National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S.
Air Traffic Control Modernization Program (01-APR-05,
GAO-05-333SP).
In 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began a
program to modernize the national airspace system and a primary
component, the air traffic control (ATC) system. The ATC
component of this program, which is designed to replace aging
equipment and accommodate predicted growth in air traffic, has
had difficulty for more than two decades in meeting cost,
schedule, and performance targets. The performance-based Air
Traffic Organization (ATO) was created in February 2004 to
improve the management of the modernization effort. On October 7,
2004, GAO hosted a panel to discuss attempts to address the ATC
modernization program's persistent problems. Participants
discussed the factors that they believed have affected FAA's
ability to acquire new ATC systems. Participants also identified
steps that FAA's ATO could take in the short term to address
these factors, as well as longer term steps that could be taken
to improve the modernization program's chances of success and
help the ATO achieve its mission. The participants included
domestic and foreign aviation experts from industry, government,
private think tanks, and academia. They are recognized for their
expertise in aviation safety, economics, and engineering;
transportation research and policy; and government and
private-sector management.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-333SP
ACCNO: A21558
TITLE: National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the
U.S. Air Traffic Control Modernization Program
DATE: 04/01/2005
SUBJECT: Air traffic control systems
Cost analysis
Cost control
Cost overruns
Future budget projections
Performance measures
Program evaluation
Schedule slippages
Strategic planning
Systems conversions
Program goals or objectives
Program implementation
FAA Air Traffic Control Modernization
Program
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GAO-05-333SP
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO GAO Panel
April 2005
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic Control Modernization Program
a
GAO-05-333SP
[IMG]
April 2005
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic Control Modernization Program
What Participants Said
Overall, the participants identified cultural, technical, and budgetary
factors that, in their view, have affected the progress of ATC
modernization. To address these factors, they proposed what one
participant termed a "two-pronged" approach-simultaneously taking care of
"the here and now" and building a "viable future" for the ATO.
Cultural and Technical Factors Have Impeded ATC Modernization
According to participants, the key cultural factor impeding modernization
has been resistance to change. Such resistance is a characteristic of FAA
personnel at all levels, participants said, and management, in the
experience of some, is more resistant than employees who may fear that new
technologies will threaten their jobs. The key technical factor affecting
modernization, participants said, has been a shortfall in the technical
expertise needed to design, develop, or manage complex air traffic
systems. Without the technical proficiency to "scrub" project proposals
for potential problems early and to oversee the contractors who implement
its modernization projects, they said, FAA has to rely on the contractors,
whose interests differ from its own.
Budgetary Factors Have Constrained ATC Modernization
The most immediate budgetary constraint, participants said, is the
multibilliondollar shortfall that FAA is projecting between available
revenues and modernization needs over the next 4 years. Participants also
identified features of the federal budget process as constraints, noting,
for example, that the federal budget cycle is too long and inflexible to
meet the needs of a dynamic ATC system that requires much more managerial
freedom and short-term decision making. They further noted that the budget
process is influenced by the political process, and that the funding for
capital projects is sometimes spread out over so many years that
technologies are out of date by the time they are deployed. Annual funding
uncertainties discourage strategic and capital planning, they said, and
the budget fails to show priorities and relationships among proposed
investments.
Short-term and Longer Term Changes Could Promote Success
Participants suggested that the ATO could facilitate cultural
transformation by creating a vision and strategy that would unite
stakeholders and by assembling project teams with different skills and
interests whose members could forge common organizational interests by
working together to solve common technology development problems. To help
offset technical inadequacies, the participants suggested that the ATO
could consult an advisory board, identify and consider purchasing needed
technologies that other countries have developed, and hire more skilled
engineers to provide in-house expertise. To address budgetary constraints,
participants suggested, among other short-term steps, reducing spending to
match revenues and developing strategies for presenting FAA's budget
request more clearly to Congress. Longer term suggestions included giving
the ATO the predictable funding and decisionmaking authority it needs to
carry out a "sensible" capital investment plan.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Panel
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
1 Limitations and Qualifications 5 Results in Brief 6 Panelists Identified
Cultural and Technical Factors That Have
Affected ATC Modernization and Suggested Short-term Steps to Address Them
8
Panelists Said Funding Shortfall and Features of the Federal Budget
Process Affect ATC Modernization and Suggested Short-term Steps to Address
Them 16
Panelists Suggested Structural Changes to Improve the ATO's Chances of
Success over Time 28 Concluding Observations 34
Appendixes
Appendix I: GAO Panel Members 36
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 38 GAO Contact 38 Staff
Acknowledgments 38
Related GAO Products 39
Cultural and Technical Factors 39
Budgetary Factors 40
Structural Issues 41
Contents
Abbreviations
AOV Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service
ATC air traffic control
ATO Air Traffic Organization
COO Chief Operating Officer
DOT/IG Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office
NAS national airspace system
NEXCOM Next-Generation Air-to-Ground Communications System
OEP Operational Evolution Plan
OMB Office of Management and Budget
RNAV area navigation
RNP required navigation performance
STARS Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
URET User Request Evaluation Tool
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
In 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began what it initially
envisioned as a 10-year modernization program to upgrade and replace the
national airspace system's (NAS) facilities and equipment to meet
projected increases in traffic volumes, enhance the system's margin of
safety, and increase the efficiency of the air traffic control (ATC)
system-a principal component of the NAS.1 Through the ATC component of
this modernization program, FAA planned to acquire a vast network of
radar, navigation, communications, and information processing systems that
would enhance aviation safety and accommodate predicted growth in air
traffic in the NAS. However, the program has proved to be more challenging
than anticipated, in terms of both technology and management, and FAA's
efforts to achieve desired improvements in performance have typically
taken longer and cost more than anticipated. As a result, planned
improvements in safety and capacity have been delayed, and the costs, both
of maintaining existing technologies and of replacing outdated ATC systems
and infrastructure, have grown.2 FAA no longer sees its modernization
program as a multiyear initiative with a defined end; rather, it now sees
the program as an ongoing investment in technological advances designed to
improve aviation safety and capacity. To date, FAA has spent $43.5 billion
on NAS modernization,3 and it expects to spend an additional $9.6 billion
through 2009, primarily to upgrade and replace ATC facilities and
equipment. Of the $43.5 billion spent thus far, about $25.1 billion, or 58
percent, has gone to ATC upgrades and replacements, according to FAA.
1The NAS is a complex network of interconnected systems that includes over
19,000 airports, 750 ATC facilities, and about 45,000 pieces of equipment.
2See GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Modernization Efforts--Past, Present,
and Future, GAO-04-227T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2003); National
Airspace System: Current Efforts and Proposed Changes to Improve
Performance of FAA's Air Traffic Control System, GAO-03-542 (Washington,
D.C.: May 30, 2003); and High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207
(Washington, D.C.: January 2005).
3For purposes of this report, NAS modernization refers to ATC facilities,
equipment, and related expenses.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
To improve FAA's management of the modernization program, Congress, in
1995, gave the agency acquisition and human capital flexibilities, which
FAA has largely implemented.4 According to our most recent work, FAA has
made important progress and improvements in its acquisition of major
systems,5 but the modernization program remains challenging and some
problems have persisted. In 2000, Congress and the administration took
further steps to improve the modernization program's management. Through
legislation and an executive order, they laid the foundation for a new,
three-component structure, including an oversight body, called the Air
Traffic Services Subcommittee;6 a Chief Operating Officer; and the Air
Traffic Organization (ATO), a performance-based organization to manage
FAA's ATC investments and operations.7 In February 2004, FAA merged its
Office of Air Traffic Services, Office of Research and Acquisitions, and
Free Flight Program Office to create the ATO. The new organizational
structure sought to break some of the existing "stovepipes" and bring
together the key organizational units responsible for, among other things,
ATC modernization.
4Fiscal Year 1996 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, Public
Law 104-50, Section 348.
5See GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Ensure Better Coordination
When Approving Air Traffic Control Systems, GAO-05-11 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 17, 2004); Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has
Improved, but Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure
Results, GAO-05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004); Information
Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities in Place, but
More Oversight of Operational Systems Is Needed, GAO-04-822 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities
Improved, but More Can Be Done to Institutionalize Improvements,
GAO-04-901 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); and GAO-05-207.
6This body was created as a subcommittee of a larger, preexisting
organization, the Management Advisory Council, which Congress had
established in 2000 to oversee the administration, management, conduct,
direction, and supervision of the ATC system. When Congress reauthorized
FAA in December 2003, it eliminated the subcommittee's oversight
responsibilities, and the subcommittee is now purely advisory. According
to FAA, the subcommittee can help the ATO achieve consensus on difficult
issues and contribute business expertise.
7Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century,
Public Law 106-181, Section 303, April 5, 2000; Executive Order 13180,
December 7, 2000. Under the executive order, part of the ATO's purpose is
to "develop methods to accelerate air traffic control modernization and to
improve aviation safety related to air traffic control."
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, temporarily reduced airport
congestion, but a number of factors-including a drop in air traffic in the
years following the attacks, the economic slowdown, and an increase in
businesses' use of low-cost carriers-led to a significant decline in
airline ticket tax receipts and in the Aviation Trust Fund, where the
receipts are deposited.8 Today, air traffic has rebounded to near
pre-September 11 levels and congestion is increasing, but the Aviation
Trust Fund balance appears to be smaller than expected. For fiscal year
2005, for example, FAA reduced its original estimate of this fund balance
by nearly $3.5 billion, and the agency is reviewing its estimates for
future years.
The House Committees on Government Reform and Transportation and
Infrastructure asked us to conduct a comprehensive review of the NAS
modernization program's ATC modernization effort, the performance-based
organizational initiatives resulting in the creation of the ATO, and the
funding challenges that the changed budget situation poses for the
modernization program. As part of our efforts to respond to the
committees' request, which we plan to address through two separate ongoing
studies,9 we convened a panel of international aviation experts and asked
them the following questions:
o What factors have affected the schedule, cost, and performance of FAA's
ATC modernization program, and what steps could the ATO take in the short
term to address these factors?
o How have federal budget constraints affected ATC modernization, and
what steps could the ATO take in the short term to address these
constraints?
8Congress appropriates funds for FAA's budget from both the Aviation Trust
Fund and the General Fund. According to FAA's FY 2006 Budget in Brief, the
Aviation Trust Fund accounted for $9.7 billion of FAA's $14.1 billion
budget for fiscal year 2004, and the General Fund accounted for the
remainder.
9These include a report on the status of individual ATC system
acquisitions and a comprehensive report on the status of the complete NAS
modernization program. In addition, in response to a request from the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, we are
currently obtaining information and plan to report on how other countries
have commercialized their air traffic services, applying a
performance-based approach. For this work, we asked the panelists to
discuss any lessons that can be learned from commercializing air traffic
services abroad. We plan to incorporate the panelists' comments on this
topic in the report that we expect to issue for the Senate committee.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
o What steps could FAA take in the longer term to improve the
modernization program's chances of success and help the ATO achieve its
mission?
This report summarizes the panelists' responses to these and related
questions that arose during the panel discussions.
The panel consisted of foreign and domestic aviation experts from
industry, government, private think tanks, and academia. Their fields of
expertise included aviation safety, economics, and engineering;
transportation research and policy; and government and private-sector
management. Former FAA officials and current executives of the air traffic
organizations in Canada and the United Kingdom10 were among the experts,
as was the chairman of EUROCONTROL's Performance Review Commission.11 In
addition, the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the ATO presented an
initial briefing on the status of and plans for the ATO. He responded to
questions but did not remain for the panel discussion. (See app. I for a
list of the panelists.)
The panelists convened at the National Academies Keck Center in
Washington, D.C., on October 7, 2004, after reviewing background materials
and discussion questions that we provided in advance. The background
materials included reports by GAO, the Department of Transportation's
Office of Inspector General (DOT/IG), FAA, and other government
organizations; industry publications; studies supporting and opposing the
corporatization of air traffic services; and a comparative Performance
Review Commission report.
As agreed with the panelists, the purpose of this panel was to engage in
an open, not-for-attribution dialogue. However, information from the
briefing by the ATO's COO and the COO's responses to the panelists'
follow-up questions are attributed to him because his presentation was
critical to the panelists' discussion. This material appears, together
with relevant
10The head of Germany's air navigation services responsible for air
traffic control, DFS (Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH), provided written
responses to our questions.
11EUROCONTROL is the European Organization for the Safety of Air
Navigation. The Performance Review Commission, one of EUROCONTROL's
oversight bodies, was established to ensure effective management of
European Air Traffic Management, through target-setting and the
establishment of a transparent and independent performance review system.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
information from some of our issued reports and work in progress, in the
italicized text at the end of each major section of this report. (See
Related GAO Products at the end of this report for a list, by topic, of
reports, testimonies, and other products we have issued in recent years on
topics related to those discussed by the panel.) Otherwise, this report
summarizes the collective discussion by topic and does not necessarily
represent the views of any individual panelist, GAO, or the National
Academies. We did not verify the panelists' statements, although we did
ask the panelists, in some instances, to clarify certain details. See
appendix II for GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments.
Limitations and Qualifications
The discussion summarized in this report should be interpreted in the
context of two key limitations and qualifications.
First, the panel was only an initial step in a possible long-term,
evolving effort to develop and sustain discussion on ATC modernization. As
such, it brought together generalists, rather than specialists, to address
broad themes and consider how to organize a more comprehensive approach.
Because our scope was limited, we could not include a large number of
leading experts, institutions, and networks involved in specialized
efforts. Furthermore, although many points of view were represented, the
panel was not representative of all potential stakeholders.
Second, even though we, in cooperation with the National Academies,
conducted preliminary research and heard from national experts in their
fields, a day's conversation cannot represent the current practice in this
vast arena. More thought, discussion, and research are needed to develop
greater agreement on what we really know, what needs to be done, and how
to do it.
These two key limitations and qualifications provide contextual
boundaries. Nevertheless, the panel provided a rich dialogue on ATC
modernization, and the panelists developed strong messages in responding
to each of the three questions. Those messages are highlighted below.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
Results in Brief Overall, the panelists identified cultural, technical,
and budgetary factors that they thought had affected the progress of the
modernization program. To address these factors, the panelists proposed
what one panelist termed a "two-pronged" approach-simultaneously taking
care of "the here and now" and building a "viable future" for the ATO.12
Envisioning "parallel efforts," the panelists identified multiple steps
that the ATO could take in the short term within its existing legislative
and organizational framework, as well as structural changes that could be
made in the longer term to enhance the modernization program's prospects
for success.
According to panelists, the key cultural factor impeding modernization has
been resistance to change. Such resistance is a characteristic of FAA
personnel at all levels, panelists said, and management, in the experience
of some panelists, is more resistant than employees who may fear that new
technologies will threaten their jobs. Panelists noted that resistance to
change is at odds with the financially stressed aviation industry's need
for new air traffic systems and procedures that will enhance capacity and
efficiency and reduce costly delays. Panelists suggested that the ATO
could facilitate cultural transformation by (1) creating a vision and
strategy that would unite stakeholders and (2) assembling project teams
with different skills and interests-engineers, finance officers,
information technology experts, and controllers-whose members could work
together to solve common technology development problems and, in so doing,
forge common organizational interests. The key technical factor affecting
modernization, panelists said, has been a shortfall in the technical
expertise needed to design, develop, or manage complex air traffic
systems. Without the technical proficiency to "scrub" project proposals
for potential problems early and to oversee the contractors who implement
its modernization projects, they said, FAA has to rely on the contractors,
whose interests differ from its own. To help offset its technical
inadequacies, the panelists suggested that the ATO could take steps such
as consulting an advisory board, identify and consider purchasing needed
technologies that other countries have developed, and hire more skilled
engineers to provide in-house expertise.
According to the panelists, budget constraints have affected ATC
modernization in several ways, and the ATO could take a number of steps
12The panelists used the terms "FAA" and "ATO" interchangeably. Therefore,
references to FAA should be considered references to the ATO in this
context.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
in the short term to address them. The most immediate budgetary constraint
identified by the panel is the multibillion-dollar shortfall that FAA is
projecting between available revenues and modernization needs over the
next 4 years. One panelist predicted that this shortfall would have
gradual rather than catastrophic effects and would manifest itself through
a slow but sure increase in air traffic delays. The panelists also
identified features of the federal budget process that they believe
constrain modernization. They said, for example, that the federal budget
cycle is too long and inflexible to meet the needs of a dynamic ATC system
that requires much more managerial freedom and short-term decision making.
In addition, they noted that the budget process is influenced by the
political process, and that the funding for capital projects is sometimes
spread out over so many years that technologies are out of date by the
time they are deployed. Annual funding uncertainties discourage strategic
and capital planning, they noted, and the budget fails to show priorities
and relationships among proposed investments. To address these
constraints, the panelists suggested various actions that the ATO could
take in the short term, including accepting the budget process as it is
and reducing spending to match revenues, developing strategies for
presenting FAA's budget request more clearly to Congress, implementing
regulatory and procedural changes to allow the use of existing cost-saving
technologies, contracting with the private sector to provide certain air
traffic services, and obtaining information on other countries' ATC
technologies and on international technical standards.
For the longer term, some panelists suggested structural changes, which
would generally require legislation. The goal of these longer term
initiatives would be to give the ATO the predictable funding and
decision-making authority these panelists said it needs to carry out a
"sensible" capital investment plan. The suggested initiatives included
replacing taxes with user fees based on the cost of air traffic services,
allowing the ATO to manage those fees, and giving the ATO borrowing and
leasing authority. The panelists advocating these kinds of initiatives
said the initiatives would help the ATO address the predicted funding
shortfall and free it from the constraints of the federal budget process,
as well as enable the ATO to pay for the technical expertise and the
technologies it needs to deliver efficient, cost-effective service. In
addition, these panelists said, removing the ATO's funding from the
appropriations process would establish a direct relationship between the
ATO and its customers that could promote efficiencies and improve service.
According to these panelists, customers would monitor the ATO's spending
to ensure that the ATO addressed their priorities, and the ATO would
provide better service because it would try to
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
please the customers rather than the appropriators who now fund its
activities. Restructuring the financing of the modernization program could
streamline and strengthen the ATO's management, they said. According to
these panelists, this kind of financing arrangement would allow program
managers to make decisions quickly, on the basis of business rather than
political considerations, and could provide the ATO with the management
tools needed to fully execute its mission. While not disagreeing with the
potential benefits of the proposed structural changes, other panelists
cautioned against investing too much effort in them, since, in the view of
these other panelists, the changes were, for the most part, politically
infeasible. Moreover, as one panelist noted, even if the structural
changes were implemented, it would be important to consider what problems
they were creating as well as what problems they were addressing. He
suggested, for example, that a weight-based user fee might incentivize
smaller planes and more planes, thereby having the unintended effect of
increasing demands on the ATC system's capacity. Finally, one panelist
said, restructuring could resolve the conflict of interest inherent in
FAA's dual responsibility as the regulator and the operator of air traffic
services.
Panelists Identified Cultural and Technical Factors That Have Affected ATC
Modernization and Suggested Short-term Steps to Address Them
The panelists attributed many of the ATC modernization program's chronic
problems to cultural and technical factors. In particular, they cited
resistance to change at all levels within the agency and insufficient
technical expertise as key factors impeding modernization. They identified
multiple, currently available options for addressing these factors.
Panelists Cited Resistance to Change as a Key Cultural Factor Impeding
Modernization
Although the panelists did not explicitly define "culture," they used the
term generally to denote an environment in which multiple stakeholders
with entrenched interests struggle to preserve their interests and to
retain control or influence. They described FAA's culture as resistant to
change and identified resistance to change as a characteristic of FAA
personnel at all levels. One panelist cited FAA's ingrained preference for
ground-based systems and for sticking with what has worked in the past
rather than rocking the boat by trying out new technologies, especially
since "the boss isn't telling you to rock the boat." A second panelist
described FAA as "very,
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
very resistant" to having private organizations, rather than FAA, develop
new procedures and systems for FAA to approve and institute.
Several panelists saw resistance to change as a consequence of federal
employment-of the security that comes from having a regular paycheck,
cost-of-living pay increases, and protections against layoffs. A
government organization is insulated from the economic pressures that the
private sector faces, one of the panelists indicated. In his view, federal
employees do not have the firsthand experience with layoffs and business
failures to understand, as private aviation industry employees do, why
improvements to the ATC system's efficiency are needed to help revitalize
the struggling aviation industry.
Other panelists emphasized the reluctance of management to change.
According to a panelist with experience in restructuring a foreign air
traffic organization, the senior and middle managers could not or would
not adjust to the change and had to be let go within the first 2 years.
The other employees also had difficulty adjusting and were still adjusting
in some respects, he said, but getting management on the right page was
the real challenge. Another panelist emphasized that cultural change
starts at the top and questioned why the ATO's new COO had, according to
the panelist's count, replaced only two top managers in the ATO and simply
reassigned other managers. Still another panelist suggested that cultural
change within the ATO alone would not be sufficient to ensure the ATO's
success, because so much of the ATO's fate depends on other organizations,
including FAA, DOT, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
Congress.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
A number of panelists described the air traffic controllers' union as also
resistant to change. According to one panelist, for example, the union
delayed the adoption of technologies such as the User Request Evaluation
Tool (URET) because some controllers saw them as a threat to its
membership.13 Another panelist cited the union's long-term opposition to
the implementation of a software program that tracks productivity-a key
measure for a performance-based organization.14 The union is "very
political," several panelists asserted, and one panelist charged that it
was "hindering the progress" of a performance-based organization.
Resistance to change can be an issue outside FAA as well as within it,
panelists noted. For example, one panelist questioned how much support the
ATO was getting from DOT, OMB, and congressional committees for changing
"some extremely entrenched political fiefdoms." Another panelist said that
he had found the congressional authorizing committees amenable to changes,
but the appropriators liked things the way they were.
Panelists Suggested Steps That the ATO Could Take in the Short Term to
Address Cultural Impediments to Modernization
According to some panelists, creating a common vision, bringing in a new
management team, and employing strategies that bring disparate
stakeholders together could immediately help the ATO address the cultural
factors that have impeded modernization. The following are steps that
panelists proposed to facilitate the ATO's cultural transformation:
o According to one panelist, the ATO needs to give people a vision and a
clear plan, or strategy, that they can understand. People have to know
13URET is a computer program that aids controllers in granting pilot's
requests to change their flight paths for more direct routes or for
different altitudes and allows controllers to look 20 minutes into the
future of a flight path. If a pilot wants a different route, the
controller punches in the request and is immediately advised if the
request is safe. Previously, the controller relied on paper flight strips
and mental calculations. According to FAA, as a result of URET, pilots now
receive more direct routes and the airlines are saving time and money.
14The National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the federal-sector
labor union representing air traffic controllers, engineers, and other
safety-related professionals, testified in June 2004 that "controller time
on position," a measure of time that tracks when controllers are working
with the primary responsibility for an operational ATC position, tracks
only a portion of the controller's job functions and, therefore, is not an
accurate measure. Testimony of Ruth E. Marlin, Executive Vice President,
National Air Traffic Controllers Association Before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Aviation, Status of the Air Traffic Controller Workforce,
June 15, 2004.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
what is expected of them, how they fit into the strategy, and what the
vision is for their organization.
o In addition to having a vision, another panelist said, it is important
for the ATO to tie that vision to the user constituency, not confine it to
the agency. FAA cannot do everything alone from the inside, because
airplanes and airports, for example, need to be equipped with the
technologies that will help realize the vision.
o Employing a team concept could help overcome resistance to the
implementation of new technologies, according to another panelist. Putting
engineers, finance people, controllers, and electronic technologists
together, all on the same team, he said, could unite them as they moved
through the stages of implementation. Therefore, when the time comes to
field a technology, the focus would be on getting it up and running and
operating safely-not, the panelist implied, on obstructing its
implementation because it might threaten jobs.
o A change in management's approach could go a long way toward overcoming
controllers' and other employees' resistance to change, one panelist
noted. One foreign air traffic organization changed its whole approach to
the unions and the staff, started talking to them as people, and began
executing "participative working" programs, according to the panelist.
Union representatives and managers take the same courses together and
address issues of affordability together, he said, and, as a result,
controllers' pay has increased, costs have dropped, and productivity has
risen. The key to these positive results, he said, is psychological
change-managers have stopped seeing employees as a problem and have
started to see them as part of the solution.
o According to other panelists, however, people find it very difficult to
change, and the only way to bring about a cultural transformation is to
replace those who resist change, either by allowing them to retire or by
hiring others to take their places. In the corporate world, one panelist
observed, a new executive brings in a new management team to support a
cultural turnaround. The new team is then loyal to the new executive. In
the view of this panelist, the COO's hiring of only two new managers and
reassignment of other managers would not be sufficient to turn the ATO's
culture around. Another panelist further noted that an executive in the
private sector replaced the top 200 people in his organization to achieve
the transformation he was seeking.
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Control Modernization Program
Panelists Said FAA Personnel Lack Technical Expertise Needed to Develop
Complex Systems and Oversee Contractors Effectively
Technical as well as cultural factors have impeded ATC modernization,
according to several of the panelists. In the words of one speaker, FAA
does not have "the engineering technical capability to deal with an
extremely complex, highly nonlinear adaptive system that's got technical
safety risk as a key technical parameter." According to another panelist,
FAA does not apply rigorous systems engineering expertise early in
nonadvocate technical reviews of project proposals to scrub them for
potential issues. As a result, a number of FAA's programs-including
complex ones such as the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), as well as
more "straightforward" ones such as the Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System (STARS) and the Next-Generation Air-to-Ground
Communications System (NEXCOM)15-had fundamental system engineering
technical issues that were not identified early in the program. The risks
were not mitigated, and the programs experienced significant cost growth
and schedule increases. "The system engineering organization in FAA is
nothing more than a process organization," another panelist said. "The
power resides with the program manager. It doesn't matter what the systems
engineering people do, their job is to keep doing plans and processes.
They think that meetings are products."
FAA's lack of systems engineering expertise is problematic not only when
the agency reviews project proposals but also when it manages contracts,
panelists observed. Although FAA personnel receive training in acquisition
management, one panelist noted, they also need technical skills. If they
simply learn how to carry out the acquisition process without really
understanding the underlying technical interrelationships, they will fail,
he said. In the words of another panelist, FAA may be able to hire smart
contractors, but it needs personnel of its own who are smart enough to ask
the right questions and smart enough to understand the answers. FAA lacks
the technical expertise needed to design, develop, or manage complex air
traffic systems, another panelist maintained, because the administration
never allowed the agency to invest in highly qualified technical
personnel. As a result, FAA is beholden to its contractors, who may or may
not do a
15WAAS is a navigation and landing system that uses global positioning
system technology. According to FAA, WAAS is to improve safety by
providing precision guidance to an aircraft in all phases of flight at
thousands of airports and landing strips, including runways where there is
no ground-based landing capability. STARS is a color computer display
system used at FAA terminal radar control and Department of Defense
facilities. NEXCOM will replace the existing analog ATC communications
system with a digital system that has greater capabilities.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
good job, but who certainly have a different motivation from FAA. As this
panelist put it, FAA lacks a rudder, in a technical sense, for modernization.
Panelists Suggested Steps That the ATO Could Take in the Short Term to
Address Insufficient Technical Expertise
To help address its lack of technical expertise, panelists suggested, the
ATO could obtain advice from an independent board or information from
other countries on technologies that they have already adopted. The
panelists proposed some immediate steps that the ATO could take to address
this deficiency, including the following:
o A technical advisory board made up of system engineers could review
proposals for FAA and demand the kinds of data and tests needed to scrub
the proposals and identify any big roadblocks.
o Hiring skilled engineers instead of relying on contractors might enable
the ATO to develop systems more economically and efficiently, one panelist
suggested. This panelist described how a foreign air traffic services
organization develops new ATC systems in-house and seldom uses
contractors. It now utilizes its engineers to build systems rather than
manage contractors. As a result, he said, it is now developing the systems
it needs faster and at less cost.
o Maximizing the use of commercial inputs was the recommendation of
another panelist, who said that FAA needs to get out of the business of
designing systems. According to him, most companies no longer develop
their own large, complex systems; instead, they get other people to do
that for them in the private sector. Another panelist also emphasized the
availability of technical expertise in the private sector. However,
according to a third panelist, commercial systems have a shorter economic
service life than the systems that FAA designs.
o The ATO could profitably take advantage of the experiences of other
countries' air traffic organizations, which are technically as good as FAA
ever was or ever will be, one panelist said. He maintained that the ATO
should institute "a fundamental requirement and a cultural expectation"
that it will review existing technologies before it buys or tries to
develop its own. With a multibillion-dollar budget for software and other
information technology, he said, the ATO has ample opportunity to save
money.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
In his opening remarks and in responding to panelists' questions, the
ATO's COO made a number of observations on FAA's culture. He also noted
that FAA plans to train or hire people with needed skills to address
shortfalls in technical expertise. The following summarizes some of his
key observations on FAA's culture and provides additional information from
previous GAO reports and work in progress on how FAA is addressing some of
the cultural and technical factors panelists identified as affecting ATC
modernization:
Recognizing that cultural factors can play a critical role in an
organization's success, the ATO has initiated organizational changes that
are designed to create a foundation for cultural change and deliver
benefits to customers efficiently. For example, the ATO
o established collaborative teams of technical experts and ATC system
users;
o reorganized air traffic services and the research and acquisition
organization along functional lines of business to bring stakeholders
together and integrate goals, as well as reward cooperation by linking
investments to operations;
o reduced layers of management from 11 to 7 to help address the
hierarchical nature of the organization; and
o conducted an organizationwide activity value analysis to determine the
full range of activities that ATO headquarters is engaged in, the value
customers place on those activities, and the potential for conducting any
of those activities more effectively and efficiently.
Although FAA anticipates that cultural change will take a long time, it is
giving high priority to changing its leadership model by linking top
management more closely to operations in the field and replacing "command
and control" with communication across organizational levels. According to
an FAA consultant's review of the agency's internal communication
needs,16communication within FAA is, in many ways, broken, but a good
number of employees want to help fix it. Employees willingly participated
in discussions and focus groups, the report said,
16"Communicating the Future within the Federal Aviation Administration,"
Review of Findings from Summer 2004, Internal Research, August 13, 2004.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
indicating a desire to improve the flow of information within the agency
by sending a large number of detailed e-mails in response to a call for
recommendations to improve internal communications.
In the past, according to the ATO's COO, FAA's management culture was
"intensely hierarchical, risk averse," and "reactionary." But now, he
said, FAA is attempting to foster "results-focused, proactive and
innovative behavior." Changing the agency's leadership model is also
designed, he said, to replace a "personality-driven culture" with a
sustainable, stable, viable organization that can make rational decisions
that transcend changes in political leadership.
The ATO is trying to better align FAA's priorities and stakeholders'
interests by developing a strategy map that captures the outputs desired
by the ATO's owners and customers, along with the outputs that must be
achieved. Called the Strategic Management Process, this effort borrows
heavily from a private-sector model and uses the ATO's strategic goals and
objectives to drive investment decisions. According to FAA, the strategy
map will enable owners and customers to clearly understand both the
services that the ATO is providing and the effects of products in
development on those services. As a result, FAA says, future budgetary
conversations will revolve around the desired level of service, instead of
focusing on a product, as past discussions typically did. According to
FAA, the Strategic Management Process will ensure linkage between FAA's
operating and capital budgets.
To become a "performance-based organization" and identify customer groups
and their service needs, the ATO created "value-based" performance
metrics; that is, it defined its performance in terms of customers' needs
and connected efforts to satisfy those needs with cost. Ultimately, the
ATO wants to know how much every unit of output costs so that it can
allocate and compare costs and measure productivity. Thus, each
organizational unit and facility is developing applicable metrics for
performance so that the ATO can compare costs, identify factors that
affect costs, and use this information to improve performance. For
example, each en route facility is determining its hourly cost to control
flights. The ATO can then compare and analyze these costs to identify
positive and negative factors affecting performance and productivity.
FAA is implementing its 10-year strategy for air traffic controllers, the
Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan, released in December 2004. This
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
plan is a response to a congressional mandate, based on a recommendation
we made in 2002, that FAA develop a plan for addressing an impending wave
of controller retirements and deal with productivity issues.
Panelists Said Funding Shortfall and Features of the Federal Budget Process
Affect ATC Modernization and Suggested Short-term Steps to Address Them
The panelists identified and discussed the impact of funding constraints
and the federal budget process on ATC modernization. In their view, the
most immediate issue is a critical shortage of funds to meet the current
modernization program's plans and users' demands. Additionally, they said,
the federal budget process is slow, inflexible, and influenced by the
political process; annual appropriations are uncertain and discourage
planning; and the budget fails to show investment priorities and
relationships between FAA's capital and operating budgets. The panelists
suggested a number of steps that the ATO could currently take to address
these challenges.
With Funding Shortfall, Flight Delays May Gradually Increase, Panelists Said
Panelists viewed the ATO's apparent fiscal shortfall-which one panelist
said would amount to a 20 percent deficit in 4 years-as a severe
challenge. In terms of operations, the panelist said, this deficit was
more likely to have a gradual than an immediately catastrophic onset. He
did not expect to see major system outages but predicted, instead, "a slow
but sure increase in delays." However, as another panelist said, if the
ATO did not carefully analyze demand and determine how that demand could
be served, the ATO would find itself facing what a third panelist referred
to as a "perfect storm," reiterating a term the ATO itself has used.
Severe reductions in the funding for ATC modernization, if required to
address the currently projected shortfall, could exacerbate what one
panelist described as the government's traditional underfunding of the ATC
system's capital requirements. According to this panelist, the government
undercapitalizes any complex, rapidly evolving operational system,
including the ATC system, and overestimates the economic service lives of
information technology investments. Whereas the government typically
assumes such investments will last for 15 years, he said, a 7-year
estimate would be more reasonable.
Although the ATO has said that its business plan, when completed, will
provide policy makers with detailed information on the current funding
shortfall, panelists expressed concerns about the political implications
of
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
showing large deficits. They suggested, for example, that FAA and DOT
officials might be unwilling to publicly release data that could raise
questions about their management.
Funding Air Traffic Services through the Budget Process Is Slow and
Inflexible, Some Panelists Said
Several panelists maintained that the federal budget cycle is too long and
inflexible to meet the needs of an ATC system. According to one panelist,
it is "impossible" to run the U.S. ATC system within the classic federal
structure. Such a "dramatic," "dynamic" system requires "more managerial
freedom, much more day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month
decisionmaking," he said. The federal budget process freezes plans for the
system 12 or 18 months in advance, but for an ATC system to succeed,
"you've got to be 12 or 18 days ahead."
The budget procedure requiring that capital investments be funded out of
annual appropriations means that major acquisitions generally take many
years to implement and projects may continue to be implemented even after
they have outlived their usefulness. Particularly when annual
appropriations fall short, panelists noted, projects' development and
deployment may be delayed and their costs may increase with time.
Furthermore, until the acquisitions are completed, the benefits of the new
technologies are deferred, aging equipment may pose risks to users, and
outdated software may require costly upgrades. By the time the
acquisitions are fully deployed, panelists said, they may be out of date.
Panelists Described the Effects of the Political Process on the Federal
Budget
Several panelists discussed the impact of the political process on the
federal budget. According to one panelist, Members of Congress may base
funding decisions on how jobs in their districts will be affected, rather
than on how reasonable the business cases for actions may be. As evidence,
he cited a Senate provision that prohibited FAA from closing its regional
accounting departments and centralizing them to achieve cost efficiencies
because the regional departments were big employers in congressional
districts. Another panelist noted that political considerations may be
more influential than broader issues. In his view, competition among
appropriators for projects benefiting their constituents, regardless of
the need for those projects, undermined need-based efforts to allocate
scarce resources so that the NAS can serve as many people as possible.
"I've been in too many of these meetings where we prioritize things," he
said. "And if your constituency doesn't get something, I know you're not
going to support me." Thus, Oklahoma, for example, may get the same ATC
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
technology as New York, despite resource constraints and major differences
in air traffic demand.
The political process influences budget decisions in the administration as
well as in Congress, some panelists said. According to one panelist,
Congress has generally supported FAA's modernization program, but funding
difficulties have ensued because the budget is consolidated and there are
always pressures on it. Other panelists added that the ATO would have
difficulty "deliver[ing] the bad news"-that is, publishing a business plan
that projects deficit scenarios-unless revenue increases are forthcoming.
According to this panelist, OMB would deny any requests for increased
funding and would, instead, tell the ATO to find another way of doing
business.
Panelists Said Uncertain Annual Funding Discourages Effective Planning
Panelists noted that funding from annual appropriations is uncertain, and
that this uncertainty is incompatible with strategic and capital planning.
The amount of money available for appropriation each year cannot be
predetermined, one panelist said, and the size of the appropriation may
vary from year to year. This uncertainty focuses attention on which
technology will receive the funding (the inputs) rather than on what
improvements in safety or capacity the technology is supposed to deliver
(the outputs), he said. In debating whether this investment or that
investment should receive funding, planners have lost sight of the big
picture, he suggested, and the ATO has spent most of its capital
investment dollars on sustaining and maintaining existing systems. Only
about 14 percent of its expenditures, he recalled, were for flight
enhancement. "Who anywhere would have a capital investment plan that was
predominantly about standing still?" he asked.
Another panelist also considered the federal budget process incompatible
with strategic planning. In his words, "it is absolutely a problem at FAA"
that "budget drives strategy and strategy does not drive budget." Although
FAA is good at forecasting demand, he said, it does not evaluate "the
anatomy of demand" and determine how that demand will be served. Panelists
noted, for example, that the number of regional jets, low-fare airlines,
and unmanned aerial vehicles are increasing, but FAA has not developed a
business model or plans for managing the increased air traffic.
Other panelists suggested that the federal budget process discourages
realistic capital planning. FAA's capital investment plan is "mired in
predictable annual fits and starts subject to micromanagement by
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
Congress," one panelist said, rather than integrated, organized, and
periodically revised. Another panelist observed that FAA asks for more
than it can get and then carries the difference over from year to year,
creating "a bow wave" of unfunded requests for capital projects that it
seldom reduces. Furthermore, as a third panelist pointed out, the budget
process establishes incentives for unrealistic planning: Project managers
first overpromise capabilities and underestimate costs to increase the
chances that new projects will be accepted. Then, after projects are
accepted, they overestimate costs because they assume their requests will
be cut. Although managers could include options in their budget
submissions to indicate what could be accomplished at different funding
levels, they do not do so because they assume items identified as options
will be cut. Finally, managers are reluctant to revise ongoing projects
because they do not want to be seen as fickle. By contrast, another
panelist said, a private company that operates under a board of directors
and obtains revenue from customers does not have incentives to play budget
games to get projects approved. "Your money is your own money," he said.
Some Panelists Believed That the Federal Budget Fails to Show Priorities and
Relationships
Some panelists criticized the federal budget for failing to show
priorities and relationships among proposed investments. In the budget,
one panelist said, "everything is as important as everything else."
Another panelist observed that the budget sets no capital investment
priorities. According to a third panelist, a line item budget tears apart
a highly layered, interdependent system and does not reveal synergies
between projects. Then, when the budget request goes to Congress, he said,
"you have no opportunity to try to explain to anybody the interconnections
of these programs." As a result, when the appropriators decide not to fund
a project, they may not understand how their decision will affect other
projects.
Several panelists discussed the "firewall" that federal budget procedures
create between the FAA's capital (Facilities and Equipment) and operating
(Operations) accounts, noting that separating these two types of costs
makes it difficult to recognize interactions between them.17 "You can't
make rational decisions if somebody is handing you those two separate
pieces with a wall between them," one panelist said. He added that the
17The vast majority of funds for FAA's ATC modernization program and
operations comes from taxes on airline tickets that are deposited into the
Aviation Trust Fund. Congress then appropriates the trust fund revenues
for line items in FAA's budget. Under federal budget procedures, funds are
appropriated separately for capital projects and for operations.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
firewall discourages analyses of life-cycle costs and may lead, in some
instances, to investments in technologies that end up in a warehouse
because the ATO cannot afford to operate them. Similarly, another panelist
observed that the separation of capital and operating costs in FAA's
accounting system makes it difficult to see the implications of capital
investment decisions for operating costs, even though "everything we put
in the field winds up increasing the ops budget." Furthermore, as another
panelist noted, the firewall makes it difficult to see the relationship
between software replacement (capital) and maintenance (operating) costs.
Thus, decisions to postpone purchases of new or upgraded software may save
capital investment costs, but rising maintenance requirements may increase
operating costs. Eventually, he said, the maintenance costs may "far
exceed" the replacement costs.
Finally, other panelists said, the budget is not integrated to show what
investments buy in terms of productivity, safety, or environmental
benefits, and FAA's capital budget fails to show the impact of investments
on the country. This can lead to mismatches-that is, to funding projects
that will provide limited benefits for users.
Panelists Identified Shortterm Steps within the Budget Process and Other
Steps That the ATO Could Take under Its Existing Authorities to Address
Budget Constraints
Short-term Steps within the Budget Process
While recognizing the magnitude of the ATO's projected funding shortfall
over the next few years, the panelists identified a number of steps that
the ATO could take to address its current financial situation. These steps
included accepting the budget process as it is and reducing spending to
match revenues, developing strategies for presenting the ATO's budget
request more clearly to Congress, implementing regulatory and procedural
changes to allow the use of existing cost-saving technologies, contracting
with the private sector to provide certain air traffic services, and
obtaining information on other countries' ATC technologies and on
international technical standards.
Several panelists emphasized the importance of accepting the budget
process as it is and of doing what can be done in today's government
system:
o One panelist thought that the ATO should scope the modernization
program so that it realistically reflects the resources that can be
expected within the next 5 years and then put together and communicate a
strategy and a vision to guide the agency's 36,000 people. He called for
the ATO to adjust its capital requirements to what can
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
realistically be funded and to review and cut its programs in light of the
current budget constraints.
o This panelist also recommended looking at longer term alternatives to
annual appropriations that are available within the government and work
well for other organizations, such as "working capital accounts and all
kinds of industrial funding schemes."
o Another panelist encouraged the ATO to focus its capital investment on
avoiding outages-that is, on replacing equipment that would otherwise
fail. This panelist also said that FAA needs a customer-oriented business
strategy and a business plan.
o One panelist, who observed that operating costs account for about
three-quarters of the ATO's total costs,18 suggested that the upcoming
wave of air traffic controller retirements19 would create "an opportunity
to redistribute and even to trim the work force in some areas," as well as
reduce personnel costs by offering incentives for early retirement.
o Improving controllers' productivity would be another way to save money,
a fourth panelist said, but he characterized his suggestion as "touch[ing]
the third rail of aviation politics."
o Another panelist emphasized the importance of starting to plan now to
accommodate the airplanes that are being bought today to provide service
for the next generation, which he variously estimated at 20, 30, or 40
years.
Some panelists proposed strategies for the ATO to present its budget
request more clearly to Congress:
18According to DOT/IG, salaries and benefits make up approximately 73
percent of FAA's operating budget. See DOT/IG, Key Issues for the Federal
Aviation Administration's FY 2005 Budget, CC-2004-038 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 22, 2004).
19In 2002, we reported that almost one-half of FAA's controller workforce
(about 7,000 controllers) would retire over the next 10 years and about 93
percent of controller supervisors would be eligible to retire by the end
of 2011. See GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Plan Still Needed to
Meet Challenges to Effectively Managing Air Traffic Controller Workforce,
GAO-04-887T (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2004) and Air Traffic Control: FAA
Needs to Better Prepare for Impending Wave of Controller Attrition,
GAO-02-591 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002).
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
o For example, one panelist said that the ATO needed to understand the
interconnections between ATC systems and break the big picture into
nuggets so that it could clarify for the appropriators why they should not
break apart the ATO's capital investment plan and selectively fund only
some components.
o Another panelist maintained that the ATO could mitigate the effects of
the firewall between its capital and operating budgets by modifying its
budget submissions to show the future cost implications of current
investment decisions.
Steps outside the Budget Process Several panelists identified options
outside the budget process that the
under Current Authorities
ATO could pursue under its current authorities. They said, for example,
that the ATO could pursue procedural and regulatory changes that would
take advantage of existing technologies to increase capacity, pilot test
contracts with the private sector to provide certain air traffic services,
and obtain information on technologies and procedures developed in other
countries that could be used in the United States.
Regulatory and Procedural Changes Could Allow the Use of Existing
Technologies to Enhance Capacity and Efficiency
Several panelists discussed the potential benefits of a more widespread
use of a concept called area navigation (RNAV), which allows operators of
properly equipped aircraft to use onboard navigation capabilities to fly
desired flight paths without requiring direct flight over ground-based
navigation aids. This provides for more direct routing, avoiding
suboptimal routes prescribed by conventional "highways in the sky" that
are defined by point-to-point flying over ground-based navigation aids.
The RNAV concept and a major new method for exploiting it, called required
navigation performance (RNP), permit flight in any airspace as long as
aircraft have been certified to meet the required accuracy level for
navigation performance. RNAV and RNP hold promise for saving system users
time and money-largely by reducing flight times and fuel consumption by
allowing users to fly shorter routes or avoid bad weather. In addition,
RNAV and RNP could potentially increase the capacity of the ATC system to
handle air traffic by reducing the required distance (separation) between
aircraft equipped with advanced navigation capabilities if the aircraft
can safely operate closer to one another than FAA's regulations currently
allow.
According to some panelists, many aircraft have had the navigation
capabilities to implement RNP for many years, but operators have not been
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
able to use these capabilities to their full potential in the United
States because FAA has not approved procedures for its use. However, the
airlines are "crying for" FAA to approve RNP, one of the panelists said,
because aircraft equipped with RNP capabilities could then fly alternative
rolling, moving routes to avoid weather delays. Service would improve for
travelers, and the airlines would avoid the substantial costs of delays,
he said. Implementing RNP could also eventually lower the ATO's costs,
another panelist said, since RNP does not require any ground equipment.
RNP technologies have been installed on larger aircraft for so long that
some aircraft equipped with the technologies have already been retired to
the desert, one panelist said. In addition, pilots have been trained to
use the technologies, and the technologies are already being used in some
other countries, including Canada, where a private airline company (West
Jet) developed implementation procedures in collaboration with the
Canadian ATC regulatory agency and the Canadian air traffic management
organization.
As a first step toward obtaining FAA's approval of procedures for using
RNP, a panelist said, the ATO could make policy announcements to set a
tone and direction. These announcements would enlist the user community's
support at little or no cost to the ATO, give the ATO an early success,
and help tie customers to the ATO's mission. However, he also cautioned,
it would be important for FAA to implement RNP in a way that did not
"disenfranchise" general aviation interests and regional carriers whose
aircraft are not already equipped with RNP technologies.
Two panelists expressed concerns about the government's approach to
regulating the use of onboard navigation equipment and the associated
procedures needed to implement RNP. According to one of these panelists,
FAA has "the wrong conceptual framework" for developing regulations to
implement new procedures. Its current approach is disproportionate, he
said, because it establishes the same safety standards for aircraft of all
sizes. "We can't keep treating airplanes that need 100 cubic miles of
airspace the same from a cost and benefit point of view as airplanes that
need a quarter cubic mile of airspace," he said. In his view, FAA needs to
revise its approach to assessing and balancing risks. He maintained that
the role of regulatory management on the evolution of the ATC system has
been underestimated and called for significant investment in understanding
risk management.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
The other panelist who expressed concerns about the government's
regulatory approach argued that navigational technology is evolving and
shifting from ground-based to cockpit-based systems. He maintained that
"you've got to get aircraft closer and closer together to be able to
increase capacity," and said that the government should allow the ATO to
change its policies on aircraft separation to permit "the technology that
exists on airplanes today to do the job." He suggested that the private
sector could assume the cost of capitalizing the equipment, but "the
government's got to allow that technology to be used, and it hasn't."
Although one panelist emphasized the importance of conducting thorough
technical evaluations of RNP to identify any roadblocks to its use, the
panelists generally considered it a highly promising, low-cost option for
the ATO to improve service. One panelist recommended that the ATO create
incentives, such as the right to fly in preferred airspace, for users that
equip their aircraft with RNP technologies, to lower the ATO's costs.
Contracting with the Private Sector to Provide Certain Air Traffic
Services Could Demonstrate Efficiencies and Potential Cost Savings
Throughout the panel, panelists discussed an initiative that FAA has
already begun-determining whether a private contractor or the federal
government can provide automated flight service station services more
efficiently.20 OMB Circular A-76 directs federal agencies to (1) identify
all activities performed by government personnel as either commercial or
inherently governmental, (2) perform inherently governmental activities
with government personnel, (3) use a competition to determine who should
perform commercial activities, and (4) award a contract to the private
sector if the outcome, or performance decision, of the competition is
20FAA formally announced in December 2003 that its flight service stations
met the criteria for competitive sourcing, and that it would conduct a
competition under OMB's A-76 guidelines for an improved way to provide
flight service operations. On February 1, 2005, FAA announced the
selection of a team headed by Lockheed Martin to provide services now
offered by the agency's network of 58 automated flight service stations
across the United States. These services include weather briefing and
flight planning services, which are used primarily by general aviation
pilots. The total evaluated cost of the 5-year contract, with 5 additional
option years, is $1.9 billion and represents estimated savings of $2.2
billion over the next 10 years.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
determined in its favor.21 The panelists, who generally assumed that the
private sector could provide flight service station services and other air
traffic services more efficiently than the government, suggested that if
contracting for flight service station services proved to be effective,
FAA could contract for other air traffic services, such as oceanic, night,
en route, or airways facilities services. The A-76 process would then
serve not only as a way of saving money but also as "a pilot program for
how things could get done," one panelist said. In the view of another
panelist, ongoing government oversight would ensure the safety of
contracted operations, and "staged outsourcing" of the NAS's functions
might build confidence in the private sector's ability to provide air
traffic services safely and efficiently.
Obtaining Information on Other Countries' ATC Technologies and on
International Technical Standards Could Help the ATO Save Costs
Obtaining information on technologies and procedures that other countries
have already developed could help the ATO control costs, as well as help
compensate for its lack of technical expertise, panelists noted. "We
should be using and sharing" the technologies that have already been
invented, one panelist said. According to his organization, the air
navigation service business worldwide spends $3 billion to $4 billion a
year on writing code for air traffic management software, and "at least
half of that" is writing code for "something that's already been invented
and...works just fine somewhere else."
Although this panelist's organization formerly maintained, as FAA has
done, that it could not adapt other countries' systems to its own unique
needs, it found, when faced with financial pressures, that it could buy
technologies from other countries or enter into agreements with them and
that it could do so at less cost than it could develop its own
technologies. To facilitate information sharing and cost saving, the
panelist suggested, benchmarks of the existing market would be useful,
including information
21Under President Clinton, air traffic services were defined as
"inherently governmental," meaning that they could not be provided by the
private sector. In June 2002, President Bush issued Executive Order 13264,
which revised that definition and opened the way for FAA to contract with
private companies for services on a test basis, as directed by OMB
Circular A-76.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
on the systems that are already running in countries, their performance,
and their cost.22
Sharing information on technical standards with international
organizations could also help the ATO avoid costly investments in
technologies whose standards were incompatible with those of other
countries. A shared vision is crucial for a globally based air traffic
system, one panelist said. If every country or continent had its own
technical standards-a North American switch, a European switch, a South
American switch, and an Australian switch, for example-an international
system could not function effectively.23
The following provides additional information from the ATO's COO and from
previous GAO reports and work in progress on how FAA is addressing some of
the funding shortfalls and features of the federal budget process that
panelists identified as affecting ATC modernization:
The ATO's COO believes that good financial management means linking FAA's
capital and operating budgets. Previously, FAA developed separate capital
(Facilities and Equipment) and operating (Operations) budgets. But the ATO
recognizes that capital expenditures directly affect operating costs over
time, and therefore the two budgets must be developed together. Creating
this linkage is important for the ATO to respond to concerns expressed by
its owners and customers as well as to address internal issues, such as
training, staffing, pay disparities, and infrastructure. Using the
Strategic Management Process to drive budget decisions will help to ensure
the establishment and maintenance of a linkage between the capital and
operating budgets.
According to the ATO's COO, it will be at least 2 years before the ATO has
completed the basic management processes needed to use the new
22EUROCONTROL has been collecting and reporting performance data from its
members since 1998, and the International Air Transport Association is
calling on the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO) to
develop performance benchmarks for its members. CANSO represents the
interests of air navigation service providers (organizations that provide
ATC services) and technology suppliers of goods and services to the
industry worldwide.
23FAA has ceased funding the ground station component of one modernization
program (NEXCOM), in part because it is reevaluating its approach for
modernizing the air-to-ground communications. FAA will move forward with
replacing older radios, which is the least complex element of the NEXCOM
effort.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
financial management systems it has been putting in place. As steps toward
that goal, the ATO expects everyone to learn the difference between cost
and cash flow and get a better handle on unit costs as better cost
accounting data become available. To gain a more complete understanding of
its costs, FAA is revising its cost accounting practices and changing from
a cash flow to a total cost business model for the ATO, and the ATO is
developing management training in cost accounting and budgeting. Moreover,
FAA plans to finish putting a new cost accounting system in place by 2006
that will allow it to assign, track, and better control costs.
In the fall of 2004, FAA updated its cost estimates in light of OMB's
revenue projections for the next 4 years and arrived at a cumulative
shortfall for the period of $5 billion for the operating budget and $3.2
billion for the capital budget. According to FAA, a business plan that the
ATO was preparing at that time will show, when completed, how large a
funding gap the ATO faces and how far it will have to go to address that
gap. Whatever the exact size of the gap may be, FAA says that it is
prepared to identify and eliminate redundancies in the NAS and to review
its long-term ATC modernization priorities.
FAA has already taken some steps to control the costs of ATC
modernization. For example, it has adopted the phased approach to
implementing new ATC systems that it used under Free Flight Phase 1,
called "build a little, test a little." This approach relies on the early
and ongoing investment of stakeholders, who review the progress of new
projects regularly and identify critical omissions and "no go" items that
would prevent a system from operating as intended. Reviews of three
projects with cost, schedule, and performance issues that our reports had
identified-the Local Area Augmentation System, Controller-Pilot Data Link
Communications, and Next-Generation Air-to-Ground Communications
System-led FAA to reduce the funding for them in FAA's fiscal year 2005
budget request. The ATO says it plans to continue this phased approach to
acquiring new systems.
FAA developed a Roadmap for Performance-Based Navigation, which it
published in July 2003, but the ATO is having difficulty finding the $10
million in its operations budget that it needs to chart RNP procedures.
Airspace redesign using RNAV is occurring in phases, and its
implementation will depend on those owners and operators who have fully
equipped aircraft and are sufficiently trained. To encourage progress, FAA
is implementing procedures that provide benefits for those
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
customers that do equip. Now, during the first phase, FAA is implementing
the redesign at very high altitudes. In January 2005, FAA doubled the
airspace routes between 29,000 feet and 41,000 feet by spacing aircraft
1,000 feet apart instead of 2,000 feet. The procedure, invisible to
passengers, is called Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum and is expected
to save airlines $400 million in fuel costs during the first year. As
technology allows, FAA says, more flight altitude levels will be added.
Currently, FAA is implementing a number of improvements to airspace and
procedures using RNP. In addition, according to FAA, five airports are
developing RNP-based procedures in partnership with airlines that favor
RNP.
Panelists Suggested Structural Changes to Improve the ATO's Chances of Success
over Time
While recognizing that the ATO could make some progress in addressing its
cultural, technical, and budgetary challenges under its current
authorities, the panelists generally agreed that structural changes would
increase the ATO's chances of success. These changes, which would give the
ATO a more predictable source of funding and greater decision-making
authority, would generally require legislative action and take time to
implement. To give the ATO a more predictable source of funding, panelists
suggested that it be authorized to establish and manage user fees, rather
than rely on appropriated tax receipts, and that it be allowed to issue
revenue bonds backed by these fees. To give the ATO greater
decision-making authority, panelists proposed restructuring it to
streamline and strengthen its management and provide its managers with the
tools needed to address its challenges. These changes would allow the ATO
to implement a "sensible" capital investment program; hire the technical
expertise it needs; achieve cost efficiencies; and offer better, more
responsive service. Additionally, panelists said, restructuring could
resolve the conflict of interest inherent in FAA's dual responsibility as
the regulator and the operator of air traffic services.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
Some Panelists Considered the Steps Taken to Create a Performance-Based Air
Traffic Organization Insufficient for Its Success
When Congress authorized the ATO's creation and generally implemented the
Mineta Commission's24 organizational recommendations without implementing
its funding recommendations, it produced an anomaly-that is, an
organization charged with becoming performance-based but deprived of the
means to transform itself, according to one panelist. Other panelists also
portrayed the ATO as an organization that is charged with operating like a
business but is not provided with the management tools available to a
business. In their view, the ATO's chances for success are limited because
the COO is being asked to turn the organization around without being given
the tools to do so. One panelist, who said he was skeptical about the
ATO's ability to act like a business when it is not really one, suggested
that it was only at the margins that the creators of the ATO had
replicated a business. According to him, the ATO is still largely a
government organization and therefore remains subject to most governmental
constraints.
Panelists Said a User Fee System Would Give the ATO a More Predictable
Source of Funding and Link Air Traffic Services with Demand
Replacing airline ticket taxes with a user fee and allowing the ATO,
rather than Congress, to manage the collected fees is a step that many
panelists considered essential for the ATO's success. While recognizing
that such a fee would be controversial, since the costs for most users
would likely increase, the panelists maintained that it would produce a
more predictable, reliable funding stream than the annual appropriations
process.
A user fee system would link air traffic services directly with demand,
panelists pointed out. Under the annual appropriations process, they
noted, Congress comes between the ATO and the airlines that use its
services. The ATO lacks a direct link with the users because Congress
appropriates the revenue from them-the airline ticket taxes that are
deposited into the Aviation Trust Fund-and the ATO is required to spend
the funds as Congress directs. Not having a direct financial link between
the ATO and the users can create inefficiencies, panelists said: The users
lack incentives to monitor the ATO's spending and may not insist on cost
control, while the ATO lacks incentives to consult the users and may
invest in technologies that the users do not want. A user fee makes the
ties between the funding source and the users "much more transparent,"
according to one panelist,
24The Mineta Commission, formally authorized as the National Civil
Aviation Review Commission, recommended in 1997 that FAA's air traffic
system be restructured as a performance-based organization, subject to
independent oversight, and be given leasing and borrowing authority.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
and helps preclude spending for "gold-plated things that don't affect the
true performance of the system and drive the costs up completely
unnecessarily." Without a direct connection to the users and their
mission, another panelist said, "evolution takes very unintended and very
undesirable paths over long periods of time." As long as the customers are
not directly paying the bills and providing the resources, still another
panelist maintained, "it's going to be very hard to bring about real
change" and make the ATO "a customer-driven, customer-servicing
organization. The ones who pay the bills are the ones you respond to and
serve," he concluded.
While panelists generally favored a user fee system, they cautioned care
in proposing and implementing one. As one panelist said, the fee question,
once raised, would be all-consuming and would require the expenditure of
political capital. In his view, it was critical that the ATO wait to
achieve some successes before seeking a user fee system. Another panelist
called for figuring out "not only what problem we're solving, but what
problems we might be likely to create," and noted that the government
would have to consider what it was incentivizing through user fees. For
example, if the fee was based on weight, he said, it might "incentivize
even smaller planes and more planes," thereby increasing demands on the
ATC system's capacity. Another issue that would have to be worked out, is
how the common costs of air traffic services (e.g., the costs of
activities in the ATC system operated by the Department of the Air Force)
should be allocated- whether users should pay only for the incremental
costs of the services they use, as most users would argue, or whether some
cross-subsidies should continue. Another panelist pointed out that
implementing a user fee alone would not guarantee efficiency, because the
air traffic services provider could simply raise the fee when costs
increased and the users would have to pay, since the service is a
monopoly. Some method of controlling costs would have to be built into the
system, he said.
Most panelists correctly assumed that legislation would be required to
institute a user fee system. Specifically, a user fee system could be
implemented in a government or a public-private type of air traffic
services organization. However, one panelist cautioned, it would be
"fatal" to implement the fee in any way that did not make the ATO
financially independent of Congress. Once the airlines and general
aviation users started to pay a fee to finance the ATO, then the ATO
should be held accountable to them, he said, and "FAA should not be
getting approval from government to spend its budget."
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
Panelists Said Borrowing Authority Would Provide the Funding for Efficient
Capital Investment
Revenue bonding based on a new user fee stream would create an
"alternative to capital starvation," one panelist said. Even if the user
fee stream initially produced no more revenue than the airlines are now
paying in aviation-related taxes, he said, the ATO could reap a
"transition dividend" during the first 5 or 10 years after the bonds are
issued, limiting its annual outlays to the debt service on the bonds. To
facilitate the airlines' recovery, he suggested, the ATO could cut what
the airlines pay and "still have a robust modernization program being
financed by the revenue bonds." He characterized this strategy as "money
that's lying on the sidewalk waiting to be picked up" and saw it as an
opportunity to buy some new equipment in bulk and get it installed before
it becomes obsolete. Such a "sensible" approach would not be possible with
annual appropriations, he said.
Further Organizational Restructuring Could Streamline and Strengthen the
ATO's Management
Panelists maintained that the ATO's organizational placement, combined
with its dependence on Congress for funding, limits the COO's ability to
make decisions and take actions. The COO is not a Chief Executive Officer,
as one of the panelists observed. Instead, he reports to his "owners"-who
include the FAA Administrator and the DOT Secretary, who in turn receive
direction from the administration (the President and OMB Director) and
Congress.
Because the ATO is embedded so deeply in the executive branch, the COO has
no means of communicating directly with the congressional committees that
authorize and fund the ATO. Congress originally tried to address this
issue when, as part of the legislation creating the COO position, it
created the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee to oversee the ATO and
report independently to Congress on the ATO's performance.25 However, the
legislation did not authorize funds to support an independent staff for
the subcommittee, and when the FAA Administrator requested funds, DOT
denied the request, one panelist said, because the Deputy Secretary saw
the subcommittee as performing a DOT function. Moreover, as another
panelist noted, Congress eliminated the subcommittee's
25As originally implemented, this committee, the Air Traffic Services
Subcommittee, was similar to the board of public interest directors that
the Mineta Commission recommended be established to oversee a
performance-based air traffic services organization.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
oversight authority,26 making the subcommittee purely advisory.
Consequently, he said, there is no oversight group that is expected to
provide constructive criticism of FAA, and FAA does not get "the kind of
constructive advice that you might hope for." According to a third
panelist, Europe's Performance Review Commission provides such
constructive advice for EUROCONTROL, the European air traffic management
organization. The commission serves as a panel of independent advisers and
costs about $2.5 million a year, he said, and "it's well worth the
investment."
According to several panelists, the ATO's COO lacks the management tools
that would be available to a private-sector CEO. His ability to plan
modernization projects, set program priorities, and implement new
technologies is constrained because the FAA Administrator, DOT Secretary,
and OMB Director can revise his budget request and Congress can make
further changes in the ATO's budget. In addition, the 20-year vision of
the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)27 is at odds with the
ATO, according to one panelist, because it looks forward to the ATC system
of 2025, rather than helping the ATO address its immediate funding needs.
Other panelists observed that the controllers' union influences
management's decisions.
The COO lacks key financial data needed to determine, analyze, and manage
the ATO's costs. When he was "parachuted" into the ATO, as one panelist
put it, he did not have the numbers he needed to know where the ATO stood
because FAA did not maintain basic information on the costs and value of
existing systems, reducing the ATO's potential to be data driven. As a
result, he spent most of his first year overseeing the implementation of a
cost accounting system and collecting other key data.
Finally, the COO's ability to manage the ATC workforce is limited. Civil
service rules give the ATO's employees powers and rights that they would
not have in a private organization, and management's ability to influence
26Congress eliminated the subcommittee's oversight responsibilities when
it reauthorized FAA in December 2003.
27This office coordinates an air transportation system planning initiative
that involves the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and
Homeland Security; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and
the Office of Science and Technology Policy and other experts from the
public and private sectors. The office reports to a Senior Policy
Committee chaired by the Secretary of Transportation.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
their performance is constrained because their terms of employment and
compensation are based largely on negotiated agreements rather than on
performance. In addition, salary caps limit FAA's ability to pay for
technical expertise.
Restructuring Could Resolve the Conflict of Interest Inherent in FAA's Dual
Role as the Regulator and the Operator of Air Traffic Services
As one panelist observed at the end of the panel, the ATO's creation did
not address the structural conflict of interest that exists because FAA is
both the regulator and the operator of air traffic services. "We didn't
have arms length regulation of air traffic control in FAA," he said, "and
the ATO didn't do anything to accomplish that." Another panelist noted
that when his country restructured its air traffic organization, it
immediately eliminated the same structural conflict of interest, and
"overnight" the regulator became more effective and the operator's safety
performance "significantly improved." According to the first panelist,
other countries that have reorganized their air traffic organizations have
also instituted arms' length regulation if they did not have it already.
"We remain one of the few places that somehow thinks that self-regulation
is a good idea, in spite of sort of overwhelming evidence in lots of
arenas that it's not a very good idea," he said.
The following is additional information from the ATO's COO and from
previous GAO reports and work in progress that indicates how FAA is
addressing some of the structural changes that panelists proposed to
improve the ATO's success over time:
In addition to the business plan that the ATO is developing to guide and
improve its operations and financial management, FAA has worked to develop
three longer term planning documents. First, it has published its Flight
Plan for 2005 through 2009, a multiyear strategic effort that sets a
5-year course for FAA in the areas of safety, capacity, international
leadership, and organizational excellence. Second, it has developed a
rolling 10-year effort, called the Operational Evolution Plan (OEP),
through which FAA plans to increase the capacity of the NAS by onethird.
Finally, FAA is participating in a multiagency effort, sponsored by the
JPDO, to develop a national plan for aviation in 2025 and beyond. Both the
OEP and the JPDO's plan are designed to meet the Flight Plan's commitment
to help the NAS flow smoothly and meet future needs. According to FAA, the
Vice President of the Operations Planning Service Unit in the ATO is also
the Director of the JPDO, helping to ensure integration of near-term and
long-term planning.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
According to the ATO's COO, the restructuring of U.S. air traffic services
that has taken place thus far, through the establishment of a
performancebased air traffic organization, constitutes "the first building
block" of the longer term effort to transform the aviation system
envisioned in the JPDO's 20-year plan. According to the COO, this vision
of the U.S. aviation system will incorporate both technologies and
processes. However, he acknowledged that the ATO has not yet connected
this longterm vision with the financial and other challenges it currently
faces. He said that his goal is to establish an organization that can
execute the long-term vision and manage not only its finances but also its
future- an organization that can, in effect, ensure the viability of the
long-term vision. Over time, he said, he plans to expand the OEP to
include a strategy and the JPDO's long-term vision, thereby "tie[ing] the
vision to the viability of the future." The OEP will then be "not just a
set of projects," but a project plan with a vision and a strategy that
goes out 20 years. But given the current budget constraints, he conceded,
the path to that goal is not clear.
In March 2004, FAA created the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV),
under FAA's Office of Aviation Safety. This step established separate
reporting relationships for the ATO, which is responsible for managing the
ATC system, and for the AOV, which is responsible for ensuring the safety
of changes to air traffic standards and procedures. The establishment of
the AOV responds directly to a recommendation by the 1997 National Civil
Aviation Review Commission that safety oversight of FAA's traffic function
be provided by a separate part of the agency. Although both organizations
remain within FAA, under the FAA Administrator, they are less closely
joined than they were previously. Hence, this step is a positive move
toward providing "arm's length" safety oversight, although it does not go
as far as placing the two organizations in separate federal agencies or
removing one of the agencies from the federal government altogether.
Concluding At our request, the panelists concluded the panel with their
parting thoughts on the day's discussion, including any advice they had
for FAA or
Observations for Congress. Overall, the panelists were united in their
desire for the ATO to succeed, but they generally agreed that its
opportunities for success were constrained within a government system. For
many, the steps taken thus far to create a performance-based organization
were insufficient, in large part because the ATO lacks control over its
revenues and funding priorities, and the ATO still had a long way to go to
achieve its goals.
National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic
Control Modernization Program
Some panelists stressed the importance of progressing by small steps
within the existing system, at least for the time being. Such small steps
might include obtaining good performance and cost information, scoping
programs in accordance with current budget projections, contracting out
some air traffic services, and obtaining outside expertise from systems
engineers and other technical and management experts. It was critical, one
panelist said, for the ATO to "have some small early practical successes"
to enlist the political support of the user community and help tie the
customers to the ATO's mission.
Other panelists focused on the obstacles within the system that they
believed would impede or prevent success. Among the obstacles they cited
were the counterproductive incentives inherent in the budget process, the
government's refusal to allow new air traffic technologies to be used, and
opposition to organizational and technological change. It was important,
one panelist said, to overcome this opposition by describing "the
difference between how things are and how they might be." Descriptions of
accomplishments elsewhere, together with actions to implement whatever
safeguards and regulatory framework might be necessary, could perhaps make
the argument for change "compelling," he said.
Still other panelists looked to the future, calling for international
technical benchmarks to promote efficient development, business models
that take into account operational trends (e.g., the growing market share
of regional jets and low-fare airlines) and incentives to help users
overcome cost barriers to acquiring new technologies. As one panelist
said, "we have to target the future mix of real operations that we're
really going to see, not build the world's most perfect system from 1956."
Despite their reservations about the ATO's potential for success as a
government organization, the panelists generally agreed that stakeholders
should not "allow the concept of privatization to be the enemy of moving
forward with the ATO," as one panelist said, or "sacrifice the good for
the better" in the words of another. Instead, taking a two-pronged
approach- telling people "what's to be done now to get results" and
telling them "that they have an obligation to build for the future"-would
be the best way, in the view of most panelists, for the ATO to meet its
immediate and longer term challenges.
Appendix I
GAO Panel Members
Clinton V. Oster, Jr. (Panel Moderator)
Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs, School of Public and
Environmental Affairs, Indiana University
Anthony J. Broderick
Independent Consultant
Former FAA Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification
Steven R. Bussolari
Assistant Division Head, Tactical Systems Division
Manager, Air Traffic Control System Group, Lincoln Laboratory,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
John W. Crichton
President and CEO, NAV Canada
George L. Donahue Director, The Center for Air Transportation Systems
Research, George Mason University Former FAA Associate Administrator for
Research and Acquisition
John J. Fearnsides
Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University
Chief Strategist and Partner of MJF Strategies
Xavier Fron
Head, Performance Review Commission, EUROCONTROL
Richard Golaszweski
Executive Vice President, Gellman Research Associates (GRA), Inc.
Ian Hall
Director of Operations, National Air Traffic Services, United Kingdom
Thomas Imrich
Chief Pilot, Research, Boeing Commercial Aircraft
Satish C. Mohleji Principal Engineer, Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development, The MITRE Corp.
Appendix I
GAO Panel Members
Robert W. Poole, Jr.
Director of Transportation Studies, Reason Foundation
Michael Powderly
President, Airspace Solutions
John A. Sorensen
Chief Executive Officer, Seagull Technology, Inc.
James A. Wilding Former President and Chief Executive Officer,
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
Appendix II
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact Gerald Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834
Staff In addition to the individual named above, Elizabeth Eisenstadt,
Brandon Haller, Bert Japikse, Maren McAvoy, Beverly Norwood, and Richard
Scott
Acknowledgments made key contributions to this special product.
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