Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Stategic and Acquisition
Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges (09-MAR-05,
GAO-05-395T).
The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) has been
under development for defense applications since the 1980s, and
as the Department of Defense (DOD) transforms its military
operations, UAVs are becoming increasingly vital. Today's
testimony identifies (1) GAO's preliminary observations on
operational successes and emerging challenges from ongoing GAO
work reviewing UAV current operations, (2) the extent to which
DOD has developed a strategic plan and oversight body to manage
its investment in UAVs, and (3) lessons from GAO's prior work
that can be used to promote the efficient development, fielding,
and operational use of UAVs.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-395T
ACCNO: A18976
TITLE: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Stategic and
Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges
DATE: 03/09/2005
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Lessons learned
Military aircraft
Military operations
Military research and development
Strategic planning
Unmanned aerial vehicles
Afghanistan
DOD Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap
EA-6B Aircraft
Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Iraq
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Prowler Aircraft
RQ-4B Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Shadow 200 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
U-2 Aircraft
Gray Ghost Aircraft
Pointer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
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GAO-05-395T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST Wednesday, March 9, 2005
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges
Statement of Sharon Pickup
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Michael J. Sullivan
Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
A
GAO-05-395T
[IMG]
March 9, 2005
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges
What GAO Found
Current UAV operations have achieved mission successes, but some
challenges are emerging. Among the successes, the Predator UAV has
performed traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions and less traditional close air support and armed strike missions.
In addition, certain small UAVs have enabled troops to accomplish their
missions at greater distances from enemy positions. Nonetheless, UAV
operations have been hampered by certain emerging challenges. For example,
some UAVs are not fully interoperable with others, with manned aircraft
systems, or even with conventional forces. Certain UAVs are unable to
operate in sandstorms or other poor weather conditions, thus forfeiting
some of the advantages otherwise available from the sensor payloads. And
UAVs increasingly compete for limited bandwidth.
DOD still lacks a viable strategic plan and oversight body to guide UAV
development efforts and related investment decisions. DOD has set up a
Joint UAV Planning Task Force to guide UAV development and fielding, but
the task force has only limited authority and cannot enforce program
direction. DOD's UAV Roadmap contains some elements of a strategic plan,
but it does not describe the interrelationship of service roadmaps to the
DOD Roadmap or clearly identify funding priorities. Thus, DOD may not be
well positioned to make sound program decisions or establish funding
priorities, nor will Congress have all the information it needs to
evaluate funding requests. Such a plan would also help DOD minimize the
types of challenges that are emerging.
DOD has not consistently implemented best practices in developing and
fielding UAVs. GAO has found that programs have succeeded when DOD has
used innovative development processes, relied on evolutionary technology
development, ensured high-level management attention, and constrained
resources and relied on achievable technologies. Development has been
hampered when DOD has insisted on requirements that outstripped
technology, rushed into production before completing testing, used overly
ambitious schedules, or engaged in concurrent testing and production.
Global Hawk UAV
Source: U.S. Air Force.
United States Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our work on the Department of
Defense's (DOD) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). As you know, we appeared
before you last year to discuss management issues that we identified in
our work on research, development, and fielding of the latest generation
of UAVs. At that time, we emphasized the need for DOD to develop a
strategic plan to guide UAV development and fielding and an oversight body
to implement such a plan. We also pointed out some of the factors that led
to success in UAV acquisition programs and those that hampered acquisition
efforts, emphasizing that strong leadership is needed to ensure that the
most cost-effective solutions are adopted.
As you know, the current generation of UAVs has been under development for
defense applications since the 1980s, and as DOD transforms the way in
which it conducts military operations, UAVs are becoming increasingly
vital. Since we appeared before you last year, we have seen continued
growth in the funding for UAVs and an acceleration of the trend of
employing UAVs in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Furthermore, the types and quantities of UAV systems currently in
operation, under development, or planned for future development are
steadily growing.
Today, you asked us to discuss our preliminary observations on the work we
are currently conducting for this Subcommittee on the performance of UAVs
in current operations, and DOD's progress in improving strategic and
acquisition planning. Specifically, we will highlight (1) operational
successes and emerging challenges that U.S. forces are experiencing with
UAVs in the field, (2) lack of progress in establishing a viable strategic
plan and oversight body to guide joint and service-specific UAV
development efforts and related investment decisions, and (3) lessons
learned from our prior reviews that can be instructive for the efficient
development and fielding of UAVs.
The information we will discuss on emerging challenges is based on our
preliminary work for the Subcommittee. We will be continuing our work
after this hearing, including meeting with officials from U.S. Central
Command and previously deployed units to discuss their actual operational
experiences with UAVs and lessons learned. We plan to issue a report based
on this work to you later this year.
To address our objectives, we conducted preliminary interviews with or
reviewed documents from the Joint UAV Planning Task Force, Joint Forces
Command, the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps, and other
organizations; updated our previously issued report on UAV force structure
planning, development, and fielding; and updated our prior body of work on
UAV development and acquisition.
We conducted our work from July 2004 to February 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary Current UAV operations have achieved certain mission successes but
challenges are emerging. UAVs have been used to support tactical,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, as well as strike
missions, in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, Global Hawk was used to
identify 55 percent of the time-sensitive targets1 to defeat enemy air
defenses in the Iraqi theater in March and April 2003. In addition, the
Predator UAV has been used in Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as highly
successful lethal strike missions using Hellfire missiles. According to
the Commander of U.S. Central Command, demand for UAVs is insatiable.2
Nonetheless, based on our preliminary discussions with DOD and the
services, it is becoming apparent that DOD faces some emerging challenges
affecting its ability to maximize the use of UAVs to enhance operations
and effectively promote force transformation. Specifically,
interoperability remains a challenge. For example, some UAVs are not fully
interoperable with one another and, in some instances, ground forces have
not been linked to or able to use data generated by other services' UAVs.
Also, the ability of UAVs to operate in poor weather conditions is limited
and the availability of bandwidth3 needed to support UAV operations is
constrained.
While DOD continues to request funds for UAVs and the services continue to
plan, develop, and field UAV systems, it still has not developed a
1 Time-sensitive targets are targets that are expected to be vulnerable to
attack for only a short time.
2 Testimony of General John P. Abizaid, Commander, United States Central
Command, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 1, 2005.
3 Bandwith refers to the available frequencies to support the flight of
UAVs, to transmit the output of on-board sensors, and to interface with
air traffic control centers.
strategic plan to guide investment decisions or established an office with
sufficient authority to implement such a plan. Last year, we reported that
DOD had established a Joint UAV Planning Task Force (Task Force) within
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), and that the Task Force had issued the UAV Roadmap 2002- 2027
in December 2002 covering UAV development from 2002 through 2027. 4
However, we noted that DOD did not have a viable strategic plan to guide
the development and fielding of UAVs. Although the Roadmap included some
elements of a strategic plan, including long-term goals, approaches to
attaining long-term goals, performance goals, and some performance
indicators, it omitted some critical elements. For example, the Roadmap
did not include a mission statement, description of how program
evaluations were used to establish or revise goals, discussion of the
interrelationship between service plans and programs to develop and field
UAVs, or provide adequate information on current and projected funding
needs. Moreover, even if a strategic plan existed, we reported that
neither the Task Force nor any other office has sufficient authority to
implement such a plan. We recommended that DOD establish a strategic plan
and designate the Task Force or another body to oversee implementation of
the plan. Since that time, we understand that the Task Force is updating
the UAV Roadmap and continues to act as the focal point to coordinate with
the services on UAV development. We are hopeful that the new Roadmap will
include all of the elements of a strategic plan. Without a strategic plan
to guide investment decisions, we continue to believe that DOD will not be
in the best position to validate requirements, make sound programmatic
decisions, or establish funding priorities. We also believe that the
Congress will not have all the information it needs to evaluate DOD's
funding requests. Furthermore, such a plan could help DOD anticipate and
take steps to minimize the types of challenges that are occurring today.
Our past work in UAV development and acquisition has identified important
lessons that can be applied to the development and fielding of UAV systems
to overcome some of the emerging challenges that we have identified. Our
reviews have found that success was achieved when DOD has used innovative
development processes, relied on evolutionary approaches to technology
development, ensured high-level management attention, and constrained
resources and relied on achievable technologies.
4 GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17,
2004).
On the other hand, development was hampered when DOD insisted on
requirements that outstripped technological capability, rushed into
production before testing was completed, implemented overly ambitious
schedules, or engaged in concurrent testing and production.
Background DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not
carry a human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses
aerodynamic forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely
piloted;5 can be expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or
nonlethal payload. Generally, UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle; a flight
control station; information and retrieval or processing stations; and,
sometimes, wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms.
In addition, UAV systems require adequate intra-or inter-theater
communications capabilities to permit operators to maintain control of
some vehicles, and to permit the UAVs' communications equipment to
transmit the information obtained by the onboard sensors to ground
commanders or other users.
UAVs provide battlefield commanders with real-time intelligence through
their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission. The United
States is also considering using UAVs to assist with border security for
homeland security or homeland defense. Important advantages of UAVs
include their ability to operate for a far longer period than a pilot
could safely operate an aircraft, and the fact that DOD avoids putting
servicemembers' lives at risk during operations.
Initially, UAVs were seen as complementary systems that augmented the
capabilities the warfighter already had. However, UAVs are evolving into
more significant roles, for which they can provide primary capability. For
example, the Global Hawk UAV may eventually replace the U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft, and the Unmanned Combat Aerial System may eventually perform
electronic warfare missions performed by the EA-6 Prowler aircraft today.
Moreover, UAVs are figuring prominently in plans to transform the military
into a more strategically responsive force. UAVs are expected to be an
integral part of this information-based force. For example, they may serve
as relay nodes in the Army's Future Combat System's command and control
network.
5 An autonomously piloted UAV is one that is pre-programmed for its
mission before it takes off. It then flies its mission without a
ground-based pilot. A remotely piloted UAV is controlled by a pilot in a
control station on the ground during the flight.
Since we testified before the Subcommittee last year, DOD has increased
its planned expenditure for UAVs and associated systems, and the systems
have continued to be heavily used in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, about
12 different types of UAV systems have been used in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition, the budget request for UAVs grew significantly between fiscal
year 2001 and fiscal year 2005, from about $363 million to about $2.3
billion, respectively. DOD projects that funding needs will grow to about
$2.9 billion in fiscal year 2009. These figures do not include
supplemental appropriations. DOD has requested about another $234 million
for UAVs in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental request.
DOD Has Achieved Certain Operational Successes, but Some Challenges Are
Emerging
As we have seen in recent operations, UAVs are being used in greater
numbers and on increasingly challenging missions, and they are likely to
be called on to operate more extensively with other UAVs, manned systems,
and conventional ground and air forces. As our preliminary discussions
with DOD officials and our review of various documents suggests, DOD has
performed successful missions using a variety of UAVs, including the
Predator, Global Hawk, Pointer, and Raven. However, some challenges are
emerging, such as issues concerning interoperability, the ability to
operate in poor weather conditions, and communications and bandwidth
limitations.
Recent UAV Successes in Combat Operations
The Air Force has used Predator in a variety of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Predator is also being used for other missions, including close air
support and armed strike. For example, a Predator UAV armed with Hellfire
missiles was used to attack a target carrying suspected terrorists in
Yemen in 2002. The Air Force believes that using Predator has enabled it
to achieve time-critical targeting that might otherwise have been
impossible.
In addition, Global Hawk has also significantly improved DOD's ability to
gather intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Global Hawk captures detailed images of targets and wide
swaths of terrain and then transmits those images on a nearly real-time
basis to battlefield commanders and intelligence centers. In fact, while
flying just 3 percent of the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Global Hawk generated
55 percent of the time-critical targets against enemy air defenses.
Lastly, small UAVs such as the Pointer and Raven have been instrumental in
enabling troops to find, locate, and destroy numerous targets. For
example, during a single mission, a team used a small UAV system to locate
a target, cover the team's movements, target the adversary, and then
conduct a bomb damage assessment to determine whether additional strike
missions were needed. Moreover, the use of small UAVs has enabled ground
forces to accomplish their missions at greater distances from enemy
positions, in effect expanding the standoff distance and thereby reducing
the risk to U.S. servicemembers on the ground.
Certain Challenges Are Emerging
Notwithstanding these operational successes, it is becoming apparent from
our preliminary discussions with DOD officials and our review of various
documents that DOD faces some emerging challenges affecting its ability to
maximize the use of UAVs to enhance operations and effectively promote
force transformation. Such challenges relate to interoperability, the
ability of UAVs to operate in poor weather, and the availability of
communications and bandwidth.
First, while numerous UAVs have been used to conduct various missions in
recent operations, interoperability is a challenge. The services have
generally been reluctant to adopt common mission management systems or
other interoperability approaches within similar types or classes of UAVs.
As a result, it appears that some UAVs may not be fully interoperable with
other UAVs, with manned aircraft systems, or even with conventional
forces. For example, in certain instances ground forces have not been
linked to or able to utilize data generated by other services' UAVs. Each
service has tended to initiate its own separate development program,
specifically tailored to its own requirements, rather than adopting an
existing capability from another service. DOD is aware of this problem and
has taken some steps to address it. For example, DOD is evaluating several
areas, including vehicle development, training, and data sharing, to
determine if improvements in these areas will increase UAV
interoperability. However, we have not evaluated the effectiveness of
DOD's efforts at this time.
Second, weather and environmental constraints are a key limiting factor
for UAV operations. UAVs are generally not able to operate in certain
inclement weather conditions, including sandstorms and icing conditions.
For example, dust storms have kept Marine Corps UAVs from performing some
of their missions. At the same time, certain UAV sensors are capable of
"seeing" through clouds, sandstorms, and other inclement weather
conditions by day or night. Nonetheless, this capability may not be
available because the vehicles themselves are not always able to carry the
onboard sensors during these poor weather conditions, consequently
undermining the capability made available by UAV operations.
Third, communications represent a major challenge for UAVs. There is
widespread concern that UAVs are consuming increasingly large amounts of
communication bandwidth as DOD fields additional UAVs requiring
communications capability. Bandwidth is needed to support systems that
control the flight of UAVs, to transmit the data collected by payload
sensors, and to interface with air traffic control centers. As UAVs and
other weapons systems requiring bandwidth are increasingly employed,
limits on bandwidth availability will hamper DOD's ability to obtain the
benefits from these new weapons systems if bandwidth availability is not
expanded. DOD is aware of this challenge and is exploring possible
solutions.
A Strategic Plan and Effective DOD Oversight Can Be Helpful in Addressing the
Challenges
DOD has set up a Joint UAV Planning Task Force to guide UAV development
and fielding. The Task Force is the primary focal point, but has limited
authority to enforce program direction. The Task Force has issued its UAV
Roadmap 2002--2027 to communicate its vision and promote interoperability.
Although the Roadmap includes some elements of a strategic plan, DOD still
lacks a comprehensive plan, as well as an office with sufficient authority
to implement it. Without a strategic plan to guide investment decisions,
DOD will not be in a position to validate requirements, make sound
programmatic decisions, or establish funding priorities nor will the
Congress have all the information it needs to evaluate DOD's funding
requests. Furthermore, such a plan would help DOD anticipate and
potentially minimize the types of challenges that are emerging today.
Joint UAV Planning Task Force Established
In October 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics) created the Joint UAV Planning Task Force as the joint
advocate for developing and fielding UAVs. The Task Force is the focal
point to coordinate UAV efforts throughout DOD, helping to create a common
vision for future UAV-related activities and establish interoperability
standards. However, while the Task Force's authority focuses on program
review and advice, it is insufficient to enforce program direction. The
Task Force Director testified in March 2003 that the Task Force does not
have program directive authority, but instead provides the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) with
advice and recommendations6-that is, the Task Force tries to influence
service programs by proposing changes for consideration by the Under
Secretary. Last year, the Director of Defense Systems, in the Office of
the Undersecretary, testified that the Task Force tries to guide service
acquisition, planning, prioritization, and execution of unmanned air
systems.7 Nonetheless, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt
its suggestions and does not have approval authority. For example,
according to DOD officials, additional progress is needed to achieve
better interoperability among the services in UAV platform and sensor
coordination.
The Roadmap Has Some Elements of a Strategic Plan
The UAV Roadmap exhibits some elements of a strategic plan, but is not a
comprehensive plan to guide the development and fielding of UAVs that
complement each other, perform the range of missions needed, and avoid
duplication. Key elements of a strategic plan would include:
o a mission statement;
o an explanation of long-term goals and objectives;
o strategies to attain long-term goals;
o an explanation of the relationship between long-term goals and
objectives and annual performance goals;
o identification of external factors that could affect accomplishment of
the goals;
o a description of how program evaluations were used to establish or
revise the goals;
o a description of the relationship between similar programs; and
6 Statement of the Director, Joint UAV Planning Task Force, before the
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed
Services, March 26, 2003.
7 Statement of the Director, Defense Systems, Office of the Undersecretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services, March 17,
2004.
o information concerning funding needs and expenditures.
The Roadmap represents a good start on a strategic plan because it
incorporates some of the key elements. For example, the Roadmap identifies
approaches to attaining long- term goals, and it assesses, in part, annual
performance goals and performance indicators that identify progress toward
these goals. However, the Roadmap only minimally addresses the other key
elements. In particular, it does not explain the interrelationship between
service-specific efforts, identify opportunities for joint endeavors, or
address funding issues.
DOD officials acknowledged that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has
not issued any guidance that establishes an overall strategy for UAVs.
While several high-level DOD strategic-planning documents-including the
National Military Strategy and the Strategic Planning Guidance-provide
some general encouragement to pursue transformational technologies, these
documents do not provide specific guidance on UAV development or related
force structure integration. In 2004, we recommended that DOD develop a
strategic plan or set of plans. We understand that DOD plans to issue an
updated Roadmap later this year. We hope that the new Roadmap will include
all of the elements of a strategic plan. As we testified last year, it is
important that DOD's plan clearly identify goals, requirements, programs,
funding needs, performance measures, and the interrelationship of
service-specific programs to each other; how service-specific UAV programs
promote joint operations; and funding requirements. With such a plan, we
continue to believe that DOD will be better positioned to validate
requirements, integrate service efforts, and establish program and funding
priorities. We also believe that such a plan will assist the Congress in
evaluating DOD's funding requests for UAVs.
Our Prior Work Identifies Important Lessons for the Efficient Development,
Fielding, and Operational Use of UAVs
Within the past year, we have reviewed four UAV programs and observed
factors that lead to successful outcomes and others that tend to increase
risk of poor outcomes. The UAV programs included in our reviews were the
Global Hawk, Predator, Shadow, and Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems.
Table 1 displays the common factors that we identified that lead to
successful acquisition programs and those that increase risk and limit
success.
Table 1: Factors That Lead to or Limit Success
Lead to success Limit success
Innovative process Requirements that outstrip resources, including
technology
Evolutionary approach Rush to production
Management attention Ambitious schedules
Simple requirements and fixed resources Concurrent testing and production
Source: GAO.
Global Hawk Top management attention set the stage for the early success
of Global Hawk. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics) became personally involved in establishing the original
plan for development. Leadership insisted on fielding an initial
capability that could be developed within a fixed budget while providing
for an evolutionary process to add enhancements to succeeding versions.
The result was a successful advanced concept technology demonstration
which produced seven demonstrators, logged several thousand-flight hours,
passed its military usefulness assessment, and effectively supported
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In March 2001, the Air Force began a systems acquisition program that
continued the evolutionary approach with a plan to first acquire basic
systems very similar to the demonstrators (designated the RQ-4A) and then
slowly and incrementally develop and acquire systems with more advanced
sensor capabilities while using the same air vehicle. However, DOD
restructured the program twice in 2002 to more quickly develop and field a
larger air vehicle (RQ-4B) with more advanced but immature technologies.
The restructurings tripled development costs and compressed the
procurement schedule. Program funding, which previously had been stretched
relatively evenly across 20 years, was compressed into roughly half the
time, tripling Global Hawk's budgetary requirements in some years. The
development period was expanded by 5 years and production period
compressed by 9 years, creating significant concurrency between fiscal
years 2004 to 2010. By adding the new larger air vehicle with its
associated new technologies and design elements, while speeding up the
acquisition schedule, the Air Force accepted higher risks compared to the
original plan which followed a more evolutionary approach.
Because of this concurrency, the Air Force plans to invest in almost half
of the total fleet of the new larger Global Hawks before a production
model is flight-tested and operational evaluations are completed to show
that the air vehicle design works as required. Likewise, full-rate
production will begin before the airborne signals intelligence and
multiplatform radar (the two required capabilities justifying the new,
larger model) complete development and are flight-tested to prove the
integrated system will work as intended. The primary reason for building
the RQ-4B model was to integrate and carry the advanced sensors to provide
added capability to the warfighter. In our November 2004 report, we raised
concerns about the substantial concurrency and accelerated pace for
acquiring the new system. We recommended rethinking the revised plans and
limiting initial procurement of the new model until a new business case is
completed that reduces risk and justifies further investments based on a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy. The Air Force did not agree with us,
but we note that since our report was issued, DOD officials have
criticized the Global Hawk program for cost increases and have decreased
buys in fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
Shadow The Army's Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program, called Shadow,
had unusual interventions by top-level individuals that early on
established resource constraints, encouraged evolutionary acquisition
strategies, and set an early fielding date. Agreements were reached to
ensure that the program followed a "no bells and whistles" approach to
development that focused on key achievable technologies and limited the
program to "must have" capabilities and restrained costs. Despite cost
increases and operational shortfalls caused largely because the program
did not allow time to develop and test the system before production began,
the Army was still able to quickly deliver a needed capability to the
warfighter that has been used during recent combat operations.
Predator The Air Force's Predator A (MQ-1) also had success by following
an innovative advanced concept technology demonstration approach.
Development was focused and brisk and within 18-months of start-up
prototypes were deployed in Bosnia, demonstrating its worth before
completing development and starting production. Predator As are being used
with substantial success in Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.
However, the Air Force then started a highly-concurrent development and
production program in 2002 to quickly acquire substantial numbers of a
new, larger, and multirole variant, the Predator B (MQ-9). Subsequently,
Air Force headquarters revised the strategy to include fielding an interim
combat capability by fiscal year 2006 and developing Predator B in three
separate increments, thereby extending the completion of development by 4
years. Recognizing increased risks, the program office lowered annual buy
quantities and extended production 5 years.
Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems
This joint effort combined previously separate efforts of the Air Force
and Navy to develop advanced unmanned systems that can attack ground
targets. The Air Force had plans to abandon its initial low-risk approach
to development that increased its requirements and accelerated its program
schedule shortly before shifting to product development. Concerned about
the accelerated schedule and a lack of synergy in the separate Air Force
and Navy efforts, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials intervened
to reconcile requirements and funding challenges and to improve oversight.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was designated to lead the
joint demonstration program with Air Force and Navy participation. Plans
and strategy established a $4 billion demonstration program that would
develop larger versions of the Air Force and Navy prototypes, leading to
an operational assessment in 2007. A common operating system was to be
developed and both versions were expected to also share common subsystems
and weapons. The intent was to then offer alternatives to the services
leading to possible start-up of systems development in 2010.
Although not clear at this time, program direction and content appears to
be again changing. Congress reduced fiscal year 2005 funding, stating that
the program had not properly coordinated with the services and that the
focus should be on meeting Air Force and Navy requirements. Recently, DOD
decided to transfer leadership and funding from the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency to the Air Force as joint office lead with Navy
participation. Transitioning will occur this year with Air Force taking
over in 2006.
There are trends that run consistently through these four programs. That
is, when DOD provides strong leadership at an appropriate organizational
level, it enables innovative, evolutionary, and disciplined processes to
work. Once leadership is removed or diminished, all these programs have
tended to lose control of requirements and add technical and funding risk.
We have also found that after successful demonstrations to quickly field
systems with existing technologies, problems were encountered after the
programs transitioned into the system development phase of the acquisition
process. The services pushed programs into production without maturing
processes and also began to add new requirements that stretched beyond
technology and design resources. DOD officials tend to agree with the
factors that lead to success and those that lead to problems and have made
some limited progress in the last year, but we have not yet seen a
consistent and across the board application of these successful practices.
Concluding Remarks We believe that a greater emphasis on strategic
planning and application of the lessons learned for development and
fielding of UAVs could be helpful in addressing the emerging challenges
that we are identifying on our current work for the Subcommittee. We will
more fully examine these emerging challenges and monitor DOD's efforts to
address the challenges, and we will report to you on this work later this
year.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy to
answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may have.
Contacts and Staff For future questions about this statement, please
contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619, Michael J. Sullivan at (937)
258-7915, or Brian J. Lepore at
Acknowledgments (202) 512-4523. Other individuals making key contributions
to this statement include Harry E. Taylor, Jr., Patricia F. Albritton,
Jeanett H. Reid, Elisha T. Matvay, Robert B. Brown, Cheryl A. Weissman,
Ron La Due Lake, Kenneth E. Patton, Lily J. Chin, Bruce D. Fairbairn,
Steven M. Hunter, Matthew B. Lea, Charlie Shivers, and Adam Vodraska.
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