Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in
Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and
Police (14-MAR-05, GAO-05-431T).
Since the fall of the former Iraq regime in April 2003, the
multinational force has been working to develop Iraqi military
and police forces capable of maintaining security. To support
this effort, the United States provided about $5.8 billion in
2003-04 to develop Iraq's security capability. In February 2005,
the president requested a supplemental appropriation with an
additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the development of Iraqi
military and police forces. GAO provides preliminary observations
on (1) the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to
Iraqi military and police forces; (2) the data on the status of
forces, and (3) challenges that the Multi-National Force in Iraq
faces in transferring security missions to these forces. To
prepare this statement, GAO used unclassified reports, status
updates, security plans, and other documents from the Departments
of Defense and State. GAO also used testimonies and other
statements for the record from officials such as the Secretary of
Defense. In addition, GAO visited the Iraqi police training
facility in Jordan.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-431T
ACCNO: A19237
TITLE: Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges
in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and
Police
DATE: 03/14/2005
SUBJECT: Data integrity
Federal aid to foreign countries
Foreign governments
International organizations
Military forces
Military training
Police training
Reporting requirements
Iraq
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GAO-05-431T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Committee on Government Reform; Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; House of
Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 12:00 p.m. EST REBUILDING IRAQ
Monday, March 14, 2005
Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities
to Iraqi Military and Police
Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director International Affairs and Trade
GAO-05-431T
[IMG]
March 14, 2005
REBUILDING IRAQ
Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities
to Iraqi Military and Police
What GAO Found
The Multinational Force in Iraq has developed and begun to implement a
strategy to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and
police forces. This strategy would allow a gradual drawdown of its forces
based on the multinational force neutralizing the insurgency and
developing Iraqi military and police services that can independently
maintain security.
U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to
which Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped. As of late February
2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police forces under
the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and almost 60,000 military forces under the
Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and equipped. However, the
reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable because the Ministry of
Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from the
police forces around the country. The data does not exclude police absent
from duty. Further, the departments of State and Defense no longer report
on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are equipped with their
required weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and body armor.
The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it
difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. From that
time through January 2005, insurgent attacks grew in number, complexity,
and intensity. At the same time, the multinational force has faced four
key challenges in increasing the capability of Iraqi forces: (1) training,
equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) developing a
system for measuring the readiness and capability of Iraqi forces; (3)
building loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and
(4) developing a police force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile
environment.
The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges, such
as developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US forces
within Iraqi units. However, without reliable reporting data, a more
capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department of
Defense faces difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down U.S.
forces from Iraq.
United States Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges in transferring
security responsibilities from the multinational force to the Iraqi
military and police forces. In April 2005, we will issue a classified
report to the Congress that provides additional analysis on this subject.
The former Iraqi regime fell in April 2003, and the United Nations
recognized an interim administration-the Coalition Provisional Authority.
On May 23, 2003, the Authority dissolved the military and paramilitary
organizations of the former Iraqi regime and announced plans to create a
new national self-defense capability for Iraq. In June 2004, the Authority
transferred sovereignty to an interim government. At the time of Iraq's
January 2005 elections, more than 159,000 U.S. forces and 24,500 coalition
forces were operating throughout Iraq.
As of March 2005, the United States has made available about $5.8 billion
to develop Iraq's security capability. In February 2005, the President
requested a supplemental appropriation for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
purposes that included an additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the
development of Iraqi security forces.
Today, I will provide preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for
transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police
forces, (2) data on the status of Iraqi forces, and (3) challenges the
Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) faces in transferring security
missions to these forces.
This statement only includes unclassified information. (See appendix I for
details on our scope and methodology.) We conducted work for this
statement in February and March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Summary Since fall 2003, MNF-I has developed and refined a plan to
transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police
forces.1 The plan's objective was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition
forces first in conjunction with the neutralization of Iraq's insurgency
and second with
1GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services,
and Oversight Issues, GAO-04-902R (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).
the development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country. In
summer 2004, MNF-I developed and began implementing a comprehensive
campaign plan with this transition concept. The campaign plan is
classified. As of March 2005, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, stated
that Iraqi security forces were growing in capability but were not ready
to take on the insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, and
assistance of MNF-I.
U.S. government data do not provide reliable information on the status of
Iraqi military and police forces. The goal of the multinational force is
to train and equip about 271,000 Iraqi security forces by July 2006. As of
late February 2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police
forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and almost 60,000 military
forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and equipped.
However, the reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable because the
Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting
from the police forces around the country. The data also include police
absent from duty. Further, State no longer reports on the extent to which
Iraqi security forces have their required weapons, vehicles, communication
equipment, and body armor.
The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it
difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. According
to Department of Defense officials and documents, the insurgency has grown
in intensity and sophistication. Attacks against the coalition and its
Iraqi forces have increased in number over time, with the highest peaks of
attacks occurring in August and November 2004 and in January 2005. At the
same time, MNF-I faces four challenges in building an Iraqi security force
capable of combating the insurgency. First, the Iraqi force structure for
the military and police is changing with the creation of new units by
MNF-I and the Iraqi ministries. This makes it difficult to provide
effective support-the training, equipment, and sustaining of Iraqi forces.
Second, MNF-I is still developing a system to assess the readiness of
Iraqi military and police forces so they can identify weaknesses and
provide them with effective support. Third, developing strong Iraqi
leadership and ensuring the loyalty of all personnel throughout the chain
of command has proven difficult. Fourth, MNF-I and the Iraqi ministries
find it difficult to train a national police force that abides by the rule
of law while operating in a hostile environment.
MNF-I is aware of these challenges and is working to address them. For
example, MNF-I is developing a system to measure the readiness of the
Background
MNF-I Plan for Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Forces
Iraqi military and police and is moving to expand a system of embedded
U.S. trainers to help develop strong Iraqi leadership.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established in May 2003, was
the U.N.-recognized coalition authority led by the United States and the
United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq.
In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military organizations of the former
regime and began the process of creating or reestablishing new Iraqi
security forces, including the police and new Iraqi army. Over time,
multinational force commanders assumed responsibility for recruiting and
training some Iraqi defense and police forces in their areas of
responsibility.2 On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to a
sovereign Iraqi interim government, the CPA officially dissolved, and
Iraq's transitional period began. Under Iraq's transitional law,3 the
transitional period covers the interim government phase and the
transitional government period, which is scheduled to end by December 31,
2005.4
The multinational force (MNF-I) has the authority to take all necessary
measures to contribute to security and stability in Iraq during this
process, working in partnership with the Iraqi government to reach
agreement on security and policy issues. A May 2004 national security
presidential directive required the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to
direct all U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi
security forces. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq,
which operates under MNF-I, now leads coalition efforts to train, equip,
and organize Iraqi security forces.
In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan for
transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces. The four phases
were (1) mutual support, where the multinational force establishes
conditions for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces; (2)
transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in a local area assume
responsibility for security; (3) transition to regional control, where
Iraqi forces are responsible for larger regions; and (4) transition to
strategic
2The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and Jordan
academies. The Iraqi army units were trained by the Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq.
3Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,
March 2004.
4See Iraq's Transitional Law, GAO-04-746R, May 25, 2004, for more
information on key events during Iraq's transitional period.
over watch, where Iraqi forces on a national level are capable of
maintaining a secure environment against internal and external threats,
with broad monitoring from the multinational force. The plan's objective
was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction
with the neutralization of Iraq's insurgency and second with the
development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country.5
Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted to
quickly shift responsibilities to them in February 2004 but did not
succeed in this effort. In March 2004, Iraqi security forces numbered
about 203,000, including about 76,000 police, 78,000 facilities protection
officers,6 and about 38,000 in the civilian defense corps. Police and
military units performed poorly during an escalation of insurgent attacks
against the coalition in April 2004. According to a July 2004 executive
branch report to Congress, many Iraqi security forces around the country
collapsed during this uprising. Some Iraqi forces fought alongside
coalition forces. Other units abandoned their posts and responsibilities
and in some cases assisted the insurgency.
A number of problems contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security forces.
MNF-I identified problems in training and equipping them as among the
reasons for their poor performance. Training of police and some defense
forces was not uniform and varied widely across Iraq. MNF-I's commanders
had the leeway to institute their own versions of the transitional police
curriculum, and the training for some defense forces did not prepare them
to fight against well-armed insurgents. Further, according to the CPA
Director of Police, when Iraqi police voluntarily returned to duty in May
2003, CPA initially provided limited training and did not thoroughly vet
the personnel to get them on the streets quickly. Many police who were
hired remain untrained and unvetted, according to Department of Defense
(DOD) officials.
5For more information on the security transition concept, see GAO-04-902R.
6The Departments of State and Defense stopped counting the Facilities
Protection Service as part of the Iraqi security force structure in
September 2004. The mission of the Facilities Protection Service is to
guard and secure individual ministry and municipal buildings against
vandalism and theft.
Data on Iraqi Security Forces Has Limitations
MNF-I completed a campaign plan7 during summer 2004 that elaborated and
refined the original strategy for transferring security responsibilities
to Iraqi forces at the local, regional, and then national levels. Further
details on this campaign plan are classified.
On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that Iraqi security forces were growing in capability but were
not yet ready to take on the insurgency without the presence, help,
mentoring, and assistance of MNF-I. He cited a mixed performance record
for the Iraqi security forces during the previous 11 months. The commander
further testified that focused training and mentoring of Iraqi
Intervention Forces, Iraqi Special Operations Forces, and National Guard
forces contributed to successful coalition operations in places such as
Najaf and Kufa during August 2004 and Fallujah during November 2004, and
during the January 2005 elections. On the other hand, he also cited
instances of poor performance by the police in western Baghdad from August
through October 2004 and Mosul during November 2004.
U.S. government data does not provide reliable information on the status
of Iraqi military and police forces. According to a March 2005 State
Department report, as of February 28, 2005, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense
had 59,695 operational troops, or roughly two thirds of the total
required. The Ministry of Interior had 82,072 trained and equipped
officers on duty, or almost half of the total required. Table 1 shows
status of Iraqi forces under the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
7According to DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02;
Nov. 30, 2004), a campaign plan is a plan for a series of related military
operations to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a
given time and space.
Table 1: Status of Iraqi Security Forces as Reported by the Department of
State
Operational/
Trained and Percentage Ministry Component Requireda Equippedb of Required
Defense Iraq Army 94,656 58,992
o Regular Army
o National Guard
o Intervention Force
o Special Operations
Air Force 453 186
Navy 582 517
Sub-total 95,691 59,695c
Interior Iraqi Police Service 135,000 55,274
Highway Patrol 6,300
Other forces 34,050 26,798
o Civil Intervention
o Special Police
o Emergency Response
o Border Enforcement
o Dignitary Protection
Sub-total 175,350 82,072d
Total 271,041 141,761
Source: State Department reports.
aRequired numbers are from 1/19/05 Iraq Weekly Status Report.
bThe term "operational" refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term
"trained and equipped" refers to Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are
from 3/2/05 Iraq Weekly Status Report.
cUnauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense
numbers.
dUnauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior
numbers.
MNF-I's goal is to train and equip a total of about 271,000 Iraqi security
forces by July 2006. However, the numbers of security forces, as reported
in table 1, are limited in providing accurate and complete information on
the status of Iraqi forces. Specifically:
o The reported number of security forces overstates the number actually
serving. Ministry of Interior reports, for example, include police who are
absent without leave in its totals. Ministry of Defense reports exclude
the absent military personnel from its totals. According to DOD officials,
the number of absentees is probably in the tens of thousands.
o The reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable. According to a
senior official from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, MNF-I does not know how
many Iraqi police are on duty at any given point because the Ministry of
Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from police
stations across Iraq.
o The Departments of Defense and State do not provide additional
information on the extent to which trained Iraqi security forces have
their necessary equipment. As recently as September 2004, State issued
unclassified reports with detailed information on the number of weapons,
vehicles, communication equipment, and body amour required by each
security force compared to the amount received. State had also provided
weekly unclassified updates on the number of personnel trained in each
unit.
In addition, the total number of Iraqi security forces includes forces
with varying missions and training levels. Not all units are designed to
be capable of fighting the insurgency. For example, the police service,
which numbers about 55,000 of Iraq's 141,000 personnel who have received
training, has a civilian law enforcement function. As of mid-December
2004, paramilitary training for a high-threat hostile environment was not
part of the curriculum for new recruits. The missions of other units, such
as the Ministry of Defense's commando battalion and the Ministry of
Interior's Emergency Response Unit, focus on combating terrorism. Required
training for both forces includes counterterrorism. Table 2 provides
information on the types of military and police units, their missions, and
their training.
Table 2: Missions and Training of Iraqi Security Forces
Ministry Unit Mission Training
Defense Iraqi Army o Regular Army Defend Iraq against external threats.
Eight weeks of basic training. Before
When directed, assist in providing deployment units receive follow-on
defense against internal threats. operational training.
o National Guard Conduct stability operations to support Abbreviated
3-week basic training. internal security. Conduct constabulary Follow-on
training similar to that given duties in support of internal security. the
regular army.
o Intervention Force Conduct operations to defeat anti-Iraqi Four weeks
of cadre training (for officers forces, with primary focus on urban areas.
and noncommissioned officers); 13 Assist in the restoration of a secure
and weeks basic and urban operations stable environment. training.
o Commando Battalion Support the Iraqi Counter-Terrorist Force. Regular
army basic training. Instruction Similar in organization, training, and
includes counter terrorism and mission to the U.S. Army Ranger
unconventional warfare. Battalion.
o Counter-Terrorist Task Force Direct action counter-terrorism similar
Regular Army basic training; specialized mission, and training to U.S.
Special 13-week course. Forces with counter-terrorist function.
Air Force Provide aerial reconnaissance and rotary and fixed-wing
transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities.
Navy Conduct security operations on Iraqi territorial waters, including
gas and oil platforms, and, in conjunction with Department of Border
Enforcement, conduct police operations on Iraq's coastline and territorial
waters to counter piracy, smuggling, and other unlawful actions.
Training consists of 1 to 4 month familiarization instruction.
Regular Army basic training; follow-on training for land-and sea-based
troops, advanced seamanship training.
Interior Police Provide law enforcement, New officers: 8-week
public safety academy training.
and internal security. Serving officers:
3-week course.
Provide law enforcement,
Highway Patrol internal N/A
security, and convoy security
along Iraq's
highways.
Other forces
o Civil Intervention Force Provide a national level, high end, rapid N/A
response police capability to counter large-scale disobedience and
insurgents.
o Special Police Commando Provide a direct action, special N/A
operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of
Interior.
o Emergency Response Unit Provide a special operations police Standard
regular police training; 8-week capability in support of the Iraqi Police
specialized training focusing on terrorist Service. incidents, high-risk
searches, and
weapons of mass destruction.
Ministry Unit Mission Training
o Department of Border Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and 4-week
academy training.
Enforcement monitor and control the movement of persons and goods.
o Bureau of Dignitary Protection Provide close protection, convoy
security, N/A and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.
Challenges to Transferring Security Missions to Iraqi Control
Source: MNF-I documents and DOD testimonies before Congress.
Note: N/A = Not available from an unclassified source.
The multinational force's security transition plan depends on neutralizing
the insurgent threat and increasing Iraqi security capability. The
insurgent threat has increased since June 2003, as insurgent attacks have
grown in number, sophistication, and complexity. At the same time, MNF-I
and the Iraqi government confront difficulties to building Iraqi security
forces that are capable of effectively combating the insurgency. These
include programming effective support for a changing force structure,
assessing progress in developing capable forces without a system for
measuring their readiness, developing leadership and loyalty throughout
the Iraqi chain of command, and developing police who abide by the rule of
law in a hostile environment.
The Insurgency Has Intensified
According to senior military officials, the insurgency in
Iraq-particularly the Sunni insurgency-has grown in number, complexity,
and intensity over the past 18 months. On February 3, 2005, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Armed Services Committee that
the insurgency in Iraq had built up slowly during the first year, then
became very intense from summer 2004 through January 2005. Figure 1
provides Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data showing these trends in
enemy initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and
infrastructure. Overall attacks peaked in August 2004 due to a rise in
violence in Sunnidominated regions and an uprising by the Mahdi Army, a
Shi'a insurgent group led by radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
Although the November 2004 and January 2005 numbers were slightly lower
than those for August, it is significant that almost all of the attacks in
these 2 months took place in Sunni-majority areas, whereas the August
attacks took place countrywide. MNF-I is the primary target of the
attacks, but the number of attacks against Iraqi civilians and security
forces increased significantly during January 2005. On March 1, 2005, the
CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that more Iraqi
security forces than Americans have died in action against insurgents
since June 2004.
Figure 1: Violent Incidents Against the Coalition and Its Partners, by
Month, June 2003 Through February 2005
aAccording to DIA officals, June 2003 data are incomplete.
Insurgents have demonstrated their ability to increase attacks around key
events, according to the DIA Director's February 2005 statement before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. For example, attacks spiked in
April and May 2004, the months before the transfer of power to the Iraqi
interim government; in November 2004 due to a rise in violence in
Sunnidominated areas during Ramadan and MNF-I's operation against
insurgents in Fallujah; and in January 2005 before the Iraqi elections.
The DIA Director testified that attacks on Iraq's election day reached
about 300, double the previous 1 day high of about 150 during last year's
Ramadan. About 80 percent of all attacks occurred in Sunni-dominated
central Iraq, with the Kurdish north and Shia south remaining relatively
calm.
In February and March 2004, the DIA Director and CENTCOM Commander
presented their views of the nature of the insurgency to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee,
respectively. According to these officials, the core of the insurgency
consists of Sunni Arabs, dominated by Ba'athist and former regime
elements. Shi'a militant groups, such as those associated with the radical
Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, remain a threat to the political process.
Following the latest round of fighting last August and September, DIA
concluded that al-Sadr's forces were re-arming, re-organizing, and
training, with al-Sadr keeping his options open to employ his forces.
Jihadists have been responsible for many high-profile attacks that have a
disproportionate impact, although their activity accounts for only a
fraction of the overall violence. Foreign fighters comprise a small
component of the insurgency and a very small percentage of all detainees.
DIA believes that insurgents' infiltration and subversion of emerging
government institutions, security, and intelligence services will be a
major problem for the new government.
In late October 2004, according to a CENTCOM document, MNF-I estimated the
overall size of active enemy forces at about 20,000. The estimate
consisted of about 10,000 former regime members; about 3,000 members of al
Sadr's forces;8 about 1,000 in the al-Zarqawi terrorist network; and about
5,000 criminals, religious extremists, and their supporters. In February
and March 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CENTCOM
Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it is difficult to
develop an accurate estimate of the number of insurgents. The CENTCOM
commander explained that the number of insurgent fighters, supporters, and
sympathizers can rise and fall depending on the politics, problems, and
major offensive operations in a given area. He also acknowledged that gaps
exist in the intelligence concerning the broader insurgency, particularly
in the area of human intelligence.
The CENTCOM commander and MNF-I commanding general recently cited Iraq's
January 2005 elections as an important step toward Iraqi sovereignty and
security but cautioned against possible violence in the future. In March
2005, the MNF-I commanding general stated that the insurgency has
sufficient ammunition, weapons, money, and people to maintain about 50 to
60 attacks per day in the Sunni areas. The CENTCOM
8MNF-I refers to the al-Sadr's forces as Muqtada Militia.
Challenges to Increasing the Capability of Iraqi Security Forces
Iraqi Security Force Structure Is Constantly Changing
Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the upcoming
processes of writing an Iraqi constitution and forming a new government
could trigger more violence, as the former regime elements in the
insurgency seek a return to power. The MNF-I commanding general stated
that a combination of political, military, economic, and communications
efforts will ultimately defeat the insurgency.
On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to take on the
insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, and assistance of MNF-I.
MNF-I has faced four key challenges in helping Iraq develop security
forces capable of combating the insurgency or conducting law enforcement
duties in a hostile environment. These key challenges are (1) training,
equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) determining
progress in developing capable forces without a system for measuring their
readiness; (3) developing loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi
chain of command; and (4) developing police capable of democratic law
enforcement in a hostile environment.
The Iraqi security force structure has constantly changed in response to
the growing insurgency. This makes it difficult to provide effective
support-the training, equipping, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. DOD
defines force structure as the numbers, size, and composition of units
that comprise defense forces.9 Some changes to the Iraqi force structure
have resulted from a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
analysis of needed Iraqi security capabilities during summer 2004 and
reported in October 2004.10 The Iraqi government has made other changes to
forces under the Ministries of Defense and Interior to allow them to
better respond to the increased threat. According to a February 2005 DOD
budget document, MNF-I and the Iraqi government plan to increase the force
structure over the next year.
According to the October report, a number of enhancements in Iraqi force
capabilities and infrastructure were critically needed to meet the current
threat environment. Based on this review, the MNF-I Commander decided to
increase the size of the Iraqi Police Service from 90,000 to 135,000
personnel; the Iraqi National Guard by 20 battalions to 62 battalions; and
9DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
10Office of Management and Budget, Quarterly Update to Congress, Section
2207 Report, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2004).
System for Measuring Iraqi Readiness Has Not Been Developed
the Department of Border Enforcement from 16,000 to 32,000 border
officers. The review also supported in the creation of the Civil
Intervention Force, which consists of nine specialized Public Order
Battalions and two Special Police Regiments under the Ministry of
Interior. This force is designed to provide a national level, high-end,
rapid response capability to counter large-scale civil disobedience and
insurgency activities.
Over the past year, the Iraqi government has created, merged, and expanded
Iraqi security forces under the Ministries of Defense and Interior. For
example, according to a DOD official, the Iraqi Army Chief of Staff
created the Iraqi Intervention Force in April 2004 in response to the
unwillingness of a regular Army battalion to fight Iraqi insurgents in
Fallujah. This intervention force will be comprised of nine battalions and
is the counter-insurgency wing of the Iraqi Army. According to Iraq's
national security strategy,11 the Iraqi government decided to increase the
Iraqi Army from 100,000 soldiers to 150,000 personnel by the end of this
year and extend the time required to complete their training from July
2005 to December 2005. The government planned to form this larger army by
including the Iraqi National Guard and accelerating the training and
recruitment of new troops. In addition, in late 2004, the Ministry of
Interior added the Mechanized Police Brigade, a paramilitary,
counterinsurgency unit that will consist of three battalions that will
deploy to high-risk areas. It also created the paramilitary, army-type
Special Police Commando brigades.
According to DOD document supporting the February 2005 supplemental
request, the Iraqi government planned to add a number of additional
military elements, primarily support units, to the force structure over
the next year. These include logistics units at the division level and
below, a mechanized division, and a brigade each for signals, military
police, engineering, and logistics.
MNF-I officials stated that, as of March 2005, MNF-I and the Iraqi
government do not yet have a system in place to assess the readiness of
Iraq's various security forces to accomplish their assigned missions and
11Strategy for National Security and the Role of the Army and Internal
Security Forces, January 2005.
Developing an Effective Iraqi Chain of Command
tasks.12 However, in early 2005, the commanding general of the
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq said that MNF-I had begun
work on a system to assess Iraqi capabilities. MNF-I plans to develop a
rating system along the lines of the U.S. military readiness reporting
system. According to the commanding general of the Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq, this system most likely would have Iraqi brigade
commanders evaluating such things as the training readiness of their
units, their personnel field, and their equipping levels. They also would
provide a subjective judgment of the units' readiness. The commanding
general said that this rating system would take time to implement.
It is unclear at this time whether the system under development would
provide adequate measures for determining the capability of Iraqi police.
Because the police have a civilian law enforcement function rather than a
military or paramilitary role in combating the insurgency, MNF-I may have
to develop a separate system for determining police readiness.
On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that the establishment of an effective Iraqi chain of command is
a critical factor in determining when Iraqi security forces will be
capable of taking the lead in fighting the counterinsurgency. The CENTCOM
Commander added that the Iraqi chain of command must be loyal and capable,
take orders from the Iraqi head of state through the lawful chain of
command, and fight to serve the Iraqi people. MNF-I faces several
challenges in helping to develop an effective chain of command, including
questionable loyalty among some Iraqi security forces, poor leadership in
Iraqi units, and the destabilizing influence of militias outside the
control of the Iraqi government.
The executive branch reported in July 2004 that some Iraqi security forces
had turned to fight with insurgents during the spring uprising.13 In
October 2004, in response to questions we submitted, CENTCOM officials
indicated that it is difficult to determine with any certainty the true
level of insurgent
12DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines readiness as the
synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels: (1) unit readiness,
which is the ability to provide capabilities required by combatant
commanders to execute their assigned missions; this is derived from the
ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was assigned; and
(2) joint readiness, which is the combatant commander's ability to
integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his
or her assigned missions.
13Section 2207 report.
Developing a Police Force in a Hostile Environment
infiltration within Iraqi security forces. Recent reports indicate that
some Iraqi security personnel continue to cooperate with insurgents. For
example, a February 2005 report cited instances of insurgent infiltration
of Iraqi police forces. Police manning a checkpoint in one area were
reporting convoy movements by mobile telephone to local terrorists. Police
in another area were infiltrated by former regime elements.
In February 2005 press briefings, the Secretary of Defense and the
commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
cited the leadership of Iraqi security forces as a critical element in
developing Iraqi forces capable of combating insurgents. MNF-I officials
indicated that they plan to expand the use of military transition teams to
support Iraqi units. These teams would help train the units and
headquarters and accompany them into combat. On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM
Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that there is broad,
general agreement that MNF-I must do more to train, advise, mentor, and
help Iraqi security forces. CENTCOM has requested an additional 1,487
troops to support these efforts and must have the continued support of the
new Iraqi government.
The continued existence of militias outside the control of Iraq's central
government also presents a major challenge to developing an effective
chain of command. In late May 2004, the CPA developed a transition and
reintegration strategy for disbanding or controlling militias that existed
prior to the transfer of power to the Iraqi interim government.14 Detailed
information on the current status of militias in Iraq is classified.
However, the CENTCOM Commander acknowledged the continued existence of
older militias and the recent creation of new militias. He said that their
presence will ultimately be destabilizing unless they are strictly
controlled, come under government supervision, and are not allowed to
operate independently.
MNF-I's efforts to develop a police force that abides by and upholds the
rule of law while operating in a hostile environment have been difficult.
U.S. police trainers in Jordan told us in mid-December 2004 that Iraqi
police were trained and equipped to do community policing in a permissive
security environment. Thus, Iraqi police were not prepared to
14Nine militias accepted the transition plans, but others either had not
agreed or decided to continue hostile operations against the coalition
rather than take part in the transition and reintegration process. See
GAO-04-902R for more information on Iraq's militias and earlier efforts to
disband them.
withstand the insurgent attacks that they have faced over the past year
and a half. According to the State Department's Country Report on Human
Rights Practices for 2004, more than 1,500 Iraqi police have been killed
between April 2003 and December 2004. To address this weakness, MNF-I and
the Iraqi government report taking steps to better prepare some police to
operate during an insurgency. In a December 2004 press briefing, the MNF-I
Commander stated that MNF-I was moving to add paramilitary-type skills to
the police training program to improve some units' ability to operate in a
counterinsurgency environment. U.S. police trainers in Jordan told us that
the curriculum was being revised to provide police paramilitary
capabilities. In addition, according to the Iraq's national security
strategy, the Iraqi government is in the process of upgrading security
measures at police stations throughout the country.
According to State's 2004 human rights report, police have operated in a
hostile environment. Attacks by insurgents and foreign terrorists have
resulted in killings, kidnappings, violence, and torture. Bombings,
executions, killings of government officials, shootings, and intimidation
were a daily occurrence throughout all regions and sectors of society. The
report also states that members of the Ministry of Interior's security
forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. For example, in
early December 2004, the Basrah police reported that the Internal Affairs
Unit was involved in the killings of 10 members of the Baath Party and the
killings of a mother and daughter accused of prostitution. The report
further states that, according to Human Rights Watch, torture and ill
treatment of detainees by the police was commonplace. Additionally, the
report states that corruption continued to be a problem. The Iraq
Commission for Public Integrity was investigating cases of police abuse
involving unlawful arrests, beatings, and theft of valuables from the
homes of persons detained.
The multinational force has been working to transfer full security
responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police.
However, the multinational force and Iraq face the challenges of an
intense insurgency, a changing Iraqi force structure, the lack of a system
to measure military and police readiness, an Iraqi leadership and chain of
command in its infancy, and a police force that finds it difficult to
uphold the rule of law in a hostile environment. MNF-I recognizes these
challenges and is moving to address them so it can begin to reduce its
presence in Iraq and draw down its troops. Of particular note is MNF-I's
effort to develop a system to assess unit readiness and to embed MNFI-I
transition teams into units to mentor Iraqis.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions you or the other Subcommittee members may have.
Contact and Staff For further information, please contact Joseph A.
Christoff on (202) 5128979. Individuals who made key contributions to this
testimony were Acknowledgments Lynn Cothern, Mattias Fenton, Laura Helm,
Judy McCloskey, Tet Miyabara, Michael Rohrback, and Audrey Solis.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We provided preliminary observations on 1) the strategy for transferring
security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces, 2) the data
on the status of the forces, and 3) challenges the Multi. National Force
in Iraq (MNF-I) faces in transferring security missions to these forces.
We conducted our review for this statement during February and March 2005
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We
used only unclassified information for this statement
To examine the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to
Iraqi forces, we focused on the 2003 security transition concept plan. We
obtained and reviewed the transition plan and related documents and
interviewed officials from the Coalition Provisional Authority and the
Departments of State and Defense. Our work on this issue is described in
June 2004 GAO report entitled Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security,
Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues (GAO-04-902R). To
update information on the transition concept, we reviewed statements for
the record from the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander
and the MNF-I commanding general on the campaign plan and on the
capability and recent performance of Iraqi security forces. These
statements focused on Iraqi security forces' ability to perform against
the insurgency, as well as the training and mentoring of forces that
contributed to successful operations.
To determine the data on Iraqi security forces, we reviewed unclassified
Department of State status reports from June 2004 to March 2005 that
provided information about the number of troops by the Ministries of
Defense and Interior. We interviewed State and Department of Defense (DOD)
officials about the number of Iraqi police on duty and the structure of
the Iraqi police forces. To identify the type of training the Iraqi
security forces receive, we reviewed and organized data and information
from the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. We also visited
the Jordan International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan to
determine the training security forces receive. This approach allowed us
to verify that Iraqi security forces have varying missions and training
levels and not all are designed to be capable of fighting the insurgency.
To discuss the insurgency in Iraq, we reviewed statements for the record
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the CENTCOM Commander on the status
of the insurgency. We obtained data and reports from DIA on the number of
reported incidents from June 2003 through February 2005. We obtained
written responses from CENTCOM on the strength and composition of the
insurgency. To address the challenges to increasing the capability of
Iraqi
security forces, we reviewed statements for the record by the CENTCOM
Commander, the MNF-I commanding general, and DOD officials. We also
examined the Iraqi National Security Strategy, funding documents from the
Office of Management and Budget and State Department, and the fiscal year
2005 Supplemental Request of the President. We obtained and reviewed
further breakdowns of briefings on the supplemental request. To identify
challenges in developing the Iraqi police force, we interviewed police
trainers in Jordan and reviewed the State Department's Country Report on
Human Rights Practices for 2004.
We obtained comments on a draft of this statement from State and DOD,
including CENTCOM. All generally agreed with our statement and provided
technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate.
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