Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations on Recruiting and	 
Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces (16-MAR-05,	 
GAO-05-419T).							 
                                                                 
To meet its human capital needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
must convince several hundred thousand people to join the	 
military each year while, at the same time, retain thousands of  
personnel to sustain its active duty, reserve, and National Guard
forces. Since September 11, 2001, DOD has launched three major	 
military operations requiring significant military		 
personnel--Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The high pace of military operations	 
combined with the level of casualties in Iraq and other factors, 
such as lengthy overseas deployments, have raised concerns about 
DOD's ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of	 
personnel who possess the skills and experience needed. This	 
testimony presents GAO's preliminary findings on (1) the extent  
to which the active duty, reserve, and Guard components have met 
their overall recruiting and retention goals, (2) the degree to  
which the components have met their recruiting and retention	 
goals for selected hard-to-fill critical occupations, and (3)	 
steps the components have taken to enhance their recruiting and  
retention efforts. This testimony focuses on enlisted personnel. 
In continuing its work, GAO will assess the reliability of	 
DOD-provided data and plans to issue a report on these issues	 
this fall.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-419T					        
    ACCNO:   A19496						        
  TITLE:     Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations on	      
Recruiting and Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces	 
     DATE:   03/16/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Armed forces reserves				 
	     Human capital					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military recruiting				 
	     Military reserve personnel 			 
	     National Guard					 
	     Personnel recruiting				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Military enlistment				 
	     Human capital management				 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 
	     Operation Enduring Freedom 			 
	     Operation Noble Eagle				 
	     DOD Individual Ready Reserve Program		 

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GAO-05-419T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST Wednesday, March 16,
2005

MILITARY PERSONNEL

  Preliminary Observations on Recruiting and Retention Issues within the U.S.
                                  Armed Forces

Statement of Derek B. Stewart,
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

                                       a

GAO-05-419T

[IMG]

March 16, 2005

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Preliminary Observations on Recruiting and Retention Issues within the U.S.
Armed Forces

  What GAO Found

DOD's 10 military components generally met their overall recruitment and
retention goals for each of the past 5 fiscal years (FY), but some of the
components experienced difficulties in meeting their overall goals in
early FY 2005. However, it should be noted that several components
introduced a "stop loss" policy shortly after September 11, 2001. The
"stop loss" policy requires some servicemembers to remain in the military
beyond their contract separation date, which may reduce the number of
personnel the components must recruit. During FY 2000-2004, each of the
active components met or exceeded their overall recruiting goals. However,
for January 2005, the Marine Corps missed its overall active duty
recruiting goal by 84 recruits and narrowly missed its goal again for
February 2005. The Army also missed its overall recruiting goal for
February 2005 by almost 2,000 recruits. This is significant, given that
the Army has also already called up members from the Individual Ready
Reserve and moved new recruits from its delayed entry program into basic
training earlier than scheduled. Four of the six reserve components mostly
met their overall recruiting goals for FYs 2000 through 2004, but many
experienced difficulties in early FY 2005. DOD has noted that the Army
Reserve components will be particularly challenged, since fewer active
Army soldiers leaving active duty are joining the reserves. In terms of
retention, the active components generally met their overall retention
goals for the past 5 FYs. The Army, for example, met or exceeded overall
retention goals from FY 2000 through FY 2004. The Army and the Air Force,
however, missed retention goals in the first quarter of FY 2005.

Overall recruitment and retention data do not provide a complete
representation of military occupations that are either over- or
under-staffed. For example, GAO's analysis of early FY 2005 data shows
that 63 percent of the Army's active component specialties are overfilled
and 32 percent are underfilled. Also, several hundred hard-to-fill
occupations exist within the 10 DOD components. GAO identified 73
occupations that have been consistently designated as hard-to-fill
occupations. GAO's analysis also shows that 7 of the Army's current
occupations (e.g., infantry and cavalry scout) and 6 of the Air Force's
current occupations (e.g., combat control and linguist) are on both their
"hard-to-recruit" and "hard-to-retain" lists.

DOD's components have been taking a number of steps to enhance their
recruiting and retention efforts. For example, DOD has expanded
eligibility for selective reenlistment bonuses and has also begun offering
reenlistment bonuses of as much as $150,000 to special operation forces
personnel with 19 or more years of experience who reenlist for an
additional 6 years. The Army increased the amount of cash bonuses it
offers to new recruits in hardto-fill military occupations to as much as
$20,000. The Army also increased its maximum college scholarship from
$50,000 to $70,000. In addition, the Army plans to add 965 recruiters in
FY 2005, and the Marine Corps plans to add 425 recruiters by FY 2007.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our preliminary
observations on recruitment and retention issues within the active and
reserve components.1 To meet its human capital needs, the Department of
Defense (DOD) must convince several hundred thousand people to join the
military each year, the majority of whom are recent high school graduates.
Last fiscal year alone, DOD had goals to recruit more than 180,000
personnel into its active duty forces and more than 120,000 personnel into
its reserve components. Moreover, DOD must retain tens of thousands of
personnel each year to sustain its active duty, reserve, and Guard forces.
As you know, this Subcommittee and others have raised concerns about DOD's
ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of personnel who possess
required skills and experience.

My statement, which focuses only on enlisted personnel, will address our
preliminary findings with respect to (1) the extent to which the active
duty, reserve, and National Guard components have met their overall
recruiting and retention goals; (2) the degree to which the components
have met their recruiting and retention goals for selected, hard-to-fill
critical occupations; and (3) steps the components have taken to enhance
their recruitment and retention efforts. Mr. Chairman, we expect to
complete our evaluation of the services' recruitment and retention efforts
by August and issue our report this fall. Findings presented here are
preliminary, and we will assess the reliability of data provided to us by
DOD as we complete our evaluation. The work done in preparation for this
hearing was conducted from February to March 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary	Our preliminary examination of DOD data indicate that DOD's active
and reserve components generally met their overall recruitment goals from
fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2004; but, some of the components
experienced difficulties in meeting their recruiting goals in early 2005.

1DOD's reserve components include the collective forces of the Army
National Guard and the Air National Guard, as well as the forces from the
Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air
Force Reserve. The Coast Guard Reserve also assists DOD in meeting its
commitments. However, we do not cover the Coast Guard Reserve here because
it accounts for about 1 percent of the total reserve force and falls under
the Department of Homeland Security rather than DOD.

However, it should be noted that the "stop loss" policy implemented by
several components shortly after September 11, 2001 might have facilitated
some components in meeting their overall recruiting goals for fiscal year
2002 and beyond. The "stop loss" policy requires some servicemembers to
remain in the military beyond the expiration of their contracts or
retirement dates, which may reduce the number of new people the components
must recruit to meet their endstrength goals. In fiscal year 2004, the
Army, Navy, and Air Force each exceeded their enlisted aggregate
recruiting goals for active duty personnel by 1 percent, while the Marine
Corps met its goal. However, the Marine Corps missed its enlisted
aggregate active duty recruiting goal of 3,270 new recruits by 84 people,
or 2.6 percent, for January 2005 and narrowly missed its goal again for
February 2005. The Army also missed its February recruiting goal of 7,050
new active duty recruits by 1,936 people, or 27.5 percent. This is
significant, given that the Army has also called members of the Individual
Ready Reserve into active duty and moved thousands of recruits from its
delayed entry program into basic training ahead of schedule. Regarding the
reserve components, four of the six components generally met their
enlisted aggregate recruiting goals for fiscal years 2000 through 2004,
but like the active Army and Marine Corps, most of these components also
experienced difficulties in meeting their early fiscal year 2005
recruiting goals. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve components will be
particularly challenged, given that more active Army soldiers are staying
in the active force, and of those leaving, fewer are joining the reserve
components. Moreover, all of the active components generally met their
aggregate retention goals for the past 5 fiscal years. The Army and the
Air Force, however, missed some aggregate retention goals in the first
quarter of 2005. For example, the Army missed its reenlistment goal for
servicemembers completing their first term by 6 percent. The Air Force
achieved a reenlistment rate of 50 percent compared with its goal of 75
percent for servicemembers completing their second term.

Recruitment and retention rates, when shown in the aggregate, do not
provide a complete representation of military occupations that are either
over-or under-staffed. Our analysis of early fiscal year 2005 data show,
for example, that 63 percent of the Army's active component occupations
(i.e., specialties) are overfilled, and 32 percent are underfilled. Also,
20 percent of the Marine Corps' active component occupations are
overfilled and 15 percent are underfilled. In the Navy, 32 of its active
component occupations are over-filled and 55 occupations are under-filled.
Based on the data we have received to date, hundreds of hard-to-fill
occupations exist within the 10 DOD components. Moreover, on the basis of
our analysis to date, we

have identified 73 occupations, in 7 of the 10 components, that have been
consistently designated as hard-to-fill occupations. Our analysis also
shows that 7 of the Army's occupations (e.g., infantry and cavalry scout)
and 6 of the Air Force's occupations (e.g., combat control and linguist)
are on their "hard-to-recruit" and "hard-to-retain" lists.

DOD's components have been taking a number of steps to enhance their
recruiting and retention efforts. DOD, for example, can now offer
selective reenlistment bonuses to personnel who reenlist while serving in
Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait, whether or not they serve in a critical
occupation. In addition, DOD recently began to offer reenlistment bonuses
of as much as $150,000 to special operation forces personnel with 19 or
more years of experience who reenlist for an additional 6 years.
Individual components have also implemented changes. The Army, for
example, increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in
hard-tofill military occupations to as much as $20,000. In addition, the
Army increased its maximum college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000,
and the Army National Guard doubled the amount it will provide to repay a
recruit's student loan to $20,000. Regarding the services' nonfinancial
efforts, the Army and Marine Corps are increasing their recruiting forces.
The Army plans to add 965 recruiters to its current recruiter force of
5,065 recruiters in fiscal year 2005, and the Marine Corps plans to add
425 recruiters to its current recruiter force of 2,600 recruiters by
fiscal year 2007. Our fall 2005 report will contain more discussion of
these and other DOD efforts to enhance recruitment and retention.

Background	Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United
States, DOD has launched three major military operations requiring
significant military personnel: Operation Noble Eagle, which covers
military operations related to homeland security; Operation Enduring
Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and
certain other countries; and Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes
ongoing military operations in Iraq. These military operations have
greatly increased the services' operations and personnel tempo of the
military services, and especially those of the Army and Marine Corps,
which have provided the bulk of the military personnel burden associated
with operations in Iraq. Additionally, a significant number of military
personnel have been killed or wounded in Iraq. Many congressional and
military observers have expressed concern that the current operations
tempo, combined with the level of casualties in Iraq, might lead to lower
recruiting and retention rates, thereby raising questions about DOD's
ability to sustain long-term force requirements. In

addition, there are growing concerns that a number of stress factors, such
as back-to-back and/or lengthy overseas deployments and heavier reliance
on the reserve components in the Army and Marine Corps, may significantly
hinder DOD's overall ability to effectively recruit and retain forces.

According to DOD officals, recruiting is the military services' ability to
bring new members into the military to carry out mission essential tasks
in the near term and to begin creating a sufficient pool of entry-level
personnel to develop into future mid-level and upper-level military
leaders. To accomplish this task, active, reserve, and Guard components
set goals for accessions, or new recruits, who will enter basic training
each year. To assist in recruiting, the military services advertise on
television, on radio, and in print and participate in promotional
activities, such as sports car racing events. In response to some of the
services missing their overall recruiting goals in the late 1990s, DOD
increased its advertising, number of recruiters, and financial incentives.
Our September 2003 report2 assessed DOD's recruiting advertising programs,
and concluded that DOD did not have clear program objectives and adequate
outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of its advertising. We
recommended, and DOD agreed, that measurable advertising objectives should
be established and outcome measures should be developed to evaluate
advertising programs' performance.

The term retention used by DOD refers to the military services' ability to
keep personnel with the necessary skills and experience. Servicemembers
have the opportunity to either leave the military or reenlist when their
contracts expire. A common retention concern is that too few people with
the needed skills and experience will stay in the military, thereby
creating a shortage of experienced personnel, decreased military
efficiency, and lower job satisfaction. Although the services have each
created their own unique means of tracking retention, they all measure
retention in a career path at key points that are delineated by various
combinations of years of service and number of enlistments. The Army and
Marine Corps set numerical retention goals; the Air Force and Navy state
their retention goals in terms of percentages of those able to reenlist.

2See GAO, Military Recruiting: DOD Needs to Establish Objectives and
Measures to Better Evaluate Advertising's Effectiveness, GAO-03-1005
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003).

  Military Components Generally Met Overall Recruiting and Retention Goals for
  the Past 5 Fiscal Years (2000-2004), but Some Components Have Missed Early
  2005 Goals

The military components generally met their overall recruiting and
retention goals over the past 5 fiscal years. However, some are beginning
to experience difficulties in meeting their overall recruiting and
retention goals for fiscal year 2005.

Most Overall Recruitment Goals Were Met for Past 5 Years, but Army and
Marine Corps Experienced Recruiting Shortages Early This Year

According to DOD data, the active and reserve components generally met
their enlisted aggregate recruiting goals for fiscal years 2000 to 2004.
However, it should be noted that the "stop loss" policy implemented by
several components shortly after September 11, 2001, might have
facilitated these components in meeting their overall recruiting goals for
fiscal year 2002 and beyond. A "stop loss" policy requires some
servicemembers to remain in the military beyond their contract separation
or retirement date. Keeping servicemembers on active duty longer can
reduce the number of new people the services need to recruit to maintain
endstrength. For example, the Army, which has implemented some form of
"stop loss" since December 4, 2001, has required several thousand
servicemembers to remain on active duty beyond their contractual
separation or retirement date. The recruiting data presented in table 1
show that in fiscal year 2004, the Army, Navy, and Air Force actually
exceeded their goals with a 101 percent rate.

Table 1: Total Active Duty Enlisted Aggregate Recruiting Goals and Achievements
                           for Fiscal Years 2000-2004

                Army                   Navy       Marine    Air Force 
                                                   Corps              
                      Percent                       Percent           Percent 
Fiscal                          Actual                                     
                      of goal      Percent of       of goal           of goal
          Goal Actual     met Goal              Goal Actual Goal          met 
    year                               goal met met         Actual    

  2000 80,000 80,113 100 55,000 55,147 100 32,417 32,440 100 34,600 35,217 102 
  2001 75,800 75,855 100 53,520 53,690 100 31,404 31,429 100 34,600 35,381 102 
  2002 79,500 79,585 100 46,150 46,155 100 32,593 32,767 101 37,283 37,967 102 
  2003 73,800 74,132 100 41,065 41,076 100 32,501 32,530 100 37,000 37,141 100 
  2004 77,000 77,586 101 39,620 39,871 101 30,608 30,618 100 34,080 34,361 101 

Source: DOD.

More recently, however, the Marine Corps and Army failed to meet February
2005 overall recruiting goals. The Marine Corps missed its January goal of
3,270 new recruits by 84 people, or 2.6 percent, and narrowly missed its
goal again in February. This is the first time that the Marine Corps has
missed a monthly annual recruiting goal since 1995. The Army is also
beginning to experience difficulties and, in February 2005, missed its
goal of 7,050 new recruits by 27.5 percent, or 1,936 recruits. This is
significant, given that the Army has also called members of the Individual
Ready Reserve3 into active duty and moved thousands of recruits from its
delayed entry program into basic training ahead of schedule.4 Air Force
and Navy overall recruiting goals, on the other hand, do not appear to be
in jeopardy at this time, as both services intend to reduce their
endstrengths. Over the next year the Air Force plans to downsize by about
20,000 personnel, and the Navy is looking to trim more than 7,300 sailors.

3The Individual Ready Reserve is comprised principally of individuals who
(1) have had training, (2) have served previously in an active or reserve
component, and (3) have some period of their military service obligation
remaining.

4The delayed entry program consists of individuals who have signed a
contract to join the military at a future date.

Table 2 shows that four of the six DOD reserve components generally met
their enlisted aggregate recruiting goals for fiscal years 2000 through
2004 but that the Army National Guard achieved only 82 percent of its
recruiting objectives in fiscal years 2003 and 87 percent 2004, and that
the Air National Guard achieved 94 percent of its recruiting objective in
fiscal year 2004.

    Table 2: Total Reserve Component Enlisted Aggregate Recruiting Goals and
                    Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000-2004

               Army National Guard     Army Reserve      Navy Reserve 
                                                                      Percent 
                         Percent of         Percent of                of goal 
Fiscal year Goal Actual goal met Goal Actual goal    Goal Actual       met 
                                    met                               
      2000     54,034 61,260 113    48,461 48,596 100  18,410 14,911       81 
      2001     60,252 61,956 103    34,910 35,522 102  15,250 15,344      101 
      2002     60,504 63,251 105    38,251 41,385 108  15,000 15,355      102 
      2003     66,000 54,202 82     40,900 41,851 102  12,000 12,772      106 
      2004     56,002 48,793 87     32,275 32,710 101  10,101 11,246      111 
                                                            Air Force 
               Marine Corps Reserve Air National Guard        Reserve 
                                                                      Percent 
                         Percent of         Percent of                of goal 
Fiscal year Goal Actual goal met Goal Actual goal    Goal Actual       met 
                                    met                               
      2000     9,341 9,465 101      10,080 10,730 106   9,624 7,740        80 
      2001     8,945 9,117 102      11,808 10,258 87    8,051 8,826       110 
      2002     9,835 10,090 103     9,570 10,122 106    6,080 6,926       114 
      2003     8,173 8,222 101      5,712 8,471 148     7,512 7,557   
      2004     8,087 8,248 102      8,842 8,276 94      7,997 8,904       111 

Source: DOD.

First quarter 2005 reserve and Guard recruiting data suggest that the
reserve components may experience difficulties in meeting their early 2005
overall recruiting goals. The Marine Corps Reserve, which achieved 106
percent of its overall first quarter 2005 recruiting goals, is the only
reserve component that has met or surpassed its goal so far this year. The
Army Reserve and Army National Guard achieved 87 and 80 percent of their
overall recruiting goals, respectively. The Air Force Reserve achieved 91
percent of its overall recruiting goal; the Air National Guard, 71
percent;

and the Navy Reserve, 77 percent. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve
components will be particularly challenged, since more active Army
soldiers are staying in the active force, and of those leaving, fewer are
joining the reserve components.

Most Overall Retention Goals Met for Past 5 Years

According to DOD data, the four active components generally met their
enlisted aggregate retention goals from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal
year 2004. However, as I stated in the discussion on recruiting, it should
also be noted here that the services' "stop loss" policies implemented
shortly after September 11, 2001, might have facilitated the services in
meeting their aggregate retention goals since fiscal year 2002. In
addition, the Army generally reduced its overall retention goals from
fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2003.

Table 3 shows that the Army is the only active component that met all of
its retention goals for fiscal years 2000 through 2004. Table 3 also shows
that, in fiscal year 2004, the Navy missed its retention goal for initial
reenlistments by just less than 2 percentage points and the Air Force
missed its goal for midcareer term reenlistments by 5 percentage points.
In fact, the Air Force missed this goal in 4 of the past 5 fiscal years
and missed its goal for career third term or subsequent reenlistments in
2000 and 2001. The Navy missed its goal for reenlistments among enlisted
personnel who have served from 10 to 14 years in 2 of the past 5 fiscal
years, and the Marine Corps missed its goal for second and subsequent
reenlistments in fiscal year 2003 only.

Table 3: Total Active Duty Enlisted Aggregate Retention Goals and
Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000-2004

Service FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

                                      Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
                                      of goal of goal of goal of goal of Goal
         Goal Actual met Goal Actual met Goal Actual met Goal Actual met Goal
                                                                   Actual met

Army Navy

 Initial                                                                     
          20,000 21,402    107 20,000    101 19,433 102 19,821 21,838    110 24,903 
                        19,750        19,100                          23,000 
Midcareer                                                                    
          23,700 24,118    102 23,727    102 23,074 102 18,422 19,509    106 21,120 
                        23,350        22,700                          20,292 
 Career                                                                      
                           106           102        105                  100        
          24,300 25,791 20,900 21,255 15,000 15,700     12,757 12,804 12,808 13,987

Zone A N/A 29.6% N/A 57% 56.9% Short 56% 58.7% Exceed 56% 61.8% Exceed 56% 54.1%
                                     Short

Zone B N/A 46.5% N/A 69% 68.2% Short 73% 74.5% Exceed 73% 76.7% Exceed 70% 70.2%
                                     Exceed

Zone C N/A 56.6% N/A 89% 85.0% Short 90% 87.4% Short 86% 87.9% Exceed 85% 86.9%
                                     Exceed

Marine Corps

First term 5,791 5,846 101 6,144 6,144 100 5,900 6,050 103 6,025 6,001 100
5,974 6,011

Subsequent N/A 63.4% N/A N/A 5,900 N/A 5,784 7,258 125 6,172 5,815 94
5,628 7,729

Air Force

 First term 55% 53.1% Short 55% 56.1% Exceed 55% 72.1% Exceed 55% 60.5% Exceed
                                 55% 63% Exceed

Second term 75% 69.7% Short 75% 68.9% Short 75% 78.3% Exceed 79% 72.9% Short 75%
                                   70% Short

Career 95% 90.8% Short 95% 90.2% Short 95% 94.6% Short 95% 95.2% Exceed 95% 97%
                                     Exceed

Source: DOD.

Notes: Various Navy and Marine Corps retention goals for fiscal years 2000
and 2001 were not available or complete (i.e., "N/A").

The Army tracks retention rates by initial term (first enlistment,
regardless of length), mid-career (second or subsequent enlistment with
less than 10 years of service), and career (second or subsequent
enlistment with 10 or more years of service).

The Navy's most important retention categories are Zone A (up to 6 years
of service), Zone B (6 years of service to under 10 years of service), and
Zone C (10 years of service to under 14 years of service).

The Marine Corps tracks retention by first enlistment and second or
subsequent enlistment.

The Air Force tracks retention by first term (first enlistment, regardless
of length), second term (second enlistment), and career (third or
subsequent enlistment).

For the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, data show that the Army missed
its initial reenlistment goal for active duty enlisted personel by 6
percent and its midcareer reenlistment goal by 4 percent. The Air Force
also missed two

of its reenlistment goals for active duty enlisted personnel in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005. The Air Force achieved a reenlistment rate of
50 percent for second-term reenlistments, compared with its goal of 75
percent, and a reenlistment rate of 92 percent for career reenlistments,
compared with its goal of 95 percent. The Air Force also established a
goal for 55 percent of all personnel eligible for a first-term
reenlistment to reenlist and missed this goal by just 1 percent.

We are continuing to collect, analyze, and assess the reliability of
retention data for both the active and reserve components, which we will
incorporate into our final report.

  Aggregate Recruitment and Retention Data Do Not Identify Over- or
  Under-staffing within Certain Military Occupations

Recruitment and retention rates, when shown in the aggregate, do not
provide a complete representation of occupations that are either over-or
under-filled. For example, our analysis of fiscal year 2005 Army data, on
its 185 active component enlisted occupations, shows that 116 occupations,
or 63 percent, are currently overfilled and that 60 occupations, or 32
percent, are underfilled. Also, the Marine Corps told us that, of its 255
active component enlisted occupations, 52 occupations, or 20 percent, are
overfilled and that 37 occupations, or 15 percent, are underfilled. Data
provided by the Navy show that 32 enlisted occupations are overfilled and
55 occupations are under filled.

According to the Congressional Budget Office, about 30 percent of the
occupations for enlisted personnel experienced shortages and about 40
percent experienced overages, on average, from fiscal year 1999 through
fiscal year 2004.5 We requested the active, reserve, and Guard components
provide us with their list of hard-to-fill occupations. On the basis of
data for 7 of 10 components, we identified several hundred occupations
that have been consistently designated as hard-to-fill because the
components had not been able to successfully recruit and retain sufficient
numbers of personnel in these areas to meet current or projected needs. Of
these, we identified 73 occupations as being consistently hard to fill.
Table 4 shows these 73 hard-to-fill occupations, by components.

5Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options (February 2005).

Table 4: Hard-to-Fill Occupations

Component Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
                              to recruit or retain

 Active Duty Army Infantry Cannon Crewmember Multi Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
                                   Crewmember

Field Artillery Computer System Specialist

                                 Cavalry Scout

M1 Armor Crewmember

Abrams Tank Maintainer

Bradley Maintainer

                          Petroleum Supply Specialist

Food Services Specialist

Cryptic Linguist Army Reserve Heavy Construction Equipment Operator Concrete and
                           Asphalt Equipment Operator

Carpentry and Masonry Specialist

Cable Systems Installer-Maintainer

              Military Police Psychological Operations Specialist

Civil Affairs, General
Light Wheel Vehicle Maintainer
Chemical Operations Specialist
Motor Transport Operator
Ammunitions Specialist
Hospital Food Specialist
Automated Logistical Specialist
Petroleum Supply Specialist
Shower/Laundry and Clothing Repair Specialist
Water Treatment Specialist

Active Duty Air Force 	Aircraft Loadmaster Airborne Mission Specialist Air
Traffic Control Combat Control Tactical Air Command and Control Aerospace
Control and Warning Systems Intelligence Imagery Analysis

(Continued From Previous Page)

Component Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
                              to recruit or retain

                                Crypto Linguist

Signals Intelligence Analysis

Electronic Signals Intelligence Exploitation

Survival/Evasion/Resistance/Escape Operations Pararescue Interpreter/Translater
Electronic Computer Switching Systems Air Force Reserve Aircrew Operations
 Intelligence Aircrew Protection Weather Manned Aerospace Maintenance Logistics
  Maintenance Management Systems Transportation Munitions and Weapons Security
                                     Forces

Active Duty Marine Corps Counter Intelligence Specialist

Marine Corps Reserve	Intelligence Imagery Analysis Reconnaissance Civil
Affairs Non Commissioned Officer Ground Communications Repairer Military
Police Air Traffic Controller Airborne Radio Operator Scout Sniper KC-130
Crewmembers

(Continued From Previous Page)

Component Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
                              to recruit or retain

Active Navy Aviation Structural Mechanic (Equipment) Aviation Structural
Mechanic (Structural)

Cryptologic Technician

                           Data Processing Technician

Electrician's Mate

                            Fire Control Technician

Machinist's Mate

                                    Mineman

Missile Technician

                             Operations Specialist

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data

Notes: The remaining components (Air National Guard, Army National Guard
and Navy Reserve) did not provide us with data.

Active duty Army data from 2001-2005, Army Reserve data from 2000-2009,
active duty Air Force data from 2000-2005, Air Force Reserve data is
current proposed information, Marine Corps data is 20002005, Navy data is
from GAO report 05-299.6

More specifically, we asked DOD to provide us with the current
hard-to-fill occupations for active duty components, and we received data
for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Marine Corps currently does not
report hard-to-fill occupation information to DOD. Table 5 shows the
extent to which these occupations were over-or under-filled as of November
2004.

6See GAO, Financial Costs and Loss of Critical Skills Due to DOD's
Homosexual Conduct Policy Cannot Be Completely Estimated, GAO-05-299
(Washington, D.C.: February 2005).

  Table 5: Over- and Under-filled Hard-to-Fill Occupations As of November 2004

Personnel Personnel Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component
authorized assigned Difference

                                 Navy Air Force

          Special Warfare Diver                 3288     2187           -1101 
          Surface Force Corpsman                 614     188      
        Nuclear Missile Technician             10536    10364     
           P-3 Flight Engineer                   354     257      
       Sonar Technician (Submarine)             1985     1901     
      In Flight Aviation Technician              214     145      
        Sonar Technician (Surface)               175     111      
                 Linguist                        932     872      
       Special Operations Corpsman               101      54      
        Aviation Warfare Operator                225     215      

                   Crypto Linguist                     1459   1916       +457 
            Explosive Ordinance Disposal               1006   1074        +68 
    Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE)        404   408          +4 
              Airborne Crypto Linguist                  944   499    
                   Operation Intel                     2519   2293   
            Network Intelligence Analysis              1511   1365       -146 
                     Pararescue                         362   243        -119 
                  Imagery Analysis                     1150   1071        -79 
                   Combat Control                       432   360         -72 
    Electrical Signals Intelligence Exploitation        734   673         -61 
                        Army                                         
                     Infantryman                      39690  41287      +1597 
                    Cavalry Scout                      7656   7889       +233 
              Motor Transport Operator                11830  10459      -1371 
               Health Care Specialist                 16962  16472       -490 
               Fire Support Specialist                 4283   3914       -369 
            Chemical Operation Specialist              6694   6342       -352 
         Special Operations Medical Sergeant            769   630        -139 
             Petroleum Supply Specialist               8306   8206       -100 
            Explosive Ordinance Disposal                984   886         -98 
               Food Service Specialist                 9659   9588        -71 

(Continued From Previous Page)

Personnel Personnel Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component
authorized assigned Difference Marine Corps

                         No data available N/A N/A N/A

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data

Note: N/A denotes not available.

Further analysis of the data shows that 7 of the Army's occupations
(infantry, fire support specialist, cavalry scout, chemical operations
specialist, motor transport operator, petroleum supply specialist, and
food service specialist) and 6 of the Air Force's occupations (airborne
linguist; combat control; imagery analysis; linguist; SERE [survival,
evasion, resistance, escape operations]; pararescue, and explosive
ordnance disposal) are on both the services' "hard to recruit" and "hard
to retain" lists.

  DOD's Components Are Taking Steps to Address Recruitingand Retention
  Challenges

DOD has made enhancements to existing programs and introduced new programs
in recent years to improve its ability to recruit and retain
servicemembers. These programs include increasing the eligibility for and
size of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and educational benefits, and
the number of recruiters.

DOD, for example, expanded the pool of servicemembers who are eligible to
receive a selective reenlistment bonus. Selective reenlistment bonuses are
designed to provide an incentive for an adequate number of qualified
midcareer enlisted members to reenlist in designated critical occupations
where retention levels are insufficient to sustain current or projected
levels necessary for a service to accomplish its mission. The statutory
authority for this bonus was amended in the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense
Authorization Act to allow the Secretary of Defense to waive the "critical
skill" requirement for members who reenlist or extend an enlistment while
serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait in support of Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.7

In addition, in February 2005, DOD announced a new retention bonus for
Special Operations Forces personnel (Army Special Forces; Navy SEALs; and
Air Force pararescue, plus a few other specialties) who decide to

7Pub. L. No. 108-136, sec. 626

remain in the military beyond 19 years of service. The largest bonus,
$150,000, will go to senior sergeants, petty officers, and warrant
officers who sign up for an additional 6 years of service. Personnel who
sign up for shorter extensions will receive a smaller bonus; personnel who
extend for 1 additional year, for example, will receive $8,000.

Individual components have also implemented changes. The Army, for
instance, increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits
in hard-to-fill military occupations up to $20,000. In December 2004, the
National Guard announced that it is increasing its initial enlistment
bonuses from $8,000 to $10,000 for individuals without prior service who
sign up for one of the National Guard's top-priority military occupations
such as infantry, military police, and transportation. DOD officials also
said the Army and the National Guard are increasing the amount of their
college scholarship funds for new enlistees. The Army increased the
maximum college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000, while the Army
National Guard doubled the amount it will provide to repay a recruit's
student loan to $20,000.

Finally, the Army and Marine Corps components are increasing their
recruiting forces to meet their additional recruiting challenges. The Army
plans to add 965 recruiters to its recruiter force in fiscal year 2005,
for a total force of 6,030 recruiters, and the Marine Corps plans to add
425 recruiters to its recruiter force by fiscal year 2007, bringing its
total recruiter force to 3,025 recruiters.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may
have at this time.

Contacts and Staff 	For questions about this statement, please contact
Derek B. Stewart at (202) 512-5559 (e-mail address: [email protected]) or
David E. Moser at

Acknowledgments	(202) 512-7611 (e-mail address: [email protected]).
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Alissa H.
Czyz, Joseph J. Faley, Brian D. Pegram, and John S. Townes.

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