Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information	 
Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further	 
Attention (15-APR-05, GAO-05-394).				 
                                                                 
Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important	 
tool in federal efforts to secure the nation's ports against a	 
potential terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead		 
responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing	 
efforts. The Coast Guard has established area maritime security  
committees--forums that involve federal and nonfederal officials 
who identify and address risks in a port. The Coast Guard and	 
other agencies have sought to further enhance information sharing
and port security operations by establishing interagency	 
operational centers--command centers that tie together the	 
efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. GAO was asked to 
review the efforts to see what impact the committees and	 
interagency operational centers have had on improving information
sharing and to identify any barriers that have hindered 	 
information sharing.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-394 					        
    ACCNO:   A21746						        
  TITLE:     Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved	      
Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires  
Further Attention						 
     DATE:   04/15/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Coast Guard personnel				 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Harbors						 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     Physical security					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Information sharing				 
	     Stakeholder consultations				 
	     Critical infrastructure				 

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GAO-05-394

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2005

MARITIME SECURITY

    New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance
                     Processing Requires Further Attention

GAO-05-394

[IMG]

April 2005

MARITIME SECURITY

New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance
Processing Requires Further Attention

                                 What GAO Found

Area maritime security committees provide a structure that improves
information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port
locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the
newly formed committees were an improvement over previous information
sharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of
vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends
to use in protecting key infrastructure.

The three interagency operational centers established to date allow for
even greater information sharing because the centers operate on a
24-hour-a-day basis, and they receive real-time information from data
sources such as radars and sensors. The Coast Guard is planning to develop
its own centers-called sector command centers-at up to 40 additional port
locations to monitor information and to support its operations. The
relationship between the interagency operational centers and the planned
expansion of sector command centers remains to be determined.

The major barrier hindering information sharing has been the lack of
federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or
centers. By February 2005-or 4 months after the Coast Guard developed a
list of 359 committee members who needed a security clearance-28 of the
359 members had submitted the necessary paperwork for a security
clearance. Coast Guard field officials did not clearly understand that
they were responsible for contacting nonfederal officials about the
clearance process. To deal with this, in early April 2005, the Coast Guard
issued guidance to field offices that clarified their role. In addition,
the Coast Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of
data to monitor application trends. Developing such procedures would aid
in identifying deficiencies in the future. As the Coast Guard proceeds
with its program, another way to improve the submission of paperwork
involves educating nonfederal officials about the clearance process.

           Interagency Operational Centers Coordinate Harbor Patrols

Source: GAO.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information

Sharing
Interagency Operational Centers Have Also Improved Information
Sharing
Lack of Security Clearances Is a Key Barrier to More Effective

Information Sharing
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      3 6

11

16

23 31 31 32

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Appendix II	Stakeholder Groups Recommended for Membership on Area Maritime
Security Committees

Appendix III	Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure 38

Appendix IV	Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 47

GAO Contacts 47
Staff Acknowledgments 47

  Related GAO Products 48

  Tables

Table 1: Representatives That an Area Maritime Security Committee Could
Include 37

Table 2: Department and Agency Intelligence Organizations at the National,
Regional, and Field Level That Are Potentially Involved in Maritime
Information Sharing 38

  Figures

Figure 1: Ports Facilitate Cargo Container Traffic, an Important Segment
of Maritime Commerce 7 Figure 2: Area Maritime Security Committees Protect
a Wide Range

of Port Facilities and Adjacent Infrastructure 13 Figure 3: Coast Guard
Patrol Enforces Security Zone at a Port 18 Figure 4: Flow of Information
from National and Regional Coast

Guard Sources to Area Maritime Security Committees and

Interagency Operational Centers at the Port Level 42 Figure 5: Flow of
Information between National Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies and
between the National and the Port Level 44

Abbreviations

DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DOJ Department of Justice
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
OMB Office of Management and Budget

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

April 15, 2005

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger
The Honorable George Miller
House of Representatives

Securing the nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack has
become
one of the nation's security priorities since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Factors that make ports vulnerable to a terrorist
attack include their location near major urban centers, such as New York
and Los Angeles; their inclusion of critical infrastructure such as oil
refineries and terminals; and their economic importance for the nation's
economy and trade. Although no port-related terrorist attacks have
occurred in the United States, internationally terrorists have
demonstrated
their ability to access and destroy infrastructure, assets, and lives in
and
around seaports. According to the Coast Guard, a major port closure for 1
month could cost tens of billions of dollars, disrupting trade and the
U.S.
economy as a whole.1

Given that ports are sprawling enterprises that often cross jurisdictional
boundaries, the need to share information among federal, state, and local
agencies is central to effective prevention and response. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002, which provided the basis for federal efforts against
terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, underscores the
importance of sharing timely, effective, and useful information to enhance
the shared partnership among federal, state, and local entities in the
fight
against terrorism.2 The act recognizes that sharing information with state
and local officials can improve the capability of nonfederal officials to
deter, prevent, or disrupt a possible terrorist attack.

1See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard Fiscal Year
2004 Report (Washington D.C.: February 2004).

2P.L. 107-296, S: 891-892 (Nov. 25, 2002).

Since the terrorist attacks, the federal government has taken a number of
approaches designed to enhance information sharing.3 One of these
approaches, called for under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 (MTSA), was to provide the Coast Guard with authority for creating
area maritime security committees at the port level.4 These committees-
which were to include representatives from the federal, state, local, and
private sectors-were intended as a way to identify and deal with
vulnerabilities in and around ports, as well as to provide a forum for
sharing information on issues related to port security. Much of the
federally generated information about port security-such as assessments of
specific port vulnerabilities or information about potential threats being
monitored-is classified national security information and cannot be
released, even to law enforcement personnel, if they have not undergone
the necessary federal background checks and received a security clearance.
Lacking access to such information, nonfederal officials may be at a
disadvantage in their efforts to respond to or combat a terrorist threat.

As another approach to improving information sharing and port security
operations, various federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland
Security (through the U.S. Coast Guard), the Department of the Navy, and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), have developed interagency operational
centers at certain port locations.5 These centers are command posts that
tie together the intelligence and operational efforts of various federal
and nonfederal participants. They currently exist in three locations:
Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California.
Congress has expressed interest in knowing more about the applicability of
such centers in other locations, and it required the Coast Guard to submit
a report by February 2005 that describes, among other things, the number
of ports that could benefit from such centers and the associated cost of
implementing them.

3Homeland security information sharing is the two-way exchange of
information, including intelligence, critical infrastructure, and law
enforcement information, among federal, state, and local governments and
the private sector to establish timely, effective, and useful
communications to detect, prevent, and mitigate potential terrorist
attacks.

4The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, P.L.107-295, contains
many of the homeland security requirements related specifically to port
security. The area maritime security committees are authorized by section
102 of MTSA, as codified at 46 U.S.C. S: 70112(a)(2) and implemented at 33
C.F.R. Part 103.

5We use the term interagency operational centers to refer to centers where
multiple federal (and in some cases, state and local) agencies are
involved in monitoring maritime security and planning related operations.

The experience gleaned to date from both of these approaches to improving
information sharing represents an opportunity that could help guide future
efforts to improve port security. Therefore, we examined the efforts of
the Coast Guard and other federal agencies in improving information
sharing between and among federal, state, local, and industry
stakeholders. This report addresses the following questions:

o  	What impact have area maritime security committees had on information
sharing?

o  	What impact have interagency operational centers had on information
sharing?

o  	What barriers, if any, have hindered improvements in information
sharing among port security stakeholders?

To answer these questions, we focused much of our work at the port level.
To review the activities of area maritime security committees, we selected
four ports for detailed review. These four ports-Baltimore, Maryland;
Charleston, South Carolina; Houston, Texas; and Seattle, Washington- were
selected to reflect various coastal regions and a wide range of volume and
types of operations. To review the activities of the interagency
operational centers, we visited all three centers currently in operation,
discussing ways in which the centers operate with both federal and
nonfederal participants as well as observing operations at the centers.
During our visits, we talked with Coast Guard officials involved in
sharing information and we also discussed information sharing issues with
numerous nonfederal stakeholders, including private sector officials and
officials from port authorities or local law enforcement. We examined in
more detail the Coast Guard's procedures for processing security
clearances for members of area maritime security committees. We also
reviewed legislation and congressional committee reports related to
information sharing, reviewed numerous other documents and reports on the
issue, and spoke with officials at the Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) about their approaches to sharing information with
nonfederal entities. See appendix I for further explanation of our scope
and methodology. Our work, which was conducted between May 2004 and March
2005, was done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

Results in Brief	Area maritime security committees have provided a
structure to improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of
information sharing

between federal and nonfederal stakeholders. At the four port locations we
visited, stakeholders said the newly formed committees were an improvement
over previous information sharing efforts because the committees
established a formal structure for communicating information and
established new procedures for sharing information. Stakeholders stated
that among other things, the committees have been used as a forum for
sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing information on illegal
or suspicious activities and providing input on portwide security plans-
called area maritime security plans-that describe the joint strategies of
the Coast Guard and its partner agencies for protecting key infrastructure
against terrorist activities. Nonfederal stakeholders, including state
officials, local port authority operators, and representatives of private
companies, said the information sharing had increased their awareness of
security issues around the port and allowed them to identify and address
security issues at their facilities. Likewise, Coast Guard officials said
the information they received from nonfederal participants had helped in
mitigating and reducing risks. While committees at each of the four
locations had the same guidance, they varied in such ways as the size of
the membership and the types of stakeholders represented. For example, to
prevent a duplication of efforts, some of the committees rely on existing
information sharing networks, such as trade and industry associations, and
have Coast Guard officials participate directly with these groups, while
other ports we visited carried out more of the work in the committee
forum. We were not able to determine if certain of these structures or
approaches work better than others, largely because the committees are
just over a year old. More time will be needed before such assessments can
be made.

The three interagency operational centers established to date allow for
even greater information sharing because the centers operate 24 hours a
day and receive real-time operational information from radars, sensors,
and cameras, as well as classified data on personnel, vessels, and cargo,
according to center participants. In contrast, the area maritime security
committees, while they have a broader membership, primarily provide
information through meetings, documents, and other means that are often
used for long-term planning purposes rather than day-to-day operations.
The three existing interagency centers fulfill varying missions and
operations, and thus share different types of information. For example,
the center in Charleston, South Carolina, focuses on port security alone
and is led by DOJ. In contrast, the center in San Diego supports the Coast
Guard's missions beyond port security, including drug interdiction, alien
migrant interdiction, and search and rescue activities, and is led by the
Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is planning to develop its own operational

centers-called sector command centers-at up to 40 additional port
locations to monitor maritime information and to support Coast Guard
operations. The relationship between the planned expansion of centers by
the Coast Guard and the existing interagency operational centers-in
particular, how many other agencies will participate in the Coast Guard's
centers-remains to be determined.

While information sharing has generally improved, a major barrier
mentioned most frequently by stakeholders as hindering information sharing
has been the lack of federal security clearances among port security
stakeholders. The lack of security clearances may limit the ability of
state, local, and industry officials, such as those involved in area
maritime security committees or interagency operational centers, to deter,
prevent, and respond to a potential terrorist attack. By February 2005-or
over 4 months after the Coast Guard had developed a list of over 350
nonfederal area maritime security committee participants with a need for a
security clearance-28 had submitted the necessary paperwork for the
background check. There were two main reasons why the Coast Guard had not
processed security clearances more expeditiously. First, local Coast Guard
officials said they did not clearly understand their responsibility for
communicating with state and local officials about the process for
obtaining a security clearance. After receiving a draft of our report, the
Coast Guard issued guidelines clarifying the role that local Coast Guard
officials play in the program. Second, the Coast Guard had not developed
formal procedures for using its database on security clearance applicants
to troubleshoot potential problems and take appropriate management action.
As the Coast Guard proceeds with its program, nonfederal officials could
benefit from more information on the process for obtaining a security
clearance. The FBI, which spearheaded a similar effort (but not specific
to ports) to expedite security clearances for nonfederal officials, found
that nonfederal officials were slow in submitting application forms in
part because of the lack of awareness about the security clearance
process, and the agency made specific efforts to educate local officials
about the application process. Similar educational efforts by the Coast
Guard might help clear up any such uncertainties about the application
process. Other barriers to greater information sharing identified by
committee participants included the size and complexity of ports-factors
that are intrinsic to port operations-but none of these barriers were
mentioned as frequently and considered as important as the lack of
security clearances.

In this report, we recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to develop formal procedures

so that local Coast Guard and headquarters officials use the Coast Guard's
database as a management tool to monitor who has submitted applications
for a security clearance and to take appropriate action when application
trends point to possible problems. For example, updating the database on a
routine basis could identify port areas where progress is slow and
indicate that follow-up with local field office officials may be needed.
Finally, we are also recommending that the Coast Guard raise the awareness
of state, local, and industry officials about the process of applying for
security clearances. This effort could involve using brochures and other
information that the FBI has used in its program for educating state and
local officials about the security clearance process.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Homeland
Security, including the Coast Guard, generally agreed with our findings
and recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security's written
comments are in appendix IV.

                                   Background

    Ports Are Important and Vulnerable

Ports play an important role in the nation's economy and security. Ports
are used to import and export cargo worth hundreds of billions of dollars,
generating jobs, both directly and indirectly, for Americans and our
trading partners. Ports, which include inland waterways, are used to move
bulk agricultural, mineral, petroleum, and paper products. In addition,
ports are also used to move cargo containers (as shown in fig. 1)-one of
the most important segments of global commerce, accounting for 90 percent
of the world's maritime cargo. In 2002, approximately 7 million containers
arrived in U.S. seaports, carrying more than 95 percent of the nation's
non-North American trade by weight and 75 percent by value. Ports also
contribute to the economy through recreational activities such as boating,
fishing, and cruises. As an indication of the economic importance of
ports, a 2002 simulation of a terrorist attack at a port led to the
temporary closure of every seaport in the United States and resulted in an
estimated loss of $58 billion in revenue to the U.S. economy, including
spoilage, loss of sales, manufacturing slowdowns, and halts in
production.6 Ports are also important to national security because they
host naval bases

6The consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton and the Conference Board
sponsored the simulation in 2002. In the simulation, representatives from
government and industry participated in a scenario involving the discovery
and subsequent detonation of radioactive bombs hidden in cargo containers.

and vessels, facilitate the movement of military equipment, and supply
troops deployed overseas.

Figure 1: Ports Facilitate Cargo Container Traffic, an Important Segment
of Maritime Commerce

Source: GAO.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation's 361 seaports
have been increasingly viewed as potential targets for future terrorist
attacks. Ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven with
complex transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and
easily accessible. Ports and their maritime approaches facilitate a unique
freedom of movement and flow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and
vessels to transit with relative anonymity. Because of their
accessibility, ports are vulnerable to a wide variety of types of attacks.
Cargo containers-mentioned above as important to maritime commerce-are a
potential conduit for terrorists to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or
other dangerous materials into the country. Finally, ports contain a
number of specific facilities that could be targeted by terrorists,
including military vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries,
terminals, dams and locks, factories, office buildings, power plants,
refineries, sports complexes, and other critical infrastructure.

    Multiple Jurisdictions Are Involved in Securing the Nation's Ports

The responsibility for protecting ports from a terrorist attack is a
shared responsibility that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, with
federal, state, and local organizations involved. For example, at the
federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has overall
homeland security responsibility, and the Coast Guard, an agency of the
department, has lead responsibility for maritime security. Other federal
departments that may be involved include the Department of Defense (DOD)
and DOJ. The Coast Guard and other federal agencies share their security
responsibilities with several local stakeholder groups. Some port
authorities, operated privately or by the state or local government, have
responsibility for protecting certain facilities in and around ports. Port
authorities provide protection through designated port police forces,
private security companies, and coordination with local law enforcement
agencies. Private sector stakeholders play a major role in identifying and
addressing the vulnerabilities in and around their facilities, which may
include oil refineries, cargo facilities, and other property adjacent to
navigable waterways.

    Information Sharing Is Important to Port Security Activities

Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is central
to port security activities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and several
congressionally chartered commissions call attention to the importance of
sharing information among officials from multiple jurisdictions as a way
to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack.7 The act recognizes that the
federal government relies on state and local personnel to help protect
against terrorist attacks, and these officials need homeland security
information to prevent and prepare for such attacks.8 One of the
congressionally chartered commissioned reports-the 9/11 Commission
Report-placed emphasis on the importance of sharing information among
federal and nonfederal entities as a means of deterring a terrorist attack
in the future. In January 2005, we designated information sharing for
homeland security as a high-risk area because the federal government still
faces formidable challenges in gathering, identifying, analyzing, and

7These congressionally chartered commissions include the 9/11 Commission
(the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States), the
Gilmore Commission (the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction), the
Bremer Commission (the National Commission on Terrorism), and the
Hart-Rudman Commission (the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century).

8P.L. 107-296, S: 891 (Nov. 25, 2002).

disseminating key information within and among federal and nonfederal

9

entities.

Information sharing between federal officials and nonfederal officials can
involve information collected by federal intelligence agencies. In order
to gain access to classified information, state and local law enforcement
officials generally need to apply for and receive approval to have a
federal security clearance. Presidential Executive Order 12968, Access to
Classified Information, dated August 1995, established federal criteria
for granting access to classified information. As implemented by the Coast
Guard, the primary criterion for granting access to classified information
is an individual's "need to know," which is defined as the determination
made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective
recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to
perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.10 To
obtain a security clearance, an applicant must complete a detailed
questionnaire that asks for information on all previous employment,
residences, and foreign travel and contacts that reach back 7 years. After
submitting the questionnaire, the applicant then undergoes a variety of
screenings and checks by the Coast Guard Security Center. The Office of
Personnel Management conducts background investigations on the applicant.

    Area Maritime Security Committees Are Established to Facilitate Information
    Sharing between Port Security Stakeholders

The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks and with the recognition that ports contain many
potential security targets, provided for area maritime security committees
to be established by the Coast Guard at ports across the country.11 A
primary goal of these committees is to assist the local Captain of the
Port-the senior Coast Guard officer who leads the committee-to develop a
security plan-called an area maritime security plan-to address the
vulnerabilities and risks in that port zone.12 In developing these

9GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington D.C.: January
2005).

10Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, Section 1.1(h).

11See 46 U.S.C. S: 70112(a)(2). Prior to MTSA, some port locations had
harbor safety committees that had representatives from federal, state, and
local organizations. In addition, port security committees had been
organized and still exist at ports where substantial out-load and in-load
of military equipment occurs.

12See 33 C.F.R. S: 103.500.

plans, the committees serve as forums to communicate with stakeholders
from federal agencies, state and local governments, law enforcement, and
private industries in an effort to gain a comprehensive perspective of
security issues at a port location. The committees also serve as a link
for communicating threats and disseminating security information to port
stakeholders. In all, the Coast Guard ultimately organized 43 area
maritime security committees, covering the nation's 361 ports.13 Besides
the Coast Guard, federal agencies such as the Customs and Border
Protection, FBI, or Maritime Administration may be part of the committee.
State, local, and industry members could include officials from port
authorities, oil refineries, and local police or fire departments.
Appendix II lists the various stakeholder groups that may be eligible.

To supplement the statutory and regulatory framework of the committees,
the Coast Guard developed specific guidelines on communication and
collaboration among committee members.14 This guidance emphasizes the
importance of information in successfully implementing security measures
and recognizes that the committee structure allows stakeholders to
identify other federal, state, and local agencies that are simultaneously
developing security standards for other critical infrastructure, such as
bridges and airports. The guidance tasks the committee with developing
information sharing procedures for various situations, including relaying
instances of suspicious activity to appropriate authorities and
communicating to port stakeholders threat information, among other things.

    Interagency Operational Centers Involve Multiple Participants and Offer
    Another Means of Improving Information Sharing

Another approach at improving information sharing and port security
operations involves interagency operational centers-command centers
that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various
federal and nonfederal participants. These centers provide intelligence
information and real-time operational data from sensors, radars, and
cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal participants 24 hours a
day. The three current centers are in Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk,
Virginia; and San Diego, California. Two of the centers (Norfolk and
San Diego) are located in ports that have a substantial number of vessels

13Because some ports are located close to one another, some committees
cover several ports. For example, the Puget Sound area maritime security
committee includes the ports of Seattle, Tacoma, Bremerton, Port Angeles,
and Everett.

14Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 9-02, Change 1, Sept. 2002.

and facilities operated by the Department of the Navy. The third center
(Charleston) is located at a port that moves military equipment in and out
of the port, and it is a major container cargo port.

The development of interagency operational centers represents an effort to
improve awareness of incoming vessels, port facilities, and port
operations. In general, these centers are jointly operated by federal and
nonfederal law enforcement officials. The centers can have command and
control capabilities that can be used to communicate information to
vessels, aircraft, and other vehicles and stations involved in port
security operations.

    Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and Supports, National-Level
    Intelligence Infrastructure

  Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information Sharing

While area maritime security committees and interagency operational
centers are port-level organizations, they are supported by, and provide
support to, a national-level intelligence infrastructure. National-level
departments and agencies in the intelligence and law enforcement
communities may offer information that ultimately could be useful to
members of area maritime security committees or interagency operational
centers at the port level. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies
conduct maritime threat identification and dissemination efforts in
support of tactical and operational maritime and port security efforts,
but most have missions broader than maritime activities as well. In
addition, some agencies also have regional or field offices involved in
information gathering and sharing. See appendix III for a description of
the departments and agencies or components involved in maritime
information sharing at the national and port levels.

Area maritime security committees have improved information sharing among
port security stakeholders, and made improvements in the timeliness,
completeness, and usefulness of information. The types of information
shared include assessments of vulnerabilities at specific port locations,
information about potential threats or suspicious activities, and
strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key
infrastructure. These efforts at sharing information generally did not
exist prior to the creation of area maritime security committees. At the
ports we visited, the collaboration and sharing of information between
committee members reflected the different types of stakeholders and
variations in the information needs of each port location. While
improvements were noted, it is too early to determine if any one port has
developed a better structure for information sharing than another, because
the committees have only been operating for just over a year.

    Ports Reviewed Showed Improvements in Timeliness, Completeness, and
    Usefulness of Shared Information

Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve the
timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. For
example, a primary function served by the committees was to develop
security plans for port areas-called area maritime security plans. The
goal of these plans was to identify vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack
in and around a port location and to develop strategies for protecting a
wide range of facilities and infrastructure (as shown in fig. 2). In doing
so, the committees established new procedures for sharing information by
holding meetings on a regular basis, issuing electronic bulletins on
suspicious activities around port facilities, and sharing key documents,
including vulnerability assessments and the portwide security plan itself,
according to committee participants. These activities did not exist prior
to the creation of the committees, and they have contributed to the
improvements in information sharing. The area maritime security plan
provides a framework for communication and coordination among port
stakeholders and law enforcement officials, and identifies strategies for
reducing vulnerabilities to security threats in and near ports. It is
designed to capture the information necessary to coordinate and
communicate security procedures at each maritime security level,
complement and encompass facility and vessel security plans, and
ultimately be integrated into the National Maritime Security Plan. Coast
Guard officials and nonfederal stakeholders we contacted agreed that
efforts such as these have improved information sharing.

Figure 2: Area Maritime Security Committees Protect a Wide Range of Port
Facilities and Adjacent Infrastructure

Source: GAO.

Committee participants we spoke with noted that an essential component
that has improved the timeliness of information sharing has been the
development of both formal and informal stakeholder networks resulting
from the formation of area maritime security committees. As part of the
process for developing the plan, the committee identifies critical
stakeholders and assembles their contact information, allowing for timely
dissemination of relevant information. For example, in the event the Coast
Guard learns of a potential and credible threat, the committee would
designate who should be contacted, the order in which members should be
contacted, and what information the committee provides or receives.
Participants in the committees told us that the interactions of committee
members have also led to the formation of informal stakeholder networks as
committee members encounter other stakeholders with similar concerns and
perspectives. The committee also provides a forum for realtime sharing of
information between stakeholders through meetings or electronic
communications. For example, our discussions with federal and nonfederal
officials at the ports of Charleston and Houston indicated that

committee members representing private industries were granted access to
daily information bulletins that they had not received prior to the
formation of area maritime security committees, and these information
bulletins have allowed them to stay informed of important Coast Guard
decisions. In Houston, the Captain of the Port has used such bulletins to
notify and inform local stakeholders of unannounced drills, changes in
security levels, and Coast Guard guidance for vessel inspections and
voluntary screening. In Charleston, bulletins have been used to share
information on closure of waterways, release of new regulations, and
methods for preventing a possible terrorist attack.

At the ports we visited, committee members noted that their participation
has allowed them to disseminate more complete information and receive more
useful information in return. Committee members representing the private
sector at two of the ports we visited noted an increased willingness to
disclose vulnerabilities to federal stakeholders with confidence that the
information would be protected. Coast Guard officials noted that access to
more complete information regarding vulnerabilities and threats at
individual facilities has aided them in mitigating risks. Additionally,
having a complete view of vulnerabilities at the port as a whole has been
useful in identifying gaps and common security needs. For example, while
private sector stakeholders are sharing their written assessments of their
vulnerabilities with the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard is, in turn, sharing
its strategies for the overall protection of ports against potential
terrorist activities. State and local port authority operators and private
sector stakeholders commented that the committees have increased their
awareness of security issues around the port and that information received
from the Coast Guard has been useful in identifying and addressing
security concerns at their facilities. Efforts at sharing information
prior to the creation of area maritime security committees had not
produced such effects.

    Committees Have Flexibility in Their Structure and in the Way in Which They
    Share Information

While the committees are required to follow the same guidance regarding
their structure, purpose, and processes, each of the committees is allowed
the flexibility to assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs
of its port area. Each port is unique in many ways, including the
geographic area covered and the type of operations that take place there.
These portspecific differences influence the number of members that
participate, the types of state and local organizations that members
represent, and the way in which information is shared.

One aspect of this flexibility is the way in which information is
channeled to specific stakeholders. The representation of various
stakeholders on a committee can cause differences in the type of
information that is shared. While committee members from federal agencies
may have access to classified information because they have obtained a
security clearance, other members may receive a sanitized version of the
information or be restricted from participating in certain committee
meetings. To mitigate this situation, some committees have formed
subcommittees that deal with classified materials such as intelligence
reports or details of military deployments.15 The role stakeholders play
in protecting strategic assets or the type of cargo they handle may also
affect what types of information they receive as well as what types of
information they can share with the committee at large. For example, at
one port we visited, the details regarding a shipment of a sensitive
material were restricted to committee members that had a direct
involvement in the operation.

The committees also show marked differences in how their meetings occur,
and these differences in turn affect the specific ways in which
information is shared. For example, at Baltimore, officials told us that
committee meetings are open to the general port community and can draw
over 80 participants in addition to the 48 committee members. Coast Guard
officials told us that such a large attendance made it difficult to
conduct committee business. To include all interested stakeholders in the
information network while maintaining a working structure for the
committee, the Captain of the Port designated 17 members to an executive
committee, while the remaining 31 members served on a general committee.
This structure allowed the committee to incorporate a large amount of
stakeholder input and to share information with all interested parties
while keeping the decision making duties of the committee at a manageable
level. In contrast to Baltimore's 48 members, the Puget Sound area
maritime security committee consists of 25 members who each share in
decision making. The smaller committee allows for greater familiarity
amongst members as well as immediate decision making at meetings because
stakeholders with decision making authority are all present.

At least two of the other committees we reviewed leveraged existing
information sharing networks, such as trade and industry associations, by
having Coast Guard officials participate in these groups. For example, at

15The area maritime security committee for the port of Charleston has a
separate intelligence subcommittee made up of members that have security
clearances.

Charleston, Coast Guard officials noted that many of the stakeholders
included on the area maritime security committee were already members of a
local maritime association that had been operating since 1926. Officials
from the Coast Guard and other federal agencies are members of the
association and use the group's meetings as one way of sharing information
with stakeholders. Coast Guard officials noted that while this approach
may reduce the role and level of participation in the committee, it avoids
duplication of efforts and allows the committee to be part of a broader
information sharing network. At the port of Houston, the strong presence
of the petrochemical industry also made sharing information easier since
an association of petrochemical companies was already in place, according
to local petrochemical and Coast Guard officials.

Regardless of the structures and communication networks a committee
adopted, stakeholders at all four locations we reviewed agreed that the
committees fostered improved information sharing. We were not able,
however, to determine if any of these structures worked better than others
for two reasons. First, the different structures reflected the specific
needs of each port location. Second, the committees are still in their
early stages of operation and more time will be needed before any
comparative assessments can be made.

Interagency operational centers-command centers where officials from
multiple agencies can receive data 24 hours a day on maritime activities-
have further improved information sharing at three locations. According to
participants at each of these centers, the improvements come mainly from
the 24-hour coverage and greater amount of real-time, operational data,
which the centers can use in their role as command posts for coordinating
multi-agency efforts. The Coast Guard is developing plans to develop its
own centers, called sector command centers, as part of an effort to
reorganize and improve its awareness of the maritime domain. Some of these
sector command centers may be interagency on either a regular or an ad hoc
basis. However, the potential relationship between interagency operational
centers and the Coast Guard's new sector command centers remains to be
determined, pending a Coast Guard report to Congress.

  Interagency Operational Centers Have Also Improved Information Sharing

Centers Process and Share Information sharing at the three existing
interagency operational centers

Information on Operations 	(Charleston, Norfolk, and San Diego),
represents a step toward further improving information sharing, according
to participants at all three centers. They said area maritime security
committees have improved information sharing primarily through a planning
process that identifies

vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, as well as through development
of two-way communication mechanisms to share threat information on an
asneeded basis. In contrast, interagency operational centers can provide
continuous information about maritime activities and involve various
agencies directly in operational decisions using this information. Radar,
sensors, and cameras offer representations of vessels and facilities.
Other data are available from intelligence sources, including data on
vessels, cargo, and crew. For example:

o  	In Charleston, four federal agencies (DOJ, Coast Guard, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)
coordinate in a unified command structure, and each of these agencies
feeds information into the center. Eight state or local agencies (such as
the county sheriff and the state's law enforcement division) have
participants at the center full-time, and eight others participate on an
as-needed or part-time basis. Federal and nonfederal officials told us
that information sharing has improved, since participants from multiple
agencies are colocated with each other and work together to identify
potential threats by sharing information.

o  	In San Diego, the center is located in a Coast Guard facility that
receives information from radars and sensors operated by the Navy and
cameras operated by the local harbor patrol. Local harbor patrol officials
are colocated with Coast Guard and Navy personnel. Harbor patrol and Coast
Guard staff said the center has leveraged their resources through the use
of shared information.

o  	In Norfolk, the center is staffed with Coast Guard and Navy personnel
and receives information from cameras and radars. A Coast Guard Field
Intelligence Support Team is colocated at the center and shares
information related to the large concentration of naval and commercial
vessels in and around the port area with Navy and Coast Guard personnel.
According to Coast Guard officials, having a central location where two
agencies can receive data from multiple sources on a 24hour-a-day basis
has helped improve information sharing.

Greater information sharing among participants at these centers has also
enhanced operational collaboration, according to participants. Unlike the
area maritime security committees, these centers are operational in
nature-that is, they have a unified or joint command structure designed to
receive information and act on it. In the three centers, representatives
from the various agencies work side by side, each having access to
databases and other sources of information from their respective agencies.
The various information sources can be reviewed together, and the

resulting information can be more readily fused together. Officials said
such centers help leverage the resources and authorities of the respective
agencies. For example, federal and nonfederal participants collaborate in
vessel boarding, cargo examination, and other port security
responsibilities, such as enforcing security zones (as shown in fig. 3).
If the Coast Guard determines that a certain vessel should be inspected on
maritime safety grounds and intends to board it, other federal and
nonfederal agencies might join in the boarding to assess the vessel or its
cargo, crew, or passengers for violations relating to their areas of
jurisdiction or responsibility.

Figure 3: Coast Guard Patrol Enforces Security Zone at a Port

                                  Source: GAO.

Variations across Centers The types of information and the way information
is shared varies at the

Affect Information Sharing 	three centers, depending on their purpose and
mission, leadership and organization, membership, technology, and
resources, according to officials at the centers. The Charleston center
has a port security purpose, so its missions are all security related. It
is led by DOJ, and its membership

includes 4 federal agencies and 16 state and local agencies. The San Diego
center has a more general purpose, so it has multiple missions to include,
not just port security, but search and rescue, environmental response,
drug interdiction, and other law enforcement activities. It is led by the
Coast Guard, and its membership includes two federal agencies and one
local agency. The Norfolk center has a port security purpose, but its
mission focuses primarily on force protection for the Navy. It is led by
the Coast Guard, and its membership includes two federal agencies and no
state or local agencies. As a result, the Charleston center shares
information that focuses on law enforcement and intelligence related to
port security among a very broad group of federal, state, and local agency
officials. The San Diego center shares information on a broader scope of
activities (beyond security) among a smaller group of federal and local
agency officials. The Norfolk center shares the most focused information
(security information related to force protection) among two federal
agencies. While the Norfolk center officials said they were planning to
broaden the scope of their purpose, mission, and membership, they had not
done so at the time of our visit.

The centers also share different information because of their technologies
and resources. The San Diego and Norfolk centers have an array of standard
and new Coast Guard technology systems and access to Coast Guard and
various national databases, while the Charleston center has these as well
as additional systems and databases. For example, the Charleston center
has access to and shares information on Customs and Border Protection's
databases on incoming cargo containers from the National Targeting Center.
In addition, Charleston has a pilot project with the Department of Energy
to test radiation detection technology, which provides additional
information to share. The Charleston center is funded by a special
appropriation that allows it to use federal funds to pay for state and
local agency salaries. This arrangement boosts the participation of state
and local agencies, and thus information sharing beyond the federal
government, according to port stakeholders in Charleston. While the San
Diego center also has 24-hour participation by the local harbor patrol,
that agency pays its own salaries.

Other Ad Hoc In addition to the three interagency operational centers we
visited, our Arrangements for work has identified other interagency
arrangements that facilitate Interagency Information information sharing
and interagency operations in the maritime

environment. One example is a predesignated single-mission task
force,Sharing which becomes operational when needed. DHS established the
Homeland Security Task Force, South-East-a working group consisting of
federal

and nonfederal agencies with appropriate geographic and jurisdictional
responsibilities that have the mission to respond to any mass migration of
immigrants affecting southeast Florida. Task force members (both agencies
and individuals) are predesignated, and they have a contingency plan
(called Vigilant Sentry) that describes each agency's specific
coordination and mission responsibilities. The task force meets regularly
to monitor potential migration events, update the contingency plan, and
otherwise coordinate its activities. When a mass migration event occurs,
the task force is activated and becomes a full-time interagency effort to
share information and coordinate operations to implement the contingency
plan. This task force was activated in February 2004 to implement
Operation Able Sentry to interdict a mass migration from Haiti.

Another example of an interagency arrangement for information sharing can
occur in single-agency operational centers that become interagency to
respond to specific events. For example, the Coast Guard has its own
command centers for both its District Seven and Sector Miami. While these
centers normally focus on a variety of Coast Guard missions and are not
normally interagency in structure, they have established protocols with
other federal agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident
command structure should it be needed. For example, the interagency
Operation Able Sentry (discussed above) was directed from the Coast
Guard's District Seven command center. Similarly, to respond to a
hijacking of a ship, an interagency operation was directed from the Coast
Guard's Sector Miami command center. While an interagency operation might
be directed from these Coast Guard command centers, it might be led by
another agency with greater interests or resources to respond to an event.
For example, this was the case with a recent interagency operation to
arrange for the security of dignitaries at an international conference in
Miami that was led by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These Coast
Guard centers make it possible to host interagency operations because they
have extra space and equipment that allow for surge capabilities and
virtual connectivity with each partner agency.

Officials from the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Miami all said that these ad hoc
interagency arrangements were crucial to sharing information and
coordinating operations.

    Coast Guard Plans to Develop Sector Command Centers at Ports

The Coast Guard is planning to develop its own operational centers- called
sector command centers-at additional ports. These command centers are
being developed to provide local port activities with a unified command as
the Coast Guard reorganizes its marine safety offices and groups into
unified sectors. In addition, the Coast Guard sector command centers are
designed to improve awareness of the maritime domain through a variety of
technologies. The Coast Guard is planning to have command centers feed
information to the Coast Guard's two area offices-one on the Pacific Coast
and the other on the Atlantic Coast. Over the long term, the Coast Guard
plans to have information from sector command centers and area offices
channeled to a center at the national level-allowing the Coast Guard to
have a nationwide common operating picture of all navigable waters in the
country. A Coast Guard official indicated that this nationwide information
will be available to other field office commanders at the same time it is
given to area and headquarters officials. To develop this nationwide
operating picture, the Coast Guard hopes to install equipment that allows
it to receive information from sensors, classified information on maritime
matters, and data related to ships and crewmembers as part of its
expansion plans. Communication from Coast Guard ships and aircraft, as
well as federal and nonfederal systems for monitoring vessel traffic and
identifying the positions of large ships, would be among the other types
of information that could be integrated into a command center.

The Coast Guard plans to develop sector command centers at 10 port
locations, with potential expansion to as many as 40 port locations. The
Coast Guard is currently conducting site surveys to identify locations
where it believes centers should be located. For fiscal year 2006, the
Coast Guard is requesting funds that support its plans to improve
awareness of the maritime domain by, among other things, continuing to
evaluate the potential expansion of sector command centers to other port
locations. For example, the Coast Guard's budget request includes $5.7
million to continue developing a nationwide maritime monitoring system,
the common operational picture. The common operational picture is
primarily a computer software package that fuses data from different
sources, such as radar, sensors on aircraft, and existing information
systems. The Coast Guard has also requested funding for training personnel
in common operational picture deployment at command centers and to modify
facilities to implement the picture in command centers. While the total
cost of operating command centers is still unknown, the Coast Guard's
Five-Year Capital Investment Plan shows that the capital costs of this
effort amount to an estimated $400 million, with acquisition of the system
estimated to start in fiscal year 2007.

    Coast Guard Report Pending on Interagency Operational Centers

The relationship between the interagency operational centers and the Coast
Guard's sector command centers has not been determined yet. Coast Guard
sector command centers can involve multiple agencies, and the Coast Guard
has begun using the term "sector command center-joint" for the interagency
operational centers in San Diego and Norfolk. Coast Guard officials have
told us that their planned sector command centers will be the basis for
any interagency operational centers at ports. However, the sector command
center we visited, in Sector Miami, was not interagency on a routine
basis-the Coast Guard is the single entity operating the center.

During our visits to the interagency operational centers, port
stakeholders raised the following issues as important factors to consider
in any expansion of interagency operational centers: (1) purpose and
mission- the centers could serve a variety of overall purposes, as well as
support a wide number of specific missions; (2) leadership and
organization-the centers could be led by several departments or agencies
and be organized a variety of ways; (3) membership-the centers could vary
in membership in terms of federal, state, local, or private sector
participants and their level of involvement; (4) technology deployed-the
centers could deploy a variety of technologies in terms of networks,
computers, communications, sensors, and databases; and (5) resource
requirements-the centers could also vary in terms of resource
requirements, which agency funds the resources, and how resources are
prioritized.

In a related step, Congress directed the Coast Guard to report on the
existing interagency operational centers, covering such matters as the
composition and operational characteristics of existing centers and the
number, location, and cost of such new centers as may be required to
implement maritime transportation security plans and maritime intelligence
activities.16 This report, which Congress called for by February 2005, had
not been issued by the time we had completed our work and prepared our
report for printing. According to DHS, the report has been written and has
been approved by DHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and is
now in the final stages of review at the Coast Guard. Until the report on
the centers is issued, it is unclear how the Coast Guard

16See The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, P.L.
108-293, S: 807 (August 9, 2004). While the statute uses the term "joint
operational centers," we are using the term "interagency operational
centers" to denote centers where multiple agencies participate. According
to Coast Guard officials, the term "joint" refers to command centers where
the Coast Guard and Navy are involved in carrying out the responsibilities
of the center.

  Lack of Security Clearances Is a Key Barrier to More Effective Information
  Sharing

will define the potential relationship between interagency operational
centers and its own sector command centers.

The lack of security clearances was most frequently cited as a barrier to
more effective information sharing among port stakeholders, such as those
involved in area maritime security committees and interagency operational
centers. The Coast Guard has initiated a security clearance program for
members of area maritime security committees. However, the results of the
Coast Guard's efforts have been mixed. For example, only a small
percentage of application forms from state, local, and industry officials
had actually been submitted by February 2005-over 4 months after the Coast
Guard had developed its list of officials. The primary reason given for
this was that Coast Guard field office officials did not clearly
understand their role in helping nonfederal officials apply for a security
clearance. The Coast Guard's program does not have formal procedures for
using data to manage the program, but developing such procedures would
allow the Coast Guard to identify and deal with possible problems in the
future. Finally, as the Coast Guard moves forward with its state, local,
and industry security clearance program, the experience of other federal
agencies that manage similar programs suggests that the limited awareness
of state, local, and industry officials about the process for obtaining a
security clearance could also impede the submission of applications for a
security clearance.

    Port Security Stakeholders Cite the Lack of Clearances as a Problem

At the ports we visited, the lack of security clearances was cited as a
key barrier to information sharing among participants of area maritime
security committees and interagency operational centers we contacted. Port
stakeholders involved in the four area maritime security committees
consistently stated that the lack of federal security clearances for
nonfederal members was an impediment to effective information sharing.
Here are several examples:

o  	An official of the Washington State Ferries who participates on the
Puget Sound area maritime security committee said that not having a
security clearance-and therefore the ability to access classified
information-affected his ability to carry out security-related
activities.17 He noted that the local U.S. Attorney reported to a local

17Washington State Ferries is the largest state-operated ferry system in
the country.

newspaper in the summer of 2004 that suspicious activities had been
reported on the state ferry system. The Washington State Ferries official
indicated that he or his staff was the source for some of the data but
that federal officials would not provide him with more details on the
activities because he did not have a security clearance. A Coast Guard
field intelligence official corroborated this by stating that the Captain
of the Port was unable to share classified information from the U.S.
Attorney's office that indicated a pattern of incidents involving the
ferries. Although Coast Guard officials said they wanted to share this
information, ferry officials' lack of a federal security clearance
precluded them from doing so. Both Coast Guard and ferry officials
indicated that more complete information would aid local security officers
in identifying or deterring illegal activities.

o  	A senior Maryland state official involved in making budget decisions
on improving security around facilities in the port of Baltimore indicated
that having a security clearance would aid his ability to make decisions
on how the state could more effectively spend its resources on homeland
security. He said information on what transportation sectors are probable
targets would be a valuable input on where the state should prioritize its
spending decisions.

o  	A senior Coast Guard official in Houston told us that granting
security clearances to selected members of the area maritime security
committee would make it easier for nonfederal officials to make decisions
on how to respond to specific threats. A local Coast Guard intelligence
official cited an example in which classified information could not be
shared with port stakeholders. The official told us that there were delays
in sharing the information until the originator of the information
supplied a sanitized version.

Similar to the concerns expressed by area maritime security committee
members, participants we contacted at the three interagency operational
centers cited the lack of security clearances as a barrier to information
sharing. At the center in San Diego, the chief of the local harbor patrol
noted that the lack of security clearances was an issue for patrol staff
who are involved in the center. Subsequent to raising this issue, DHS
sponsored security clearances for 18 harbor patrol officials. At the
center in Charleston, participants in the interagency operational center
cited the lack of security clearances as a potential barrier to
information sharing. The Department of Justice addressed this potential
barrier by granting security clearances to nonfederal officials involved
in the center. Finally, Coast Guard officials indicated that when
nonfederal officials begin working at the interagency operational center
in Norfolk, granting security

clearances to nonfederal participants will be critical to their success in
sharing information.

According to the Coast Guard and state and local officials we contacted,
the shared partnership between the federal government and state and local
entities may fall short of its potential to fight terrorism because of the
lack of security clearances. If state and local officials lack security
clearances, the information they possess may be incomplete. According to
Coast Guard and nonfederal officials, the inability to share classified
information may limit their ability to deter, prevent, and respond to a
potential terrorist attack.

While security clearances for nonfederal officials who participate in
interagency operational centers are sponsored by DOJ and DHS, the Coast
Guard sponsors security clearances for members of area maritime security
committees. For the purposes of our review, we examined in more detail the
Coast Guard's efforts to address the lack of security clearances among
members of area maritime security committees.

    Coast Guard Has Taken Steps to Grant Additional Clearances to State, Local,
    and Industry Officials, but Efforts to Date Have Been Mixed

As part of its effort to improve information sharing at ports, the Coast
Guard initiated a program in July 2004 to sponsor security clearances for
members of area maritime security committees, but nonfederal officials
have been slow in submitting their applications for a security clearance.
By October 2004, the Coast Guard had identified 359 nonfederal committee
members who had a need to know and should receive a security clearance,
but as of February 2005, only 28 officials, or about 8 percent, had
submitted the application forms for a security clearance. Twenty-four of
these officials have been granted an interim clearance, which allows
access to classified material while the final clearance is being
processed.

We interviewed local Coast Guard officials at the four ports we visited to
gain a better understanding of the role of the Coast Guard in guiding
state and local officials through the process. Our work shows that there
were two areas that affected the Coast Guard's efforts: (1) local Coast
Guard officials did not clearly understand their role in the security
clearance program and (2) the Coast Guard did not use available data to
track the status of security clearances for state and local officials.

Coast Guard Field Office Officials Said They Did Not Clearly Understand
Their Role in the Security Clearance Program

Coast Guard field office officials said they did not clearly understand
their role in helping nonfederal officials apply for a security clearance.
In July 2004, Coast Guard headquarters sent guidance to Coast Guard field
offices requesting them to proceed with submissions of personnel security
investigation packages and to submit the additional names of state and
local officials who had a need for a security clearance. However, this
guidance evidently was unclear to field office officials. For example, by
January 2005-3 months after they submitted names to headquarters- Coast
Guard officials at three of the ports we visited were still awaiting
further guidance from headquarters on how to proceed.18 These officials
said they thought that headquarters was processing security clearances for
nonfederal officials, and they were waiting for notification from
headquarters that security clearances had been granted.

Our discussions with a Coast Guard field office official at the fourth
port location suggest that additional guidance about the process for the
state, local, and industry security clearance program could be beneficial.
For example, according to this official, membership on area maritime
security committees changes over time, and it would be helpful to have
guidance on the process for obtaining additional security clearances or
dropping clearances for officials who no longer participate on the
committees or who no longer have a need to know classified information.
This official noted that the process differed depending on whether a
committee participant is considered to be a military or civilian official.

In early February 2005, we expressed our concerns about the security
clearance program to Coast Guard officials. On the basis, in part, of our
discussions, Coast Guard headquarters took action and drafted guidance
informing its field office officials that they were responsible for
contacting nonfederal officials and for providing them with application
forms for obtaining a security clearance, according to Coast Guard
officials. Additionally, to further clarify the role of field office
officials, the Coast Guard's draft guidance included information on
various procedures for obtaining a security clearance. After receiving a
draft of this report, the Coast Guard finalized this guidance and sent it
to field office officials in early April 2005. Our review of the guidance
shows that it clarifies the role of field office officials in
administering the security clearance process at

18At the fourth location, the local Coast Guard official initiated contact
with nonfederal officials on his own, and he asked for additional
information from headquarters. At this location, the field office is
working with nonfederal officials to submit their application forms or to
verify that they already have a security clearance.

Data Could Be More Effectively Used as a Tool to Manage the Security
Clearance Program

the local level and that it provides more detailed procedures on how to
check the status of applications that have been submitted for a security
clearance.

In addition to writing draft guidance on the program, the Coast Guard
recently demonstrated that the security clearance program has produced
some positive results. For example, in late 2004, the Coast Guard
determined the need to share the results of a security study on ferries,
portions of which were classified, with some members of an area maritime
security committee. Working with Coast Guard field office officials, Coast
Guard headquarters and the Coast Guard Security Center were able to
process and grant about a dozen security clearances to state, local, and
industry officials. As a result, the Coast Guard was able to share
classified information with state, local, and industry officials that it
believed would help them in carrying out their port security
responsibilities.

A key component of a good management system is to have relevant, reliable,
and timely information available to assess performance over time and to
correct deficiencies as they occur. The Coast Guard has two databases that
contain information on the status of security clearances for state, local,
and industry officials. The first database is a commercial offthe-shelf
system that contains information on the status of all applications that
have been submitted to the Coast Guard Security Center, such as whether a
security clearance has been issued or whether personnel security
investigations have been conducted. In February 2004, the Coast Guard
began testing the database for use by field staff, and while headquarters
has still not granted field staff access to the database, it plans to do
so in the future. The second database-an internally developed spreadsheet
on the 359 area maritime committee participants- summarizes information on
the status of the security clearance program, such as whether they have
submitted their application forms and whether they have received their
clearances.

Although the Coast Guard has databases that could be used to manage the
state, local, and industry security clearance program, thus far, it has
not developed formal procedures for using the data as a management tool to
follow up on possible problems at the national or local level to verify
the status of clearances. In regard to the database used by the Security
Center, a Coast Guard official told us that the database was not designed
to monitor application trends, but instead is used to provide information
on individual applicants. The Coast Guard's internally developed
spreadsheet on committee participants who have been deemed candidates for
a security clearance, however, does offer information on application
trends,

Raising the Awareness of State, Local, and Industry Officials Might
Improve the Processing of Application Forms

and could be used to monitor progress that has been made at the national
or local level. For example, updating the database on a routine basis
could identify port areas where progress is slow and indicate that
follow-up with local field office officials may be needed. In a similar
security clearance program, the experience of the FBI shows the utility of
data as a tool for managing the program. For example, FBI officials
indicated that its databases have served as management tools for tracking
state, local, and industry security applications and for monitoring
application trends and percentages. The Coast Guard has yet to develop
formal procedures for using its data on committee participants as a tool
to assess potential problems and to take appropriate action, if necessary.
Doing so would likely aid its efforts to manage the state, local, and
industry security clearance program at both the local and the national
levels.

While the Coast Guard's databases on security clearances shows promise as
a tool for monitoring the state, local, and industry security clearance
program, the database also has limitations in that it cannot be used to
determine how many nonfederal officials have a federal security clearance
sponsored by other federal agencies. For example, a Coast Guard official
stated that this information is difficult to obtain because the Coast
Guard does not have easy access to databases of other agencies. In
September 2004, we testified that existing impediments to managing the
security clearance process include the lack of a governmentwide database
of clearance information, which hinders efforts to provide timely,
highquality clearance determinations.19 As a way to deal with this
problem, a local Coast Guard official sent a survey to port security
stakeholders to determine how many stakeholders had security clearances
sponsored by other federal agencies.

Our prior reviews of DOD and FBI efforts to manage a large number of
security clearances for service members, government employees, and
industry personnel have demonstrated long-standing backlogs and delays. In
addition, our FBI work showed that it is important to address training and
education to successfully carry out an effective security clearance

19GAO, Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms, GAO-04-1084T (Washington, D.C.: September
14, 2004).

program.20 Our reviews also showed that the use of internal controls to
ensure that security clearances are granted in compliance with existing
rules and regulations will become increasingly important.

The experience of the FBI in managing its security clearance program shows
that educating nonfederal officials about the security clearance program
resulted in improvements in the processing of applications for a security
clearance. The FBI grants security clearances to state and local law
enforcement officials who may require access to classified national
security information to help prevent or respond to terrorist attacks.
After September 11, an increasing number of state and local officials
began requesting security clearances to obtain terrorism-related
information that might affect their jurisdictions. However, when the FBI
received a low percentage of application forms for security clearances
from nonfederal officials, the agency consulted with state and local
officials to collect their views and recommendations regarding information
sharing and improving the security clearance process, and the FBI
identified unfamiliarity with the requirements for processing security
clearance applications as one of the main impediments to timely processing
of applications. For example, some state and local officials said that
they did not have adequate guidance for filling out and submitting the
appropriate application forms. In response, the FBI widely distributed
step-by-step guidance to state and local law enforcement officials through
informational brochures (available on a FBI Web site) and meetings with
state and local officials, among other efforts. Some law enforcement
officials we interviewed stated that the FBI's guidance and consultation
with law enforcement professional organizations helped improve state and
local officials' understanding of the security clearance application
process.21

Once the Coast Guard begins notifying more state, local, and industry
officials about the process for obtaining a security clearance, raising
the awareness of nonfederal officials about the program could improve the
processing of application forms. An official at the field office that had

20GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to
Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for
Industry Personnel, GAO-04-202T (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004); Aviation
Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its
Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed, GAO-04-242
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003); and Security Clearances: FBI Has
Enhanced Its Process for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials,
GAO-04-596 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2004).

21GAO-04-596, p.24.

actually contacted state and local officials about the security clearance
program indicated that field office officials did not have basic
information about the security clearance program. Among other things, he
mentioned that informational brochures and Web sites could be given to
nonfederal officials as a way to improve their awareness of the security
clearance process.

Attending to the potential lack of awareness by nonfederal officials about
the security clearance program is important because the number of
nonfederal officials who submit application forms for a security clearance
may be much larger than the several hundred state, local, and industry
officials who participate on area maritime security committees. For
example, DHS will sponsor an estimated 5,000 security clearances for
state, local, and industry officials and the Coast Guard Security Center
will process these clearances, according to Coast Guard officials.
Additionally, the Coast Guard plans to grant clearances to about 200 other
nonfederal officials who are involved in supporting other Coast Guard
operations, such as sector command centers. In addition, as the Coast
Guard's security clearance program evolves, participants on area maritime
security committees or in sector command centers may change over time,
thus highlighting the importance of having ways to raise the awareness of
nonfederal officials about the security clearance process.

    Other Barriers Intrinsic to Port Operations May Also Impede Information
    Sharing

Port security stakeholders cited other barriers to effective information
sharing intrinsic to ports we visited, but none of these barriers were
mentioned as frequently as the lack of security clearances. At the four
ports we visited, characteristics intrinsic to the port, such as their
size and complexity were stated as barriers to effective information
sharing. In Houston, for example, multiple stakeholders, such as port
authorities, numerous jurisdictions, and a diverse set of users, were
presented as challenges in information sharing efforts. The length of the
Houston Ship Channel (50 miles), with numerous public and private entities
using the channel, also complicates information sharing efforts. To deal
with the size and complexity of this port area, Coast Guard officials said
they have worked with associations representing the commercial fishing
industry, petrochemical companies, and state and local law enforcement as
a means to share information about port security with as many users of the
port and the Houston Ship Channel as possible. For example, the local
Coast Guard officials said they held informational meetings with
recreational boating associations and with area maritime security
committee participants to inform boaters and other stakeholders of "safety
zones"- areas where recreational use of the waterway is prohibited-in the

Conclusions

Recommendations for Executive Action

Houston Ship Channel. Another barrier mentioned at another port location
was the "cultural" barrier between various members of the area maritime
security committees. For example, officials at this port location stated
that an informal network has created insiders and outsiders drawing
particular distinctions between law enforcement and non-law enforcement
officials.

Effective information sharing among members of area maritime security
committees and participants in interagency operational centers can enhance
the partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it can
improve the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries for
deterring, preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack at the
nation's ports. The Coast Guard has recognized the importance of granting
security clearances to nonfederal officials as a means to improve
information sharing, but progress in moving these officials through the
application process has been slow. In the future, the Coast Guard may need
to grant additional security clearances to state, local, or industry
participants who join area maritime security committees or sector command
centers to support counterterrorism programs. In this way, as the Coast
Guard's state, local, and industry security clearance program matures, the
importance of effectively managing the security clearance program will
become even more important. Increased management attention and guidance
about the process would strengthen the program for security clearances,
and it would reduce the risk that nonfederal officials may have incomplete
information as they carry out their law enforcement activities.

To help ensure that nonfederal officials receive needed security
clearances as quickly as possible, both now and in the future, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of
the Coast Guard to take the following two actions.

o  	Develop formal procedures so that local and headquarters officials use
the Coast Guard's internal databases of state, local, and industry
security clearances for area maritime committee members as a management
tool to monitor who has submitted applications for a security clearance
and to take appropriate action when application trends point to possible
problems. For example, updating the database on a routine basis could
identify port areas where progress is slow and indicate that follow-up
with local field office officials may be needed.

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

o  	Raise the awareness of state, local, and industry officials about the
process of applying for security clearances. This effort could involve
using brochures, Web sites, or other information that the FBI has used in
its program for educating state and local officials about the security
clearance process.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOJ, and DOD for comment. DHS,
including the Coast Guard, generally agreed with our findings and
recommendations. Specifically, DHS noted that our recommendations should
enhance the Coast Guard's efforts to promote information sharing among
port security stakeholders. DHS also indicated that changes associated
with processing security clearances should overcome identified
impediments. DOJ and DOD declined to provide comments.

Our draft report included a recommendation that the Coast Guard clarify
the role of field office officials in communicating with state, local, and
industry officials about the process for obtaining a security clearance.
After receiving our draft report, the Coast Guard issued a memo to field
office officials that clarified their role in the security clearance
program. The Coast Guard's memo also provided more detailed guidance on
the process for sponsoring additional state, local, or industry officials
for a security clearance. As a result of the Coast Guard's action, we have
dropped this recommendation from our final report. In regard to
interagency operational centers, DHS also noted that the Coast Guard
report required by Congress on existing interagency operational centers
has been approved by DHS and OMB and is now in the final stages of review
at the Coast Guard. In addition to commenting on our findings and
recommendations, DHS provided technical comments on the report under
separate cover and we revised the draft report where appropriate. Written
comments from DHS are reprinted in appendix IV.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its issue date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report
to appropriate departments and interested congressional committees. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. This report will
also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any question about this report, please contact
me at (415) 904-2200 or at [email protected] or Stephen L. Caldwell,
Assistant Director, at (202) 512-9610 or at [email protected]. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Margaret T. Wrightson Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Each of our objectives involved information sharing between federal
agencies and nonfederal stakeholders. Specifically,

o  	What impact have area maritime security committees had on information
sharing?

o  	What impact have interagency operational centers had on information
sharing?

o  	What barriers, if any, have hindered improvements in information
sharing among port security stakeholders?

We carried out part of our work at Coast Guard headquarters or in
consultation with headquarters officials. We spoke with Coast Guard
officials to obtain information on how information is shared within the
maritime security community and reviewed pertinent legislation, guidance,
rules, and other relevant documents related to the sharing of maritime
security information with nonfederal stakeholders. For example, we
reviewed pertinent statutes, such as the Maritime Transportation Security
Act and the Homeland Security Act. We also reviewed selected maritime
security plans, Coast Guard regulations implementing the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, and various reports from congressionally
chartered commissions related to information sharing.

To address our first objective, we conducted structured interviews with
officials from federal agencies and representatives from state and local
governments, law enforcement agencies, maritime industry associations, and
private sector entities who were stakeholders in port security issues.
Many of these officials were members of area maritime security committees.
These interviews were largely conducted during site visits to four
specific maritime port areas. We selected these ports to provide a diverse
sample of security environments and perspectives, basing our selections on
such matters as geographic location, varying levels of strategic
importance, and unique local characteristics. The four port areas and some
of our reasons for choosing them are as follows:

o  	Baltimore, Maryland: a Mid-Atlantic port that is managed by a state
agency and services a variety of cargo, including bulk and container
cargo, and cruise passengers;

o  	Charleston, South Carolina: a South Atlantic port that is state owned
and operated, with three separate facilities and military facilities and
installations;

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

o  	Houston, Texas: a Gulf coast port that is governed by an appointed
commission and consists of a 25-mile-long complex of diversified public
and private facilities, including the nation's largest petrochemical
complex; and

o  	Seattle/Tacoma, Washington: a Pacific coast port area that is operated
by municipal corporations, represents the third largest container cargo
port in the country, and services the country's largest state-operated
passenger ferry system.

During each of our visits to these four ports, we met with the identified
port stakeholders, Coast Guard marine safety offices, and Captains of the
Port. In our meetings with Captains of the Port and marine safety offices,
we discussed the creation of and composition of the area maritime security
committee at their port and the effectiveness of the committee in
facilitating information sharing. We also discussed and collected
documents related to policies and procedures pertaining to sharing
information with nonfederal stakeholders. We collected documentary
evidence in the form of information bulletins that are used to disseminate
information to stakeholders. When we met with the nonfederal stakeholders
at the ports, we discussed specific security concerns at their facilities
or in their jurisdictions and how they were being addressed. We also
discussed their involvement and experiences with the local area maritime
security committee, of which most were members, and how they receive and
share information with federal agencies, particularly the Coast Guard.
With both groups, we discussed any perceived barriers to information
sharing and ideas and plans to resolve these issues. This information was
used in conducting a comparative analysis of the port areas and allowed us
to distinguish differences between the locations while identifying common
issues.

In addressing the second objective, we conducted site visits at the three
interagency operational centers located in Charleston, South Carolina;
Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California. Related to this, we visited
the Homeland Security Task Force South-East and command centers for the
Coast Guard district and sector in Miami, Florida because these centers
also aim to facilitate information sharing and joint operations related to
maritime security. At each location, we conducted structured interviews
with officials from the agencies participating in the centers. These
interviews allowed us to obtain information regarding the history of the
centers and how their missions and structures are changing. Specifically,
we discussed how their presence affects information sharing among federal
stakeholders as well as with nonfederal stakeholders. We also

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

discussed challenges facing the centers as they become more formalized.
During the visits, documents that describe the centers as well as examples
of the products they distribute were collected. Observations made at the
facilities allowed us to provide context to the testimonial evidence we
collected. We also viewed demonstrations of the emerging technologies as
well as differences in the physical attributes of each center. The
testimonial evidence, aided by our observations, was synthesized and
analyzed, allowing us to perform a comparative analysis, identifying
differences and commonalities in information sharing among the centers.

To address the third objective, we followed up with officials at Coast
Guard headquarters and obtained guidance and data regarding the current
effort to administer security clearances at the secret level to selected
nonfederal stakeholders at each port. In subsequent phone interviews with
the officials of marine safety offices at the ports we visited, we
discussed problems encountered in the communication and implementation of
this effort and steps that are being taken to resolve these problems. In
addition, we reviewed Coast Guard documents related to information
sharing, such as data on the number of nonfederal officials who had
received security clearances, guidance from Coast Guard headquarters to
field offices, and other pertinent instructions. In regard to this
database, we checked the reliability of the database for the four ports we
visited and found that the database was generally accurate. We found that
24 of the 27 entries were correct. In addition, we reviewed prior GAO
reports that dealt with information sharing issues. Finally, we
interviewed 64 federal and nonfederal stakeholders at the four ports we
visited and asked them whether there were any barriers to information
sharing. The results of our interviews cannot be projected to all
participants on the area maritime security committees.

Our review was conducted from May 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Stakeholder Groups Recommended for Membership on Area Maritime
Security Committees

This appendix provides information on the Coast Guard's guidance for
developing the local membership and organization of the area maritime
security committee. The Coast Guard's guidance directs the Captain of the
Port to take into account all aspects of each port area and its adjacent
waterways and coastal areas. The committees should be composed of federal,
state, and local agencies; law enforcement and security agencies; and port
stakeholders. Representatives for each aspect of the port and those
charged with its regulation or enforcement should be encouraged to
participate. Table 1 provides a list of representatives that an area
maritime security committee could include.

Table 1: Representatives That an Area Maritime Security Committee Could
Include

      Federal agencies State and local agencies Industry-related agencies

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
Department of Defense (DOD)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE)
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
Military Sealift Command (MSC)
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS)
Maritime Administration (MARAD)
Research and Special Programs Administration
(RSPA)
Federal Railway Administration (FRA)
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
Other government representatives, where
appropriate

National Guard
Marine police
Port authority police and security forces
Fire departments
Civil defense
City government officials
Transportation agencies
Fish and wildlife marine units
Health agencies
Occupational safety agencies
Terminal/facility security forces
Pilot associations
Other state, local, and city government
representatives
State department of natural or environmental
resources marine units
Other environmental agencies
Regional development agencies/
metropolitan planning organizations

Facility owners/operators
Terminal owners/operators
Trade organizations
Recreational boating
organizations (yacht clubs,
rowing clubs)
Railroad companies
Trucking companies
Shipyards
Tow-boat operators
Marine exchanges
Industry organizations
Organized labor
Commercial fishing industry
Waterborne vendors and service
providers (harbor tugs, launch
services, line handlers, small
ferry operators, water taxis)
Other facilities within the port
having waterside access, e.g.,
refineries, chemical plants,
power plants

Source: Coast Guard.

Area maritime security committees are not limited to the agencies and
organizations on this list. As each port has specific needs and issues,
the membership of committees can vary greatly from port to port.

Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and Supports,
National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

This appendix provides information on the departments and
agencies/components involved in maritime information sharing, at both the
national level and the regional or field level. Table 2 lists departments
and agencies/components (including the Coast Guard) that potentially play
a role in disseminating maritime threat information to, and receiving
information from, area maritime security committees and interagency
operational centers.

Table 2: Department and Agency Intelligence Organizations at the National,
Regional, and Field Level That Are Potentially Involved in Maritime
Information Sharing

Department and Regional or field-level intelligence agency/component
National-level intelligence organizations organizations

                        Department of Homeland Security

U.S. Coast Guard The Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center

(USCG) 	(ICC), working in conjunction with the Navy's Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC),
tracks the movement of vessels, cargoes, and crews while providing
intelligence analysis and warning information.

Two Coast Guard Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs), located on
each coast, receive intelligence from, and provide intelligence to, ICC.
MIFCs also provide actionable intelligence to Coast Guard commanders at
the district and port levels, and share that analysis with interagency
partners. At the port level, Captains of the Ports (COTPs) head area
maritime security committees that include federal and nonfederal
stakeholders and help facilitate information sharing. Field Intelligence
Support Teams (FISTs), also located at the port level, are composed of
intelligence specialists who collect, analyze, and disseminate critical
maritime threat information. FISTs can be colocated at interagency
operational centers or Coast Guard district or sector command centers.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) The CBP Office of Intelligence
collects, develops, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence in support of
tactical and operational maritime security mission requirements and
prepares strategic analysis for key decision makers. Analytical reports
are prepared for DHS to disseminate to appropriate agency components and
other federal agencies. CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) conducts
"sweep" operations of information on air, sea, and land passengers,
conveyances, and cargo. The center does 24-hour tactical targeting that
coordinates CBP's field operations response to terrorist threats and
national security concerns, develops raw intelligence into actionable
targets, and works as a liaison between other CBP offices and other
federal agencies such as the Coast Guard. CBP Advanced Targeting Units
(ATUs), at the port level, screen incoming cargo that poses a possible
threat to the national security of the United States.

Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

Department and Regional or field-level intelligence agency/component
National-level intelligence organizations organizations

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ICE Office of Intelligence
evaluates, disseminates, and coordinates classified intelligence community
and law enforcement reporting. A central component of the ICE
information-sharing effort is ICE Intelligence Watch, which evaluates all
tactical intelligence of terrorist threats to the homeland and provides
additional analytical support through crosschecks of all agency and
intelligence community databases. ICE has six Field Intelligence Units
(FIUs) that provide geographic and regional intelligence analysis and
supervise Intelligence Collection and Analysis Teams (ICATs) that are also
active in the field. In the maritime domain, ICE maintains Watchtower,
which is a field maritime intelligence operation that provides detailed
information on incoming vessels resulting from targeted inspections of
vessels and cargo. Over 20 Watchtower specialists, located at 17 seaports
nationwide, produce Field Intelligence Reports (FIRs) covering all
domestic seaports. Watchtower specialists meet and work with state and
local law enforcement, Coast Guard, CBP, and DOJ officials. Among other
things, these specialists provide information on ships (e.g., container
cargo ships, tankers, and bulk carriers) that may require an enforcement
action, such as a boarding or interview of the vessel master.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) As part of its mission to
protect the nation's transportation system, TSA is tasked to develop a
maritime information system in accordance with requirements of the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. As such, DHS is exploring
the most appropriate means of fulfilling this legislative requirement. The
TSA Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS) disseminates
intelligence and law enforcement information about threats to
transportation security and serves as a liaison for transportation
security to the intelligence community. In this capacity, TSIS helps to
coordinate domestic and international transportation security activities
with DHS and other government agencies.

  No domestic presence at the regional or field levels specifically related to
                               maritime security.

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) The mission of
IAIP is to identify and assess current and future threats to the homeland,
map those threats against known vulnerabilities, develop protective
measures, issue timely warnings, and take preventive and protective
action. This threat information includes, but is not limited to, the
maritime environment. As part of this mission, IAIP is to provide
information to federal, state, local, tribal government, law enforcement,
and private sector officials as appropriate, both classified and
unclassified, and also conducts a daily Information Analysis Morning
Executive Brief, whereby DHS components share and coordinate threat
information.

  No domestic presence at the regional or field levels specifically related to
                               maritime security.

Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

Department and Regional or field-level intelligence agency/component
National-level intelligence organizations organizations

                             Department of Justice

U.S. Attorneys' Offices 	Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA)
provides DOJ, through U.S Attorney Anti-Terrorism for close liaison
between DOJ in Washington, D.C., and Advisory Councils (ATACs), has
established state the 94 U.S. Attorneys' offices located throughout the
and regional task forces and coordination centers nation, as well as
direction, oversight, and support. that may include a maritime component
or nexus,

such as the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC).

                     Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Counterterrorism Division (CTD) is colocated with the National
Counterterrorism Center, but remains under the direction of FBI. CTD
conducts analysis, evidence exploitation, and the preparation and
dissemination of finished intelligence products and briefing materials
related to counterterrorism.

National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) includes representatives from
the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, Treasury,
Transportation, Commerce, Energy, State, and Interior; and collects
terrorism information and intelligence and funnels it to Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTFs).

Joint Terrorism Task Forces are multi-agency investigative teams composed
of federal, state and local agencies that work jointly with other
nonmember agencies to investigate terrorism matters. JTTFs are designated
conduits of information from federal to state and local officials (and the
private sector) and are located in 66 field offices across the country.

In addition, the FBI Maritime Liaison Agent (MLA) Program is intended to
enhance the security of the U.S. maritime environment by training special
agents and Joint Terrorism Task Force officers serving at various port
area on subjects pertaining to preventing terrorism at our nation's
seaports. Designated MLAs throughout the nation are required to increase
interaction between law enforcement and the private sector, state and
local port authorities, and other federal agencies with maritime
responsibilities.

Department of Defense

Department of the Navy	The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) provides
nationallevel maritime intelligence on merchant and nonmerchant ship
activity to determine possible terrorist threats abroad and at home. ONI
is colocated with the Coast Guard ICC at NMIC.

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) is the primary law enforcement
and counterintelligence arm of the Navy. The NCIS Multiple Threat Alert
Center (MTAC) tracts worldwide threats against navy facilities and
vessels.

ONI has no domestic presence at the regional or field levels specifically
related to domestic maritime security.

NCIS has regional agents who work closely with federal, state, and local
agencies to counter terrorism and protect navy facilities and vessels, as
well as shipping military equipment.

                          Other Intelligence Community

Central Intelligence CIA's Counterterrorism Center No domestic presence at 
                        (CTC), colocated at the       the regional or field   
                          National Counterterrorism       levels specifically 
       Agency (CIA)        Center, assists CIA in         related to maritime 
                                                                    security. 
                              coordinating the        
                         counterterrorist efforts of  
                                     the              
                          intelligence community by   
                               implementing a         
                         counterterrorist operations  
                             program to collect       
                        intelligence on international 
                        terrorist groups, producing   
                         analyses of the groups and   
                           states responsible for     
                         international terrorism and  
                              coordinating the        
                          counterterrorist activities 
                                  of the intelligence 
                                           community. 
                        CTC has dedicated analysts to 
                        the threat against U.S.       
                        seaports and maritime assets. 

Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

Department and Regional or field-level intelligence agency/component
National-level intelligence organizations organizations

National NCTC is responsible for analyzing and integrating No domestic
presence at the regional or field Counterterrorism Center foreign and
domestic intelligence acquired from all U.S. levels specifically related
to maritime security. (NCTC) government departments and agencies
pertaining to

terrorism. The center will identify, coordinate, and prioritize the
counterterrorism intelligence requirements of the nation's intelligence
agencies.

Source: GAO.

The Coast Guard, as the lead in domestic maritime security, plays a
central role in maritime threat information sharing and has a robust
presence at the national, regional, and port levels. In this capacity, it
conducts intelligence activities in support of all its missions, maritime
homeland security, and national security objectives, including information
collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information.
Figure 4 illustrates how Coast Guard national and regional maritime
information is channeled to and from representatives of a local area
maritime security committee (AMSC) or interagency operational center.

Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

Figure 4: Flow of Information from National and Regional Coast Guard
Sources to Area Maritime Security Committees and Interagency Operational
Centers at the Port Level

Beyond the Coast Guard, other agencies can also play a major role in
channeling maritime security information to the port level. As shown in
table 2, some of these agencies have broader responsibilities for
intelligence across all domains. For example, DOJ has a number of

Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

organizations involved in terrorist threat information sharing, such as
the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, which act as a liaison and
conduit for "all domain" (e.g., maritime and nonmaritime) information from
FBI headquarters to Joint Terrorism Task Forces operating in the field.
The FBI also has designated Maritime Liaison Agents at the port level who
interact with state, local, and private sector officials and other federal
agencies, to enhance security at the nation's seaports. In addition, U.S.
Attorneys' Offices of DOJ set up Anti-terrorism Advisory Councils that
sponsor state-or regional-level task forces or coordination centers that
may include a maritime security component. Figure 5 graphically
illustrates (1) how maritime and nonmaritime information and intelligence
is shared among agencies at the national level and (2) organizational
conduits through which information is shared with the port level. The left
side of the figure shows DOJ channels for information discussed above. On
the right side, the figure also shows the flow of information through
Coast Guard channels, as already shown in figure 4.

Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

Figure 5: Flow of Information between National Intelligence and Law
Enforcement Agencies and between the National and the Port Level

                                  Source: GAO.

                         Appendix IV: Comments from the
                        Department of Homeland Security

                      Page 45 GAO-05-394 Maritime Security

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

                      Page 46 GAO-05-394 Maritime Security

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts 	Margaret T. Wrightson (415) 904-2200 Stephen L. Caldwell
(202) 512-9610

Staff In addition to those named above, David Alexander, Neil Asaba,
Juliana Bahus, Christine Davis, Kevin Heinz, Emily Pickrell, Albert
Schmidt, AmyAcknowledgments Sheller, Stan Stenersen, and April Thompson
made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget
Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: January
14, 2005.

Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: December
10, 2004.

Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective Port
Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: September 30,
2004.

Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.

GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.

Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, D.C.:
June 30, 2004.

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005 and
Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
2004.

Coast Guard Programs: Relationship between Resources Used and Results
Achieved Needs to Be Clearer. GAO-04-432. Washington, D.C.: March 22,
2004.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security
Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, D.C.: December
16, 2003.

Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-04-315R.
Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.

Related GAO Products

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation
Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. Washington, D.C.:
September 9, 2003.

Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be
Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater
Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2003.

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security
in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions.
GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.

Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security. GAO-03-594T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.

Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor
Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T.
Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It Transitions to
the New Department. GAO-03-467T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2003.

Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort
for All Missions. GAO-03-155. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2002.

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO02-955TNI.
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.

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