Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support (19-NOV-04,
GAO-05-39R).
Land-, air-, and sea-based components form the "fires triad" that
is used to support Marine Corps amphibious assault operations.
The sea-based part of the fires triad is referred to as Naval
Surface Fire Support (NSFS). The retirement of the last Iowa
class battleship left a void in the NSFS part of the fires triad.
To field a replacement NSFS capability, the Navy developed a
two-phased plan in 1994. In the near-term to midterm, it would
modify the capability of 5-inch guns on existing destroyers and
cruisers, and develop extended-range guided munitions for the
modified 5-inch gun. In the far term, it would field a sufficient
number of new destroyers fitted with an even-longerrange advanced
gun system and ultimately a very-long-range electromagnetic gun
or "Rail Gun." However, in 1996, congressional authorizers became
concerned that the Navy would not be able to produce a
replacement NSFS capability comparable to the battleships until
well into the twenty-first century. In that year's Defense
Authorization Act, the Congress directed the Secretary of the
Navy to restore at least two Iowa class battleships to the naval
vessel registry until a capability was developed equal to or
greater than that provided by the battleships. By 1999 the Navy
had placed the Iowa and Wisconsin battleships back on the naval
vessel registry and has been maintaining them in an inactive
state since then. In recent years, the Navy's efforts to develop
a NSFS replacement capability have not progressed as quickly as
planned. Given concerns about the gap in NSFS capability, the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces House Committee on
Armed Services requested that we review (1) the validated
requirements for NSFS, (2) the estimated cost and schedule for
reactivating and modernizing two Iowa class battleships to
provide NSFS, and (3) the status of Navy efforts to develop a
replacement NSFS capability.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-39R
ACCNO: A13853
TITLE: Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support
DATE: 11/19/2004
SUBJECT: Maintenance costs
Military operations
Military vessels
Naval procurement
Naval warfare
Repair costs
Weapons systems
Schedule slippages
DD(X) Destroyer
Naval Surface Fire Support Modernization
Program
U.S.S. Iowa
U.S.S. Wisconsin
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GAO-05-39R
* Results in Brief
* Validated Requirements for NSFS Overall Have Not Been Established
* Full Cost and Schedule for Reactivating and Modernizing Battleships
Have\ Not Been Analyzed
* Delays in Fielding Replacement NSFS Systems After Retiring Battleships
E\xtend Gap in NSFS Capability
* Agency Comments
* Enclosure I
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
November 19, 2004
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection
Forces Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
Subject: Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Land-, air-, and sea-based components form the "fires triad" that is used
to support Marine Corps amphibious assault operations. The sea-based part
of the fires triad is referred to as Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS).
From World War II until the Persian Gulf War in 1991, NSFS resided mainly
in the capability of the 16-inch guns on the Navy's Iowa class
battleships. The thick armor of these battleships and the 24-nautical-mile
range of their 16-inch guns gave the battleships increased survivability
in high-threat scenarios. The last Iowa class battleship was
decommissioned in 1992.
Their retirement left a void in the NSFS part of the fires triad. To field
a replacement NSFS capability, the Navy developed a two-phased plan in
1994. In the near-term to midterm, it would modify the capability of
5-inch guns on existing destroyers and cruisers, and develop
extended-range guided munitions for the modified 5-inch gun. In the far
term, it would field a sufficient number of new destroyers fitted with an
even-longer-range advanced gun system and ultimately a very-long-range
electromagnetic gun or "Rail Gun."
However, in 1996, congressional authorizers became concerned that the Navy
would not be able to produce a replacement NSFS capability comparable to
the battleships until well into the twenty-first century. In that year's
Defense Authorization Act, 1 the Congress directed the Secretary of the
Navy to restore at least two Iowa class battleships to the naval vessel
registry until a capability was developed equal to or greater than that
provided by the battleships. By 1999 the Navy had placed the Iowa and
Wisconsin battleships back on the naval vessel registry and has been
maintaining them in an inactive state since then.
1
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
Sec. 1011.
Page 1 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS
Results in Brief
In recent years, the Navy's efforts to develop a NSFS replacement
capability have not progressed as quickly as planned. Given concerns about
the gap in NSFS capability, you requested that we review (1) the validated
requirements for NSFS, (2) the estimated cost and schedule for
reactivating and modernizing two Iowa class battleships to provide NSFS,
and (3) the status of Navy efforts to develop a replacement NSFS
capability. This letter summarizes our findings and transmits the detailed
briefing that we prepared for your staff. (See encl. I.)
To address our engagement objectives, we interviewed responsible officials
and reviewed official documents, including internal memos, operational
requirements documents, and related studies, from the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, the Navy's Inactive Ships Program Office, the Navy's
Surface Warfare Directorate, the Navy's Guided Projectile Office, the
Joint Staff (J-8) Force Application Assessment Division, and the U.S.
Naval Fire Support Association. We also toured the Battleship Wisconsin
(BB-64) and the USS Winston Churchill (DDG-81). We conducted our work from
April through September 2004 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
The Navy and Marine Corps have only recently begun the process to
establish validated NSFS requirements that address the overall
capabilities needed and the balance between different systems that will be
required to provide effective, continuous, and sustaining support fire for
forces operating ashore. Validated requirements for some specific systems
have been established, however.
The cost and schedule for reactivating and modernizing two Iowa class
battleships have not been fully developed. However, the Navy believes that
reactivation of the battleships should not be pursued for a number of
reasons. These include, among other things, manpower requirements and
modernization needed to integrate the battleships into today's modern
Navy. Therefore, the Navy has no plans to conduct the detailed studies
needed to identify the full extent of needs and costs.
The Navy's fielding of a replacement NSFS capability has been delayed. The
near-term and midterm efforts to extend the range of munitions fired from
the 5-inch guns on its cruisers and destroyers have been delayed from 2001
to possibly as late as 2011, but other program options have been discussed
including the option of canceling or reducing the extended-range munitions
program to fund development of another gun system. Far-term plans to help
fill the NSFS gap by 2015 using a new destroyer with advanced gun systems
were revised in 2001 to employ a
Validated Requirements for NSFS Overall Have Not Been Established
different destroyer concept-the DD (X). The Navy currently expects
sufficient numbers of DD (X) destroyers to be ready to help fill the NSFS
gap by 2018 at the earliest.
The role of naval surface fire support has been evolving in tandem with
the Navy's amphibious assault doctrine, and for well over a decade, since
the decommissioning of the last of the Iowa class battleships, both the
Navy and Marine Corps have strived to address the specifics of how to
fulfill NSFS requirements. Until recently, these services have had
difficulty with reconciling their respective positions. Operational
requirements documents for several systems, such as the new destroyer,
that will contribute to the NSFS mission have been developed. On several
occasions, the Marine Corps has specified to the Navy what they believe
the replacement NSFS capability should be and the timing of the
capability. However, no single document has ever addressed the overall
capabilities and the balance between different systems that will be
required to provide effective, continuous, and sustainable supporting fire
for increasingly capable expeditionary forces operating ashore.
Although no formal NSFS requirement currently exists, in August 2004, the
Navy and Marine Corps agreed on an approach to correct the problem by
formally agreeing to develop an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) that
would address the overall capabilities needed for naval fire support. The
goal of this ICD is to document and address the overall capabilities
required of naval fire support. This will assist in determining the most
effective and efficient balance of capabilities and in determining the
cumulative offensive power that naval forces must be capable of
generating. An integrated product team chaired by the Marine Corps' Deputy
Commandant for Combat Development office, in coordination with the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, will conduct the required analyses,
develop the ICD, and endeavor to gain the Department of Defense's approval
for the ICD.
Full Cost and Schedule for Reactivating and Modernizing Battleships Have Not
Been Analyzed
To reactivate two Iowa class battleships to their decommissioned
capability, the Navy estimates costs in excess of $500 million. This does
not include an additional $110 million needed to replenish gunpowder for
the 16-inch guns because a recent survey found that it is unsafe. In terms
of schedule, the Navy's program management office estimates that
reactivation would take 20 to 40 months, given the loss of corporate
memory and the shipyard industrial base.
Reactivating the battleships would require a wide range of battleship
modernization improvements, according to the Navy's program management
office. At a minimum, these modernization improvements include command and
control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment;
environmental protection (including ozonedepleting substances); a
plastic-waste processor; pulper/shredder and wastewater alterations;
firefighting/fire safety and women-at-sea alterations; a modernized sensor
suite (air and surface search radar); and new combat and self-defense
systems. Although detailed studies would be needed to identify the full
extent of modernization needs and costs, the Navy has no plans to conduct
these studies.
The Navy's program management office also identified other issues that
would strongly discourage the Navy from reactivating and modernizing the
battleships. For example, personnel needed to operate the battleships
would be extensive, and the skills needed may not be available or easily
reconstituted. Other issues include the age and unreliability of the
battleships' propulsion systems and the fact that the Navy no longer
maintains the capability to manufacture their 16-inch gun system
components and ordnance.
Following the retirement of the last Iowa class battleship in 1992, the
Navy laid out a two-phase plan to provide a replacement NSFS capability:
Replacement NSFS
Systems After o The near-term and midterm phases called for modifying
the 5-inch guns on the current class of destroyers and cruisers planned
for production and Retiring Battleships developing extended-range guided
munitions (ERGM) to be used in the
upgraded guns for improved range. Extend Gap in NSFS o The far-term
phase called for developing a longer-range advanced gun Capability system
to be fitted on a new destroyer and eventually a Rail Gun with even
greater range.
In the near-term and midterm, expected fielding of the ERGM system for use
in upgraded 5-inch guns on current destroyers and cruisers has been
delayed from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011. Technical and design
problems on the ERGM, which has been under development since 1996, have
led to test failures and delays. 2 The Navy has awarded a contract to a
different company for developing an alternative technology. The Navy now
intends to issue a solicitation in 2005 to hold full and open competition
for development and low-rate production for the extended-range munitions
for the 5-inch gun. Other program options have also been discussed to
include canceling or reducing the extended-range munitions program to fund
the development of another gun under consideration for the future
destroyer called the "hypersonic naval rail gun." Also, the Navy is
considering the benefits of installing modified 5-inch guns on the current
cruisers to fire the extended-range guided munitions. However, if
undertaken, the Navy does not intend to use these platforms in an NSFS
role. This decision will reduce the number of ships able to provide NSFS
by 41 percent in those scenarios where a 25-nautical-mile standoff range
of the ships from the shore is needed to protect them from shore-based
threats. Without the 5-inch gun modification to handle the extended-range
guided munitions, the range of the cruisers' guns is only 13 nautical
miles.
In the far term, the fielding of an advanced gun system has been delayed.
Initial plans called for fielding 32 new destroyers, designated the DD 21,
with advanced gun systems between 2008 and 2020 to fill the NSFS gap. In
2001, the Navy announced that it would replace the DD 21 with another
destroyer concept called the DD(X). The Navy now expects to field 24 DD(X)
destroyers between 2011 and 2023. A sufficient number of DD(X) destroyers
to help close the NSFS gap will not be available until 2018. We reported
that the ship's construction plan was risky because some technologies are
unproven and the design is not yet stable.
DOD provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated in our
letter where appropriate.
As agreed with your staff, we plan no further distribution of this letter
until 14 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of
this letter to other congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense;
the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
parties. Copies are available to others upon request. The letter will also
be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
2
For more details on these problems, see our report, Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Major Weapon Programs ( GAO-04-248, Mar. 31, 2004), pp. 57
and 58.
Page 5 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS
Should you or your staff have questions on the matters discussed in this
report, please contact me on (202) 512-4841 or Jim Morrison, Assistant
Director, at (202) 512-7078. Contributors to this report include Jerry
Clark, Robert Swierczek, and Martha Dey.
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Enclosure
Enclosure I
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