Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems (15-MAR-05,
GAO-05-365).
Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection
systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening
equipment: explosives detection systems (EDS), which use
computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics
of explosives, and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems,
which use chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive
material vapors or residues. This report assesses (1) TSA's use
of budgeted funds to install EDS and ETD systems and the impact
of initially deploying these systems, (2) TSA and airport actions
to install EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems,
and the federal resources made available for this purpose, and
(3) actions taken by TSA to optimally deploy checked baggage
screening systems.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-365
ACCNO: A19377
TITLE: Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems
DATE: 03/15/2005
SUBJECT: Airport security
Airports
Baggage (personal effects)
Cost analysis
Counterterrorism
Explosives
Financial analysis
National preparedness
Search and seizure
Strategic planning
Terrorism
Homeland security
FAA Airport Improvement Program
TSA Federal Aviation Security Capital
Fund
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GAO-05-365
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee
on Appropriations, House of Representatives
March 2005
AVIATION SECURITY
Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage
Screening Systems
GAO-05-365
[IMG]
March 2005
AVIATION SECURITY
Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage
Screening Systems
What GAO Found
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the
nation's more than 400 airports to provide the capability to screen all
checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by
Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD equipment, TSA
placed stand-alone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS machines-mainly in
airport lobbies-that were not integrated in-line with airport baggage
conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the agency's ability to
initially install in-line systems was limited because of the high costs
and the time required for airport modifications. These interim lobby
solutions resulted in operational inefficiencies, including requiring a
greater number of screeners, as compared with using EDS machines in-line
with baggage conveyor systems.
TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line baggage
screening systems to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce
screening costs, and enhance security. Eighty-six of the 130 airports we
surveyed either have, are planning to have, or are considering installing
full or partial in-line systems. However, resources have not been made
available to fund these capital-intensive systems on a large-scale basis.
Also, the overall costs of installing in-line baggage screening systems at
each airport are unknown, the availability of future federal funding is
uncertain, and perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the
federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these
systems.
Moreover, TSA has not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to
determine at which airports it could achieve long-term savings and enhance
efficiencies and security by installing in-line systems or, where in-line
systems may not be economically justified, by making greater use of
standalone EDS systems rather than relying on the labor-intensive and less
efficient ETD screening process. However, at nine airports where TSA has
agreed to help fund the installation of in-line baggage screening systems,
TSA conducted a retrospective cost-benefit analysis which showed that
these in-line systems could yield significant savings for the federal
government. TSA further estimated that it could recover its initial
investment in the in-line systems at these airports in a little over 1
year.
EDS and ETD Machines Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
TSA Equipped More than 400 Airports to Screen Checked Baggage
for Explosives, but the Initial Deployment Led to Operational
Inefficiencies, and Additional Security Risks
Airports and the Federal Government Are Taking Actions to Install
In-line Baggage Screening Systems, but Resources Have Not
Been Made Available to Fund These Systems on a Large-Scale
Basis
TSA Has Not Systematically Planned for the Optimal Deployment
of Checked Baggage Screening Equipment to Ensure the
Efficient and Cost-Effective Screening for Explosives while
Enhancing Security Benefits
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
1
3 6
13
26
37 45 46 47
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Appendix II Summary of Checked Baggage Screening Legislation
Appendix III Airports Receiving TSA Airport Modification and EDS/ETD
Equipment Installation Funding for In-line Systems
Appendix IV Analysis of TSA's Cost Savings Estimates for In-line
EDS Checked Baggage Screening Systems 61
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland
Security 66
Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 69
GAO Contacts 69 Staff Acknowledgments 69
Glossary
Tables
Table 1: Airport Modification, Procurement, and Installation Funding for
EDS/ETD Equipment for Fiscal Years 20022004
Table 2: Fiscal Year 2002-2004 Airport Modification and EDS/ETD
Installation Obligations as of September 30, 2004
Table 3: Fiscal Year 2002-2004 EDS/ETD Procurement Obligations
as of September 30, 2004 Table 4: EDS and ETD Machines Deployed at U.S.
Airports as of June 2004
Table 5: Average Percentage of Checked Baggage Reported as Screened Using
EDS, ETD, or Other Approved Method at 263 Airports on or around February
29, 2004
Table 6: Bags Per Hour Screened by Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines
and ETD Machines
Table 7: Source of Federal Funding Used for Airport Modification Planning
and Construction of In-line EDS Systems as of July 2004
Table 8: Airports Awarded LOIs
Table 9: Highlights of Authorizations in Laws Related to Checked Baggage
Screening in Aviation Transportation Security since the Terrorist Attacks
of September 11, 2001
Table 10: Highlights of Appropriations in Laws Related to Checked Baggage
Screening in Aviation Transportation Security since the Terrorist Attacks
of September 11, 2001
Table 11: Listing of Airports Receiving Modification and EDS/ETD Equipment
Installation Funding for Developing In-line EDS Baggage Screening Systems
as of September 30, 2004
15
17
19
20
22
23
31 32
55
57
59
Figures
Figure 1: EDS Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage 8 Figure 2:
ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage 8
Figure 3: In-line Checked Baggage Screening System 11 Figure 4: Crowded
Airport Lobby with Stand-alone EDS Screening 26 Figure 5: Status of
In-line EDS Systems for Category X, I, and II
Airports Included in Survey of Federal Security Directors
as of July 2004 28 Figure 6: TSA Criteria for Prioritizing Letters of
Intent 38 Figure 7: Airport Modification Costs Per In-line EDS Machine at
Nine Airports 63 Figure 8: Cost Savings from In-line EDS Systems Compared
to Stand-alone EDS at Nine Airports 64 Figure 9: Costs and Savings at Nine
Airports 65
Abbreviations
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act
DHS Department of Homeland Security
EDS explosives detection system
ETD explosives trace detection
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
LOI letter of intent
OMB Office of Management and Budget
TSA Transportation Security Administration
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
March 15, 2005
The Honorable Harold Rogers
Chairman
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As demonstrated by the 1988 bombing of a U.S. airliner over Lockerbie,
Scotland, U.S. commercial aircraft have long been a target for terrorist
attacks through the use of explosives carried in checked baggage. In 1996,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established a long-term goal of
screening all checked baggage for explosives to prevent such attacks and a
timetable for deploying explosive detection systems at all airports by
2014.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, increased the
federal government's focus on screening checked baggage for explosives
at U.S. airports. On November 19, 2001, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA)1 was signed into law, creating the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and mandating, among other things, the
screening of all checked baggage using explosive detection systems by
December 31, 2002. To satisfy this mandate, TSA deployed two types of
screening equipment to all airports in the United States where screening
is
required: (1) explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer
aided tomography X-rays adapted from the medical field to automatically
recognize the characteristic signatures of threat explosives and
(2) explosives trace detection (ETD), which uses chemical analysis to
detect traces of explosive materials' vapors and residue.
As we reported in February 2004, largely because of shortages of
equipment and insufficient time to modify airports to accommodate EDS
machines, TSA was unable, at certain airports, to meet the 2002
congressionally established deadline to screen all checked baggage for
explosives using EDS and ETD machines.2 Recognizing the obstacles
1Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (2001).
2GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.:
February 12, 2004).
encountered by TSA, Congress passed, and the President signed into law,
the Homeland Security Act of 2002,3 which, in effect, extended the
deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives until December
31, 2003, for airports at which TSA was unable to meet the earlier
deadline established by ATSA. We also reported that TSA fell short of
fully satisfying the extended 2003 mandate and continued to face
challenges in deploying and leveraging screening equipment and
technologies. To further assess TSA's efforts to deploy equipment and
screen checked baggage for explosives using EDS and ETD, we addressed the
following questions: (1) How did TSA use the funds it initially budgeted
to procure and install EDS and ETD systems and make associated airport
modifications, and what was the impact of the initial deployment of EDS
and ETD systems? (2) What actions are airports and TSA currently taking to
install automated in-line EDS baggage screening systems,4 and what are the
federal resources that have been made available to fund these systems? (3)
What actions, if any, is TSA taking to plan for the optimal deployment of
EDS and ETD equipment, including in-line checked baggage screening
systems, in order to ensure the efficiency, cost effectiveness, and
security of its checked baggage screening operations?
To address these objectives, we reviewed available documentation on TSA's
checked baggage screening program, including contract obligations for
modifying airports and procuring and installing EDS and ETD systems,
inventory listings of EDS and ETD systems, funding and planning
documentation for in-line systems, and cost analysis of in-line and
standalone EDS equipment. Although we could not independently verify the
reliability of all of this information, we compared it with other
supporting documents, when available, to determine data consistency and
reasonableness. On the basis of these efforts, we believe the information
we obtained is sufficiently reliable for this report. We also reviewed the
results of covert testing (undercover and unannounced) of checked baggage
screening operations conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and
Program Review and questioned TSA officials about the procedures used to
ensure the reliability of the covert test data. Based on their answers, we
believe that the covert test data are sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our review. Further, we interviewed officials from
3Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
4In-line EDS checked baggage screening systems typically involve checked
baggage undergoing automated screening with EDS machines while on a
conveyor belt that sorts and transports baggage to the proper location for
its ultimate loading onto an aircraft.
TSA, air carriers, airports, EDS and ETD equipment manufacturers, and
airport industry associations to obtain information regarding TSA's
efforts to improve checked baggage screening operations using EDS
machines. We performed our work at TSA headquarters and 22 airports
throughout the United States. At the airports we visited, we observed
baggage screening procedures and discussed these procedures with TSA,
airport, and airline officials. We chose these 22 airports based on one or
more of the following factors: a large number of passenger boardings, the
existence of an operational in-line system, whether the airport had
received or requested TSA funding for an in-line system, whether the
airport had begun screening all checked baggage using EDS or ETD, and the
proximity to a larger airport also being visited by GAO. In addition, we
surveyed all 155 federal security directors, who oversee federal security
operations at one or more airports in the United States where screening is
required to obtain their perspectives on the implementation of checked
baggage screening operations at 263 airports under their supervision, and
to obtain information on these airports' plans regarding the incorporation
of EDS machines within the airports' baggage conveyor systems for
screening checked baggage for explosives. We conducted our work from
September 2003 through January 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. A detailed discussion of our scope and
methodology is contained in appendix I. Terms used in this report are
further defined in a glossary at the end of this report.
From its creation in November 2001 through September 2004, TSA obligated
about $2.5 billion (93 percent) of the approximately $2.7 billion it had
budgeted for fiscal years 2002 through 2004 for procuring and installing
explosive detection equipment-predominantly to screen checked baggage for
explosives-and making associated airport modifications to accommodate the
equipment.5 Specifically, TSA procured and placed about 1,200 EDS machines
and about 6,000 ETD machines at over 400 airports and modified airports
for the installation of this equipment. Although TSA made significant
progress in fielding EDS and ETD equipment to the nation's airports, TSA
placed this equipment in a stand-alone mode-usually in airport lobbies-to
conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives, rather
than integrating EDS machines in-line with airports' baggage conveyor
systems. TSA officials
5Obligations are amounts of orders placed or contracts awarded during a
given period that will require payment during the same or a future period.
Results in Brief
stated that they use EDS machines in stand-alone mode and ETD machines as
an interim solution in order to meet the congressional deadline for
screening all checked baggage for explosives. Officials stated that they
employed these interim solutions because of the significant costs required
to install in-line systems and the need to reconfigure many airports'
baggage conveyor systems to accommodate the equipment. These interim
screening solutions led to operational inefficiencies, including requiring
a greater number of screeners and screening fewer bags for explosives each
hour, as compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor
systems. Performing primary screening using ETD machines, as is the case
for more than 300 airports, is more labor intensive and less efficient
than screening using the EDS process. TSA's placement of stand-alone EDS
and ETD machines in airport lobbies also resulted in passenger crowding,
which presented unsafe conditions and may have added security risks for
passengers and airport workers. Certain information we obtained and
analyzed regarding explosive detection technologies and their
effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage screening operations are classified
or are considered by TSA to be sensitive security information.
Accordingly, the results of our review of this information have been
removed from this report.6
TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line EDS
baggage screening systems-to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce
screening costs, and enhance security-but resources have not been made
available to fund these systems on a large-scale basis. Most airports that
have installed or are planning to install these capital-intensive in-line
systems have relied on or plan to rely on some form of federal funding to
help install the systems. Although TSA and airports operators are taking
actions to install in-line EDS baggage screening systems, identifying the
resources to fund the systems on a large-scale basis continues to be a
challenge. The issuance of letter of intent (LOI) agreements-TSA's primary
method for funding in-line systems-has been limited to nine airports. An
LOI, though not a binding commitment of federal funding, represents an
intent by TSA to provide funds in future years if they are
6We issued two additional reports detailing the results of our review,
which discuss results deemed to be classified or sensitive security
information. The report that contains classified and sensitive security
information is GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to
Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems,
GAO-05-135C (Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005). The report containing
sensitive security information but not the classified information is GAO,
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment
of Checked Baggage Screening Systems,
GAO-05-302SU (Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005).
appropriated by Congress. This in turn enables an airport to proceed with
a project, such as installing in-line baggage screening systems, because
the airport and investors are aware that allowable costs will likely be
reimbursed. Further, TSA has not determined the total cost of installing
inline EDS baggage screening systems at airports determined to need these
systems, the availability of funding for in-line systems is uncertain, and
perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal
government and airport operators in funding these systems.
Moreover, TSA has not yet conducted the systematic analyses needed to plan
for optimally deploying EDS and ETD equipment-including installing in-line
EDS baggage screening systems or replacing ETD machines with stand-alone
EDS machines-at the nation's more than 400 airports to enhance security
and reduce TSA staffing requirements and long-term costs. Although TSA
established criteria to prioritize airport eligibility for receiving LOI
funds for in-line EDS systems and conducted a limited retrospective
analysis for the nine airports that received LOI agreements, TSA has not
conducted a prospective analysis to determine at which airports it could
achieve long-term savings and improved security benefits by installing
in-line baggage screening systems rather than continuing to rely on
labor-intensive stand-alone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage
for explosives. TSA's retrospective cost-benefit analysis conducted on the
nine airports with signed LOI agreements to install in-line screening
systems found that significant savings and other benefits, including
reduced screener staffing requirements and increased baggage throughput,
may be achieved through the installation of in-line systems. Also, for
airports where in-line systems may not be economically justified because
of the high cost of installing these systems, TSA has not conducted an
analysis to determine whether it could achieve savings and other benefits
by making greater use of stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on
the use of less efficient and more labor-intensive ETD machines at these
airports. Further, although Congress has directed TSA to continue
submitting quarterly reports on its plans for installing in-line baggage
screening systems, TSA has not yet provided all of the information
requested by Congress.7
7Conference Report 108-774 (Oct. 9, 2004), which accompanies the fiscal
year 2005 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
108-334, 118 Stat. 1298 (2004), directs that TSA continue submitting
quarterly reports on its plans for installing inline systems, consistent
with similar language included in House Report 108-169 (June 23, 2003),
directing that TSA submit quarterly reports beginning September 1, 2003.
We are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) direct the TSA Administrator to systematically evaluate
baggage screening systems at the nation's airports to include the costs
and benefits associated with installing in-line EDS baggage screening
systems and deploying stand-alone EDS machines-in lieu of ETD machines-to
conduct the primary screening of checked baggage at airports where an
inline system would not be cost-effective or for justified other reasons.
We also made a recommendation to DHS addressing TSA's protocols for
screening checked baggage and associated screener training, which is
included in the restricted versions of this report.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review. DHS, in its
written comments, generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations, and agreed that efforts to implement the recommendations
are critical to a successful checked baggage screening program. DHS
described some actions TSA has initiated to implement these
recommendations, including conducting an analysis of the deployment of
in-line checked baggage screening systems, and an analysis of those
airports that would benefit from replacing ETDs with stand-alone EDS
equipment. A copy of DHS's comments is included as appendix V.
With the passage of ATSA in November 2001, TSA assumed from FAA the
majority of the responsibility for securing the commercial aviation
system.8 Under ATSA, TSA is responsible for ensuring that all baggage is
properly screened for explosives at airports in the United States where
screening is required, and for the procurement, installation, and
maintenance of explosive detection systems used to screen checked baggage
for explosives. ATSA required that TSA screen 100 percent of checked
baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002. As it
became apparent that certain airports would not meet the December 2002
deadline to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 in effect extended the deadline to December
31, 2003, for noncompliant airports.9 Prior to the passage of
8For additional details on ATSA and other legislation related to checked
baggage screening, see appendix II.
9ATSA also authorized the use of alternative means to screen checked
baggage, such as positive passenger bag match (i.e., air carriers
determining whether the passenger is on the same aircraft as the checked
baggage), canine searches, and searches of bags by hand for time periods
when airports were not able to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using
explosive detection equipment.
Background
ATSA in November 2001, only limited screening of checked baggage for
explosives occurred. When this screening took place, air carriers had
operational responsibility for conducting the screening, while FAA
maintained oversight responsibility. With the passage of ATSA, TSA assumed
operational responsibility from air carriers for screening checked baggage
for explosives. Airport operators and air carriers continued to be
responsible for processing and transporting passenger checked baggage from
the check-in counter to the airplane.
Explosive detection systems include EDS and ETD machines (see figs. 1 and
2). EDS machines use computer-aided tomography X-rays adapted from the
medical field to automatically recognize the characteristic signatures of
threat explosives. By taking the equivalent of hundreds of X-ray pictures
of a bag from different angles, the EDS machine examines the objects
inside of the baggage to identify characteristic signatures of threat
explosives. TSA has certified, procured, and deployed EDS machines
manufactured by two companies. ETD machines work by detecting vapors and
residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags
with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of
explosive materials. ETD is used both for primary, or the initial,
screening of checked baggage, as well as secondary screening, which
resolves alarms from EDS machines that indicate the possible presence of
explosives inside a bag. TSA has certified, procured, and deployed ETD
machines from three manufacturers.
Figure 1: EDS Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage
Figure 2: ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage
Source: GAO.
The operational processes for conducting screening of checked baggage for
explosives using ETD and EDS machines differ. Specifically, the ETD
screening process requires the screener to manually screen checked baggage
by (1) swabbing an area of, or item in, the checked bag and (2) placing
the swab in the ETD machine. The ETD machine then evaluates the sample on
the swab to detect trace amounts of explosive residue. If these steps are
not conducted correctly, the test may fail to detect explosives that are
present. Since the first steps of this process require screeners to
collect explosive particles, they are vulnerable to human error. In
contrast, when using EDS machines as the primary means of detection, the
screening is automated and the machine either alarms indicating the
possible presence of explosives or does not alarm without screener
involvement.
As we reported in February 2004, to initially deploy EDS and ETD equipment
to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, TSA implemented
interim airport lobby solutions and in-line EDS baggage screening
systems.10 The interim lobby solutions involved placing standalone EDS and
ETD machines in the nation's airports, most often in airport lobbies or
baggage makeup areas where baggage is sorted for loading onto aircraft.
For EDS in a stand-alone mode (not integrated with airport's or air
carrier's baggage conveyor system) and ETD, TSA screeners are responsible
for obtaining the passengers' checked baggage from either the passenger or
the air carrier, lifting the bags onto and off of EDS machines or ETD
tables, using TSA protocols to appropriately screen the bags, and
returning the cleared bags to the air carriers to be loaded onto departing
aircraft.
In addition to installing stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in airport
lobbies and baggage makeup areas, TSA collaborated with some airport
operators and air carriers to install integrated in-line EDS baggage
screening systems within their baggage conveyor systems. While each inline
baggage screening system is unique, these systems generally operate in a
similar manner, as shown in figure 3. Typically, in-line systems involve
checked baggage undergoing automated screening while on a conveyor belt
that sorts and transports baggage to the proper location for its ultimate
loading onto an aircraft. During this automated process, all checked
baggage on the conveyor belt passes through EDS machines where the bags
are screened for explosives. If no explosives are detected during this
primary screening, the bag continues forward on the main conveyor belt to
be loaded onto the aircraft. If an EDS machine alarms,
10GAO-04-440T.
indicating the possibility of explosives, TSA screeners, by reviewing
computer-generated images of the inside of the bag, attempt to determine
whether a suspect item is actually a threat.11 If the screener determines
that the suspect item is not a threat, the cleared bag continues on the
conveyor belt system to be loaded onto the aircraft. If the screener is
unable to make this determination, the bag is diverted from the main
conveyor belt into an area where it receives a secondary screening in
which the bag is opened and the contents of the bag are screened by a
screener using an ETD machine and physical inspection. If the bag
successfully clears secondary screening, it is placed on the main conveyor
belt system to be loaded onto the aircraft. If the bag tests positive for
explosives during secondary screening, TSA screeners are required to
notify the appropriate officials.
11This review procedure is known as on-screen alarm resolution, which TSA
began to implement in May 2004 after pilot testing the procedure at
several airports. To enhance the efficiency of an in-line screening
system, TSA also may network several EDS machines together so that images
from multiple EDS machines that alarm can be sent to a centralized
location for screeners to review and resolve using the on-screen
resolution procedure. This process is known as "multiplexing."
facilities to install in-line EDS systems-LOIs, other transaction
agreements, and Airport Improvement Program funds from the FAA.12 In 2003,
Congress authorized TSA to issue LOIs for airport modifications related to
the installation of in-line baggage screening systems.13 When an LOI is
established to provide multiyear funding for a project, the airport
operator is responsible for providing-up front-the total funding needed to
complete the project, even though the LOI is not a binding commitment of
federal funds. Work proceeds with the understanding that TSA will, if
sufficient funding is appropriated, reimburse the airport operator for a
percentage of the facility modification costs. Congress initially mandated
a 75 percent federal government cost-share for LOIs in February 2003, but
in December of that year it increased the cost-share to 90 percent.14
However, the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Act subsequently
re-established the federal government cost-share at 75 percent for fiscal
year 2005. Also, the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request for TSA
proposes to maintain the 75 percent federal government cost share for
projects funded by LOIs at large and medium airports.
TSA also uses other transaction agreements, which are administrative
vehicles used by TSA to directly fund airport operators engaged, or
planning to engage, in smaller in-line airport modification projects
without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions, which can
take many forms and are generally not required to comply with federal laws
and regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative
agreements, enable the federal government and others entering into these
agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually agreeable.
12As described below and in appendix II, Congress has supported in-line
EDS baggage screening systems by authorizing funding mechanisms and
appropriating funds, and issuing calls for expediting the installation of
such systems. However, Congress does not require that in-line systems be
installed to satisfy the 100 percent explosive detection system screening
mandate.
13Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, S: 367,
117 Stat. 11.
14The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution mandated that each LOI
provide for a 75 percent federal cost-share of the project's cost, with
the remaining 25 percent to be paid by the airport operator at airports
with at least 0.25 percent of the total number of passenger boardings each
year at all airports (and 90 percent for projects at all other airports).
The Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision 100), Pub.
L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490 (2003), instituted a 90 percent federal
cost-share of the project's cost, with the remaining 10 percent to be paid
by the airport operator at medium and large hub airports (and 95 percent
for projects at any other airport).
TSA Equipped More than 400 Airports to Screen Checked Baggage for Explosives,
but the Initial Deployment Led to Operational Inefficiencies, and Additional
Security Risks
In addition, airports have utilized Airport Improvement Program grants,
which are awarded by the Secretary of Transportation for airport planning
and development to maintain a safe and efficient nationwide system of
public airports and for limited aviation security purposes. Some airport
operators used the Airport Improvement Program in fiscal years 2002 and
2003 to fund facility modifications needed to accommodate installing
inline systems. However, provisions of ATSA and the Vision 100-Century of
Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision 100), as well as fiscal years 2004
and 2005 appropriations language, have limited the future availability of
the Airport Improvement Program to fund in-line systems.15
Since its inception in November 2001 through September 2004, TSA obligated
about $2.5 billion (93 percent) of the approximately $2.7 billion it
budgeted for fiscal years 2002 through 2004 for the procurement and
installation of EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage for
explosives and to modify airport facilities to accommodate this equipment.
Although TSA made significant progress in fielding this equipment, TSA
used most of the $2.5 billion to design, develop, and deploy interim lobby
screening solutions rather than install more permanent in-line EDS baggage
screening systems. TSA employed these as interim solutions in order to
meet the congressional deadline for screening all checked baggage for
explosives because of the significant costs required to install in-line
systems and the need to reconfigure many airports' baggage conveyor
systems to accommodate the equipment. TSA officials also stated that they
did not have time to conduct the planning needed or make airport
modifications required for longer-term and more streamlined baggage
screening operations. However, these interim lobby screening solutions
used by TSA resulted in operational inefficiencies and additional security
risks. Specifically, TSA's use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines
required a greater number of screener staff and resulted in screening
fewer bags for explosives per hour, as compared with using EDS
15Section 119 of ATSA significantly increased the amount of Airport
Improvement Program funds available for security-related projects but also
provided that this increase would be substantially reduced at the
conclusion of fiscal year 2002. In December 2003, section 142 of Vision
100 further reduced the availability of Airport Improvement Program funds
by limiting the sources from which Airport Improvement Program funds could
be used for security-related improvements. Subsequent prohibitions on the
use of Airport Improvement Program funds for activities related to the
installation of in-line explosive detection systems arose in the fiscal
year 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat.
283, enacted in January 2004, and again in the fiscal year 2005
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809,
enacted in December 2004.
machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems. Also, screening with ETD
machines, as is the case for more than 300 airports, is more
laborintensive and less efficient than screening using the EDS process.
TSA officials also raised concerns about the possible security risks
caused by baggage screening equipment being located in airport
lobbies-causing overcrowding due to passengers waiting to have their bags
screened.
TSA Procured and Installed Explosive Detection Equipment and Modified
Airports to Integrate this Equipment to Screen Checked Baggage for
Explosives
TSA used most of the airport modification and equipment procurement and
installation funds to deploy interim lobby screening solutions at more
than 400 airports to provide the means for screening all checked baggage
for explosives as mandated by the Congress. As shown in table 1, the
Congress earmarked about $1.5 billion of the $2.7 billion budgeted amount
specifically to install EDS and ETD equipment, and to modify and prepare
airport facilities to incorporate the use of this equipment for screening
checked baggage for explosives. Congress earmarked and TSA budgeted the
remaining $1.2 billion for the procurement of EDS and ETD machines.
Table 1: Airport Modification, Procurement, and Installation Funding for EDS/ETD
Equipment for Fiscal Years 2002-2004
Dollars in millions
Airport modification EDS/ETD and EDS/ETD procurement Public law
installation funds funds Total
Fiscal year 2002 TSA budget (not earmarked)
EDS/ETD procurement $0.0 $703.5 $703.5
Other nonearmarked TSA funding $0.0 $156.0 $156.0
Total nonearmarked budget $0.0 $859.5 $859.5
Earmarked TSA appropriations a
Fiscal year 02 supplemental 107-206 $738.0 $738.0
Fiscal year 03 consolidation 108-7 $265.0 $174.5 $439.5
Fiscal year 03 emergency wartime 108-11 $235.0 $235.0
supplemental
Fiscal year 04 DHS appropriations 108-90 $249.4 $149.7 $399.1
Total earmarked appropriations $1,487.4 $324.2 $1,811.6
Total fiscal year 2002-2004 $1,487.4 $1,183.6 $2,671.1
EDS/ETD fundingb
Less amount obligated as of ($1,307.4) ($1,183.4) ($2,490.8)
September 30, 2004
Amount available for additional
obligation as of
September 30, 2004b $180.0 $0.3 $180.3
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
aThese earmarked appropriations are funds that Congress has specified can
be spent by TSA only for the particular purpose indicated in the table.
bTotals may not add because of rounding.
As of the end of fiscal year 2004, TSA used about one-half of the $2.5
billion that it had obligated to modify airport facilities and to install
EDS and ETD machines, and the remaining half primarily to procure EDS and
ETD machines. As of September 30, 2004, TSA had obligated approximately
$1.3 billion of the approximately $1.5 billion that had been earmarked for
airport modifications and the installation of EDS and ETD equipment. As
shown in table 2, TSA had used about $885 million (about 68 percent) of
these obligated funds for the general deployment and installation of EDS
and ETD equipment at various airports as part of interim lobby solutions
to quickly install checked baggage screening equipment. Also included in
this amount are funds that TSA used for installing interim partial in-line
baggage screening systems at some airports. In general, these systems were
for sections of an airport, were not fully integrated into the airport's
baggage handling system, and most often were temporary until a permanent
in-line system could be installed. For example, TSA awarded the Port of
Seattle about $9 million for the construction of interim partial in-line
systems and modification of the
baggage handling systems serving four airlines at the Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport. These interim partial in-line systems, which are
not fully integrated with the baggage handling systems, will be replaced
by permanent in-line baggage screening systems that will be fully
integrated with the airport's baggage handling systems by March 2007. Most
of the remaining airport modification and equipment installation
obligations are being used by TSA for work related to the permanent
in-line integration of EDS baggage screening equipment into airportwide or
individual terminal baggage conveyor systems at 33 airports. See appendix
III for a listing of the 33 airports having in-line baggage screening
systems installed and the source of TSA funding for the in-line systems.
Table 2: Fiscal Year 2002-2004 Airport Modification and EDS/ETD Installation
Obligations as of September 30, 2004
Dollars in millions
Reason for obligation Amount obligated Percentageb
Funding for general interim lobby deployment and integration of EDS and
ETD equipment for screening checked baggage
Planning, designing, and airport structural modification work performed at
over 400 airports
a
by TSA's prime contractor, Boeing Service Company and its subcontractors
$843.3
Work performed by other individual contractors and EDS manufacturers $32.8
Costs associated with transporting and upgrading EDS/ETD equipment $8.5
Subtotalb $884.7
Funding for permanent in-line integration of EDS screening equipment into
airportwide or individual terminal baggage conveyor systems at 33 airports
Initial letter of intent funding to nine airports for airport modification
$259.4
Other transaction agreement funding to eight airports for airport
modification $82.6
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service
Company, other contractors, and EDS manufacturers at 25 airports $52.2
Subtotalb $394.3
Funding for engineering, testing, and analytical support services
Engineering, testing, and analytical support services to TSA for airport
facility modification and
EDS/ETD installation activities $28.4
Total obligatedb $1,307.4
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
aSome of these funds were used for the permanent in-line installation and
integration of EDS equipment into baggage conveyor systems at eight
airports including two category X, and six category I and II airports. We
were unable to determine the amount expended for this effort because at
the time the work was accomplished, TSA did not require Boeing Service
Company, the prime contractor responsible for deploying EDS and ETD
equipment, to track obligations and expenditures at the airport level.
bTotals and subtotals may not add because of rounding.
TSA contracted with Boeing Service Company in June 2002 to be the prime
contractor for deploying EDS and ETD equipment at the nation's airports.
This effort involved designing and implementing airport facility
modifications for EDS and ETD equipment, such as new construction,
infrastructure reinforcement, and modification of electrical systems
required to install the EDS and ETD equipment. Originally, the period of
performance for this contract was to expire on December 31, 2002. However,
TSA extended the contract's period of performance in order for Boeing to
perform activities associated with installing interim lobby solutions to
help airports meet or to maintain compliance to screen 100 percent of
checked baggage with explosive detection systems. These contract
extensions have resulted in a $486.3 million increase in TSA
obligations against this contract for work related to airport
modifications and EDS and ETD installation from $372.6 million in fiscal
year 2002 to $858.8 million as of September 30, 2004.16 Boeing had
expended most (98 percent) of these funds for interim lobby screening
solutions.
As of September 30, 2004, TSA had obligated almost 100 percent of the
approximately $1.2 billion that had been budgeted or earmarked for
procurement of EDS and ETD machines. As shown in table 3, about 80 percent
of these funds has been obligated for procuring EDS machines, with most of
the remaining funding being obligated for procuring ETD machines.
16As of September 30, 2004, TSA has obligated $1.3 billion against the
Boeing contract; in addition to the $858.8 million for airport
modification and EDS/ETD installation, Boeing is receiving $297.4 million
for EDS/ETD maintenance, $134.9 million for training baggage screeners,
and $2.5 million for EDS/ETD transportation and other costs.
Table 3: Fiscal Year 2002-2004 EDS/ETD Procurement Obligations as of
September 30, 2004
Dollars in millions Amount obligated
Number of Item/task description units Subtotal Total Percent
Procurement of EDS machines and associated equipment
Invision EDS machines and associated equipment
CTX 2500 EDS designed for stand-alone configuration 82 $31.0
CTX 5500 EDS designed for both stand-alone or in-line
configurations 357 $190.5
CTX 9000 EDS designed for in-line configuration 246 $284.4
EDS machine manufacturing ramp-up, engineering
services and
other costs $17.3
L3 Examiner 6000 EDS designed for both stand-alone or
in-line
configurations 519 $428.7
Total EDS procurement 1,204 $951.9
Procurement of ETD machines, parts and consumables Other services and equipment
procurement
Ionscan 400B ETD machines, parts, and consumables 3,162 $121.5
Itemiser ETD machines, parts, and consumables 1,785 $65.5
EGIS-II ETD machines, parts, and consumables 700 $32.5
Total ETD procurement 5,647 $219.5
Other engineering, testing, and analytical support services to TSA
for airport facility modification and EDS/ETD installation activities $6.6
X-ray machines and other services $3.6
Transportation of EDS equipment within and between airports $1.0 Other
charges for services and supplies $0.9
Total other services and equipment $12.1 Total obligateda $1,183.4
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
aTotal does not add because of rounding.
Table 4 summarizes the location of EDS and ETD equipment at the nation's
airports by airport category,17 based on a June 2004 TSA inventory
listing. The number of machines shown in table 4 includes EDS and ETD
17 TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United States into one of
five categories-X, I, II, III, and IV. Generally, category X airports have
the largest number of passenger boardings, and category IV airports have
the smallest number.
machines procured by both TSA and FAA prior to and during the
establishment of TSA.
Table 4: EDS and ETD Machines Deployed at U.S. Airports as of June 2004 Number
Airport category Airports EDS machines ETD machines
X 21 679 2,833
I 61 467 2,401
II 50 71
III 124 9
IV 190 2
Total 446 1,228 7,146
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
TSA's Initial Deployment of EDS and ETD Machines Resulted in Interim
Solutions for Screening with Stand-alone Equipment Located Mainly in
Airport Lobbies
Although TSA made significant progress in fielding EDS and ETD equipment
to the nation's airports to screen checked baggage for explosives, as
mandated by Congress, TSA primarily used this equipment as part of interim
lobby solutions to screen checked baggage for explosives, rather than the
permanent integration of EDS machines in-line with airport baggage
conveyor systems. TSA fielded most of the EDS and ETD machines needed to
screen checked baggage for explosives to the nation's over 400 airports by
the congressionally mandated date of December 2003 (extended from the
original deadline of December 2002), despite limited time to deploy the
equipment and some of the equipment not being available when needed. In
1996, FAA, the organization then responsible for the procurement of
checked baggage screening equipment, established a long-term goal of
fielding explosive detection systems at all airports within 18 years-by
2014. As of June 2002, we reported that FAA had fielded 200 EDS and 200
ETD systems to 56 airports.18 In about two and one-half years following
the mandate to screen all checked baggage for explosives, TSA's deployment
of equipment resulted in 1,228 EDS machines and 7,146 ETD machines being
available in over 400 airports, as shown in table 4. Initially, EDS
manufacturers were unable to produce and deliver the number of machines
needed by TSA, and TSA determined that a mix of EDS and ETD technologies
would provide an efficient and effective means of passenger protection.
18GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-971T (Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2002).
During our site visits to 22 category X, I, and II airports, we observed
that in most cases, TSA used stand-alone EDS machines and ETD machines as
the primary method for screening checked baggage.19 Generally, this
equipment was located in airport lobbies and in baggage makeup areas. In
addition, in our survey of 155 federal security directors, we asked the
directors to estimate, for the 263 airports included in the survey, the
approximate percentage of checked baggage that was screened on or around
February 29, 2004, using EDS, ETD, or other approved alternatives for
screening baggage such as positive passenger bag match or canine
searches.20 As shown in table 5, the directors reported that for 130 large
to medium-sized airports in our survey (21, 60, and 49 category X, I, and
II airports, respectively), most of the checked baggage was screened using
stand-alone EDS or ETD machines. The average percentage of checked baggage
reported as screened using EDS machines at airports with partial or full
in-line EDS capability ranged from 4 percent for category II airports to
11 percent for category X airports. In addition, the directors reported
that ETD machines were used to screen checked baggage 93 to 99 percent of
the time at category III and IV airports, respectively.
19The 22 airports included 12 category X, 9 category I, and 1 category II
airports.
20A TSA federal security director oversees federal security operations at
one or more U.S. commercial airports and has operational responsibility
for the screening of passengers and checked baggage.
Table 5: Average Percentage of Checked Baggage Reported as Screened Using
EDS, ETD, or Other Approved Method at 263 Airports on or around February
29, 2004
Airport category X I II III IV Total
Number of airports 21 60 49 73 60 263
Percentage of checked baggage screened using:
EDS (at airports with no in-line EDS
capability) 59 59 27 6 0
EDS (at airports with partial or
airportwide in-line EDS capability) 11 8 4 0 0
Totala EDS 70 67 32 6 0
ETD 18 33 66 93 99
Totala EDS and ETD 88 99 98 99 99
Other approved method 12 1 2 2 1
Totala 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Analysis of GAO federal security director survey data.
aPercentages may not add because of rounding.
Interim Solutions Resulted in Operational Inefficiencies and Additional
Security Risks
TSA's interim solution of using stand-alone EDS and ETD machines as the
primary method to screen checked baggage for explosives led to operational
inefficiencies including (1) the increased use of screener staff, (2) a
lower baggage throughput rate per hour for screening baggage for
explosives, and (3) an increase in on-the-job injuries. Further, at many
airports, TSA's placement of the minivan-sized stand-alone EDS machines
and ETD machines in airport lobbies at times resulted in passenger
crowding, which presented unsafe conditions and may have added security
risks for passengers and airport workers.
Stand-alone EDS and ETD machines are both labor-and time-intensive to
operate since each bag must be physically carried to an EDS or ETD machine
for screening and then moved back to the baggage conveyor system prior to
being loaded onto an aircraft. With an in-line EDS system, checked baggage
is screened within an airport's baggage conveyor system, eliminating the
need for a baggage screener or other personnel to physically transport the
baggage from the check-in point to the EDS machine for screening and then
to the airport baggage conveyor system. Further, according to TSA
officials, ETD machines and stand-alone EDS machines are less efficient in
the number of checked bags that can be screened per hour per machine than
are EDS machines that are integrated in-line with the airport baggage
conveyor systems. As shown in table 6, as
of October 2003, TSA estimated that the number of checked bags screened
per hour could more than double when EDS machines were placed in-line
versus being used in a stand-alone mode. According to a senior TSA
official in the Office of Security Technology, these throughput numbers
could change as TSA gains greater operational experience.
Table 6: Bags Per Hour Screened by Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines
and ETD Machines
Bags per hour Type of equipment Stand-alone In-line
EDS machines
CTX 2500-stand-alone only 120 NA
CTX 5500 180 250
CTX 9000-in-line only NA 425
L3 6000 180 425
ETD machines-stand-alone only 36 NA
Source: TSA.
NA: Not applicable.
In January 2004, TSA, in support of its planning, budgeting, and
acquisition of security screening equipment, reported to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) that the efficiency benefits of in-line rather
than standalone EDS are significant, particularly with regard to bags per
hour screened and the number of TSA screeners required to operate the
equipment. According to TSA officials, at that time, a typical lobby-based
screening unit consisting of a stand-alone EDS machine with three ETD
machines had a baggage throughput of 376 bags per hour with a staffing
requirement of 19 screeners. In contrast, TSA estimated that approximately
425 bags per hour could be screened by in-line EDS machines with a
staffing requirement of 4.25 screeners.
In order to achieve the higher throughput rates and reduce the number of
screener staff needed to operate in-line baggage screening systems, TSA
(1) uses a screening procedure known as "on-screen alarm resolution" and
(2) networks multiple in-line EDS machines together, referred to as
"multiplexing," so that the computer-generated images of bags from these
machines are sent to a central location where TSA screeners can monitor
the images of suspect bags centrally from several machines using the
onscreen alarm resolution procedure. When an EDS machine alarms,
indicating the possibility that explosive material may be contained in the
bag, the on-screen alarm resolution procedure allows screeners to
examine computer-generated images of the inside of a bag to determine if
suspect items identified by the EDS machines are in fact suspicious. If a
screener, by viewing these images, is able to determine that the suspect
item or items identified by the EDS machine are in fact harmless, the
screener is allowed to clear the bag, and it is sent to the airline
baggage makeup area for loading onto the aircraft. If the screener is not
able to make the determination that the bag does not contain suspicious
objects, the bag is sent to a secondary screening room where the bag is
further examined by a screener. In secondary screening, the screener opens
the bag and examines the suspect item or items, and usually swabs the
items to collect a sample for analysis using an ETD machine. TSA also uses
this on-screen alarm resolution procedure with stand-alone EDS machines.21
A TSA official estimated that the on-screen alarm resolution procedure
with in-line EDS baggage screening systems will enable TSA to reduce by 40
to 60 percent the number of bags requiring the more labor-intensive
secondary screening using ETD machines. In estimating the potential
savings in staffing requirements, TSA officials stated that they expect to
achieve a 20 to 25 percent savings because of reductions in the number of
staff needed to screen bags using ETD to resolve alarms from in-line EDS
machines.
TSA also reported that because procedures for using stand-alone EDS and
ETD machines require screeners to lift heavy baggage onto and off of the
machines, the interim lobby screening solutions used by TSA led to
significant numbers of on-the-job injuries.22 In addition, in responding
to our survey about 263 airports, numerous federal security directors
reported that on-the-job injuries related to lifting heavy baggage onto or
off the EDS and ETD machines were a significant concern at the airports
for which they were responsible. Specifically, these federal security
directors reported that on-the-job injuries caused by lifting heavy bags
onto and off of EDS machines were a significant concern at 65 airports,
and were a significant concern with the use of ETD machines at 110
airports. To reduce on-the-job injuries, TSA has provided training to
screeners on proper lifting procedures. However, according to TSA
officials, in-line EDS screening systems would significantly reduce the
21TSA began implementing the on-screen alarm resolution procedure in May
2004 after pilot testing the procedure.
22TSA was unable to provide GAO with data on the on-the-job injuries
sustained during baggage screening operations.
need for screeners to handle baggage, thus further reducing the number of
on-the-job injuries being experienced by TSA baggage screeners.
In addition, during our site visits to 22 large and medium-sized airports,
several TSA, airport, and airline officials expressed concern regarding
the security risks caused by overcrowding due to ETD and stand-alone EDS
machines being located in airport lobbies. The location of the equipment
resulted in less space available to accommodate passenger movement and
caused congestion due to passengers having to wait in lines in public
areas to have their checked baggage screened. TSA headquarters officials
also reported that large groups of people congregating in crowded airport
lobbies, as shown in figure 4, increases security risks by creating a
potential target for terrorists. The TSA officials noted that crowded
airport lobbies have been the scenes of terrorist attacks in the past. For
example, in December 1985, four terrorists walked to the El Al ticket
counter at Rome's Leonardo DaVinci Airport and opened fire with assault
rifles and grenades, killing 13 and wounding 75. On that same day, three
terrorists killed three people and wounded 30 others at Vienna
International Airport.
Figure 4: Crowded Airport Lobby with Stand-alone EDS Screening
Source: TSA.
Airports and the Airport operators and TSA are taking actions to install
in-line EDS baggage
screening systems because of the expected benefits of these systems.
Federal Government However, airport operators and TSA have made limited
progress in Are Taking Actions to installing in-line baggage screening
systems on a large-scale basis because
sufficient resources have not been made available for the installation of
Install In-line Baggage these capital-intensive systems. To install
in-line systems, airport Screening Systems, operators and TSA work
cooperatively, with airport operators responsible
for the baggage conveyor systems and utilities, and TSA responsible forbut
Resources Have the EDS and ETD machines. Airport operators and TSA have
also shared Not Been Made in the total costs-25 percent and 75 percent
respectively under LOI
agreements, which have been TSA's primary method for funding
in-lineAvailable to Fund systems. Most airports that have installed or are
planning to install in-line These Systems on a systems have relied on or
plan to rely on some form of federal funding to
help install the systems. However, as of January 2005, TSA has not used
Large-Scale Basis LOIs to fund the installation of in-line systems beyond
nine airports. Further, TSA has not determined the total cost of
installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems at airports determined to
need these systems. In addition, perspectives differ regarding the
appropriate role of the federal government and airport operators in
funding these systems.
Many Airports Have, Are Planning to Have, or Are Considering Installing
Inline EDS Baggage Screening Systems
Airport operators and TSA are taking actions to install in-line EDS
baggage screening systems because of the expected benefits of these
systems. Our survey of federal security directors and interviews with
airport officials revealed that 86 of 130 category X, I, and II airports
(66 percent) included in our survey either have, are planning to have, or
are considering installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems
throughout or at a portion of their airports. As shown in figure 5, as of
July 2004, 12 airports had operational in-line systems airportwide or at a
particular terminal or terminals, and an additional 45 airports were
actively planning or constructing in-line systems. Our survey of federal
security directors further revealed that an additional 33 of the 130
category X, I, and II airports we surveyed were considering developing
in-line systems.
Figure 5: Status of In-line EDS Systems for Category X, I, and II Airports
Included in Survey of Federal Security Directors as of July 2004
aThe total number of airports having, planning to have, or considering an
in-line system is 86. The pie charts above include three category X and
one category I airports twice because they currently have operating
in-line systems either covering the total airport or a particular terminal
or terminals and are in the process of planning and constructing
additional in-line systems.
In addition to the expected benefits of reduced TSA screening personnel,
enhanced security, and increased baggage throughput, airport officials
anticipate that they will be able to streamline their airport
operations from installing in-line baggage screening systems. For example,
some airport and air carrier officials we interviewed anticipate that
in-line systems will result in less congestion at airline ticket counters
by removing stand-alone EDS and ETD machines from crowded airport lobbies,
thereby improving airline passenger flow and queuing in the terminals by
not forcing passengers to wait in long lines at ticket counters to have
their bags screened. Officials also believe that the installation of
in-line systems would allow for airport growth because in-line EDS systems
could screen checked baggage faster than stand-alone EDS and ETD systems
and could be upgraded to accommodate growth in airline passenger traffic.
Officials further stated that in-line systems would allow them to retain
greater control and autonomy of their baggage handling systems by creating
a streamlined process for moving checked baggage directly from where
baggage is checked to the aircraft.
Total Costs of In-line EDS Baggage Screening Systems Are Unknown, and
Federal Resources Have Not Been Made Available to Fund These Systems on a
Large-Scale Basis
While in-line EDS baggage screening systems have a number of potential
benefits, the total cost to install these systems is unknown, and limited
federal resources have been made available to fund these systems on a
large-scale basis. In-line baggage screening systems are capital-intensive
because they often require significant airport modifications, including
terminal reconfigurations, new conveyor belt systems, and electrical
upgrades.
TSA has not determined the total cost of installing in-line EDS baggage
screening systems at airports that it had determined need these systems to
maintain compliance with the congressional mandate to screen all checked
baggage for explosives using explosive detection systems, or to achieve
more efficient and streamlined checked baggage screening operations.
However, TSA and airport industry association officials have estimated
that the total cost of installing in-line systems is-a rough
orderof-magnitude estimate-from $3 billion to more than $5 billion. TSA
officials stated that they have not conducted a detailed analysis of the
costs required to install in-line EDS systems at airports because most of
their efforts have been focused on deploying and maintaining a sufficient
number of EDS and ETD machines to screen all checked baggage for
explosives. TSA officials further stated that the estimated costs to
install in-line baggage screening systems would vary greatly from airport
to airport depending on the size of the airport and the extent of airport
modifications that would be required to install the system. While we did
not independently verify the estimates, officials from the Airports
Council International-North America and American Association of Airport
Executives estimated that project costs for in-line systems could range
from about $2 million for a category III airport to $250 million for a
category X airport.23
Airport operators have relied on several sources of federal funding to
help pay for the planning and construction of in-line EDS baggage
screening systems. We interviewed airport officials from 53 airports that
either have or are in the process of planning or constructing in-line
systems to determine the extent to which they have relied on or plan to
rely on federal funding to install in-line systems.24 As shown in table 7,
officials at 42 of the 53 airports we interviewed reported that they
relied on the use of federal funds from the FAA Airport Improvement
Program and TSA to help fund the planning and construction of these
systems. However, there was no readily available information that would
allow us to determine to what extent these 42 airports relied on or plan
to rely on the use of federal funds for constructing or planning their
in-line systems. Only one of the 53 airports completed its in-line system
without first receiving federal funds for the project, while an additional
10 airports have started planning or constructing their in-line systems
without receiving federal assistance or a commitment to receive federal
assistance.
23Joint Statement of David Z. Plavin, President, Airports Council
International-North America (ACI-NA) and Todd Hauptli, Sr. Executive Vice
President, American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) before the
House Aviation Subcommittee Hearing on Passenger and Baggage Screening
Problems; February 12, 2004. GAO did not independently verify cost figures
provided in this testimony.
24These 53 airports were among 70 airports identified by federal security
directors during our Web-based survey as either having or in the process
of planning or constructing in-line systems. Officials at the remaining 17
airports indicated that their airports had not developed plans for in-line
baggage screening systems.
Table 7: Source of Federal Funding Used for Airport Modification Planning
and Construction of In-line EDS Systems as of July 2004
Number by airport category
X I II Total
Airports that have either constructed
or are in the process of planning 19 27 7
Source of federal funding used
Combination of Airport
Improvement Program and TSA
funding 5 0 0
Airport Improvement Program
funding only 7 17 4
TSA funding only 3 5 1
Total 15 22 5
No federal funding used 4 5 2
Source: GAO analysis of information received from interviews with airport
officials.
TSA and airport operators are relying on LOI agreements as their principal
method for funding the modification of airport facilities to incorporate
in
line baggage screening systems. The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution approved the use of LOIs as a vehicle to
leverage federal government and industry funding to support facility
modification costs for installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems.
When an LOI is established to provide multiyear funding for a project, the
airport operator is responsible for providing-up front-the total funding
needed to complete the project, even though the LOI is not a binding
commitment of federal funds. Work proceeds with the understanding that
TSA will, if sufficient funding is appropriated, reimburse the airport
operator for a percentage of the facility modification costs, with the
airport funding the remainder of the costs. LOIs issued by TSA for in-line
baggage screening systems provide for reimbursement payments over a
multiple year period, contingent upon the appropriation of sufficient
funding to cover such projects.
As of January 2005, TSA had issued eight LOIs to reimburse nine airports
for the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening systems for a total
cost of $957.1 million to the federal government over 4 years. In
addition,
TSA officials stated that as of July 2004, they had identified
27 additional airports that they believe would benefit from receiving LOIs
for in-line systems because such systems are needed to screen an
increasing number of bags due to current or projected growth in passenger
traffic. TSA officials stated that without such systems, these airports
would not remain in compliance with the congressional mandate to screen
all checked baggage using EDS and ETD.25 However, because TSA would not
identify these 27 airports, we were unable to determine whether these
airports are among the 45 airports we identified as in the process of
planning or constructing in-line systems. Table 8 identifies the nine
airports awarded LOI agreements, total project costs, and the cost-share
for the federal government and the airport.
Table 8: Airports Awarded LOIs
Total federal Airport cost-
Total cost-share share Estimated in-line
Airport project cost (75 percent) (25 percent) operational date
Atlanta $125.0 $93.8 $31.3 December 2005
Boston Completed January
116.0 87.0 29.0 2003
Dallas-Fort Worth 104.4 34.8 June 2005
139.2
Denver 95.0 71.2 23.8 January 2005
Las Vegas July 2005
(McCarran) 125.0 93.8 31.3
Los Angeles and September 2007
Ontario, Calif. 341.9 256.5 85.4
Phoenix 122.0 91.5 30.5 Fall of 2006
Seattle 212.0 159.0 53.0 March 2007
Total $1,276.1 $957.1 $319.1
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: Total project costs do not include costs to procure and install EDS
machines.
TSA officials stated that they also use other transaction agreements as an
administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments,
airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification projects.26
Under these agreements, as implemented by TSA, the airport operator also
25TSA officials stated that the number of airports that could benefit most
from in-line checked baggage screening systems varies depending on
changing airport circumstances, such as adding new terminals or an
increased or decreased number of flights.
26Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by TSA to
directly fund airport operators for smaller airport modification projects
without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions take many
forms and are generally not required to comply with federal laws and
regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements;
and enable the federal government and others entering into these
agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually agreeable.
provides a portion of the funding required for the modification. As of
September 30, 2004, TSA had negotiated arrangements with eight airports to
fund small permanent in-line projects or portions of large permanent
inline projects using other transaction agreements.27 These other
transaction agreements range from about $640,000 to help fund the
conceptual design of an in-line system for one terminal at the Dallas
Fort-Worth airport to $37.5 million to help fund the design and
construction of in-line systems and modification of the baggage handling
systems for two terminals at the Chicago O'Hare International Airport. TSA
officials stated that they would continue to use other transaction
agreements to help fund smaller in-line projects.28
Airport operators also used the FAA's Airport Improvement Program- grants
to maintain safe and efficient airports-in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to
help fund facility modifications needed to accommodate installing in-line
systems. As shown in table 7, 28 of 53 airports that reported either
having constructed or planning to construct in-line systems relied on the
Airport Improvement Program as their sole source of federal funding.
27The eight airports included four category X airports: Dallas Fort-Worth
International, Chicago O'Hare International, Detroit Metro Wayne County,
and San Francisco International; three category I airports: Piedmont Triad
International (North Carolina), Pittsburgh International, and Sacramento
International; and one category II airport Harrisburg International
(Pennsylvania). These eight airports were among the 45 airports that we
identified as being in the process of planning or constructing in-line
systems.
28TSA also used four other transaction agreements to fund work related to
interim solutions, three of these agreements were for partial in-line
systems that eventually were to be replaced by permanent in-line systems.
Airport Officials Report That They Will Require Federal Funding to Install
In-line EDS Baggage Screening Systems, but the Availability of this
Funding Is Uncertain, and Perspectives Differ Regarding Funding
Responsibilities of the Federal Government and the Aviation Industry
Airport officials at over half of the 45 airports that we identified are
in the process of planning or constructing in-line systems stated that
they will require federal funding in order to complete the planning and
construction of these in-line systems. Despite this reported need,
however, the President's fiscal year 2005 and 2006 budget requests do not
provide, and the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Act does not include,
funding for additional LOIs for in-line EDS baggage screening systems
beyond the eight already issued. Also, the availability of federal funds
from the Airport Improvement Program for future planning and construction
of in-line baggage screening systems is limited. In addition, perspectives
differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal government, airport
operators, and air carriers in funding these capital-intensive systems.
Officials at 28 of the 45 airports that we identified in figure 5 as
planning or constructing in-line baggage screening systems stated that
they could not or would not move forward with installing these systems
without funding support from TSA.29 Also, in our review of correspondence
to TSA regarding 26 airports' interest in receiving LOIs, officials from
half of the 26 airports stated that they would have to delay, suspend, or
abandon their plans for installing in-line systems until TSA committed to
funding these projects. According to TSA officials, the high cost of
developing final design plans for in-line systems has resulted in airports
delaying plans to install the systems until they are confident that TSA
will be able to support their funding needs.
Although airport officials stated that they will require federal funding
to install in-line systems-and TSA officials reported that additional
airports will require in-line systems to maintain compliance with the
congressional mandate to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for
explosives-TSA officials stated that they do not have sufficient resources
in their budget to fund additional LOIs beyond the eight LOIs that have
already been issued. Vision 100, among other things, provided for the
creation of the Aviation Security Capital Fund to help pay for placing EDS
machines in line with
29These 28 airports include 8 of the 9 airports that have been awarded
LOIs by TSA for planning and constructing in-line systems.
airport baggage handling systems.30 However, according to OMB officials,
the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request, which referred to the
Vision 100-mandated appropriation of $250 million for the Aviation
Security Capital Fund, only supported continued funding for the eight LOIs
that have already been issued and does not provide resources to support
new LOIs for funding the installation of in-line systems at additional
airports. Further, while the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Act
provides $45 million for installing explosive detection systems in
addition to the $250 million from the Aviation Security Capital Fund,
Congress directed, in the accompanying conference report, that the $45
million be used to assist in the continued funding of the existing eight
LOIs. Further, the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request for TSA
provides approximately $240.5 million for the continued funding of the
eight existing LOIs and provides no funds for new LOI agreements for
in-line system integration activities.
In addition, the availability of Airport Improvement Program funds for
airport security-related improvements, though expanded for a time, is
presently limited as a resource for the installation of in-line EDS
baggage screening systems. Following the events of September 11, ATSA
authorized the use of Airport Improvement Program funds for
securityrelated enhancements through fiscal year 2002. ATSA also provided
for the use of Airport Improvement Program funds to replace airport
baggage handling systems and to reconfigure airport terminal baggage areas
as required to install explosive detection equipment, but Vision 100
amended this provision to allow only a specific portion of Airport
Improvement Program funds to be used for this purpose after December 12,
2003.31 Subsequent prohibitions found in the fiscal year 2004 Consolidated
30Vision 100 authorizes up to $500 million for aviation security for each
of fiscal years 2004 through 2007, of which $250 million is a mandatory
appropriation to the Aviation Security Capital Fund. Of that mandatory
amount, the act designates $125 million as priority funding to fulfill
intentions to obligate under LOIs. In the fiscal year 2004 Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Congress provided $250 million for
the physical modification of airports to install checked baggage explosive
detection systems but did so separate from the Aviation Security Capital
Fund because a provision of that act precluded the use of funds to
establish the Fund in fiscal year 2004. The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638,
enacted in December 2004, increases the authorized appropriation for
aviation security from Vision 100 from $250 million to $400 million for
each of fiscal years 2005 through 2007. The $250 million mandatory
appropriation remains the same.
31Vision 100 limited the source of funding available to carry out this
provision (49 U.S.C. S: 47102(3)(b)(x)) to amounts apportioned under 49
U.S.C. S: 47114.
Appropriations Act, enacted in January 2004, and again in the fiscal year
2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, enacted in December 2004, prohibit
the use of Airport Improvement Program funds for activities related to the
installation of in-line explosive detection systems.
A 75 percent federal cost-share will apply to any project under an LOI for
fiscal year 2005.32 Further, the President's fiscal year 2006 budget
request for TSA requests to maintain the 75 percent federal government
cost share for projects funded by LOIs at large and medium airports.
However, in testimony before Congress, an aviation industry official
expressed a different perspective regarding the cost sharing between the
federal government and the aviation industry for installing in-line
checked baggage screening systems. Testifying in July 2004, the official
said that airports contend that the cost of installing in-line systems
should be met entirely by the federal government, given its direct
responsibility for screening checked baggage, as established by law, in
light of the national security imperative for doing so, and because of the
economic efficiencies of this strategy. Although the official stated that
airports have agreed to provide a local match of 10 percent of the cost of
installing in-line systems at medium and large airports, as stipulated by
Vision 100, he expressed opposition to the administration's proposal,
which was subsequently adopted by Congress for fiscal year 2005, to
reestablish the airport's costshare at 25 percent.33
In July 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States (the 9/11 Commission) also addressed the issue of the federal
government/airport cost-share for installing EDS in-line baggage
32The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution authorized
TSA to issue LOIs for terminal modifications related to the installation
of in-line baggage screening systems and mandated that each LOI provide
for a 75 percent federal cost-share of the project's cost, with the
remaining 25 percent to be paid by the airport operator at airports with
at least 0.25 percent of the total number of passenger boardings each year
at all airports (and 90 percent for projects at all other airports).
Subsequently, Vision 100 instituted a 90 percent federal cost-share of the
project's cost, with the remaining 10 percent to be paid by the airport
operator at medium and large hub airports (and 95 percent for projects at
any other airport) though TSA continued to operate at the 75 percent
cost-share. The fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Act, signed into law
in October 2004, reestablished the federal cost-share at 75 percent for
any medium or large hub airport during fiscal year 2005.
33TSA officials stated that the increased cost-share to 90 percent
stipulated in Vision 100 would further constrain their ability to fund
future LOIs, as well as impact their ability to assist airports to achieve
and maintain compliance with the congressional mandate to screen all
checked baggage for explosives.
screening systems.34 Specifically, the commission recommended that TSA
expedite the installation of in-line systems and that the aviation
industry should pay its fair share of the costs associated with installing
these systems, since the industry will derive many benefits from the
systems. Although the 9/11 Commission recommended that the aviation
industry should pay its fair share of the costs of installing in-line
systems, the commission did not report what it believed the fair share to
be.35
TSA Has Not Systematically Planned for the Optimal Deployment of Checked
Baggage Screening Equipment to Ensure the Efficient and Cost-Effective
Screening for Explosives while Enhancing Security Benefits
TSA has not conducted the analyses needed to plan for optimally deploying
EDS and ETD equipment-including installing in-line EDS baggage screening
systems or replacing ETD machines with stand-alone EDS machines-at the
nation's more than 400 airports to enhance security and reduce TSA
staffing requirements and long-term costs. Although TSA established
criteria to prioritize airport eligibility for receiving LOI funds for
in-line EDS baggage screening systems, it has not conducted a systematic,
prospective analysis to determine at which airports it could achieve
long-term savings and enhanced security by installing in-line systems
rather than continue to rely on labor-intensive stand-alone EDS and ETD
machines to screen checked baggage for explosives. TSA's retrospective
analysis of the nine airports that received LOIs identified the potential
for significant cost savings through the installation of in-line EDS
baggage screening systems and the merit of conducting prospective analyses
of other airports to provide information for future funding decisions.
Further, for airports where in-line systems may not be economically
justified because of the high cost of installing the systems, TSA has not
conducted an analysis to determine whether it could achieve savings by
making greater use of stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the
use of more labor-intensive ETD machines. OMB has provided guidance for
agencies to conduct these types of cost analyses to help build a business
case for funding their programs. Moreover, Congress directed that TSA
continue submitting plans for installing in-line baggage
34The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: July 2004).
35The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires
the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a cost-sharing study that
must include, among other things, a proposed formula for cost sharing
among the federal, state, and local governments and the private sector for
projects to install in-line baggage screening equipment that reflects the
benefits that each such entity will derive from the projects, including
national security benefits and labor and other cost savings.
screening systems. However, TSA has not yet provided Congress with all of
the information requested.
TSA Applied Criteria to Award Initial LOIs to Fund In-line Systems but Has
Not Systematically Determined Which Additional Airports Should Receive
Future In-line Systems to Increase Efficiencies and Enhance Security
In October 2003, TSA reported to OMB criteria it used to prioritize
airports eligible to receive LOI funds to install in-line EDS baggage
screening systems. However, TSA did not systematically determine which
airports could achieve long-term savings and improved security by
installing in-line systems rather than continuing to rely on
labor-intensive stand-alone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage
for explosives.
The criteria TSA established for prioritizing airport participation in the
LOI program, as shown in figure 6, included airports that were not yet
conducting 100 percent screening of checked baggage with EDS or ETD, and
airports that would fall out of compliance with the requirement to screen
checked baggage with EDS or ETD at peak load times. In July 2004, TSA
officials reported that they had recently expanded these criteria to take
into account additional security benefits that an in-line baggage
screening system would provide an airport. Specifically, TSA officials
stated that they compared airport operational needs with identified
threats, based on information received from TSA's Transportation Security
Intelligence Service, to consider security needs for specific airports.
TSA officials further reported that an airport's circumstances, such as
passenger load increases or decreases, may change how it is prioritized,
given these criteria, and that an airport could qualify to receive LOI
funding based on more than one criterion.
Figure 6: TSA Criteria for Prioritizing Letters of Intent
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
TSA officials stated that they selected the first nine airports to receive
LOIs to fund in-line baggage screening systems because, in general, they
were the first to submit applications for an LOI, and they agreed to pay
25 percent of airport modification costs in accordance with the LOI
requirements.36 TSA officials also stated that the nine airports generally
met their criteria even though seven of the airports had received LOIs in
July and September 2003, before the TSA's promulgation of the criteria in
October 2003.
In addition to the nine airports currently receiving LOI funds, TSA
officials stated that, based on their criteria, in July 2004, they
identified 27 additional airports that are potential candidates for 22
future LOIs.37 TSA officials stated that an in-line screening system at
each of these airports would provide enhanced security and efficiencies.
More important, officials stated that if the 27 airports did not receive
an LOI to install an in-line baggage system, these airports could fall out
of compliance with the requirement to screen 100 percent of checked
baggage using explosive detection systems during peak passenger traffic
load periods or because of passenger load increases or new air carrier
service-TSA's second prioritization criterion shown in figure 6. Although
TSA officials asserted that in July 2004, 27 airports were good candidates
for in-line systems, they would not identify the 27 airports. TSA
officials also did not provide the analyses they conducted to determine
that these airports would fall out of compliance with the mandate to
screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems or state why
these airports were more at risk than other airports for not complying
with this mandate. Rather, TSA officials stated that they identified these
27 airports as good candidates for LOIs based on their day-to-day working
knowledge of airports and professional judgment about airport operations.
TSA officials were also unable to provide information on what the
associated costs, benefits, and time frames would be for installing
in-line systems at these 27 airports.
Although TSA developed criteria to use as a guide for determining which
airports should receive LOI funding for in-line EDS baggage screening
systems, TSA has not yet conducted a systematic, prospective analysis of
individual airports or groups of airports to determine at which airports
installing in-line EDS systems would be cost-effective in terms of
reducing long-term screening costs for the government and would improve
security.
36TSA did not have a formal, standardized process for soliciting or
responding to requests for LOIs.
37LOI agreements can include multiple airports, as was the case with one
of the original eight LOIs including both the Los Angeles International
and Ontario airports.
Such an analysis would enable TSA to determine at which airports it would
be most beneficial to invest limited federal resources for in-line systems
rather than continue to rely on the stand-alone EDS and ETD machines to
screen checked baggage for explosives, and it would be consistent with
best practices for preparing benefit-cost analysis of government programs
or projects called for by OMB Circular A-94.38 TSA officials stated that
they have not conducted the analyses related to the installation of
in-line systems at individual airports or groups of airports because they
have used available staff and funding to ensure all airports have a
sufficient number of EDS or ETD machines to meet the congressional mandate
to screen all checked baggage with explosive detection systems. During the
course of our review, in September 2004, TSA contracted for services
through March 2005 to develop methodologies and criteria for assessing the
effectiveness and suitability of airport screening solutions requiring
significant capital investment, such as those projects associated with the
LOI program. However, TSA officials could not provide us with information
on how they plan to use the results of the effort in planning for the
installation of in-line systems.
In October 2004, the conference report accompanying the 2005 Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act directed that TSA continue submitting
quarterly reports on its plans for the installation of inline baggage
screening systems. However, TSA has not yet provided Congress with all of
the information requested. Specifically, the conference report directed
that TSA provide information describing, among other things, the universe
of airports that could benefit from an inline EDS baggage screening system
or other physical modifications; costs associated with each airport's
project, along with a tentative timeline for award and completion; and
information reflecting the anticipated cost savings-particularly personnel
savings-that would be achieved through the use of in-line checked baggage
systems instead of ETD and stand-alone EDS systems. TSA, directed to
provide a report on September 1, 2003, and every quarter thereafter,
provided two reports to Congress. However, TSA was asked to submit amended
reports because the original reports lacked the requested information. As
of January 2005, TSA had not submitted the amended reports or subsequent
reports to Congress. The conference report further directed TSA to develop
a comprehensive plan for
38OMB Circular A-94 Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost
Analysis of Federal Programs, January 22, 2002. Agencies use this guidance
to support government decisions to initiate, review, or expand programs
that would result in measurable costs or benefits extending for 3 or more
years into the future.
expediting the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening systems,
including the formulation of detailed budget requirements to provide for
both equipment acquisition and the capital costs of installing these
system configurations at airports. In addition, the December 2004,
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, among other things,
directs TSA to develop a schedule to expedite the installation of in-line
explosive detection systems.
According to TSA officials, TSA recently began to conduct an analysis of
alternatives to determine the best manner to acquire, deploy, and maintain
EDS and ETD equipment for screening checked baggage as part of the
Department of Homeland Security Investment Review process.39 However,
according to TSA officials who prepared the review, the Investment Review
Board review did not include a prioritization of which airports should
receive funding for in-line systems or an analysis of screening needs at
individual airports. TSA would not provide us with the baggage screening
program data and analysis that it provided to the Investment Review Board
for the review that occurred in late October 2004.
The Installation of In-line EDS Baggage Screening Systems May Result in
Significant Savings and Benefits
Although TSA has not conducted a systematic analysis of cost savings and
other benefits that could be derived from the installation of in-line
baggage screening systems, TSA's limited, retrospective cost-benefit
analysis of inline projects at the nine airports with signed LOI
agreements found that significant savings and other benefits may be
achieved through the installation of these systems. This analysis was
conducted in May 2004- after the eight LOI agreements for the nine
airports were signed in July and September 2003 and February 2004-to
estimate potential future cost savings and other benefits that could be
achieved from installing in-line systems instead of using stand-alone EDS
systems. TSA estimated that inline baggage screening systems at these
airports would save the federal government $1.3 billion40 compared with
stand-alone EDS systems and that
39The Department of Homeland Security Investment Review Board reviews the
department's capital asset programs with acquisition costs exceeding $100
million to ensure that projects meet mission needs at the expected levels
of cost and risk.
40This figure refers to the net present value saved over 7 years if
received up front.
TSA would recover its initial investment in a little over 1 year. 41 TSA's
analysis also provided data to estimate the cost savings for each airport
over the 7-year period. According to TSA's data, federal cost savings
varied from about $50 million to over $250 million at eight of the nine
airports, while at one airport, there was an estimated $90 million loss.
The individual airport results are described in appendix IV.
According to TSA's analysis of the nine LOI airports, in-line cost savings
critically depend on how much an airport's facilities have to be modified
to accommodate the in-line configuration. Savings also depend on TSA's
costs to buy, install, and network the EDS machines; subsequent
maintenance cost; and the number of screeners needed to operate the
machines in-line instead of using stand-alone EDS systems. In its
analysis, TSA also found that a key factor driving many of these costs is
throughput-how many bags an in-line EDS system can screen per hour
compared with the rate for a stand-alone system. TSA used this factor to
determine how many stand-alone EDS machines could be replaced by a single
in-line EDS machine while achieving the same throughput. According to
TSA's analysis, in-line EDS would reduce by 78 percent the number of TSA
baggage screeners and supervisors required to screen checked baggage at
these nine airports, from 6,645 to 1,477 screeners and supervisors.
However, the actual number of TSA screeners and supervisor positions that
could be eliminated would be dependent on the individual design and
operating conditions at each airport.
TSA also reported that aside from increased efficiency and lower overall
costs, there were a number of qualitative benefits that in-line systems
would provide over stand-alone systems, including:
o fewer on-the-job injuries, since there is less lifting of baggage when
EDS machines are integrated into the airport's baggage conveyor system;
o less lobby disruption because the stand-alone EDS and ETD machines
would be removed from airport lobbies; and
o unbroken chain of custody of baggage because in-line systems are more
secure, since the baggage handling is performed away from passengers.
41For a basis of comparison, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94
stipulates using a 7 percent real discount rate to compute the present
value of cost savings. TSA used a 4 percent real discount rate. Following
Office of Management and Budget guidance, cost savings are $1.14 billion.
In addition, in TSA's analysis, the federal government does not pay for
$319 million, or 25 percent, of project costs. Accounting for these costs
to reflect total costs, as recommended by Circular A-94, lowers overall
savings to $820 million.
TSA's retrospective analysis of these nine airports indicates the
potential for cost savings through the installation of in-line EDS baggage
screening systems at other airports, and it provides insights about key
factors likely to influence potential cost savings from using in-line
systems at other airports. This analysis also indicates the merit of
conducting prospective analyses of other airports to provide information
for future federal government funding decisions as required by the OMB
guidance on costbenefit analyses.42 This guidance describes best practices
for preparing benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects,
one of which involves analyzing uncertainty. Given the diversity of
airport designs and operations, TSA's analysis could be modified to
account for uncertainties in the values of some of the key factors, such
as how much it will cost to modify an airport to install an in-line
system. Analyzing uncertainty in this manner is consistent with OMB
guidance. Appendix IV illustrates how analyzing uncertainty in TSA's cost
estimates can help identify which cost factors to focus on when
determining the appropriateness of installing EDS baggage screening
systems for a particular airport.
TSA Has Not Systematically Assessed Needs of Airports to Gain Efficiencies
by Making Greater Use of Stand-alone EDS Systems
TSA also has not systematically analyzed which airports could benefit from
the implementation of additional stand-alone EDS systems in lieu of
labor-intensive ETD systems at more than 300 airports that rely on ETD
machines, and where in-line EDS systems may not be appropriate or
costeffective. More specifically, TSA has not prepared a plan that
prioritizes which airports should receive EDS machines (including machines
that become surplus because of the installation of in-line systems) to
balance short-term installation costs with future operational savings.
Furthermore, TSA has not yet determined the potential long-term operating
cost savings and the short-term costs of installing the systems, which are
important factors to consider in conducting analyses to determine whether
airports would benefit from the installation of EDS machines. TSA
officials said that they had not yet had the opportunity to develop such
analyses or plans, and they did not believe that such an exercise would
necessarily be an efficient use of their resources, given the fluidity of
baggage screening at various airports.
There is potential for TSA to benefit from the introduction of smaller
stand-alone EDS machines-in terms of labor savings and added
efficiencies-at some of the more than 300 airports where TSA relies on
42OMB Circular A-94.
the use of ETD machines to screen checked baggage. Stand-alone EDS
machines are able to screen a greater number of bags in an hour than the
ETD used for primary screening while lessening reliance on screeners
during the screening process. For example, TSA's analysis showed that an
ETD machine can screen 36 bags per hour, while the stand-alone EDS
machines can screen 120 to 180 bags per hour. As a result, it would take
three to five ETD machines to screen the same number of bags that one
stand-alone EDS machine could process. In addition, greater use of the
stand-alone EDS machines could reduce staffing requirements. For example,
one stand-alone EDS machine would potentially require 6 to 14 fewer
screeners than would be required to screen the same number of bags at a
screening station with three to five ETD machines. This calculation is
based on TSA estimates that 4.1 screeners are required to support each
primary screening ETD machine, while one stand-alone EDS machine requires
6.75 screeners-including staff needed to operate ETD machines required to
provide secondary screening.
Without a Plan for Installing In-line Systems and EDS Equipment, It Is
Unclear How TSA May Make Use of New Technologies to Screen Checked Baggage
for Explosives
Without a plan for installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems, and
for using additional stand-alone EDS systems in place of ETD machines at
the nation's airports, it is unclear how TSA will make use of new
technologies for screening checked baggage for explosives, such as the
smaller and faster EDS machines that may become available through TSA's
research and development programs. For example, TSA is working with
private sector firms to enhance existing EDS systems and develop new
screening technologies through its Phoenix project. As part of this
project, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent almost $2.4 million to develop a
new computer-aided tomography explosives detection system that is smaller
and lighter than systems currently deployed in airport lobbies. The new
system is intended to replace systems currently in use, including larger
and heavier EDS machines and ETD equipment. The smaller size of the system
creates opportunities for TSA to transfer screening operations to other
locations such as airport check-in counters. TSA certified this equipment
in December 2004 and will pilot the machine in the field to evaluate its
operational efficiency. Also, the ARGUS program was initiated in 1999 to
develop EDS equipment that would cost less to build and install-even
though baggage throughput may be lower-in order to provide a more uniform
level of security using EDS machines at U.S. airports. TSA's
Transportation Security Laboratory has certified three varieties of these
machines, though the machines have not been procured and deployed at U.S.
airports.
Conclusions
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the
nation's airports-mainly as part of interim lobby screening solutions-to
provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for explosives, as
mandated by Congress. With the objective of initially fielding this
equipment largely accomplished, TSA needs to shift its focus from
equipping airports with interim screening solutions to systematically
planning for the more optimal deployment of checked baggage screening
systems. The need for sound planning is also recognized by Congress
through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and
through the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Act Conference Report,
which, among other things, directs TSA to develop a comprehensive plan for
expediting the installation of in-line explosive detection systems. Part
of such planning should include analyzing which airports should receive
federal support for in-line EDS baggage screening systems based on cost
savings that could be achieved from more effective and efficient baggage
screening operations and on other factors, including enhanced security.
Also, for airports, where in-line systems may not be economically
justified because of high investment costs, a cost effectiveness analysis
could be used to determine the benefits of additional stand-alone EDS
machines to screen checked baggage in place of the more labor-intensive
ETD machines that are currently being used at the more than 300 airports.
In addition, TSA should consider the costs and benefits of the new
technologies being developed through its research and development efforts,
which could provide smaller EDS machines that have the potential to reduce
the costs associated with installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems
or to replace ETD machines currently used as the primary method for
screening. We believe that without such analyses, and without associated
plans for the installation of in-line baggage screening systems and
replacing stand-alone EDS machines, TSA cannot ensure that it is
efficiently allocating its limited resources to maximize the effectiveness
of its checked baggage screening operations.
An analysis of airport baggage screening needs would also help enable TSA
to determine whether expected reduced staffing costs, higher baggage
throughput, and increased security would justify the significant up-front
investment required to install in-line baggage screening. TSA's
retrospective analysis of nine airports installing in-line baggage
screening systems with LOI funds, while limited, demonstrated that cost
savings could be achieved through reduced staffing requirements for
screeners and increased baggage throughput. In fact, the analysis showed
that using in-line systems instead of stand-alone systems at these nine
airports would save the federal government about $1 billion over 7 years
and that TSA's initial investment would be recovered in a little over 1
year. In considering
airports for in-line baggage screening systems or the continued use of
stand-alone EDS and ETD machines, a systematic analysis of the costs and
benefits of these systems would help TSA justify the appropriate screening
for a particular airport, and such planning would help support funding
requests by demonstrating enhanced security, improved operational
efficiencies, and cost savings to both TSA and the affected airport.
In addition to identifying the most optimal baggage screening solutions at
the nation's airports, a systematic analysis of baggage screening
operations and solutions-including an estimate of savings that could be
achieved through the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening
systems-would assist the Administration and Congress in determining the
appropriate role of the federal government and aviation industry in
funding capital-intensive in-line baggage screening systems. By
identifying efficiencies that could be achieved for both TSA-such as
savings achieved through reduced TSA staffing needs for screeners-and the
airports and airlines-such as increased security due to less crowding in
airport lobbies and the faster processing of baggage and passengers-the
Administration and Congress would have information identifying the costs
and benefits of in-line baggage screening systems for all parties involved
to assist in determining an appropriate cost-share between the federal
government and aviation industry in funding these systems.
In developing the comprehensive plan for installing in-line EDS baggage
screening systems, as directed by the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriation
Act Conference Report, and in satisfying the requirements set forth in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, we recommend
that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the
Administrator for the Transportation Security Administration to
systematically assess the costs and benefits of deploying in-line baggage
screening systems at airports that do not yet have in-line systems
installed. As part of this assessment, the Administrator should take the
following four actions:
Recommendations for Executive Action
o identify and prioritize the airports where the benefits-in terms of
cost savings of baggage screening operations and improved security-of
replacing stand-alone baggage screening systems with in-line systems are
likely to exceed the costs of the systems, or the systems are needed to
address security risks or related factors;
o consider the projected availability and costs of baggage screening
equipment being developed through research and development efforts;
o estimate total funds needed to install in-line systems where
appropriate, including the federal funds needed given different
assumptions regarding the federal government and airport cost-shares for
funding the in-line systems; and
o work collaboratively with airport operators, who are expected to share
the costs and benefits of in-line systems, to collect data and prepare the
analyses needed to develop plans for installing in-line systems.
We also recommend that the Administrator for the Transportation Security
Administration assess the feasibility, expected benefits, and costs of
replacing ETD machines with stand-alone EDS machines for primary screening
at those airports where in-line systems would not be either economically
justified or justified for other reasons. In conducting this assessment,
the Administrator should consider the projected availability and costs for
screening equipment being developed through research and development
efforts.
We also made a recommendation to DHS addressing TSA's protocols for
screeners using ETD systems and associated screener training, which is
included in the restricted versions of this report.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On
February 18, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report, which
are reproduced in appendix V.43 DHS generally concurred with our findings
and recommendations, and agreed that efforts to implement the
recommendations are critical to a successful checked baggage screening
deployment program. Regarding our recommendation that TSA systematically
assess the costs and benefits of deploying in-line baggage screening
systems at airports that do not yet have in-line systems installed, DHS
stated that TSA has initiated an analysis of deploying in-line checked
baggage screening systems and is in the process of formulating criteria to
use to identify those airports that would benefit from an in-line system.
According to DHS, TSA believes that it can focus on approximately 40
airports that handle anywhere from 60 to 80 percent of all checked
43 DHS's initial comments on our draft report were dated January 12, 2005
, and we have included in the version of this report that contains
classified and sensitive security information--GAO-05-135C--and in our
report containing sensitive security information but not the classified
information--GAO-05-302SU. In its February18, 2005 letter, DHS removed
comments considered by TSA to be security sensitive information.
baggage nationwide. Once TSA officials have finalized the criteria and
determined those airports at which in-line systems should be installed,
they plan to conduct an airport-specific analysis to determine the
individual costs and operational benefits. We are encouraged that TSA is
proceeding with this analysis, which should provide a sound business case
to justify resource allocation decisions. It is important, however, that
TSA establish milestones and time frames for completing the analysis and
documenting and reporting the results, such that they are available in a
timely manner for DHS and congressional budget decisions.
Concerning our recommendation that TSA assess the feasibility, expected
benefits, and costs of replacing ETD machines with stand-alone EDS
machines for primary screening at those airports where in-line systems
would either not be economically justified or justified for other reasons,
DHS stated that TSA has started conducting an analysis of the airports
that rely on ETD machines as the primary checked baggage screening
technology to identify those airports that would benefit from replacing
ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment. Again, we are pleased that TSA
officials are conducting this analysis, which should provide them with the
basis for optimizing the use of its EDS machines for screening checked
baggage. Further, DHS stated that TSA continues to review and refine the
protocols and training of all screening procedures including screening
checked baggage, and are in the process of implementing the
recommendations made by the DHS Inspector General regarding improved
screener training and other improvements for both the passenger and
checkpoint and checked baggage.
TSA also provided additional technical comments on our draft report, which
we have incorporated where appropriate.
We will send copies of the report to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, the TSA Administrator, and interested congressional
committees as appropriate. We will also make copies available to others on
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-3404, [email protected] or Christine Fossett, Assistant Director at
(202) 512-2956, [email protected]. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
Cathleen A. Berrick, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess efforts by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
screen checked baggage for explosives using explosives detection system
(EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD) equipment, we addressed the
following questions: (1) How did TSA use the funds it initially budgeted
to procure and install EDS and ETD systems and make associated airport
modifications, and what was the impact of the initial deployment of EDS
and ETD systems? (2) What actions are airports and TSA currently taking to
install automated in-line EDS baggage screening systems,1 and what are the
federal resources that have been made available to fund these systems? (3)
What actions, if any, is TSA taking to plan for the optimal deployment of
in-line baggage screening systems in order to ensure the efficiency, cost
effectiveness, and security of its checked baggage screening operations?
To determine how TSA used its funding for procuring and installing EDS and
ETD systems and modifying airports, we obtained and analyzed relevant
legislation and appropriate budget documents, contracts, and inventory
reports from TSA related to checked baggage screening with EDS and ETD
machines. We interviewed TSA officials from the Office of Budget and
Performance, the Office of Acquisition, and TSA's Security Technology
Deployment Office. We also obtained and reviewed funding and contractual
documents from these locations. To determine what impact the initial
deployment of EDS and ETD systems had on TSA and airport operations, we
conducted a literature search to obtain information on the purpose and use
of explosive detection screening equipment to screen checked baggage at
airports for explosives. This search identified various TSA reports,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General reports,
Congressional Research Service reports, and aviation industry reports
documenting TSA's use of this equipment for screening checked baggage.
Also, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents from TSA and interviewed
TSA headquarters officials from TSA's Office of Aviation Operations,
Office of Chief Counsel, Office of Technology Deployment and Maintenance,
and Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review. This documentation
included information on staffing requirements and the number of bags per
hour that can be screened by inline EDS systems as compared with
stand-alone EDS and ETD machines. We also interviewed officials from TSA,
air carriers, airports, explosive
1In-line EDS checked baggage screening systems typically involve checked
baggage undergoing automated screening while on a conveyor belt that sorts
and transports baggage to the proper location for its ultimate loading
onto an aircraft.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
detection systems equipment manufacturers, and airport industry
associations to obtain information regarding TSA's efforts to improve
checked baggage screening operations using EDS machines. Although we could
not independently verify the reliability of all of this information, we
compared it with other supporting documents, when available, to determine
data consistency and reasonableness. Based on these efforts, we believe
the information we obtained is sufficiently reliable for this report.
Further, we reviewed the results from unannounced, undercover covert
testing of checked baggage screening operations conducted by TSA's Office
of Internal Affairs and Program Review and questioned TSA officials about
the procedures used to ensure the reliability of the covert test data. On
the basis of their answers, we believe that the covert test data are
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review.
To address our second and third objectives-to determine what actions
airports and TSA are taking to develop in-line EDS baggage screening
systems and what resources are available for these systems; and to
determine what TSA is doing to optimally deploy these systems in order to
improve the efficiency, cost effectiveness, and security of its checked
baggage screening operations-we obtained briefings and other documents
related to the planned use and installation of in-line systems and
interviewed officials from the Office of Chief Counsel and the Office of
Security Technology. We also interviewed officials from the TSA's
Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New Jersey, to
discuss the agency's efforts to examine future baggage screening
technologies and the certification process for EDS and ETD equipment. We
also used information related to checked baggage screening from a
Web-based survey of all 155 federal security directors about 263 of the
airports under their supervision. This survey is described below. We also
followed up by telephone with airport officials from 70 of those airports
to obtain additional information about their plans for in-line systems.
These airports were selected primarily based on the responses from the
federal security directors regarding whether the airport had or planned on
installing in-line EDS checked baggage screening systems. In addition,
GAO's Office of General Counsel formally requested that TSA describe its
means for compliance with the baggage screening requirements of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Homeland Security Act of
2002, and inquired how TSA would approach its letters of intent for
funding in-line checked baggage screening systems in light of changes
mandated by the
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act.2 Also, to assess
potential savings, we reviewed a TSA cost model showing savings expected
to be achieved with in-line rather than stand-alone EDS equipment at nine
airports. We assessed the model's logic to ensure its completeness and
correctness of calculations. Also, as discussed in appendix IV, we
conducted a Monte Carlo simulation to: (1) illustrate sensitivity of
potential cost savings of replacing stand-alone with in-line EDS systems
to alternative values of key cost drivers and (2) to explore the
variability in the key factors used by TSA in their model. Based on our
review of TSA's cost model, we believe that it is sufficiently reliable
for the analyses we conducted and the information included in this report.
In addition, in addressing all three objectives, we conducted site visits
and a Web-based survey. Specifically, we conducted site visits at 22
airports (12 category X airports, 9 category I airports, and 1 category II
airport) to observe airport security baggage screening procedures and
discuss issues related to the baggage screening processes with TSA,
airport, and airline officials. We chose these airports on the basis of
one or more of the following factors: a large number of passenger
boardings; the existence of an operational in-line system; whether the
airport had received or requested TSA funding for an in-line system;
whether the airport had begun screening all checked baggage using EDS or
ETD; and the proximity to a larger airport being visited by GAO. The
results from our airport visits provide examples of checked baggage
screening operations and issues but cannot be generalized beyond the
airports visited because we did not use statistical sampling techniques in
selecting the airports. We administered a Web-based survey to all 155
federal security directors who oversee security at each of the airports
falling under TSA's jurisdiction. The questionnaire contained questions
related to the status of checked baggage screening operations and planning
and implementation of in-line EDS checked baggage screening systems. A GAO
survey specialist designed the questionnaire in combination with other GAO
staff knowledgeable about airport security issues. We conducted pretest
interviews with six federal security directors to ensure that the
questions were clear, concise, and comprehensive. In addition, TSA
managers and an independent GAO survey specialist reviewed the
questionnaire.
2The fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act
re-established the federal cost-share for letters of intent at the
pre-Vision 100 level.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For this Web-based survey, each federal security director received one or
two airport-specific questionnaires to complete, depending on the number
of airports for which he or she was responsible. Where a federal security
director was responsible for more than two airports, we selected the first
airport based on the federal security director's location and the second
airport to obtain a cross-section of all airports by size and geographic
distribution. In all, we requested information on 265 airports. However,
two airports were dropped from our initial selection because the airlines
serving these airports suspended operations and TSA employees were
redeployed to other airports. As a result, our sample size was reduced to
263 airports, which included all 21 category X airports, 60 category I
airports, 49 category II airports, 73 category III airports, and 60
category IV airports. In that we did not use probability sampling methods
to select the sample of airports, we cannot generalize our findings beyond
the selected airports in these categories.
We conducted this Web-based survey from late March to mid-May 2004. We
received completed questionnaires from all 155 federal security directors
for all 263 separate airports for which we sought information for a 100
percent response rate. We called selected survey respondents, or other TSA
officials designated to respond on the respondent's behalf, to obtain
answers to key survey questions that may have been left blank, to look
into situations where instructions were not followed and to investigate
answers that looked suspicious or out of range. The survey results are not
subject to sampling errors because all federal security directors were
asked to participate in the survey and we did not use probability sampling
techniques to select specific airports. However, the practical
difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly
referred to as non-sampling errors. For example, inconsistencies in how a
particular question is interpreted, in the sources of information that are
available to respondents, or in how the data are entered into a database
or were analyzed can introduce unwanted variability in the survey results.
We took steps in the development of the questionnaires, the data
collection, and the data editing and analysis to minimize these
non-sampling errors. Also, in that these were Web-based surveys whereby
respondents entered their responses directly into our database, data entry
or transcription errors were possible. In addition, all computer programs
used to analyze the data were peer-reviewed and verified to ensure that
the syntax was written and executed correctly.
We performed our work from September 2003 through January 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Certain
information we obtained and analyzed regarding explosive
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
detection technologies and their effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage
screening operations are classified or are considered by TSA to be
sensitive security information. Accordingly, the results of our review of
this information have been removed from this report. 3
3We issued two additional reports detailing the results of our review,
which discuss results deemed to be classified or sensitive security
information. The report that contains classified and sensitive security
information is GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to
Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-135C
(Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005). The report containing sensitive
security information but not the classified information is GAO, Aviation
Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked
Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-302SU (Washington D.C.: February 4,
2005).
Appendix II: Summary of Checked Baggage Screening Legislation
Table 9: Highlights of Authorizations in Laws Related to Checked Baggage
Screening in Aviation Transportation Security since the Terrorist Attacks
of September 11, 2001
Authorizations found in public laws Key provisions
Aviation and Transportation Security Established the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) as the agency responsible
Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 for security in all modes of
transportation, including civil aviation
Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001)
Appointed federal security managers to oversee the screening of passengers
and baggage at airports
Deployment of federal personnel to screen all passengers and baggage at
airports
Mandated the screening of all checked baggage with explosive detection
systems by December 31, 2002, and authorized alternative means to screen
checked baggage (positive passenger bag match, manual search, canine
search in combination with other means, other technology approved by TSA)
where explosive detections systems are unavailable
Mandated the imposition of passenger security fees (and authorized the
imposition of air carrier fees, if necessary)
Authorized use of Airport Improvement Program funds to replace baggage
conveyor systems and reconfigure terminal baggage areas for installing
bulk explosive detection systems; for other security-related activities
required by law or the Secretary of Transportation from September 11,
2001, through October 1, 2002; and waived the local matching share for
fiscal 2002 security related projects
Required that the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, or any
successor system, evaluate all passengers before they board an aircraft
and that procedures exist to ensure adequate screening of selected
individuals and their checked baggage
Authorized $50 million for each of fiscal years 2002 through 2006 for
research, development, testing and evaluation of technologies such as
explosive detection systems Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L.
Extended ATSA's mandate to screen all checked baggage using explosive
detection No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, systems to December 31,
2003, for noncompliant airports and required that all baggage 2002) at
noncompliant airports be screened by alternative means until the mandate
is fulfilled Requires the submission of a classified report describing
TSA's progress toward meeting the baggage screening mandate every 30 days
to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the
House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Requires the Secretary of Transportation to consult with the Secretary of
Homeland Security before approving applications for Airport Improvement
Program grants as they relate to security equipment or the installation of
bulk explosive detection systems
Consolidated Appropriations Authorized $500 million for each of fiscal
years 2003 through 2007 for TSA to issue letters Resolution, 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-7, 117 of intent (LOIs) to airports, with a government cost-share
of 75 percent at airports with at Stat. 386 (Feb. 20, 2003) least 0.25
percent of total passenger boardings each at all airports (90 percent at
any
other airport)
Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Authorized LOIs to assist in the installation of explosive detection
systems at airports by December 31, 2003
Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11, 117 Stat. 559 (Apr. 16,
2003) Vision 100-Century of Aviation Limited the availability of Airport
Improvement Program funds for replacing baggage Reauthorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 108-conveyor systems and reconfiguring terminal baggage areas to
install bulk explosive 176, 117 Stat. 2490 (Dec. 12, 2003) detection
systems to entitlement funds
Appendix II: Summary of Checked Baggage Screening Legislation
Authorizations found in public laws Key provisions
Required the Secretary of Homeland Security to study the effectiveness of
the aviation security system, including checked baggage, and to report
that study within 6 months of the act's passage to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Authorized TSA to make grants for projects to replace baggage conveyer
systems related to aviation security, to reconfigure terminal baggage
areas as needed to install explosive detection systems, to enable TSA to
deploy explosive detection systems behind the ticket counter, in the
baggage sorting area, or in line with the baggage handling system, and for
other airport security capital improvement projects TSA determines will
improve security at an airport or improve the efficiency of the airport
without lessening security
Authorized up to $500 million for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2007
for TSA to make grants under 49 U.S.C. S: 44923:
$250 million mandatory appropriation derived from passenger security fees
to constitute the Aviation Security Capital Fund: $125 million available
on the basis of airport size and aviation security risks; $125 million
available for discretionary grants with priority to fulfilling LOIs
$250 million authorized appropriation for each of fiscal years 2004
through 2007: 50 percent available on the basis of airport size and
aviation security risks; 50 percent available for discretionary grants
with priority to fulfilling LOIs
Authorizes LOIs for airport security improvement projects at a 90 percent
government cost-share at medium or large hub airports (95 percent at any
other airport) and provides that TSA shall revise LOIs issued before the
date of enactment to reflect the new costshare with respect to grants made
after September 30, 2003
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Requires that TSA take action to
expedite the installation and use of baggage screening
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. equipment and requires that TSA submit
schedules to the Senate Committee on
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004) Commerce, Science and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure for expediting the installation and use
of in-line baggage screening equipment that estimate the impact that such
equipment, facility modification, and baggage conveyor placement will have
on staffing needs and levels related to aviation security and for
replacing trace detection equipment with explosive detection system
equipment as soon as practicable and where appropriate, within 180 days of
enactment
Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with air
carriers, airport operators, and other interested parties, to submit, in
conjunction with its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal, a proposed formula
for cost sharing among federal, state and local governments and the
private sector for the installation of in-line baggage screening systems,
recommendations for defraying the costs of in-line systems, and a review
of innovative financing approaches and possible cost savings associated
with installing inline systems at airports
Amends 49 U.S.C. S: 44923(i) by increasing the authorized appropriations
for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2007 to $400 million
Allows for a reimbursement period under any LOI to extend for a maximum of
10 years after issuance
Source: GAO analysis of public laws related to checked baggage screening
since the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.
Appendix II: Summary of Checked Baggage Screening Legislation
Table 10: Highlights of Appropriations in Laws Related to Checked Baggage
Screening in Aviation Transportation Security since the Terrorist Attacks
of September 11, 2001
Appropriations found in public laws Funding appropriated and other key
provisions
2002 Emergency Supplemental $40 billion (available until expended) for,
among other things, the costs of providing
Appropriations Act for Recovery from and increased transportation
security; no specific baggage screening-related appropriation
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
United States, Pub. L. No. 107-38, 115 Stat.
220 (Sept. 18, 2001)
Department of Transportation and Related $1.25 billion (available until
expended) for necessary expenses of TSA related to Agencies Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. providing civil aviation security services pursuant to
ATSA; no specific baggage 107-87, 115 Stat. 833 (Dec. 18, 2001)
screening-related appropriation H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-308 (2001)
directed $97.5 million from "FAA, Facilities and Equipment": $38 million
for bulk explosive detection systems; $12 million for trace detection
equipment; $12 million for threat image projection systems; $2 million for
computer-based training; $33.5 million for system integration Department
of Defense Emergency Funds to be obligated from amounts made available in
Public Law 107-38:
Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery $108.5 million to "FAA Facilities
and Equipment" (available until Sept. 30, 2004) for
from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on procurement and installation of
explosive detection systems
the United States, 2002; Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. $50 million to "FAA Research and
Development" (available until Sept. 30, 2003), of No. 107-117, 115 Stat.
2230 (Jan. 10, 2002) which H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-350 (2001) directed $2
million for a demonstration of 100 percent positive passenger bag match
technology at DCA
2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub.
L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820 (Aug. 2, 2002) $738 million (available until
expended) for physical modifications to commercial service airports for
installing checked baggage explosive detection systems
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 386 (Feb. 20, 2003)
$3.0379 billion (available until expended) for screening activities, of
which H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-10 (2003) directed $1.4159 billion for
baggage screening activities:
The Resolution earmarked $265 million for the physical modification of
commercial service airports to install, and $174.5 million for the
procurement of, checked baggage explosive detection systems
The Conference Report directed $900 million for baggage screeners, $75
million for detection equipment maintenance, and $1.4 million for a
checked baggage data system Emergency Wartime Supplemental $235 million
(available until expended) for the physical modification of commercial
Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. service airports to install checked
baggage explosive detection systems 108-11, 117 Stat. 559 (Apr. 16, 2003).
Department of Homeland Security $1.3187 billion (available until expended)
for baggage screening activities:
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. The act earmarked $250 million for
physical modification of commercial service
108-90, 117 Stat. 1137 (Oct. 1, 2003). airports to install, and $150
million for the procurement of, checked baggage explosive detection
systems.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-280 (2003) directed $774.2 million for personnel,
compensation and benefits; $69.5 for training and other purposes; and $75
million for explosive detection system maintenance $45 million (available
until expended) for research and development of explosive detection
devices
Appendix II: Summary of Checked Baggage Screening Legislation
Appropriations found in public laws Funding appropriated and other key
provisions
Precludes the obligation or expenditure of funds appropriated or otherwise
made available by this or any other act to carry out provisions of 49
U.S.C. S: 44923(h)-the Aviation Security Capital Fund-during fiscal year
2004
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Precludes the availability of
Airport Improvement Program funds for the replacement Pub. L. No. 108-199,
118 Stat. 3 (Jan. 23, of baggage conveyor systems, reconfiguration of
terminal baggage areas, and other 2004) improvements necessary to install
bulk explosive detection systems
Department of Homeland Security $1.45246 billion (available until
expended) for baggage screening activities:
Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-The act earmarks $180 million
for procurement of, and $45 million to install, checked334, 118 Stat. 1298
(Oct.18, 2004) baggage explosive detection systems.
H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-774 (2004) directs $848.86 million for personnel,
compensation and benefits; $203.66 million for training and other
purposes; $174.94 million for maintenance; and at least $30 million of the
$180 procurement earmark to install nextgeneration explosive detection
systems to permit more efficient handling of checked bags and reduce
dependence on baggage screeners, particularly at medium-sized and small
airports. It further recognizes the mandatory $250 million mandatory
appropriation to the Aviation Security Capital Fund.
$54 million earmarked for research and development of next generation
explosive detection devices, of which the Conference Report directs $10
million for the Manhattan II project
Reestablishes, for fiscal year 2005, the75 percent government cost-share
for the eight LOIs issued for the installation of in-line baggage
screening systems
The Conference Report directs that TSA:
comprehensively plan for expediting the installation of in-line explosive
detection systems, including the formulation of detailed budget
requirements to provide for both equipment acquisition and the capital
costs of installing such system configurations at airports; continue
submitting quarterly reports, consistent with the requirement of H.R. Rep.
No. 108-169 (2003), on its plans for the installation of in-line systems
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Precludes the availability of
Airport Improvement Program funds for the replacement Pub. L. No. 108-447,
118 Stat. 2809 (Dec. 8, of baggage conveyor systems, reconfiguration of
terminal baggage areas, and other 2004) improvements necessary to install
bulk explosive detection systems
Source: GAO analysis of public laws related to checked baggage screening
since the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.
Appendix III: Airports Receiving TSA Airport Modification and EDS/ETD Equipment
Installation Funding for In-line Systems
Table 11: Listing of Airports Receiving Modification and EDS/ETD Equipment
Installation Funding for Developing In-line EDS Baggage Screening Systems
as of September 30, 2004
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work Other transaction
performed by Boeing Service LOI funding for agreement funding for Company,
other contractors, or Name of airport airport modification airport
modification EDS manufacturers
13 Category X Airports
Hartsfield Atlanta International X
Boston Logan International X X
Baltimore/Washington International X
Chicago O'Hare International X
Denver International X X
Dallas-Fort Worth International X X X
Detroit Metro Wayne County X
Houston George Bush Intercontinental X
Los Angeles International X
Miami International X
Orlando International X
San Francisco International X X
Seattle-Tacoma International X X
Subtotal 6 4 9
16 Category I Airports
Anchorage Ted Stevens International X
Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field X
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena X
Santa Ana John Wayne X
Las Vegas McCarran International X X
Metropolitan Oakland International Airport X
Oklahoma City Will Rogers World X
Ontario International X
Phoenix Sky Harbor International X
Greensboro Piedmont Triad International X
Pittsburgh International X X
Sacramento International X
Southwest Florida International
Spokane International X
Tampa International X
Tulsa International X
Appendix III: Airports Receiving TSA Airport Modification and EDS/ETD
Equipment Installation Funding for In-line Systems
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work Other transaction
performed by Boeing Service LOI funding for agreement funding for Company,
other contractors, or Name of airport airport modification airport
modification EDS manufacturers
Subtotal 3 3 12
3 Category II Airports
Harrisburg International X X
Juneau International X
Manchester X
Subtotal 1 3
1 Category III Airport
Okaloosa County Air Terminal X
Subtotal 1
Total (33 Airports) 9 8 25
Source: GAO analysis of TSA obligation and commitment data and contract
files.
Appendix IV: Analysis of TSA's Cost Savings Estimates for In-line EDS Checked
Baggage Screening Systems
TSA estimated that baggage screening operations at the nine airports
receiving letters of intent (LOIs) will result in a savings to the federal
government of $1.26 billion over 7 years-and would recover the initial
investment in 1.07 years-as a result of installing in-line rather than
standalone EDS systems.1 To make these estimates, TSA made a variety of
assumptions about in-line and stand-alone EDS systems, including how many
bags can be processed per hour by both, how many screeners both would
need, and how much it would cost to purchase, install, and operate these
systems.2 In addition, TSA used data on how much it cost to modify these
nine airports to accommodate in-line systems. In considering the accuracy
of TSA's estimates, uncertainties inherent in many of these assumptions
should be considered. TSA could have analyzed uncertainty in their
estimate by conducting sensitivity or other analyses to determine how
variations in these assumptions would change its estimate of cost savings.
Analyzing uncertainty in this way is consistent with best practices for
preparing benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects called
for by OMB Circular A-94. Nonetheless, TSA's cost model for these nine
airports offers insights about key factors likely to influence potential
cost savings at other airports.
To illustrate taking uncertainty into account, we conducted a Monte Carlo
analysis using TSA's cost model.3 We found that TSA's cost savings
estimate of $3.5 million per in-line EDS machine as compared to standalone
could range from a loss of $1.6 million to a savings of $8.3 million per
machine using generalized assumptions about cost uncertainty in TSA's
model. The most important source of uncertainty causing this wide range in
possible savings was the cost to modify an airport to accommodate an
in-line EDS system. Variation in modification costs explained over 60
percent of the variation in potential cost savings from
1This is the present value of cost savings over a seven-year period.
Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures cited are present values. As
noted earlier, this estimate falls to $1.14 billion after adjustments to
the discount rate following Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94
guidance.
2Costs to install and multiplex in-line EDS systems were based on budget
assumptions rather than true requirements.
3Our analysis was conducted using what is called Monte Carlo simulation,
which uses random numbers to measure the effects of uncertainty. In the
absence of additional information, our simulation is based on some general
assumptions about the probability distributions characterizing values used
by TSA for most of the cost factors. In the case of modification costs, we
were able to use information on the variation of those costs across the
nine airports.
Appendix IV: Analysis of TSA's Cost Savings Estimates for In-line EDS
Checked Baggage Screening Systems
in-line EDS as compared to stand-alone EDS. The next most important
variable, the number of bags per hour that in-line and stand-alone
machines can screen per hour, each accounted for about 15 percent of the
variation in cost savings. In this way, Monte Carlo analysis can offer
insights on factors to focus on when determining the appropriateness of an
in-line EDS baggage screening system for a particular airport.4
The analysis provided by TSA aggregated the nine airports to present a
total estimate. Using TSA's analysis, we were able to determine the
results for each of the nine airports. Figure 7 illustrates the variation
in modification costs at the nine airports TSA studied, ranging from over
$14 million per in-line EDS machine at Seattle to less than $2 million for
Boston and Dallas-Fort Worth.5 Figure 8, which shows the cost savings from
in-line EDS compared to stand-alone EDS, identifies that Seattle could end
up spending more for an in-line EDS system than from using stand-alone EDS
machines. Further, as shown in figure 9, at Seattle the relatively large
costs for upfront in-line EDS are not offset by the estimated $48 million
in operation and maintenance cost savings; therefore, the in-line EDS
system may be more costly than EDS standalone. By contrast, at Dallas-Fort
Worth, the upfront costs of in-line EDS are lower than for stand-alone
EDS, and there is an estimated $252 million in operation and maintenance
cost savings. Therefore, the in-line EDS system at Dallas-Fort Worth may
be less costly than stand-alone EDS.
4TSA's model covers nine airports handling relatively large numbers of
passengers, reflecting the fact that in-line EDS has been limited mostly
to larger airports.
5TSA's data shows zero cost shown for Ontario, but it may be due to it
being combined with Los Angeles.
Appendix IV: Analysis of TSA's Cost Savings Estimates for In-line EDS
Checked Baggage Screening Systems
Figure 7: Airport Modification Costs Per In-line EDS Machine at Nine
Airports
Dollars
16,000,000
14,000,000
12,000,000
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
0
Atlanta Boston Denver Dallas Los Seattle Las Phoenix Ontario Fort Angeles
Vegas Worth
Airports
Source: Transportation Security Administration data.
Appendix IV: Analysis of TSA's Cost Savings Estimates for In-line EDS
Checked Baggage Screening Systems
Figure 8: Cost Savings from In-line EDS Systems Compared to Stand-alone
EDS at
Nine Airports
Present value
300,000,000
250,000,000
200,000,000
150,000,000
100,000,000
50,000,000
0
-50,000,000
-100,000,000
-150,000,000
Atlanta Boston Denver Dallas Los Seattle Las Phoenix Ontario Fort Angeles
Vegas Worth
Airports
Source: Transportation Security Administration data.
Appendix IV: Analysis of TSA's Cost Savings Estimates for In-line EDS
Checked Baggage Screening Systems
Figure 9: Costs and Savings at Nine Airports
Dollars
300,000,000
250,000,000
200,000,000
150,000,000
100,000,000
50,000,000
0
-50,000,000
-100,000,000
-150,000,000
-200,000,000
Atlanta Boston Denver Dallas Los Seattle Los Phoenix Ontario Fort Angeles
Vegas Worth
Airports
In-line operation and maintenance cost savings
Upfront standalone EDS costs minus upfront in-line EDS costs
Overall savings from in-line
Source: Transportation Security Administration data.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404 Christine A. Fossett
(202) 512-2956
Staff In addition to those named above, David Alexander, Leo Barbour,
Charles Bausell Jr., Kevin Copping, Katherine Davis, Kevin Dooley,
Acknowledgments David Hooper, Lemuel Jackson, Stuart Kaufman, Noel Lance,
Thomas Lombardi, Jan Montgomery, Jobenia Odum, Jean Orland, Keith Rhodes,
Minette Richardson, and Mark Tremba were key contributors to this report.
Glossary
Airport categories TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United
States that require screening into one of five categories (X, I, II, III,
and IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of take-offs
and landings annually, the extent to which passengers are screened at the
airport, and other special security considerations. In general, category X
airports have the largest number of passenger boardings and category IV
airports have the smallest. TSA periodically reviews airports in each
category, and, if appropriate, changes an airport's categorization to
reflect current operations.
Airport Improvement Program
The Airport Improvement Program has provided federal grants since the
passage of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, 96 Stat. 324. Administered by the Federal Aviation Administration,
Airport Improvement Program grants have supported airport planning and
development. Grants are issued to maintain and enhance airport safety,
preserve existing airport infrastructure, and expand capacity and
efficiency throughout the airport system. Funds obligated for the Airport
Improvement Program are drawn from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund,
which is supported by user fees and fuel taxes.
Checked baggage An individual's personal property offered to and accepted
by an aircraft operator for transport, which will be inaccessible to the
individual during flight.
Cost-effectiveness analysis
A program is cost effective if, on the basis of life cycle cost analysis
of competing alternatives, it is determined to have the lowest costs
expressed in present value terms for a given amount of benefits.
Costeffectiveness analysis is appropriate whenever it is unnecessary or
impractical to consider the dollar value of the benefits provided by the
alternatives under consideration. This is the case whenever (1) each
alternative has the same annual benefits expressed in monetary terms; or
(2) each alternative has the same annual affects but dollar values cannot
be assigned to their benefits.
Explosives Detection A TSA certified automated device that has the ability
to detect in checked
System (EDS) baggage, the amounts, types, and configurations of explosive
material specified by the TSA. An EDS machine uses computer-aided
tomography to automatically measure the density of objects in baggage to
determine whether the objects have the same density as explosives. The
system automatically triggers an alarm when objects with high densities
characteristic of explosives are detected.
Glossary
Explosives Trace A device that has been certified by TSA for detecting
explosive vapors and
Detection (ETD) residues on objects intended to be transported aboard an
aircraft. Explosives trace detection works by detecting vapors and
residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags
with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of
explosive materials. ETD is used both for primary screening of baggage and
secondary screening to resolve alarms from EDS machines.
Interim lobby Solutions employed by TSA to initially deploy explosive
detection systems
solutions to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, until
more permanent solutions could be designed and constructed. Efforts
involved designing and implementing facility modifications, such as new
construction, infrastructure reinforcement, and modification of electrical
systems required to install the EDS and ETD equipment; and developing and
administering equipment training for baggage screeners.
In-line system (also known A baggage conveyor system with incorporated EDS
machines. The EDS's as integrated checked baggage feed and output belts
are directly connected to an airline's or baggage screening system
airport's baggage belt system. The checked baggage undergoes automated
screening in the EDS while on the conveyor belt system that sorts and
or integrated EDS system) transports baggage to the proper location for
its ultimate loading on an aircraft. Baggage is introduced into the EDS
without manual loading or unloading by TSA screeners.
Letters of intent (LOI) The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations
Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, authorized an LOI program for
shared federal government and aviation industry funding to support
facility modification costs associated with the installation of in-line
EDS baggage screening systems. The Vision 100-Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490 (2003), also
authorized the use of LOIs for this purpose.
Multiplex EDS machines are networked together so that images from
multiple EDS machines can be sent to a centralized location where
screeners can resolve alarms by studying EDS generated images.
On-screen alarm resolution When an EDS machine alarms, indicating the
possibility of explosives,
of EDS alarms TSA screeners, by reviewing computer generated images of
the inside of the bag, attempt to determine whether or not a suspect item
or items are in fact explosive materials. If the screener is unable to
make this determination, the bag is diverted from the main conveyor belt
into an area where it receives a secondary screening by a screener with an
ETD machine.
Glossary
Other Transaction Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles
used by TSA to
Agreements directly fund airport operators for smaller in-line airport
modification projects without undertaking a long-term commitment. These
transactions, which undertake many forms and are generally not required to
comply with Federal laws and regulations that apply to contracts, grants,
and/or cooperative agreements, enable the federal government and others
entering into these agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are
mutually agreeable.
Positive passenger An alternative means of screening checked baggage,
conducted by the
bag match airline, which requires that the passenger be on the same
aircraft as his or her checked baggage.
Stand-alone EDS machines EDS machines that are placed in terminal
lobbies, curbside or in baggage makeup areas, not integrated with baggage
conveyor systems as part of inline systems.
Throughput Bags screened per hour as a measure of efficiency.
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