Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of		 
Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future 
Programs (06-SEP-05, GAO-05-427).				 
                                                                 
The importance of prepositioned stocks to the U.S. military was  
highlighted during recent operations in Iraq, as much of the	 
equipment and supplies stored at land sites in the region and	 
aboard prepositioning ships were used to support operations.	 
Long-standing problems in the Department of Defense's (DOD)	 
prepositioning program are systematic of the inventory management
issues, and more recently supply chain management issues, that	 
GAO has considered as high-risk areas since 1990. GAO was asked  
to review the risks facing DOD's prepositioning programs,	 
including an assessment of (1) the near-term operational risk	 
given the continuing use of these stocks, (2) the sufficiency of 
DOD and service-level oversight of these prepositioning programs,
and (3) whether DOD has developed a coordinated plan for the	 
future of the department's prepositioning programs that would	 
meet the goals of the recently published defense strategy.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-427 					        
    ACCNO:   A35680						        
  TITLE:     Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of    
Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future 
Programs							 
     DATE:   09/06/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Air Force supplies 				 
	     Army supplies					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Equipment inventories				 
	     Equipment maintenance				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Inventory control					 
	     Military inventories				 
	     Military materiel					 
	     Naval supplies					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Strategic planning 				 

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GAO-05-427

                 United States Government Accountability Office

GAO	Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House
                               of Representatives

September 2005

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Better Management and Oversight of Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk
                          and Improve Future Programs

                                       a

GAO-05-427

[IMG]

September 2005

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Better Management and Oversight of Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk
and Improve Future Programs

  What GAO Found

DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale
conflict emerge because it has drawn heavily on its prepositioned stocks
to support ongoing operations in Iraq. And, although remaining stocks
provide some residual capability, many of the programs face significant
inventory shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance problems. For example,
the Army has drawn equipment from virtually all of its prepositioned
stocks to support operations in Iraq. Some of its storage sites have
shortfalls of equipment and sustainment items, like spare parts, and some
stocks are in poor condition. Additionally, the Marine Corps has used a
significant portion of the stocks downloaded from 5 of its 16
prepositioning ships to support operations in Iraq and it is unclear when
this equipment will be refilled. The Air Force is also continuing to use a
considerable amount of its prepositioned stocks to support combat
operations in Iraq and it is unclear when these stocks will be refilled.
The precise operational risk created by these shortfalls is difficult to
assess. However, should a new conflict arise in the near term, the
combatant commander would likely face difficult operational challenges.

The department and the military services have provided insufficient
oversight over DOD's prepositioning programs. This inattention has allowed
long-standing problems with determining program requirements and managing
inventory to persist. DOD has not enforced its directive that could
provide centralized oversight over its prepositioning programs. Officials
told us they did not enforce this directive because they were able to
provide adequate oversight through other mechanisms. Even if the
department had enforced its directive, however, the requirements
underpinning some of DOD's prepositioning programs are questionable and
the services do not have sufficient information on the inventory level and
maintenance condition of some prepositioned stocks. Without reliable
information on requirements, inventory levels, and maintenance condition,
DOD cannot provide sufficient oversight over its programs, which
potentially leaves war fighters at risk of not having needed stocks in the
future.

DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint doctrine
to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the heavy use
of prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department's plans to
rely on them in the future. DOD's recently published defense strategy
indicates that prepositioning programs should be more innovative,
flexible, and joint. In the absence of a departmentwide plan or joint
doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution and future plans for these
programs, the services have been recapitalizing stocks and developing
future plans without an understanding of how the programs will fit
together to meet the evolving defense strategy. Without a framework that
establishes priorities for prepositioning among competing initiatives, DOD
cannot provide assurances to Congress that the billions of dollars that
will be required to recapitalize the stocks and develop future programs
will produce programs that operate jointly, support the needs of the war
fighter, and are affordable.

United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Inventory Shortfalls and Poor Equipment Condition Leave Many of

DOD's Prepositioning Programs at Risk DOD and Some of the Military
Services Have Provided Insufficient

Oversight Over Their Prepositioning Programs DOD Lacks A Plan To
Coordinate Future Prepositioning Programs Conclusions Recommendations for
Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      3 7

10

19 26 33 34 35

Appendix I	Past Products Identifying DOD Inventory Management and
Prepositioning Challenges

Appendix II Scope and Methodology

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Tables

Table 1: Description of DOD's Prepositioning Programs 8 Table 2: Current
Status and Operations and Maintenance Funding

for Army Prepositioned Stocks at Key Locations as of

January 2005 11 Table 3: GAO Products 37 Table 4: Other Products 40

Figures

Figure 1: Locations of Army (USAR), Marine Corps (USMC), Navy (USN), and
Air Force (USAF) Prepositioned Stocks 9

Figure 2: Sustainment Stocks Stored Outside at Camp Carroll, South Korea
13

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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

September 6, 2005

The Honorable Joel Hefley
Chairman
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

With fewer troops permanently stationed overseas, prepositioned stocks
of equipment and supplies have become an integral part of the Department
of Defense's (DOD) ability to project forces into conflict areas faster.
The
importance of prepositioned stocks to the U.S. military was highlighted
during recent operations in Iraq. The military used equipment and supplies
stored at land sites in the region and offloaded much of the stocks from
its
prepositioning ships. Perhaps more importantly, the availability of the
sites gave the United States the facilities it needed to assemble forces
for
combat. Recognizing the importance of the department's prepositioning
programs, Congress has made significant investments in these programs.
In recent years, the services have collectively used over $1 billion each
year to operate and maintain their prepositioning programs; by fiscal year
2005 this amount had declined to about $724 million, since a large portion
of these stocks were used to support military operations in Iraq. However,
billions of dollars in future investments will be needed to recapitalize
equipment and develop future programs. The recently published National
Defense Strategy indicates that prepositioning will continue to be an
important aspect of DOD's defense posture in the future.1 The strategy
establishes several goals for the future of these programs, including the
need for the programs to be more flexible and increasingly joint in
character.

Each of the military services prepositions combat or support equipment
and supplies in order to speed response times of U.S. forces to operating
locations and reduce the strain on scarce airlift or slower sealift
assets.
For example, the Army stores sets of combat brigade equipment and

1 The Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America (March 2005).

supporting supplies at land sites in several countries and aboard
prepositioning ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Marine Corps
stores equipment and supplies for its forces aboard squadrons of maritime
prepositioning ships located around the world and at land sites in Norway.
The Navy stores equipment and supplies to support ship offloading,
deployable hospitals, and construction projects also aboard the maritime
prepositioning ships and at land sites around the world. The Air Force
stores ammunition at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships and
prepositions base support equipment, vehicles, and supporting supplies at
several land sites.

In 1998, we reported on problems ranging from poor inventory visibility to
unreliable requirements-setting processes in the Army and Air Force
prepositioning programs.2 Similar problems were more recently identified
in numerous after-action assessments of the war in Iraq, and we testified
in March 2004 before the Subcommittee about the performance of the Army
and Marine Corps' prepositioning programs during Operation Iraqi Freedom.3
We found that although the programs performed well in general, some Army
units faced equipment shortfalls and there were instances where certain
types of equipment were outdated or did not match unit needs. We stated
that DOD may need to rethink its prepositioning programs to ensure that
they are compatible with overall transformation goals and the evolving
military strategy. Following our testimony, Congress directed the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report on its prepositioning plans by
October 1, 2005.4 Inventory management issues, and more recently supply
chain management, have been considered high-risk areas by GAO since 1990.
To further assist the Subcommittee in its oversight, you asked that we
assess the status and plans for DOD's prepositioning programs in advance
of the department's report. Specifically, you asked us to review the risks
facing the department's prepositioning programs, including an assessment
of: (1) the near-term operational risk given the continuing use of these
stocks, (2) the sufficiency of DOD and service-level oversight of these
prepositioning programs, and (3) whether DOD has developed a coordinated
plan for the

2 GAO: Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be
Reassessed, GAO/NSIAD-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 1998).

3 GAO, Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps
Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond, GAO-04-562T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2004).

4 Pub. L. No. 108-375, S: 1046, (2004).

future of the department's prepositioning programs that would meet the
goals of the recently published defense strategy.

To assess the near-term operational risk given the continuing use of
prepositioned stocks, we obtained reports prepared by the military
services on the inventory levels of their prepositioned stocks compared to
program requirements5 and discussed the potential near-term operational
and long-term program risks associated with inventory shortfalls and
maintenance deficiencies. We visited selected prepositioning sites and
reviewed available maintenance reports or other data used by the services
to measure the condition of the prepositioned stocks. To assess the
sufficiency of DOD and the services' oversight of these programs, we
discussed the processes used by DOD to oversee its prepositioning programs
with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Staff, and the military services. To assess whether DOD has developed a
coordinated plan for the future of its prepositioning programs that would
meet the goals of the recently published defense strategy, we reviewed the
recently published National Defense Strategy and discussed the future
direction of the department's prepositioning programs with officials in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military
services. We also collected and analyzed information from the military
services on the future plans for their prepositioning programs. We also
discussed the time frames and costs needed to repair or replace
prepositioned stocks used in recent military operations. We conducted our
work from July 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Our assessments of data reliability
revealed significant concerns that are discussed later in the report. A
more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in
appendix II.

DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale
conflict emerge because it has drawn heavily on its prepositioned stocks
to support ongoing operations in Iraq. And, although remaining stocks
provide some residual capability, many of the programs face significant
inventory shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance problems.6 There is

5 We will refer to stocks on hand as compared against required levels as
"inventory fill" in this report.

6 As discussed later in this report, reliable data needed to assess
inventory fill and maintenance condition were unavailable in many cases.
Therefore, the precise readiness of prepositioned stocks and the impact of
any shortfalls are difficult to determine.

  Results in Brief

currently no strategy in place to mitigate the operational risks created
by inventory shortfalls and poor maintenance condition of prepositioned
equipment. Combatant commanders rely on prepositioned stocks being
available and in good maintenance condition; otherwise U.S. forces must
bring needed stocks with them or spend valuable time repairing equipment.
The current status of the services' programs is summarized as follows:

o  	The Army has drawn equipment from virtually all of its prepositioned
stocks to support operations in Iraq and little of the equipment has been
returned. Some stocks are currently stored in South Korea, or are afloat
on prepositioning ships near Guam/Saipan and Diego Garcia. However, these
sites have shortfalls of equipment and sustainment items like spare parts.
Some of these shortfalls have existed in these and other Army programs for
years, however, and are not attributable to the war in Iraq. In addition,
we found that some of these stocks were in poor maintenance condition,
especially those stored in South Korea.

o  	The Marine Corps is currently using a significant portion of the
stocks offloaded from 5 of its 16 prepositioning ships to support ongoing
operations in Iraq. It is unclear when this equipment will be returned to
prepositioned stocks because much of this equipment will be left in Iraq
to support the continuing deployment of Marine Corps forces there.
Conversely, while the Navy used prepositioned assets like field hospitals
in Iraq, it currently reports few shortfalls.

o  	The Air Force also has a reduced capability in its prepositioned
stocks because it is continuing to use a considerable amount of these
stocks to support combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. For
example, it used approximately 43 percent of the total number of its
prepositioned bare base sets7 to house deployed forces supporting
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. It is unclear when these
stocks will be refilled. The precise operational risk created by these
shortfalls is difficult to assess. Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed
significant issues with the status of prepositioned stocks, such as
shortages in spare parts and lessthan-modern equipment. These problems
still exist today. While the military planners we spoke with told us that
they would find a way to work around the shortfalls, they offered little
in the way of concrete plans. Should a new conflict arise in the near
term-especially one where U.S. forces did not control the timing-the
combatant commander would likely face even more difficult operational
challenges.

7 The term "bare base sets" refers to tents for troops, latrines,
kitchens, aircraft hangers, maintenance shops, generators, and
environmental controls. The sets support earlyarriving combat forces and
are especially critical in austere environments.

DOD and the military services have provided insufficient oversight over
the department's prepositioning programs. This inattention has allowed
long-standing problems with determining program requirements and managing
inventory to persist. Management principles, such as those embraced in the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, provide federal agencies
with a framework for effectively implementing and managing programs.8
Management principles include sufficient information to support sound
decision making and enable Congress to provide proper oversight. However,
DOD has not implemented its directive on war reserve materiel policy that
could provide centralized oversight over its prepositioning programs.9
Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us they did not
implement this directive because they did not believe they had the
authority to enforce its provisions. In addition, officials told us they
were able to provide adequate oversight over the department's
prepositioning programs through other mechanisms, such as reviewing
quarterly readiness assessments and the services' budget submissions.
While these mechanisms provide DOD with important information on gaps in
capabilities and resource allocations, they provide only a vague and broad
description of shortfalls or readiness problems and, therefore, are not
effective as an oversight tool. Based on our analysis, even if the
department had implemented its directive, the requirements underpinning
some of DOD's prepositioning programs are questionable and the Army and
Air Force do not have reliable information on the inventory fill and
maintenance condition of some prepositioned stocks. For example, as
recently as February 2005, information contained in the Army's readiness
reporting system showed the maintenance condition of prepositioned
equipment in South Korea to be at a high level. However, during our work
we found that much of the Army's prepositioned combat equipment stored in
South Korea had not been properly maintained. Without reliable information
on requirements, inventory levels, and maintenance condition, DOD cannot
provide sufficient oversight over its programs, which potentially leaves
war fighters at risk of not having needed stocks in the future.

DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint doctrine
to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the heavy use
of prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department's

8 Pub. L. No. 103-62.

9 DOD Directive 3110.6, War Reserve Materiel Policy (Nov. 9,
2000-certified current as of Dec. 1, 2003).

plans to rely on them in the future. The 2005 National Defense Strategy
specifically notes the importance of prepositioning in the future and
indicates that prepositioning programs should be more innovative,
flexible, and joint in character, but provides few details on how it will
accomplish these goals. The independent Overseas Basing Commission
recently echoed the continued importance of the department's
prepositioning programs in the future. DOD officials told us that the
future of its prepositioning programs is unclear and dependent on the
outcome of several interrelated studies ongoing within the department,
especially reviews of mobility and an additional study being led within
the department on overseas presence and basing. In the absence of a
departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution10
and future plans for these programs, the military services have been
recapitalizing some stocks and developing future plans for their programs
without a clear understanding of how they will fit together to meet the
evolving defense strategy. This service-centric approach to prepositioning
is out of step with the department's goals of transforming the military to
be more joint and expeditionary, and potentially misses opportunities to
achieve greater efficiencies where service programs overlap in making
future investment decisions. For example, the Army and Air Force maintain
separate service-centric bare base programs, although the basic
capabilities of these programs are the same. Furthermore, the Navy and
Marine Corps are proposing multibillion dollar procurement programs to
support new concepts, such as sea basing, while the Defense Logistics
Agency is proposing floating depots to resupply troops in theater. Without
an overarching framework that establishes priorities for prepositioning
among competing initiatives and identifies the resources required to
implement the future programs, DOD cannot provide assurances to Congress
that the billions of dollars that will be required to recapitalize the
stocks and develop future programs will ultimately produce programs that
will operate jointly, support the needs of the war fighter, and are
affordable.

We are making several recommendations to address the risks of inventory
shortfalls and improve DOD's management and oversight of its
prepositioning programs. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD

10Reconstitution includes the costs to clean, inspect, maintain, replace,
and restore equipment to the required condition at the conclusion of a
contingency operation or unit deployment.

Background

partially or fully concurred with our recommendations and indicated that
it had initiated several actions to address our recommendations.

Prepositioning is an important part of DOD's overall strategic mobility
framework. It allows DOD to field combat-ready forces in days rather than
the weeks it would take if the forces and all necessary equipment and
supplies had to be brought from the United States to the location of the
conflict. The U.S. military can deliver equipment and supplies in three
ways: by air, by sea, or by prepositioning. While airlift is fast, it is
expensive to use and impractical for moving all of the material needed for
a large-scale deployment. Although ships can carry large loads, they are
slower than airlift. Prepositioning lessens the strain of using expensive
airlift and reduces the reliance on slower sealift deliveries. Concerned
about the reduction in U.S. forces overseas and their ability to move
forces in the time required to resolve potential conflicts quickly, the
services have expanded prepositioning programs ashore and on ships in
potential areas of conflict.

The military services have prepositioning programs to store combat or
support equipment and supplies near areas with a high potential for
conflict and to speed response times and reduce the strain on other
mobility assets. The Defense Logistics Agency prepositions food and bulk
fuel to support a range of contingency operations and training exercises.
The Special Operations Command relies on the military services to
preposition common support items for its forces, such as base support
items and vehicles.

The Army's program involves three primary categories of stocks: combat
brigade sets, operational projects, and war reserve sustainment stocks
stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships around the world. The
Marine Corps also prepositions equipment and supplies aboard
prepositioning ships and at land sites in Norway. The Navy's
prepositioning efforts are comparatively small, used mainly to support the
Marine Corps' prepositioning program and deploying forces. The Navy
prepositions equipment and supplies at land sites and aboard the maritime
prepositioning ships. The Air Force prepositions stocks of war reserve
equipment and supplies to meet initial contingency requirements and to
sustain early deploying forces. The Air Force's prepositioned war reserve
stocks include bare base sets; vehicles; munitions; and a variety of
consumable supplies, such as rations, fuel, support equipment, aircraft
accessories, and medical supplies. DOD's prepositioning programs are
briefly described in the table below.

Table 1: Description of DOD's Prepositioning Programs

Service Types of stocks Description

Army Combat brigade o    Stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning    
                                                 ships                        
             sets      o      Sets are designed to support 3,000 to 5,000     
                                               soldiers                       
                       o   Heavy weaponry such as tanks and Bradley fighting  
                                               vehicles                       
                       o   Support equipment such as trucks and High Mobility 
                                               Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles 
                       o  Spare parts and other sustainment stocks to support 
                                    the early stages of a conflict            

Sustainment  o  Stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships
stocks  o  Replacement equipment for losses in early stages of operations
or until resupply is established

o  Includes major end-items such as aircraft engines and tracked vehicles

o  	Secondary items such as meals, clothing, petroleum supplies,
construction materials, ammunition, medical materials, and repair parts

Operational  o  Stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships

project stocks  o  	Authorized material above unit authorizations designed
to support Army operations or contingencies

o  	Equipment and supplies for special operations forces, bare base sets,
petroleum and water distribution, mortuary operations, and prisoner-of-war
operations

Navy/Marine Maritime  o  Consists of 16 prepositioning ships organized
into three squadrons

Corps	prepositioning  o  Each squadron supports about 15,000 Marines for
up to 30 daysforce

o  	Includes combat systems, communications systems, construction
equipment, munitions, medical supplies, and sustainment stocks

Prepositioning  o  Several land sites located in central Norway

program-  o  Designed to support 13,000 Marines for up to 30 days

Norway  o  	Includes vehicles, weapons, munitions, rations, and other
equipment that will be used to support any geographic combatant command

Navy prepositioned assets  o  Assets are stored aboard maritime
prepositioning ships and at land sites

o  	Equipment to offload prepositioning ships, including material handling
equipment, ramps and barges, landing and amphibious craft, and bulk fuel

o  Construction equipment such as cranes, forklifts, trucks, and tractor
trailers

                                       a

o  Includes six 500-bed fleet hospitals Bare base sets  o  Base operating
support equipment used to house forces, and equipment and supplies
neededAir Force

                         to support airfield operations

Vehicles  o  Includes trucks, buses, and High Mobility Multi-purpose
Wheeled Vehicles

Other support  o  Includes materiel handling equipment, rations, fuel,
fuel support equipment, aircraft
equipment and accessories, and medical supplies at land sites and
munitions aboard four prepositioning ships
supplies

Source: GAO.

aThe Navy is in the process of transitioning from 500-bed fleet hospitals
to smaller modular units.

The military services preposition these stocks of equipment and supplies
at several land sites and aboard prepositioning ships around the world.
Most of the military services preposition equipment and supplies in
southwest Asia, the Pacific theater, Europe, and aboard prepositioning
ships. Figure 1 shows the locations of DOD's prepositioned stocks.

Figure 1: Locations of Army (USAR), Marine Corps (USMC), Navy (USN), and
Air Force (USAF) Prepositioned Stocks

Note: DOD also prepositions smaller stocks of equipment and supplies at
other locations not identified on this map.

  Inventory Shortfalls and Poor Equipment Condition Leave Many of DOD's
  Prepositioning Programs at Risk

DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale
conflict emerge due to inventory shortfalls and poor maintenance condition
of some of its prepositioned stocks. For example, the department has drawn
heavily on its prepositioned stocks to support ongoing operations in Iraq
and relatively little has been reconstituted. In addition, while remaining
stocks provide some residual capability, many have significant inventory
shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance problems. Combatant commanders
rely on prepositioned stocks being available and in good maintenance
condition; otherwise U.S. forces must bring needed stocks with them or
spend valuable time repairing equipment. Since these stocks are typically
used in the early stages of a conflict, it is important for DOD to
determine the operational risk associated with any shortfalls. Operation
Iraqi Freedom revealed significant issues with the status of prepositioned
stocks, such as shortages in spare parts and less-than-modern equipment.
The same problems continue to exist today in some programs.

    The Army Is Reporting Low Inventory Fill and Poor Maintenance Condition for
    Some Prepositioned Stocks

The Army is currently reporting low inventory fill for the combat brigade
sets, operational project stocks, and sustainment stocks that comprise its
prepositioning program, and some stocks not used in recent operations are
in poor maintenance condition. For example, the Army used much of the
equipment and supplies associated with the combat brigade sets stored at
land sites in Kuwait and Qatar and aboard prepositioning ships afloat near
Diego Garcia to support operations in Iraq. In addition, the Army used
some equipment from its other prepositioned stocks in Europe, South Korea,
and from other prepositioning ships located near Guam/Saipan.

The Army is also reporting low inventory fill for its operational projects
and sustainment stocks. The Army has a total of 14 operational projects
that contain equipment and supplies needed for unique mission
requirements, such as special operations forces, mortuary operations, and
prisoner handling. Sustainment stocks provide replacement equipment and
supplies, such as repair parts, petroleum items, and tracked vehicles,
until normal resupply channels are established. The Army is reporting
inventory fills for operational projects and sustainment stocks-
approximately 26 percent and 20 percent respectively-that are considerably
lower than the program requirements. Some of the Army's shortfalls have
been long-standing, however, including shortfalls in critical

areas like spare parts, and are not attributable to the war in Iraq. For
example, we reported in 2003 that DOD experienced equipment readiness
problems because of a lack of key spare parts.11 Table 2 provides an
overview of the inventory levels, maintenance condition, and operations
and maintenance funding of the Army's prepositioned stocks.

Table 2: Current Status and Operations and Maintenance Funding for Army
Prepositioned Stocks at Key Locations as of January 2005

                              Dollars in millions

                              Total funding fiscal

Location Current status years 2000-2005

Europe 	Low inventory fill, with limited combat $277.6 equipment,
operational projects, and other stocks stored at sites in Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Some stocks were taken out to support
operations in Iraq, while stocks from Italy were used to temporarily
refill the prepositioning ships now positioned near Diego Garcia.

Kuwait/Qatar 	Equipment in use in Iraq and storage $304.2 warehouses in
Qatar have been converted to become Central Command's regional
headquarters.

South Korea 	As of March 2005, the brigade set had most $245.9 of its
authorized equipment on hand, though a recent maintenance inspection
revealed maintenance deficiencies. The Army plans to correct the
maintenance problems with the set in September 2005, as well as
reconfigure it to be consistent with the Army's new modular configuration.

Afloat near Diego Two squadrons, each with a partial brigade $1,835.8
Garcia and set, are available.
Guam/Saipan

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Some stocks that were taken from prepositioned storage locations and used
during operations in Iraq are either still in use, or have experienced
extreme wear and tear. For example, the Army continues to use equipment
taken from prepositioned stocks to support its units in Iraq, delaying the
reconstitution and redistribution of the equipment. According to Army
officials, this equipment may not be returned to the prepositioned stocks

11 GAO, Defense Inventory: The Army Needs a Plan to Overcome Critical
Spare Parts Shortages, GAO-03-705 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003).

because the Army is giving priority to transforming its forces into more
deployable and expeditionary brigade-based formations and may use formerly
prepositioned equipment to fill additional equipment requirements
associated with the new formations. Importantly, this heavy stress on
equipment is a problem across much of the Army's equipment that has been
used in Iraq, not just the equipment taken from prepositioned stocks.

We also found that some other prepositioned stocks in storage were in poor
maintenance condition, even though they had not been used in Operation
Iraqi Freedom. For example, during a March 2005 visit to Camp Carroll,
South Korea, we found that some of the Army's prepositioned stocks at this
location were in poor maintenance condition and that much of the equipment
was overdue for periodic maintenance. Army officials confirmed that
required cyclic maintenance had not been performed on the equipment in the
brigade set, operational projects, and sustainment stocks for several
years. To address this, the Army has stepped up its maintenance efforts by
bringing in contractor support and setting up temporary maintenance
facilities to assist in repairing the equipment to standard. Moreover, as
shown in figure 2, certain stocks were stored outside and had been for
many years and corrosion was evident on some pieces of equipment.
Corrosion can significantly affect the readiness of prepositioned
equipment: DOD spends an estimated $20 billion each year to repair the
damage to military equipment and infrastructure caused by this problem. In
this regard, we have called for improvements to DOD's long-term corrosion
strategy, including better planning and establishment of a long-term
funding mechanism.12 Because of continuing concerns over corrosion, we are
currently conducting a congressionally directed review of its impact on
DOD's overall prepositioned assets.

12 See GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs
and Increase Readiness, GAO-03-753 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003), and
Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of DOD's
Long-Term Corrosion Strategy, GAO-04-640 (Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2004).

Figure 2: Sustainment Stocks Stored Outside at Camp Carroll, South Korea

Source: GAO.

The Army also maintains European prepositioning storage sites in Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. However, few stocks remain there
because they have been drawn out to support operations in other locations,
including Bosnia and Iraq. The mission in Europe has steadily declined
since the European drawdown of the early 1990s, and the remaining sites
are the last remnants of the Army's large-scale prepositioning program
developed during the Cold War. Army officials told us that they are
currently using the local national workforce at these locations to perform
other maintenance workloads, including fixing equipment from Iraq. In past
reports, we have recommended that the Army align its workforce and
facilities to meet the reduced post-Cold War mission in Europe.13
Officials told us that they have reduced infrastructure in response to our
recommendations, and are contemplating further reductions. In Italy,
however, the Army has requested about $55 million to construct new storage
and maintenance facilities that it has said will become the centerpiece of
its land prepositioning in the region. This region still receives
considerable funding, as shown in table 2. The Army

13 GAO, Army War Reserves: DOD Could Save Millions by Aligning Resources
With the

Reduced European Mission, GAO/NSIAD-97-158 (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
1997) and

Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be
Reassessed,

GAO/NSIAD-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 1998).

spent nearly $290 million during fiscal years 2000-2004, even though the
sites have had an uncertain mission and reduced stocks for much of that
time.

    The Marine Corps Is Reporting Low Inventory Fill for Some Prepositioned
    Stocks, While the Navy Reports Few Shortfalls

The Marine Corps has offloaded about 75 percent of the major end-items
stored on 5 of its 16 prepositioning ships to support combat operations in
Iraq. The remaining 11 prepositioning ships are reporting inventory fills
of 95 percent or greater and good maintenance condition for major
end-items and sustainment stocks. The Marine Corps also used some of its
prepositioned major end-items stored at several land sites in Norway to
support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and to fill shortfalls at
Marine Corps bases and on some of the prepositioning ships. As a result,
these sites are currently reporting an inventory fill of about 71 percent.

It is unclear when this equipment will be returned to prepositioned stocks
because, according to a Marine Corps official, a large portion of the
Marine Corps' equipment offloaded from prepositioning ships to support the
deployment of the I Marine Expeditionary Force to Iraq is currently being
kept in Iraq to support the rotation of the II Marine Expeditionary Force.
In a recent congressional testimony on the status of its military
equipment, a Marine Corps official reported that in addition to higher
usage rates, equipment is being used under extreme conditions which have
increased the maintenance requirements. For example, to date, more than
1,800 equipment items have been destroyed and an additional 2,300 damaged
equipment items will require depot maintenance.14

For the Norway stocks, the Marine Corps is in the process of updating the
requirements for its program there so that it will be capable of providing
a global response capability to any regional combatant commander. During
our September 2004 visit to the prepositioning sites in Norway, we
discussed this change in the scope of the program and Marine Corps
officials confirmed that the facilities in Norway can support any
combatant commander and the stocks are globally deployable via air, rail,
and sea. This shift in scope is in response to concerns about the
continued

14 Statement of the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations,
United States Marine Corps, before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House
Armed Services Committee, Concerning Requirements to Reconstitute Military
Equipment, April 6, 2005.

relevance of land stocks in Norway.15 According to Marine Corps officials,
however, these stocks are important to Norway, cost relatively little to
maintain (about $3.9 million in operational costs per year), are stored in
excellent facilities, and can be taken out to respond to crises as needed.

The Navy is reporting high inventory fill for its prepositioned assets.
According to Navy officials, most of its equipment used to offload the
maritime prepositioning ships was not used in direct combat and has not
required extensive reconstitution, and other equipment was available to
backfill the field hospitals and construction forces deployed to support
operations in Iraq.

    The Air Force Is Reporting Low Inventory Fill and Some Stocks in Poor
    Condition

The Air Force has used a considerable amount of its prepositioned
equipment and supplies to support combat operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq and, as a result, the inventory fill of many of these stocks is low.
For example, it used approximately 43 percent of the total number of its
prepositioned bare base sets to support Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom, and due to the extreme desert conditions, many of these
sets will have to be replaced. A U.S. Central Command, Air Forces,
official told us that the command is continuing to issue prepositioned
base operating support equipment and vehicles to forces that have been
deployed to the area of responsibility. While the Air Force is working on
refilling its prepositioned equipment and supplies, if a conflict arises
in the near term, these stocks may not be available for use as it is
unclear when these stocks will be refilled.

In addition, the Air Force is experiencing shortfalls in its inventory of
fuel bladders. These bladders are used to store fuel for Air Force
aircraft at austere operating locations. Air Force officials stated that
to support combat operations in Iraq, Central Command, Air Forces, has
used a considerable number of its prepositioned war reserve fuel bladders.
As combat operations continue, the Air Force is depleting its supply of
these bladders, and officials have characterized the impact of potential
shortfalls in these bladders as its "highest operational risk." At the
same time, the Air Force is undergoing an initiative to modernize its fuel
support equipment, including its fuel bladders. As part of this
initiative, the Air Force

15 Naval Audit Service: The Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Prepositioning Program, N2003-0079 (September 2003) and Final Report of
the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the
United States (Arlington, Va.: Aug. 15, 2005).

requested that Central Command, Air Forces, officials not purchase the
type of fuel bladders that had previously been used. To mitigate the risk,
the Air Force has allowed Central Command, Air Forces, to purchase some
replacement fuel bladders; however, it is unclear when its modernization
initiative will be fully implemented.

During our review, we were also told that some bare base sets that the Air
Force prepositions at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam are in poor
maintenance condition and are unusable. According to a Pacific Air Forces
official, the sets stored at Andersen Air Force Base have deteriorated due
to a lack of required maintenance. Air Force maintenance personnel are
responsible for the war reserve stocks prepositioned at this location as
an additional duty to the maintenance of operating stocks also stored at
the base. The official told us that the quality of maintenance performed
by Air Force personnel on the war reserve bare base sets has been a
longstanding problem at this location. Air Force officials told us that
bare base sets stored in Southwest Asia and South Korea did not have these
same maintenance problems because contractors have been hired to maintain
these sets.

When we discussed these issues with Air Force officials, they told us that
they believed they could overcome shortfalls and any maintenance problems
in the event of a conflict by using supplemental funding or crossleveling
equipment from other theaters. Additionally, Pacific Air Forces officials
told us that they would be able to obtain some vehicles from countries
where they will operate by using contracts already in place.

    Shortfalls in Inventory Fill Exist for Stocks Prepositioned to Support
    Special Operations Forces

The Army, Air Force, and Navy preposition common support equipment and
supplies for use by their special operations forces.16 However, the
services have traditionally underfunded these stocks and, as a result,
inventory shortfalls exist in most of these stocks. Lessons learned from
recent military operations in Iraq further highlighted the need for
special operations forces to have stocks of prepositioned equipment and
supplies to support these forces in multiple austere environments. Special
Operations Command officials told us that special operations forces are
often among the first units to deploy and, therefore, have a need to draw

16 Common support equipment and supplies include items adopted by a
military service for use by its own forces and their activities, including
standard issue military items, base support items, and the supplies and
services provided by the military service to support and sustain its own
forces.

prepositioned stocks. The department recognized this and recent guidance
issued by DOD directs the military services to fully fund inventory
shortfalls in these stocks of common items prepositioned to support
special operations forces.17 The military services have agreed to provide
funding for prepositioned stocks for special operations forces beginning
in fiscal year 2006.

    Shortfalls Create Some Operational Risks

Since prepositioned stocks are integral to the military's war plans,
shortfalls in these programs create risks that combatant commanders would
have to mitigate in the event of a new conflict. It could cost time or
manpower to fill shortages or fix equipment. Since these stocks are
typically used in the early stages of a conflict, it is important for DOD
to determine the operational risk associated with any shortfalls. The
military planners we spoke to told us that they would find a way to work
around the shortfalls, but offered little in the way of concrete plans.

Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed significant lessons for DOD's
prepositioning managers, especially in the Army, such as shortages in
spare parts and less-than-modern equipment. Prior to the onset of combat
operations in Iraq, the Army had significant shortages in its
prepositioned stocks, especially in spare parts. The Army overcame these
shortfalls by having the units that were drawing the prepositioned stocks
bring their own spare parts, in addition to obtaining spare parts from
nondeploying units.18 However, according to the Army's after-action
assessments of the war, the Army had shortages in these and other items,
including food, water, fuel, construction materials, and ammunition. The
available stocks of these supplies were insufficient to meet sustainment
requirements at the outset of the deployment and it took the supply chain
months to respond. At the time of our work, we found that many of the same
shortfalls that existed in the Army's program are still evident, and may
be getting worse. For example, as of mid-March 2005, the Army had only 21
percent of its authorized prepositioned repair parts on hand in South
Korea. According to Army officials, if a military conflict should arise
there,

17 Department of Defense, (U) Joint Programming Guidance for Fiscal Years
2006-2011, June 2004.

18 GAO, Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps
Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond, GAO-04-562T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2004).

their strategy to mitigate these shortfalls would be to cross-level
required parts from available sustainment stocks as needed.

Although the precise operational risks created by shortfalls in the Marine
Corps and Air Force's prepositioned stocks are difficult to assess,
officials from these services told us that these risks can be managed.
This is because the Marine Corps has kept about two-thirds of its
prepositioned combat capability available for potential contingencies and
that equipment is reported to be in good condition. Moreover, Air Force
officials stated that if a conflict arises, they will be able to fill
shortfalls and repair equipment as needed by using supplemental funding
and obtaining some vehicles and other stocks in other countries through
contracts already in place. Air Force officials stated, however, that this
presumes that they will have the time and necessary funding available to
address the shortfalls.

Combatant commanders rely on prepositioned stocks being available and in
good maintenance condition. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
combatant commander built up the required forces over a period of months,
and had time to overcome any inventory shortages in the prepositioned
stocks or resolve any maintenance issues with prepositioned equipment.
However, should a new conflict arise in the near term-especially one where
U.S. forces did not control the timing-the combatant commander would
likely face even more difficult operational challenges. During our visit
to South Korea, officials told us that their strategy to mitigate
maintenance issues with the Army's prepositioned stocks stored there,
should a conflict arise, would be to surge maintenance personnel as needed
to fix equipment, use arriving personnel to assist in maintenance
execution, and cross-level required parts from available sustainment
stocks. Officials acknowledged, however, that it could take longer than
planned to get the equipment ready in the event of a conflict.

Another factor making it difficult to assess the potential operational
risks is the lack of sound information available to assess and manage
DOD's prepositioning programs. Such programs need valid inventory
requirements that meet the needs of the war fighters, and reliable
information about inventory levels and maintenance condition for those
requirements. These long-standing management problems are discussed in the
next section of this report.

  DOD and Some of the Military Services Have Provided Insufficient Oversight
  Over Their Prepositioning Programs

Oversight over prepositioning programs by DOD and the military services
has been insufficient, despite the importance of prepositioning to the
military. This inattention has allowed long-standing problems to linger.
Management principles, such as those embraced in the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993,19 provide federal agencies a
framework for effectively implementing and managing programs. Management
principles include sufficient information to support sound decision making
and enable Congress to provide proper oversight. However, DOD has not
adhered to its directive on war reserve materiel policy that could provide
oversight over its prepositioning programs. In addition, service oversight
has been inadequate, particularly in the Army's processes for determining
requirements and the Army and Air Force processes for assessing inventory
shortfalls and maintenance condition. This limited oversight unnecessarily
leaves the programs at risk of being unavailable when required and lacking
the right mix of equipment and supplies to support the war fighter.

    Oversight Has Been Insufficient

The overarching departmental guidance is contained in DOD directive
3110.6, updated in December 2003, which provides policy guidance on the
department's war reserve materiel program and assigns oversight and
accountability responsibilities within the department. The secretaries of
the military departments, directors of defense agencies, and the combatant
commands are responsible for setting program requirements and the Defense
Logistics Agency has responsibility for storage and distribution of the
stocks. At the department level, their responsibilities are as follows:

o  	The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics is required to assess the adequacy of war reserve stocks
annually.

o  	The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is required to provide
planning guidance that includes war reserve requirements.

o  	The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to validate the
operational requirements of the geographic combatant commands.

A provision of the directive related to oversight states that the
department is to assess the adequacy of its war reserve stocks. In order
to assess adequacy, the directive requires the secretaries of the military
departments and the directors of defense agencies to submit annual reports
on war reserve materiel levels to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition,

19 Pub. L. No. 103-62.

Technology, and Logistics within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Officials within the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain
Integration told us that this oversight responsibility had been delegated
to their office. However, the directive has not been implemented and,
therefore, the reporting requirement contained in the directive has not
been enforced. Neither the services nor the Under Secretary's office could
provide us with copies of these reports. Officials told us that they had
suspended this reporting requirement in 2002; however, the directive had
been updated in late 2003 and the reporting requirement was maintained.
Officials also stated that although they had been given responsibility for
implementing the oversight provisions of the directive, since their office
primarily deals with only sustainment issues, they did not have sufficient
authority or personnel to meet the requirements stated by the directive,
specifically to assess the adequacy of the services' prepositioning
programs.

Officials further told us they did not believe the reporting requirement
in the directive was necessary because they were able to provide adequate
oversight of the department's prepositioning programs through other
mechanisms, such as reviewing the services' budget submissions and
quarterly readiness assessments. Quarterly readiness reviews and
integrated priority list submissions allow the combatant commanders and
others to identify issues that have reached critical thresholds that may
limit war-fighting capabilities. These assessments, some of which have
included issues related to prepositioned stocks, are briefed to DOD's
senior leadership and may be included in a legislatively mandated
quarterly readiness report to Congress. However, we have previously
reported that these reports provide a vague and broad description of
readiness problems and, therefore, are not effective as an oversight
tool.20 Furthermore, officials at one combatant command told us that these
assessments do not provide a sufficient mechanism to determine the
inventory readiness of stocks prepositioned in their area of
responsibility. Also, a DOD official told us that they review the budget
submissions from the military services and approve how much the services
allocate to their prepositioning programs. In our view, while such
mechanisms provide the department with important information on gaps in
capabilities and

20 GAO, Military Readiness: Reports to Congress Provide Few Details on
Deficiencies and Solutions, GAO/NSIAD-98-68 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30,
1998) and Military Readiness: New Reporting System Is Intended to Address
Longstanding Problems, but Better Planning is Needed, GAO-03-456
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).

resource allocation, they do not constitute sufficient, sustained program
oversight.

Such oversight problems have existed for years and several prior reports
have cited the lack of centralized oversight and direction in the
department's prepositioning programs, particularly in the Army. For
example, the Institute for Defense Analyses concluded in a 1997 report
that the military services do not coordinate their war reserve planning
among themselves or with the combatant commanders. The report specifically
called on the Army to reinvent the entire war reserve process, and work
with the unified combatant commands and other Army commands to build
credible requirements and better planning factors. The Army Materiel
Command Inspector General also reported in 2001 that the Army and the
combatant commands had not uncovered, mitigated, or elevated issues about
the readiness of the Army's prepositioning programs to the department
level. Further, the report stated that the lack of centralized oversight
fostered inefficiencies and impacted the effectiveness of the Army's
prepositioning program.

    Lack of Valid Requirements and Insufficient Information Makes Oversight
    Difficult

Questionable Requirements

The Army does not have sound requirements for some of its prepositioning
programs and both the Army and Air Force do not have sufficient
information about inventory levels and maintenance condition, making
oversight difficult. Without valid requirements underpinning the services'
prepositioning programs, it is impossible to reliably assess the impact of
reported shortfalls or equipment in poor maintenance condition. As a
result, the services cannot assess the overall readiness of their
prepositioning programs, which potentially leaves war fighters at risk of
not having needed stocks in the future. In addition, assessing the
readiness of prepositioned stocks requires reliable information about
inventory levels and maintenance condition. Inventory levels are measured
against requirements set by the services, while maintenance condition
describes whether on-hand items work well enough to perform their mission.
Because prepositioned stocks are intended to be used in the early stages
of a conflict, the stocks need to be completely filled and in working
order. Otherwise, the purpose of prepositioning is likely defeated. Such
problems with questionable requirements and insufficient information are
longstanding, and make it difficult for the services and the department to
assess readiness, provide oversight, and support sound decision making
about where to make program investments.

During our review, we found that the requirements underpinning some of the
Army's prepositioning programs are questionable, which may make the

impact of shortfalls difficult to assess. Specifically, Army officials
told us that the war reserve information system used to calculate the
requirements for some sustainment stocks had not been successfully updated
since 1999, although Army officials told us that they are required to
compute these requirements on an annual basis.21 While the Army is
planning on recalculating these requirements by the end of 2005, it is
currently unclear what the requirements for these stocks should be. As a
result, program managers cannot be sure what to buy because they do not
know if inventory shortfalls are valid. We reported on the operational
impacts of this problem in our March 2004 testimony on prepositioned
stocks used during Operation Iraqi Freedom.22 Additionally, in our April
2005 report, we found that because the process used to determine
requirements for Army war reserve spare parts had not been updated, the
war reserve inventories for some spare parts were inadequate in Operation
Iraqi Freedom and could not meet initial wartime demands.23 In addition,
inaccurate and inadequately funded Army war reserve requirements
contributed to shortages in other items, such as track shoes for Abrams
tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles and lithium batteries.

Additionally, we identified problems with DOD's process for establishing
requirements for prepositioned munitions. For example, during our visit to
U.S. Forces Korea, officials told us that the command is not afforded the
opportunity to proactively participate in the determination of either
total munitions requirements or, more specifically, prepositioned
munitions requirements. In October 2002, we reported that DOD's munitions
requirements determination process did not fully consider the combatant
commander's preferences for munitions and weapon systems that will be used
against targets identified in projected scenarios.24 We recommended that
the Secretary of Defense establish a direct link between the munitions
needs of the combatant commands and the munitions requirements
determinations and purchasing decisions made by the military services. In

21 The Army uses the Army War Reserve Automated Process to determine its
requirements for spare parts in the war reserve.

22 GAO, Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps
Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond, GAO-04-562T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2004).

23 GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of
Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

24 GAO, Defense Management: Munitions Requirements and Combatant
Commander's Needs Require Linkage, GAO-03-17 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15,
2002).

                             Unreliable Information

October 2003, DOD issued instruction 3000.4, which required that the
munitions requirements developed by each of the military services address
the operational objectives of the combatant commanders against potential
threats. In addition, it directed the military services to work directly
with the military service component and the combatant commands to develop
near- and out-year munitions requirements. Finally, it directed combatant
commanders to review the military services' generated munitions
requirements and report any issues needing resolution during the planning
and programming process. We found that these requirements are not being
met. Only the Air Force visits the command prior to developing total
munitions requirements to support purchasing decisions. The other services
do not coordinate with the command prior to generating munitions
requirements. Further, U.S. Forces, Korea, officials told us that they do
not have the opportunity to review the service-generated munitions
requirements prior to purchasing decisions and have no input to what
munitions will be prepositioned or where those munitions will be located.
While officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff
expressed skepticism about the way U.S. Forces, Korea, had developed their
munitions requirements, they agreed that the proper coordination was not
occurring. As a result, the needed linkage between the combatant command's
needs and the munitions purchases made by the services continues to be
inadequate and raises questions as to whether combatant commands will have
what they need should a conflict arise.

We also found that the Army and Air Force lack reliable information on the
inventory fill and maintenance condition for some prepositioned stocks.
The lack of reliable inventory information may provide program managers
with an unrealistic view on the preparedness of these programs.

o  	Army officials told us that its information management system does not
provide reliable information on the inventory levels and maintenance
condition of its operational projects and sustainment stocks. Army
managers told us that this lack of inventory visibility has persisted for
many years, and sometimes the only way to get reliable information is to
contact the storage site directly.

o  	As recently as February 2005, the Army reported in the unclassified
inventory information that it extracts from its main readiness reporting
system25 that a high percentage of the combat brigade set prepositioned in

25 The Army's Status of Resources and Training System is the counterpart
to the Global Status of Resources and Training System, which is an
automated system that assesses the extent to which military units possess
the required resources and training to undertake their wartime missions.

South Korea was fully mission capable. However, in an October 2004 Army
assessment, inspectors had found that a high percentage of the equipment
reviewed was not mission capable.

o  Air Force officials also told us that they do not have adequate
information

Problems with Requirements and Reliability of Information Have Been
Long-standing, but Remain Unresolved

available to assess the overall readiness of their prepositioned stocks.
While this information is decentralized and available in some cases to
base and component commanders, information on inventory levels and
maintenance condition is not available to Air Force managers overseeing
the war reserve materiel program. Air Combat Command and Central Command,
Air Forces, officials told us that in order to obtain information on the
readiness of most prepositioned stocks, they had to contact the storage
locations since this information is not readily available to them. Pacific
Air Forces officials told us that they developed their own automated
system to track the inventory levels and maintenance condition of the war
reserve materiel prepositioned in their area of responsibility because the
Air Force lacked a comprehensive system that provides reliable and timely
readiness information on its war reserve program.

The problems we found during our review with requirements determination
and reliability of inventory information are not new. Our review of past
reports going back to 1995 revealed that similar issues have been reported
repeatedly, but have not been resolved. The findings from several past
studies are described below, and appendix I provides a more comprehensive
summary of the major findings from more than 30 past reports by us and the
department's own studies.

Inventory management issues, and more recently supply chain management,
have been considered high-risk areas by us since 1990. Specific to the
prepositioning programs, we have previously reported numerous times on
long-standing management problems. For example, we reported in our last
review of prepositioning programs in 1998 that the Army and Air Force had
poorly defined, outdated, and otherwise questionable requirements in their
programs.26 Our 1998 report also noted that it was difficult for DOD to
assess the readiness of its prepositioned stocks and the impact of any
shortfalls due to the poor information the services used to manage these
programs. We also reported in 2001 that, among other things, a potential
mismatch existed between the Army's methodology for determining spare
parts requirements and the Army's

26 GAO, Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be
Reassessed, GAO/NSIAD-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 1998).

anticipated battlefield needs.27 And more recently, we reported in January
2005 that DOD does not have the ability to provide timely or accurate
information on the location, movement, status, or identity of its supplies
due to long-standing data accuracy and reliability problems within
existing inventory management systems.28

The department's own auditors and an Army command have also been sharply
critical of program management, especially how program requirements have
been determined. For example, the Army Materiel Command reported in 2003
that the requirements computation for war reserve stocks and stockage
lists for prepositioned stocks did not accurately portray what was needed
for Operation Iraqi Freedom. These stockage lists did not contain the most
critical items needed to sustain combat equipment during the operation.29
In addition, the Army Audit Agency reported in 2004 that Army program
managers had not reviewed the requirements for many of the operational
projects it examined. As a result, some operational projects contained
inaccurate, overstated, or questionable requirements. Of $1.5 billion in
requirements examined, about $727 million were valid, $472 million were
invalid, and about $280 million were questionable.30 In addition, the Air
Force Audit Agency reported in May 2003 that Air Force personnel did not
properly segregate certain war reserve requirements from peacetime
operating spare parts requirements, resulting in more than $118.8 million
of overstated requirements for peacetime.31

Past reports have also revealed problems with the reliability of inventory
information. In 2001, Army auditors reported that the lack of reliable
data on operational projects and sustainment stocks impeded the overall
readiness capability of the Army's prepositioning program. In addition,
the Army reported that there was a general lack of confidence in the

27 GAO, Defense Inventory: Army War Reserve Spare Parts Requirements Are
Uncertain, GAO-01-425 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001).

28GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).

29 U.S. Army Materiel Command, Iraq Lessons Learned Conference (Redstone
Arsenal, Ala.: Sept. 10-11, 2003).

30 Army Audit Agency, Operational Project Stocks Phase II, Report
A-2004-0108-AML (Alexandria, Va.: Feb. 12, 2004).

31 Air Force Audit Agency, Other War Reserve Materiel, F2003-0010-FC4000
(Washington, D.C.: May 2003).

information management system used to provide information on inventory
levels.32 More recently, the Army Materiel Command's 2003 report on
lessons learned in Iraq also found that different automated systems
provided different inventory levels at the same storage location during
operations in Iraq.33 Similarly, a June 2004 CNA Corporation after-action
report on the Marine Corps' prepositioning program in Operation Iraqi
Freedom found that the Marine Corps did not have reliable information on
the status of some prepositioned equipment used to support operations in
Iraq.34 Specifically, due to a lack of automated tracking systems, the
Marine Corps had to use manual methods for tracking equipment with hand
counts and written reports. As a result, Marine Corps commanders did not
have clear and accurate tools for determining where cargo was in the
pipeline, and more importantly, forecasting when equipment would arrive
and when integration would be complete.

  DOD Lacks A Plan To Coordinate Future Prepositioning Programs

DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint doctrine
to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the heavy use
of prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department's plans to
rely on them in the future. The 2005 National Defense Strategy
specifically notes the importance of prepositioning in the future and
indicates that prepositioning programs should be more innovative,
flexible, and joint in character, but provides few details on how DOD
plans to accomplish these goals. In addition, the independent Overseas
Basing Commission recently echoed the continued importance of the
department's prepositioning programs in the future. In the absence of a
departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution and
future plans for these programs, the military services have been
recapitalizing some stocks and developing future plans for their programs
without a clear understanding of how they will fit together to meet the
evolving defense strategy. Without an overarching framework that
establishes priorities for prepositioning among competing initiatives and
identifies the resources required to implement the future programs, DOD

32 U.S. Army Materiel Command Inspector General, Systematic Inspection of
the Material Condition of Army War Reserve Sustainment Stocks (Ft.
Belvoir, Va.: August 2001).

33 U.S. Army Materiel Command, Iraq Lessons Learned Conference (Redstone
Arsenal, Ala.: Sept. 10-11, 2003).

34 CNA Corporation, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Maritime Prepositioning
Force (MPF) Reconstitution, Regeneration, and Reembarkation Operations:
Summary Findings (Alexandria, Va.: June 2004).

cannot provide assurances to Congress that the billions of dollars that
will be required to recapitalize the stocks and develop future programs
will ultimately produce programs that will operate jointly, support the
needs of the war fighter, and are affordable.

    National Defense Strategy and Overseas Basing Report Indicate a Reliance on
    Prepositioning in the Future

The most recent National Defense Strategy published in March 2005 states
that to strengthen DOD's capability for prompt global action and
flexibility to employ military forces where needed, prepositioned stocks
"will be better configured and positioned for global employment."35 This
overarching defense strategy establishes key goals for the future of
defense capabilities such as the prepositioning of support materiel and
combat capabilities in critical regions of the world and along key
transportation routes, and a greater reliance on joint prepositioning
capabilities that will be in accordance with other aspects of
transformation. However, while such goals confirm that prepositioning will
continue to play a key role in the evolving military strategy,36 the
National Defense Strategy provides no specific details on how the
department and the military services will accomplish them.

In addition, the recently released report of the Overseas Basing
Commission states that where DOD puts prepositioned stocks, what they are
comprised of, and how they are maintained is central to the department's
operational capability.37 The report states that prepositioning is
"imperative" for quick response of U.S. forces in areas of the world where
access may be difficult, and calls for tight integration of service
concepts, doctrines, and plans as a first step in ensuring the
sustainability of prepositioning. Importantly, the Commission recommends
that given the centrality of these stocks to the operational capability of
U.S. forces, their high costs, and their anticipated heavy use over time,
Congress should periodically review the status of prepositioned stocks.

35 DOD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America
(March 2005).

36 Recent changes in DOD's defense posture have shifted the department's
focus from being capable of winning two major theater wars to including
having the capabilities needed to (1) defend the United States, (2) deter
aggression and coercion in four critical regions, (3) swiftly defeat
aggression in overlapping major conflicts, and (4) preserve the option to
win decisively in one conflict.

37 Final report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility
Structure of the United States (Arlington, Va.: August 15, 2005).

    DOD Has Not Developed a Plan or Joint Doctrine for Its Prepositioning
    Programs

While it seems certain that DOD will continue to rely on prepositioning in
the future, it is unclear how prepositioning will fit into its future
plans since DOD currently has no department-level prepositioning plan that
provides specific details on how the department and the military services
will work together to plan the future of their prepositioning programs or
joint doctrine for its prepositioning programs. DOD officials told us that
the future of its prepositioning programs has not yet been determined, in
part because the future is dependent on the outcome of several
interrelated studies ongoing within the department. For example, DOD is
currently reviewing the mobility capabilities required to meet the full
range of mobility needs for all aspects of the national defense strategy.
According to DOD officials, the recommendations from this study will
likely have a significant impact on the services' prepositioning programs
since requirements for prepositioning are being factored into the mobility
deliberations. In addition, in March 2003, the Secretary of Defense
requested that the department develop a comprehensive and integrated
presence and basing strategy for the next 10 years. This strategy will
build upon multiple DOD studies and will use information from the
combatant commanders to determine the appropriate location of the basing
and associated infrastructure necessary to execute the U.S. defense
strategy. DOD officials told us that the basing study will also likely
have an impact on prepositioning as the services will need to determine
where to preposition their stocks to support the new defense strategy.
Although some preliminary results have been released, DOD officials stated
that once these studies are completed, they will have a better
understanding of how prepositioning will be able to support the war
fighter.

Similarly, DOD has not developed joint doctrine to guide the planning and
employment of its prepositioning programs. DOD defines joint doctrine as
the fundamental military principles that guide the employment of forces of
two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective.
DOD's transformation guidance states that part of the department's
transformation efforts is developing concepts to operate in a joint
environment, and placing a continuing emphasis on the importance of
expeditionary operations.38 DOD has published joint doctrine in a number
of areas, including deployment and redeployment operations, multinational
operations, and military operations other than war. However, in the
absence of a departmentwide plan and joint doctrine for prepositioning,
the military services currently plan and implement

38 DOD, DOD Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington, D.C.: April
2003).

separate programs in an independent, service-centric manner. A
servicecentric approach to prepositioning potentially misses opportunities
to achieve greater efficiencies where service programs overlap. In a 2003
Joint Staff-sponsored study on strategies for prepositioning, the
Logistics Management Institute found that the military services continue
to program for prepositioning materiel to meet individual service rather
than joint requirements. As a result, the services may overstate
operational requirements and put unnecessary burdens on limited
transportation assets that would be required to move these prepositioned
assets from their storage locations to the operational sites.39 For
example, although the Army and Air Force have separate bare base programs,
there is a lack of commonality among the design and components of these
programs even though basic capabilities are the same.40 Moreover, this
service-centric approach to prepositioning is out of step with DOD's
transformation guidance, which states that developing concepts to operate
in a joint environment and a continuing emphasis on the importance of
expeditionary operations is key to the department's transformation
efforts.41

    Reconstitution Likely to Be Delayed Due to Ongoing Operations, but Delay
    Offers DOD Opportunities to Set Clear Direction for Programs

Clearly prepositioning figures prominently in the department's future
plans, but the services do not have precise estimates of the costs and
time required to reconstitute their prepositioned stocks since the
services continue to use these stocks in Afghanistan and Iraq. In a recent
report to Congress, DOD estimated that the costs to reconstitute the Army
and Marine Corps' prepositioned equipment will be between $4 billion and
$5 billion.42 The report acknowledges, however, that these estimates may
change depending on several factors, including the length of time the
equipment is in use, the number of combat losses, and any changes in the
future plans for its prepositioning programs. However, most of the costs
required to reconstitute and recapitalize the Army and Marine Corps'

39 Logistics Management Institute, Strategies for Worldwide Prepositioning
(McLean, Va.: August 2003).

40 Science Applications International Corporation, Bare Base Assets Study
(McLean, Va.: Aug. 31, 2004).

41 DOD Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003; Air Force
Transformation Flight Plan, November 2003.

42 DOD, Ground Force Equipment Repair, Replacement, and Recapitalization
Requirements Resulting From Sustained Combat Operations (Washington, D.C.:
April 2005).

prepositioned stocks have not been budgeted for in the department's
baseline submissions or supplemental funding requests. In the absence of a
departmentwide plan that coordinates the reconstitution of these programs
with the future plans of the department's prepositioning programs, the
services are developing plans to reconstitute and recapitalize their
prepositioned stocks without a clear understanding of how the future of
these programs will fit together in support of the evolving defense
strategy.

According to Army officials, plans to reconstitute the equipment and
return it to the combat brigade sets are uncertain because, in some cases,
Army units are continuing to use prepositioned stocks to support
operations in Iraq instead of bringing their own equipment. In addition,
the Army is placing a higher priority for its resources on supporting
ongoing operations and on its modular conversion initiative-restructuring
its forces to make them more flexible and rapidly deployable. As a result
of this initiative, the Army is planning to use combat equipment that was
part of the prepositioned brigade sets to meet the increased equipment
requirements. For example, over 11,000 pieces of prepositioned combat
equipment used in Iraq-such as tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and
armored personnel carriers-are slated to be repaired and turned over to
active duty units. Furthermore, Army officials told us that decisions have
not been made as to whether the sustainment and operational project stocks
will be reconstituted because of the large investments required and the
uncertainty of the future plans for the Army's prepositioning program.
DOD's recent report to Congress estimates the costs to reset and
reconfigure the Army's prepositioned stocks to be more than $4 billion.
According to the report, however, these costs are not currently captured
in DOD's baseline submissions or in any of its supplemental funding
requests.

The Marine Corps' prepositioning programs are expected to have a reduced
capability until 2008, at least. The department's April 2005 report to
Congress estimates the cost to reconstitute the Marine Corps'
prepositioned equipment is approximately $490 million. Of this amount,
about half ($247 million) was requested in the department's most recent
supplemental request. In the past year, the Marine Corps considered its
options to reconstitute the equipment stored aboard the prepositioning
ships given its continuing commitment to support operations in Iraq. The
Marine Corps recently decided to partially refill the five ships offloaded
to support operations in Iraq; however, due to the limited availability
within the Marine Corps of equipment needed, such as heavy cargo trucks
and High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles, the Marine Corps
forecasts

that these ships will have major end-item fill rates of less than 50
percent. Additionally, Marine Corps officials stated that the
reconstitution of the stocks in Norway is scheduled to be completed by
2008, at which time the fill rate of these stocks is projected to be
approximately 88 percent.

Air Force officials stated that they do not know when they will be able to
reconstitute prepositioned stocks and return them to storage. As part of
its reconstitution effort, the Air Force is in the process of replacing or
converting all of its existing bare base sets into a smaller and more
modular configuration.43 However, it is uncertain when the new sets will
be available. For example, the Air Force had budgeted approximately $320
million in fiscal year 2005 for procurement of the new bare base sets.
However, according to an Air Force official, Congress reduced the Air
Force's budget by $53 million because it was concerned about the large
increase in the Air Force's procurement budget for that year. As a result,
the official stated that the Air Force will not be able to procure all of
the required sets. In addition, Air Force officials told us that they do
not know when reconstitution for other categories of prepositioned stocks
will be completed since much of this equipment is still in use.

    Without a Plan and Joint Doctrine, the Military Services and Defense
    Logistics Agency's Prepositioning Plans Are Uncoordinated

Each of the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency are
planning the future of their prepositioning programs without the benefit
of an overall plan or joint doctrine to coordinate their efforts. Thus, it
is unclear to us how the programs will fit together to meet the evolving
defense strategy. DOD officials representing the Joint Staff and the
services shared our assessment and concerns. And, according to these
officials, the Joint Staff has formed a working group that is focused on
establishing common definitions for prepositioning as a first step in
developing joint doctrine and setting a future plan for the department's
prepositioning programs.

The future of the Army's prepositioning program, the largest of DOD's
programs, is still unclear, and the Army acknowledges that it faces

43 Formerly known as Harvest Eagle and Harvest Falcon, the new bare base
sets are called Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR). Rather than
deploying all of the assets that are part of the larger Harvest Eagle and
Harvest Falcon sets, the Air Force established a more tailored basing
capability. This tiered approach establishes a new 150-person set and
replaces the Harvest Eagle/Falcon sets with 550-person initial and
550-person followon sets. The plan for deployment is for the 150-person
set to support the forces that open the airbase, followed by a 550-person
initial set to establish the airbase. The 550-person follow-on sets would
then be set up as the base capability expands, on an as-needed basis.

continuing funding challenges as it attempts to modernize, support ongoing
combat operations, and reconstitute its prepositioned equipment, leaving
the future direction of its prepositioning program uncertain. The Army has
a major effort ongoing to transform its units into more flexible, rapidly
deployable forces at the same time it is supporting ongoing combat
operations. The Army's future prepositioning strategy was being revised
during our review, so we could not assess how this overall
transformation-commonly called "modularity" by the Army-will affect the
prepositioning program. In addition, the Army's prepositioned stocks will
have to be reconstituted due to their heavy use in Operation Iraqi
Freedom. According to Army officials, however, the Army is nearing
completion on a new strategy for its prepositioning programs. They told us
that prepositioning will continue to be important in the future and that
the prepositioned sets would be converted to the "modular" configuration
by 2012 or sooner.

While the Marine Corps and Navy have identified concepts for future
prepositioning programs, they have not developed firm schedules and cost
estimates for these programs. For example, the Marine Corps is planning on
changing the focus of its prepositioned stocks in Norway from their Cold
War configuration to a more global support capability. Additionally, the
Marine Corps is considering a fundamental change to the future of its
prepositioning program that would replace existing Maritime Prepositioning
Force ships with an undetermined number of new ships with a wider range of
capabilities. These ships are intended to be an integral part of a future
Navy sea base. The seabasing concept provides maritime platforms capable
of supporting at-sea arrival of forces, assembly of those forces, rapid
movement ashore, and combat sustainment without reliance on shore
facilities. While such seabasing is envisioned by DOD to be a joint
service capability, it is not clear how this will be accomplished.
Furthermore, the affordability of the program is in question-this new
concept could cost billions of dollars.44

The Defense Logistics Agency began developing a global stock positioning
strategy in 2004 to support its overseas customers for the items it

44 Issues of joint service participation and affordability are discussed
in more detail in two reports: Congressional Budget Office, The Future of
the Navy's Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces (Washington,
D.C.: November 2004) and Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship
Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2004).

manages. The strategy involves a combination of fixed-forward depots, a
floating distribution center, and a deployable distribution depot.
Fixedforward stocking depots have been established at the following
locations: Germersheim, Germany; Yokosuka, Japan; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii;
Sigonella, Italy; Kuwait; Guam; and South Korea. The floating distribution
center involves a mobile floating depot which will be capable of providing
immediate distribution within the first 30 days of a contingency and could
operate as part of the seabasing concept. The deployable distribution
depot will be able to provide a full range of distribution capabilities in
a theater of operations early in a contingency in developed or remote
operating areas. These last two capabilities are still being developed and
the Defense Logistics Agency does not yet have firm estimates for the
costs of these capabilities.

The Air Force is also planning changes for its prepositioning programs. It
is transforming its bare base sets into a smaller, more modular
configuration and is considering new prepositioning sites to support the
new defense strategy. However, Air Force officials told us that it cannot
make some decisions related to new storage sites for its prepositioned
stocks until DOD's basing study is complete.

Without a plan or joint doctrine to guide their efforts, the services are
planning for the future of their programs without an overarching framework
that establishes priorities for prepositioning among competing
initiatives, develops performance goals to measure success, and identifies
resources to implement plans. Until the department determines how
prepositioning fits into future military plans, it cannot provide
assurances to Congress that the substantial investments required to
recapitalize the stocks will be affordable.

Conclusions 	Prepositioning seems certain to be a key component of U.S.
military strategy for years to come, but the department must make it a
priority for it to overcome past management problems and ensure its
future. In the near term, operational risks may exist should other
military contingencies arise given the current inventory shortfalls and
poor maintenance condition of some prepositioned stocks. However, the
department has not developed concrete plans to overcome these challenges,
even though inventory shortfalls and maintenance issues exist in the
prepositioned stocks in potential trouble spots such as South Korea.

Despite the importance of prepositioning to the military, however,
longstanding management problems persist and the programs seem to have

received little attention at the department level. Oversight mechanisms
are in place, but they have been ineffective or ignored. Leadership and
accountability begin at the top. Until DOD fully implements its own
directive on war reserve materiel, oversight of its prepositioning
programs will likely continue to be inadequate and the department will be
unable to assess risks associated with any shortfalls in the programs.
Moreover, DOD lacks reliable information in regard to its prepositioning
programs and will be unable to make reliable assessments of the readiness
of these programs. This could result in failure to obtain the right amount
and types of equipment for the designated prepositioning locations, which
could ultimately jeopardize the ability of U.S. forces to accomplish their
warfighting missions and leave them at risk.

Congress is also concerned about these issues and directed the Secretary
of Defense to submit a report on its prepositioning plans by October 1,
2005. Looking toward the future, without a coordinated plan and joint
doctrine that identifies the role of prepositioning in the transformed
military, the department cannot plan the future of its programs in a
comprehensive manner. As a result, DOD cannot provide assurance to
Congress that its prepositioning programs will be coordinated, effective,
and affordable.

Taking all these problems together-and considering them against the
backdrop of growing operational and fiscal strains on the military-we
believe the future of the prepositioning programs are at risk. Unless the
department addresses long-standing management issues and sets a clear plan
for the future, the department and Congress cannot make informed decisions
about the significant investments needed to reconstitute or recapitalize
the stocks.

Recommendations for To address the risks and management challenges facing
the department's prepositioning programs and improve oversight, we
recommend that the Executive Action Secretary of Defense take the
following five actions:

o  	Direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to assess the near-term
operational risks associated with current inventory shortfalls and
equipment in poor condition should a conflict arise.

o  	Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to provide oversight over the department's prepositioning
programs by fully implementing the department's directive on war reserve
materiel and, if necessary, revise the directive to clarify the lines of
accountability for this oversight.

o  	Direct the Secretary of the Army to improve the processes used to
determine requirements and direct the Secretary of the Army and Air Force
to improve the processes used to determine the reliability of inventory
data so that the readiness of their prepositioning programs can be
reliably assessed and proper oversight over the programs can be
accomplished.

o  	Develop a coordinated departmentwide plan and joint doctrine for the
department's prepositioning programs that identifies the role of
prepositioning in the transformed military and ensures these programs will
operate jointly, support the needs of the war fighter, and are affordable.

o  Report to Congress, possibly as part of the mandated October 2005
report,

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

how the department plans to manage the near-term operational risks created
by inventory shortfalls and management and oversight issues described in
this report.

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments
are reprinted in appendix III. DOD partially or fully concurred with our
recommendations. However, in its response, DOD disagreed with the
implementation of two of our recommendations because it had already taken
actions to address them. In subsequent discussions with DOD, officials
indicated that this disagreement was not related to the substance of our
recommendations. In fact, the department has already initiated several
actions to address our recommendations including conducting an assessment
of risk, improving requirements and inventory visibility, and conducting a
departmental assessment on future prepositioning. Further, DOD agreed that
oversight policy as discussed in its directive does not reflect
appropriate oversight roles and responsibilities. To address this issue,
DOD plans to clarify policy and roles and responsibilities for oversight.
With respect to our recommendation to improve requirements determination
and the reliability of inventory data, the initial efforts taken by the
Army and Air Force represent progress, but the planned actions should
address all categories of the Army and Air Force's prepositioned stocks,
as discussed in our report, and not just a portion of these programs. For
example, the planned actions should also include the Army's operational
project stocks and the Air Force's vehicle stocks, among others. Overall,
we acknowledge the actions already taken by the department to address
these issues, but DOD will need sustained management focus to resolve
these deeply rooted and long-standing problems.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the
date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air
Force, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at
http://www.gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.

If you or your staffs have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512
8365. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

William M. Solis, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD Inventory Management and
Prepositioning Challenges

The Department of Defense's (DOD) prepositioning programs have faced
long-standing challenges including poor asset visibility; equipment
excesses and shortfalls; and invalid, inaccurate, poorly defined, and
otherwise questionable requirements. GAO, military service auditors, DOD's
Inspector General, and others have called attention to these problems in
products issued over the years. In 1990, we identified DOD's inventory
management as high risk because inventory levels were too high and the
supply system was not responsive to the needs of the war fighters.1 With
the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, other supply chain issues related to
inventory management have been reported as impediments. In a January 2005
update, we expanded this high-risk area to include DOD's management of its
entire supply chain, which includes distribution, inventory management,
and asset visibility.

Table 3 provides summaries of challenges identified in select GAO reports
and testimonies issued between January 1995 and March 2005. Table 4
provides summaries of issues identified in select products released by
other organizations during the same time period.

                             Table 3: GAO Products

Title Key challenges identified

Defense Inventory: Actions In March 2005, we reported on DOD's
supply-chain management during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Needed to Improve
the We developed detailed case studies of nine supply items that were
reported to be in short supply Availability of Critical Items and could
have had operational impacts, and found that U.S. troops experienced
shortages of during Future Military Operations seven of the nine items
that led, in some cases, to a decline in the operational capability of
(GAO-05-275, March 2005) equipment and increased risk to troops. We
identified five systemic deficiencies that contributed to

shortages of the selected items, including (1) inaccurate and inadequately
funded Army war reserve requirements, (2) inaccurate supply forecasts, (3)
insufficient and delayed funding, (4) delayed acquisition, and (5)
ineffective distribution.

                          High-Risk Series: An Update,

                           GAO-05-207 (January 2005)

In January 2005, we reported that DOD's supply-chain management had
experienced significant weaknesses in its ability to provide efficient and
effective supply support to war fighters. While DOD reports showed the
department owning about $67 billion of inventory, shortages of certain
critical spare parts were adversely affecting equipment readiness and
contributing to maintenance delays. DOD also lacked visibility and control
over the supplies and spare parts it owned and did not have the ability to
provide timely or accurate information on the location, movement, status,
or identity of its supplies.

1 In 1990, we began a special effort to review and report on the federal
program areas we considered high risk because they were especially
vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. In December 1992, we
issued a series of reports on the fundamental causes of problems in
designated high-risk areas, including one entitled: High-Risk Series:
Defense Inventory Management, GAO/HR-93-12 (Washington, D.C.: December
1992).

Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD Inventory Management and
Prepositioning Challenges

                        Title Key challenges identified

Military Prepositioning: In March 2004, we testified that during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the Army's prepositioning Observations on Army and program
had some equipment that was outdated or did not match unit needs. The
program also Marine Corps Programs During faced shortfalls, such as
trucks, spare parts, and other items. We noted that shortages in Army
Iraqi Freedom and Beyond, prepositioned and war reserve spare parts had
been a long-standing systemic problem. We GAO-04-562T (March 2004)
likewise reported that the theater supply-and-distribution system became
overwhelmed and was

worsened by the inability to track assets available in theater, which
meant that war fighters did not

know what was available.

Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of
Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (December
2003)

Military Readiness: New Reporting System Is Intended to Address
Long-Standing Problems, but Better Planning Is Needed, GAO-03-456 (March
2003)

In December 2003, we reported that during Operation Iraqi Freedom poor
asset visibility and insufficient and ineffective theater distribution
capabilities contributed to substantial logistics support problems. DOD
and military service officials raised a number of issues that may have
contributed to the logistics problems, including (1) shortages of some
spares or repair parts needed by deployed forces, (2) a reported mismatch
between Army prepositioned equipment and unit needs, (3) DOD contractors
used for logistics support during Operation Iraqi Freedom were not always
effective, and (4) physical security at ports and other distribution
points in the theater was not always adequate to protect assets.

In March 2003, we reported that DOD used readiness measures that varied 10
percentage points or more to determine readiness ratings and often did not
report the precise measurements outside DOD. We additionally reported that
DOD had complied with most, but not all, of the legislative
readiness-reporting requirements and, as a result, Congress was not
receiving all the information mandated by law. DOD issued a directive in
June 2002 to establish a new comprehensive readiness-reporting system.
However, as of January 2003, DOD had not developed an implementation plan
containing measurable performance goals, identification of resources,
performance indicators, and an evaluation plan to assess progress in
developing the new reporting system.

Major Management Challenges In January 2003, we reported that inefficient
inventory management practices represented one of and Program Risks:
Department the most serious weaknesses in DOD's logistics operations.
While DOD's inventory value had of Defense, GAO-03-98 (January been
declining for the previous 10 years, GAO's past and current work in the
area indicated that 2003) DOD (1) continued to store unnecessarily large
amounts of material, with about half of its

secondary inventory exceeding then-war reserve or current operating
requirements; (2) purchased material for which there was no valid
requirement; (3) experienced equipment readiness problems because of a
lack of key spare parts; and (4) maintained inadequate visibility over
material being shipped to and from military activities.

Defense Management: Munitions In October 2002, we reported that a
fundamental problem in DOD's munitions requirements Requirements and
Combatant process remained unaddressed-inadequate linkage between the
near-term munitions needs of Commanders' Needs Require the combatant
commands and the purchases made by the military services based on
computations Linkage, GAO-03-17 (October derived from the department's
munitions requirements-determination process. This disjunction had 2002)
resulted in the combatant commands and the services identifying different
munitions needs and,

ultimately, in the combatant commanders reporting shortages. A more
fundamental reason for the disconnect, however, was because DOD's
munitions requirements-determination process did not fully consider the
combatant commanders' preferences for munitions and weapon systems that
would be used against targets identified in projected scenarios.

Defense Inventory: Improved In July 2002, we reported that the Army's
approach to industrial-base capability assessments Industrial Base
Assessments for lacked key attributes that included the collection of
current industry data, the analysis of that data, Army War Reserve Spares
Could and the creation of management strategies for improving wartime
spare parts availability. We noted Save Money, GAO-02-650 (July that
out-of-date data could result in reduced readiness and inflated or
understated war reserve 2002) spare parts funding requests within budget
submissions to Congress, and the Army's ability to

identify long lead times and create management strategies to reduce lead
times and thus the

amount of inventory needed.

Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD Inventory Management and
Prepositioning Challenges

                        Title Key challenges identified

Defense Inventory: Army War In May 2001, we reported that notwithstanding
the apparent shortfall in funding for war reserve Reserve Spare Parts
spare parts, our review showed uncertainties about the accuracy of the
Army's requirements and Requirements Are Uncertain, funding needs in that
area. Specifically, we found that (1) the best available data regarding
the rate GAO-01-425 (May 2001) at which spare parts would be consumed
during wartime had generally not been used in

determining war reserve requirements for spare parts, (2) a potential
mismatch existed between the Army's methodology for determining spare
parts requirements and the Army's planned battlefield maintenance
practices, (3) the capacity of the industrial base to support the parts
requirements of the two major theaters of war scenario was not well
defined or based on industry data, and (4) emerging issues, such as force
restructuring actions, could significantly affect future war reserve
requirements.

Defense Inventory: In November 1999, we reported that the Air Force
requirements model included prestocked Improvements Needed to requirements
in computing the amount of inventory that needed to be purchased, but this
inventory Prevent Excess Purchases by was not considered important enough
to be funded. However, when the model identified contract the Air Force,
GAO/NSIAD-00-5 quantities to be cancelled, these items were counted as
valid. Thus, the model decreased the (November 1999) quantity to be
cancelled by the amount of these requirements.

Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be
Reassessed, GAO/NSIAD-99-6 (November 1998)

Afloat Prepositioning: Not All Equipment Meets the Army's Readiness Goal,
GAO/NSIAD97-169 (July 1997)

Army War Reserves: DOD Could Save Millions by Aligning Resources With the
Reduced European Mission,GAO/NSIAD97-158 (July 1997)

Defense Inventory Management: Problems, Progress, and Additional Actions
Needed, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-109 (March 1997)

In November 1998, we reported that the Army and Air Force had poorly
defined, outdated, or otherwise questionable requirements in the major
programs that GAO reviewed. The Army and the Air Force had reported
significant shortages and poor maintenance conditions in their
prepositioning programs. In some cases, however, reliable data to assess
inventory fill and maintenance condition were unavailable. Thus, the
precise readiness of the prepositioned stocks- and the impact of any
shortfalls-was difficult to determine because of the questionable
requirements that underpinned the programs and the poor information that
the services used to manage the programs.

In July 1997, we reported that of the Army's unit sets considered when
reporting the readiness of the brigade set of war reserve equipment, about
25 percent did not meet the Army's readiness goal for full-mission
capability. According to Army maintenance records, some equipment aboard
prepositioning ships had been reported as nonmission capable since
September 1995. These records also erroneously identified some
nonmission-capable equipment as repairable aboard ship, although Army
officials said that many repairs could not be made until the equipment was
downloaded. One factor that contributed to lower readiness rates was that
some equipment was not fully mission capable when it was originally loaded
on prepositioning ships. Other factors include the deterioration of the
equipment while in storage aboard ships and the limited ability to conduct
maintenance on the equipment while in storage.

In July 1997, we reported that DOD could have saved about $54 million per
year in personnel costs once the Army removed unneeded war reserve
equipment from central Europe and aligned its resources with the reduced
mission. Army data showed that of 128,000 items in central Europe
identified as available for redistribution outside of Europe, the Army had
firm plans for about 54,000 items, had proposed-but had not funded or
implemented-the plans for about 27,000 items, and had no plans for about
46,000 items because it found no known requirement for them in the war
reserve program.

In March 1997, we testified that inventory management problems had plagued
DOD for decades. We had recently reported that about half of DOD's
secondary inventory was not needed to support war reserve or current
operating requirements. Most of the problems that contributed to the
accumulation of this unneeded inventory still existed, such as outdated
and inefficient inventory management practices that frequently did not
meet customer demands, inadequate inventory oversight, weak financial
accountability, and overstated requirements. We noted that while we
continued to see pockets of improvement, DOD had made little overall
progress in correcting systemic problems that had traditionally resulted
in large unneeded inventories.

       Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD Inventory Management and
                           Prepositioning Challenges

Title Key challenges identified

Defense Logistics: Much of the In February 1997, we reported that $34
billion of DOD's $69.6 billion secondary inventory on hand Inventory
Exceeds Current as of September 30, 1995, exceeded then-current operating
and war reserve requirements. Needs, GAO/NSIAD-97-71 Although DOD had
reduced its inventory from $77.5 billion since September 30, 1993, about
half of (February 1997) the inventory continued to exceed current
operating and war reserve requirements. Further

analysis showed that inventory valued at $1.1 billion represented 100 or
more years of supply.

Defense Inventory: Spare and Repair Parts Inventory Costs Can Be Reduced,
GAO/NSIAD97-47 (January 1997) In January 1997, we reported that $2.7
billion of DOD's $8.3 billion in inventory at nonmajor locations was not
needed to meet the services' then-current operating and war reserve
requirements. We estimated the services could save about $382 million
annually in inventoryholding costs by eliminating the excess inventory.

Defense Programs and

Spending: Need for Reforms, GAO/T-NSIAD-95-149 (April 1995) In April 1995,
we testified that inventory management was an area where DOD had
experienced long-standing problems in managing its resources. While we had
seen some improvements over the previous several years, DOD continued to
waste billions of dollars buying, maintaining, and storing supplies that
became excess. For example, as of September 1993, about $1.7 billion of
the $9 billion of inventory that DOD was buying at that time was not
needed to meet war reserve or operational requirements.

                                  Source: GAO.

            Table 4: Other Products Title Key challenges identified

Bare Base Assets Study, Science Applications International Corporation
(August 2004) In August 2004, the Science Applications International
Corporation completed a comprehensive review and assessment of DOD bare
base capabilities across the services, and identified a number of
problems. The study, prepared for the Joint Staff Director of Logistics,
found that the primary deficiency was the lack of a common understanding
of doctrine that should provide the foundation for the services' bare base
programs. This lack of understanding of doctrine (1) impacted all aspects
of bare base support, to include its relationship to other basing
operations, the methods of providing bare base support, and the
responsibilities associated with bare base support; and (2) inhibited the
ability of combatant commanders to articulate requirements, and the
ability of the services to develop the appropriate capabilities. The study
also found no simple solutions to the challenge of bare base, that the
procurement of additional or new bare base assets was not the key, and
those material solutions that were not linked to doctrinal requirements
and not part of a coordinated solution would result in inefficient and
less effective support.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) In June 2004, the Center for Naval Analyses
reported that although Marine Corps Maritime
Maritime Prepositioning Force Prepositioning Force operations in Iraq
could be characterized as a success, the execution of
(MPF) Reconstitution, reconstitution, regeneration, and reembarkation was
neither simple nor easy. Challenges and
Regeneration, and issues included (1) a lack of detailed published
policies and guidance, and servicewide knowledge
Reembarkation (R3) Operations: and experience, in planning and executing
operations; (2) simultaneous conduct of combat and
Summary Findings, Center for operations; and (3) a lack of effective
systems, organizations, and procedures for tracking and
Naval Analyses, CAB accounting for prepositioned equipment after it was
downloaded.
D0009974.A2/Final (June 2004)

Operational Project Stocks - In February 2004, the Army Audit Agency
reported that some operational projects-one of four Phase II,
Headquarters, categories of Army prepositioned stocks-had (1) invalid
intended purposes; (2) inaccurate, Department of the Army, U. S.
overstated, outdated, or questionable requirements; (3) insufficient
quantities of equipment on Army Audit Agency, A-2004-hand; or (4) a lack
of requirements for essential equipment. Consequently, about $472 million
of 0108-AML (February 2004) the roughly $1.5 billion in requirements
reviewed were invalid and $280 million were questionable.

Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD Inventory Management and
Prepositioning Challenges

Title Key challenges identified

The Norway Air-Landed Marine In September 2003, the Naval Audit Service
reported that the Marine Corps continued to store and Expeditionary
Brigade maintain prepositioned stocks in Norway despite the program's
original strategic purpose having Prepositioning Program, Naval ended with
the fall of the Soviet Union. The Naval Audit Service further reported
that none of the Audit Service, N2003-0079 inventory was sourced to an
approved or planned Joint Chiefs of Staff war scenario and that the
(September 2003) stocks were in excess of Marine Corps-wide requirements.

U.S. Army Materiel Command In September 2003, the U.S. Army Materiel
Command sponsored an Operation Iraqi Freedom (USAMC) Operation Iraqi
lessons learned conference during which 27 major issues were identified in
such areas as Freedom (OIF) Lessons Learned personnel, supply,
maintenance, and distribution. For example (1) supply-related lessons
learned Conference, 10-11 September included the need to relook at
requirements determinations, asset management and visibility, 2003,
Redstone Arsenal, prepositioned stocks, and ammunition warfighter support;
(2) maintenance-related lessons learned Alabama included the need to
improve prepositioning maintenance, readiness and other reporting,

accountability, and forward repair activity; and (3) distribution-related
lessons learned included the need to modify force structure and doctrine
to support the distribution system, appoint a single DOD distribution
manager, and develop and implement a business system.

Other War Reserve Materiel, Air Force Audit Agency, F20030010-FC4000 (May
2003)

Systematic Inspection of the Material Condition of Army War Reserve
Stocks, U.S. Army Materiel Command Inspector General (August 2001)

In May 2003, the Air Force Audit Agency reported that Air Force personnel
did not properly segregate Other War Reserve Materiel requirements from
peacetime operating spares requirements for about 16 percent of items,
resulting in more than $118.8 million of overstated peacetime operating
spares requirements. The audit agency likewise reported that Air Force
supply personnel inappropriately applied $4.3 million of excess war
reserve materiel assets to offset unfunded requirements rather than using
the excesses to offset funded peacetime operating spares requirements.

In August 2001, the Army Materiel Command Inspector General reported the
following problems with Army war reserve sustainment stocks related to the
Army Prepositioned Stock program: (1) a lack of centralized strategic
operational direction; (2) insufficient funding for program requirements;
(3) a lack of data integrity in automated systems; (4) adverse mission
impact caused by readiness reporting procedures and overall operational
practices; (5) mismatches between recorded condition codes of materiel and
true conditions; (6) no established procedures for test, measurement, and
diagnostic equipment support; (7) an inability of the command to
effectively support the Army's wartime mortuary affairs mission; (8)
materiel excess to requirements stored at prepositioned sites; (9)
ineffective government oversight of a contractor allowing decreased
readiness and increased costs; and (10) bulk fuel, potable water, and
other assets to support forces during deployment were not part of the
package.

Medical Unit Readiness Reporting, Air Force Audit Agency, 00058007
(December 2000)

Inventory Management of Navy Fleet Hospitals by the Fleet Hospital Support
Office, Cheatham Annex, Virginia, Department of Defense Inspector General,
D-2000-191 (September 2000) In December 2000, the Air Force Audit Agency
reported that medical unit personnel inconsistently apportioned Air Force
resources among the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces and improperly (1)
reported war reserve materiel condition status, (2) accomplished readiness
training, (3) monitored expiration-dated war reserve materiel items, and
(4) controlled sensitive readiness data.

In September 2000, the DOD Inspector General assessed the Navy's
prepositioned fleet hospitals. It found that the Naval Fleet Hospital
Support Office (1) improperly managed its approximate $108 million
inventory warehoused at Cheatham Annex, Virginia; (2) fielded two fleet
hospitals without key pieces of equipment; and (3) did not properly manage
unliquidated obligations.

Prepositioned Aircraft Fuel Drop In July 2000, the Air Force Audit Agency
reported that Air Force managers did not validate, Tanks, Air Force Audit
Agency, quantify, and correct suspected parts shortages in more than 9,000
prepositioned, unassembled 00062006 (July 2000) drop tanks resulting in a
possible inability to meet wartime tank requirements and consequent

delays in critical wartime fighter sorties.

Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD Inventory Management and
Prepositioning Challenges

                        Title Key challenges identified

Selected War and Mobilization Planning Factors, Air Force Audit Agency,
99058006 (September 1999)

Civil Engineer Support Equipment Assigned to Naval Mobile Construction
Battalions, Naval Audit Service, 036-99 (May 1999)

Accountability and Inventory Levels of Air Force Medical War Reserve
Material at Fort Worth, Texas, Department of Defense Inspector General,
98-163 (June 1998) In September 1999, the Air Force Audit Agency reported
that the Central and Pacific Air Forces planning personnel did not always
correctly prepare War and Mobilization Plan, Volume 4 data or consistently
and correctly use program planning factors to determine war reserve
materiel requirements.

In May 1999, the Naval Audit Service reported that (1) 1,587 of 5,289
assets assigned to fulfill the table of allowances for 20 naval mobile
construction battalions could not satisfy the requirements, and (2) 37
civil engineering support equipment assets not assigned to a table of
allowances but kept as backup in case of a contingency could possibly
satisfy up to $1.1 million in planned procurements for other Navy
activities.

In June 1998, the DOD Inspector General reported that while the Air Force
maintained adequate accountability over medical war reserve material
warehoused at Fort Worth, about $33 million of the medical war reserve
material was not needed to satisfy its deployable medical systems
requirements.

Army Prepositioned Stock Program, Combat Equipment Group - Europe, U.S.
Army Audit Agency, AA 98-138 (March 1998)

Sustainment Requirements for the Army Prepositioned Stock Program, U.S.
Army Audit Agency, AA 98-99 (February 1998)

Total Asset Visibility-Operational Projects, U.S. Army Audit Agency, AA
98-31 (November 1997)

In March 1998, the Army Audit Agency reported that while the Army Combat
Equipment Group properly accounted for its war reserve stocks stored in
Europe, improved accounting procedures were needed for its war reserve
stocks loaned in support of Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. The audit
agency additionally reported that repair parts had been identified during
the audit that were not needed to support the deployable unit sets
authorized for the war reserve program. Moreover, while war reserve
equipment was generally maintained and stored properly, some of the combat
equipment companies retained too many line items, maintained excess
stockage levels, and didn't establish an effective method to monitor
maintenance operations.

In February 1998, the Army Audit Agency reported that a substantial number
of undesignated war reserve assets were stored in Europe that could have
been used to satisfy new sustainment stock requirements.

In November 1997, the Army Audit Agency reported problems in the Total
Asset Visibility capability for Army operational projects, including (1)
incomplete or unreliable onhand asset balances, (2) a lack of visibility
over loaned assets, (3) inadequate identification of key management
controls in Army policy regulations, (4) weaknesses in data integrity, and
(5) failure of Army managers at both the wholesale and retail levels to
redistribute assets to improve readiness and reduce requirements.

Equipment Pre-positioned Afloat, In December 1996, the DOD Inspector
General reported that the Army had rapidly expanded its Department of
Defense Inspector afloat prepositioning program without first publishing
criteria, policy, plans, and doctrine resulting in General, 97-054
(December a possible inability to ensure effective equipment management in
support of the combatant 1996) commanders.

                                  Source: GAO.

                       Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

To assess the near-term operational risk given the continuing use of
prepositioned stocks, we obtained reports prepared by the military
services on the inventory levels of their prepositioned stocks compared to
program requirements. We also reviewed available maintenance reports or
other data used by the services to measure the maintenance condition of
the prepositioned stocks. We also observed the physical condition of
materiel stored by the Marine Corps at its prepositioning locations in
Norway and aboard a prepositioning ship at its maintenance facility
located at Blount Island, Florida; and observed the maintenance condition
of the Army's prepositioned stocks at Camp Carroll, South Korea and Sagami
Army Depot, Japan. We interviewed program managers at each of the military
services to determine the impact of reported shortfalls and poor
maintenance condition in the prepositioned stocks and discussed the time
frames and costs needed to repair or replace prepositioned stocks used in
recent military operations.

To assess the sufficiency of the Department of Defense's (DOD) and
service-level oversight of these prepositioning programs, we discussed the
processes used by DOD and the services to oversee their prepositioning
programs with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and the military services. We reviewed relevant DOD
directives and readiness reports prepared by the services and the Joint
Staff to determine the extent to which the information contained in these
reports could be used by DOD or the services to provide oversight. We also
reviewed past reports prepared by GAO, the Army Audit Agency, the Air
Force Audit Agency, the Army Materiel Command Inspector General, and the
CNA Corporation that identified problems with the reliability of data
regarding the preparedness of the services' prepositioned stocks and
problems with the requirements determination processes for some of these
stocks. We discussed issues regarding the sufficiency of data on the
preparedness of DOD's prepositioned stocks with program managers from each
of the services.

To assess whether DOD has developed a coordinated plan for the future of
its prepositioning programs that would meet the goals of the recently
published defense strategy, we collected and analyzed information from the
military services and the Defense Logistics Agency on the future plans for
their prepositioning programs. We also reviewed the recently published
National Defense Strategy and discussed the future direction of the
department's prepositioning programs with officials in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military services.

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

We conducted our review from July 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. We reviewed available
data for inconsistencies and discussed the data with DOD officials. Our
assessments of data reliability revealed significant concerns that are
discussed in the report.

We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following
locations:

Army

o  U.S. Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

o  U.S. Army Materiel Command, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

o  U.S. Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, Illinois

o  U.S. Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia

o  U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina

o  Eighth U.S. Army, Yongsan Garrison, South Korea

o  Combat Equipment Battalion-Northeast Asia, Camp Carroll, South Korea

o  Materiel Support Center-Korea, Camp Carroll, South Korea

o  Sagami Army Depot, Camp Zama, Japan

Marine Corps

o  U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia

o  Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia

o  Blount Island Command, Jacksonville, Florida

o  Frigaard Storage Facility, Norway

o  Hammerkammen Storage Facility, Norway

o  Vaernes Aviation Storage Facility, Norway

o  Marine Corps Logistics Command, Albany, Georgia

Navy

o  Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.

o  CNA Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia

o  Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Washington, D.C.

o  Naval Special Warfare Command, San Diego, California

o  Naval Audit Service, Falls Church, Virginia

o  Naval Medical Logistics Command, Fort Detrick, Maryland

o  Military Sealift Command, Washington, D.C.

Air Force

o  U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

                       Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

o  Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

o  	Headquarters, Central Command, Air Forces, Shaw Air Force Base, South
Carolina

o  Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii

o  U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany

o  49th Materiel Maintenance Group, Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico

o  Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida

Unified Commands

o  U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii

o  U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

o  U.S. Forces Korea, Yongsan Garrison, South Korea

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Acknowledgments

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365

In addition to the contact named above, John Pendleton, Assistant
Director, Harold Reich, Assistant Director, Aisha Cabrer, Katherine
Chenault, Lee Cooper, Jeff Kans, Renee McElveen, John Nelson, Emmy Rhine,
Enemencio Sanchez, Patricia Sari-Spear, Kimberly Seay, Robyn Trotter,
Matthew Ullengren, Eddie Uyekawa, Hector Wong, and Ignacio Yanes also made
key contributions to this report.

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