    Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
    Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority
    Foreign Seaports (31-MAR-05, GAO-05-375).

    Since September 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists
    could smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country in
    the approximately 7 million containers that arrive annually at
    U.S. seaports. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across borders
    by being placed inside containers aboard cargo ships. In response
    to this concern, since 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) has
    deployed radiation detection equipment to key foreign seaports
    through its Megaports Initiative (Initiative). GAO examined the
    (1) progress DOE has made in implementing the Initiative, (2)
    current and expected costs of the Initiative, and (3) challenges
    DOE faces in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign
    ports.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-375
        ACCNO:   A20583
      TITLE:     Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited
    Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest
    Priority Foreign Seaports
         DATE:   03/31/2005
      SUBJECT:   Cost analysis
    	     Counterterrorism
    	     Foreign governments
    	     Harbors
    	     Inspection
    	     International agreements
    	     International cooperation
    	     International relations
    	     Nuclear radiation monitoring
    	     Nuclear weapons
    	     Performance measures
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Ships
    	     Smuggling
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Terrorism
    	     Homeland security
    	     Program goals or objectives
    	     DOE Megaports Initiative
    	     NNSA Future Years Nuclear Security
    	     Program

    	     DOE Maritime Prioritization Model

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    GAO-05-375

                     United States Government Accountability Office

                         GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

    March 2005

    PREVENTING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

      DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at
                           Highest Priority Foreign Seaports

                                           a

    GAO-05-375

    [IMG]

    March 2005

    PREVENTING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

    DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at
    Highest Priority Foreign Seaports

                                     What GAO Found

    DOE's Megaports Initiative has had limited success in initiating work at
    seaports identified as high priority by DOE's Maritime Prioritization
    Model, which ranks ports in terms of their relative attractiveness to
    potential nuclear smugglers. Gaining the cooperation of foreign
    governments has been difficult in part because some countries have
    concerns that screening large volumes of containers will create delays
    that could inhibit the flow of commerce at their ports. DOE has completed
    work at 2 ports and signed agreements to initiate work at 5 other ports.
    Additionally, DOE is negotiating agreements with the governments of 18
    additional countries and DOE officials told us they are close to signing
    agreements with 5 of these countries. However, DOE does not have a
    comprehensive long-term plan to guide the Initiative's efforts. Developing
    such a plan would lead DOE to, among other things, determine criteria for
    deciding how many and which lower priority ports to complete if it
    continues to have difficulties working at higher volume and higher threat
    ports of interest.

    Through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on
    Megaports Initiative activities. Of this amount, about $14 million was
    spent on completing installations at 2 ports. Although DOE currently plans
    to install equipment at a total of 20 ports by 2010, at an estimated cost
    of $337 million, this cost projection is uncertain for several reasons.
    For example, the projection is based in part on DOE's $15 million estimate
    for the average cost per port, which may not be accurate because it was
    based primarily on DOE's work at Russian land borders, airports, and
    seaports. Additionally, DOE is currently assessing whether the
    Initiative's scope should increase beyond 20 ports; if this occurs, total
    costs and time frames will also increase.

    DOE faces several operational and technical challenges in installing
    radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. For example, DOE is
    currently devising ways to overcome technical challenges posed by the
    physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations at some ports.
    Additionally, environmental conditions, such high winds and sea spray, can
    affect radiation detection equipment's performance and sustainability.

    DOE-Funded Radiation Detection Equipment at a Foreign Port

    Source: GAO.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    DOE's Megaports Initiative Has Had Limited Success Initiating Work

    at High Priority Foreign Seaports and Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan
    to Guide Its Efforts

    Through the End of Fiscal Year 2004, DOE Had Spent About $43 Million on
    Megaports Initiative Activities, but Total Program Costs Are Uncertain

    DOE Faces Several Operational and Technical Challenges in

    Preventing Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Seaports Conclusions
    Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    1 3 6

    10

    19

    22 26 27 28

    Appendixes
                    Appendix I:             Scope and Methodology              31
                   Appendix II:    National Laboratory and Contractor Roles    34
                                 Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed or
                  Appendix III:                   Initiated
                                                     Work                      37
                                  Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
                  Appendix IV:                 Greece Prior to
                                            the 2004 Olympic Games             40
                    Appendix V:     Comments from the Department of Energy     46

    Related GAO Products

    Figures Figure 1:

    Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4: Figure 5:

    Ports Where DOEHas Completed Installations and Those Where It Plans to
    Begin Work or Complete Installations in Fiscal Year 2005 13 Truck Passing
    through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Rotterdam, the Netherlands 15 Truck
    Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Piraeus, Greece 17 Megaports
    Initiative Expenditures through the End of Fiscal Year 2004 (dollars in
    millions) 19 Design of Modified Straddle Carrier Fitted with Radiation
    Detection Equipment 25

    Contents

    Figure 6: Radiation Portal Monitors at a Northern Greek Border

    Crossing 41 Figure 7: A Handheld Gamma Radiation Detector and a

    Radioactive Isotope Identification Device 42 Figure 8: Radiation Detection
    Pager 43 Figure 9: Teletherapy Unit Containing Radioactive Source, Prior
    to

    Receiving Physical Security Upgrades 44

    Abbreviations

    CSI Container Security Initiative
    DHS Department of Homeland Security
    DOE Department of Energy
    IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
    MOU memorandum of understanding
    PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
    SLD-Core Second Line of Defense-Core program
    TEU twenty-foot equivalent unit

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    A

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

    March 31, 2005

    Congressional Requesters

    Over the past decade, as terrorist activities have spread throughout the
    world, the United States has become increasingly concerned about the
    threat posed by unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material.1 Such material
    could be stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists or countries seeking
    weapons of mass destruction. According to the International Atomic Energy
    Agency (IAEA), between 1993 and 2003, there were 540 confirmed cases of
    illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials. A significant
    number of the cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used
    to produce a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives
    with radioactive material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Even small amounts of
    nuclear and radiological materials are worrisome because as little as 25
    kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium could be
    used to build a nuclear weapon, and small amounts can be smuggled across
    borders in cars, carried in personal luggage on aircraft, or placed inside
    containers aboard cargo ships.

    Seaports are critical gateways for international commerce, and maritime
    shipping containers play a vital role in the movement of cargo between
    global trading partners. In 2002, approximately 7 million shipping
    containers arrived at U.S. ports carrying more than 95 percent of U.S.
    imports by weight from outside North America. Responding to heightened
    concern about national security since September 11, 2001, several U.S.
    government agencies have acted to prevent terrorists from smuggling
    weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers from overseas locations.
    In 2003, the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security
    Administration2 initiated its Megaports Initiative (Initiative), the goal
    of which is to enable foreign government personnel at key seaports to use
    radiation detection equipment to screen shipping containers entering and
    leaving these ports, regardless of the containers' destination, for
    nuclear

    1Weapons-usable nuclear material is uranium enriched to 20 percent or
    greater in uranium235 or uranium-233 isotopes and any plutonium containing
    less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-238 and less than 10 percent
    of the isotopes plutonium-241 and plutonium-242. These types of material
    are of the quality used to make nuclear weapons.

    2The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately organized
    agency within DOE that was created by the National Defense Authorization
    Act for fiscal year 2000 with responsibility for the nation's nuclear
    weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.

    and other radioactive material that could be used against the United
    States or its allies. Through the Initiative, DOE installs radiation
    detection equipment at foreign seaports that is then operated by foreign
    government officials and port personnel working at these ports.3

    DOE's Megaports Initiative coordinates with and complements the Department
    of Homeland Security's Container Security Initiative (CSI). Under CSI,
    which began operating in January 2002, U.S. Customs officials stationed in
    foreign ports review the cargo manifests of containers bound directly for
    the United States and attempt to identify containers with potentially
    dangerous cargo, such as explosives or weapons of mass destruction.4 U.S.
    Customs officials then request that the host country's customs officials
    inspect these containers before they are loaded on vessels destined for
    the United States. CSI and the Megaports Initiative differ in several
    important ways. For example, while CSI stations U.S. personnel in foreign
    ports, the Megaports Initiative does not. Instead it installs radiation
    detection equipment that enables foreign customs officials to improve the
    level of sophistication of their inspections by screening cargo for
    nuclear and radioactive materials. Also, under CSI, the United States
    bears the financial burden for posting its own inspectors at foreign
    ports, while participating in the Megaports Initiative requires a
    significant financial commitment from a host country because it may need
    to hire additional customs agents to operate the radiation detection
    equipment DOE provides.

    To help decisionmakers identify and prioritize foreign seaports for
    participation in the Megaports Initiative, DOE uses a complex model that
    ranks foreign ports according to their relative attractiveness to
    potential nuclear smugglers. The Maritime Prioritization Model
    incorporates information, such as port security conditions, volume of
    container traffic passing through ports, the proximity of the ports to
    sources of nuclear

    3DOE's Second Line of Defense-Core (SLD-Core) program, which installs
    radiation detection equipment at international land border crossings,
    airports, and seaports in Russia and other countries, has also installed
    equipment at some Russian ports. These ports are considered part of the
    SLD-Core program, not the Megaports Initiative. As a result, for the
    purposes of this report, we have not included discussions of work DOE
    performed at these ports in Russia.

    4For additional information about CSI, see GAO, Container Security:
    Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to
    Critical Success Factors, GAO-03770 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003) and
    related GAO products cited at the end of this report.

    material, and the proximity of the ports to the United States and is
    updated regularly to incorporate new information. When selecting ports for
    equipment installations, DOE also considers other factors, including the
    likelihood that a potential host country will agree to participate in the
    Initiative and the location of significant world events, such as the
    Olympic Games. Once DOE selects a port and the host country shows interest
    in participating in the Initiative, program officials may conduct a visit
    to the port to familiarize themselves with its operations and layout.
    Prior to implementation activities at a selected port, DOE and the host
    country's government negotiate an agreement, or memorandum of
    understanding (MOU), that outlines the expectations, roles, and
    responsibilities of both parties for work at the selected port as well as
    the long-term use of the equipment to be installed.5

    As agreed with your offices, we examined (1) DOE's progress in
    implementing its Megaports Initiative, (2) the current and expected costs
    of the Initiative, and (3) the challenges DOE faces in installing
    radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. To address these
    objectives, we analyzed documentation on the Megaports Initiative from DOE
    and its contractors, both at DOE's national laboratories and in the
    private sector, and conducted interviews with key program officials. We
    also visited completed Megaports Initiative installations at Rotterdam,
    the Netherlands, and Piraeus, Greece, to observe U.S.-funded radiation
    detection equipment and to discuss the implementation of the program with
    foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary
    information, performed a data reliability assessment of the data we
    received, and interviewed knowledgeable program officials on the
    reliability of the data. We determined these data were sufficiently
    reliable for the purposes of this report. More details on our scope and
    methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our review from June
    2004 to March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards.

    Results in Brief	DOE's Megaports Initiative has had limited success in
    initiating work at ports identified as high priority by its Maritime
    Prioritization Model because DOE has been unable to reach agreement with
    key countries, such as China. DOE has completed work at only 2 foreign
    seaports, signed

    5No installation of equipment may take place before DOE and the host
    country have signed an agreement or memorandum of understanding, which is
    typically a non-binding political document.

    agreements to begin work at 5 others, and is negotiating agreements with
    the governments of 18 additional countries. According to DOE officials,
    the Initiative's limited success in initiating work at key ports is
    largely due to difficulties negotiating agreements with countries that
    have ports ranked as high priority by DOE's model. Gaining the cooperation
    of foreign governments has been difficult because some countries have
    concerns that screening large volumes of containers will create delays
    that could inhibit the flow of commerce at their ports. In addition, some
    foreign governments are reluctant to hire the additional customs officials
    needed to operate the radiation detection equipment DOE provides under the
    Initiative. In fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to begin work in Antwerp,
    Belgium, and to complete installations in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Algeciras,
    Spain, and Freeport, Bahamas. DOE currently plans to complete
    installations at a total of 20 ports by 2010. The two ports where DOE has
    completed installations include a pilot project in Rotterdam, the
    Netherlands, and a full installation in Piraeus, Greece. Both of these
    ports were ranked lower in priority than other foreign seaports by DOE's
    model. However, DOE officials believe their work at these two ports has
    been beneficial for a number of reasons. For example, the success of DOE's
    pilot project at one port terminal in Rotterdam led to a decision by the
    Dutch government to fund the deployment of radiation detection equipment
    at the port's three remaining terminals. Similarly, installing equipment
    at Piraeus contributed to the increased security in Greece for the 2004
    Olympic Games.

    Currently, DOE does not have a comprehensive long-term plan for its
    Megaports Initiative, although with limited progress installing radiation
    detection equipment at its highest priority ports, a well thought out plan
    can be an important guide for its efforts to further implement the
    Initiative. DOE uses an annual work plan to guide the Initiative's efforts
    and document the scope of work to be accomplished in the current fiscal
    year. Additionally, DOE uses its Future Years Nuclear Security Program, a
    fiveyear financial projection, to provide the Initiative with a long-term
    cost projection and annual performance measures of a certain number of
    ports completed per year. While using the number of ports completed
    annually provides a broad measure of the Initiative's progress, this
    measure does not take into account whether the ports where equipment is
    being installed are of highest priority. DOE's Maritime Prioritization
    Model provides a tool to help DOE officials identify important ports to
    include in the Initiative. Developing a comprehensive long-term plan for
    the Megaports Initiative would require DOE to, among other things, develop
    criteria for deciding how many and which lower priority ports to complete
    if it continues to have difficulties gaining agreements to install
    radiation detection

    equipment at the highest priority ports. DOE officials told us that they
    will be developing such a plan for the Initiative in the near future. We
    believe that a comprehensive long-term plan that includes better criteria
    for measuring program success is needed and, as a result, we are making a
    recommendation to the Secretary of Energy that DOE develop such a plan for
    its Megaports Initiative.

    Through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on
    Megaports Initiative activities, but uncertainties may affect the
    Initiative's projected costs, scope, and time frames. DOE spent about $14
    million, or 32 percent of program expenditures, on the pilot project at
    Rotterdam and completing installations at Piraeus. Additionally, DOE spent
    about $29 million on program integration activities, which are costs not
    directly associated with installing equipment at a specific port. Of this
    amount, about $14 million was spent on advanced equipment procurement
    activities, which includes the purchase and storage of radiation portal
    monitors for future installations. The remaining $15 million was spent on
    such other activities as the development and maintenance of DOE's Maritime
    Prioritization Model, the process of negotiating agreements with foreign
    governments, and the testing of radiation detection equipment. Although
    DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of 20 ports by 2010,
    at an estimated total cost of $337 million, this cost projection is
    uncertain for several reasons. For example, the Initiative's long-term
    cost projection is based in part on DOE's $15 million average cost per
    port estimate, which may not be accurate. According to DOE officials, this
    estimate was derived primarily from DOE's prior experience in deploying
    radiation detection equipment at Russian land borders, airports, and
    seaports. DOE officials acknowledged that the cost of doing business in
    Russia may not be an accurate basis on which to estimate the cost of
    installing radiation detection equipment in other parts of the world. DOE
    has not yet reevaluated this estimate in light of experience gained from
    its installations at seaports. By the end of fiscal year 2005, however,
    DOE expects to have completed installations at a total of 5 ports and will
    have more information with which to assess the accuracy of its per port
    cost estimate. Additionally, DOE is currently assessing whether the
    Initiative's scope should increase beyond 20 ports; if this occurs, total
    costs and time frames will increase. To ensure the most accurate cost
    projections possible, we are recommending that DOE reevaluate the accuracy
    of the Initiative's average cost per port estimate and adjust its
    long-term cost projection, if necessary.

    As DOE continues to implement its Megaports Initiative, it faces several
    operational and technical challenges specific to installing radiation
    detection equipment at foreign ports. Certain factors can affect the
    general capability of radiation detection equipment to detect nuclear
    material. For example, some nuclear materials can be shielded with lead or
    other materials to prevent radiation from being detected. In addition, one
    of the materials of greatest proliferation concern, highly enriched
    uranium, is difficult to detect because of its relatively low level of
    radioactivity. In its effort to screen cargo containers at foreign ports
    for radioactive and nuclear materials, DOE faces technical challenges
    related to these ports' physical layouts and cargo stacking
    configurations. To address a part of these challenges at some ports, DOE
    plans to outfit a device used to transport cargo containers between port
    locations-known as a straddle carrier-with radiation detection equipment.
    However, this approach may not work at all ports, so DOE is pursuing other
    solutions as well. Additionally, environmental conditions specific to
    ports, such as the existence of high winds and sea spray, can affect the
    radiation detection equipment's performance and long-term sustainability.
    To minimize the effects of these conditions, DOE has used steel plates to
    stabilize radiation portal monitors placed in areas with high winds, such
    as in Rotterdam, and is currently evaluating approaches to combat the
    corrosive effects of sea spray on radiation detection equipment. We
    provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment. DOE
    generally agreed with our recommendations. DOE is currently working to
    produce a long-term plan for the Initiative and plans to reevaluate its
    per port cost estimate at the end of fiscal year 2005.

    Background	The Megaports Initiative is part of DOE's Office of the Second
    Line of Defense, whose aim is to strengthen the overall capability to
    detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive
    materials across international borders. DOE, with the assistance of
    several DOE national laboratories and private contractors,6 generally
    implements its Megaports Initiative at foreign seaports in six phases: (1)
    port prioritization; (2) government-to-government negotiations and port
    familiarization; (3) technical site surveys, site design, and training;
    (4) final design, construction, and equipment installation; (5) equipment
    calibration and testing; and (6) maintenance and sustainability.

    6For more information about the roles of each of the DOE national
    laboratories and private contractors that participate in the Megaports
    Initiative, see app. II.

    The Maritime Prioritization Model, which is maintained by Sandia National
    Laboratories (Sandia), uses unclassified information to rank foreign
    seaports for their attractiveness to a potential nuclear material
    smuggler. This information is maintained within the model in several
    categories that are individually weighted and scored and then combined to
    provide each port with an overall score.7 Ports receiving higher scores
    are considered more attractive to a nuclear material smuggler and
    therefore of potentially higher interest for inclusion in the Initiative.
    In May 2004, DOE directed Sandia to conduct a peer review of the model to
    determine the validity of its modeling approach, the appropriateness of
    the factors used in the model, and the suitability of the data for
    selecting and prioritizing foreign ports for the Initiative.8 The peer
    review panel concluded in August 2004, that the approach used in the
    design and execution of the model is conceptually sound and provides a
    relevant, defensible baseline from which to pursue bilateral engagements
    for installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. The
    panelists noted that the primary strengths of the model are the ease with
    which new sources of information relevant to prioritizing potential
    nuclear material smuggling routes can be added and the transparency of the
    data and calculations used in the model. Currently, the model ranks about
    120 seaports worldwide, and DOE plans to add an additional 80 ports to the
    model in fiscal year 2005. DOE officials noted that the model will
    continue to evolve to more clearly consider both volume and threat. DOE
    also considers other factors when deciding which specific ports to engage,
    such as a potential host country's level of interest in the Initiative and
    the location of significant world events, such as the Olympic Games.

    Once DOE selects a port for inclusion in the Initiative, DOE officials and
    host country representatives begin to negotiate an agreement or memorandum
    of understanding that defines the scope of work and level of cooperation
    between DOE and the host country for work at the selected port or ports.
    Concurrently, a team of experts from DOE's national laboratories visits
    the selected port to familiarize themselves with the port's operations and
    layout. Discussions are also conducted, as appropriate, with major port
    and terminal operators. In many cases the

    7There are three primary categories within the Maritime Prioritization
    Model: (1) country score, (2) port security score, and (3) shipping lane
    score.

    8The Maritime Prioritization Model peer review panel consisted of members
    from academia, industry, and federal agencies with experience in maritime
    commerce operation, intelligence, and counterterrorism.

    port-operating companies, along with terminal operators, have an economic
    interest in cooperating with the Initiative, since they have the most to
    lose in the event terrorists are successful in exploiting weaknesses of
    the maritime shipping network to launch an attack using weaponsusable
    nuclear or other radioactive material.

    After an MOU has been signed, the technical site survey, design, and
    training phase begins.9 Initially, one or more site visits are conducted
    to gather technical information to determine the degree to which cargo can
    be effectively screened in a port, to assess the vulnerabilities of the
    port to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials,
    and to estimate equipment needs. These visits help DOE determine port
    security information, port traffic patterns, shipping volume, training
    needs, and any other relevant information. Program officials then develop
    a port security report that analyzes the flow of container traffic for all
    port entry and exit gates, as well as for cargo that arrives at a port on
    one ship, is offloaded onto a dock, and then leaves aboard another
    ship-known as transshipped cargo. DOE also performs a cost benefit
    analysis of the proposed equipment installations at specific entry and
    exit gates. On the basis of the results of these assessments, DOE develops
    a design requirements package that includes the port's layout, proposed
    equipment needs, and installation requirements. This information is used
    to conduct more detailed engineering surveys to develop the final design.
    During this phase, DOE also begins to provide training to foreign customs
    officials, including training at the DOE Hazardous Materials Management
    and Emergency Response center located at Pacific Northwest National
    Laboratory (PNNL). The training focuses on radiation safety, the use of
    radiation detection equipment, and alarm response procedures. The training
    generally consists of a 1-week course with both classroom learning and
    simulated field operations. Training is tailored to each port, and
    materials are provided in the working language of the host country.

    During the final design, construction, and equipment installation phase,
    DOE determines the equipment needs of the port, the specific placement of
    the equipment, and any site preparation or construction work to be done at
    the port. The equipment that DOE provides through the Initiative is
    commercially available, off-the-shelf technology. DOE provides radiation
    detection portal monitors, which are stationary pieces of equipment

    9To expedite implementation of the Initiative, DOE may choose on a
    case-by-case basis to conduct technical site visits prior to the
    negotiation and signature of an MOU.

    designed to detect radioactive materials being carried by vehicles or
    pedestrians. These portal monitors can detect both gamma and neutron
    radiation, which is important for detecting the presence of highly
    enriched uranium and plutonium, respectively. In addition, DOE provides
    portable radiation detection devices, including handheld devices that can
    help assist foreign customs officials conduct secondary inspections to
    pinpoint the source of an alarm and to determine the type of radioactive
    material present. DOE also provides radiation detection pagers, which are
    small detectors that can be worn on a belt to continuously monitor
    radiation levels in the immediate area of the customs officials wearing
    the pagers. DOE installs the portal monitors at specific locations within
    the port, such as terminal entry and exit gates, and integrates the portal
    monitors with a central alarm station through the use of fiber optic cable
    or other methods.

    Once installation is complete, the equipment is calibrated and tested
    before being turned over to the host country's government. DOE officials
    calibrate the equipment to optimal specifications for the detection of
    weaponsusable nuclear material. The settings, which determine the
    equipment's sensitivity, are based on a number of factors, including the
    level of background radiation of the location, the type of cargo handled
    at a specific port, and the potential use of shielding. Once the equipment
    is calibrated and tested, the host country's customs officials can begin
    to screen cargo containers for radiation. When a container is scanned, an
    alarm will sound if the equipment detects radiation. A monitoring system
    logs which monitor set off the alarm, the date and time of the alarm, the
    alarm type, the gamma and neutron count for the alarm, any indications of
    tampering, an average reading of the background radiation of the area, and
    takes a photograph of the container's identification number. If determined
    necessary, the customs official then conducts a secondary inspection with
    a handheld radiation detection device to identify the source and location
    of the radiation. If the radiation profile of a scanned container's
    contents matches the profile of consumer goods that are known to contain
    natural sources of radiation,10 foreign customs officers may opt not to
    conduct a secondary inspection. However, the profile of consumer goods can
    appear different from the typical profile if the container is not
    uniformly packed with this item or if the container is filled with a
    combination of consumer goods. If the customs officials cannot determine
    the content of the container after the screening with a handheld radiation
    device, they may

    10Natural sources of radiation, which are usually relatively harmless,
    occur in a wide variety of common items and consumer goods, such as
    bananas, fertilizer, and ceramic tiles.

    manually inspect the container or request assistance from other agencies
    within their government. Concurrent with the calibration and testing
    phase, DOE national laboratory experts travel to the host country to
    provide specific in-country training to foreign customs officials in the
    proper use of the radiation portal monitors as well as portable radiation
    detection equipment.11

    Once DOE fully turns the equipment over to the host government, the
    project moves to the maintenance and sustainability phase. Typically, DOE
    plans to fund 3 years of sustainability activities at each port. These
    activities include providing refresher training for foreign customs
    officials; general maintenance of the radiation detection equipment; spare
    parts; and, as negotiated with the host country, periodic evaluation of
    alarm data and port procedures to ensure that the equipment is being
    operated properly. DOE wants the U.S. government to be informed of any
    incidents or seizures that occur as a result of using equipment provided
    by the Initiative. Additionally, other technical data may be exchanged to
    assist technical experts from both DOE and the host country in their
    ongoing analysis of the operational effectiveness of the systems. To date,
    data sharing provisions have been incorporated into the agreements signed
    by DOE and host country governments.

    DOE's Megaports Initiative Has Had Limited Success Initiating Work at High
    Priority Foreign Seaports and Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan to
    Guide Its Efforts

    DOE's Megaports Initiative has made limited progress in beginning to
    install radiation detection equipment at seaports identified as high
    priority by its Maritime Prioritization Model. According to DOE officials,
    the Initiative's limited success in initiating work at certain ports is
    largely due to difficulties negotiating agreements with foreign
    governments, in particular with countries that have ports ranked as high
    priority by DOE's model, such as China. Further, DOE has completed work at
    only two ports, both of which were ranked lower in priority than other
    ports by DOE's model. Given DOE's limited success in installing radiation
    detection equipment at most high priority ports, it is particularly
    noteworthy that the Initiative does not have a comprehensive long-term
    plan that describes how DOE plans to measure program success, overcome
    obstacles it faces, and achieve the goals of the Initiative.

    11Training provided through the Megaports Initiative is an ongoing process
    that begins once agreements are reached with the host country and
    continues through the maintenance and sustainability phase for each port.

    DOE Has Signed Agreements to Begin Work at Only 2 of the 20 Highest
    Priority Ports Identified by an Earlier Version of Its Prioritization
    Model

    DOE has had difficulty reaching agreement with some countries where
    high-priority ports are located, such as China, due to a variety of
    political factors often outside of DOE's control. DOE has completed work
    at two ports and signed agreements to initiate work at five others, two of
    which were ranked in the 20 highest priority ports by DOE's model.12
    According to DOE officials, some foreign governments have been hesitant to
    participate in the Megaports Initiative for two main reasons: possible
    interruptions to the flow of commerce at their ports and reluctance to
    hire the additional customs agents necessary to operate and maintain the
    radiation detection equipment DOE provides.

    First, some foreign governments have concerns that the flow of commerce at
    their ports could be disrupted by participating in the Initiative in both
    the short-and long-term. For the short-term, some foreign governments have
    expressed concern that the flow of commerce at their ports could be
    disrupted during the installation of radiation detection equipment. A
    related long-term concern is that, by agreeing to participate in the
    Initiative, the host country's customs officials will be screening large
    volumes of cargo containers, which could lead to delays or disruptions to
    the flow of commerce at the port. To address these concerns, DOE provides
    prospective Initiative participants with information on how the radiation
    detection equipment would be installed and operated in the country,
    including information on the design, construction, training, and
    implementation processes. To alleviate concerns about construction issues,
    such as the placement of radiation portal monitors, DOE analyzes the
    natural choke points that occur in a port and seeks to install equipment
    at these locations to avoid the interruption of commerce. According to a
    DOE official, to avoid delays in port operations during installation of

    12At a February 14, 2005, meeting to discuss an early draft of this
    report, DOE officials informed us that revisions had been made to DOE's
    Maritime Prioritization Model and port prioritization process, but they
    did not provide us with a revised prioritization list. We met with
    officials from DOE and Sandia National Laboratories on February 22, 2005,
    to discuss these changes. These officials informed us that the revised
    prioritization model and process, among other things, placed a greater
    emphasis on ports with a high volume of cargo containers that enter and
    exit the port by land, rather than cargo that is transferred from one ship
    to the port's dock and then onto another ship (known as transshipment). At
    this meeting, DOE provided us with a new prioritization list showing its
    35 highest priority ports listed alphabetically, rather than ranked from
    highest to lowest priority. The revisions to DOE's model and
    prioritization process resulted in a higher prioritization for some ports
    where DOE had completed or initiated work. A more detailed discussion
    about our work to better understand DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model
    and port prioritization process can be found in appendix I.

    equipment, construction work is often performed at night so that normal
    port operations are not impeded. To further demonstrate how the radiation
    detection equipment is installed and operated, DOE officials show
    prospective Initiative participants a video or arrange site visits to the
    port of Rotterdam, where DOE has completed equipment installations in a
    pilot project at one port terminal, so that they can witness port
    operations and have an example of how the equipment will be operated in
    their country.

    A second impediment to negotiating agreements with foreign governments is
    their reluctance to hire additional officials (generally customs agents)
    to operate and maintain the equipment DOE provides through the Initiative.
    Although some foreign governments have large numbers of personnel at their
    ports to regulate imports and exports, others lack the staff necessary to
    both perform other port functions and operate and monitor the radiation
    detection equipment DOE provides. For example, the Dutch government
    expressed this reservation before it agreed to participate in the
    Initiative, and Dutch officials told us that they will need to hire and
    train an additional 40-60 customs agents when radiation detection
    equipment is installed at all port terminals in Rotterdam. The need for
    additional workers, combined with limited financial resources, may prevent
    some countries from participating in the Megaports Initiative. However,
    DOE officials told us that they do not believe that this impediment would
    prevent a foreign government's participation in the Initiative.

    DOE officials told us that they are in the process of negotiating with the
    governments of 18 countries to gauge their interest in participating in
    the Initiative. According to DOE officials, the Initiative has primarily
    focused on engaging countries that have ports ranked in the top 50 by
    DOE's model, but it also pursues ports of special interest that may be
    ranked lower than

    50. DOE plans to begin work at Antwerp and to complete the installations
    in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Freeport, Bahamas, and Algeciras, Spain by the end
    of fiscal year 2005,13 but complications may prohibit DOE from meeting
    this goal. For example, a DOE official told us that program officials are
    currently in the process of determining the impact of the December 2004
    tsunami disaster on DOE's planned work at the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
    According to a DOE official, resources for project construction and
    materials may be affected. If so, DOE may not be able to complete
    installation of radiation detection equipment at this port in fiscal year
    2005.

    13See appendix III for profiles of each of the ports where DOE has
    completed installation of equipment or is currently initiating work.

    DOE Has Completed Installations at 2 Ports That Were Ranked Lower in
    Priority Than Other Foreign Seaports by DOE's Model

    DOE has completed work at only two ports: Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and
    Piraeus, Greece, both of which were ranked lower in priority than other
    foreign seaports by DOE's model. The port of Rotterdam, which is the
    largest in Europe and handles an estimated 40 percent of all European
    shipments bound for the United States, became part of the Initiative on
    August 13, 2003, when DOE signed an MOU with the Dutch government. DOE
    installed a limited number of vehicle radiation detection portal monitors
    at the largest of Rotterdam's four terminals, which ships an estimated 87
    percent of all of Rotterdam's cargo destined for the United States (see
    figure 2). Initially, DOE planned to install monitors at all four
    terminals at Rotterdam. However, as discussions with Dutch officials
    progressed, the Dutch government decided to limit its level of involvement
    in the Initiative by permitting DOE to install monitors at only one of
    Rotterdam's four terminals. Additionally, DOE trained 43 Dutch customs
    officials at its training center at PNNL and conducted additional onsite
    training for other Dutch customs officials. DOE also provided over 20
    pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment for use in conducting
    secondary inspections.

    Figure 2: Truck Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Rotterdam,
    the Netherlands

    Source: GAO.

    DOE officials told us that they consider the installation at Rotterdam a
    pilot project and believe it to be a success because, as a result of their
    experience with it, the Dutch government agreed to pay for the
    installation of radiation detection equipment throughout the rest of the
    port. Dutch government officials told us that they plan to complete the
    full installation of radiation detection equipment at all four Rotterdam
    terminals by 2006. Although this type of cost-sharing arrangement is not
    an established objective of the Initiative, DOE officials believe that
    they may pursue other such pilot projects when a host government requests
    limited assistance from DOE. DOE completed the pilot project and the
    radiation detection equipment was fully turned over to the Dutch
    government in April 2004. During fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to conduct
    additional training on secondary inspection methods at Rotterdam for
    between 20 and 30 Dutch customs officials and will continue to provide
    equipment support and maintenance. Beyond fiscal year 2005, DOE's
    involvement at the port will likely be limited to training and technical
    consultations on future equipment installations made by the Dutch
    government.

    While the port of Piraeus, Greece, is not one of the largest container
    ports in the world and was not ranked as a high priority by DOE's model,
    security concerns at the port increased prior to the 2004 Olympic Games in
    Greece. The heightened importance of Piraeus, which is about 6 miles from
    the center of Athens, led DOE to include the port in the Megaports
    Initiative as part of its efforts to secure Greece prior to the Olympic
    Games.14 Initially, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission requested
    assistance from IAEA in identifying ways to mitigate radiological and
    nuclear threats during the Olympics. IAEA then approached DOE to consider
    including the port of Piraeus in the Initiative. On October 30, 2003, DOE,
    the Greek Atomic Energy Commission, and the Greek Customs Service signed a
    tripartite agreement to include Piraeus in the Initiative. Because the
    design, construction, installation, training, and equipment testing needed
    to be complete before the Olympic Games, DOE executed the project on an
    accelerated schedule and, as a result, completed all equipment
    installations in July 2004. DOE installed a limited number of vehicle
    portal monitors at the cargo terminal in Piraeus (see figure 3), and some
    portal monitors (for both vehicles and pedestrians) at the passenger
    terminal of the port of Piraeus. Piraeus has one of Europe's largest ferry
    terminals, and the Greek government anticipated an increased volume of
    passenger traffic associated with the Olympic Games. DOE officials told us
    that providing radiation detection equipment to passenger terminals is
    normally outside the scope of the Megaports Initiative, but the potential
    security issues surrounding Greece's hosting of the Olympic Games led DOE
    to provide radiation detection equipment to the Piraeus passenger
    terminal. DOE also trained 10 Greek customs officials from Piraeus at its
    training center and provided additional in-country training to 50 Greek
    customs officials who work at the port. In fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to
    provide additional onsite training to Greek officials, determine whether
    any additional equipment installations are necessary, and evaluate any
    equipment problems that arise.

    14DOE also performed other related work in Greece prior to the Olympic
    Games. See app. IV for additional information on this work.

    Figure 3: Truck Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Piraeus,
    Greece

    DOE's Megaports Initiative does not have a comprehensive long-term plan to
    guide the Initiative as it moves forward, which is particularly important
    given DOE's recent proposal to expand the Initiative's scope to include
    additional foreign seaports. To set the direction for the Megaports
    Initiative, DOE currently uses three planning documents: the Megaports
    Initiative Fiscal Year 2005 Program Work Plan, the DOE Future Years
    Nuclear Security Program, and the Megaports Initiative Strategy Paper. The
    Fiscal Year 2005 Program Work Plan is an evolving planning document that
    incorporates day-to-day changes in program activities and documents the
    scope of work to be conducted in this fiscal year. This plan also includes
    a detailed activity-based budget for the current fiscal year to guide the
    work of national laboratories and contractors involved in the Initiative.
    The Future Years Nuclear Security Program includes a 5-year
    financial-based projection of the number of ports to be completed.
    Additionally, at a February 22, 2005, meeting to discuss an early draft of
    this report, DOE officials provided us with a copy of the Megaports
    Initiative Strategy Paper. This two and one half-page document provides a
    broad vision for the Initiative, and describes some factors that may
    affect program success, but

                                      Source: GAO.

    DOE's Megaports Initiative Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan to Guide
    Its Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Ports

    it contains few details about how DOE plans to achieve the goals of the
    Initiative.

    These three documents provide some elements that are needed in a longterm
    plan for the Initiative. Specifically, the DOE Future Years Nuclear
    Security Program establishes that the long-term goal for the program is to
    install radiation detection equipment at 20 ports by 2010 and provides
    cost estimates for the Initiative.15 In addition, the Megaports Initiative
    Strategy Paper describes DOE's approach for determining which ports to
    target for inclusion in the Initiative and states that the Initiative's
    mission is to diminish the probability of illicit trafficking of nuclear
    materials and other radioactive material in the global maritime system
    that could be used against the United States, its key allies, and
    international partners. However, DOE's goal of completing 20 ports may not
    be an adequate measure toward sufficiently addressing the overall threat
    of nuclear smuggling in the international maritime system. As previously
    stated, DOE uses its Maritime Prioritization Model to rank foreign ports
    on their relative attractiveness to nuclear smugglers and as a tool to
    help program officials decide which ports to pursue for inclusion in the
    Initiative. DOE has annual performance measures to install radiation
    detection equipment at a given number of ports to show progress towards
    its long-term goal of completing installations at 20 ports by 2010. While
    using the number of ports completed annually provides a broad measure of
    the Initiative's progress, this measure does not take into account whether
    the ports where equipment is being installed are of highest priority. That
    is, DOE has not tied its annual performance measures of completing a
    certain number of ports to the model it uses to determine which ports are
    of highest priority.

    In addition, DOE did not meet its fiscal year 2004 performance measure of
    completing three ports through the Megaports Initiative. DOE officials
    stated that the Initiative did not meet this measure because of their
    inability to sign agreements with foreign governments to install radiation
    detection equipment. DOE's lack of progress in gaining agreements with
    countries that contain high-priority ports has led it to initiate work at
    ports that were not ranked as highest priority by DOE's model. Developing
    a comprehensive long-term plan for the Megaports Initiative would require
    DOE to, among other things, develop criteria for deciding how many and

    15In its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal, DOE proposed expanding the
    scope of the Megaports Initiative to 24 ports. However, because this is a
    budget proposal and is subject to congressional approval, the official
    scope of the program currently remains at 20 ports.

    which lower priority ports to complete, or what other actions may be
    warranted, if it continues to have difficulties gaining agreements to
    install radiation detection equipment at the highest priority ports. DOE
    officials told us that they intend to develop such a plan for the
    Initiative in the near future.

    Through the End of Fiscal Year 2004, DOE Had Spent About $43 Million on
    Megaports Initiative Activities, but Total Program Costs Are Uncertain

    Since the inception of the Megaports Initiative in fiscal year 2003
    through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on
    Megaports Initiative activities. DOE spent these funds on such activities
    as the completion of a pilot project at Rotterdam, the Netherlands;
    equipment installations at Piraeus, Greece; the advanced purchase of
    equipment for use at future ports; program oversight; and the development
    and maintenance of DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model (see figure 4).

    Figure 4: Megaports Initiative Expenditures through the End of Fiscal Year
    2004 (dollars in millions)

    Advanced equipment procurement activities

    $1

    Establishing cooperative agreements

    $1.3

    Development and maintenance of prioritization models

    Other

    Equipment testing and evaluation

    Program oversight

    Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

                            Note: Figures have been rounded.

    As figure 4 shows, DOE spent $13.8 million, or 32 percent of program
    expenditures, to complete installations at Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and
    Piraeus, Greece. DOE also spent an additional $238,000 on activities
    related to future equipment installations in Freeport, Bahamas. DOE spent
    $28.8 million on program integration activities, which are costs not
    directly associated with installing equipment at a specific port. Of this
    amount, $13.7 million was spent on advanced equipment procurement
    activities, which include the purchase and storage of approximately 408
    portal monitors and associated spare parts for use at future
    installations. DOE also spent $6.6 million on program oversight
    activities, such as program cost and schedule estimating, technical
    assistance provided by participating national laboratories, contractor
    reviews of project work plans, travel coordination, and translation
    services. In addition, $1.9 million was spent on other program integration
    activities, such as the development of materials and curricula for
    training foreign customs agents on the use of radiation detection
    equipment.16

    DOE's current plan is to install radiation detection equipment at a total
    of 20 ports by 2010 at an estimated cost of $337 million, but several
    uncertainties may affect the Initiative's scope, cost, and time frames for
    completion. First, DOE uses $15 million as its estimate for what an
    average port should cost to complete, but this estimate may not be
    accurate. Second, DOE is currently assessing whether the Initiative's
    scope should increase beyond 20 ports. Regarding the first uncertainty,
    DOE officials told us that the primary basis for their $15 million per
    port cost estimate was DOE's prior experience deploying radiation
    detection equipment at Russian land border crossings, airports, and
    seaports. However, DOE acknowledged that the cost of doing business in
    Russia may not be an accurate basis for developing their per port cost
    estimate, and DOE has yet to reevaluate this estimate in light of work it
    has performed installing radiation detection equipment at ports.
    Furthermore, the costs of installing equipment at individual ports vary
    and are influenced by factors such as a port's size, its physical layout,
    existing infrastructure, and the level of the host country's cooperation
    with DOE. For example, the port of Antwerp, Belgium, which is the second
    largest port in Europe, will be a much larger, more expensive and complex
    project than DOE's two previously completed

    16Once an agreement or memorandum of understanding is reached with a
    foreign government to include a port in the Initiative, all past and
    present program integration expenditures that can be directly associated
    with that port are transferred to an expenditure category for that
    specific port.

    installations. According to DOE officials, because of the large physical
    size of the port, an estimated 60 radiation detection portal monitors will
    be required to complete the installation. The age of the port and the
    geographic location of some of the terminals will also create challenges
    in integrating information generated from the radiation detection monitors
    to the central alarm station where the alarm information will be processed
    and evaluated.

    Additionally, another factor that may affect DOE's installation costs at a
    particular port is that, as a result of negotiating agreements with
    foreign governments, DOE's level of involvement at specific ports may
    vary, affecting the amount of radiation detection equipment DOE installs
    and, thereby, its installation costs. For example, although the port of
    Rotterdam is the largest port in Europe, the Dutch government chose to
    limit the scope of DOE's involvement at the port to installing equipment
    at only one of the port's four terminals. This resulted in DOE's costs at
    Rotterdam being significantly reduced compared to what it would have cost
    to install equipment all four terminals. DOE officials stated that as
    future agreements are reached with foreign governments and more port
    installations are completed, additional data will be gathered, which could
    assist them in refining the average per port cost estimate. By the end of
    fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to have completed installations at a total of
    five ports and should have additional information with which to reevaluate
    the accuracy of its current per port cost estimate. DOE officials told us
    that they plan to reevaluate the cost estimate once these ports are
    completed. A reevaluation of this estimate would allow DOE to better
    project individual port costs, as well as the total future costs of the
    Initiative. However, if DOE does not reevaluate its average per port cost
    estimate it will be difficult to accurately determine the total future
    costs of the Initiative and future annual funding needs.

    DOE also is currently assessing whether the Initiative's scope should
    increase beyond 20 ports. DOE officials told us that DOE did not intend
    for the Initiative's initial goal to be static and they believe the scope
    of the Initiative will likely increase in the future. Additionally, these
    officials stated that if they determine that installing radiation
    detection equipment at a total of 20 ports does not sufficiently reduce
    the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive
    materials, they plan to expand the scope of the Initiative to include a
    greater number of ports. In its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal, DOE
    proposed expanding the scope of the Initiative to 24 ports, but this scope
    expansion is subject to congressional approval. If the

    scope of the Initiative increases, the total costs and time frames for
    completion will also increase.

    DOE Faces Several Operational and Technical Challenges in Preventing
    Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Seaports

    In its effort to install radiation detection equipment at foreign
    seaports, DOE faces several operational and technical challenges. First,
    the capability of radiation detection equipment to detect nuclear material
    depends on such factors as how fast containers pass through the radiation
    portal monitors and how near the containers are to the detection
    equipment. Additionally, some nuclear materials can be shielded with lead
    or other materials to prevent radiation from being detected. Compounding
    these challenges, DOE faces technical challenges related to ports'
    physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations in its effort to screen
    cargo containers for radioactive and nuclear materials. Further,
    environmental conditions specific to ports, such the existence of high
    winds and sea spray, can affect the radiation detection equipment's
    performance and long-term sustainability.

    Several Factors Can Affect the Capability of Radiation Detection Equipment
    to Detect Nuclear Material

    Three factors have an impact on the effectiveness of radiation detection
    equipment: time, distance, and shielding. The time factor refers to the
    amount of time that a radiation detector has to perform the process of
    detecting radiological material. For example, trucks carrying cargo
    containers are supposed to drive through a vehicle radiation detector at a
    uniform controlled speed. Variation from this program requirement can
    impact the radiation detection equipment's performance. The distance
    between the radiation detection equipment and the material being scanned
    also affects the effectiveness of the equipment. As a general rule, the
    closer the nuclear material is to the detector, the better the radiation
    detection equipment will perform.

    Nuclear materials are more difficult to detect if lead or other metal is
    used to shield them. For example, in July 2004, a container that housed a
    small amount of radioactive material17 passed through radiation detection
    equipment that DOE had installed at one of the ports it has completed
    without being detected due to the presence of the large amounts of scrap

    17This particular radioactive isotope is commonly used for medical
    practices as cancer treatment and commercially for the sterilization of
    food products. Sufficient amounts of this material could be used by
    terrorist to construct a "dirty bomb."

    metal in the same container. The host country's government later received
    information about the container, which led to the discovery of the
    radioactive source. The host country's government raised concerns that the
    radiation detection equipment did not register an alarm during a scan of
    the container and asked DOE to investigate the incident. DOE national
    laboratory experts determined that the radiation detection equipment had
    been set to program requirements. As a result, DOE national laboratory
    officials and the host country's government decided not to alter the
    settings of the radiation detection equipment.

    A technical challenge is to detect and identify low-level radiation
    sources in the presence of high background radiation levels. Detecting
    actual cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material is
    complicated because one of the materials of greatest concern in terms of
    proliferation- highly enriched uranium-is amongst the most difficult
    materials to detect due to its relatively low level of radioactivity.
    Uranium emits only gamma radiation so the radiation detection equipment,
    which contains gamma and neutron detectors, will only detect uranium from
    the gamma detector. Plutonium emits both gamma and neutron radiation.
    However, shielding of nuclear material does not prevent the detection of
    neutron radiation and, as a result, plutonium can be detected by neutron
    detectors regardless of the amount of shielding. According to DOE
    officials, a neutron alarm can be caused by only a few materials,18 while
    a gamma alarm can be caused by a variety of sources including commercial
    goods such as bananas, ceramic tiles and fertilizer and nuclear materials,
    such as plutonium and uranium.

    Once DOE finishes installing radiation detection equipment at a port and
    hands control of the equipment over to the host government, the United
    States no longer has control over the specific settings used by the
    equipment or how the equipment is used by foreign government customs
    officials. Settings can be changed to decrease the number of nuisance
    alarms, which may also decrease the probability that the equipment will
    detect nuclear material. Additionally, foreign customs officials may
    decide not to perform secondary inspections when alarms sound in order to
    increase the flow of traffic through a port. Therefore, the level of
    effective use of the equipment is unclear. According to DOE officials, the
    periodic

    18According to DOE, cosmic radiation can also activate a neutron alarm. At
    Rotterdam, DOE had difficulty identifying the cause of many nuisance
    neutron alarms from the radiation detection equipment. After testing, DOE
    and national laboratory officials determined that cosmic radiation was
    interfering with the calibration of the radiation detection equipment. DOE
    national laboratory officials installed a software program to solve this
    problem.

    maintenance DOE national laboratory official perform on the radiation
    detection equipment helps them to ensure that the equipment is set to the
    optimal calibrations and operated appropriately. If the equipment settings
    have been altered, the DOE officials can inquire about these discrepancies
    to the foreign government and work to resolve any problems.

    DOE Is Developing Methods to Overcome Technical Challenges Posed by Ports'
    Physical Layouts and Cargo Stacking Configurations

    When implementing its Megaports Initiative at foreign ports, DOE has the
    specific challenge of trying to screen all cargo passing through a port.
    Currently, DOE usually installs radiation detection equipment at locations
    within a port where natural choke points occur. These locations slow down
    the transport of containers, making them optimal locations for the
    installation of radiation detection equipment. At some ports, however, a
    high percentage of cargo containers do not leave the port but are gathered
    together in the shipyard and then shipped to another location. DOE is
    addressing this problem in two ways: (1) by placing radiation detection
    equipment within ports to be able to screen cargo that moves between port
    terminals and (2) working with Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos)
    to develop a mobile radiation detection system for screening of this type
    of cargo. At some ports, DOE plans to place radiation detection equipment
    at the exits of each port terminal so that inter-terminal transport of
    cargo can be monitored, despite the fact that the cargo does not leaving
    the port itself. Additionally, Los Alamos officials are working to fit
    radiation detection equipment onto a straddle carrier19 so that containers
    that are awaiting transshipment can be scanned for the presence of
    radiation. This carrier would be able to scan containers stacked three
    containers high within the shipyard before they are loaded onto the next
    ship. The straddle carrier would scan the stacked containers with its
    radiation detection equipment to determine if radiological materials are
    present and follow-up inspections would then occur if necessary. See
    figure 5 for a diagram of the proposed straddle carrier design modified to
    carry radiation detection equipment.

    19A straddle carrier is a piece of equipment used at ports to transport
    cargo containers from various port locations.

    Figure 5: Design of Modified Straddle Carrier Fitted with Radiation
    Detection Equipment

    Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

    According to Los Alamos officials, the modified straddle carrier will be
    more effective than a vehicle radiation detection portal monitor because
    the distance from the monitor to the container is greatly reduced, which
    increases the overall detection capabilities of the system. Los Alamos
    officials stated that they plan to test the design in a foreign seaport in
    summer 2005. If this testing is successful, DOE plans to implement this
    design in other ports that have similar cargo stacking arrangements and
    that utilize straddle carriers. However, this technology cannot remedy the
    entire problem DOE faces because many ports stack greater than three
    containers on top of each other in their shipyards and not all ports have
    straddle carriers because they move their containers with other types of

    equipment and stack them in different configurations. According to a DOE
    official, because the straddle carrier solution will not work at all
    ports, DOE will continue to seek additional solutions to this problem.

    Environmental Conditions Can Affect Radiation Detection Equipment's
    Performance and Sustainability

    Another technical challenge specific to ports is coping with environmental
    conditions, particularly high winds and sea spray, which can cause
    problems for radiation detection equipment. Wind disturbances can vibrate
    the equipment and interfere with its ability to detect radiation. For
    example, after the pilot project at Rotterdam was completed, the bases of
    the radiation detection portal monitors DOE installed had to be reinforced
    with steel plates to stabilize them because high winds were causing them
    to vibrate and reducing their capability to detect nuclear material. Sea
    spray may also affect radiation detection equipment by corroding the
    equipment and its components. The corrosive nature of sea spray combined
    with other conditions such as coral in the water can accelerate the
    degradation of equipment. If the equipment casing becomes corroded,
    moisture can get into the equipment and affect its performance and
    long-term sustainability. Corrosion and moisture can cause radiation
    detection alarms to go off when they should not and not when they should.
    DOE and national laboratory officials told us that they are analyzing the
    problem to identify methods to alleviate sea spray's adverse effects on
    the equipment. At one port where DOE plans to complete installations in
    fiscal year 2005, sea spray is a potentially large problem. In December
    2004, DOE convened a workshop of U.S. government officials and contractors
    to discuss possible solutions to the sea spray problem. At this workshop,
    several options for addressing the issue were discussed, such as
    installing special stainless steel casings, installing bolts and other
    hardware with protective coatings, and using nitrogen-filled housings to
    protect the video cameras. DOE officials are considering the
    recommendations from the workshop and how they should be implemented in
    this port and at other ports where DOE plans to install equipment.

    Conclusions	DOE uses a threat-and volume-based analysis to determine which
    foreign seaports are of highest priority, and we believe that this is a
    sound basis for targeting the expenditure of U.S. funds. While DOE has
    completed work at two ports, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Piraeus,
    Greece, both were ranked lower in priority than other foreign seaports by
    DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model. In addition, DOE has been unable to
    reach agreement with many key countries that have ports ranked as high
    priority by its

    model. If DOE continues to have difficulty gaining agreements to install
    radiation detection equipment at its highest priority ports, then this
    could raise questions about the Initiative's effectiveness and about how
    many lower priority ports to include. Currently, however, the Initiative's
    longterm goal is to install radiation detection equipment at 20 foreign
    seaports regardless of their priority. This goal is inconsistent with
    DOE's approach for selecting high-priority ports and does not provide a
    reasonable measure of long-term program success. Considering its limited
    progress at the highest priority ports, a well thought out plan can be an
    important guide for DOE's efforts in the further implementation of its
    Megaports Initiative. However, to date, DOE has not developed such a plan
    for the Initiative. Without a comprehensive long-term plan for the
    Initiative, Congress may not be able to judge whether DOE is making
    progress towards achieving the Initiative's long-term goals or how best to
    assist DOE in working toward its goals. DOE officials told us that they
    will be developing a plan for the Initiative in the near future, and we
    agree that such a plan is needed.

    While the cost of installing radiation detection equipment at a port is
    dependent on a number of variables, such as the port's size, physical
    layout, and existing infrastructure, the costs of installing equipment at
    the two ports DOE has completed to date were significantly less than the
    $15 million per port cost estimate that DOE used to develop its long-term
    cost projection for the Initiative. DOE's $15 million estimate for the
    average cost of installing equipment at a port was based on the
    department's prior experience installing radiation detection equipment at
    Russian land borders, airports, and seaports. DOE officials acknowledged
    that the cost of doing business in Russia may not be an accurate basis on
    which to estimate the costs of installing such equipment at other foreign
    ports. Because DOE has not yet reevaluated its per port cost estimate to
    reflect its recent experience installing radiation detection equipment at
    ports, the accuracy of DOE's long-term cost projection for the Initiative
    is questionable. By the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to have
    completed installations at a total of 5 ports, and will have additional
    information about the costs of these installations that could assist it in
    refining its per port cost estimate and long-term cost projection for the
    Initiative.

    Recommendations for 	We recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working
    with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,
    take the

    Executive Action following two actions:

    o 	Develop a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the future efforts of
    the Initiative that includes, at a minimum, (1) performance measures that
    are consistent with DOE's desire to install radiation detection equipment
    at the highest priority foreign seaports, (2) strategies DOE will employ
    to determine how many and which lower priority ports it will include in
    the Initiative if it continues to have difficulty installing equipment at
    the highest priority ports as identified by its model, (3) projections of
    the anticipated funds required to meet the Initiative's objectives, and
    (4) specific time frames for effectively spending program funds.

    o 	Evaluate the accuracy of the current per port cost estimate of $15
    million, make any necessary adjustments to the Initiative's long-term cost
    projection, and inform Congress of any changes to the long-term cost
    projection for the Initiative.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    We provided the Department of Energy with a draft of this report for its
    review and comment. DOE's written comments are presented as appendix

    V. DOE generally agreed with our recommendations. In its written comments,
    DOE also provided further clarification on the evolution of its Maritime
    Prioritization Model. Specifically, DOE noted that in the early stages of
    the Megaports Initiative, it focused on the 20 highest-volume-to-U.S.
    seaports, which was consistent with the approach taken by the Department
    of Homeland Security's Container Security Initiative. However, when DOE
    initially briefed us on its model in July 2004, DOE had changed its
    prioritization approach and was focusing almost entirely on a threatbased
    model. As DOE notes in its comments, it did not present us with
    information on modifications to its model until February 22, 2005, which
    was after DOE received an early draft of this report for a factual review.
    DOE's new port prioritization approach represents a combination of ports
    that ship large volumes of containers to the United States and ports that
    lie in regions of interest. DOE also provided technical comments, which we
    incorporated as appropriate.

    As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
    the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary
    of Energy; the Administrator, the National Nuclear Security
    Administration; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director, Office
    of Management and Budget; and

    interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to
    others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no
    charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can be
    reached at 202-512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Key contributors to this
    report include R. Stockton Butler, Julie Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers,
    Chris Ferencik, and F. James Shafer, Jr.

    Gene Aloise Director, Natural Resources and Environment

    List of Congressional Requesters

    The Honorable Susan M. Collins
    Chairman
    Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Norm Coleman
    Chairman
    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
    Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Carl Levin
    Ranking Minority Member
    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
    Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    United States Senate

    The Honorable John D. Dingell
    Ranking Minority Member
    Energy and Commerce Committee
    House of Representatives

    Appendix I

    Scope and Methodology

    We performed our review of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Megaports
    Initiative at DOE's offices in Washington, D.C.; the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) in Washington, D.C.; the Department of State in
    Washington, D.C.; Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) in Los
    Alamos, New Mexico; Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) in Albuquerque,
    New Mexico; and the National Nuclear Security Administration's Service
    Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Additionally, we visited completed
    Megaports Initiative installations in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and
    Piraeus, Greece.

    To assess the progress DOE has made in implementing its Megaports
    Initiative, we reviewed documents and had discussions with officials from
    DOE; DHS; Los Alamos; Sandia; DOE's private sector contractors-SI
    International and Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler; and a number of
    nongovernmental entities, including nonproliferation and port security
    experts. In addition, in October 2004, we visited the Netherlands and
    Greece to interview Dutch and Greek officials and to see the completed
    Megaports Initiative installations at the ports of Rotterdam and Piraeus,
    respectively. While in Rotterdam, we spoke with officials from the Dutch
    Ministry of Finance, the Dutch Customs authority, the U.S. Embassy in The
    Hague, and a U.S. official from Container Security Initiative for the port
    of Rotterdam. We toured the Megaports Initiative installations in
    Rotterdam and observed the radiation detection equipment DOE installed.
    When we visited Piraeus, we interviewed officials from the Greek Atomic
    Energy Commission; the Port Authority of Piraeus; the Greek Ministry of
    Economy and Finance, Customs Directorate General (Greek Customs Service);
    DOE's contractors-Los Alamos, SI International, and Tetra Tech/Foster
    Wheeler; and officials from the Container Security Initiative in Piraeus.
    We toured the Megaports Initiative installations at both the passenger and
    cargo terminals at the port of Piraeus and observed the radiation
    detection equipment DOE had installed. Additionally, while we were in
    Greece, we toured (1) two border crossings where DOE had installed
    radiation detection equipment through its Second Line of Defense-Core
    program (SLD-Core), (2) the SLD-Core installations at the passenger
    arrival area of Athens International Airport, and (3) a small research
    reactor in Athens that received physical security upgrades from DOE prior
    to the 2004 Olympic Games.

    To better understand DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model and port
    prioritization process, we met with officials from DOE and Sandia National
    Laboratories in August 2004 to discuss the components of the model, the
    types of data the model uses to rank foreign seaports, as well as the port

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    prioritization list DOE provided us in July 2004. DOE and Sandia officials
    told us that the model was threat-based and that the overall volume of
    containers shipped from a given port to the United States accounted for
    only 20 percent of the port's overall prioritization score. In addition,
    we reviewed a briefing packet on the model developed by Sandia as well as
    the report of the Maritime Prioritization Model Peer Review1 that was
    conducted in August 2004 by members of academia, the intelligence
    community, and industry experts. We also visited Sandia National
    Laboratories in November 2004 and discussed the model and the results of
    the peer review report with a Sandia official in charge of the development
    and maintenance of the model. While we did not conduct an assessment of
    the model, it is worth noting that we were informed by the DOE project
    manager for the Megaports Initiative on January 24, 2005, that the port
    prioritization list we were using was still the current operational model
    that DOE was using for the Initiative. However, when we met with DOE
    officials 2 weeks later on February 14, 2005, to discuss their comments on
    a review of an early draft of this report they informed us that, because
    they had made recent changes to the model, the prioritization list we had
    been using was now outdated and no longer accurate. At a February 22,
    2005, meeting, DOE and Sandia officials informed us that the revised model
    and port prioritization process, among other things, (1) reduced the
    emphasis on the threat of nuclear smuggling at individual ports and placed
    a greater emphasis on ports with a high volume of cargo containers that
    enter and exit the port by land, rather than cargo that is transshipped
    and (2) deemphasized the risk from spent (used) nuclear fuel in a target
    country. DOE also provided us with a new prioritization list that showed
    its 35 highest priority ports listed alphabetically, rather than ranked
    from highest to lowest priority.

    We also spoke with DOE officials about strategic planning and reviewed DOE
    documentation, such as the Megaports Program Work Plan for Fiscal Year
    2005 and DOE's Future Years Nuclear Security Program. We reviewed the
    Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the President's Management
    Agenda from fiscal year 2002, and several of our previous reports on
    strategic planning and related topics.

    To assess the current and expected costs of the Initiative, we reviewed
    DOE documents detailing program expenditures, projected costs, and

    1The Maritime Prioritization Model Peer Review took place from August
    17-18, 2004 at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point, NY.

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    schedule estimates. We reviewed contract data for expenditures through the
    end of fiscal year 2004 and met numerous times with DOE agency officials
    to discuss the data. We obtained responses from key database officials to
    a number of questions focused on data reliability covering issues such as
    data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and
    completeness of the data. Follow-up questions were added whenever
    necessary. We also reviewed DOE's 2004 Performance and Accountability
    Report. A caveat worth noting is that although DOE gathers and maintains
    expenditure data reported by contractors assisting in implementing the
    Megaports Initiative, rather than conducting routine follow-up checks to
    corroborate the data reported by the contractors, DOE officials noted that
    periodic follow-up checks will be conducted, if necessary. In addition,
    during the course of our review we found that for fiscal year 2004,
    approximately $5.45 million in program expenditures had been
    inappropriately costed to the Megaports Initiative, which should have been
    costed to the SLD-Core program. As a result, total expenditures for the
    Megaports Initiative are $5.45 million less than what is reflected in
    DOE's fiscal year 2004 financial reports. DOE officials told us that this
    mistake will be corrected and reflected in DOE's fiscal year 2005
    financial reports. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable
    for the purposes of this report based on work we performed.

    To identify challenges DOE faces in installing radiation detection
    equipment at foreign ports, we examined documents and spoke with officials
    from DOE, Los Alamos, Sandia, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and
    nongovernmental entities, including nonproliferation and port security
    experts. We also attended a National Academies of Science conference on
    non-intrusive technologies for improving the security of containerized
    maritime cargo. Additionally, we attended the National Cargo Security
    Council conference on Radiation Detection and Screening.

    We conducted our review between June 2004 and March 2005 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II

                        National Laboratory and Contractor Roles

    DOE National Laboratories

    Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia)

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos)

    In addition to developing and maintaining the Maritime Prioritization
    Model, Sandia also conducts research related to international threat
    information, which is used to maintain the Megaports Design Basis Threat
    document. This document contains information on both known maritime
    smuggling activities and plans by terrorist organizations seeking to
    acquire nuclear and other commodities that have parallels to nuclear
    smuggling patterns. Related to this, Sandia maintains a seaport
    information database and develops port specific background papers to
    assist DOE in evaluating ports for engagement. Furthermore, Sandia
    officials conduct port familiarization visits and technical site visits in
    order to gain a general understanding of port operations as well as to
    determine specific information on the physical layout of the port,
    security, port traffic, shipping volume, the host country's commitment
    level to implementing the Initiative, training needs, and other relevant
    information. This information is used to develop vulnerability
    assessments, which help DOE determine the most cost-effective locations at
    a seaport in which to install the equipment.

    PNNL provides specific in-country training to foreign customs officials,
    as well as training at DOE's Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency
    Response facility. Training includes hands-on instruction in the use of
    the radiation detection equipment and systems provided under the
    Initiative and covers operation, maintenance, and appropriate response
    protocols. To do this training, PNNL purchases presentation equipment and
    handheld radiation detection equipment and develops and maintains training
    props and related documentation. Training is tailored to each port and
    developed and delivered by technical experts in the form of presentations,
    manuals, hands-on practical exercises, field training, videos, and
    interactive games. In addition, PNNL provides the Initiative with a
    certified project manager at each port who assists the federal project
    manager in overseeing the implementation of the Initiative at a given port
    and is the primary point of contact responsible for integrating all the
    work conducted by the participating national laboratories and contractors.

    Los Alamos provides expertise in radiation detection technologies and is
    the lead national laboratory for testing and evaluating the performance of
    radiation detection equipment. Los Alamos tests the deployed radiation
    detection equipment and supports Sandia in performing site surveys and
    preparing design requirements documents. In addition, Los Alamos

                  Appendix II National Laboratory and Contractor Roles

    technical experts analyze portal detection performance data to ensure the
    deployed equipment is meeting current detection requirements. Los Alamos
    has also conducted equipment testing in order to overcome challenges
    associated with scanning transshipped cargo.

    Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge provides technical assistance at
    DOE headquarters on the

    (Oak Ridge)	communications infrastructure associated with the installation
    of radiation detection equipment at foreign ports and assists with the
    testing and evaluation of radiation detection equipment. Oak Ridge
    officials told us that a trainer from Oak Ridge will be provided to assist
    in each of the classes conducted for foreign customs officials at PNNL's
    Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response training facility
    during fiscal year 2005.

    Private Contractors

    TSA Systems	TSA Systems is a private contractor that manufactures the
    radiation portal monitors that DOE installs at foreign ports and also
    provides technical support to DOE on the equipment. According to TSA
    officials, each site is visited yearly to check the monitors for damage
    and to perform routine maintenance. In addition, TSA has modified
    radiation portal monitors to address challenges specific to particular
    ports. For example, TSA installed stabilization plates on portal monitors
    at Rotterdam to deal with high winds at the port.

    Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler	Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler is an engineering and
    construction company who was the primary contractor in charge installing
    equipment at Rotterdam and Piraeus. Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler also led the
    construction of the associated infrastructure to support the radiation
    detection equipment at these ports.

    Ahtna Government Services Ahtna will be the primary contractor for the
    design and construction of

    Corporation (Ahtna)	future Megaports Initiative installations. Ahtna was
    not involved in the installation of equipment in Rotterdam or Piraeus.
    Ahtna has entered into a subcontract with the former design build
    contractor, Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler, to support design and construction
    activities at future installations.

                  Appendix II National Laboratory and Contractor Roles

    Technology Ventures Technology Ventures Incorporated provides logistical
    support to DOE's

    Incorporated	Megaports Initiative by storing and shipping radiation portal
    monitors that DOE procures in advance for installation at future ports.

    SI International	SI International provides DOE with technical support
    related to the development and installation of the communications
    infrastructure associated with radiation detection equipment installed
    under the Initiative. SI International staff provide onsite training to
    foreign customs officials in operating and maintaining the communications
    systems.

    Miratek	Miratek helps DOE manage and maintain budget and expenditure data
    for the Megaports Initiative.

    Appendix III

    Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed or Initiated Work

    Rotterdam, the Netherlands	The Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands
    signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Department of Energy
    (DOE) on August 13, 2003, to include the port of Rotterdam in the
    Megaports Initiative. The Netherlands was the first European Union country
    to join the Initiative. Rotterdam is Europe's largest port. The volume of
    containers passing through Rotterdam is roughly 7 million twenty-foot
    equivalent units (TEU) annually, about 6 percent of which is shipped to
    the United States.1 Approximately 20 percent of cargo passing through
    Rotterdam is transshipped, meaning it does not pass through any natural
    choke points, such as vehicle or rail entry and exit gates. Containers at
    the port are handled primarily in four container terminals. In addition,
    the Department of Homeland Security began conducting Container Security
    Initiative (CSI) activities at Rotterdam in June 2002.

    Piraeus, Greece 	The Directorate General of Customs and Excise of the
    Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Hellenic Republic, the Greek Atomic
    Energy Commission, and DOE signed a tripartite agreement on October 30,
    2003 to include the port of Piraeus in the Megaports Initiative. The port
    is located in the southwestern Aegean Sea on the innermost point of the
    Saronikas Gulf. The port received increased attention because of security
    concerns associated with the 2004 Olympic Games. Piraeus was also
    considered a significant port for inclusion in the Initiative because it
    not only serves as a major seaport for Greece, but also is the third
    largest passenger port in the world. The volume of containers passing
    through Piraeus is about 1.6 million TEUs annually. In addition, roughly
    11,000 TEUs were shipped from Piraeus directly to the United States during
    2003. Greece was the second European Union country to join the Initiative
    and become fully operational. CSI also began operations at Piraeus in June
    2004.

    Colombo, Sri Lanka	The Ministry of Ports and Aviation of the Democratic
    Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and DOE signed an MOU on July 20, 2004 to
    include the port of Colombo in the Megaports Initiative. The port is
    located on the southwest coast of the country. The port of Colombo has a
    high level of container traffic-over 1.9 million TEUs annually. The port
    uses cranes to move containers within and out of the terminals. DOE
    anticipates using vehicle

    1Twenty-foot equivalent units are a standard unit of measurement for cargo
    capacity. One TEU equals a standard container measuring approximately 20
    ft long and 8 ft wide.

                                      Appendix III
                       Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed
                                   or Initiated Work

    monitors to screen all containers imported to Sri Lanka, all export
    containers originating in Sri Lanka, and all inter-terminal transshipment
    containers as they exit the terminals. CSI became operational at Colombo
    in June 2003.

    Antwerp, Belgium	The Federal Public Service of Finance of the Kingdom of
    Belgium signed an MOU with DOE on November 24, 2004 to include the port of
    Antwerp in the Megaports Initiative. Antwerp is the 4th largest seaport in
    the world and the largest port in Belgium. Container traffic through the
    port is over 5 million TEUs annually, while traffic to the United States
    accounts for nearly 5 percent of the total annual container traffic
    through Antwerp. In 2003, Antwerp ranked 9th in the world for total volume
    of container traffic shipped to the United States. Additionally, there are
    direct cargo routes from Antwerp to many major U.S. seaports. The port is
    geographically split into a right and a left bank. While the right bank is
    fully operational, the left bank has two operational terminals with
    another two large terminals currently under construction. When the
    terminals are completed, the volume of cargo passing through the port will
    double. In addition, CSI began operations at Antwerp in June 2002.

    Algeciras, Spain	The Central Agency for Tax Administration of the Kingdom
    of Spain signed an MOU with DOE on December 21, 2004 to include the port
    of Algeciras in the Megaports Initiative. The port is located on the
    southernmost tip of Spain adjacent to Gibraltar. It is the 25th largest
    container port in the world with container traffic through the port being
    over 2.5 million TEUs annually. The port is strategically important in its
    location because, in addition to being a through route from the Atlantic
    Ocean to the Mediterranean, and on to the Far East, the port lies on the
    crossroads of the busiest sea-lanes that use the Suez Canal. Spain's
    cooperation with DOE currently includes only the port of Algeciras, the
    Spanish port DOE was most interested in. However, the Spanish government
    wants DOE to consider installing equipment at the ports of Valencia and
    Barcelona as well. Currently, DOE is considering this request, including
    the possibility of using a cost-sharing arrangement similar to the one
    used in Rotterdam. In addition, CSI became operational at the port in
    January 2003.

    Freeport, Bahamas 	The Ministry of Finance of the Commonwealth of the
    Bahamas and DOE signed an MOU on December 30, 2004 to include the port of
    Freeport in the

    Appendix III
    Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed
    or Initiated Work

    Megaports Initiative. Freeport has a high level of container traffic
    moving through the port. In particular, container traffic to the United
    States accounts for over 16 percent of the total annual container traffic
    through the port. Additionally, container traffic being shipped from
    Freeport accounts for a total of approximately 1.2 percent of all
    container traffic to the United States. In addition, CSI is not scheduled
    to be operational at Freeport.

    Appendix IV

                       Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
                         Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

    In addition to the work done by the Megaports Initiative at the port of
    Piraeus, Greece, DOE conducted three other efforts to increase security in
    Greece prior to the 2004 Summer Olympics. First, the Second Line of
    Defense-Core program installed radiation detection equipment at three land
    border crossings and at the Athens International Airport to assist Greek
    authorities in preventing nuclear smuggling. Second, the International
    Radiological Threat Reduction program helped secure 21 sites around Greece
    that contain radiological sources that could be used to make a
    radiological dispersion device (also known as a "dirty bomb"). Finally,
    the International Nuclear Materials Security program upgraded the physical
    security around Greece's only nuclear reactor-a small research reactor
    used for research and training-located in Athens.

    Second Line of Defense-The Second Line of Defense-Core program (SLD-Core)
    installed radiation

    Core Program	portal monitors in four locations throughout Greece: three
    land border crossing and a large airport. According to DOE officials, the
    total cost of these projects was about $15 million. The projects began in
    October 2003 and were completed in July 2004. DOE and national laboratory
    officials also provided technical assistance and training to Greek customs
    officials during the period of the Olympic Games. Figure 6 shows an
    example of the radiation portal monitors DOE supplied through the SLD-Core
    program.

    Appendix IV
    Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
    Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

    Figure 6: Radiation Portal Monitors at a Northern Greek Border Crossing

    Source: GAO.

    In addition to the training provided through the Megaports Initiative to
    Greek customs officials working at the port of Piraeus, DOE provided
    detailed training to 20 Greek customs officials who work at land border
    crossings at the Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response
    center at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Additionally, about 400
    Greek customs agents were trained at various sites around Greece. In
    fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to conduct sustainability work and additional
    training at these sites.

    Finally, DOE supplied over 450 pieces of handheld radiation detection
    equipment some of which were intended for use at Olympic venues. This
    equipment included handheld gamma radiation detectors, radioactive isotope
    identification devices, and radiation detection pagers (see figures 7 and
    8). According to an agreement between the Greek Atomic Energy Commission
    and DOE, after the Olympic Games, these handheld devices

    Appendix IV
    Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
    Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

    were to be distributed to border locations throughout Greece that did not
    receive other DOE assistance.

    Figure 7: A Handheld Gamma Radiation Detector and a Radioactive Isotope
    Identification Device

    Source: GAO.

                                      Appendix IV
                       Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
                         Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

                          Figure 8: Radiation Detection Pager

    Through its International Radiological Threat Reduction program, DOE spent
    $780,000 to increase security at 21 sites throughout Greece that contained
    radiological sources of a type and size that could be used for a dirty
    bomb and to provide additional handheld radiation detection equipment for
    first responders in Greece. DOE secured sites that included facilities
    with blood irradiator units containing cesium chloride sources, a large
    industrial sterilization facility, and oncology clinics that had medical
    isotopes used in cancer therapy. Figure 9 shows a teletherapy unit
    containing a radiological source, which is used to treat cancer.

                                      Source: GAO.

                  International Radiological Threat Reduction Program

                                      Appendix IV
                       Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
                         Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

    Figure 9: Teletherapy Unit Containing Radioactive Source, Prior to
    Receiving Physical Security Upgrades

                                      Source: DOE.

    Additionally, DOE provided handheld radiation detection equipment to
    Greece through the Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer project.
    Through this project, DOE donated 110 handheld radiological detection
    devices that DOE national laboratories had previously deemed surplus. DOE
    officials said that Greece was not high on the list of target countries
    for assistance through the International Radiological Threat Reduction
    program, but because of the increased security needs for the Olympic
    Games, DOE expedited assistance to Greece. DOE began this project in
    October 2003 and completed the upgrades in May 2004.

    International Nuclear DOE spent about $1 million to upgrade the physical
    security of Greece's

    Materials Security Program	only nuclear reactor-a small, 5-megawatt
    research reactor located in Athens known as the Greek Research Reactor-1.
    DOE and the Greek

    Appendix IV
    Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in
    Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games

    Atomic Energy Commission believed that it was important to upgrade the
    physical security of this reactor primarily because the reactor is fueled
    with a mix of highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium. This site
    is the only location in Greece with weapons-usable nuclear material. The
    Greek Atomic Energy Commission is in the process of converting the reactor
    to use only low enriched uranium fuel.1

    To upgrade the physical security of the reactor, DOE installed a new
    perimeter detection system that included closed-circuit television,
    hardened windows and doors on the reactor building, a new central alarm
    station, and enhanced lighting of the building's perimeter. As an
    additional security measure, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission shut down
    the research reactor during the period of the Olympics Games.

    1We recently reported on research reactors, see GAO, Nuclear
    Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return
    of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and
    Russia, GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004) and Nuclear
    Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of
    Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807
    (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004).

                                       Appendix V

                         Comments from the Department of Energy

    Appendix V
    Comments from the Department of Energy

    Appendix V
    Comments from the Department of Energy

    Appendix V
    Comments from the Department of Energy

    Related GAO Products

    Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
    Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.

    Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the
    Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States
    and Russia. GAO-05-57. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.

    Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the
    Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors. GAO04-807.
    Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004.

    Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
    Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
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    Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security
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    Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater
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    Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Material, New
    Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 18,
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    Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
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    Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
    Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO02-426.
    Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

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