Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in	 
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority	 
Foreign Seaports (31-MAR-05, GAO-05-375).			 
                                                                 
Since September 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists  
could smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country in  
the approximately 7 million containers that arrive annually at	 
U.S. seaports. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across borders  
by being placed inside containers aboard cargo ships. In response
to this concern, since 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) has  
deployed radiation detection equipment to key foreign seaports	 
through its Megaports Initiative (Initiative). GAO examined the  
(1) progress DOE has made in implementing the Initiative, (2)	 
current and expected costs of the Initiative, and (3) challenges 
DOE faces in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign 
ports.								 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-375 					        
    ACCNO:   A20583						        
  TITLE:     Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited       
Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest  
Priority Foreign Seaports					 
     DATE:   03/31/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Cost analysis					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Harbors						 
	     Inspection 					 
	     International agreements				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International relations				 
	     Nuclear radiation monitoring			 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Ships						 
	     Smuggling						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     DOE Megaports Initiative				 
	     NNSA Future Years Nuclear Security 		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     DOE Maritime Prioritization Model			 

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GAO-05-375

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                     GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2005

PREVENTING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

  DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at
                       Highest Priority Foreign Seaports

                                       a

GAO-05-375

[IMG]

March 2005

PREVENTING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at
Highest Priority Foreign Seaports

                                 What GAO Found

DOE's Megaports Initiative has had limited success in initiating work at
seaports identified as high priority by DOE's Maritime Prioritization
Model, which ranks ports in terms of their relative attractiveness to
potential nuclear smugglers. Gaining the cooperation of foreign
governments has been difficult in part because some countries have
concerns that screening large volumes of containers will create delays
that could inhibit the flow of commerce at their ports. DOE has completed
work at 2 ports and signed agreements to initiate work at 5 other ports.
Additionally, DOE is negotiating agreements with the governments of 18
additional countries and DOE officials told us they are close to signing
agreements with 5 of these countries. However, DOE does not have a
comprehensive long-term plan to guide the Initiative's efforts. Developing
such a plan would lead DOE to, among other things, determine criteria for
deciding how many and which lower priority ports to complete if it
continues to have difficulties working at higher volume and higher threat
ports of interest.

Through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on
Megaports Initiative activities. Of this amount, about $14 million was
spent on completing installations at 2 ports. Although DOE currently plans
to install equipment at a total of 20 ports by 2010, at an estimated cost
of $337 million, this cost projection is uncertain for several reasons.
For example, the projection is based in part on DOE's $15 million estimate
for the average cost per port, which may not be accurate because it was
based primarily on DOE's work at Russian land borders, airports, and
seaports. Additionally, DOE is currently assessing whether the
Initiative's scope should increase beyond 20 ports; if this occurs, total
costs and time frames will also increase.

DOE faces several operational and technical challenges in installing
radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. For example, DOE is
currently devising ways to overcome technical challenges posed by the
physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations at some ports.
Additionally, environmental conditions, such high winds and sea spray, can
affect radiation detection equipment's performance and sustainability.

DOE-Funded Radiation Detection Equipment at a Foreign Port

Source: GAO.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
DOE's Megaports Initiative Has Had Limited Success Initiating Work

at High Priority Foreign Seaports and Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan
to Guide Its Efforts

Through the End of Fiscal Year 2004, DOE Had Spent About $43 Million on
Megaports Initiative Activities, but Total Program Costs Are Uncertain

DOE Faces Several Operational and Technical Challenges in

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Seaports Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

1 3 6

10

19

22 26 27 28

Appendixes                                                              
                Appendix I:             Scope and Methodology              31 
               Appendix II:    National Laboratory and Contractor Roles    34 
                             Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed or  
              Appendix III:                   Initiated                    
                                                 Work                      37 
                              Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in    
              Appendix IV:                 Greece Prior to                 
                                        the 2004 Olympic Games             40 
                Appendix V:     Comments from the Department of Energy     46 

Related GAO Products

Figures Figure 1:

Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4: Figure 5:

Ports Where DOEHas Completed Installations and Those Where It Plans to
Begin Work or Complete Installations in Fiscal Year 2005 13 Truck Passing
through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Rotterdam, the Netherlands 15 Truck
Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Piraeus, Greece 17 Megaports
Initiative Expenditures through the End of Fiscal Year 2004 (dollars in
millions) 19 Design of Modified Straddle Carrier Fitted with Radiation
Detection Equipment 25

Contents

Figure 6: Radiation Portal Monitors at a Northern Greek Border

Crossing 41 Figure 7: A Handheld Gamma Radiation Detector and a

Radioactive Isotope Identification Device 42 Figure 8: Radiation Detection
Pager 43 Figure 9: Teletherapy Unit Containing Radioactive Source, Prior
to

Receiving Physical Security Upgrades 44

Abbreviations

CSI Container Security Initiative
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOE Department of Energy
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
MOU memorandum of understanding
PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
SLD-Core Second Line of Defense-Core program
TEU twenty-foot equivalent unit

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A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

March 31, 2005

Congressional Requesters

Over the past decade, as terrorist activities have spread throughout the
world, the United States has become increasingly concerned about the
threat posed by unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material.1 Such material
could be stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists or countries seeking
weapons of mass destruction. According to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), between 1993 and 2003, there were 540 confirmed cases of
illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials. A significant
number of the cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used
to produce a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives
with radioactive material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Even small amounts of
nuclear and radiological materials are worrisome because as little as 25
kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium could be
used to build a nuclear weapon, and small amounts can be smuggled across
borders in cars, carried in personal luggage on aircraft, or placed inside
containers aboard cargo ships.

Seaports are critical gateways for international commerce, and maritime
shipping containers play a vital role in the movement of cargo between
global trading partners. In 2002, approximately 7 million shipping
containers arrived at U.S. ports carrying more than 95 percent of U.S.
imports by weight from outside North America. Responding to heightened
concern about national security since September 11, 2001, several U.S.
government agencies have acted to prevent terrorists from smuggling
weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers from overseas locations.
In 2003, the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security
Administration2 initiated its Megaports Initiative (Initiative), the goal
of which is to enable foreign government personnel at key seaports to use
radiation detection equipment to screen shipping containers entering and
leaving these ports, regardless of the containers' destination, for
nuclear

1Weapons-usable nuclear material is uranium enriched to 20 percent or
greater in uranium235 or uranium-233 isotopes and any plutonium containing
less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-238 and less than 10 percent
of the isotopes plutonium-241 and plutonium-242. These types of material
are of the quality used to make nuclear weapons.

2The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately organized
agency within DOE that was created by the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2000 with responsibility for the nation's nuclear
weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.

and other radioactive material that could be used against the United
States or its allies. Through the Initiative, DOE installs radiation
detection equipment at foreign seaports that is then operated by foreign
government officials and port personnel working at these ports.3

DOE's Megaports Initiative coordinates with and complements the Department
of Homeland Security's Container Security Initiative (CSI). Under CSI,
which began operating in January 2002, U.S. Customs officials stationed in
foreign ports review the cargo manifests of containers bound directly for
the United States and attempt to identify containers with potentially
dangerous cargo, such as explosives or weapons of mass destruction.4 U.S.
Customs officials then request that the host country's customs officials
inspect these containers before they are loaded on vessels destined for
the United States. CSI and the Megaports Initiative differ in several
important ways. For example, while CSI stations U.S. personnel in foreign
ports, the Megaports Initiative does not. Instead it installs radiation
detection equipment that enables foreign customs officials to improve the
level of sophistication of their inspections by screening cargo for
nuclear and radioactive materials. Also, under CSI, the United States
bears the financial burden for posting its own inspectors at foreign
ports, while participating in the Megaports Initiative requires a
significant financial commitment from a host country because it may need
to hire additional customs agents to operate the radiation detection
equipment DOE provides.

To help decisionmakers identify and prioritize foreign seaports for
participation in the Megaports Initiative, DOE uses a complex model that
ranks foreign ports according to their relative attractiveness to
potential nuclear smugglers. The Maritime Prioritization Model
incorporates information, such as port security conditions, volume of
container traffic passing through ports, the proximity of the ports to
sources of nuclear

3DOE's Second Line of Defense-Core (SLD-Core) program, which installs
radiation detection equipment at international land border crossings,
airports, and seaports in Russia and other countries, has also installed
equipment at some Russian ports. These ports are considered part of the
SLD-Core program, not the Megaports Initiative. As a result, for the
purposes of this report, we have not included discussions of work DOE
performed at these ports in Russia.

4For additional information about CSI, see GAO, Container Security:
Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to
Critical Success Factors, GAO-03770 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003) and
related GAO products cited at the end of this report.

material, and the proximity of the ports to the United States and is
updated regularly to incorporate new information. When selecting ports for
equipment installations, DOE also considers other factors, including the
likelihood that a potential host country will agree to participate in the
Initiative and the location of significant world events, such as the
Olympic Games. Once DOE selects a port and the host country shows interest
in participating in the Initiative, program officials may conduct a visit
to the port to familiarize themselves with its operations and layout.
Prior to implementation activities at a selected port, DOE and the host
country's government negotiate an agreement, or memorandum of
understanding (MOU), that outlines the expectations, roles, and
responsibilities of both parties for work at the selected port as well as
the long-term use of the equipment to be installed.5

As agreed with your offices, we examined (1) DOE's progress in
implementing its Megaports Initiative, (2) the current and expected costs
of the Initiative, and (3) the challenges DOE faces in installing
radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. To address these
objectives, we analyzed documentation on the Megaports Initiative from DOE
and its contractors, both at DOE's national laboratories and in the
private sector, and conducted interviews with key program officials. We
also visited completed Megaports Initiative installations at Rotterdam,
the Netherlands, and Piraeus, Greece, to observe U.S.-funded radiation
detection equipment and to discuss the implementation of the program with
foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary
information, performed a data reliability assessment of the data we
received, and interviewed knowledgeable program officials on the
reliability of the data. We determined these data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. More details on our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our review from June
2004 to March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

Results in Brief	DOE's Megaports Initiative has had limited success in
initiating work at ports identified as high priority by its Maritime
Prioritization Model because DOE has been unable to reach agreement with
key countries, such as China. DOE has completed work at only 2 foreign
seaports, signed

5No installation of equipment may take place before DOE and the host
country have signed an agreement or memorandum of understanding, which is
typically a non-binding political document.

agreements to begin work at 5 others, and is negotiating agreements with
the governments of 18 additional countries. According to DOE officials,
the Initiative's limited success in initiating work at key ports is
largely due to difficulties negotiating agreements with countries that
have ports ranked as high priority by DOE's model. Gaining the cooperation
of foreign governments has been difficult because some countries have
concerns that screening large volumes of containers will create delays
that could inhibit the flow of commerce at their ports. In addition, some
foreign governments are reluctant to hire the additional customs officials
needed to operate the radiation detection equipment DOE provides under the
Initiative. In fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to begin work in Antwerp,
Belgium, and to complete installations in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Algeciras,
Spain, and Freeport, Bahamas. DOE currently plans to complete
installations at a total of 20 ports by 2010. The two ports where DOE has
completed installations include a pilot project in Rotterdam, the
Netherlands, and a full installation in Piraeus, Greece. Both of these
ports were ranked lower in priority than other foreign seaports by DOE's
model. However, DOE officials believe their work at these two ports has
been beneficial for a number of reasons. For example, the success of DOE's
pilot project at one port terminal in Rotterdam led to a decision by the
Dutch government to fund the deployment of radiation detection equipment
at the port's three remaining terminals. Similarly, installing equipment
at Piraeus contributed to the increased security in Greece for the 2004
Olympic Games.

Currently, DOE does not have a comprehensive long-term plan for its
Megaports Initiative, although with limited progress installing radiation
detection equipment at its highest priority ports, a well thought out plan
can be an important guide for its efforts to further implement the
Initiative. DOE uses an annual work plan to guide the Initiative's efforts
and document the scope of work to be accomplished in the current fiscal
year. Additionally, DOE uses its Future Years Nuclear Security Program, a
fiveyear financial projection, to provide the Initiative with a long-term
cost projection and annual performance measures of a certain number of
ports completed per year. While using the number of ports completed
annually provides a broad measure of the Initiative's progress, this
measure does not take into account whether the ports where equipment is
being installed are of highest priority. DOE's Maritime Prioritization
Model provides a tool to help DOE officials identify important ports to
include in the Initiative. Developing a comprehensive long-term plan for
the Megaports Initiative would require DOE to, among other things, develop
criteria for deciding how many and which lower priority ports to complete
if it continues to have difficulties gaining agreements to install
radiation detection

equipment at the highest priority ports. DOE officials told us that they
will be developing such a plan for the Initiative in the near future. We
believe that a comprehensive long-term plan that includes better criteria
for measuring program success is needed and, as a result, we are making a
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy that DOE develop such a plan for
its Megaports Initiative.

Through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on
Megaports Initiative activities, but uncertainties may affect the
Initiative's projected costs, scope, and time frames. DOE spent about $14
million, or 32 percent of program expenditures, on the pilot project at
Rotterdam and completing installations at Piraeus. Additionally, DOE spent
about $29 million on program integration activities, which are costs not
directly associated with installing equipment at a specific port. Of this
amount, about $14 million was spent on advanced equipment procurement
activities, which includes the purchase and storage of radiation portal
monitors for future installations. The remaining $15 million was spent on
such other activities as the development and maintenance of DOE's Maritime
Prioritization Model, the process of negotiating agreements with foreign
governments, and the testing of radiation detection equipment. Although
DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of 20 ports by 2010,
at an estimated total cost of $337 million, this cost projection is
uncertain for several reasons. For example, the Initiative's long-term
cost projection is based in part on DOE's $15 million average cost per
port estimate, which may not be accurate. According to DOE officials, this
estimate was derived primarily from DOE's prior experience in deploying
radiation detection equipment at Russian land borders, airports, and
seaports. DOE officials acknowledged that the cost of doing business in
Russia may not be an accurate basis on which to estimate the cost of
installing radiation detection equipment in other parts of the world. DOE
has not yet reevaluated this estimate in light of experience gained from
its installations at seaports. By the end of fiscal year 2005, however,
DOE expects to have completed installations at a total of 5 ports and will
have more information with which to assess the accuracy of its per port
cost estimate. Additionally, DOE is currently assessing whether the
Initiative's scope should increase beyond 20 ports; if this occurs, total
costs and time frames will increase. To ensure the most accurate cost
projections possible, we are recommending that DOE reevaluate the accuracy
of the Initiative's average cost per port estimate and adjust its
long-term cost projection, if necessary.

As DOE continues to implement its Megaports Initiative, it faces several
operational and technical challenges specific to installing radiation
detection equipment at foreign ports. Certain factors can affect the
general capability of radiation detection equipment to detect nuclear
material. For example, some nuclear materials can be shielded with lead or
other materials to prevent radiation from being detected. In addition, one
of the materials of greatest proliferation concern, highly enriched
uranium, is difficult to detect because of its relatively low level of
radioactivity. In its effort to screen cargo containers at foreign ports
for radioactive and nuclear materials, DOE faces technical challenges
related to these ports' physical layouts and cargo stacking
configurations. To address a part of these challenges at some ports, DOE
plans to outfit a device used to transport cargo containers between port
locations-known as a straddle carrier-with radiation detection equipment.
However, this approach may not work at all ports, so DOE is pursuing other
solutions as well. Additionally, environmental conditions specific to
ports, such as the existence of high winds and sea spray, can affect the
radiation detection equipment's performance and long-term sustainability.
To minimize the effects of these conditions, DOE has used steel plates to
stabilize radiation portal monitors placed in areas with high winds, such
as in Rotterdam, and is currently evaluating approaches to combat the
corrosive effects of sea spray on radiation detection equipment. We
provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment. DOE
generally agreed with our recommendations. DOE is currently working to
produce a long-term plan for the Initiative and plans to reevaluate its
per port cost estimate at the end of fiscal year 2005.

Background	The Megaports Initiative is part of DOE's Office of the Second
Line of Defense, whose aim is to strengthen the overall capability to
detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive
materials across international borders. DOE, with the assistance of
several DOE national laboratories and private contractors,6 generally
implements its Megaports Initiative at foreign seaports in six phases: (1)
port prioritization; (2) government-to-government negotiations and port
familiarization; (3) technical site surveys, site design, and training;
(4) final design, construction, and equipment installation; (5) equipment
calibration and testing; and (6) maintenance and sustainability.

6For more information about the roles of each of the DOE national
laboratories and private contractors that participate in the Megaports
Initiative, see app. II.

The Maritime Prioritization Model, which is maintained by Sandia National
Laboratories (Sandia), uses unclassified information to rank foreign
seaports for their attractiveness to a potential nuclear material
smuggler. This information is maintained within the model in several
categories that are individually weighted and scored and then combined to
provide each port with an overall score.7 Ports receiving higher scores
are considered more attractive to a nuclear material smuggler and
therefore of potentially higher interest for inclusion in the Initiative.
In May 2004, DOE directed Sandia to conduct a peer review of the model to
determine the validity of its modeling approach, the appropriateness of
the factors used in the model, and the suitability of the data for
selecting and prioritizing foreign ports for the Initiative.8 The peer
review panel concluded in August 2004, that the approach used in the
design and execution of the model is conceptually sound and provides a
relevant, defensible baseline from which to pursue bilateral engagements
for installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. The
panelists noted that the primary strengths of the model are the ease with
which new sources of information relevant to prioritizing potential
nuclear material smuggling routes can be added and the transparency of the
data and calculations used in the model. Currently, the model ranks about
120 seaports worldwide, and DOE plans to add an additional 80 ports to the
model in fiscal year 2005. DOE officials noted that the model will
continue to evolve to more clearly consider both volume and threat. DOE
also considers other factors when deciding which specific ports to engage,
such as a potential host country's level of interest in the Initiative and
the location of significant world events, such as the Olympic Games.

Once DOE selects a port for inclusion in the Initiative, DOE officials and
host country representatives begin to negotiate an agreement or memorandum
of understanding that defines the scope of work and level of cooperation
between DOE and the host country for work at the selected port or ports.
Concurrently, a team of experts from DOE's national laboratories visits
the selected port to familiarize themselves with the port's operations and
layout. Discussions are also conducted, as appropriate, with major port
and terminal operators. In many cases the

7There are three primary categories within the Maritime Prioritization
Model: (1) country score, (2) port security score, and (3) shipping lane
score.

8The Maritime Prioritization Model peer review panel consisted of members
from academia, industry, and federal agencies with experience in maritime
commerce operation, intelligence, and counterterrorism.

port-operating companies, along with terminal operators, have an economic
interest in cooperating with the Initiative, since they have the most to
lose in the event terrorists are successful in exploiting weaknesses of
the maritime shipping network to launch an attack using weaponsusable
nuclear or other radioactive material.

After an MOU has been signed, the technical site survey, design, and
training phase begins.9 Initially, one or more site visits are conducted
to gather technical information to determine the degree to which cargo can
be effectively screened in a port, to assess the vulnerabilities of the
port to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials,
and to estimate equipment needs. These visits help DOE determine port
security information, port traffic patterns, shipping volume, training
needs, and any other relevant information. Program officials then develop
a port security report that analyzes the flow of container traffic for all
port entry and exit gates, as well as for cargo that arrives at a port on
one ship, is offloaded onto a dock, and then leaves aboard another
ship-known as transshipped cargo. DOE also performs a cost benefit
analysis of the proposed equipment installations at specific entry and
exit gates. On the basis of the results of these assessments, DOE develops
a design requirements package that includes the port's layout, proposed
equipment needs, and installation requirements. This information is used
to conduct more detailed engineering surveys to develop the final design.
During this phase, DOE also begins to provide training to foreign customs
officials, including training at the DOE Hazardous Materials Management
and Emergency Response center located at Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL). The training focuses on radiation safety, the use of
radiation detection equipment, and alarm response procedures. The training
generally consists of a 1-week course with both classroom learning and
simulated field operations. Training is tailored to each port, and
materials are provided in the working language of the host country.

During the final design, construction, and equipment installation phase,
DOE determines the equipment needs of the port, the specific placement of
the equipment, and any site preparation or construction work to be done at
the port. The equipment that DOE provides through the Initiative is
commercially available, off-the-shelf technology. DOE provides radiation
detection portal monitors, which are stationary pieces of equipment

9To expedite implementation of the Initiative, DOE may choose on a
case-by-case basis to conduct technical site visits prior to the
negotiation and signature of an MOU.

designed to detect radioactive materials being carried by vehicles or
pedestrians. These portal monitors can detect both gamma and neutron
radiation, which is important for detecting the presence of highly
enriched uranium and plutonium, respectively. In addition, DOE provides
portable radiation detection devices, including handheld devices that can
help assist foreign customs officials conduct secondary inspections to
pinpoint the source of an alarm and to determine the type of radioactive
material present. DOE also provides radiation detection pagers, which are
small detectors that can be worn on a belt to continuously monitor
radiation levels in the immediate area of the customs officials wearing
the pagers. DOE installs the portal monitors at specific locations within
the port, such as terminal entry and exit gates, and integrates the portal
monitors with a central alarm station through the use of fiber optic cable
or other methods.

Once installation is complete, the equipment is calibrated and tested
before being turned over to the host country's government. DOE officials
calibrate the equipment to optimal specifications for the detection of
weaponsusable nuclear material. The settings, which determine the
equipment's sensitivity, are based on a number of factors, including the
level of background radiation of the location, the type of cargo handled
at a specific port, and the potential use of shielding. Once the equipment
is calibrated and tested, the host country's customs officials can begin
to screen cargo containers for radiation. When a container is scanned, an
alarm will sound if the equipment detects radiation. A monitoring system
logs which monitor set off the alarm, the date and time of the alarm, the
alarm type, the gamma and neutron count for the alarm, any indications of
tampering, an average reading of the background radiation of the area, and
takes a photograph of the container's identification number. If determined
necessary, the customs official then conducts a secondary inspection with
a handheld radiation detection device to identify the source and location
of the radiation. If the radiation profile of a scanned container's
contents matches the profile of consumer goods that are known to contain
natural sources of radiation,10 foreign customs officers may opt not to
conduct a secondary inspection. However, the profile of consumer goods can
appear different from the typical profile if the container is not
uniformly packed with this item or if the container is filled with a
combination of consumer goods. If the customs officials cannot determine
the content of the container after the screening with a handheld radiation
device, they may

10Natural sources of radiation, which are usually relatively harmless,
occur in a wide variety of common items and consumer goods, such as
bananas, fertilizer, and ceramic tiles.

manually inspect the container or request assistance from other agencies
within their government. Concurrent with the calibration and testing
phase, DOE national laboratory experts travel to the host country to
provide specific in-country training to foreign customs officials in the
proper use of the radiation portal monitors as well as portable radiation
detection equipment.11

Once DOE fully turns the equipment over to the host government, the
project moves to the maintenance and sustainability phase. Typically, DOE
plans to fund 3 years of sustainability activities at each port. These
activities include providing refresher training for foreign customs
officials; general maintenance of the radiation detection equipment; spare
parts; and, as negotiated with the host country, periodic evaluation of
alarm data and port procedures to ensure that the equipment is being
operated properly. DOE wants the U.S. government to be informed of any
incidents or seizures that occur as a result of using equipment provided
by the Initiative. Additionally, other technical data may be exchanged to
assist technical experts from both DOE and the host country in their
ongoing analysis of the operational effectiveness of the systems. To date,
data sharing provisions have been incorporated into the agreements signed
by DOE and host country governments.

DOE's Megaports Initiative Has Had Limited Success Initiating Work at High
Priority Foreign Seaports and Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan to
Guide Its Efforts

DOE's Megaports Initiative has made limited progress in beginning to
install radiation detection equipment at seaports identified as high
priority by its Maritime Prioritization Model. According to DOE officials,
the Initiative's limited success in initiating work at certain ports is
largely due to difficulties negotiating agreements with foreign
governments, in particular with countries that have ports ranked as high
priority by DOE's model, such as China. Further, DOE has completed work at
only two ports, both of which were ranked lower in priority than other
ports by DOE's model. Given DOE's limited success in installing radiation
detection equipment at most high priority ports, it is particularly
noteworthy that the Initiative does not have a comprehensive long-term
plan that describes how DOE plans to measure program success, overcome
obstacles it faces, and achieve the goals of the Initiative.

11Training provided through the Megaports Initiative is an ongoing process
that begins once agreements are reached with the host country and
continues through the maintenance and sustainability phase for each port.

DOE Has Signed Agreements to Begin Work at Only 2 of the 20 Highest
Priority Ports Identified by an Earlier Version of Its Prioritization
Model

DOE has had difficulty reaching agreement with some countries where
high-priority ports are located, such as China, due to a variety of
political factors often outside of DOE's control. DOE has completed work
at two ports and signed agreements to initiate work at five others, two of
which were ranked in the 20 highest priority ports by DOE's model.12
According to DOE officials, some foreign governments have been hesitant to
participate in the Megaports Initiative for two main reasons: possible
interruptions to the flow of commerce at their ports and reluctance to
hire the additional customs agents necessary to operate and maintain the
radiation detection equipment DOE provides.

First, some foreign governments have concerns that the flow of commerce at
their ports could be disrupted by participating in the Initiative in both
the short-and long-term. For the short-term, some foreign governments have
expressed concern that the flow of commerce at their ports could be
disrupted during the installation of radiation detection equipment. A
related long-term concern is that, by agreeing to participate in the
Initiative, the host country's customs officials will be screening large
volumes of cargo containers, which could lead to delays or disruptions to
the flow of commerce at the port. To address these concerns, DOE provides
prospective Initiative participants with information on how the radiation
detection equipment would be installed and operated in the country,
including information on the design, construction, training, and
implementation processes. To alleviate concerns about construction issues,
such as the placement of radiation portal monitors, DOE analyzes the
natural choke points that occur in a port and seeks to install equipment
at these locations to avoid the interruption of commerce. According to a
DOE official, to avoid delays in port operations during installation of

12At a February 14, 2005, meeting to discuss an early draft of this
report, DOE officials informed us that revisions had been made to DOE's
Maritime Prioritization Model and port prioritization process, but they
did not provide us with a revised prioritization list. We met with
officials from DOE and Sandia National Laboratories on February 22, 2005,
to discuss these changes. These officials informed us that the revised
prioritization model and process, among other things, placed a greater
emphasis on ports with a high volume of cargo containers that enter and
exit the port by land, rather than cargo that is transferred from one ship
to the port's dock and then onto another ship (known as transshipment). At
this meeting, DOE provided us with a new prioritization list showing its
35 highest priority ports listed alphabetically, rather than ranked from
highest to lowest priority. The revisions to DOE's model and
prioritization process resulted in a higher prioritization for some ports
where DOE had completed or initiated work. A more detailed discussion
about our work to better understand DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model
and port prioritization process can be found in appendix I.

equipment, construction work is often performed at night so that normal
port operations are not impeded. To further demonstrate how the radiation
detection equipment is installed and operated, DOE officials show
prospective Initiative participants a video or arrange site visits to the
port of Rotterdam, where DOE has completed equipment installations in a
pilot project at one port terminal, so that they can witness port
operations and have an example of how the equipment will be operated in
their country.

A second impediment to negotiating agreements with foreign governments is
their reluctance to hire additional officials (generally customs agents)
to operate and maintain the equipment DOE provides through the Initiative.
Although some foreign governments have large numbers of personnel at their
ports to regulate imports and exports, others lack the staff necessary to
both perform other port functions and operate and monitor the radiation
detection equipment DOE provides. For example, the Dutch government
expressed this reservation before it agreed to participate in the
Initiative, and Dutch officials told us that they will need to hire and
train an additional 40-60 customs agents when radiation detection
equipment is installed at all port terminals in Rotterdam. The need for
additional workers, combined with limited financial resources, may prevent
some countries from participating in the Megaports Initiative. However,
DOE officials told us that they do not believe that this impediment would
prevent a foreign government's participation in the Initiative.

DOE officials told us that they are in the process of negotiating with the
governments of 18 countries to gauge their interest in participating in
the Initiative. According to DOE officials, the Initiative has primarily
focused on engaging countries that have ports ranked in the top 50 by
DOE's model, but it also pursues ports of special interest that may be
ranked lower than

50. DOE plans to begin work at Antwerp and to complete the installations
in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Freeport, Bahamas, and Algeciras, Spain by the end
of fiscal year 2005,13 but complications may prohibit DOE from meeting
this goal. For example, a DOE official told us that program officials are
currently in the process of determining the impact of the December 2004
tsunami disaster on DOE's planned work at the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
According to a DOE official, resources for project construction and
materials may be affected. If so, DOE may not be able to complete
installation of radiation detection equipment at this port in fiscal year
2005.

13See appendix III for profiles of each of the ports where DOE has
completed installation of equipment or is currently initiating work.

DOE Has Completed Installations at 2 Ports That Were Ranked Lower in
Priority Than Other Foreign Seaports by DOE's Model

DOE has completed work at only two ports: Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and
Piraeus, Greece, both of which were ranked lower in priority than other
foreign seaports by DOE's model. The port of Rotterdam, which is the
largest in Europe and handles an estimated 40 percent of all European
shipments bound for the United States, became part of the Initiative on
August 13, 2003, when DOE signed an MOU with the Dutch government. DOE
installed a limited number of vehicle radiation detection portal monitors
at the largest of Rotterdam's four terminals, which ships an estimated 87
percent of all of Rotterdam's cargo destined for the United States (see
figure 2). Initially, DOE planned to install monitors at all four
terminals at Rotterdam. However, as discussions with Dutch officials
progressed, the Dutch government decided to limit its level of involvement
in the Initiative by permitting DOE to install monitors at only one of
Rotterdam's four terminals. Additionally, DOE trained 43 Dutch customs
officials at its training center at PNNL and conducted additional onsite
training for other Dutch customs officials. DOE also provided over 20
pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment for use in conducting
secondary inspections.

Figure 2: Truck Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Rotterdam,
the Netherlands

Source: GAO.

DOE officials told us that they consider the installation at Rotterdam a
pilot project and believe it to be a success because, as a result of their
experience with it, the Dutch government agreed to pay for the
installation of radiation detection equipment throughout the rest of the
port. Dutch government officials told us that they plan to complete the
full installation of radiation detection equipment at all four Rotterdam
terminals by 2006. Although this type of cost-sharing arrangement is not
an established objective of the Initiative, DOE officials believe that
they may pursue other such pilot projects when a host government requests
limited assistance from DOE. DOE completed the pilot project and the
radiation detection equipment was fully turned over to the Dutch
government in April 2004. During fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to conduct
additional training on secondary inspection methods at Rotterdam for
between 20 and 30 Dutch customs officials and will continue to provide
equipment support and maintenance. Beyond fiscal year 2005, DOE's
involvement at the port will likely be limited to training and technical
consultations on future equipment installations made by the Dutch
government.

While the port of Piraeus, Greece, is not one of the largest container
ports in the world and was not ranked as a high priority by DOE's model,
security concerns at the port increased prior to the 2004 Olympic Games in
Greece. The heightened importance of Piraeus, which is about 6 miles from
the center of Athens, led DOE to include the port in the Megaports
Initiative as part of its efforts to secure Greece prior to the Olympic
Games.14 Initially, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission requested
assistance from IAEA in identifying ways to mitigate radiological and
nuclear threats during the Olympics. IAEA then approached DOE to consider
including the port of Piraeus in the Initiative. On October 30, 2003, DOE,
the Greek Atomic Energy Commission, and the Greek Customs Service signed a
tripartite agreement to include Piraeus in the Initiative. Because the
design, construction, installation, training, and equipment testing needed
to be complete before the Olympic Games, DOE executed the project on an
accelerated schedule and, as a result, completed all equipment
installations in July 2004. DOE installed a limited number of vehicle
portal monitors at the cargo terminal in Piraeus (see figure 3), and some
portal monitors (for both vehicles and pedestrians) at the passenger
terminal of the port of Piraeus. Piraeus has one of Europe's largest ferry
terminals, and the Greek government anticipated an increased volume of
passenger traffic associated with the Olympic Games. DOE officials told us
that providing radiation detection equipment to passenger terminals is
normally outside the scope of the Megaports Initiative, but the potential
security issues surrounding Greece's hosting of the Olympic Games led DOE
to provide radiation detection equipment to the Piraeus passenger
terminal. DOE also trained 10 Greek customs officials from Piraeus at its
training center and provided additional in-country training to 50 Greek
customs officials who work at the port. In fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to
provide additional onsite training to Greek officials, determine whether
any additional equipment installations are necessary, and evaluate any
equipment problems that arise.

14DOE also performed other related work in Greece prior to the Olympic
Games. See app. IV for additional information on this work.

Figure 3: Truck Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Piraeus,
Greece

DOE's Megaports Initiative does not have a comprehensive long-term plan to
guide the Initiative as it moves forward, which is particularly important
given DOE's recent proposal to expand the Initiative's scope to include
additional foreign seaports. To set the direction for the Megaports
Initiative, DOE currently uses three planning documents: the Megaports
Initiative Fiscal Year 2005 Program Work Plan, the DOE Future Years
Nuclear Security Program, and the Megaports Initiative Strategy Paper. The
Fiscal Year 2005 Program Work Plan is an evolving planning document that
incorporates day-to-day changes in program activities and documents the
scope of work to be conducted in this fiscal year. This plan also includes
a detailed activity-based budget for the current fiscal year to guide the
work of national laboratories and contractors involved in the Initiative.
The Future Years Nuclear Security Program includes a 5-year
financial-based projection of the number of ports to be completed.
Additionally, at a February 22, 2005, meeting to discuss an early draft of
this report, DOE officials provided us with a copy of the Megaports
Initiative Strategy Paper. This two and one half-page document provides a
broad vision for the Initiative, and describes some factors that may
affect program success, but

                                  Source: GAO.

DOE's Megaports Initiative Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan to Guide
Its Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Ports

it contains few details about how DOE plans to achieve the goals of the
Initiative.

These three documents provide some elements that are needed in a longterm
plan for the Initiative. Specifically, the DOE Future Years Nuclear
Security Program establishes that the long-term goal for the program is to
install radiation detection equipment at 20 ports by 2010 and provides
cost estimates for the Initiative.15 In addition, the Megaports Initiative
Strategy Paper describes DOE's approach for determining which ports to
target for inclusion in the Initiative and states that the Initiative's
mission is to diminish the probability of illicit trafficking of nuclear
materials and other radioactive material in the global maritime system
that could be used against the United States, its key allies, and
international partners. However, DOE's goal of completing 20 ports may not
be an adequate measure toward sufficiently addressing the overall threat
of nuclear smuggling in the international maritime system. As previously
stated, DOE uses its Maritime Prioritization Model to rank foreign ports
on their relative attractiveness to nuclear smugglers and as a tool to
help program officials decide which ports to pursue for inclusion in the
Initiative. DOE has annual performance measures to install radiation
detection equipment at a given number of ports to show progress towards
its long-term goal of completing installations at 20 ports by 2010. While
using the number of ports completed annually provides a broad measure of
the Initiative's progress, this measure does not take into account whether
the ports where equipment is being installed are of highest priority. That
is, DOE has not tied its annual performance measures of completing a
certain number of ports to the model it uses to determine which ports are
of highest priority.

In addition, DOE did not meet its fiscal year 2004 performance measure of
completing three ports through the Megaports Initiative. DOE officials
stated that the Initiative did not meet this measure because of their
inability to sign agreements with foreign governments to install radiation
detection equipment. DOE's lack of progress in gaining agreements with
countries that contain high-priority ports has led it to initiate work at
ports that were not ranked as highest priority by DOE's model. Developing
a comprehensive long-term plan for the Megaports Initiative would require
DOE to, among other things, develop criteria for deciding how many and

15In its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal, DOE proposed expanding the
scope of the Megaports Initiative to 24 ports. However, because this is a
budget proposal and is subject to congressional approval, the official
scope of the program currently remains at 20 ports.

which lower priority ports to complete, or what other actions may be
warranted, if it continues to have difficulties gaining agreements to
install radiation detection equipment at the highest priority ports. DOE
officials told us that they intend to develop such a plan for the
Initiative in the near future.

Through the End of Fiscal Year 2004, DOE Had Spent About $43 Million on
Megaports Initiative Activities, but Total Program Costs Are Uncertain

Since the inception of the Megaports Initiative in fiscal year 2003
through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on
Megaports Initiative activities. DOE spent these funds on such activities
as the completion of a pilot project at Rotterdam, the Netherlands;
equipment installations at Piraeus, Greece; the advanced purchase of
equipment for use at future ports; program oversight; and the development
and maintenance of DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model (see figure 4).

Figure 4: Megaports Initiative Expenditures through the End of Fiscal Year
2004 (dollars in millions)

Advanced equipment procurement activities

$1

Establishing cooperative agreements

$1.3

Development and maintenance of prioritization models

Other

Equipment testing and evaluation

Program oversight

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

                        Note: Figures have been rounded.

As figure 4 shows, DOE spent $13.8 million, or 32 percent of program
expenditures, to complete installations at Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and
Piraeus, Greece. DOE also spent an additional $238,000 on activities
related to future equipment installations in Freeport, Bahamas. DOE spent
$28.8 million on program integration activities, which are costs not
directly associated with installing equipment at a specific port. Of this
amount, $13.7 million was spent on advanced equipment procurement
activities, which include the purchase and storage of approximately 408
portal monitors and associated spare parts for use at future
installations. DOE also spent $6.6 million on program oversight
activities, such as program cost and schedule estimating, technical
assistance provided by participating national laboratories, contractor
reviews of project work plans, travel coordination, and translation
services. In addition, $1.9 million was spent on other program integration
activities, such as the development of materials and curricula for
training foreign customs agents on the use of radiation detection
equipment.16

DOE's current plan is to install radiation detection equipment at a total
of 20 ports by 2010 at an estimated cost of $337 million, but several
uncertainties may affect the Initiative's scope, cost, and time frames for
completion. First, DOE uses $15 million as its estimate for what an
average port should cost to complete, but this estimate may not be
accurate. Second, DOE is currently assessing whether the Initiative's
scope should increase beyond 20 ports. Regarding the first uncertainty,
DOE officials told us that the primary basis for their $15 million per
port cost estimate was DOE's prior experience deploying radiation
detection equipment at Russian land border crossings, airports, and
seaports. However, DOE acknowledged that the cost of doing business in
Russia may not be an accurate basis for developing their per port cost
estimate, and DOE has yet to reevaluate this estimate in light of work it
has performed installing radiation detection equipment at ports.
Furthermore, the costs of installing equipment at individual ports vary
and are influenced by factors such as a port's size, its physical layout,
existing infrastructure, and the level of the host country's cooperation
with DOE. For example, the port of Antwerp, Belgium, which is the second
largest port in Europe, will be a much larger, more expensive and complex
project than DOE's two previously completed

16Once an agreement or memorandum of understanding is reached with a
foreign government to include a port in the Initiative, all past and
present program integration expenditures that can be directly associated
with that port are transferred to an expenditure category for that
specific port.

installations. According to DOE officials, because of the large physical
size of the port, an estimated 60 radiation detection portal monitors will
be required to complete the installation. The age of the port and the
geographic location of some of the terminals will also create challenges
in integrating information generated from the radiation detection monitors
to the central alarm station where the alarm information will be processed
and evaluated.

Additionally, another factor that may affect DOE's installation costs at a
particular port is that, as a result of negotiating agreements with
foreign governments, DOE's level of involvement at specific ports may
vary, affecting the amount of radiation detection equipment DOE installs
and, thereby, its installation costs. For example, although the port of
Rotterdam is the largest port in Europe, the Dutch government chose to
limit the scope of DOE's involvement at the port to installing equipment
at only one of the port's four terminals. This resulted in DOE's costs at
Rotterdam being significantly reduced compared to what it would have cost
to install equipment all four terminals. DOE officials stated that as
future agreements are reached with foreign governments and more port
installations are completed, additional data will be gathered, which could
assist them in refining the average per port cost estimate. By the end of
fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to have completed installations at a total of
five ports and should have additional information with which to reevaluate
the accuracy of its current per port cost estimate. DOE officials told us
that they plan to reevaluate the cost estimate once these ports are
completed. A reevaluation of this estimate would allow DOE to better
project individual port costs, as well as the total future costs of the
Initiative. However, if DOE does not reevaluate its average per port cost
estimate it will be difficult to accurately determine the total future
costs of the Initiative and future annual funding needs.

DOE also is currently assessing whether the Initiative's scope should
increase beyond 20 ports. DOE officials told us that DOE did not intend
for the Initiative's initial goal to be static and they believe the scope
of the Initiative will likely increase in the future. Additionally, these
officials stated that if they determine that installing radiation
detection equipment at a total of 20 ports does not sufficiently reduce
the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive
materials, they plan to expand the scope of the Initiative to include a
greater number of ports. In its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal, DOE
proposed expanding the scope of the Initiative to 24 ports, but this scope
expansion is subject to congressional approval. If the

scope of the Initiative increases, the total costs and time frames for
completion will also increase.

DOE Faces Several Operational and Technical Challenges in Preventing
Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Seaports

In its effort to install radiation detection equipment at foreign
seaports, DOE faces several operational and technical challenges. First,
the capability of radiation detection equipment to detect nuclear material
depends on such factors as how fast containers pass through the radiation
portal monitors and how near the containers are to the detection
equipment. Additionally, some nuclear materials can be shielded with lead
or other materials to prevent radiation from being detected. Compounding
these challenges, DOE faces technical challenges related to ports'
physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations in its effort to screen
cargo containers for radioactive and nuclear materials. Further,
environmental conditions specific to ports, such the existence of high
winds and sea spray, can affect the radiation detection equipment's
performance and long-term sustainability.

Several Factors Can Affect the Capability of Radiation Detection Equipment
to Detect Nuclear Material

Three factors have an impact on the effectiveness of radiation detection
equipment: time, distance, and shielding. The time factor refers to the
amount of time that a radiation detector has to perform the process of
detecting radiological material. For example, trucks carrying cargo
containers are supposed to drive through a vehicle radiation detector at a
uniform controlled speed. Variation from this program requirement can
impact the radiation detection equipment's performance. The distance
between the radiation detection equipment and the material being scanned
also affects the effectiveness of the equipment. As a general rule, the
closer the nuclear material is to the detector, the better the radiation
detection equipment will perform.

Nuclear materials are more difficult to detect if lead or other metal is
used to shield them. For example, in July 2004, a container that housed a
small amount of radioactive material17 passed through radiation detection
equipment that DOE had installed at one of the ports it has completed
without being detected due to the presence of the large amounts of scrap

17This particular radioactive isotope is commonly used for medical
practices as cancer treatment and commercially for the sterilization of
food products. Sufficient amounts of this material could be used by
terrorist to construct a "dirty bomb."

metal in the same container. The host country's government later received
information about the container, which led to the discovery of the
radioactive source. The host country's government raised concerns that the
radiation detection equipment did not register an alarm during a scan of
the container and asked DOE to investigate the incident. DOE national
laboratory experts determined that the radiation detection equipment had
been set to program requirements. As a result, DOE national laboratory
officials and the host country's government decided not to alter the
settings of the radiation detection equipment.

A technical challenge is to detect and identify low-level radiation
sources in the presence of high background radiation levels. Detecting
actual cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material is
complicated because one of the materials of greatest concern in terms of
proliferation- highly enriched uranium-is amongst the most difficult
materials to detect due to its relatively low level of radioactivity.
Uranium emits only gamma radiation so the radiation detection equipment,
which contains gamma and neutron detectors, will only detect uranium from
the gamma detector. Plutonium emits both gamma and neutron radiation.
However, shielding of nuclear material does not prevent the detection of
neutron radiation and, as a result, plutonium can be detected by neutron
detectors regardless of the amount of shielding. According to DOE
officials, a neutron alarm can be caused by only a few materials,18 while
a gamma alarm can be caused by a variety of sources including commercial
goods such as bananas, ceramic tiles and fertilizer and nuclear materials,
such as plutonium and uranium.

Once DOE finishes installing radiation detection equipment at a port and
hands control of the equipment over to the host government, the United
States no longer has control over the specific settings used by the
equipment or how the equipment is used by foreign government customs
officials. Settings can be changed to decrease the number of nuisance
alarms, which may also decrease the probability that the equipment will
detect nuclear material. Additionally, foreign customs officials may
decide not to perform secondary inspections when alarms sound in order to
increase the flow of traffic through a port. Therefore, the level of
effective use of the equipment is unclear. According to DOE officials, the
periodic

18According to DOE, cosmic radiation can also activate a neutron alarm. At
Rotterdam, DOE had difficulty identifying the cause of many nuisance
neutron alarms from the radiation detection equipment. After testing, DOE
and national laboratory officials determined that cosmic radiation was
interfering with the calibration of the radiation detection equipment. DOE
national laboratory officials installed a software program to solve this
problem.

maintenance DOE national laboratory official perform on the radiation
detection equipment helps them to ensure that the equipment is set to the
optimal calibrations and operated appropriately. If the equipment settings
have been altered, the DOE officials can inquire about these discrepancies
to the foreign government and work to resolve any problems.

DOE Is Developing Methods to Overcome Technical Challenges Posed by Ports'
Physical Layouts and Cargo Stacking Configurations

When implementing its Megaports Initiative at foreign ports, DOE has the
specific challenge of trying to screen all cargo passing through a port.
Currently, DOE usually installs radiation detection equipment at locations
within a port where natural choke points occur. These locations slow down
the transport of containers, making them optimal locations for the
installation of radiation detection equipment. At some ports, however, a
high percentage of cargo containers do not leave the port but are gathered
together in the shipyard and then shipped to another location. DOE is
addressing this problem in two ways: (1) by placing radiation detection
equipment within ports to be able to screen cargo that moves between port
terminals and (2) working with Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos)
to develop a mobile radiation detection system for screening of this type
of cargo. At some ports, DOE plans to place radiation detection equipment
at the exits of each port terminal so that inter-terminal transport of
cargo can be monitored, despite the fact that the cargo does not leaving
the port itself. Additionally, Los Alamos officials are working to fit
radiation detection equipment onto a straddle carrier19 so that containers
that are awaiting transshipment can be scanned for the presence of
radiation. This carrier would be able to scan containers stacked three
containers high within the shipyard before they are loaded onto the next
ship. The straddle carrier would scan the stacked containers with its
radiation detection equipment to determine if radiological materials are
present and follow-up inspections would then occur if necessary. See
figure 5 for a diagram of the proposed straddle carrier design modified to
carry radiation detection equipment.

19A straddle carrier is a piece of equipment used at ports to transport
cargo containers from various port locations.

Figure 5: Design of Modified Straddle Carrier Fitted with Radiation
Detection Equipment

Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

According to Los Alamos officials, the modified straddle carrier will be
more effective than a vehicle radiation detection portal monitor because
the distance from the monitor to the container is greatly reduced, which
increases the overall detection capabilities of the system. Los Alamos
officials stated that they plan to test the design in a foreign seaport in
summer 2005. If this testing is successful, DOE plans to implement this
design in other ports that have similar cargo stacking arrangements and
that utilize straddle carriers. However, this technology cannot remedy the
entire problem DOE faces because many ports stack greater than three
containers on top of each other in their shipyards and not all ports have
straddle carriers because they move their containers with other types of

equipment and stack them in different configurations. According to a DOE
official, because the straddle carrier solution will not work at all
ports, DOE will continue to seek additional solutions to this problem.

Environmental Conditions Can Affect Radiation Detection Equipment's
Performance and Sustainability

Another technical challenge specific to ports is coping with environmental
conditions, particularly high winds and sea spray, which can cause
problems for radiation detection equipment. Wind disturbances can vibrate
the equipment and interfere with its ability to detect radiation. For
example, after the pilot project at Rotterdam was completed, the bases of
the radiation detection portal monitors DOE installed had to be reinforced
with steel plates to stabilize them because high winds were causing them
to vibrate and reducing their capability to detect nuclear material. Sea
spray may also affect radiation detection equipment by corroding the
equipment and its components. The corrosive nature of sea spray combined
with other conditions such as coral in the water can accelerate the
degradation of equipment. If the equipment casing becomes corroded,
moisture can get into the equipment and affect its performance and
long-term sustainability. Corrosion and moisture can cause radiation
detection alarms to go off when they should not and not when they should.
DOE and national laboratory officials told us that they are analyzing the
problem to identify methods to alleviate sea spray's adverse effects on
the equipment. At one port where DOE plans to complete installations in
fiscal year 2005, sea spray is a potentially large problem. In December
2004, DOE convened a workshop of U.S. government officials and contractors
to discuss possible solutions to the sea spray problem. At this workshop,
several options for addressing the issue were discussed, such as
installing special stainless steel casings, installing bolts and other
hardware with protective coatings, and using nitrogen-filled housings to
protect the video cameras. DOE officials are considering the
recommendations from the workshop and how they should be implemented in
this port and at other ports where DOE plans to install equipment.

Conclusions	DOE uses a threat-and volume-based analysis to determine which
foreign seaports are of highest priority, and we believe that this is a
sound basis for targeting the expenditure of U.S. funds. While DOE has
completed work at two ports, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Piraeus,
Greece, both were ranked lower in priority than other foreign seaports by
DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model. In addition, DOE has been unable to
reach agreement with many key countries that have ports ranked as high
priority by its

model. If DOE continues to have difficulty gaining agreements to install
radiation detection equipment at its highest priority ports, then this
could raise questions about the Initiative's effectiveness and about how
many lower priority ports to include. Currently, however, the Initiative's
longterm goal is to install radiation detection equipment at 20 foreign
seaports regardless of their priority. This goal is inconsistent with
DOE's approach for selecting high-priority ports and does not provide a
reasonable measure of long-term program success. Considering its limited
progress at the highest priority ports, a well thought out plan can be an
important guide for DOE's efforts in the further implementation of its
Megaports Initiative. However, to date, DOE has not developed such a plan
for the Initiative. Without a comprehensive long-term plan for the
Initiative, Congress may not be able to judge whether DOE is making
progress towards achieving the Initiative's long-term goals or how best to
assist DOE in working toward its goals. DOE officials told us that they
will be developing a plan for the Initiative in the near future, and we
agree that such a plan is needed.

While the cost of installing radiation detection equipment at a port is
dependent on a number of variables, such as the port's size, physical
layout, and existing infrastructure, the costs of installing equipment at
the two ports DOE has completed to date were significantly less than the
$15 million per port cost estimate that DOE used to develop its long-term
cost projection for the Initiative. DOE's $15 million estimate for the
average cost of installing equipment at a port was based on the
department's prior experience installing radiation detection equipment at
Russian land borders, airports, and seaports. DOE officials acknowledged
that the cost of doing business in Russia may not be an accurate basis on
which to estimate the costs of installing such equipment at other foreign
ports. Because DOE has not yet reevaluated its per port cost estimate to
reflect its recent experience installing radiation detection equipment at
ports, the accuracy of DOE's long-term cost projection for the Initiative
is questionable. By the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to have
completed installations at a total of 5 ports, and will have additional
information about the costs of these installations that could assist it in
refining its per port cost estimate and long-term cost projection for the
Initiative.

Recommendations for 	We recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working
with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,
take the

Executive Action following two actions:

o 	Develop a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the future efforts of
the Initiative that includes, at a minimum, (1) performance measures that
are consistent with DOE's desire to install radiation detection equipment
at the highest priority foreign seaports, (2) strategies DOE will employ
to determine how many and which lower priority ports it will include in
the Initiative if it continues to have difficulty installing equipment at
the highest priority ports as identified by its model, (3) projections of
the anticipated funds required to meet the Initiative's objectives, and
(4) specific time frames for effectively spending program funds.

o 	Evaluate the accuracy of the current per port cost estimate of $15
million, make any necessary adjustments to the Initiative's long-term cost
projection, and inform Congress of any changes to the long-term cost
projection for the Initiative.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided the Department of Energy with a draft of this report for its
review and comment. DOE's written comments are presented as appendix

V. DOE generally agreed with our recommendations. In its written comments,
DOE also provided further clarification on the evolution of its Maritime
Prioritization Model. Specifically, DOE noted that in the early stages of
the Megaports Initiative, it focused on the 20 highest-volume-to-U.S.
seaports, which was consistent with the approach taken by the Department
of Homeland Security's Container Security Initiative. However, when DOE
initially briefed us on its model in July 2004, DOE had changed its
prioritization approach and was focusing almost entirely on a threatbased
model. As DOE notes in its comments, it did not present us with
information on modifications to its model until February 22, 2005, which
was after DOE received an early draft of this report for a factual review.
DOE's new port prioritization approach represents a combination of ports
that ship large volumes of containers to the United States and ports that
lie in regions of interest. DOE also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release the contents of
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the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary
of Energy; the Administrator, the National Nuclear Security
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of Management and Budget; and

interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can be
reached at 202-512-3841 or [email protected]. Key contributors to this
report include R. Stockton Butler, Julie Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers,
Chris Ferencik, and F. James Shafer, Jr.

Gene Aloise Director, Natural Resources and Environment

List of Congressional Requesters

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Norm Coleman
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable John D. Dingell
Ranking Minority Member
Energy and Commerce Committee
House of Representatives

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

We performed our review of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Megaports
Initiative at DOE's offices in Washington, D.C.; the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in Washington, D.C.; the Department of State in
Washington, D.C.; Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) in Los
Alamos, New Mexico; Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) in Albuquerque,
New Mexico; and the National Nuclear Security Administration's Service
Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Additionally, we visited completed
Megaports Initiative installations in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and
Piraeus, Greece.

To assess the progress DOE has made in implementing its Megaports
Initiative, we reviewed documents and had discussions with officials from
DOE; DHS; Los Alamos; Sandia; DOE's private sector contractors-SI
International and Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler; and a number of
nongovernmental entities, including nonproliferation and port security
experts. In addition, in October 2004, we visited the Netherlands and
Greece to interview Dutch and Greek officials and to see the completed
Megaports Initiative installations at the ports of Rotterdam and Piraeus,
respectively. While in Rotterdam, we spoke with officials from the Dutch
Ministry of Finance, the Dutch Customs authority, the U.S. Embassy in The
Hague, and a U.S. official from Container Security Initiative for the port
of Rotterdam. We toured the Megaports Initiative installations in
Rotterdam and observed the radiation detection equipment DOE installed.
When we visited Piraeus, we interviewed officials from the Greek Atomic
Energy Commission; the Port Authority of Piraeus; the Greek Ministry of
Economy and Finance, Customs Directorate General (Greek Customs Service);
DOE's contractors-Los Alamos, SI International, and Tetra Tech/Foster
Wheeler; and officials from the Container Security Initiative in Piraeus.
We toured the Megaports Initiative installations at both the passenger and
cargo terminals at the port of Piraeus and observed the radiation
detection equipment DOE had installed. Additionally, while we were in
Greece, we toured (1) two border crossings where DOE had installed
radiation detection equipment through its Second Line of Defense-Core
program (SLD-Core), (2) the SLD-Core installations at the passenger
arrival area of Athens International Airport, and (3) a small research
reactor in Athens that received physical security upgrades from DOE prior
to the 2004 Olympic Games.

To better understand DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model and port
prioritization process, we met with officials from DOE and Sandia National
Laboratories in August 2004 to discuss the components of the model, the
types of data the model uses to rank foreign seaports, as well as the port

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

prioritization list DOE provided us in July 2004. DOE and Sandia officials
told us that the model was threat-based and that the overall volume of
containers shipped from a given port to the United States accounted for
only 20 percent of the port's overall prioritization score. In addition,
we reviewed a briefing packet on the model developed by Sandia as well as
the report of the Maritime Prioritization Model Peer Review1 that was
conducted in August 2004 by members of academia, the intelligence
community, and industry experts. We also visited Sandia National
Laboratories in November 2004 and discussed the model and the results of
the peer review report with a Sandia official in charge of the development
and maintenance of the model. While we did not conduct an assessment of
the model, it is worth noting that we were informed by the DOE project
manager for the Megaports Initiative on January 24, 2005, that the port
prioritization list we were using was still the current operational model
that DOE was using for the Initiative. However, when we met with DOE
officials 2 weeks later on February 14, 2005, to discuss their comments on
a review of an early draft of this report they informed us that, because
they had made recent changes to the model, the prioritization list we had
been using was now outdated and no longer accurate. At a February 22,
2005, meeting, DOE and Sandia officials informed us that the revised model
and port prioritization process, among other things, (1) reduced the
emphasis on the threat of nuclear smuggling at individual ports and placed
a greater emphasis on ports with a high volume of cargo containers that
enter and exit the port by land, rather than cargo that is transshipped
and (2) deemphasized the risk from spent (used) nuclear fuel in a target
country. DOE also provided us with a new prioritization list that showed
its 35 highest priority ports listed alphabetically, rather than ranked
from highest to lowest priority.

We also spoke with DOE officials about strategic planning and reviewed DOE
documentation, such as the Megaports Program Work Plan for Fiscal Year
2005 and DOE's Future Years Nuclear Security Program. We reviewed the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the President's Management
Agenda from fiscal year 2002, and several of our previous reports on
strategic planning and related topics.

To assess the current and expected costs of the Initiative, we reviewed
DOE documents detailing program expenditures, projected costs, and

1The Maritime Prioritization Model Peer Review took place from August
17-18, 2004 at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point, NY.

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

schedule estimates. We reviewed contract data for expenditures through the
end of fiscal year 2004 and met numerous times with DOE agency officials
to discuss the data. We obtained responses from key database officials to
a number of questions focused on data reliability covering issues such as
data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and
completeness of the data. Follow-up questions were added whenever
necessary. We also reviewed DOE's 2004 Performance and Accountability
Report. A caveat worth noting is that although DOE gathers and maintains
expenditure data reported by contractors assisting in implementing the
Megaports Initiative, rather than conducting routine follow-up checks to
corroborate the data reported by the contractors, DOE officials noted that
periodic follow-up checks will be conducted, if necessary. In addition,
during the course of our review we found that for fiscal year 2004,
approximately $5.45 million in program expenditures had been
inappropriately costed to the Megaports Initiative, which should have been
costed to the SLD-Core program. As a result, total expenditures for the
Megaports Initiative are $5.45 million less than what is reflected in
DOE's fiscal year 2004 financial reports. DOE officials told us that this
mistake will be corrected and reflected in DOE's fiscal year 2005
financial reports. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of this report based on work we performed.

To identify challenges DOE faces in installing radiation detection
equipment at foreign ports, we examined documents and spoke with officials
from DOE, Los Alamos, Sandia, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and
nongovernmental entities, including nonproliferation and port security
experts. We also attended a National Academies of Science conference on
non-intrusive technologies for improving the security of containerized
maritime cargo. Additionally, we attended the National Cargo Security
Council conference on Radiation Detection and Screening.

We conducted our review between June 2004 and March 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II

                    National Laboratory and Contractor Roles

DOE National Laboratories

Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia)

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)

Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos)

In addition to developing and maintaining the Maritime Prioritization
Model, Sandia also conducts research related to international threat
information, which is used to maintain the Megaports Design Basis Threat
document. This document contains information on both known maritime
smuggling activities and plans by terrorist organizations seeking to
acquire nuclear and other commodities that have parallels to nuclear
smuggling patterns. Related to this, Sandia maintains a seaport
information database and develops port specific background papers to
assist DOE in evaluating ports for engagement. Furthermore, Sandia
officials conduct port familiarization visits and technical site visits in
order to gain a general understanding of port operations as well as to
determine specific information on the physical layout of the port,
security, port traffic, shipping volume, the host country's commitment
level to implementing the Initiative, training needs, and other relevant
information. This information is used to develop vulnerability
assessments, which help DOE determine the most cost-effective locations at
a seaport in which to install the equipment.

PNNL provides specific in-country training to foreign customs officials,
as well as training at DOE's Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency
Response facility. Training includes hands-on instruction in the use of
the radiation detection equipment and systems provided under the
Initiative and covers operation, maintenance, and appropriate response
protocols. To do this training, PNNL purchases presentation equipment and
handheld radiation detection equipment and develops and maintains training
props and related documentation. Training is tailored to each port and
developed and delivered by technical experts in the form of presentations,
manuals, hands-on practical exercises, field training, videos, and
interactive games. In addition, PNNL provides the Initiative with a
certified project manager at each port who assists the federal project
manager in overseeing the implementation of the Initiative at a given port
and is the primary point of contact responsible for integrating all the
work conducted by the participating national laboratories and contractors.

Los Alamos provides expertise in radiation detection technologies and is
the lead national laboratory for testing and evaluating the performance of
radiation detection equipment. Los Alamos tests the deployed radiation
detection equipment and supports Sandia in performing site surveys and
preparing design requirements documents. In addition, Los Alamos

              Appendix II National Laboratory and Contractor Roles

technical experts analyze portal detection performance data to ensure the
deployed equipment is meeting current detection requirements. Los Alamos
has also conducted equipment testing in order to overcome challenges
associated with scanning transshipped cargo.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge provides technical assistance at
DOE headquarters on the

(Oak Ridge)	communications infrastructure associated with the installation
of radiation detection equipment at foreign ports and assists with the
testing and evaluation of radiation detection equipment. Oak Ridge
officials told us that a trainer from Oak Ridge will be provided to assist
in each of the classes conducted for foreign customs officials at PNNL's
Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response training facility
during fiscal year 2005.

Private Contractors

TSA Systems	TSA Systems is a private contractor that manufactures the
radiation portal monitors that DOE installs at foreign ports and also
provides technical support to DOE on the equipment. According to TSA
officials, each site is visited yearly to check the monitors for damage
and to perform routine maintenance. In addition, TSA has modified
radiation portal monitors to address challenges specific to particular
ports. For example, TSA installed stabilization plates on portal monitors
at Rotterdam to deal with high winds at the port.

Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler	Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler is an engineering and
construction company who was the primary contractor in charge installing
equipment at Rotterdam and Piraeus. Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler also led the
construction of the associated infrastructure to support the radiation
detection equipment at these ports.

Ahtna Government Services Ahtna will be the primary contractor for the
design and construction of

Corporation (Ahtna)	future Megaports Initiative installations. Ahtna was
not involved in the installation of equipment in Rotterdam or Piraeus.
Ahtna has entered into a subcontract with the former design build
contractor, Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler, to support design and construction
activities at future installations.

              Appendix II National Laboratory and Contractor Roles

Technology Ventures Technology Ventures Incorporated provides logistical
support to DOE's

Incorporated	Megaports Initiative by storing and shipping radiation portal
monitors that DOE procures in advance for installation at future ports.

SI International	SI International provides DOE with technical support
related to the development and installation of the communications
infrastructure associated with radiation detection equipment installed
under the Initiative. SI International staff provide onsite training to
foreign customs officials in operating and maintaining the communications
systems.

Miratek	Miratek helps DOE manage and maintain budget and expenditure data
for the Megaports Initiative.

Appendix III

Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed or Initiated Work

Rotterdam, the Netherlands	The Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Department of Energy
(DOE) on August 13, 2003, to include the port of Rotterdam in the
Megaports Initiative. The Netherlands was the first European Union country
to join the Initiative. Rotterdam is Europe's largest port. The volume of
containers passing through Rotterdam is roughly 7 million twenty-foot
equivalent units (TEU) annually, about 6 percent of which is shipped to
the United States.1 Approximately 20 percent of cargo passing through
Rotterdam is transshipped, meaning it does not pass through any natural
choke points, such as vehicle or rail entry and exit gates. Containers at
the port are handled primarily in four container terminals. In addition,
the Department of Homeland Security began conducting Container Security
Initiative (CSI) activities at Rotterdam in June 2002.

Piraeus, Greece 	The Directorate General of Customs and Excise of the
Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Hellenic Republic, the Greek Atomic
Energy Commission, and DOE signed a tripartite agreement on October 30,
2003 to include the port of Piraeus in the Megaports Initiative. The port
is located in the southwestern Aegean Sea on the innermost point of the
Saronikas Gulf. The port received increased attention because of security
concerns associated with the 2004 Olympic Games. Piraeus was also
considered a significant port for inclusion in the Initiative because it
not only serves as a major seaport for Greece, but also is the third
largest passenger port in the world. The volume of containers passing
through Piraeus is about 1.6 million TEUs annually. In addition, roughly
11,000 TEUs were shipped from Piraeus directly to the United States during
2003. Greece was the second European Union country to join the Initiative
and become fully operational. CSI also began operations at Piraeus in June
2004.

Colombo, Sri Lanka	The Ministry of Ports and Aviation of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and DOE signed an MOU on July 20, 2004 to
include the port of Colombo in the Megaports Initiative. The port is
located on the southwest coast of the country. The port of Colombo has a
high level of container traffic-over 1.9 million TEUs annually. The port
uses cranes to move containers within and out of the terminals. DOE
anticipates using vehicle

1Twenty-foot equivalent units are a standard unit of measurement for cargo
capacity. One TEU equals a standard container measuring approximately 20
ft long and 8 ft wide.

                                  Appendix III
                   Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed
                               or Initiated Work

monitors to screen all containers imported to Sri Lanka, all export
containers originating in Sri Lanka, and all inter-terminal transshipment
containers as they exit the terminals. CSI became operational at Colombo
in June 2003.

Antwerp, Belgium	The Federal Public Service of Finance of the Kingdom of
Belgium signed an MOU with DOE on November 24, 2004 to include the port of
Antwerp in the Megaports Initiative. Antwerp is the 4th largest seaport in
the world and the largest port in Belgium. Container traffic through the
port is over 5 million TEUs annually, while traffic to the United States
accounts for nearly 5 percent of the total annual container traffic
through Antwerp. In 2003, Antwerp ranked 9th in the world for total volume
of container traffic shipped to the United States. Additionally, there are
direct cargo routes from Antwerp to many major U.S. seaports. The port is
geographically split into a right and a left bank. While the right bank is
fully operational, the left bank has two operational terminals with
another two large terminals currently under construction. When the
terminals are completed, the volume of cargo passing through the port will
double. In addition, CSI began operations at Antwerp in June 2002.

Algeciras, Spain	The Central Agency for Tax Administration of the Kingdom
of Spain signed an MOU with DOE on December 21, 2004 to include the port
of Algeciras in the Megaports Initiative. The port is located on the
southernmost tip of Spain adjacent to Gibraltar. It is the 25th largest
container port in the world with container traffic through the port being
over 2.5 million TEUs annually. The port is strategically important in its
location because, in addition to being a through route from the Atlantic
Ocean to the Mediterranean, and on to the Far East, the port lies on the
crossroads of the busiest sea-lanes that use the Suez Canal. Spain's
cooperation with DOE currently includes only the port of Algeciras, the
Spanish port DOE was most interested in. However, the Spanish government
wants DOE to consider installing equipment at the ports of Valencia and
Barcelona as well. Currently, DOE is considering this request, including
the possibility of using a cost-sharing arrangement similar to the one
used in Rotterdam. In addition, CSI became operational at the port in
January 2003.

Freeport, Bahamas 	The Ministry of Finance of the Commonwealth of the
Bahamas and DOE signed an MOU on December 30, 2004 to include the port of
Freeport in the

Appendix III
Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed
or Initiated Work

Megaports Initiative. Freeport has a high level of container traffic
moving through the port. In particular, container traffic to the United
States accounts for over 16 percent of the total annual container traffic
through the port. Additionally, container traffic being shipped from
Freeport accounts for a total of approximately 1.2 percent of all
container traffic to the United States. In addition, CSI is not scheduled
to be operational at Freeport.

Appendix IV

                   Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
                     Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

In addition to the work done by the Megaports Initiative at the port of
Piraeus, Greece, DOE conducted three other efforts to increase security in
Greece prior to the 2004 Summer Olympics. First, the Second Line of
Defense-Core program installed radiation detection equipment at three land
border crossings and at the Athens International Airport to assist Greek
authorities in preventing nuclear smuggling. Second, the International
Radiological Threat Reduction program helped secure 21 sites around Greece
that contain radiological sources that could be used to make a
radiological dispersion device (also known as a "dirty bomb"). Finally,
the International Nuclear Materials Security program upgraded the physical
security around Greece's only nuclear reactor-a small research reactor
used for research and training-located in Athens.

Second Line of Defense-The Second Line of Defense-Core program (SLD-Core)
installed radiation

Core Program	portal monitors in four locations throughout Greece: three
land border crossing and a large airport. According to DOE officials, the
total cost of these projects was about $15 million. The projects began in
October 2003 and were completed in July 2004. DOE and national laboratory
officials also provided technical assistance and training to Greek customs
officials during the period of the Olympic Games. Figure 6 shows an
example of the radiation portal monitors DOE supplied through the SLD-Core
program.

Appendix IV
Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

Figure 6: Radiation Portal Monitors at a Northern Greek Border Crossing

Source: GAO.

In addition to the training provided through the Megaports Initiative to
Greek customs officials working at the port of Piraeus, DOE provided
detailed training to 20 Greek customs officials who work at land border
crossings at the Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response
center at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Additionally, about 400
Greek customs agents were trained at various sites around Greece. In
fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to conduct sustainability work and additional
training at these sites.

Finally, DOE supplied over 450 pieces of handheld radiation detection
equipment some of which were intended for use at Olympic venues. This
equipment included handheld gamma radiation detectors, radioactive isotope
identification devices, and radiation detection pagers (see figures 7 and
8). According to an agreement between the Greek Atomic Energy Commission
and DOE, after the Olympic Games, these handheld devices

Appendix IV
Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

were to be distributed to border locations throughout Greece that did not
receive other DOE assistance.

Figure 7: A Handheld Gamma Radiation Detector and a Radioactive Isotope
Identification Device

Source: GAO.

                                  Appendix IV
                   Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
                     Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

                      Figure 8: Radiation Detection Pager

Through its International Radiological Threat Reduction program, DOE spent
$780,000 to increase security at 21 sites throughout Greece that contained
radiological sources of a type and size that could be used for a dirty
bomb and to provide additional handheld radiation detection equipment for
first responders in Greece. DOE secured sites that included facilities
with blood irradiator units containing cesium chloride sources, a large
industrial sterilization facility, and oncology clinics that had medical
isotopes used in cancer therapy. Figure 9 shows a teletherapy unit
containing a radiological source, which is used to treat cancer.

                                  Source: GAO.

              International Radiological Threat Reduction Program

                                  Appendix IV
                   Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
                     Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

Figure 9: Teletherapy Unit Containing Radioactive Source, Prior to
Receiving Physical Security Upgrades

                                  Source: DOE.

Additionally, DOE provided handheld radiation detection equipment to
Greece through the Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer project.
Through this project, DOE donated 110 handheld radiological detection
devices that DOE national laboratories had previously deemed surplus. DOE
officials said that Greece was not high on the list of target countries
for assistance through the International Radiological Threat Reduction
program, but because of the increased security needs for the Olympic
Games, DOE expedited assistance to Greece. DOE began this project in
October 2003 and completed the upgrades in May 2004.

International Nuclear DOE spent about $1 million to upgrade the physical
security of Greece's

Materials Security Program	only nuclear reactor-a small, 5-megawatt
research reactor located in Athens known as the Greek Research Reactor-1.
DOE and the Greek

Appendix IV
Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

Atomic Energy Commission believed that it was important to upgrade the
physical security of this reactor primarily because the reactor is fueled
with a mix of highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium. This site
is the only location in Greece with weapons-usable nuclear material. The
Greek Atomic Energy Commission is in the process of converting the reactor
to use only low enriched uranium fuel.1

To upgrade the physical security of the reactor, DOE installed a new
perimeter detection system that included closed-circuit television,
hardened windows and doors on the reactor building, a new central alarm
station, and enhanced lighting of the building's perimeter. As an
additional security measure, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission shut down
the research reactor during the period of the Olympics Games.

1We recently reported on research reactors, see GAO, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return
of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and
Russia, GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004) and Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of
Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807
(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004).

                                   Appendix V

                     Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix V
Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix V
Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix V
Comments from the Department of Energy

Related GAO Products

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the
Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States
and Russia. GAO-05-57. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the
Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors. GAO04-807.
Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004.

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
2004.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security
Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, D.C.: December
16, 2003.

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater
Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2003.

Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Material, New
Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 18,
2002.

Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO02-426.
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

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