short of
    the checkpoint so that they can attempt to walk around to a point where
    they would be picked up again. However, the agents said that it is very
    difficult terrain to traverse, even along ranch and pipeline trails, which
    are monitored by several means, including electronic surveillance. The
    agents further stated that local ranchers are very supportive of the
    Border Patrol activities in the area and have provided keys to their
    ranches for access when intrusions are detected, or when the ranchers
    themselves call to notify agents that suspected illegal aliens are on the
    property. Figures 19 and 20 show two checkpoints in the sector.

    Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile

    Source: GAO.

                           Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile

    The Laredo checkpoints we observed had a wide range of capabilities to
    screen vehicles and their occupants. These included

    o  	permanent tollboth-like structures that provide cover from the
    weather, including shade for agents and canines;

    o  lifts to permit inspection of undersides of vehicles;

    o  	computers with hardwired communications and databases to permit
    investigation into those detained;

    o  detention facilities; and

    o  	concrete side aprons with their own traffic lanes to permit trucks to
    line up with off highway room for inspections.

    As noted, a new I-35 checkpoint is scheduled to open in August 2005, about
    10 miles north of the current location. Border Patrol officials told us
    that one major advantage of the new location is that it will not be within
    sight of warehouses or other structures, which they said currently provide
    cover for smugglers to observe the operations at the existing I-35
    checkpoint. The new checkpoint, which will cost about $12 million to

                                 Source: Border Patrol.

                                Checkpoint Capabilities

    Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile

    construct, will be able to accommodate six lanes of vehicles, with
    separate lanes for passenger vehicles and trucks, along with a large area
    for inspecting and unloading trucks, if necessary (see fig. 21).

    Source: Border Patrol.

                           Appendix V: McAllen Sector Profile

                                Geography of the Sector

    The McAllen, Texas, Border Patrol sector covers 18,584 square miles, 19
    counties, and approximately 316 river miles of common border with Mexico.
    According to Border Patrol officials, the sector's area of responsibility
    runs from the mouth of the Rio Grande at the Gulf of Mexico to the
    Zapata/Starr county line, where it meets the Laredo sector. The sector's
    international border represents about 9.4 percent of the southwest border;
    its southern edge follows the Rio Grande through Brownsville, emptying
    into the Gulf of Mexico. Large parts of the sector, which includes a
    portion of the Rio Grande Valley, are privately owned ranches, including
    the well-known King Ranch, which is approximately 800,000 acres in size.

    Although the land in the sector is fairly flat, it receives sufficient
    precipitation to permit growth of dense sage, scrub brush, and cacti. This
    has created an inhospitable environment for persons such as smugglers or
    illegal aliens attempting to walk off-road, as the brush is so thick that
    it can actually block foot traffic or can severely injure persons trying
    to negotiate it, according to Border Patrol officials.

                           Appendix V: McAllen Sector Profile

    Organizational Structure of the Sector

    At the time of our February 2005 visit, the sector was headed by a chief
    patrol agent and staffed with 1,465 Border Patrol agents, deployed
    throughout the sector from nine Border Patrol stations. The sector had
    ATVs, helicopters, patrol boats, and fixed wing aircraft. The sector also
    utilizes bicycle patrols around the ports of entry and downtown areas, and
    video monitors and electronic sensors placed along the border to detect
    people or vehicles attempting to enter the country illegally.

    Only two major north-south highways in the sector lead away from the
    border: U.S. highways 281 and 77. The Border Patrol has permanent
    checkpoints on both, at Falfurrias and Sarita, respectively. Both
    checkpoints are approximately 80 miles inland from the international
    border and are roughly parallel to each other, although about 25 miles
    apart (see fig. 22). Border Patrol officials told us that the combination
    of only two north-south highways and the absence of secondary roads make
    it unnecessary to establish tactical checkpoints in support of the
    permanent ones. The checkpoints at Falfurrias and Sarita cannot be easily
    evaded by walking or driving around them, given the terrain, fenced
    private ranches, detection sensors, and lack of secondary roads, Border
    Patrol officials stated.

    Appendix V: McAllen Sector Profile

    Permanent checkpoints Source: Border Patrol.

                           Appendix V: McAllen Sector Profile

    Much of the land near the Border Patrol checkpoints on U.S. highways 281
    and 77 is private ranch land that is both heavily fenced and actively
    patrolled by private security forces, according to Border Patrol
    officials. As in the Laredo sector, checkpoint operations are supported by
    the local ranchers, according to the Border Patrol, who permit the Border
    Patrol to enter their fenced property to apprehend illegal entrants.

                                 Checkpoint Operations

    We observed the operations of the Falfurrias permanent checkpoint on U.S.
    highway 281, a major north-south highway that runs from McAllen on the
    border north toward San Antonio, Texas (see fig. 22). This checkpoint (and
    the one on U.S. highway 77, which we did not visit) had a tollboothlike
    area with at least two traffic lanes, one reserved for passenger cars and
    trucks, while the other is for commercial trucks and buses. At both
    checkpoints, Border Patrol agents are to stop and screen every vehicle
    that is proceeding northward. As we observed, each vehicle was sniffed by
    a canine, and its occupants were questioned by a Border Patrol agent. We
    also observed a bus being searched, after a canine got a "hit," indicating
    possible drugs. The agents found three 30-pound packages of marijuana in
    the engine compartment.

    According to Border Patrol officials, the agents process a vehicle in
    about 9 seconds and average about 14,900 vehicles-about 40 percent
    trucks-a day transiting the checkpoints. This volume of traffic allows for
    agents to stop and question occupants of each vehicle, compared with the
    144,000 vehicles daily going through the California checkpoint on I-5
    south of San Clemente.

    There is little need to use tactical checkpoints in support of the
    permanent ones in the McAllen sector, according to Border Patrol
    officials, because a lack of secondary roads and geography that is not
    easily traversed force smugglers and illegal aliens to attempt to proceed
    through the checkpoints on U.S. highways 281 and 77. This situation is in
    contrast to the Tucson and San Diego sector operations, where tactical
    checkpoints on secondary roads are constantly being used to support the
    permanent checkpoints because of the many different routes leading away
    from the border that are available to smugglers and illegal aliens.

    Checkpoint Capabilities 	The permanent checkpoints on U.S. highways 281
    and 77 had a wide range of capabilities and facilities to screen vehicles
    and their occupants. These included

    Appendix V: McAllen Sector Profile

    o  	permanent tollbooth-like structures that provide cover from the
    weather, including shade for agents and canines;

    o  lifts to permit inspection of undersides of vehicles;

    o  	computers with hardwired communications and databases to provide
    identity checks;

    o  detention facilities; and

    o  	concrete side aprons away from main traffic lanes that permit trucks
    to safely line up with sufficient room for a VACIS gamma-ray vehicle to
    pass over and inspect them.

    Figure 23 shows several photos of the checkpoint on U.S. highway 281, near
    Falfurrias, Texas.

                           Appendix V: McAllen Sector Profile

    Source: GAO.

                             Appendix VI: Comments from the
                            Department of Homeland Security

                            Page 83 GAO-05-435 Border Patrol

    Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

                            Page 84 GAO-05-435 Border Patrol

    Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777

    Acknowledgments 	In addition to the contact named above, Leo Barbour,
    Katherine Davis, Darryl W. Dutton, Ann H. Finley, Lemuel N. Jackson, James
    R. Russell, and Jonathan R. Tumin made key contributions to this report.

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