    Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information
    Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further
    Attention (15-APR-05, GAO-05-394).

    Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important
    tool in federal efforts to secure the nation's ports against a
    potential terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead
    responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing
    efforts. The Coast Guard has established area maritime security
    committees--forums that involve federal and nonfederal officials
    who identify and address risks in a port. The Coast Guard and
    other agencies have sought to further enhance information sharing
    and port security operations by establishing interagency
    operational centers--command centers that tie together the
    efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. GAO was asked to
    review the efforts to see what impact the committees and
    interagency operational centers have had on improving information
    sharing and to identify any barriers that have hindered
    information sharing.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-394
        ACCNO:   A21746
      TITLE:     Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved
    Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires
    Further Attention
         DATE:   04/15/2005
      SUBJECT:   Coast Guard personnel
    	     Counterterrorism
    	     Harbors
    	     Interagency relations
    	     Intergovernmental relations
    	     Physical security
    	     Homeland security
    	     Information sharing
    	     Stakeholder consultations
    	     Critical infrastructure

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    GAO-05-394

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

                           Report to Congressional Requesters

    April 2005

    MARITIME SECURITY

        New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance
                         Processing Requires Further Attention

    GAO-05-394

    [IMG]

    April 2005

    MARITIME SECURITY

    New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance
    Processing Requires Further Attention

                                     What GAO Found

    Area maritime security committees provide a structure that improves
    information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port
    locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the
    newly formed committees were an improvement over previous information
    sharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of
    vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends
    to use in protecting key infrastructure.

    The three interagency operational centers established to date allow for
    even greater information sharing because the centers operate on a
    24-hour-a-day basis, and they receive real-time information from data
    sources such as radars and sensors. The Coast Guard is planning to develop
    its own centers-called sector command centers-at up to 40 additional port
    locations to monitor information and to support its operations. The
    relationship between the interagency operational centers and the planned
    expansion of sector command centers remains to be determined.

    The major barrier hindering information sharing has been the lack of
    federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or
    centers. By February 2005-or 4 months after the Coast Guard developed a
    list of 359 committee members who needed a security clearance-28 of the
    359 members had submitted the necessary paperwork for a security
    clearance. Coast Guard field officials did not clearly understand that
    they were responsible for contacting nonfederal officials about the
    clearance process. To deal with this, in early April 2005, the Coast Guard
    issued guidance to field offices that clarified their role. In addition,
    the Coast Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of
    data to monitor application trends. Developing such procedures would aid
    in identifying deficiencies in the future. As the Coast Guard proceeds
    with its program, another way to improve the submission of paperwork
    involves educating nonfederal officials about the clearance process.

               Interagency Operational Centers Coordinate Harbor Patrols

    Source: GAO.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information

    Sharing
    Interagency Operational Centers Have Also Improved Information
    Sharing
    Lack of Security Clearances Is a Key Barrier to More Effective

    Information Sharing
    Conclusions
    Recommendations for Executive Action
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                           1

                                          3 6

    11

    16

    23 31 31 32

    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Appendix II	Stakeholder Groups Recommended for Membership on Area Maritime
    Security Committees

    Appendix III	Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
    Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure 38

    Appendix IV	Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 47

    GAO Contacts 47
    Staff Acknowledgments 47

      Related GAO Products 48

      Tables

    Table 1: Representatives That an Area Maritime Security Committee Could
    Include 37

    Table 2: Department and Agency Intelligence Organizations at the National,
    Regional, and Field Level That Are Potentially Involved in Maritime
    Information Sharing 38

      Figures

    Figure 1: Ports Facilitate Cargo Container Traffic, an Important Segment
    of Maritime Commerce 7 Figure 2: Area Maritime Security Committees Protect
    a Wide Range

    of Port Facilities and Adjacent Infrastructure 13 Figure 3: Coast Guard
    Patrol Enforces Security Zone at a Port 18 Figure 4: Flow of Information
    from National and Regional Coast

    Guard Sources to Area Maritime Security Committees and

    Interagency Operational Centers at the Port Level 42 Figure 5: Flow of
    Information between National Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies and
    between the National and the Port Level 44

    Abbreviations

    DHS Department of Homeland Security
    DOD Department of Defense
    DOJ Department of Justice
    FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
    MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
    OMB Office of Management and Budget

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
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    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

    April 15, 2005

    The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Government Reform
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger
    The Honorable George Miller
    House of Representatives

    Securing the nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack has
    become
    one of the nation's security priorities since the terrorist attacks of
    September 11, 2001. Factors that make ports vulnerable to a terrorist
    attack include their location near major urban centers, such as New York
    and Los Angeles; their inclusion of critical infrastructure such as oil
    refineries and terminals; and their economic importance for the nation's
    economy and trade. Although no port-related terrorist attacks have
    occurred in the United States, internationally terrorists have
    demonstrated
    their ability to access and destroy infrastructure, assets, and lives in
    and
    around seaports. According to the Coast Guard, a major port closure for 1
    month could cost tens of billions of dollars, disrupting trade and the
    U.S.
    economy as a whole.1

    Given that ports are sprawling enterprises that often cross jurisdictional
    boundaries, the need to share information among federal, state, and local
    agencies is central to effective prevention and response. The Homeland
    Security Act of 2002, which provided the basis for federal efforts against
    terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, underscores the
    importance of sharing timely, effective, and useful information to enhance
    the shared partnership among federal, state, and local entities in the
    fight
    against terrorism.2 The act recognizes that sharing information with state
    and local officials can improve the capability of nonfederal officials to
    deter, prevent, or disrupt a possible terrorist attack.

    1See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard Fiscal Year
    2004 Report (Washington D.C.: February 2004).

    2P.L. 107-296, S: 891-892 (Nov. 25, 2002).

    Since the terrorist attacks, the federal government has taken a number of
    approaches designed to enhance information sharing.3 One of these
    approaches, called for under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
    2002 (MTSA), was to provide the Coast Guard with authority for creating
    area maritime security committees at the port level.4 These committees-
    which were to include representatives from the federal, state, local, and
    private sectors-were intended as a way to identify and deal with
    vulnerabilities in and around ports, as well as to provide a forum for
    sharing information on issues related to port security. Much of the
    federally generated information about port security-such as assessments of
    specific port vulnerabilities or information about potential threats being
    monitored-is classified national security information and cannot be
    released, even to law enforcement personnel, if they have not undergone
    the necessary federal background checks and received a security clearance.
    Lacking access to such information, nonfederal officials may be at a
    disadvantage in their efforts to respond to or combat a terrorist threat.

    As another approach to improving information sharing and port security
    operations, various federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland
    Security (through the U.S. Coast Guard), the Department of the Navy, and
    the Department of Justice (DOJ), have developed interagency operational
    centers at certain port locations.5 These centers are command posts that
    tie together the intelligence and operational efforts of various federal
    and nonfederal participants. They currently exist in three locations:
    Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California.
    Congress has expressed interest in knowing more about the applicability of
    such centers in other locations, and it required the Coast Guard to submit
    a report by February 2005 that describes, among other things, the number
    of ports that could benefit from such centers and the associated cost of
    implementing them.

    3Homeland security information sharing is the two-way exchange of
    information, including intelligence, critical infrastructure, and law
    enforcement information, among federal, state, and local governments and
    the private sector to establish timely, effective, and useful
    communications to detect, prevent, and mitigate potential terrorist
    attacks.

    4The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, P.L.107-295, contains
    many of the homeland security requirements related specifically to port
    security. The area maritime security committees are authorized by section
    102 of MTSA, as codified at 46 U.S.C. S: 70112(a)(2) and implemented at 33
    C.F.R. Part 103.

    5We use the term interagency operational centers to refer to centers where
    multiple federal (and in some cases, state and local) agencies are
    involved in monitoring maritime security and planning related operations.

    The experience gleaned to date from both of these approaches to improving
    information sharing represents an opportunity that could help guide future
    efforts to improve port security. Therefore, we examined the efforts of
    the Coast Guard and other federal agencies in improving information
    sharing between and among federal, state, local, and industry
    stakeholders. This report addresses the following questions:

    o  	What impact have area maritime security committees had on information
    sharing?

    o  	What impact have interagency operational centers had on information
    sharing?

    o  	What barriers, if any, have hindered improvements in information
    sharing among port security stakeholders?

    To answer these questions, we focused much of our work at the port level.
    To review the activities of area maritime security committees, we selected
    four ports for detailed review. These four ports-Baltimore, Maryland;
    Charleston, South Carolina; Houston, Texas; and Seattle, Washington- were
    selected to reflect various coastal regions and a wide range of volume and
    types of operations. To review the activities of the interagency
    operational centers, we visited all three centers currently in operation,
    discussing ways in which the centers operate with both federal and
    nonfederal participants as well as observing operations at the centers.
    During our visits, we talked with Coast Guard officials involved in
    sharing information and we also discussed information sharing issues with
    numerous nonfederal stakeholders, including private sector officials and
    officials from port authorities or local law enforcement. We examined in
    more detail the Coast Guard's procedures for processing security
    clearances for members of area maritime security committees. We also
    reviewed legislation and congressional committee reports related to
    information sharing, reviewed numerous other documents and reports on the
    issue, and spoke with officials at the Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau
    of Investigation (FBI) about their approaches to sharing information with
    nonfederal entities. See appendix I for further explanation of our scope
    and methodology. Our work, which was conducted between May 2004 and March
    2005, was done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards.

    Results in Brief	Area maritime security committees have provided a
    structure to improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of
    information sharing

    between federal and nonfederal stakeholders. At the four port locations we
    visited, stakeholders said the newly formed committees were an improvement
    over previous information sharing efforts because the committees
    established a formal structure for communicating information and
    established new procedures for sharing information. Stakeholders stated
    that among other things, the committees have been used as a forum for
    sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing information on illegal
    or suspicious activities and providing input on portwide security plans-
    called area maritime security plans-that describe the joint strategies of
    the Coast Guard and its partner agencies for protecting key infrastructure
    against terrorist activities. Nonfederal stakeholders, including state
    officials, local port authority operators, and representatives of private
    companies, said the information sharing had increased their awareness of
    security issues around the port and allowed them to identify and address
    security issues at their facilities. Likewise, Coast Guard officials said
    the information they received from nonfederal participants had helped in
    mitigating and reducing risks. While committees at each of the four
    locations had the same guidance, they varied in such ways as the size of
    the membership and the types of stakeholders represented. For example, to
    prevent a duplication of efforts, some of the committees rely on existing
    information sharing networks, such as trade and industry associations, and
    have Coast Guard officials participate directly with these groups, while
    other ports we visited carried out more of the work in the committee
    forum. We were not able to determine if certain of these structures or
    approaches work better than others, largely because the committees are
    just over a year old. More time will be needed before such assessments can
    be made.

    The three interagency operational centers established to date allow for
    even greater information sharing because the centers operate 24 hours a
    day and receive real-time operational information from radars, sensors,
    and cameras, as well as classified data on personnel, vessels, and cargo,
    according to center participants. In contrast, the area maritime security
    committees, while they have a broader membership, primarily provide
    information through meetings, documents, and other means that are often
    used for long-term planning purposes rather than day-to-day operations.
    The three existing interagency centers fulfill varying missions and
    operations, and thus share different types of information. For example,
    the center in Charleston, South Carolina, focuses on port security alone
    and is led by DOJ. In contrast, the center in San Diego supports the Coast
    Guard's missions beyond port security, including drug interdiction, alien
    migrant interdiction, and search and rescue activities, and is led by the
    Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is planning to develop its own operational

    centers-called sector command centers-at up to 40 additional port
    locations to monitor maritime information and to support Coast Guard
    operations. The relationship between the planned expansion of centers by
    the Coast Guard and the existing interagency operational centers-in
    particular, how many other agencies will participate in the Coast Guard's
    centers-remains to be determined.

    While information sharing has generally improved, a major barrier
    mentioned most frequently by stakeholders as hindering information sharing
    has been the lack of federal security clearances among port security
    stakeholders. The lack of security clearances may limit the ability of
    state, local, and industry officials, such as those involved in area
    maritime security committees or interagency operational centers, to deter,
    prevent, and respond to a potential terrorist attack. By February 2005-or
    over 4 months after the Coast Guard had developed a list of over 350
    nonfederal area maritime security committee participants with a need for a
    security clearance-28 had submitted the necessary paperwork for the
    background check. There were two main reasons why the Coast Guard had not
    processed security clearances more expeditiously. First, local Coast Guard
    officials said they did not clearly understand their responsibility for
    communicating with state and local officials about the process for
    obtaining a security clearance. After receiving a draft of our report, the
    Coast Guard issued guidelines clarifying the role that local Coast Guard
    officials play in the program. Second, the Coast Guard had not developed
    formal procedures for using its database on security clearance applicants
    to troubleshoot potential problems and take appropriate management action.
    As the Coast Guard proceeds with its program, nonfederal officials could
    benefit from more information on the process for obtaining a security
    clearance. The FBI, which spearheaded a similar effort (but not specific
    to ports) to expedite security clearances for nonfederal officials, found
    that nonfederal officials were slow in submitting application forms in
    part because of the lack of awareness about the security clearance
    process, and the agency made specific efforts to educate local officials
    about the application process. Similar educational efforts by the Coast
    Guard might help clear up any such uncertainties about the application
    process. Other barriers to greater information sharing identified by
    committee participants included the size and complexity of ports-factors
    that are intrinsic to port operations-but none of these barriers were
    mentioned as frequently and considered as important as the lack of
    security clearances.

    In this report, we recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security
    direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to develop formal procedures

    so that local Coast Guard and headquarters officials use the Coast Guard's
    database as a management tool to monitor who has submitted applications
    for a security clearance and to take appropriate action when application
    trends point to possible problems. For example, updating the database on a
    routine basis could identify port areas where progress is slow and
    indicate that follow-up with local field office officials may be needed.
    Finally, we are also recommending that the Coast Guard raise the awareness
    of state, local, and industry officials about the process of applying for
    security clearances. This effort could involve using brochures and other
    information that the FBI has used in its program for educating state and
    local officials about the security clearance process.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Homeland
    Security, including the Coast Guard, generally agreed with our findings
    and recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security's written
    comments are in appendix IV.

                                       Background

        Ports Are Important and Vulnerable

    Ports play an important role in the nation's economy and security. Ports
    are used to import and export cargo worth hundreds of billions of dollars,
    generating jobs, both directly and indirectly, for Americans and our
    trading partners. Ports, which include inland waterways, are used to move
    bulk agricultural, mineral, petroleum, and paper products. In addition,
    ports are also used to move cargo containers (as shown in fig. 1)-one of
    the most important segments of global commerce, accounting for 90 percent
    of the world's maritime cargo. In 2002, approximately 7 million containers
    arrived in U.S. seaports, carrying more than 95 percent of the nation's
    non-North American trade by weight and 75 percent by value. Ports also
    contribute to the economy through recreational activities such as boating,
    fishing, and cruises. As an indication of the economic importance of
    ports, a 2002 simulation of a terrorist attack at a port led to the
    temporary closure of every seaport in the United States and resulted in an
    estimated loss of $58 billion in revenue to the U.S. economy, including
    spoilage, loss of sales, manufacturing slowdowns, and halts in
    production.6 Ports are also important to national security because they
    host naval bases

    6The consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton and the Conference Board
    sponsored the simulation in 2002. In the simulation, representatives from
    government and industry participated in a scenario involving the discovery
    and subsequent detonation of radioactive bombs hidden in cargo containers.

    and vessels, facilitate the movement of military equipment, and supply
    troops deployed overseas.

    Figure 1: Ports Facilitate Cargo Container Traffic, an Important Segment
    of Maritime Commerce

    Source: GAO.

    Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation's 361 seaports
    have been increasingly viewed as potential targets for future terrorist
    attacks. Ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven with
    complex transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and
    easily accessible. Ports and their maritime approaches facilitate a unique
    freedom of movement and flow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and
    vessels to transit with relative anonymity. Because of their
    accessibility, ports are vulnerable to a wide variety of types of attacks.
    Cargo containers-mentioned above as important to maritime commerce-are a
    potential conduit for terrorists to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or
    other dangerous materials into the country. Finally, ports contain a
    number of specific facilities that could be targeted by terrorists,
    including military vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries,
    terminals, dams and locks, factories, office buildings, power plants,
    refineries, sports complexes, and other critical infrastructure.

        Multiple Jurisdictions Are Involved in Securing the Nation's Ports

    The responsibility for protecting ports from a terrorist attack is a
    shared responsibility that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, with
    federal, state, and local organizations involved. For example, at the
    federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has overall
    homeland security responsibility, and the Coast Guard, an agency of the
    department, has lead responsibility for maritime security. Other federal
    departments that may be involved include the Department of Defense (DOD)
    and DOJ. The Coast Guard and other federal agencies share their security
    responsibilities with several local stakeholder groups. Some port
    authorities, operated privately or by the state or local government, have
    responsibility for protecting certain facilities in and around ports. Port
    authorities provide protection through designated port police forces,
    private security companies, and coordination with local law enforcement
    agencies. Private sector stakeholders play a major role in identifying and
    addressing the vulnerabilities in and around their facilities, which may
    include oil refineries, cargo facilities, and other property adjacent to
    navigable waterways.

        Information Sharing Is Important to Port Security Activities

    Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is central
    to port security activities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and several
    congressionally chartered commissions call attention to the importance of
    sharing information among officials from multiple jurisdictions as a way
    to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack.7 The act recognizes that the
    federal government relies on state and local personnel to help protect
    against terrorist attacks, and these officials need homeland security
    information to prevent and prepare for such attacks.8 One of the
    congressionally chartered commissioned reports-the 9/11 Commission
    Report-placed emphasis on the importance of sharing information among
    federal and nonfederal entities as a means of deterring a terrorist attack
    in the future. In January 2005, we designated information sharing for
    homeland security as a high-risk area because the federal government still
    faces formidable challenges in gathering, identifying, analyzing, and

    7These congressionally chartered commissions include the 9/11 Commission
    (the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States), the
    Gilmore Commission (the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
    Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction), the
    Bremer Commission (the National Commission on Terrorism), and the
    Hart-Rudman Commission (the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
    Century).

    8P.L. 107-296, S: 891 (Nov. 25, 2002).

    disseminating key information within and among federal and nonfederal

    9

    entities.

    Information sharing between federal officials and nonfederal officials can
    involve information collected by federal intelligence agencies. In order
    to gain access to classified information, state and local law enforcement
    officials generally need to apply for and receive approval to have a
    federal security clearance. Presidential Executive Order 12968, Access to
    Classified Information, dated August 1995, established federal criteria
    for granting access to classified information. As implemented by the Coast
    Guard, the primary criterion for granting access to classified information
    is an individual's "need to know," which is defined as the determination
    made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective
    recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to
    perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.10 To
    obtain a security clearance, an applicant must complete a detailed
    questionnaire that asks for information on all previous employment,
    residences, and foreign travel and contacts that reach back 7 years. After
    submitting the questionnaire, the applicant then undergoes a variety of
    screenings and checks by the Coast Guard Security Center. The Office of
    Personnel Management conducts background investigations on the applicant.

        Area Maritime Security Committees Are Established to Facilitate Information
        Sharing between Port Security Stakeholders

    The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in the aftermath of the
    September 11 attacks and with the recognition that ports contain many
    potential security targets, provided for area maritime security committees
    to be established by the Coast Guard at ports across the country.11 A
    primary goal of these committees is to assist the local Captain of the
    Port-the senior Coast Guard officer who leads the committee-to develop a
    security plan-called an area maritime security plan-to address the
    vulnerabilities and risks in that port zone.12 In developing these

    9GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington D.C.: January
    2005).

    10Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, Section 1.1(h).

    11See 46 U.S.C. S: 70112(a)(2). Prior to MTSA, some port locations had
    harbor safety committees that had representatives from federal, state, and
    local organizations. In addition, port security committees had been
    organized and still exist at ports where substantial out-load and in-load
    of military equipment occurs.

    12See 33 C.F.R. S: 103.500.

    plans, the committees serve as forums to communicate with stakeholders
    from federal agencies, state and local governments, law enforcement, and
    private industries in an effort to gain a comprehensive perspective of
    security issues at a port location. The committees also serve as a link
    for communicating threats and disseminating security information to port
    stakeholders. In all, the Coast Guard ultimately organized 43 area
    maritime security committees, covering the nation's 361 ports.13 Besides
    the Coast Guard, federal agencies such as the Customs and Border
    Protection, FBI, or Maritime Administration may be part of the committee.
    State, local, and industry members could include officials from port
    authorities, oil refineries, and local police or fire departments.
    Appendix II lists the various stakeholder groups that may be eligible.

    To supplement the statutory and regulatory framework of the committees,
    the Coast Guard developed specific guidelines on communication and
    collaboration among committee members.14 This guidance emphasizes the
    importance of information in successfully implementing security measures
    and recognizes that the committee structure allows stakeholders to
    identify other federal, state, and local agencies that are simultaneously
    developing security standards for other critical infrastructure, such as
    bridges and airports. The guidance tasks the committee with developing
    information sharing procedures for various situations, including relaying
    instances of suspicious activity to appropriate authorities and
    communicating to port stakeholders threat information, among other things.

        Interagency Operational Centers Involve Multiple Participants and Offer
        Another Means of Improving Information Sharing

    Another approach at improving information sharing and port security
    operations involves interagency operational centers-command centers
    that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various
    federal and nonfederal participants. These centers provide intelligence
    information and real-time operational data from sensors, radars, and
    cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal participants 24 hours a
    day. The three current centers are in Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk,
    Virginia; and San Diego, California. Two of the centers (Norfolk and
    San Diego) are located in ports that have a substantial number of vessels

    13Because some ports are located close to one another, some committees
    cover several ports. For example, the Puget Sound area maritime security
    committee includes the ports of Seattle, Tacoma, Bremerton, Port Angeles,
    and Everett.

    14Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 9-02, Change 1, Sept. 2002.

    and facilities operated by the Department of the Navy. The third center
    (Charleston) is located at a port that moves military equipment in and out
    of the port, and it is a major container cargo port.

    The development of interagency operational centers represents an effort to
    improve awareness of incoming vessels, port facilities, and port
    operations. In general, these centers are jointly operated by federal and
    nonfederal law enforcement officials. The centers can have command and
    control capabilities that can be used to communicate information to
    vessels, aircraft, and other vehicles and stations involved in port
    security operations.

        Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and Supports, National-Level
        Intelligence Infrastructure

      Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information Sharing

    While area maritime security committees and interagency operational
    centers are port-level organizations, they are supported by, and provide
    support to, a national-level intelligence infrastructure. National-level
    departments and agencies in the intelligence and law enforcement
    communities may offer information that ultimately could be useful to
    members of area maritime security committees or interagency operational
    centers at the port level. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies
    conduct maritime threat identification and dissemination efforts in
    support of tactical and operational maritime and port security efforts,
    but most have missions broader than maritime activities as well. In
    addition, some agencies also have regional or field offices involved in
    information gathering and sharing. See appendix III for a description of
    the departments and agencies or components involved in maritime
    information sharing at the national and port levels.

    Area maritime security committees have improved information sharing among
    port security stakeholders, and made improvements in the timeliness,
    completeness, and usefulness of information. The types of information
    shared include assessments of vulnerabilities at specific port locations,
    information about potential threats or suspicious activities, and
    strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key
    infrastructure. These efforts at sharing information generally did not
    exist prior to the creation of area maritime security committees. At the
    ports we visited, the collaboration and sharing of information between
    committee members reflected the different types of stakeholders and
    variations in the information needs of each port location. While
    improvements were noted, it is too early to determine if any one port has
    developed a better structure for information sharing than another, because
    the committees have only been operating for just over a year.

        Ports Reviewed Showed Improvements in Timeliness, Completeness, and
        Usefulness of Shared Information

    Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve the
    timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. For
    example, a primary function served by the committees was to develop
    security plans for port areas-called area maritime security plans. The
    goal of these plans was to identify vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack
    in and around a port location and to develop strategies for protecting a
    wide range of facilities and infrastructure (as shown in fig. 2). In doing
    so, the committees established new procedures for sharing information by
    holding meetings on a regular basis, issuing electronic bulletins on
    suspicious activities around port facilities, and sharing key documents,
    including vulnerability assessments and the portwide security plan itself,
    according to committee participants. These activities did not exist prior
    to the creation of the committees, and they have contributed to the
    improvements in information sharing. The area maritime security plan
    provides a framework for communication and coordination among port
    stakeholders and law enforcement officials, and identifies strategies for
    reducing vulnerabilities to security threats in and near ports. It is
    designed to capture the information necessary to coordinate and
    communicate security procedures at each maritime security level,
    complement and encompass facility and vessel security plans, and
    ultimately be integrated into the National Maritime Security Plan. Coast
    Guard officials and nonfederal stakeholders we contacted agreed that
    efforts such as these have improved information sharing.

    Figure 2: Area Maritime Security Committees Protect a Wide Range of Port
    Facilities and Adjacent Infrastructure

    Source: GAO.

    Committee participants we spoke with noted that an essential component
    that has improved the timeliness of information sharing has been the
    development of both formal and informal stakeholder networks resulting
    from the formation of area maritime security committees. As part of the
    process for developing the plan, the committee identifies critical
    stakeholders and assembles their contact information, allowing for timely
    dissemination of relevant information. For example, in the event the Coast
    Guard learns of a potential and credible threat, the committee would
    designate who should be contacted, the order in which members should be
    contacted, and what information the committee provides or receives.
    Participants in the committees told us that the interactions of committee
    members have also led to the formation of informal stakeholder networks as
    committee members encounter other stakeholders with similar concerns and
    perspectives. The committee also provides a forum for realtime sharing of
    information between stakeholders through meetings or electronic
    communications. For example, our discussions with federal and nonfederal
    officials at the ports of Charleston and Houston indicated that

    committee members representing private industries were granted access to
    daily information bulletins that they had not received prior to the
    formation of area maritime security committees, and these information
    bulletins have allowed them to stay informed of important Coast Guard
    decisions. In Houston, the Captain of the Port has used such bulletins to
    notify and inform local stakeholders of unannounced drills, changes in
    security levels, and Coast Guard guidance for vessel inspections and
    voluntary screening. In Charleston, bulletins have been used to share
    information on closure of waterways, release of new regulations, and
    methods for preventing a possible terrorist attack.

    At the ports we visited, committee members noted that their participation
    has allowed them to disseminate more complete information and receive more
    useful information in return. Committee members representing the private
    sector at two of the ports we visited noted an increased willingness to
    disclose vulnerabilities to federal stakeholders with confidence that the
    information would be protected. Coast Guard officials noted that access to
    more complete information regarding vulnerabilities and threats at
    individual facilities has aided them in mitigating risks. Additionally,
    having a complete view of vulnerabilities at the port as a whole has been
    useful in identifying gaps and common security needs. For example, while
    private sector stakeholders are sharing their written assessments of their
    vulnerabilities with the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard is, in turn, sharing
    its strategies for the overall protection of ports against potential
    terrorist activities. State and local port authority operators and private
    sector stakeholders commented that the committees have increased their
    awareness of security issues around the port and that information received
    from the Coast Guard has been useful in identifying and addressing
    security concerns at their facilities. Efforts at sharing information
    prior to the creation of area maritime security committees had not
    produced such effects.

        Committees Have Flexibility in Their Structure and in the Way in Which They
        Share Information

    While the committees are required to follow the same guidance regarding
    their structure, purpose, and processes, each of the committees is allowed
    the flexibility to assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs
    of its port area. Each port is unique in many ways, including the
    geographic area covered and the type of operations that take place there.
    These portspecific differences influence the number of members that
    participate, the types of state and local organizations that members
    represent, and the way in which information is shared.

    One aspect of this flexibility is the way in which information is
    channeled to specific stakeholders. The representation of various
    stakeholders on a committee can cause differences in the type of
    information that is shared. While committee members from federal agencies
    may have access to classified information because they have obtained a
    security clearance, other members may receive a sanitized version of the
    information or be restricted from participating in certain committee
    meetings. To mitigate this situation, some committees have formed
    subcommittees that deal with classified materials such as intelligence
    reports or details of military deployments.15 The role stakeholders play
    in protecting strategic assets or the type of cargo they handle may also
    affect what types of information they receive as well as what types of
    information they can share with the committee at large. For example, at
    one port we visited, the details regarding a shipment of a sensitive
    material were restricted to committee members that had a direct
    involvement in the operation.

    The committees also show marked differences in how their meetings occur,
    and these differences in turn affect the specific ways in which
    information is shared. For example, at Baltimore, officials told us that
    committee meetings are open to the general port community and can draw
    over 80 participants in addition to the 48 committee members. Coast Guard
    officials told us that such a large attendance made it difficult to
    conduct committee business. To include all interested stakeholders in the
    information network while maintaining a working structure for the
    committee, the Captain of the Port designated 17 members to an executive
    committee, while the remaining 31 members served on a general committee.
    This structure allowed the committee to incorporate a large amount of
    stakeholder input and to share information with all interested parties
    while keeping the decision making duties of the committee at a manageable
    level. In contrast to Baltimore's 48 members, the Puget Sound area
    maritime security committee consists of 25 members who each share in
    decision making. The smaller committee allows for greater familiarity
    amongst members as well as immediate decision making at meetings because
    stakeholders with decision making authority are all present.

    At least two of the other committees we reviewed leveraged existing
    information sharing networks, such as trade and industry associations, by
    having Coast Guard officials participate in these groups. For example, at

    15The area maritime security committee for the port of Charleston has a
    separate intelligence subcommittee made up of members that have security
    clearances.

    Charleston, Coast Guard officials noted that many of the stakeholders
    included on the area maritime security committee were already members of a
    local maritime association that had been operating since 1926. Officials
    from the Coast Guard and other federal agencies are members of the
    association and use the group's meetings as one way of sharing information
    with stakeholders. Coast Guard officials noted that while this approach
    may reduce the role and level of participation in the committee, it avoids
    duplication of efforts and allows the committee to be part of a broader
    information sharing network. At the port of Houston, the strong presence
    of the petrochemical industry also made sharing information easier since
    an association of petrochemical companies was already in place, according
    to local petrochemical and Coast Guard officials.

    Regardless of the structures and communication networks a committee
    adopted, stakeholders at all four locations we reviewed agreed that the
    committees fostered improved information sharing. We were not able,
    however, to determine if any of these structures worked better than others
    for two reasons. First, the different structures reflected the specific
    needs of each port location. Second, the committees are still in their
    early stages of operation and more time will be needed before any
    comparative assessments can be made.

    Interagency operational centers-command centers where officials from
    multiple agencies can receive data 24 hours a day on maritime activities-
    have further improved information sharing at three locations. According to
    participants at each of these centers, the improvements come mainly from
    the 24-hour coverage and greater amount of real-time, operational data,
    which the centers can use in their role as command posts for coordinating
    multi-agency efforts. The Coast Guard is developing plans to develop its
    own centers, called sector command centers, as part of an effort to
    reorganize and improve its awareness of the maritime domain. Some of these
    sector command centers may be interagency on either a regular or an ad hoc
    basis. However, the potential relationship between interagency operational
    centers and the Coast Guard's new sector command centers remains to be
    determined, pending a Coast Guard report to Congress.

      Interagency Operational Centers Have Also Improved Information Sharing

    Centers Process and Share Information sharing at the three existing
    interagency operational centers

    Information on Operations 	(Charleston, Norfolk, and San Diego),
    represents a step toward further improving information sharing, according
    to participants at all three centers. They said area maritime security
    committees have improved information sharing primarily through a planning
    process that identifies

    vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, as well as through development
    of two-way communication mechanisms to share threat information on an
    asneeded basis. In contrast, interagency operational centers can provide
    continuous information about maritime activities and involve various
    agencies directly in operational decisions using this information. Radar,
    sensors, and cameras offer representations of vessels and facilities.
    Other data are available from intelligence sources, including data on
    vessels, cargo, and crew. For example:

    o  	In Charleston, four federal agencies (DOJ, Coast Guard, U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)
    coordinate in a unified command structure, and each of these agencies
    feeds information into the center. Eight state or local agencies (such as
    the county sheriff and the state's law enforcement division) have
    participants at the center full-time, and eight others participate on an
    as-needed or part-time basis. Federal and nonfederal officials told us
    that information sharing has improved, since participants from multiple
    agencies are colocated with each other and work together to identify
    potential threats by sharing information.

    o  	In San Diego, the center is located in a Coast Guard facility that
    receives information from radars and sensors operated by the Navy and
    cameras operated by the local harbor patrol. Local harbor patrol officials
    are colocated with Coast Guard and Navy personnel. Harbor patrol and Coast
    Guard staff said the center has leveraged their resources through the use
    of shared information.

    o  	In Norfolk, the center is staffed with Coast Guard and Navy personnel
    and receives information from cameras and radars. A Coast Guard Field
    Intelligence Support Team is colocated at the center and shares
    information related to the large concentration of naval and commercial
    vessels in and around the port area with Navy and Coast Guard personnel.
    According to Coast Guard officials, having a central location where two
    agencies can receive data from multiple sources on a 24hour-a-day basis
    has helped improve information sharing.

    Greater information sharing among participants at these centers has also
    enhanced operational collaboration, according to participants. Unlike the
    area maritime security committees, these centers are operational in
    nature-that is, they have a unified or joint command structure designed to
    receive information and act on it. In the three centers, representatives
    from the various agencies work side by side, each having access to
    databases and other sources of information from their respective agencies.
    The various information sources can be reviewed together, and the

    resulting information can be more readily fused together. Officials said
    such centers help leverage the resources and authorities of the respective
    agencies. For example, federal and nonfederal participants collaborate in
    vessel boarding, cargo examination, and other port security
    responsibilities, such as enforcing security zones (as shown in fig. 3).
    If the Coast Guard determines that a certain vessel should be inspected on
    maritime safety grounds and intends to board it, other federal and
    nonfederal agencies might join in the boarding to assess the vessel or its
    cargo, crew, or passengers for violations relating to their areas of
    jurisdiction or responsibility.

    Figure 3: Coast Guard Patrol Enforces Security Zone at a Port

                                      Source: GAO.

    Variations across Centers The types of information and the way information
    is shared varies at the

    Affect Information Sharing 	three centers, depending on their purpose and
    mission, leadership and organization, membership, technology, and
    resources, according to officials at the centers. The Charleston center
    has a port security purpose, so its missions are all security related. It
    is led by DOJ, and its membership

    includes 4 federal agencies and 16 state and local agencies. The San Diego
    center has a more general purpose, so it has multiple missions to include,
    not just port security, but search and rescue, environmental response,
    drug interdiction, and other law enforcement activities. It is led by the
    Coast Guard, and its membership includes two federal agencies and one
    local agency. The Norfolk center has a port security purpose, but its
    mission focuses primarily on force protection for the Navy. It is led by
    the Coast Guard, and its membership includes two federal agencies and no
    state or local agencies. As a result, the Charleston center shares
    information that focuses on law enforcement and intelligence related to
    port security among a very broad group of federal, state, and local agency
    officials. The San Diego center shares information on a broader scope of
    activities (beyond security) among a smaller group of federal and local
    agency officials. The Norfolk center shares the most focused information
    (security information related to force protection) among two federal
    agencies. While the Norfolk center officials said they were planning to
    broaden the scope of their purpose, mission, and membership, they had not
    done so at the time of our visit.

    The centers also share different information because of their technologies
    and resources. The San Diego and Norfolk centers have an array of standard
    and new Coast Guard technology systems and access to Coast Guard and
    various national databases, while the Charleston center has these as well
    as additional systems and databases. For example, the Charleston center
    has access to and shares information on Customs and Border Protection's
    databases on incoming cargo containers from the National Targeting Center.
    In addition, Charleston has a pilot project with the Department of Energy
    to test radiation detection technology, which provides additional
    information to share. The Charleston center is funded by a special
    appropriation that allows it to use federal funds to pay for state and
    local agency salaries. This arrangement boosts the participation of state
    and local agencies, and thus information sharing beyond the federal
    government, according to port stakeholders in Charleston. While the San
    Diego center also has 24-hour participation by the local harbor patrol,
    that agency pays its own salaries.

    Other Ad Hoc In addition to the three interagency operational centers we
    visited, our Arrangements for work has identified other interagency
    arrangements that facilitate Interagency Information information sharing
    and interagency operations in the maritime

    environment. One example is a predesignated single-mission task
    force,Sharing which becomes operational when needed. DHS established the
    Homeland Security Task Force, South-East-a working group consisting of
    federal

    and nonfederal agencies with appropriate geographic and jurisdictional
    responsibilities that have the mission to respond to any mass migration of
    immigrants affecting southeast Florida. Task force members (both agencies
    and individuals) are predesignated, and they have a contingency plan
    (called Vigilant Sentry) that describes each agency's specific
    coordination and mission responsibilities. The task force meets regularly
    to monitor potential migration events, update the contingency plan, and
    otherwise coordinate its activities. When a mass migration event occurs,
    the task force is activated and becomes a full-time interagency effort to
    share information and coordinate operations to implement the contingency
    plan. This task force was activated in February 2004 to implement
    Operation Able Sentry to interdict a mass migration from Haiti.

    Another example of an interagency arrangement for information sharing can
    occur in single-agency operational centers that become interagency to
    respond to specific events. For example, the Coast Guard has its own
    command centers for both its District Seven and Sector Miami. While these
    centers normally focus on a variety of Coast Guard missions and are not
    normally interagency in structure, they have established protocols with
    other federal agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection and
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident
    command structure should it be needed. For example, the interagency
    Operation Able Sentry (discussed above) was directed from the Coast
    Guard's District Seven command center. Similarly, to respond to a
    hijacking of a ship, an interagency operation was directed from the Coast
    Guard's Sector Miami command center. While an interagency operation might
    be directed from these Coast Guard command centers, it might be led by
    another agency with greater interests or resources to respond to an event.
    For example, this was the case with a recent interagency operation to
    arrange for the security of dignitaries at an international conference in
    Miami that was led by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These Coast
    Guard centers make it possible to host interagency operations because they
    have extra space and equipment that allow for surge capabilities and
    virtual connectivity with each partner agency.

    Officials from the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Miami all said that these ad hoc
    interagency arrangements were crucial to sharing information and
    coordinating operations.

        Coast Guard Plans to Develop Sector Command Centers at Ports

    The Coast Guard is planning to develop its own operational centers- called
    sector command centers-at additional ports. These command centers are
    being developed to provide local port activities with a unified command as
    the Coast Guard reorganizes its marine safety offices and groups into
    unified sectors. In addition, the Coast Guard sector command centers are
    designed to improve awareness of the maritime domain through a variety of
    technologies. The Coast Guard is planning to have command centers feed
    information to the Coast Guard's two area offices-one on the Pacific Coast
    and the other on the Atlantic Coast. Over the long term, the Coast Guard
    plans to have information from sector command centers and area offices
    channeled to a center at the national level-allowing the Coast Guard to
    have a nationwide common operating picture of all navigable waters in the
    country. A Coast Guard official indicated that this nationwide information
    will be available to other field office commanders at the same time it is
    given to area and headquarters officials. To develop this nationwide
    operating picture, the Coast Guard hopes to install equipment that allows
    it to receive information from sensors, classified information on maritime
    matters, and data related to ships and crewmembers as part of its
    expansion plans. Communication from Coast Guard ships and aircraft, as
    well as federal and nonfederal systems for monitoring vessel traffic and
    identifying the positions of large ships, would be among the other types
    of information that could be integrated into a command center.

    The Coast Guard plans to develop sector command centers at 10 port
    locations, with potential expansion to as many as 40 port locations. The
    Coast Guard is currently conducting site surveys to identify locations
    where it believes centers should be located. For fiscal year 2006, the
    Coast Guard is requesting funds that support its plans to improve
    awareness of the maritime domain by, among other things, continuing to
    evaluate the potential expansion of sector command centers to other port
    locations. For example, the Coast Guard's budget request includes $5.7
    million to continue developing a nationwide maritime monitoring system,
    the common operational picture. The common operational picture is
    primarily a computer software package that fuses data from different
    sources, such as radar, sensors on aircraft, and existing information
    systems. The Coast Guard has also requested funding for training personnel
    in common operational picture deployment at command centers and to modify
    facilities to implement the picture in command centers. While the total
    cost of operating command centers is still unknown, the Coast Guard's
    Five-Year Capital Investment Plan shows that the capital costs of this
    effort amount to an estimated $400 million, with acquisition of the system
    estimated to start in fiscal year 2007.

        Coast Guard Report Pending on Interagency Operational Centers

    The relationship between the interagency operational centers and the Coast
    Guard's sector command centers has not been determined yet. Coast Guard
    sector command centers can involve multiple agencies, and the Coast Guard
    has begun using the term "sector command center-joint" for the interagency
    operational centers in San Diego and Norfolk. Coast Guard officials have
    told us that their planned sector command centers will be the basis for
    any interagency operational centers at ports. However, the sector command
    center we visited, in Sector Miami, was not interagency on a routine
    basis-the Coast Guard is the single entity operating the center.

    During our visits to the interagency operational centers, port
    stakeholders raised the following issues as important factors to consider
    in any expansion of interagency operational centers: (1) purpose and
    mission- the centers could serve a variety of overall purposes, as well as
    support a wide number of specific missions; (2) leadership and
    organization-the centers could be led by several departments or agencies
    and be organized a variety of ways; (3) membership-the centers could vary
    in membership in terms of federal, state, local, or private sector
    participants and their level of involvement; (4) technology deployed-the
    centers could deploy a variety of technologies in terms of networks,
    computers, communications, sensors, and databases; and (5) resource
    requirements-the centers could also vary in terms of resource
    requirements, which agency funds the resources, and how resources are
    prioritized.

    In a related step, Congress directed the Coast Guard to report on the
    existing interagency operational centers, covering such matters as the
    composition and operational characteristics of existing centers and the
    number, location, and cost of such new centers as may be required to
    implement maritime transportation security plans and maritime intelligence
    activities.16 This report, which Congress called for by February 2005, had
    not been issued by the time we had completed our work and prepared our
    report for printing. According to DHS, the report has been written and has
    been approved by DHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and is
    now in the final stages of review at the Coast Guard. Until the report on
    the centers is issued, it is unclear how the Coast Guard

    16See The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, P.L.
    108-293, S: 807 (August 9, 2004). While the statute uses the term "joint
    operational centers," we are using the term "interagency operational
    centers" to denote centers where multiple agencies participate. According
    to Coast Guard officials, the term "joint" refers to command centers where
    the Coast Guard and Navy are involved in carrying out the responsibilities
    of the center.

      Lack of Security Clearances Is a Key Barrier to More Effective Information
      Sharing

    will define the potential relationship between interagency operational
    centers and its own sector command centers.

    The lack of security clearances was most frequently cited as a barrier to
    more effective information sharing among port stakeholders, such as those
    involved in area maritime security committees and interagency operational
    centers. The Coast Guard has initiated a security clearance program for
    members of area maritime security committees. However, the results of the
    Coast Guard's efforts have been mixed. For example, only a small
    percentage of application forms from state, local, and industry officials
    had actually been submitted by February 2005-over 4 months after the Coast
    Guard had developed its list of officials. The primary reason given for
    this was that Coast Guard field office officials did not clearly
    understand their role in helping nonfederal officials apply for a security
    clearance. The Coast Guard's program does not have formal procedures for
    using data to manage the program, but developing such procedures would
    allow the Coast Guard to identify and deal with possible problems in the
    future. Finally, as the Coast Guard moves forward with its state, local,
    and industry security clearance program, the experience of other federal
    agencies that manage similar programs suggests that the limited awareness
    of state, local, and industry officials about the process for obtaining a
    security clearance could also impede the submission of applications for a
    security clearance.

        Port Security Stakeholders Cite the Lack of Clearances as a Problem

    At the ports we visited, the lack of security clearances was cited as a
    key barrier to information sharing among participants of area maritime
    security committees and interagency operational centers we contacted. Port
    stakeholders involved in the four area maritime security committees
    consistently stated that the lack of federal security clearances for
    nonfederal members was an impediment to effective information sharing.
    Here are several examples:

    o  	An official of the Washington State Ferries who participates on the
    Puget Sound area maritime security committee said that not having a
    security clearance-and therefore the ability to access classified
    information-affected his ability to carry out security-related
    activities.17 He noted that the local U.S. Attorney reported to a local

    17Washington State Ferries is the largest state-operated ferry system in
    the country.

    newspaper in the summer of 2004 that suspicious activities had been
    reported on the state ferry system. The Washington State Ferries official
    indicated that he or his staff was the source for some of the data but
    that federal officials would not provide him with more details on the
    activities because he did not have a security clearance. A Coast Guard
    field intelligence official corroborated this by stating that the Captain
    of the Port was unable to share classified information from the U.S.
    Attorney's office that indicated a pattern of incidents involving the
    ferries. Although Coast Guard officials said they wanted to share this
    information, ferry officials' lack of a federal security clearance
    precluded them from doing so. Both Coast Guard and ferry officials
    indicated that more complete information would aid local security officers
    in identifying or deterring illegal activities.

    o  	A senior Maryland state official involved in making budget decisions
    on improving security around facilities in the port of Baltimore indicated
    that having a security clearance would aid his ability to make decisions
    on how the state could more effectively spend its resources on homeland
    security. He said information on what transportation sectors are probable
    targets would be a valuable input on where the state should prioritize its
    spending decisions.

    o  	A senior Coast Guard official in Houston told us that granting
    security clearances to selected members of the area maritime security
    committee would make it easier for nonfederal officials to make decisions
    on how to respond to specific threats. A local Coast Guard intelligence
    official cited an example in which classified information could not be
    shared with port stakeholders. The official told us that there were delays
    in sharing the information until the originator of the information
    supplied a sanitized version.

    Similar to the concerns expressed by area maritime security committee
    members, participants we contacted at the three interagency operational
    centers cited the lack of security clearances as a barrier to information
    sharing. At the center in San Diego, the chief of the local harbor patrol
    noted that the lack of security clearances was an issue for patrol staff
    who are involved in the center. Subsequent to raising this issue, DHS
    sponsored security clearances for 18 harbor patrol officials. At the
    center in Charleston, participants in the interagency operational center
    cited the lack of security clearances as a potential barrier to
    information sharing. The Department of Justice addressed this potential
    barrier by granting security clearances to nonfederal officials involved
    in the center. Finally, Coast Guard officials indicated that when
    nonfederal officials begin working at the interagency operational center
    in Norfolk, granting security

    clearances to nonfederal participants will be critical to their success in
    sharing information.

    According to the Coast Guard and state and local officials we contacted,
    the shared partnership between the federal government and state and local
    entities may fall short of its potential to fight terrorism because of the
    lack of security clearances. If state and local officials lack security
    clearances, the information they possess may be incomplete. According to
    Coast Guard and nonfederal officials, the inability to share classified
    information may limit their ability to deter, prevent, and respond to a
    potential terrorist attack.

    While security clearances for nonfederal officials who participate in
    interagency operational centers are sponsored by DOJ and DHS, the Coast
    Guard sponsors security clearances for members of area maritime security
    committees. For the purposes of our review, we examined in more detail the
    Coast Guard's efforts to address the lack of security clearances among
    members of area maritime security committees.

        Coast Guard Has Taken Steps to Grant Additional Clearances to State, Local,
        and Industry Officials, but Efforts to Date Have Been Mixed

    As part of its effort to improve information sharing at ports, the Coast
    Guard initiated a program in July 2004 to sponsor security clearances for
    members of area maritime security committees, but nonfederal officials
    have been slow in submitting their applications for a security clearance.
    By October 2004, the Coast Guard had identified 359 nonfederal committee
    members who had a need to know and should receive a security clearance,
    but as of February 2005, only 28 officials, or about 8 percent, had
    submitted the application forms for a security clearance. Twenty-four of
    these officials have been granted an interim clearance, which allows
    access to classified material while the final clearance is being
    processed.

    We interviewed local Coast Guard officials at the four ports we visited to
    gain a better understanding of the role of the Coast Guard in guiding
    state and local officials through the process. Our work shows that there
    were two areas that affected the Coast Guard's efforts: (1) local Coast
    Guard officials did not clearly understand their role in the security
    clearance program and (2) the Coast Guard did not use available data to
    track the status of security clearances for state and local officials.

    Coast Guard Field Office Officials Said They Did Not Clearly Understand
    Their Role in the Security Clearance Program

    Coast Guard field office officials said they did not clearly understand
    their role in helping nonfederal officials apply for a security clearance.
    In July 2004, Coast Guard headquarters sent guidance to Coast Guard field
    offices requesting them to proceed with submissions of personnel security
    investigation packages and to submit the additional names of state and
    local officials who had a need for a security clearance. However, this
    guidance evidently was unclear to field office officials. For example, by
    January 2005-3 months after they submitted names to headquarters- Coast
    Guard officials at three of the ports we visited were still awaiting
    further guidance from headquarters on how to proceed.18 These officials
    said they thought that headquarters was processing security clearances for
    nonfederal officials, and they were waiting for notification from
    headquarters that security clearances had been granted.

    Our discussions with a Coast Guard field office official at the fourth
    port location suggest that additional guidance about the process for the
    state, local, and industry security clearance program could be beneficial.
    For example, according to this official, membership on area maritime
    security committees changes over time, and it would be helpful to have
    guidance on the process for obtaining additional security clearances or
    dropping clearances for officials who no longer participate on the
    committees or who no longer have a need to know classified information.
    This official noted that the process differed depending on whether a
    committee participant is considered to be a military or civilian official.

    In early February 2005, we expressed our concerns about the security
    clearance program to Coast Guard officials. On the basis, in part, of our
    discussions, Coast Guard headquarters took action and drafted guidance
    informing its field office officials that they were responsible for
    contacting nonfederal officials and for providing them with application
    forms for obtaining a security clearance, according to Coast Guard
    officials. Additionally, to further clarify the role of field office
    officials, the Coast Guard's draft guidance included information on
    various procedures for obtaining a security clearance. After receiving a
    draft of this report, the Coast Guard finalized this guidance and sent it
    to field office officials in early April 2005. Our review of the guidance
    shows that it clarifies the role of field office officials in
    administering the security clearance process at

    18At the fourth location, the local Coast Guard official initiated contact
    with nonfederal officials on his own, and he asked for additional
    information from headquarters. At this location, the field office is
    working with nonfederal officials to submit their application forms or to
    verify that they already have a security clearance.

    Data Could Be More Effectively Used as a Tool to Manage the Security
    Clearance Program

    the local level and that it provides more detailed procedures on how to
    check the status of applications that have been submitted for a security
    clearance.

    In addition to writing draft guidance on the program, the Coast Guard
    recently demonstrated that the security clearance program has produced
    some positive results. For example, in late 2004, the Coast Guard
    determined the need to share the results of a security study on ferries,
    portions of which were classified, with some members of an area maritime
    security committee. Working with Coast Guard field office officials, Coast
    Guard headquarters and the Coast Guard Security Center were able to
    process and grant about a dozen security clearances to state, local, and
    industry officials. As a result, the Coast Guard was able to share
    classified information with state, local, and industry officials that it
    believed would help them in carrying out their port security
    responsibilities.

    A key component of a good management system is to have relevant, reliable,
    and timely information available to assess performance over time and to
    correct deficiencies as they occur. The Coast Guard has two databases that
    contain information on the status of security clearances for state, local,
    and industry officials. The first database is a commercial offthe-shelf
    system that contains information on the status of all applications that
    have been submitted to the Coast Guard Security Center, such as whether a
    security clearance has been issued or whether personnel security
    investigations have been conducted. In February 2004, the Coast Guard
    began testing the database for use by field staff, and while headquarters
    has still not granted field staff access to the database, it plans to do
    so in the future. The second database-an internally developed spreadsheet
    on the 359 area maritime committee participants- summarizes information on
    the status of the security clearance program, such as whether they have
    submitted their application forms and whether they have received their
    clearances.

    Although the Coast Guard has databases that could be used to manage the
    state, local, and industry security clearance program, thus far, it has
    not developed formal procedures for using the data as a management tool to
    follow up on possible problems at the national or local level to verify
    the status of clearances. In regard to the database used by the Security
    Center, a Coast Guard official told us that the database was not designed
    to monitor application trends, but instead is used to provide information
    on individual applicants. The Coast Guard's internally developed
    spreadsheet on committee participants who have been deemed candidates for
    a security clearance, however, does offer information on application
    trends,

    Raising the Awareness of State, Local, and Industry Officials Might
    Improve the Processing of Application Forms

    and could be used to monitor progress that has been made at the national
    or local level. For example, updating the database on a routine basis
    could identify port areas where progress is slow and indicate that
    follow-up with local field office officials may be needed. In a similar
    security clearance program, the experience of the FBI shows the utility of
    data as a tool for managing the program. For example, FBI officials
    indicated that its databases have served as management tools for tracking
    state, local, and industry security applications and for monitoring
    application trends and percentages. The Coast Guard has yet to develop
    formal procedures for using its data on committee participants as a tool
    to assess potential problems and to take appropriate action, if necessary.
    Doing so would likely aid its efforts to manage the state, local, and
    industry security clearance program at both the local and the national
    levels.

    While the Coast Guard's databases on security clearances shows promise as
    a tool for monitoring the state, local, and industry security clearance
    program, the database also has limitations in that it cannot be used to
    determine how many nonfederal officials have a federal security clearance
    sponsored by other federal agencies. For example, a Coast Guard official
    stated that this information is difficult to obtain because the Coast
    Guard does not have easy access to databases of other agencies. In
    September 2004, we testified that existing impediments to managing the
    security clearance process include the lack of a governmentwide database
    of clearance information, which hinders efforts to provide timely,
    highquality clearance determinations.19 As a way to deal with this
    problem, a local Coast Guard official sent a survey to port security
    stakeholders to determine how many stakeholders had security clearances
    sponsored by other federal agencies.

    Our prior reviews of DOD and FBI efforts to manage a large number of
    security clearances for service members, government employees, and
    industry personnel have demonstrated long-standing backlogs and delays. In
    addition, our FBI work showed that it is important to address training and
    education to successfully carry out an effective security clearance

    19GAO, Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
    Commission's Proposed Reforms, GAO-04-1084T (Washington, D.C.: September
    14, 2004).

    program.20 Our reviews also showed that the use of internal controls to
    ensure that security clearances are granted in compliance with existing
    rules and regulations will become increasingly important.

    The experience of the FBI in managing its security clearance program shows
    that educating nonfederal officials about the security clearance program
    resulted in improvements in the processing of applications for a security
    clearance. The FBI grants security clearances to state and local law
    enforcement officials who may require access to classified national
    security information to help prevent or respond to terrorist attacks.
    After September 11, an increasing number of state and local officials
    began requesting security clearances to obtain terrorism-related
    information that might affect their jurisdictions. However, when the FBI
    received a low percentage of application forms for security clearances
    from nonfederal officials, the agency consulted with state and local
    officials to collect their views and recommendations regarding information
    sharing and improving the security clearance process, and the FBI
    identified unfamiliarity with the requirements for processing security
    clearance applications as one of the main impediments to timely processing
    of applications. For example, some state and local officials said that
    they did not have adequate guidance for filling out and submitting the
    appropriate application forms. In response, the FBI widely distributed
    step-by-step guidance to state and local law enforcement officials through
    informational brochures (available on a FBI Web site) and meetings with
    state and local officials, among other efforts. Some law enforcement
    officials we interviewed stated that the FBI's guidance and consultation
    with law enforcement professional organizations helped improve state and
    local officials' understanding of the security clearance application
    process.21

    Once the Coast Guard begins notifying more state, local, and industry
    officials about the process for obtaining a security clearance, raising
    the awareness of nonfederal officials about the program could improve the
    processing of application forms. An official at the field office that had

    20GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to
    Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for
    Industry Personnel, GAO-04-202T (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004); Aviation
    Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its
    Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed, GAO-04-242
    (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003); and Security Clearances: FBI Has
    Enhanced Its Process for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials,
    GAO-04-596 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2004).

    21GAO-04-596, p.24.

    actually contacted state and local officials about the security clearance
    program indicated that field office officials did not have basic
    information about the security clearance program. Among other things, he
    mentioned that informational brochures and Web sites could be given to
    nonfederal officials as a way to improve their awareness of the security
    clearance process.

    Attending to the potential lack of awareness by nonfederal officials about
    the security clearance program is important because the number of
    nonfederal officials who submit application forms for a security clearance
    may be much larger than the several hundred state, local, and industry
    officials who participate on area maritime security committees. For
    example, DHS will sponsor an estimated 5,000 security clearances for
    state, local, and industry officials and the Coast Guard Security Center
    will process these clearances, according to Coast Guard officials.
    Additionally, the Coast Guard plans to grant clearances to about 200 other
    nonfederal officials who are involved in supporting other Coast Guard
    operations, such as sector command centers. In addition, as the Coast
    Guard's security clearance program evolves, participants on area maritime
    security committees or in sector command centers may change over time,
    thus highlighting the importance of having ways to raise the awareness of
    nonfederal officials about the security clearance process.

        Other Barriers Intrinsic to Port Operations May Also Impede Information
        Sharing

    Port security stakeholders cited other barriers to effective information
    sharing intrinsic to ports we visited, but none of these barriers were
    mentioned as frequently as the lack of security clearances. At the four
    ports we visited, characteristics intrinsic to the port, such as their
    size and complexity were stated as barriers to effective information
    sharing. In Houston, for example, multiple stakeholders, such as port
    authorities, numerous jurisdictions, and a diverse set of users, were
    presented as challenges in information sharing efforts. The length of the
    Houston Ship Channel (50 miles), with numerous public and private entities
    using the channel, also complicates information sharing efforts. To deal
    with the size and complexity of this port area, Coast Guard officials said
    they have worked with associations representing the commercial fishing
    industry, petrochemical companies, and state and local law enforcement as
    a means to share information about port security with as many users of the
    port and the Houston Ship Channel as possible. For example, the local
    Coast Guard officials said they held informational meetings with
    recreational boating associations and with area maritime security
    committee participants to inform boaters and other stakeholders of "safety
    zones"- areas where recreational use of the waterway is prohibited-in the

    Conclusions

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    Houston Ship Channel. Another barrier mentioned at another port location
    was the "cultural" barrier between various members of the area maritime
    security committees. For example, officials at this port location stated
    that an informal network has created insiders and outsiders drawing
    particular distinctions between law enforcement and non-law enforcement
    officials.

    Effective information sharing among members of area maritime security
    committees and participants in interagency operational centers can enhance
    the partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it can
    improve the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries for
    deterring, preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack at the
    nation's ports. The Coast Guard has recognized the importance of granting
    security clearances to nonfederal officials as a means to improve
    information sharing, but progress in moving these officials through the
    application process has been slow. In the future, the Coast Guard may need
    to grant additional security clearances to state, local, or industry
    participants who join area maritime security committees or sector command
    centers to support counterterrorism programs. In this way, as the Coast
    Guard's state, local, and industry security clearance program matures, the
    importance of effectively managing the security clearance program will
    become even more important. Increased management attention and guidance
    about the process would strengthen the program for security clearances,
    and it would reduce the risk that nonfederal officials may have incomplete
    information as they carry out their law enforcement activities.

    To help ensure that nonfederal officials receive needed security
    clearances as quickly as possible, both now and in the future, we
    recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of
    the Coast Guard to take the following two actions.

    o  	Develop formal procedures so that local and headquarters officials use
    the Coast Guard's internal databases of state, local, and industry
    security clearances for area maritime committee members as a management
    tool to monitor who has submitted applications for a security clearance
    and to take appropriate action when application trends point to possible
    problems. For example, updating the database on a routine basis could
    identify port areas where progress is slow and indicate that follow-up
    with local field office officials may be needed.

      Agency Comments
      and Our Evaluation

    o  	Raise the awareness of state, local, and industry officials about the
    process of applying for security clearances. This effort could involve
    using brochures, Web sites, or other information that the FBI has used in
    its program for educating state and local officials about the security
    clearance process.

    We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOJ, and DOD for comment. DHS,
    including the Coast Guard, generally agreed with our findings and
    recommendations. Specifically, DHS noted that our recommendations should
    enhance the Coast Guard's efforts to promote information sharing among
    port security stakeholders. DHS also indicated that changes associated
    with processing security clearances should overcome identified
    impediments. DOJ and DOD declined to provide comments.

    Our draft report included a recommendation that the Coast Guard clarify
    the role of field office officials in communicating with state, local, and
    industry officials about the process for obtaining a security clearance.
    After receiving our draft report, the Coast Guard issued a memo to field
    office officials that clarified their role in the security clearance
    program. The Coast Guard's memo also provided more detailed guidance on
    the process for sponsoring additional state, local, or industry officials
    for a security clearance. As a result of the Coast Guard's action, we have
    dropped this recommendation from our final report. In regard to
    interagency operational centers, DHS also noted that the Coast Guard
    report required by Congress on existing interagency operational centers
    has been approved by DHS and OMB and is now in the final stages of review
    at the Coast Guard. In addition to commenting on our findings and
    recommendations, DHS provided technical comments on the report under
    separate cover and we revised the draft report where appropriate. Written
    comments from DHS are reprinted in appendix IV.

    As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
    after its issue date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report
    to appropriate departments and interested congressional committees. We
    will also make copies available to others upon request. This report will
    also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any question about this report, please contact
    me at (415) 904-2200 or at wrightsonm@gao.gov or Stephen L. Caldwell,
    Assistant Director, at (202) 512-9610 or at caldwells@gao.gov. Key
    contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

    Margaret T. Wrightson Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Each of our objectives involved information sharing between federal
    agencies and nonfederal stakeholders. Specifically,

    o  	What impact have area maritime security committees had on information
    sharing?

    o  	What impact have interagency operational centers had on information
    sharing?

    o  	What barriers, if any, have hindered improvements in information
    sharing among port security stakeholders?

    We carried out part of our work at Coast Guard headquarters or in
    consultation with headquarters officials. We spoke with Coast Guard
    officials to obtain information on how information is shared within the
    maritime security community and reviewed pertinent legislation, guidance,
    rules, and other relevant documents related to the sharing of maritime
    security information with nonfederal stakeholders. For example, we
    reviewed pertinent statutes, such as the Maritime Transportation Security
    Act and the Homeland Security Act. We also reviewed selected maritime
    security plans, Coast Guard regulations implementing the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act, and various reports from congressionally
    chartered commissions related to information sharing.

    To address our first objective, we conducted structured interviews with
    officials from federal agencies and representatives from state and local
    governments, law enforcement agencies, maritime industry associations, and
    private sector entities who were stakeholders in port security issues.
    Many of these officials were members of area maritime security committees.
    These interviews were largely conducted during site visits to four
    specific maritime port areas. We selected these ports to provide a diverse
    sample of security environments and perspectives, basing our selections on
    such matters as geographic location, varying levels of strategic
    importance, and unique local characteristics. The four port areas and some
    of our reasons for choosing them are as follows:

    o  	Baltimore, Maryland: a Mid-Atlantic port that is managed by a state
    agency and services a variety of cargo, including bulk and container
    cargo, and cruise passengers;

    o  	Charleston, South Carolina: a South Atlantic port that is state owned
    and operated, with three separate facilities and military facilities and
    installations;

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    o  	Houston, Texas: a Gulf coast port that is governed by an appointed
    commission and consists of a 25-mile-long complex of diversified public
    and private facilities, including the nation's largest petrochemical
    complex; and

    o  	Seattle/Tacoma, Washington: a Pacific coast port area that is operated
    by municipal corporations, represents the third largest container cargo
    port in the country, and services the country's largest state-operated
    passenger ferry system.

    During each of our visits to these four ports, we met with the identified
    port stakeholders, Coast Guard marine safety offices, and Captains of the
    Port. In our meetings with Captains of the Port and marine safety offices,
    we discussed the creation of and composition of the area maritime security
    committee at their port and the effectiveness of the committee in
    facilitating information sharing. We also discussed and collected
    documents related to policies and procedures pertaining to sharing
    information with nonfederal stakeholders. We collected documentary
    evidence in the form of information bulletins that are used to disseminate
    information to stakeholders. When we met with the nonfederal stakeholders
    at the ports, we discussed specific security concerns at their facilities
    or in their jurisdictions and how they were being addressed. We also
    discussed their involvement and experiences with the local area maritime
    security committee, of which most were members, and how they receive and
    share information with federal agencies, particularly the Coast Guard.
    With both groups, we discussed any perceived barriers to information
    sharing and ideas and plans to resolve these issues. This information was
    used in conducting a comparative analysis of the port areas and allowed us
    to distinguish differences between the locations while identifying common
    issues.

    In addressing the second objective, we conducted site visits at the three
    interagency operational centers located in Charleston, South Carolina;
    Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California. Related to this, we visited
    the Homeland Security Task Force South-East and command centers for the
    Coast Guard district and sector in Miami, Florida because these centers
    also aim to facilitate information sharing and joint operations related to
    maritime security. At each location, we conducted structured interviews
    with officials from the agencies participating in the centers. These
    interviews allowed us to obtain information regarding the history of the
    centers and how their missions and structures are changing. Specifically,
    we discussed how their presence affects information sharing among federal
    stakeholders as well as with nonfederal stakeholders. We also

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    discussed challenges facing the centers as they become more formalized.
    During the visits, documents that describe the centers as well as examples
    of the products they distribute were collected. Observations made at the
    facilities allowed us to provide context to the testimonial evidence we
    collected. We also viewed demonstrations of the emerging technologies as
    well as differences in the physical attributes of each center. The
    testimonial evidence, aided by our observations, was synthesized and
    analyzed, allowing us to perform a comparative analysis, identifying
    differences and commonalities in information sharing among the centers.

    To address the third objective, we followed up with officials at Coast
    Guard headquarters and obtained guidance and data regarding the current
    effort to administer security clearances at the secret level to selected
    nonfederal stakeholders at each port. In subsequent phone interviews with
    the officials of marine safety offices at the ports we visited, we
    discussed problems encountered in the communication and implementation of
    this effort and steps that are being taken to resolve these problems. In
    addition, we reviewed Coast Guard documents related to information
    sharing, such as data on the number of nonfederal officials who had
    received security clearances, guidance from Coast Guard headquarters to
    field offices, and other pertinent instructions. In regard to this
    database, we checked the reliability of the database for the four ports we
    visited and found that the database was generally accurate. We found that
    24 of the 27 entries were correct. In addition, we reviewed prior GAO
    reports that dealt with information sharing issues. Finally, we
    interviewed 64 federal and nonfederal stakeholders at the four ports we
    visited and asked them whether there were any barriers to information
    sharing. The results of our interviews cannot be projected to all
    participants on the area maritime security committees.

    Our review was conducted from May 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: Stakeholder Groups Recommended for Membership on Area Maritime
    Security Committees

    This appendix provides information on the Coast Guard's guidance for
    developing the local membership and organization of the area maritime
    security committee. The Coast Guard's guidance directs the Captain of the
    Port to take into account all aspects of each port area and its adjacent
    waterways and coastal areas. The committees should be composed of federal,
    state, and local agencies; law enforcement and security agencies; and port
    stakeholders. Representatives for each aspect of the port and those
    charged with its regulation or enforcement should be encouraged to
    participate. Table 1 provides a list of representatives that an area
    maritime security committee could include.

    Table 1: Representatives That an Area Maritime Security Committee Could
    Include

          Federal agencies State and local agencies Industry-related agencies

    U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
    Department of Defense (DOD)
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
    U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
    Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA)
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
    Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE)
    U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
    Military Sealift Command (MSC)
    Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
    Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
    (APHIS)
    Maritime Administration (MARAD)
    Research and Special Programs Administration
    (RSPA)
    Federal Railway Administration (FRA)
    Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
    Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
    Other government representatives, where
    appropriate

    National Guard
    Marine police
    Port authority police and security forces
    Fire departments
    Civil defense
    City government officials
    Transportation agencies
    Fish and wildlife marine units
    Health agencies
    Occupational safety agencies
    Terminal/facility security forces
    Pilot associations
    Other state, local, and city government
    representatives
    State department of natural or environmental
    resources marine units
    Other environmental agencies
    Regional development agencies/
    metropolitan planning organizations

    Facility owners/operators
    Terminal owners/operators
    Trade organizations
    Recreational boating
    organizations (yacht clubs,
    rowing clubs)
    Railroad companies
    Trucking companies
    Shipyards
    Tow-boat operators
    Marine exchanges
    Industry organizations
    Organized labor
    Commercial fishing industry
    Waterborne vendors and service
    providers (harbor tugs, launch
    services, line handlers, small
    ferry operators, water taxis)
    Other facilities within the port
    having waterside access, e.g.,
    refineries, chemical plants,
    power plants

    Source: Coast Guard.

    Area maritime security committees are not limited to the agencies and
    organizations on this list. As each port has specific needs and issues,
    the membership of committees can vary greatly from port to port.

    Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and Supports,
    National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

    This appendix provides information on the departments and
    agencies/components involved in maritime information sharing, at both the
    national level and the regional or field level. Table 2 lists departments
    and agencies/components (including the Coast Guard) that potentially play
    a role in disseminating maritime threat information to, and receiving
    information from, area maritime security committees and interagency
    operational centers.

    Table 2: Department and Agency Intelligence Organizations at the National,
    Regional, and Field Level That Are Potentially Involved in Maritime
    Information Sharing

    Department and Regional or field-level intelligence agency/component
    National-level intelligence organizations organizations

                            Department of Homeland Security

    U.S. Coast Guard The Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center

    (USCG) 	(ICC), working in conjunction with the Navy's Office of Naval
    Intelligence (ONI) at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC),
    tracks the movement of vessels, cargoes, and crews while providing
    intelligence analysis and warning information.

    Two Coast Guard Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs), located on
    each coast, receive intelligence from, and provide intelligence to, ICC.
    MIFCs also provide actionable intelligence to Coast Guard commanders at
    the district and port levels, and share that analysis with interagency
    partners. At the port level, Captains of the Ports (COTPs) head area
    maritime security committees that include federal and nonfederal
    stakeholders and help facilitate information sharing. Field Intelligence
    Support Teams (FISTs), also located at the port level, are composed of
    intelligence specialists who collect, analyze, and disseminate critical
    maritime threat information. FISTs can be colocated at interagency
    operational centers or Coast Guard district or sector command centers.

    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) The CBP Office of Intelligence
    collects, develops, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence in support of
    tactical and operational maritime security mission requirements and
    prepares strategic analysis for key decision makers. Analytical reports
    are prepared for DHS to disseminate to appropriate agency components and
    other federal agencies. CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) conducts
    "sweep" operations of information on air, sea, and land passengers,
    conveyances, and cargo. The center does 24-hour tactical targeting that
    coordinates CBP's field operations response to terrorist threats and
    national security concerns, develops raw intelligence into actionable
    targets, and works as a liaison between other CBP offices and other
    federal agencies such as the Coast Guard. CBP Advanced Targeting Units
    (ATUs), at the port level, screen incoming cargo that poses a possible
    threat to the national security of the United States.

    Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
    Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

    Department and Regional or field-level intelligence agency/component
    National-level intelligence organizations organizations

    U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ICE Office of Intelligence
    evaluates, disseminates, and coordinates classified intelligence community
    and law enforcement reporting. A central component of the ICE
    information-sharing effort is ICE Intelligence Watch, which evaluates all
    tactical intelligence of terrorist threats to the homeland and provides
    additional analytical support through crosschecks of all agency and
    intelligence community databases. ICE has six Field Intelligence Units
    (FIUs) that provide geographic and regional intelligence analysis and
    supervise Intelligence Collection and Analysis Teams (ICATs) that are also
    active in the field. In the maritime domain, ICE maintains Watchtower,
    which is a field maritime intelligence operation that provides detailed
    information on incoming vessels resulting from targeted inspections of
    vessels and cargo. Over 20 Watchtower specialists, located at 17 seaports
    nationwide, produce Field Intelligence Reports (FIRs) covering all
    domestic seaports. Watchtower specialists meet and work with state and
    local law enforcement, Coast Guard, CBP, and DOJ officials. Among other
    things, these specialists provide information on ships (e.g., container
    cargo ships, tankers, and bulk carriers) that may require an enforcement
    action, such as a boarding or interview of the vessel master.
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) As part of its mission to
    protect the nation's transportation system, TSA is tasked to develop a
    maritime information system in accordance with requirements of the
    Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. As such, DHS is exploring
    the most appropriate means of fulfilling this legislative requirement. The
    TSA Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS) disseminates
    intelligence and law enforcement information about threats to
    transportation security and serves as a liaison for transportation
    security to the intelligence community. In this capacity, TSIS helps to
    coordinate domestic and international transportation security activities
    with DHS and other government agencies.

      No domestic presence at the regional or field levels specifically related to
                                   maritime security.

    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) The mission of
    IAIP is to identify and assess current and future threats to the homeland,
    map those threats against known vulnerabilities, develop protective
    measures, issue timely warnings, and take preventive and protective
    action. This threat information includes, but is not limited to, the
    maritime environment. As part of this mission, IAIP is to provide
    information to federal, state, local, tribal government, law enforcement,
    and private sector officials as appropriate, both classified and
    unclassified, and also conducts a daily Information Analysis Morning
    Executive Brief, whereby DHS components share and coordinate threat
    information.

      No domestic presence at the regional or field levels specifically related to
                                   maritime security.

    Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
    Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

    Department and Regional or field-level intelligence agency/component
    National-level intelligence organizations organizations

                                 Department of Justice

    U.S. Attorneys' Offices 	Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA)
    provides DOJ, through U.S Attorney Anti-Terrorism for close liaison
    between DOJ in Washington, D.C., and Advisory Councils (ATACs), has
    established state the 94 U.S. Attorneys' offices located throughout the
    and regional task forces and coordination centers nation, as well as
    direction, oversight, and support. that may include a maritime component
    or nexus,

    such as the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC).

                         Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

    Counterterrorism Division (CTD) is colocated with the National
    Counterterrorism Center, but remains under the direction of FBI. CTD
    conducts analysis, evidence exploitation, and the preparation and
    dissemination of finished intelligence products and briefing materials
    related to counterterrorism.

    National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) includes representatives from
    the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, Treasury,
    Transportation, Commerce, Energy, State, and Interior; and collects
    terrorism information and intelligence and funnels it to Joint Terrorism
    Task Forces (JTTFs).

    Joint Terrorism Task Forces are multi-agency investigative teams composed
    of federal, state and local agencies that work jointly with other
    nonmember agencies to investigate terrorism matters. JTTFs are designated
    conduits of information from federal to state and local officials (and the
    private sector) and are located in 66 field offices across the country.

    In addition, the FBI Maritime Liaison Agent (MLA) Program is intended to
    enhance the security of the U.S. maritime environment by training special
    agents and Joint Terrorism Task Force officers serving at various port
    area on subjects pertaining to preventing terrorism at our nation's
    seaports. Designated MLAs throughout the nation are required to increase
    interaction between law enforcement and the private sector, state and
    local port authorities, and other federal agencies with maritime
    responsibilities.

    Department of Defense

    Department of the Navy	The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) provides
    nationallevel maritime intelligence on merchant and nonmerchant ship
    activity to determine possible terrorist threats abroad and at home. ONI
    is colocated with the Coast Guard ICC at NMIC.

    Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) is the primary law enforcement
    and counterintelligence arm of the Navy. The NCIS Multiple Threat Alert
    Center (MTAC) tracts worldwide threats against navy facilities and
    vessels.

    ONI has no domestic presence at the regional or field levels specifically
    related to domestic maritime security.

    NCIS has regional agents who work closely with federal, state, and local
    agencies to counter terrorism and protect navy facilities and vessels, as
    well as shipping military equipment.

                              Other Intelligence Community

    Central Intelligence CIA's Counterterrorism Center No domestic presence at
                            (CTC), colocated at the       the regional or field
                              National Counterterrorism       levels specifically
           Agency (CIA)        Center, assists CIA in         related to maritime
                                                                        security.
                                  coordinating the
                             counterterrorist efforts of
                                         the
                              intelligence community by
                                   implementing a
                             counterterrorist operations
                                 program to collect
                            intelligence on international
                            terrorist groups, producing
                             analyses of the groups and
                               states responsible for
                             international terrorism and
                                  coordinating the
                              counterterrorist activities
                                      of the intelligence
                                               community.
                            CTC has dedicated analysts to
                            the threat against U.S.
                            seaports and maritime assets.

    Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
    Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

    Department and Regional or field-level intelligence agency/component
    National-level intelligence organizations organizations

    National NCTC is responsible for analyzing and integrating No domestic
    presence at the regional or field Counterterrorism Center foreign and
    domestic intelligence acquired from all U.S. levels specifically related
    to maritime security. (NCTC) government departments and agencies
    pertaining to

    terrorism. The center will identify, coordinate, and prioritize the
    counterterrorism intelligence requirements of the nation's intelligence
    agencies.

    Source: GAO.

    The Coast Guard, as the lead in domestic maritime security, plays a
    central role in maritime threat information sharing and has a robust
    presence at the national, regional, and port levels. In this capacity, it
    conducts intelligence activities in support of all its missions, maritime
    homeland security, and national security objectives, including information
    collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information.
    Figure 4 illustrates how Coast Guard national and regional maritime
    information is channeled to and from representatives of a local area
    maritime security committee (AMSC) or interagency operational center.

    Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
    Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

    Figure 4: Flow of Information from National and Regional Coast Guard
    Sources to Area Maritime Security Committees and Interagency Operational
    Centers at the Port Level

    Beyond the Coast Guard, other agencies can also play a major role in
    channeling maritime security information to the port level. As shown in
    table 2, some of these agencies have broader responsibilities for
    intelligence across all domains. For example, DOJ has a number of

    Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
    Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

    organizations involved in terrorist threat information sharing, such as
    the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, which act as a liaison and
    conduit for "all domain" (e.g., maritime and nonmaritime) information from
    FBI headquarters to Joint Terrorism Task Forces operating in the field.
    The FBI also has designated Maritime Liaison Agents at the port level who
    interact with state, local, and private sector officials and other federal
    agencies, to enhance security at the nation's seaports. In addition, U.S.
    Attorneys' Offices of DOJ set up Anti-terrorism Advisory Councils that
    sponsor state-or regional-level task forces or coordination centers that
    may include a maritime security component. Figure 5 graphically
    illustrates (1) how maritime and nonmaritime information and intelligence
    is shared among agencies at the national level and (2) organizational
    conduits through which information is shared with the port level. The left
    side of the figure shows DOJ channels for information discussed above. On
    the right side, the figure also shows the flow of information through
    Coast Guard channels, as already shown in figure 4.

    Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and
    Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure

    Figure 5: Flow of Information between National Intelligence and Law
    Enforcement Agencies and between the National and the Port Level

                                      Source: GAO.

                             Appendix IV: Comments from the
                            Department of Homeland Security

                          Page 45 GAO-05-394 Maritime Security

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

                          Page 46 GAO-05-394 Maritime Security

    Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contacts 	Margaret T. Wrightson (415) 904-2200 Stephen L. Caldwell
    (202) 512-9610

    Staff In addition to those named above, David Alexander, Neil Asaba,
    Juliana Bahus, Christine Davis, Kevin Heinz, Emily Pickrell, Albert
    Schmidt, AmyAcknowledgments Sheller, Stan Stenersen, and April Thompson
    made key contributions to this report.

    Related GAO Products

    Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget
    Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.

    Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
    Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: January
    14, 2005.

    Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
    Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: December
    10, 2004.

    Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective Port
    Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: September 30,
    2004.

    Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate
    Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.

    GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.

    Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
    Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, D.C.:
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    Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005 and
    Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.

    Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
    Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
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    Coast Guard Programs: Relationship between Resources Used and Results
    Achieved Needs to Be Clearer. GAO-04-432. Washington, D.C.: March 22,
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    Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security
    Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, D.C.: December
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    Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-04-315R.
    Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.

    Related GAO Products

    Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation
    Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. Washington, D.C.:
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    Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be
    Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.

    Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater
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    Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security
    in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions.
    GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.

    Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
    Homeland Security. GAO-03-594T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.

    Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
    Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.

    Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor
    Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T.
    Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.

    Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It Transitions to
    the New Department. GAO-03-467T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2003.

    Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort
    for All Missions. GAO-03-155. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2002.

    Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
    Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.

    Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
    Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO02-955TNI.
    Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.

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