National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to
Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control Systems
(10-JUN-05, GAO-05-331).
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) multibillion-dollar
effort to modernize the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system
has suffered from cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls
in its system acquisitions for more than two decades and has been
on our list of high risk programs since 1995. FAA's
performance-based Air Traffic Organization (ATO) was created in
February 2004, in part, to address these legacy challenges. In
this report, GAO examined (1) FAA's experience in meeting cost,
schedule, and performance targets for major ATC system
acquisitions; (2) steps taken to address legacy problems with the
program and additional steps needed; and (3) the potential impact
of the constrained federal budget on this program.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-331
ACCNO: A26298
TITLE: National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but
Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic
Control Systems
DATE: 06/10/2005
SUBJECT: Air traffic control systems
Command control communications systems
Cost analysis
Procurement
Procurement planning
Schedule slippages
Strategic planning
Program evaluation
Performance measures
Budget administration
Budgets
Air transportation
FAA Acquisition Management System
FAA Air Traffic Control Modernization
Program
FAA Air Traffic Control System
FAA Capital Investment Plan
FAA National Airspace System Plan
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GAO-05-331
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to Congressional Requesters
June 2005
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air
Traffic Control Systems
a
GAO-05-331
[IMG]
June 2005
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air
Traffic Control Systems
What GAO Found
The ATO met its acquisition goal for fiscal year 2004. However, prior to
the establishment of the ATO, FAA had experienced more than two decades of
cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls in acquiring major systems
under its ATC modernization program. For example, 13 of the 16 major
system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail have experienced cost,
schedule, and/or performance shortfalls when assessed against their
original milestones. These 13 system acquisitions experienced total cost
growth from $1.1 million to about $1.5 billion; schedule extensions
ranging from 1 to 13 years; and performance shortfalls, including safety
problems. We found that one or more of four factors-funding, requirements
growth and/or unplanned work, stakeholder involvement, and software
complexity-have contributed to these legacy challenges. While FAA met its
recent acquisition goal, it is important to note that this goal is based
on updated program milestones and cost targets for system acquisitions,
not those set at their inception. Consequently, they do not provide a
consistent benchmark for assessing progress over time. Also, as indicators
of annual progress, they cannot be used in isolation to measure progress
over the life of an acquisition.
Although additional steps are warranted, FAA has taken some positive steps
to address key legacy challenges it has had with acquiring major systems
under the modernization program. For example, the ATO has cut funding for
some major systems that were not meeting their goals and is reassessing
all capital investments to help ensure that priority systems receive
needed funding. The ATO has improved its management of software-intensive
acquisitions and information technology investments and begun to more
actively involve stakeholders. As we recommended, the ATO plans to
establish an overall policy to apply its process improvement model to all
software-intensive acquisitions. However, additional steps could be taken
to improve its management of system acquisitions. For example, the ATO
could use a knowledge-based approach to managing system acquisitions,
characteristic of best commercial practices, to help avoid cost, schedule,
and performance problems.
The ATO will also be challenged to modernize the ATC system under
constrained budget targets, which would provide FAA with about $2 billion
less than it planned to spend through 2009. To fund its major system
acquisitions and remain within these targets, the ATO has eliminated
planned
funding to start new projects and substantially reduced planned funding
for
other areas. However, when forwarding its budget submission for review by
senior officials at FAA, DOT, the Office of Management and Budget, and
Congress, the ATO provides no detail on the impact of the planned funding
reductions on ATC modernization and related activities to modernize the
NAS. Our work shows that the ATO should provide these decisionmakers
with detailed information in its budget submissions about the impact of
funding decisions on modernization efforts. Without this type of
information,
decision-makers lack important details when considering FAA's annual
budget submissions.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
FAA Has Had Difficulty Meeting Cost, Schedule, and/or Performance
Targets for Major System Acquisitions, but Made Progress in Fiscal Year
2004
FAA Has Taken Some Positive Steps to Address Key Legacy Challenges, but
Additional Steps Are Warranted to Reduce Risk and Strengthen Oversight
A Constrained Budgetary Environment Could Further Challenge the
ATO's Efforts to Modernize the ATC System Conclusions Recommendation for
Executive Action Agency Comments
1 4 7
11
24
30 33 34 34
Appendixes
Appendix I:
Appendix II:
Appendix III: Appendix IV:
Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System
Acquisitions We Reviewed in Detail 36
Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X) 36
Airport Surveillance Radar Model-11 (ASR-11) 38
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon Interrogator-Replacement
(ATCBI-6) 40 Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP) 42
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) 45 En Route
Communications Gateway (ECG) 47 En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM)
49 Free Flight Phase 2 (FFP2) 50 FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure
(FTI) 52 Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) 54 Local Area
Augmentation System (LAAS) 56 Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication
(NEXCOM) 59 NAS Infrastructure Management System-Phase 2 (NIMS-2) 61
Operational and Supportability Implementation System (OASIS) 63 Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) 66 Wide Area Augmentation
System (WAAS) 69
Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC Modernization
Program 72
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 80
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 83
Contents
Tables Table 1: Table 2:
Table 3:
Table 4: Table 5:
Changes in Cost and Schedule Targets for 16 Major ATC
System Acquisitions 12
Four Key Factors Contributing to Cost Growth, Schedule
Extensions, and/or Performance Problems for 13 ATC
System Acquisitions 16
Description and Status of Nine Additional Major ATC
System Acquisitions with Cost, Schedule, and
Performance Targets 22
Cost and Schedule Information for Nine Additional Major
Systems under the ATC Modernization Program 72
Cost and Schedule Information for the 30
Buy-It-by-the-Pound Systems under the ATC
Modernization Program 74
Figures Figure 1:
Figure 2:
Figure 3: Figure 4: Figure 5: Figure 6:
Figure 7: Figure 8:
Figure 9:
Sixteen Major Systems We Examined in Detail by Phase
of Flight
ASDE-X Screen Depicting an Airport Layout with Active
Aircraft Targets
Changes to ASDE-X Schedule and Cost Targets
ASR-11 Equipment
Changes to ASR-11 Schedule and Cost Targets
ATCBI-6 Screen Display Depicting All
Transponder-Equipped Aircraft
Changes to ATCBI-6 Cost and Schedule Targets
ATOP Equipment Reporting Aircraft Position
Information
Changes to ATOP Schedule and Cost Targets
Figure 10: CPDLC Text Message on an Aircraft Display Figure 11: Changes to
CPDLC Schedule and Cost Targets Figure 12: ECG Maintenance Workstation
Display Figure 13: Changes to ECG Schedule and Cost Targets Figure 14:
Changes to ERAM Schedule and Cost Targets Figure 15: Free Flight Phase 2
User Request Evaluation Tool Figure 16: Changes to FFP2 Schedule and Cost
Targets Figure 17: FTI Primary Network Operations Control Center Figure
18: Changes to FTI Schedule and Cost Targets Figure 19: ITWS Situation
Display Figure 20: Changes to ITWS Schedule and Cost Targets Figure 21:
Key Components of LAAS Figure 22: Changes to LAAS Schedule and Cost
Targets Figure 23: Multimode Digital Radio 10
36 37 38 39
40 41
42 43 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 59
Contents
Figure 24: Changes to NEXCOM Schedule and Cost Targets 60 Figure 25: NIMS
Infrastructure 61 Figure 26: Changes to NIMS-Phase 2 Schedule and Cost
Targets 62 Figure 27: OASIS Dual Screen Display 63 Figure 28: Changes to
OASIS Schedule and Cost Estimates 64 Figure 29: STARS Controller
Workstation 66 Figure 30: Changes to STARS Schedule and Cost Targets 67
Figure 31: Key Components of WAAS 69 Figure 32: Change to WAAS Schedule
and Cost Targets 70
Abbreviations
ACE-IDS Automated Surface Observing System Controller Equipment
Information Display System ADL Aeronautical Data Link ADS-B Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast AFSS Automated Flight Service Stations
ALSIP Approach Lighting System Improvement Program AMS Acquisition
Management System ARCSCC FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Centers ARTS Automated Radar Terminal
System ASWON Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network ASDE-X Airport
Surface Detection Equipment - Model X ASOS Automated Surface Observing
System ASR-9 Airport Surveillance Radar - Model 9 ASR-11 Airport
Surveillance Radar - Model 11 ATC Air Traffic Control ATCBI-6 Air Traffic
Control Beacon Interrogator Replacement ATCT Air Traffic Control Towers
ATO Air Traffic Organization ATOP Advanced Technologies and Oceanic
Procedures AWOS Automated Weather Observing System AWSS Automated Weather
Sensors Systems C3 Command, Control, and Communications CARTS Common
Automated Radar Terminal System CCS Command Center Conference Control
System CDM Collaborative Decision Making CFE Communications Facilities
Enhancements CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration CNS
Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance
Contents
CIWS Corridor Integrated Weather System
COTS Commercial-Off-the-Shelf
CPDLC Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications
CTS Critical Telecommunications Support
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
DOD Department of Defense
DSP Departure Spacing Program
E-Scan Electronic Scan
ECG En Route Communication Gateway
ERAM En Route Automation Modernization
ETVS Enhanced Terminal Voice Switches
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FFP2 Free Flight Phase 2
FIS Flight Information Service
FISDL Flight Information Service Data Link
FTI FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure
GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office
GNSS Global Navigation Surveillance Systems
HAATS Houston Area Air Traffic System
HOCSR HOST/Oceanic Computer System Replacement
IATS Initial Academy Training System
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
iCMM integrated Capability Maturity Model
ILS Instrument Landing System
IOC Initial Operating Capability
IT Information Technology
ITIM Information Technology Investment Management
ITWS Integrated Terminal Weather System
JRC Joint Resources Council
LAAS Local Area Augmentation System
LRR Long-range Radar
NAS National Airspace System
NDI Non-Developmental Item
NASR National Airspace System Resources
NEXCOM Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication System
NEXRAD Next Generation Weather Radar
NIMS-2 National Airspace System Infrastructure Management
System-Phase 2 NOTAM Notice to Airmen NTSB National Transportation Safety
Board NWS National Weather Service OASIS Operational and Supportability
Implementation System
Contents
OMB Office of Management and Budget
ORD Operational Readiness Date
PRM Precision Runway Monitor
RFI Radio Frequency Interference
RIRP Runway Incursion Reduction Program
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
RVR Runway Visual Range
SAWS Stand-alone Weather Sensors
SF-21 Safe Flight 21 Program
SLEP Service Life Extension Program
STARS Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
TDLS Tower Data Link Services
TFM-I Traffic Flow Management-Infrastructure
TMA Traffic Management Advisor
UHF Ultra High Frequency
URET User Request Evaluation Tool
VOR Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range
VORTAC Very High Frequency Omni-directional Collocated with Tactical
Air Navigation VRRP Voice Recorder Replacement Program VSCS Voice
Switching and Control System WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System WMSCR
Weather Message Switching Center Replacement
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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A
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548
June 10, 2005
Congressional Requesters
In 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began what it initially
envisioned as a 10-year modernization program to upgrade and replace the
National Airspace System's (NAS) facilities and equipment to meet
projected increases in traffic volumes, enhance the system's margin of
safety, and increase the efficiency of the air traffic control (ATC)
system-a principal component of the NAS. To date, FAA has spent $43.5
billion for its NAS modernization effort1 and plans to spend an additional
$9.6 billion through fiscal year 2009, primarily to upgrade and replace
ATC systems and facilities.2 For more than two decades, ATC system
acquisitions under the NAS modernization program3 have experienced
significant cost growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. As a
result, the ATC modernization program has been on our list of high-risk
programs since 1995. To improve FAA's management of the modernization
program, Congress, in 1995, gave the agency acquisition and human capital
flexibilities,4 which FAA has largely implemented.
In 2000, Congress and the administration took further steps to improve the
modernization program's management. Through legislation and an executive
order, they laid the foundation for, among other things, a
performance-based organization to manage FAA's ATC investments and
operations and a chief operating officer to lead it. In response, FAA
hired a chief operating officer in August 2003 and created the Air Traffic
1For purposes of this report, "NAS modernization" refers to ATC
facilities, equipment, and related expenses.
2The estimates are presented in then-year dollars, which means that they
represent the nominal dollar sum of the estimated spending in different
years. To estimate future-year spending, FAA incorporates assumptions on
inflation developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
3This report, as well as our work for more than two decades on FAA's ATC
modernization program, has assessed progress for major ATC system
acquisitions based on the cost, schedule, and performance goals set at the
inception of each program.
4Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104-50, S: 348
(1995).
Organization (ATO)5 in February 2004. The ATO inherited the decades-long
legacy of cost, schedule, and/or performance problems with major ATC
system acquisitions and at the same time received $400 million less for
fiscal year 2005 than it had planned to spend for ATC modernization. In
addition, projected funding levels from the administration are about $2
billion less than FAA had planned to spend for fiscal years 2005 through
2009.
The ATC modernization program is critical to meeting future air traffic
safety, capacity, and efficiency needs. FAA reported that U.S. airlines
carried nearly 690 million passengers in 2004 and that it expects the
number of passengers to reach 1 billion by 2015. According to FAA, the
agency has spent about 58 percent, or $25.1 billion, of the $43.5 billion
total for NAS modernization on system acquisitions designed to replace or
upgrade various ATC systems.
In light of past problems with and continuing concerns about funding major
ATC system acquisitions under the ATC modernization program, you asked us
to examine (1) FAA's experience in meeting cost, schedule, and/or
performance targets for major system acquisitions under its ATC
modernization program; (2) the steps FAA has taken to address longstanding
challenges with the ATC modernization program and additional steps that
are needed; and (3) the potential effects of the constrained budget
environment on FAA's ability to modernize the ATC system. To address these
objectives, we reviewed in detail 16 of the 55 system acquisitions6 under
the ATC modernization program, primarily by interviewing FAA officials and
obtaining and analyzing key acquisition
5Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century,
Pub. L. 106-181, S: 303 (2000); E.O.13180. Under the executive order, part
of the ATO's purpose is to "develop methods to accelerate air traffic
control modernization and to improve aviation safety related to air
traffic control."
6According to FAA officials, the number of system acquisitions in the ATC
modernization program can vary annually, when Congress earmarks funds for
a specific system acquisition. As of March 2005, the number of system
acquisitions under the program was 55.
documents.7 We selected these 16 systems in July 2004, when this review
was still a part of our broader work on FAA's efforts to modernize the
NAS.8,9 Specifically, we selected the 16 ATC system acquisitions with the
largest life-cycle costs that met the following criteria: each system had
cost, schedule, and performance targets; was discussed in prior GAO and
Department of Transportation Inspector General (DOT IG) reports, had not
been fully implemented or deployed by 2004, and received funding in 2004.
We reviewed this list with FAA officials to ensure that we did not exclude
any significant system. In fiscal year 2005, these 16 major ATC system
acquisitions account for about 36 percent of FAA's facilities and
equipment budget.10 (See app. I for additional information on these 16
systems.) We also collected information on the remaining 39 system
acquisitions under this program, which account for about 19 percent of
FAA's facilities and equipment account for fiscal year 2005.11 (See app.
II for additional information on these 39 systems.) In addition, we
reviewed past GAO and DOT IG reports. We interviewed FAA officials within
the recently created ATO and collected and analyzed the documents they
provided. We also interviewed officials with the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association, Air Transport Association, Department of Defense
(DOD), National Air Traffic
7At the time of our audit, FAA planned to deploy 64 Operational and
Supportability Implementation Systems (OASIS) to automated flight service
stations by 2005. However, after deploying 19 such systems in 2004, FAA
discontinued the system's deployment, pending a decision about whether to
contract out the operation of automated flight service stations. In
February 2005, FAA awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin to operate these
stations.
8Our methodology for selecting the 16 system acquisitions to review in
detail was based on the fiscal year 2004 appropriation for FAA's
facilities and equipment budget, which was available when the engagement
was designed. However, to make the report as current as possible, we have
used fiscal year 2005 funding levels where appropriate, including the
status sheets for each of the 16 systems in appendix I. See app. III for
additional information on our methodology.
9Our review of FAA's NAS modernization efforts will be issued later this
year.
10FAA does not have a formal definition of "major" systems under its
Acquisition Management System; however, agency officials told us that if a
system acquisition has a formally approved baseline, we could consider it
"major." Using this definition, 25 of the 55 system acquisitions under the
ATC modernization program are major.
11The remaining 45 percent of the facilities and equipment budget for
fiscal year 2005 will be spent on facilities, mission support, and
personnel-related activities.
Controllers Association, and RTCA.12 Furthermore, we convened a panel of
international aviation experts.13 Our review did not focus on FAA's
efforts to modernize its airports and other agency facilities. We
conducted our review from November 2004 through May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See app. III for
additional information on our objectives, scope, and methodology.)
Results in Brief The ATO has shown progress during its first year of
operation by meeting its acquisition goal for fiscal year 2004. However,
for more than two decades, FAA has experienced cost growth, schedule
extensions, and/or performance problems in acquiring major systems under
its ATC modernization program and has been on our list of high-risk
programs since 1995.14 Since their inception, 13 of the 16 major system
acquisitions that we reviewed in detail for this engagement have
experienced cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls when assessed
against their original baselines or performance targets. Specifically, the
total cost for these 13 major system acquisitions ranged from $1.1 million
to about $1.5 billion over their original cost targets. In addition, these
13 system acquisitions also experienced schedule extensions that ranged
from 1 to 13 years15 over their original schedule targets. Furthermore,
several of these 13 system acquisitions experienced performance shortfalls
related to
12Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics, RTCA is today known just by its acronym. RTCA is a private,
not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based performance
standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee,
and its recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA's policy,
program, and regulatory decisions.
13GAO, Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic Control
Modernization Program, GAO-05-333SP (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
14GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005); GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Ensure Better Coordination
When Approving Air Traffic Control Systems, GAO-05-11 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 17, 2004); GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has
Improved, but Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure
Results, GAO-05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004); GAO, Information
Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities in Place, but
More Oversight of Operational Systems Is Needed, GAO-04-822 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); and GAO, Air Traffic Control: System Management
Capabilities Improved, but More Can Be Done to Institutionalize
Improvements, GAO-04-901 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004).
15Schedule extensions were calculated based on the date FAA plans to
deploy the last system.
safety. Our work indicates that one or more of the following four factors
have contributed to the legacy challenges FAA has experienced in meeting
system acquisitions' cost, schedule, and/or performance targets: (1)
receiving funding for acquisitions at lower levels than called for in
agency planning documents, (2) adding requirements and/or unplanned work,
(3) not sufficiently involving stakeholders throughout system development,
and (4) underestimating the complexity of software development. Three of
the major 16 ATC system acquisitions we reviewed in detail are currently
operating within their original cost, schedule, and performance targets,
despite challenges that are symptomatic of past problems. To its credit,
the ATO has reported that it met its annual acquisition performance goal
for fiscal year 2004: to meet 80 percent of designated milestones and
maintain 80 percent of critical program costs within 10 percent of the
budget as published in its Capital Investment Plan. However, in our
opinion, having and meeting such performance goals is commendable, but it
is important to note that these goals are updated program milestones and
cost targets, not those set at the program's inception.16 Consequently,
they do not provide a consistent benchmark for assessing progress over
time. Moreover, as indicators of annual progress, the goals cannot be used
in isolation to measure progress in meeting cost and schedule targets over
the life of an acquisition. Finally, given the problems FAA has had in
acquiring major ATC systems for over two decades, it is too soon to tell
whether meeting these annual performance goals will ultimately improve the
agency's ability to deliver system acquisitions as promised.
FAA has taken a number of positive steps, primarily through the ATO, to
address key legacy challenges it has had with acquiring major systems
under its ATC modernization program; however, additional steps are
warranted to reduce risk and strengthen oversight. Some of the positive
steps taken directly address the four factors we identified as
contributing to cost, schedule, and/or performance problems, while others
support more general efforts to improve the modernization program's
management. For example, the ATO has demonstrated a willingness to cut
some major acquisitions that are not meeting their performance targets,
even after investments of significant resources, and is reassessing all of
its capital investments to help ensure that high-priority system
acquisitions receive needed funding. The ATO has also improved its
management of information
16Our statements about cost, schedule, and/or performance in this report
and in our past reports are based on the original targets that FAA
established and approved at the start of its acquisition programs.
technology investments and software-intensive acquisitions; these efforts
are positive steps toward minimizing growth in requirements and unplanned
work and better assessing the complexity of software development. For
example, on a number of software-intensive acquisition projects, the ATO
has applied a process improvement model that resulted in positive outcomes
such as enhanced productivity and greater ability to predict schedules and
resources. As we recommended, FAA plans to institutionalize the use of
this model by establishing a policy to define the ATO's expectations for
process improvements and a plan to address and coordinate process
improvement activities throughout the organization.17 The ATO has also
begun to include stakeholders in all phases of system development, so that
they can provide input in response to technical or financial developments.
However, we have identified additional steps that are needed to reduce
risk and strengthen oversight. For example, we found that the ATO does not
use a knowledge-based approach to system acquisitions, characteristic of
best commercial practices for managing commercial and DOD product
developments, which would help avoid cost, schedule, and/or performance
problems.18 We recommended, among other things, that FAA take several
actions to more closely align its acquisition management system with
commercial best practices. FAA said that our recommendations would be
helpful to them as they continue to refine this system. Continued
improvement and management attention will be crucial if the organization
is to succeed in addressing key legacy challenges.19
The current constrained budget environment, which includes lower future
budget targets than those of recent years, poses further challenges to the
ATO as it attempts to modernize the ATC system. FAA plans to spend $4.4
billion from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009 to fund key
modernization efforts; however, this funding level is about $2 billion
less than the agency had expected in appropriations for this 5-year
period. To fund its major system acquisitions while remaining within the
budget targets, the ATO has eliminated planned funding to start new
projects and reduced planned funding for other areas. However, when
forwarding its budget submission for review by senior FAA, DOT, and OMB
officials and by Congress, the ATO provides no detail on the impact of the
planned funding reductions on ATC modernization and related activities to
17GAO-04-901. 18GAO-05-23. 19GAO-05-207.
modernize the NAS. Our work shows that the ATO should provide these
officials and Congress with detailed information in its budget submissions
about the impact of reduced budgets on both ATC and NAS modernization. To
do so, the ATO should explicitly identify the trade-offs it is making to
reach budget targets, highlighting those programs slated for increased
funding and those slated for reduced funding. Without this type of
information, decision-makers lack important details when considering FAA's
annual budget submissions. We are recommending that FAA provide this
information to Congress annually.
In commenting on draft of this report, DOT, FAA, and ATO generally agreed
with the report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate. The FAA officials said they are continuing to consider our
recommendation and indicated they would provide a written statement
required by 31 U.S.C. 720.20
Background The mission of FAA, as a DOT agency, is to provide the safest,
most efficient aerospace system in the world. To fulfill its mission, FAA
must rely on an extensive use of technology, including many
software-intensive systems. FAA constantly relies on the adequacy and
reliability of the nation's ATC system, which comprises a vast network of
radars; automated data processing, navigation, and communications
equipment; and ATC facilities.21 Through this system, FAA provides
services such as controlling takeoffs and landings and managing the flow
of traffic between airports.
FAA is organized into several staff support offices and five lines of
business, which include Airports, Aviation Safety, Commercial Space
2031 U.S.C. S: 720 requires, in part, that agencies report the actions
taken on our recommendation to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs and to the House Committee on Government Reform
not later than 60 days from the date of the report.
21FAA uses three types of facilities to control traffic: airport towers,
terminal radar approach control facilities, and en route centers. Airport
towers direct traffic on the ground, before landing, and after takeoff
within 5 nautical miles of the airport and about 3,000 feet above the
airport. Terminal radar approach control facilities sequence and separate
aircraft as they approach and leave airports, beginning about 5 nautical
miles and ending about 50 nautical miles from the airport and generally up
to 10,000 feet above the ground. Air route traffic control centers, called
en route centers, control aircraft in transit and during approaches to
some airports, generally controlling air space that extends above 18,000
feet for commercial aircraft.
Transportation, the Office of Security and Hazardous Materials, and the
newly formed ATO.22 The ATO was formed in February 2004 to, among other
things, improve the provision of air traffic services and accelerate
modernization efforts. To create the ATO, FAA combined its Research and
Acquisition and Air Traffic Services into one performance-based
organization, bringing together those who acquire systems and those who
use them, respectively. The ATO is led by FAA's chief operating officer,
consists of 10 service units,23 and has 36,000 of FAA's 48,000 employees.
The ATO is the principal FAA organizational unit responsible for acquiring
ATC systems through the use of the agency's Acquisition Management System
(AMS). Because FAA formerly contended that some of its modernization
problems were caused by federal acquisition regulations, Congress enacted
legislation in November 1995 that exempted the agency from most federal
procurement laws and regulations and directed FAA to develop and implement
a new acquisition management system that would address the unique needs of
the agency. In April 1996, FAA implemented AMS. AMS was intended to reduce
the time and cost of fielding new system acquisitions by introducing (1) a
new investment system that spans the life cycle of an acquisition, (2) a
new procurement system that provides flexibility in selecting and managing
contractors, and (3) organizational and human capital reforms that support
the new acquisition system.
AMS provides high-level acquisition policy and guidance for selecting and
controlling ATC system acquisitions through all phases of the acquisition
life cycle, which is organized into a series of phases and decision points
that include (1) mission analysis, (2) investment analysis, (3) solution
implementation, and (4) in-service management. To select system
acquisitions, FAA has two processes--mission analysis and investment
analysis-that together constitute a set of policies and procedures, as
well as guidance, that enhance the agency's ability to screen system
acquisitions submitted for funding. Also through these two processes, FAA
assesses and ranks each system acquisition according to its relative
costs, benefits,
22Executive Order 13180 created the ATO. The executive order was later
amended by Executive Order 13264, which removed the description of air
traffic services as an "inherently governmental function."
23The 10 service units that make up the ATO include Safety,
Communications, Operations Planning, Finance, Acquisition and Business
Services, En Route and Oceanic Services, Terminal Services, Flight
Services, System Operations Services, and Technical Operations Services.
risks, and contribution to FAA's mission; a senior, corporate-level
decisionmaking group then selects system acquisitions for funding. After a
system acquisition has been selected, FAA officials are required to
formally establish the life-cycle cost, schedule, benefits, and
performance targets- known as acquisition program baselines,24 which are
used to monitor the status of the system acquisition throughout the
remaining phases of its life cycle.
Through its NAS modernization program, FAA is upgrading and replacing ATC
facilities and equipment to help improve the system's safety, efficiency,
and capacity. These systems involve improvement in the areas of
automation, communication, navigation and landing, surveillance, and
weather to support the following five phases of flight (see fig. 1):
o Preflight - The pilot performs flight checks and the aircraft is
pushedback from the gate. For preflight, we looked at Collaborative
Decision Making (CDM) and OASIS.
o Airport Surface - The aircraft taxis to the runway for takeoff or,
after landing, to the destination gate to park at the terminal. For
airport surface, we examined the Airport Surface Detection Equipment -
Model X (ASDE-X).
o Terminal Departure - The aircraft lifts off the ground and climbs to a
cruising altitude. For terminal departure, we examined the following
systems: Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR-11), Integrated Terminal Weather
System (ITWS), Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), Standard Terminal
Automation Replacement System (STARS), and Traffic Management Advisor
(TMA).
o En route/Oceanic --The aircraft travels through one or more center
airspaces and approaches the destination airport. For en route and
oceanic, we examined the following systems: Air Traffic Control Radar
Beacon Interrogator-Replacement (ATCBI-6), Advanced Technologies and
Oceanic Procedures (ATOP), Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications
(CPDLC), and User Request Evaluation Tool (URET).
24In December 2004, FAA revised its Acquisition Management System,
including changing the name Acquisition Program Baseline to Exhibit 300
Program Baseline.
o Terminal Arrival --The pilot lowers, maneuvers, aligns, and lands the
aircraft on the destination airport's designated landing runway. For
terminal arrival, we looked at the systems already listed under terminal
departure: ASR-11, ITWS, LAAS, STARS, and TMA.
In addition, for the major ATC systems that support multiple phases of
flight, we examined the following systems: En Route Communications Gateway
(ECG), En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM), Next-Generation
Air-to-Ground Communication (NEXCOM), and Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS). Furthermore, for major ATC systems that support NAS
infrastructure, we examined FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)
and NAS Infrastructure Management System (NIMS)- Phase Two.25 (See app. I
for additional information on these 16 systems.)
Figure 1: Sixteen Major Systems We Examined in Detail by Phase of Flight
Preflight Airport En route/ Terminal Airport
surface Terminal departure oceanic arrival surface
ASR-11 ITWS LAAS ATCBI-6 ASR-11 ITWS
CDMa OASIS ASDE-X STARS TMAa ATOP CPDLC LAAS STARS ASDE-X
URETa TMAa
Multiple stages of flight ECG, ERAM, NEXCOM, WAAS
Infrastructure FTI, NIMS
Source: FAA.
aCDM, TMA, and URET are decision support tools that fall under the Free
Flight program, which is currently called Free Flight Phase 2 (FFP2). We
reviewed FFP2 as a single system acquisition.
25Air Traffic Control involves a number of other systems, such as the
Common Automated Radar Terminal System, used in the terminal arrival and
terminal departure phases.
FAA Has Had Difficulty Meeting Cost, Schedule, and/or Performance Targets
for Major System Acquisitions, but Made Progress in Fiscal Year 2004
For more than two decades, FAA has experienced cost growth, schedule
extensions, and/or performance problems in acquiring major systems under
its ATC modernization program and has been on our list of high-risk
programs since 1995. For example, 13 of the 16 major system acquisitions
we reviewed in detail continue to experience cost, schedule, and/or
performance shortfalls when assessed against their original baselines. The
three other major system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail are
currently operating within their original cost, schedule, and performance
targets, but are experiencing challenges symptomatic of past problems. Of
the remaining 39 system acquisitions within the ATC modernization program,
few have had problems meeting cost and schedule targets.26 However, the
ATO made progress during its first year of operation by meeting its
acquisition goal for fiscal year 2004.
Thirteen of the 16 Major ATC System Acquisitions We Reviewed in Detail
Continue to Experience Shortfalls When Assessed against Original
Performance Targets
Thirteen of the 16 major system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail
for this engagement under the ATC modernization program have continued to
experience cost growth, schedule delays, and/or performance problems when
assessed against their original performance targets (see table 1). These
major system acquisitions had total cost growth ranging from $1.1 million
to about $1.5 billion over their original cost targets. In addition, these
systems required extensions in their initial deployment schedules ranging
from 1 to 13 years. Furthermore, several systems experienced
safety-related performance problems.
26Many of these systems are referred to as "buy-it-by-the-pound" systems,
which, generally, are commercially available at a set level of
performance, and, therefore, do not have performance goals per se.
Table 1: Changes in Cost and Schedule Targets for 16 Major ATC System
Acquisitions
Dollars in millions
Cost targets Last-site implementation targets
ATC system Original date
Original cost
Current cost (as of March 2005) Change
Original date
Current date
Change (in years)
Airport Surface Detection September $424.3 $510.2 $85.9a 2007 2009b
Equipment - Model X 2001
(ASDE-X)
Airport Surveillance November $743 $916 $173 2005 2013 Radar Model - 11
(ASR-1997
11)
ATC Radar Beacon August $281.8 $1.10 2004 2008
$282.9
Interrogator - 1997
Replacement
(ATCBI-6)
Advanced June 2001 $548.2 None 2006 2006 None
Technologies $548.2
and Oceanic
Procedures
(ATOP)
Controller-Pilot 1999 $166.7 To June To be
Data Link be N/A 2005 N/A
Communications determined determined
(CPDLC)
En Route March $245.2 None 2005 2005 None
$245.2
Communications 2002
Gateway (ECG)
En Route Automation June 2003 $2,150 None December December None
$2,150
Modernization 2010 2010
(ERAM)
June 2002 $546.2 None 2006 2007
Free Flight Phase 2 $546.2
(FFP2)
FAA $205.7 $104.5c 2008 2008 None
Telecommunications July 1999 $310.2
Infrastructure
(FTI)
June 1997 $276.1 $10.0 July 2009+ 6+
Integrated Terminal $286.1 2003
Weather System
(ITWS)
Local Area $530.1 $166.0 2006 To be
Augmentation January $696.1 N/A
System (LAAS) 1998 determined
Next Generation $405.7 $580.7 2008 To be
Air-to- September $986.4 N/A
(First
Ground 1998 segment determined
Communication (First
segment
(NEXCOM) only) only)
NAS Infrastructure $172.9 None 2005 2010d 5
May 2000 $172.9
Management System -
Phase 2 (NIMS-2)
Operational and April 1997 $174.7 $155.50 ($19.2) 2001 2004 3
Supportability
Implementation System
(OASIS)
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dollars in millions
Cost targets Last-site implementation targets
Original cost
Current cost (as of March 2005) Change
Original date
Current dateATC system Original date
Change (in years)
Standard Terminal February $940 $1,460 $520 2005 2008
Automation Replacement 1996 (Phase 1 only)
System (STARS)
Wide Area Augmentation 1994 $509 $2,036e $1,527 December 2013
System (WAAS) 2000
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
N/A: Not applicable.
aAccording to FAA officials, the change in cost target for ASDE-X was due
to an increase in the scope of the project.
bFAA plans to extend ASDE-X's current deployment target from 2007 to 2009
because the project's budgets were cut in fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
cThe increased costs were for requirements which, while included in the
original baseline, were unknown at the time the original baseline was
prepared.
dIn light of reduced funding, FAA is revising NIMS-2's targets; a Joint
Resource Council decision is planned for May 2005.
eSeptember 1999 and May 2004 estimates for WAAS development exclude $1.3
billion in satellite communications leases.
For 12 of the 13 major system acquisitions27 we reviewed in detail with
cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls, one or more of the following
four key factors contributed to these shortfalls:
(1) The funding level received was less than called for in agency planning
documents. Most major ATC system acquisitions have cost, schedule, and
performance baselines that are approved by FAA's Joint Resources
Council--the agency's body responsible for approving and overseeing major
system acquisitions. Each baseline28 includes annual funding levels that
the council agrees are needed for a system acquisition to meet its cost,
schedule, and/or performance targets. The estimated cost for a given year
assumes that the program received all funding for prior fiscal
27FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure was not directly affected by these
four factors, but did experience cost growth.
28In December 2004, FAA revised its acquisition management system policy
by replacing the requirement for an acquisition program baseline with a
requirement for preparing an OMB Exhibit 300 Baseline, which includes
additional information required for FAA's annual budget formulation and
submission process.
years as described in the baseline. In practice, however, this is not
always the case. For example, when FAA's budget level does not allow all
system acquisitions to be fully funded at the levels approved in their
baselines, FAA may elect to fully fund higher-priority acquisitions and
provide less funding for lower-priority acquisitions than called for in
their baselines. When a system acquisition does not receive the annual
funding levels called for in its baseline, its ability to meet cost,
schedule, and/or performance targets can be jeopardized, for example, by
requiring the agency to defer funding for essential development or
deployment activities until sufficient funding becomes available, which,
in turn, could require FAA to maintain costly legacy systems until a new
system is deployed. Receiving less funding than the agency approved for a
given acquisition was a factor contributing to the inability of 8 of the
16 major system acquisitions we reviewed in detail to meet their cost,
schedule, and/or performance targets. The ASR-11 acquisition, a digital
radar system, illustrates how reduced funding has resulted in schedule
delays. FAA officials stated that because of funding reductions and
reprogramming, the program received $46.45 million less than requested for
fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and program officials plan to request that the
program's deployment schedule be extended to 2013.29 According to FAA
officials, in general, schedules for system acquisitions may slip under
such circumstances (e.g., the rate of software development may be reduced
and planned hardware and software deployments may be delayed). The ATO's
chief operating officer testified in April 2005 that receiving multiyear
rather than annual funding from Congress for system acquisitions would
help FAA to address this problem by providing funding stability for system
acquisitions. In addition, according to a senior DOT official, 50 percent
of cost growth is a result of an unstable funding stream.
(2) The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or
unplanned work. Requirements that are inadequate or poorly defined prior
to developing a system may contribute to the inability of system
acquisitions to meet their original cost, schedule, and/or performance
targets. In addition, unplanned development work can occur when the agency
misjudges the extent to which commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)/
29The ASR-11 program is scheduled to go to the Joint Resources Council in
fiscal year 2005 to extend the program's schedule to 2013 and to revise
the baseline funding.
nondevelopmental item (NDI)30 solutions, such as those procured by another
agency, will meet FAA's needs. Requirements growth and/or unplanned work
contributed to the inability of 7 of the 16 major system acquisitions we
reviewed in detail to meet their cost, schedule, and/or performance
targets.
(3) Stakeholders were not sufficiently involved in design and development:
Insufficient involvement of relevant stakeholders, such as air traffic
controllers and maintenance technicians, throughout the development and
approval processes for a system acquisition can lead to costly changes in
requirements and unplanned work late in the development process. Not
involving stakeholders sufficiently contributed to the inability of 4 of
the 16 major system acquisitions to meet their cost, schedule, and/or
performance targets.
(4) The complexity of software development was underestimated.31
Underestimating the complexity of developing software for system
acquisitions or the difficulty of modifying available software to fulfill
FAA's mission needs may contribute to unexpected software development,
higher costs, and schedule delays. Underestimation contributed to the
inability of 3 of the 16 major system acquisitions we reviewed in detail
to meet their cost, schedule, and/or performance targets. (See table 2.)
30FAA defines a COTS item as a product or service that has been developed
for sale, lease, or license to the general public. The product is
currently available at a fair market value. FAA defines a NDI as an item
that was previously developed for use by a government (federal, state,
local, or foreign) and that requires limited further development. For
example, the Army's SINCGARS radio is the core of FAA's NEXCOM radio, and
the software FAA selected for ATOP was NDI software from New Zealand's air
navigation system.
31For purposes of this report, the underestimation of software complexity
refers to poor estimation of the level of effort that would be required to
modify software to meet requirements (e.g., COTS or NDI).
Table 2: Four Key Factors Contributing to Cost Growth, Schedule
Extensions, and/or Performance Problems for 13 ATC System Acquisitions
The funding
level
received was The system
less acquisition
than called experienced The complexity of Stakeholders
for in requirements were
agency growth and/or software not
planning unplanned development sufficiently
Name of documents work was involved
system underestimated
ASDE-X X
ASR-11 X X
ATCBI-6 X
CPDLC X
FFP2 X
ITWS X X X
LAAS X X X
NEXCOM X X
NIMS-2 X X
OASIS X X X
STARS X X
WAAS X X
FTIa
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
Note: Blank spaces in the chart denote that the specific factor was not a
key contributor to a program's inability to meet cost, schedule, or
performance targets.
aFTI was not directly impacted by any of these four factors, but did
experience cost growth.
Several of the 16 major systems acquisitions we reviewed in detail
effectively illustrate how these four factors can interact to contribute
to cost growth, schedule extensions, and performance problems. For
example, for WAAS, a precision approach and landing system augmented by
satellites, two of the four key factors came into play: underestimation of
software complexity and insufficient stakeholder involvement.
Specifically, FAA underestimated the complexity of the software that would
be needed to support this system when it accelerated the implementation of
performance targets, which included moving up the commissioning of WAAS by
3 years. FAA originally planned to commission WAAS by 2000; however, at
the urging of government and aviation industry groups in the 1990s, it
decided to change the commissioning date to 1997. FAA then tried to
develop, test, and deploy WAAS within 28 months, although the software
development alone was expected to take 24 to 28 months.
In retrospect, FAA acknowledged that the agency's in-house technical
expertise was not sufficient to address WAAS's technical challenges and
that expert stakeholders should have been involved earlier. Although WAAS
was being developed by an integrated product team that included
representatives from several FAA offices, the team did not effectively
resolve problems in meeting a required performance capability-that pilots
be warned in a timely manner when a system may be giving them potentially
misleading and therefore hazardous information. Consequently, in 2000, FAA
convened a panel of expert stakeholders to help it meet this requirement.
These actions resulted in unplanned work and contributed to the rise in
WAAS's cost from the original estimate of $509 million in 1994 to $2.036
billion in 2005, and to a 6-year extension in its commissioning date.
According to FAA, adding 6 years to the program's life cycle also
contributed to increased costs.32
Another example involves STARS, a joint program of FAA and DOD that
replaced outdated monochromatic controller workstation monitors with
multicolor monitors in ATC facilities. While joint FAA and DOD
acquisitions offer the opportunity to leverage federal resources, in the
case of STARS, the interaction of insufficient stakeholder involvement and
subsequent unplanned work contributed to cost growth and schedule
extensions. Specifically, FAA and DOD decided to acquire COTS equipment,
rather than developing a new system. This strategy envisioned immediately
deploying STARS to the highest priority ATC facilities and making further
improvements later, thereby avoiding the increasing cost of maintaining
the legacy system. However, this strategy provided for only limited
evaluation by FAA and DOD controllers and maintenance technicians during
the system's development phase, although these employees were identified
as stakeholders in developing the system's requirements. While DOD
controllers adopted and began using the original COTS version of STARS,
FAA elected to modify the acquisition strategy and suspended the STARS
deployment to address FAA controller and technician concerns with the new
system. These concerns included, for example, that many features of the
old equipment could be operated with knobs, allowing controllers to focus
on the screen. By contrast, STARS was menu-driven and required the
controllers to make several keystrokes and use a trackball, diverting
their attention from the screen. The maintenance
32FAA also transferred $1.3 billion--the cost of satellite leases--from
the operations account to the facilities and equipment account, bringing
the total estimate at completion cost to $3.3 billion.
technicians also identified differences between STARS and its backup
system that made it difficult to monitor the system. For example, the
visual warning alarms and the color codes identifying problems were not
the same for the two systems.
According to FAA, the original COTS acquisition strategy that limited the
involvement of controllers and maintenance technicians to just prior to
deployment caused unplanned work for the agency because it had to revise
its strategy for acquiring and approving STARS; this contributed to an
increase in the overall cost of STARS of $500 million and a schedule
extension of 5 years to deploy the system to its first site. The
interaction of these factors also contributed to the agency's ability to
deploy STARS at only 47 of the 172 facilities initially planned. As of
February 2005, FAA was developing a long-term acquisition plan to
modernize or upgrade the highest-priority Terminal Radar Approach Control
facilities that direct aircraft in the airspace that extends from the
point where the tower's control ends to about 50 nautical miles from the
airport. The plan consists of alternatives to STARS, including the
existing Common Automated Radar Terminal System (CARTS), which STARS was
designed to replace.33 Finally, to help avoid similar problems in the
future, stemming from the insufficient involvement of stakeholders during
critical phases of a system's design, development, and implementation, FAA
has been more proactive in involving the stakeholders that will operate
and maintain system acquisitions.
A final example of how these factors can interact is FAA's acquisition of
OASIS, which is designed to replace outdated technology in FAA's automated
flight service stations. The new system is intended to improve the ability
of air traffic specialists34 to process flight plans, deliver weather
information, and provide search and rescue services to general aviation
pilots. In August 1997, FAA awarded a contract to replace the Flight
Service
33FAA began fielding CARTS in 1997, as the interim primary terminal
automation system until it was replaced with STARS. To date, the agency
has not ruled out keeping CARTS as an alternative, if STARS proves to be
unaffordable or does not perform as expected. CARTS was not one of the
systems FAA was acquiring in fiscal year 2004, when we designed our
methodology.
34Air traffic specialists are controllers and automation specialists who
work at flight service stations throughout the United States and provide,
among other things, briefings of weather conditions along a pilot's route
of flight and information on traffic conditions for landing and departing
at airports where there is no control tower and no restrictions on the use
of airspace.
Automation System and console workstations. However, unplanned work,
insufficient involvement of stakeholders, and lower funding than the
agency had determined was needed to meet cost, schedule, and performance
targets have together contributed to cost growth and schedules extensions.
For example, the agency saw the system acquisition schedule slip because
of a larger-than-planned development effort. According to the DOT IG, FAA
identified a number of significant concerns, including the inadequate
weather graphics capabilities for air traffic specialists. In our view,
this indicates that stakeholders were not sufficiently involved throughout
the system's design and development phases. As a result, FAA eliminated
the option of COTS procurement. In addition, the OASIS program was
rebaselined in March 2000, when the system acquisition received only $10
million of the $21.5 million called for in its baseline for that year.
This reduction in funding reduced the rate of software development,
delayed and reduced the rate of planned hardware and console deployments,
and led to the incremental deployment of operational software. This
contributed to a delay in the first-site implementation from July 1998 to
July 2002. According to FAA officials, because OASIS received less funding
than the agency had approved for fiscal year 2004 and 2005, its deployment
to automated flight service stations was postponed.
As of February 2005, FAA had deployed 19 OASIS units: 16 at automated
flight service stations and 3 at other sites. Software upgrades that are
under way will be completed by June 2005. FAA plans neither installations
nor software upgrades beyond those at the automated sites, because the
agency awarded a contract to a private vendor in February 2005 to operate
flight service stations. Until then, FAA has directed the program to
remain within its current Capital Investment Plan funding levels for
fiscal years 2004 through 2006.35 According to FAA, since it completed its
evaluation of OASIS in February 2005, planning for the program's
implementation and baseline remain unchanged. FAA plans to phase out OASIS
between March 2006 and March 2007 in accordance with the new service
provider's transition plan.
35The Capital Investment Plan, a 5-year financial plan, allocates funds to
NAS projects on the basis of a detailed analysis of project funding by FAA
functional working groups. The plan includes estimates for the current
fiscal-year budget and for 4 future-year expenditures for each line item
in the facilities and equipment budget.
Three of the Major ATC System Acquisitions We Reviewed in Detail Currently
Operate within Their Original Cost, Schedule, and Performance Targets,
Despite Challenges
Three of the 16 major ATC system acquisitions we reviewed in detail are
currently operating within their original cost, schedule, and performance
targets; however they have experienced challenges, including symptoms of
one or more of the four factors cited earlier, such as requirements
growth. These system acquisitions include (1) ECG, a communications system
gateway that serves as the point of entry and exit for data used by FAA
personnel to provide air traffic control at 20 en route facilities; (2)
ERAM, a replacement for the primary computer system used to control air
traffic; and (3) ATOP, an integrated system for processing flight data for
oceanic flights.
While ECG has not exceeded its original cost, schedule, and performance
targets, it encountered requirements growth when FAA added a new
capability to address a security weakness. According to FAA officials,
correcting this weakness cost about $25,000, and an additional $480,000
will likely be needed to improve the monitoring capability for this
system's operation. However, these cost increases will not exceed the
system's cost or schedule targets. ERAM and ATOP also have areas that
warrant attention. For example, ERAM is a high-risk effort because of its
size and the amount of software that needs to be developed-over 1 million
lines of code are expected to be written for this effort. In addition, the
DOT IG reports that, to date, ERAM has experienced software growth of
about 70,000 lines of code. While the DOT IG considers this amount of
software growth to be modest, given FAA's long-standing difficulties with
developing this volume of software for system acquisitions while remaining
within cost, schedule, and/or performance targets, sustained management
attention is warranted. For ATOP, when FAA tried to accelerate the initial
deployment of this system by 14 months, it was unable to do so, because of
poorly defined requirements, unrealistic schedule estimates, and
inadequate evaluation by the contractor. In addition, according to
contract provisions, FAA assumed responsibility in February 2005 for the
cost of resolving any additional software problems it identifies.
Overall, although these system acquisitions are currently operating within
their cost, schedule, and performance targets, the challenges they have
experienced thus far indicate that they will require the sustained
attention of FAA's senior managers to help ensure that they stay on
track.36
36GAO-05-207.
FAA Has Experienced Cost Growth and Schedule Extensions for the Remaining
39 System Acquisitions under the ATC Modernization Program
For the 39 system acquisitions that make up the balance of FAA's ATC
modernization program, only 9 are considered "major" or directly
comparable to the 16 major ATC system acquisitions we reviewed in
detail.37 (See table 3.) Of these 9 major systems, 2 have required changes
in their cost targets. For example, for an automated weather observation
system, the Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network,38 the cost has
increased by 15 percent because of system capacity issues, among other
things. For another system that will be used on an interim basis for
managing air traffic until the new primary computer system is available,
the Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement, the cost has decreased
by 13 percent because the agency determined that parts of the existing
system could be sustained through fiscal year 2008, which is within the
scope of the program.39 The remaining 30 systems are not directly
comparable, because they do not involve acquiring a new system. Instead,
they are what FAA terms "buy-it-by-the pound" purchases-systems that are
commercially available and ready for FAA to use without modification, such
as a landing system purchased to replace one that has reached the end of
its useful life. (See app. II for additional information on these 39
systems.)
37As mentioned previously, FAA does not have a formal definition of
"major" systems, but suggested that we consider a system as major if it
has a baseline for cost, schedule, and performance formally approved by
senior agency officials. Using this definition, we consider 9 of the
remaining 39 systems major. These 9 major systems bring the total number
of major systems under the ATC modernization program to 25.
38Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network (ASWON) automates surface
weather observation information, replacing labor-intensive and high-cost
manual surface weather observations.
39The Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement (HOCSR) is an interim
upgrade and modernization program designed to replace the En Route Host
Computer hardware, software, and peripheral equipment to reduce delays and
improve reliability.
Table 3: Description and Status of Nine Additional Major ATC System
Acquisitions with Cost, Schedule, and Performance Targets
Dollars in millions
Development costs Deployment schedule ATC system acquisition and system
description Original Current Original Current
HOST/Oceanic Computer System $424.10 $368.50 Start: December Start:
Replacement (HOCSR) - December
The HOCSR program replaces
the main ATC computer 1998 1998
processor and
some peripherals, while Finish: April
ensuring the supportability Finish:June 2004
of other peripherals
until they are replaced by
En Route Automation 2004
Modernization
(ERAM).
Command Center Conference 12.70 12.70 Start: Fiscal Start: Fiscal
Control System (CCS) -Replace Year
OTS -This ongoing program
involves replacing the existing Year 2005 2005
telephone
system at the FAA Air Traffic Finish: Fiscal Finish: Fiscal
Control System Command Center Year
(ARCSCC) in Herndon, Va. The
existing telephone system is Year 2005 2005
becoming
unsupportable and can no longer
perform ARCSCC command
functions.
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Radio 85.15 85.15 Start: Fiscal Start: Fiscal
Replacement -The UHF radio Year
replacement project replaces
aging equipment used to Year 2003 2010
communicate
with DOD aircraft. FAA maintains Finish: Finish:
the UHF air and/or ground
communication service for air Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
traffic control of military 2010 2010
operations in the
United States.
Capstone Phase 1 -Capstone is a 18.55 18.55 Start: Fiscal Start: N/A
congressionally directed
demonstration program primarily Year 2000 Finish:
intended to improve aviation system
safety in Alaska through the Finish: N/A
introduction of new communications,
navigation, and surveillance Fiscal Year
technologies. The Capstone program 2003
is a
part of a larger program known as
the Safe Flight 21 Program (SF-21),
which is designed to establish
pockets of broadcast service
technology
enhancements to support the
demonstration of new
technology-driven
safety and efficiency benefits.
ASR-9 / Mode S Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP) 186.50 186.50 Start: TBD Start: TBD
-The
ASR-9 program provides
aircraft detection and Finish: Finish:
separation services at
congested airports, which
reduces aircraft delays and TBD TBD
improves safety.
Precision Runway Monitor
(PRM) - The PRM system is an 145.80 145.80 Start: October Start: October
accurate,
electronic scan radar that
tracks and processes 1997 1997
aircraft targets at a 1-
second update rate. Finish: Finish: January
2007 2007
En Route System Modification
- This program will replace 201.90 201.90
obsolete Start: N/A Start: N/A
en route components, such as
processors; upgrade the Finish: May Finish: N/A
controllers'
displays and the
infrastructure that supports 2009
those displays; and
configure the consoles to
accommodate additional
processors.
Initial Academy Training
System (IATS) - This 23.35 23.35 Start:
high-fidelity training Start: September
system for the FAA Academy
will enable the training of September 2005 2005
an increasing
number of new air traffic Finish:
controllers as the existing Finish: September
workforce retires.
September 2005 2005
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dollars in millions
Development costs Deployment schedule ATC system acquisition and system
description Original Current Original Current
Aviation Surface Weather
Observation Network (ASWON) $350.90 $403.80 Start: Start: Unknown
- The
primary purpose of ASWON is
to support FAA and National September 2002 Finish:
Weather
Service (NWS) modernization
by automating surface Finish: Unknown
weather
observation to meet the
needs of pilots, operators, September 2010
and air traffic
personnel without incurring
the high costs of
labor-intensive manual
surface weather
observations.
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
To its credit, FAA has reported that it met its annual acquisition
performance goal for fiscal year 2004--to meet 80 percent of designated
milestones and maintain 80 percent of critical program costs within 10
percent of the budget as published in its Capital Investment Plan.40
Specifically, it set annual performance cost goals and schedule milestones
for 41 of the 55 system acquisitions under the ATC modernization program.
For these 41 system acquisitions, FAA set 51 schedule milestones and met
46 of them-with "meeting the goal" defined as achieving 80 percent of its
designated program milestones. It also set and met its annual cost
performance goals for each of these 41 system acquisitions. In our
opinion, having and meeting such performance goals is commendable, but it
is important to note that these goals are updated program milestones and
cost targets, not those set at the program's inception.41 Consequently,
they do not provide a consistent benchmark for assessing progress over
time. Moreover, as indicators of annual progress, they cannot be used in
isolation to measure progress in meeting cost and schedule targets over
the life of an acquisition. Finally, given the problems FAA has had in
acquiring major ATC systems for over two decades, it is too soon to tell
whether meeting these annual performance goals will ultimately improve the
agency's ability to deliver system acquisitions as promised.
40According to FAA, 43 capital projects were included in the fiscal year
2004 acquisition performance goal--41 of these projects fall under the ATC
modernization program.
41Our statements about meeting cost, schedule, and/or performance targaets
in this report and in our past reports are based on the original targets
that FAA established and approved at the start of its acquisition
programs.
FAA Has Taken Some Positive Steps to Address Key Legacy Challenges, but
Additional Steps Are Warranted to Reduce Risk and Strengthen Oversight
FAA has taken a number of positive steps, primarily through the ATO, to
address key legacy challenges in acquiring major systems under its ATC
modernization program; however, we have identified additional steps that
are warranted to reduce risk and strengthen oversight. Some of the steps
FAA has taken directly address the four factors we identified as
contributing to cost, schedule, and/or performance problems, while others
support more general efforts to improve the modernization program's
management. The steps taken and additional steps needed are discussed
below by key areas.
Steps Taken to Address the Four Factors We Identified As Contributing to
Performance Shortfalls and Additional Steps Needed
To address the concern that some system acquisitions have had difficulty
meeting performance targets because they have not received annual funding
at the levels called for in key planning documents, the ATO has taken
several steps. For example, the ATO has demonstrated a willingness to cut
major programs that were not meeting their performance targets even after
a significant investment of agency resources. The ATO is currently
reviewing all of its capital projects to reassess priorities. Both of
these actions should help improve the chances that sufficient funding will
be available for priority system acquisitions to conduct the annual
activities necessary to keep them on track to meet cost, schedule, and
performance targets.
Specifically, for fiscal year 2005, the appropriation for FAA's facilities
and equipment budget, which funds the ATC modernization program, was $393
million less than the agency had planned to spend. FAA absorbed the $393
million reduction largely by cutting funding for three of the major system
acquisitions we reviewed in detail: a digital e-mail-type capability
between controllers and pilots was suspended (CPDLC); the next generation
air-to
ground communication system had the funding cut for a major component
(NEXCOM); and a precision-landing system augmented by satellites for use
primarily by commercial airlines (LAAS) was returned to research and
development to focus the remaining funding for the system on resolving a
key performance shortfall. FAA also plans to defer funding for CPDLC and
LAAS for fiscal year 2006.
FAA decisions to cut or eliminate funding for system acquisitions in its
current ATC modernization system may prove to be positive in the long run.
For example, although FAA and National Air Traffic Controllers
Association officials say that the cuts the agency made to 3 of its 16
major ATC system acquisitions will delay system benefits until the
acquisitions are fully developed and deployed, the cuts demonstrate FAA's
willingness to suspend major ATC system acquisitions, despite large
resource investments. In addition, by delaying a system acquisition, FAA
may later be able to save time and money by leveraging the experiences
that others have had with developing and deploying systems that provide
similar capabilities (e.g., the controller-pilot e-mail-type capability
for which FAA cut funding is now in use in both Canada and Europe).
Furthermore, as FAA continues to reassesses its funding priorities, it
could explore cost
saving options including taking steps to systematically (1) evaluate the
costs and benefits of continuing to fund system acquisitions across the
ATC modernization program at current and planned levels to identify
potential areas for savings and (2) identify potentially lower-cost
alternatives to current system acquisitions, such as lower-cost controller
workstations.
FAA has also taken a number of steps to address two other factors-reduce
the risk of requirements growth and/or the need to undertake unplanned
work-and to improve its ability to better assess and manage the risks
associated with acquiring major ATC systems that require complex software
development. However, additional steps are needed in these areas.
o Processes for acquiring software and systems: FAA has made progress in
improving its process for acquiring software-intensive systems-
including establishing a framework for improving its system management
processes, and performing many of the desired practices for selected FAA
projects.42 The quality of these systems and software, which are essential
to FAA's ATC modernization program, depends on the value and maturity of
the processes used to acquire, develop, manage, and maintain them. In
response to our previous recommendations, FAA developed an FAA-integrated
capability maturity model (iCMM). Since FAA implemented the model, a
growing number of system acquisitions have adopted the model, and its use
has paid off in enhanced productivity, higher quality, greater ability to
predict schedules and resources, better morale, and improved communication
and teamwork. However, ATO did not mandate the use of the process
improvement model for all software-intensive acquisition
42GAO, Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved, but
More Can Be Done to Institutionalize Improvements, GAO-04-901 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004).
projects. In response to our recommendation, the ATO informed us of its
plans to establish, by June 30, 2005, an overall policy defining the ATO's
expectations for process improvement, and by September 30, 2005, a process
improvement plan to address and coordinate improvement activities
throughout the organization.
o Management of information technology investments: In 2004, we reported
that FAA has made considerable progress in managing its information
technology investments.43 However, we also found that FAA's lack of
regular review of investments that are more than 2 years into their
operations is a weakness in the agency's ability to oversee more than $1
billion of its information technology investments as a total package of
competing investment options and pursue those that best meet the agency's
goals. FAA recently informed us that it has taken a number of steps aimed
at achieving a higher maturity level, including establishing service-level
mission need statements and service-level reviews, which address
operational systems to ensure that they are achieving the expected level
of performance. While these steps could resolve some of the deficiencies
that we previously reported, we have not yet performed our own evaluation
of these steps. FAA could potentially realize considerable savings or
performance improvements if these reviews result in the discontinuation of
some investments, since operating systems beyond their second year of
service accounted for 37 percent of FAA's total investment in information
technology in fiscal year 2004.
o Enterprise architecture: FAA has established a project office to
develop a NAS enterprise architecture-a blueprint for modernization-and
designated a chief architect, and has committed resources to this effort,
and issued its latest version of its architecture.44 However, FAA has not
yet taken key steps to improve its architecture development, such as
designating a committee or group representing the enterprise to direct,
oversee, or approve the architecture; establishing a policy for
developing, maintaining, and implementing the architecture; or fully
developing architecture products that meet contemporary guidance and
43GAO-04-822.
44GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program
Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts, GAO-05-266 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).
describe both the "As Is" and "To Be" environments and developing a
sequencing plan for transitioning between the two.
To help address concerns that stakeholders have not been sufficiently
involved throughout the development of major systems acquisitions, FAA has
taken a number of steps. For example, when the ATO was created, it brought
together the FAA entities that develop systems and those who will
ultimately use them. Specifically, it reorganized FAA's air traffic
services and research and acquisition organizations along functional lines
of business to bring stakeholders together and integrate goals. The ATO is
also continuing with a phased approach to system acquisitions that it
began using under Free Flight Phase 1,45 through which it has begun to
involve stakeholders more actively throughout a system acquisition's
development and deployment. However, as we reported in November 2004, FAA
needs to take additional steps to ensure the continued and active
involvement of stakeholders in certifying new ATC system acquisitions.46
In addition, the union that represents the specialists who install,
maintain, troubleshoot, and certify NAS systems, recently testified that
over the past 2 years, FAA has systematically eliminated the participation
of these specialists in all but a few modernization programs.47 Given the
importance of stakeholder involvement in the development and deployment of
new ATC systems, their continued involvement in ATC modernization efforts
will be important to help avoid the types of problems that led to cost
growth and delays for STARS.
Other Steps FAA Has Taken Reassessment of capital investment to decrease
operating costs: Both the to Improve the FAA Administrator and the ATO's
chief operating officer have committed to Modernization Program's basing
future funding decisions for system acquisitions on their
contribution to reducing the agency's operating costs while
maintainingManagement and Additional safety. This is consistent with our
2004 recommendation that FAA consider Steps That Are Needed its total
portfolio of investments as a package of competing options.
45Under Free Flight Phase 1, FAA developed a suite of tools to assist
controllers with managing air traffic.
46GAO-05-11.
47On Transforming the Federal Aviation Administration: A Review of the Air
Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint Program Development Office
(JPDO), Statement of Thomas Brantley, President, Professional Airways
Systems Specialists (PASS) AFL-CIO, before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, April 7,
2005.
Currently, only 1 of the 55 system acquisitions in FAA's ATC modernization
program-FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure-helps to reduce the agency's
operating costs. Most of FAA's major system acquisitions are aimed at
increasing the capacity of the NAS and delivering benefits to system
users. The ATO is in the process of reviewing all of its capital
investments, including system acquisitions under the ATC modernization
program, to identify areas of cost savings and to focus limited funding on
investments that will reduce operating costs. However, because FAA has
only recently begun to incorporate this type of analysis of the costs and
operational efficiency of system acquisitions into the decision-making and
management processes, it is too early to assess the results.
Acquisition Management System: The ATO has taken a number of steps to
improve its Acquisition Management System (AMS). For example, it has
revised AMS to require that acquisition planning documents be prepared in
a format consistent with that prescribed by OMB for use in justifying all
major capital investments. In addition, the ATO revised AMS in December
2004, in part to respond to recommendations we made about needed changes
in its investment management practices for information technology.48
However, we have not yet independently assessed the sufficiency of these
changes. Moreover, additional changes to AMS are warranted. For example,
while AMS provides some discipline for acquiring major ATC systems, it
does not use a knowledge-based approach to acquisitions, characteristic of
best commercial and DOD practices. A knowledge-based approach includes
using established criteria to attain specific knowledge at three critical
junctures in the acquisition cycle, which we call knowledge points, and
requiring oversight at the corporate executive level for each of these
knowledge points. Experience has shown that not attaining the level of
knowledge called for at each knowledge point increases the risk of cost
growth and schedule delays.49 We recommended, among other things, that FAA
take several actions to more closely align its acquisition management
system with commercial best practices. FAA said that our recommendations
would be helpful to them as they continue to refine this system.
48GAO-04-822.
49For more information on using a knowledge-based approach, see GAO, Air
Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has Improved, but Policies
and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure Results, GAO-05-23
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004).
Cost accounting and cost estimating practices: FAA has improved its
financial management by moving forward with the development of a cost
accounting system, which it plans to fully deploy by 2006. Ultimately, FAA
plans to use this cost information routinely in its decision-making. When
implemented, this cost accounting system will address a long-standing GAO
concern that FAA has not had the needed cost accounting practices in place
to effectively manage software-intensive investments, which characterize
many of agency's major ATC system acquisitions. This type of information
can be used to improve future estimates of cost for these acquisitions.50
Organizational culture: FAA has also sought to establish an organizational
culture that supports sound acquisitions. We have ongoing work to assess
FAA's efforts concerning cultural change.
ATO business practices: To improve its investment management decision
making and oversight of major ATC acquisitions, the ATO has informed us
that it has initiated the following steps, which we have reported are
important to effective oversight:51
o integrated AMS and OMB's Capital Planning and Investment Control
Process to develop a process for analyzing, tracking, and evaluating the
risks and results of all major capital investments made by FAA;
o conducted Executive Council52 reviews of project breaches of 5 percent
in cost, schedule, and/or performance to better manage cost growth;
o issued monthly variance reports to upper management to keep them
apprised of cost and schedule trends; and
50GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).
51GAO-05-23; GAO-04-822.
52The ATO's Executive Council is responsible for further implementing
acquisition reform for major ATC system acquisitions.
o increased the use of cost monitoring or earned value management53
systems to improve oversight of programs.
However, much work remains before the ATO will have key business practices
in place.
Specifically, according to the ATO's chief operating officer, it will be
at least 2 years before the ATO has completed the basic management
processes needed to use the new financial management systems it has been
putting in place.
Despite progress to date, until the agency addresses the residual issues
cited above, it will continue to risk the project management problems
affecting cost, schedule, and/or performance that have hampered its
ability to acquire systems for improving air traffic control.
A Constrained Budgetary Environment Could Further Challenge the ATO's
Efforts to Modernize the ATC System
The ATO will be further challenged to modernize the ATC system in the
current constrained budget environment and remain within the
administration's future budget targets, which are lower than those of
recent years. Specifically, for fiscal year 2005, FAA requested $393
million less than it had planned to spend for activities under the
facilities and equipment budget account, which funds the ATC modernization
program and related modernization activities. In addition, the President's
fiscal year 2006 budget submission calls for an additional cut to this
budget account of $77 million from FAA's planned level, which would bring
the fiscal year 2006 funding level to about $470 million below the fiscal
year 2004 appropriation. Moreover, FAA officials told us that funding for
the facilities and equipment account is likely to hold near fiscal year
2004 levels, or at about $2.5 billion annually, for the next 5 years. In
total, FAA plans to spend $4.4 billion during fiscal years 2005 through
2009 on key modernization efforts, despite FAA receiving about $2 billion
less than it had planned in appropriations over this 5-year period for its
facilities and equipment
53Earned value management compares the actual work performed at certain
stages of a job to its actual costs-rather than comparing budgeted and
actual costs, the traditional management approach to assessing progress.
By measuring the value of the work that has been completed at certain
stages in a job, earned value management can alert program managers,
contractors, and administrators to potential cost growth and schedule
delays before they occur and to problems that need correcting before they
worsen.
budget, which funds the ATC modernization program and related
modernization activities.
To fund its major system acquisitions while remaining within the
administration's budget targets, the ATO has eliminated planned funding to
start new projects and substantially reduced planned funding for other
areas. These funding decisions are reflected in FAA's updated Capital
Investment Plan. This plan shows substantially reduced funding for two
major system acquisitions in fiscal year 2005-CPDLC and LAAS--and defers
funding for them in fiscal year 2006. For the remaining 14 major ATC
system acquisitions we reviewed in detail, FAA plans to increase funding
by $533 million between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2009. In
contrast, for the remaining 39 system acquisitions, FAA has reduced
funding by $420 million for this period.
The planned increases in funding for these 14 major system acquisitions
also come at the expense of other modernization activities outside the ATC
modernization program, such as capital expenditures to replace aging ATC
facilities that will house the system acquisitions. For example, FAA
reports that it needs $2.5 billion (2005 dollars) annually to renew its
aging physical infrastructure-assuming a $30 billion value of its assets
and a 7-to 12-year useful life. According to the ATO, much of its physical
infrastructure, including the buildings and towers that house costly ATC
systems, is over 30 years old and needs to be refurbished or replaced.54
However, FAA plans to reduce funding for facilities by nearly $790 million
between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2009-a plan that runs counter to
its reported need to refurbish or replace its physical infrastructure.
Furthermore, FAA also plans to cut $1.4 billion from its spending plans
for fiscal years 2005 through 2009 for, among other things, new system
acquisitions in the ATC modernization pipeline that do not yet have
agency-approved cost, schedule, and performance targets or baselines
(e.g., a new technology that would allow pilots to "see" the location of
other aircraft on cockpit display).55
Our work has shown that FAA has taken some important steps to prioritize
the 55 system acquisitions under its ATC modernization program. These
54We have not verified FAA's reported needs to refurbish or replace these
structures/ facilities.
55Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).
revised priorities are reflected in its most recent plans, which detail
the areas where FAA plans to make cuts within its facilities and equipment
budget to live within its expected means during fiscal years 2005 through
2009. However, our work has also shown that these plans do not provide
detailed information about the trade-offs that are underlie decisions to
fully fund some systems and to defer, reduce, or eliminate funding for
others and how these cuts will affect FAA's modernization efforts,
including what impact they will have on interdependent system
acquisitions. To convey information to decision-makers on the impact of
reduced funding on modernization, the ATO should detail its rationale and
explicitly identify the trade-offs it is making to reach the
administration's budget targets, highlighting those programs slated for
increased funding and those slated for reduced funding. Key information
includes delayed benefits, the impact of cutting one ATC system
acquisition on related or interdependent systems, and increased costs for
maintaining legacy systems until new systems are deployed. Overall, the
ATO needs to explicitly identify the implications of deferring, reducing,
or cutting funding for a particular system or activity on the agency's
ability to modernize both the ATC system and related components of the NAS
in the near, mid, and longer term. While funding deferrals, reductions,
and cuts to ATC system acquisitions and related activities in FAA's
facilities and equipment budget may be beneficial and necessary in the
long run, it is important for senior agency, department, OMB, and
congressional decision-makers to have complete information to make
informed decisions about the trade-offs that are being made when they
consider annual budget submissions.
As part of our research, we sought the perspective of an international
group of experts, who also suggested that the ATO should provide the
administration and Congress with detailed information in its budget
submissions about the impact of reduced budgets on both ATC and NAS
modernization.56 These experts were a part of an international panel of
aviation experts we convened to address, among other issues, how federal
56The panel consisted of foreign and domestic aviation experts from
industry, government, private think tanks, and academia. Their fields of
expertise included aviation safety, economics, and engineering;
transportation research and policy; and government and private-sector
management. Former FAA officials and current executives of the air traffic
organizations in Canada and the United Kingdom were among the experts, as
was the chairman of EUROCONTROL's Performance Review Commission. GAO,
Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic Control Modernization
Program, GAO-05-333SP (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
budget constraints have affected ATC modernization and what steps the ATO
could take in the short term to address these constraints.
For example, aviation experts emphasized the need for the ATO-which is now
the organizational entity responsible for acquiring ATC systems-to
prioritize its capital investments, as well as its investment in operating
systems, with affordability in mind. These experts believe that the ATO
needs to review all of its spending plans for modernization, determine
which programs can realistically be funded, and select programs to cut.
Moreover, they indicated that the ATO should have a mechanism to explain
to Congress the implications that cutting one system has on other systems.
For example, according to one of these experts, the current budget process
tears apart a highly layered, interdependent system and does not reveal
synergies between projects. Then, when the budget request goes to
Congress, he said, "you have no opportunity to try to explain to anybody
the interconnections of these programs." As a result, when the
appropriators decide not to fund a project, they may not understand how
their decision will affect other projects.
Conclusions The constrained budgetary environment makes it more important
than ever for FAA to meet cost, schedule, and performance targets for each
of the major ATC systems it continues to fund and to ensure that related
activities, such as those to refurbish or replace the buildings that house
ATC modernization systems, receive sufficient funding. The need for FAA to
accommodate a 25 percent increase in demand for air travel over the next
decade underscores the importance of these efforts. FAA has demonstrated a
commitment to live within its expected means during fiscal years 2005
through 2009 by setting priorities among its ATC system acquisitions and
identifying areas where it plans to cut funding. However, without detailed
information about the trade-offs that underlie decisions to fully fund
some systems and to defer, reduce, or eliminate funding for others, FAA's
plans do not allow senior agency, department, OMB, and congressional
decision-makers to assess the implications of approving annual budget
submissions for the ATC modernization program and related modernization
activities that support more comprehensive efforts to modernize the NAS.
Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that key administration and congressional decision-makers
have more complete information to assess the potential impact of annual
budget submissions on individual ATC system acquisitions, the overall ATC
modernization program, and related larger-scale NAS modernization
activities funded through the facilities and equipment budget, we
recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct FAA to identify
which activities under the ATC modernization program have had funding
deferred, reduced, or eliminated and to provide detailed information about
the impact of those decisions on FAA's ability to modernize the ATC system
and related components of the NAS in the near, mid, and longer term. This
information should be reported to Congress annually.
Agency Comments We provided a copy of our draft report to DOT for review
and comment. The draft was reviewed by officials throughout DOT and FAA,
including the Vice President for Acquisition and Business Service. These
officials provided comments through email. They generally agreed with the
report and provided technical comments on specific aspects of the report,
which we incorporated as appropriate. The FAA officials said they are
continuing to consider our recommendation and indicated they would provide
a response to it as required by 31 U.S.C. S:720.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and
the Administrator, FAA. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please call me at (202) 512-2834 if you or your staff have any questions
about this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.
Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
List of Congressional Requesters
The Honorable Tom DavisChairmanThe Honorable Henry A. WaxmanRanking
Minority MemberCommittee on Government ReformHouse of Representatives
The Honorable Don YoungChairmanThe Honorable James L. OberstarRanking
Democratic MemberCommittee on Transportation and InfrastructureHouse of
Representatives
The Honorable John L. MicaChairmanThe Honorable Jerry CostelloRanking
Democratic MemberSubcommittee on AviationCommittee on Transportation and
InfrastructureHouse of Representatives
Appendix I
Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We Reviewed in
Detail
Airport Surface Detection Equipment- Model X (ASDE-X)
Figure 2: ASDE-X Screen Depicting an Airport Layout with Active Aircraft
Targets
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Sensis Corporation.
Purpose and Status ASDE-X enables air traffic controllers to track the
surface movement of aircraft and vehicles. It was developed to reduce
runway incursions, reported as increasing from 186 in 1993 to 383 in
2001.1 ASDE-X improves the ability of controllers to maintain awareness of
the operational environment and to anticipate contingencies. The detection
system automatically predicts potential conflicts and seamlessly covers
airport runways, taxiways, and other areas.
1FAA defines runway incursion as any occurrence at an airport involving an
aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a
collision hazard or results in a loss of separation between aircraft
taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Figure 3: Changes to ASDE-X Schedule and Cost Targets
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
aAccording to FAA officials, the change in cost target for ASDE-X was due
to an increase in the scope of the project.
bFAA plans to extend ASDE-X's current deployment target from 2007 to 2009
because the project's budgets were cut in fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
In June 2002, FAA decided to upgrade seven additional airports increasing
the project's total cost by $80.9 million. As of September 2004, FAA had
placed three systems in operation and installed six others. FAA officials
said they propose to extend the deployment baseline from 2007 to 2009
because budgets were cut in fiscal years 2004 and 2005; in addition,
internal and external funding was reprogrammed for other high-priority
activities. The ASDE-X program office is working on alternative cost
estimates and plans to present them to the Joint Resources Council by June
2005.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Airport Surveillance Radar Model-11 (ASR
11) Figure 4: ASR-11 Equipment
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
Purpose and Status ASR-11 replaces aging analog radars, such as ASR-7 and
ASR-8, with a single, integrated digital radar system. ASR-11 reduces
operational costs, improves safety, and accommodates future capacity
increases. ASR-11 also provides surveillance information to existing
systems, such as the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
(STARS) in terminal facilities and other systems in en route ATC
facilities. As of March 2005, five sites have been commissioned into the
NAS and five additional sites are in full operational capability.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Figure 5: Changes to ASR-11 Schedule and Cost Targets
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
ASR-11 has experienced unplanned work, and the funding level received was
less than the agency-approved funding level for the system acquisition;
both factors contributed to schedule extensions and cost increases. FAA
misjudged the extent to which the high-level requirements that were used
to support the Department of Defense's procurement of the commercial
off-the-shelf/nondevelopmental item (COTS/NDI) could result in a product
capable of meeting FAA's mission or user needs. As a result, unplanned
software changes were required. The program requested $98.8 million for
fiscal year 2004, based on the system's acquisition program baseline, but
received $74.3 million. In May 2004, FAA reprogrammed $2.35 million from
ASR-11's appropriated funds to the Essential Air Service.2 Due to funding
reductions, FAA decreased the number of ASR-11 systems to be purchased
from 112 to 111. The 2005 request of $107.6 million was not approved; the
reduction to $87.5 million may result in additional cost growth or the
elimination of planned replacement sites. The ASR-11 program is scheduled
to go to the Joint Resources Council in fiscal year 2005 to extend the
program's schedule to 2013 and to revise the baseline funding, primarily
because of deferrals and budget reductions. As of March 2005, five sites
have been commissioned into the NAS and five additional sites are fully
operational.
2The objective of the Essential Air Service program is to ensure that
small communities that had received scheduled passenger air service before
deregulation will continue to have access to the nation's air
transportation system.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon Interrogator-Replacement (ATCBI-6)
Figure 6: ATCBI-6 Screen Display Depicting All Transponder-Equipped
Aircraft
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
Purpose and Status ATCBI-6 is part of the agency's continuing effort to
upgrade equipment to provide greater system capability and reliability
that will, in turn, reduce operating costs. The ATCBI-6 replacement
program will replace existing en route air traffic control beacon
interrogator (ATCBI-4/5) equipment. The new ATCBI-6 radars will be able to
determine both range and direction to and from aircraft, in addition to
forwarding this information to the appropriate Air Route Traffic Control
Centers' automation systems.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Figure 7: Changes to ATCBI-6 Cost and Schedule Targets
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
Funding reductions of $31.0 million for fiscal years 2002 and 2003
contributed to the extension of ATCBI-6's schedule. According to FAA, if
funding reductions continue, further delays could occur with the system's
deployment, installation, and commissioning activities. As of September
2004, the contractor has been meeting the new contract delivery schedule.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures
(ATOP) Figure 8: ATOP Equipment Reporting Aircraft Position Information
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Lockheed Martin.
Purpose and Status ATOP replaces aging oceanic ATC systems and procedures
with an integrated system of new controller workstations, data-processing
equipment, and software that will enhance the control and flow of oceanic
air traffic to and from the United States. The system automatically
updates information on an aircraft's location and supersedes the current
manual process. FAA controls oceanic air traffic at three sites:
Anchorage, Alaska; New York, New York; and Oakland, California.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Figure 9: Changes to ATOP Schedule and Cost Targets
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
The ATOP program is operating within its cost, schedule, and performance
targets. ATOP achieved its initial operational capability milestone in
June 2004. The contractor had originally agreed to a more aggressive
development schedule in order to achieve this milestone by April 2003, or
14 months earlier. FAA determined, however, that the contractor could not
meet this accelerated date because of poor requirements development,
unrealistic schedule targets, and inadequate estimation of software
complexity. This exacerbated the scheduled transition from the current
oceanic system to ATOP. Consequently, FAA spent an additional $4 million a
year to operate and maintain the old system until ATOP is fully
operational. According to FAA, the ATOP program office did not overspecify
the operational and performance requirements; it wrote the technical
document at a level that allowed the contractor to select the appropriate
solutions and did not restrict design innovations. Yet, FAA's internal
documents revealed that the requirements were not adequately defined. For
example, the ATOP Investment Analysis Study reported to the Joint
Resources Council prior to the contract award that the lack of more
detailed ATOP requirements at this stage of acquisition added risk and was
of concern to the investment analysis team.
According to FAA, the agency has taken steps to recognize the concerns
identified by the ATOP Investment Analysis Study by maintaining
requirements, encouraging controller participation, and robustly
testingthe system. FAA officials stated that the agency has developed a
transition plan for the three sites. To accelerate the transition schedule
and offset facility attrition, the ATOP program filled eight new
controller positions at the New
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
York site and six at the Oakland site. In addition, ATOP training
schedules are in place, and classes for FAA's Air Traffic and Airway
Facilities personnel are under way. Although the contractor's costs to
develop ATOP have grown by approximately $20 million, FAA is not
responsible for payment because it has a fixed-price contract arrangement
with the contractor. Yet, according to the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General, FAA would have to pay for all software problems after
February 28, 2005. After February 2005, Lockheed Martin will continue to
work on software changes under the time and materials portion of the ATOP
contract. FAA plans to maintain the acquisition program baseline
milestones by relying on current contractor staffing and resources. FAA
expects to conduct full transition exercises in June 2005 at the New York
and Oakland sites.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC)
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is to be determined.
Purpose and Status CPDLC will allow pilots and controllers to transmit
digital data messages directly between FAA automated ground computers and
aircraft. By digitally transmitting routine air traffic control (ATC)
messages between pilots and controllers, CPDLC will alleviate voice
congestion, enhance ATC efficiency, and increase capacity by allowing
controllers to handle more aircraft. FAA originally planned to implement
CPDLC in several phases. Build 1, the initial development phase, was
deployed in Miami for 2 years and consisted of four information services:
initial contact, transfer of communications, altimeter setting, and
predefined menu text. Build 1A would have added five additional services,
including speed, altitude, and route clearance, but it was deferred by a
Joint Resources Council decision in April 2003. Presently, FAA is
conducting a preliminary investment analysis of National Build, which is
intended to deploy the CPDLC system
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
to all 20 Air Route Traffic Control Centers after they have implemented
the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) program.
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Undetermined
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
CPDLC Build 1, implemented at Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center in
October 2002, operated for 2 years. FAA's acquisitions office had awarded
the CPDLC Build 1A development contract before fully understanding the
system's requirements, including those of FAA's aircraft certification
office. Additionally, detailed interoperability requirements of air and
ground equipment were not complete before the contract was awarded.
According to FAA, additional CPDLC hardware, software, and other
requirements increased costs by $69.8 million over the original baseline
of $166.7 million. The revised cost target presented to the Joint
Resources Council in April 2003 was $236.5 million, about a 42 percent
increase from its original cost target, for only 8 of the 20 proposed
Build 1A locations. FAA decided to suspend acquisition of Build 1A because
of concerns about the high costs of communications service provider
messages, the uncertainty of integrating CPDLC with ERAM, and the ability
of airlines to install, and benefit from, the CPDLC avionics equipment.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
En Route Communications Gateway (ECG)
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Lockheed Martin.
Purpose and Status ECG replaces the interim Peripheral Adapter Module
Replacement Item (PAMRI). Providing an interface from radar sites to en
route centers, PAMRI has been operating for 10 years and has exceeded its
life expectancy. The open and expandable platform of the ECG will allow
for new connectivity and functionality as the NAS evolves.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
FAA is on schedule to complete ECG deployment in calendar year 2005. Tests
revealed a weakness in security: limitations in designing the monitoring
capability prevented appropriate monitoring unless a system technician
remained logged on. To ensure that only authorized personnel had access to
the system and that the monitoring could be done without a technician
on-site, the ECG program office implemented a "guest" logon that enabled
monitoring and prevented unauthorized access. According to FAA officials,
correcting the weakness cost about $25,000, which falls within the
program's budget and schedule. An additional challenge concerns monitoring
the ECG system from the System Operations Control (SOC)3 positions. This
issue may require SOC personnel to leave their posts if ECG requires some
intervention to, among other things, discover why an event occurred. FAA
is evaluating an improvement in the monitoring capability at the SOC
positions. The estimated cost is $480,000, which falls within the
program's budget and schedule.
3The System Operations Center (SOC) is the workspace on the operations
control room floor where managers monitor the state of the equipment
providing air traffic services.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM)
Purpose and Status Modular and expandable, ERAM will replace software and
hardware in the host computers at FAA's 20 en route air traffic control
centers, which provide separation, routing, and advisory information.
ERAM's flight data processing capabilities will provide flexible routing
around restrictions, such as congestion and weather. It will improve
surveillance by increasing the number and types of surveillance sources,
such as radars. ERAM will provide safety alerts to prevent aircraft
collisions and congestion.
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
ERAM has not breached schedule or cost parameters, but it remains a high
risk program because of its size and its amount of software code (more
than 1 million lines). The contractor has reported that engineering costs
are rising because of lower productivity than originally planned and an
increase in the number of lines of software code. According to FAA
officials, the contractor's management reserve can absorb additional
software development costs.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Free Flight Phase 2 (FFP2)
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractors for this system are Computer Sciences Corporation, ITT,
Lockheed Martin, and Metron.
Purpose and Status FFP2 builds on Free Flight Phase 1, which established
the concept of managing air traffic in a way that enhances the safety,
capacity, and efficiency of the NAS. Under FFP2, FAA expects air traffic
control to move gradually from a highly structured system, based on
elaborate rules and procedures, to a more flexible system that allows
pilots, within limits, to change their route, speed, and altitude while
keeping air traffic controllers informed of such changes. FFP2 will allow
controllers to manage pilot requests for flight information in en route
airspace, identify and resolve possible mid-air conflicts up to 20 minutes
in advance, and develop arrival sequence plans.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
According to FAA officials, the schedule delay in FFP2's deployment from
2006 to 2007 because, among other things, the funding level received was
less than the agency-approved funding level for the system acquisition.
Since the transition from Free Flight Phase 1 to Phase 2, the program has
received less than the expected level of funding. For example, in fiscal
year 2003, FAA requested $107 million; however, due to external and
internal budget cuts, the funding was reduced to $70 million.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Harris Corporation.
Purpose and Status FTI will replace costly networks of separately managed
systems and services-both leased and owned-by integrating advanced
telecommunications services within the NAS and non-NAS infrastructures.
FTI will provide FAA with commercial telecommunications services that can
meet present and future telecommunications needs between facilities. Its
modern and reliable consolidated network will furnish multi-service
capabilities.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
FTI's two-phase transition will take about 5 years to complete. Phase I
was implemented at 21 Air Route Traffic Control Centers and 2 National
Network Operations Control Centers. Deployment of Phase II, which is under
way, will extend service to the remaining 4,477 NAS facilities.
In June 2003, the FTI program returned to the Joint Resources Council with
a proposed revision to the baseline that was based on actual contract
prices for NAS operational services and estimated prices for mission
support services. The council deferred revising the baseline until the
program negotiated prices for mission support services. A consolidated
Acquisition Program Baseline package for the full scope of NAS operational
and mission support services was then completed in December 2004. The
Joint Resources Council approved the revised baseline on December 8, 2004.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS)
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
Purpose and Status ITWS furnishes air traffic controllers and supervisors
with full-color graphic displays of weather information concerning airport
terminal airspace within a 60-mile radius. It provides a comprehensive
current weather situation and precise forecasts of expected weather
conditions for the next 60 minutes. ITWS requires no meteorological
interpretation by air traffic controllers or pilots.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
aFAA initially projected that its first ITWS deployment would occur
between September 2001 and August 2002 and that final system deployment
would occur between January 2003 and July 2003.
ITWS experienced delays because its software development was complex and
the funding level received was less than the agency-approved funding level
for the system acquisition. The program appeared to be progressing
according to its baseline; however, immediately after the critical design
review in September 1998, the contractor revealed that the program had
exceeded the target cost by $4 million. Consequently, ITWS experienced
schedule delays and cost increases, along with performance shortfalls.
In May 2004, FAA's Joint Resources Council revised the baseline for the
ITWS program to include, in production, the capability to predict weather
conditions 60 minutes into the future. Because of constrained funding, the
ATO Executive Council froze funding for fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007.
In addition, FAA postponed deploying 12 of the 34 systems until an
undefined future date. In January 2005, FAA management decided that the
ITWS program would use already-procured equipment to install the next six
sites and transition to Airport Improvement Program grants for the
remaining scheduled sites. The ITWS program office is currently studying
the impact of the decision on the system's baseline. According to the
contractor and the original acquisition plan, all systems were scheduled
for delivery by December 2001, but that date has now been extended to
after 2009.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Honeywell.
Purpose and Status LAAS will allow aircraft to execute precision
instrument approaches and landings in all weather conditions. Its global
positioning system will broadcast highly accurate information to aircraft
in a flight's final phases, providing more precise approach paths than the
current instrument landing system, reducing the required separation
between incoming aircraft, and increasing airspace capacity. LAAS will
also provide airports with precision approach capability for all runways,
eliminating the need for multiple
instrument landing system installations.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
For LAAS, three of the four factors we discussed have contributed to the
system's cost increases, schedule extensions, and performance problems.
Specifically, poorly established requirements resulted in the addition of
113 new requirements to the initial specification, entailing unplanned
work including significant software and hardware changes. In addition, FAA
underestimated LAAS' software complexity because it inadequately assessed
the system's technology maturity. In particular, the agency misunderstood
the potential for radio interference through the atmosphere, which could
limit LAAS' operations. FAA also did not fully engage technical experts
early in the approval process of LAAS. According to the Department of
Transportation Inspector General, although FAA has had a LAAS Integrity
Panel in place since 1996 to assist with its research and development
activities, the panel was not formally tasked with resolving the integrity
requirement4 early in the approval process, which might have enabled FAA
to develop a quicker solution.5 In 2003, FAA focused the LAAS Integrity
Panel on developing a solution to meet the integrity requirement.
4The system's integrity requirement alerts pilots of erroneous information
not more often than once every 47 years, or 10-7.
5Department of Transportation's Inspector General, FAA Needs to Reset
Expectations for LAAS Because Considerable Work Is Required before It Can
Be Deployed for Operational Use, AV-2003-006 (Dec. 16, 2002).
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
The contractor has experienced difficulties ensuring that the system will
alert pilots when it produces erroneous information. FAA and the
contractor agree that these difficulties have resulted from a lack of
communication. When the contract was awarded, FAA assumed that LAAS was
80-percent developed but later discovered that only about 20 percent was
complete. FAA therefore suspended funding in fiscal year 2005 and used the
remaining $18 million to resolve the integrity requirement problem, among
other things, in fiscal year 2004. Although FAA had not requested funding,
Congress did approve an additional $10 million for LAAS in fiscal year
2005. The FAA will continue to work on resolving LAAS integrity and safety
assurance issues during fiscal year 2005. During fiscal year 2006, the
program office will develop a business case justification on whether to
continue the LAAS program.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication
(NEXCOM) Figure 23: Multimode Digital Radio
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contracter for this system is ITT (segiment 1A).
Purpose and Status NEXCOM will improve air traffic control communications
by replacing controller-pilot analog communication with a state-of-the-art
digital system. Consisting of multimode digital radios, avionics, and
ground stations, NEXCOM will enhance security by requiring digital
authentication and preventing "phantom controllers" from gaining access to
the communications system. NEXCOM Segment 1A will replace 30-to 40-year
old radios, deploying 12,000 new radio sets that use analog and digital
communications with aircraft. Segment 1B will create ground stations to
communicate with aircraft equipped with digital capability.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Undetermined
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
NEXCOM experienced schedule slippages in developing Segment 1A-the
multimode radio sets-because the vendor failed to meet interference
requirements and to perform additional tests to avoid risks associated
with future upgrades. FAA's initial plans did require meeting interference
requirements. The initial schedule assumed FAA could procure a
nondevelopmental item (NDI) product that met the interference
requirements. The vendor's product did not meet the established
interference requirements. A solution had to be developed and tested. The
project schedule had to be adjusted to accommodate additional development
and testing. As a result, the system's approval was delayed by about 20
months. In September 2003, NEXCOM Segment 1A was initially deployed at
Jacksonville, Florida. Segment 1A cost and schedule baseline is scheduled
for a Joint Resources Council review in August 2005.
NEXCOM's cost growth has resulted from additional software and hardware
requirements. Because the funding level received was less than the
agency-approved funding level for the system acquisition, FAA postponed
funding Segment 1B-the ground stations-until at least fiscal year 2008.
FAA has no current estimate for the last deployment date.
FAA plans to develop and deploy NEXCOM Segment 2 between 2008 and 2013.
This segment will provide a digital data link to aircraft at high and
super-high altitudes. Segment 3, scheduled between 2011 and 2013, will
provide digital voice and data link capabilities throughout the ATC
system. FAA has not developed funding estimates for these two segments.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
NAS Infrastructure Management System- Phase 2 (NIMS-2)
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Digicon.
Purpose and Status NIMS, a centralized maintenance management system, will
operate and maintain the NAS infrastructure, including its facilities,
systems, and equipment (e.g., communications, radars, and navigational
aids). NIMS will decrease the number of en route delays by reducing the
time required to restore systems to full operation following maintenance.
NIMS-Phase 1
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
currently provides initial Operational Control Center capability,6 along
with remote monitoring and control functionality, to 3,700 NAS facilities
and 5,800 deployed maintenance data terminals. By fully implementing
resource management and enterprise management software, NIMS-Phase 2 will
focus on increasing workforce productivity in such priority activities as
receiving orders and managing resources. Future NIMS phases will allow for
information sharing that is in sync with NAS' technological improvements.
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
According to FAA, the funding for NIMS-Phase 2 was $96.4 million below the
approved amount in agency planning documents. Subsequently, FAA had to
defer additional system requirements, extend the schedule by 5 years, and
increase the system's cost estimate by $84.0 million. FAA is revising the
baseline for Phase 2, as shown in figure 26; a Joint Resources Council
decision is planned for August 2005.
6Operational Control Center capability, established in 2001, is a standard
set of tools and procedures needed to open the control centers. The tools
provide the initial enterprise management and resource management
technical capabilities needed at Operational Control Centers.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Operational and Supportability Implementation
System (OASIS) Figure 27: OASIS Dual Screen Display
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractors for this system are Harris Corporation (OASIS
workstations) and Evans Corporation (consoles), respectively.
Purpose and Status
OASIS, a modified commercial-off-the-shelf system, replaces workstation
consoles, among other things, at automated flight service stations. It
also replaces the Flight Services Automation system for which spare parts
and hardware support have been difficult for FAA to maintain. OASIS
furnishes up-to-the-minute weather graphics by integrating real-time
weather and flight planning data with overlays of flight routes. It also
provides operational support, retrieves reports, and supplies lightning
data and icing images, among other things.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
OASIS has experienced schedule extensions and cost increases because of
unplanned work, insufficient stakeholder involvement, and funding that is
less than the agency had approved as needed for meeting the system's
schedule, cost, and performance targets. For example, the system
acquisition schedule slipped because of a larger-than-planned development
effort. FAA's 1998 review of the contractor system's architecture for
OASIS revealed that the commercial-off-the-shelf solution was not as
mature as FAA had envisioned when the contract was awarded and revealed
that the contractor's commercial products did not fully satisfy its
requirements. According to the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General, FAA had identified a number of significant human factors
concerns, such as inadequate weather graphics. This indicated that
stakeholders were not sufficiently involved throughout the system's design
and development. As a result, FAA eliminated the option of
commercial-off-the-shelf procurement. In addition, the OASIS program was
rebaselined in March 2000 due to fiscal year 2000 appropriations being
reduced to $10 million from the $21.5 million baseline. The reduction in
funding resulted in a reduced rate of software development, delayed and
reduced the rate of planned hardware and console deployments, and resulted
in the incremental deployment of operational software. This contributed to
FAA's delay of its first-site implementation from July 1998 to 2002.
According to FAA officials, receiving less funding than the agency had
approved for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 also resulted in a delay in OASIS'
deployment to automated flight service stations. As of February 2005, FAA
had deployed 19 systems: 16 at Automated Flight Service Stations (AFSS)
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
and 3 at other sites. Software upgrades that are under way will be
completed by June 2005. FAA had no plans for installations or software
upgrades beyond those at the AFSS sites, pending an evaluation of
private sector bids to operate flight service stations. Until then, FAA
had directed the program to remain within the funding levels of its
Capital Investment Plan for fiscal years 2004 to 2006.7 According to FAA,
since completion of the evaluation of bids in February 2005, OASIS'
implementation remains unchanged. FAA does not plan on additional OASIS
funding for software enhancements or more installations. FAA plans to
phase out OASIS between March 2006 and March 2007 in accordance with the
new service provider's transition plan.
7The Capital Investment Plan, a 5-year financial plan, allocates funds to
NAS projects on the basis of a detailed analysis of project funding by FAA
functional working groups. The plan includes estimates for the current
fiscal year budget and for 4 future year expenditures for each line item
in the facilities and equipment budget.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
(STARS) Figure 29: STARS Controller Workstation
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
Purpose and Status
STARS-a joint program of FAA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the
Department of Transportation (DOT)-replaces aging FAA and DOD terminal
systems with state-of-the-art terminal air traffic control systems. The
system is designed to prevent duplication of development and logistic
costs. Civil and military air traffic controllers use STARS to direct
aircraft near major U.S. airports. Its open and expandable terminal
automation platform can accommodate air traffic growth, as well as new
hardware and software that promote safety, maximize operational
efficiency, and improve controllers' productivity.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Initial deployment
Final deployment
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
aThis estimate includes development costs only and does not include
technology refresh and terminal automation enhancement.
bBased on the May 2004 FAA approved Acquisition Program Baseline for
development and procurement estimates.
cThe February 1996 baseline included limited human factor evaluations and
a basic commercial-off the-shelf configuration.
FAA revised its baseline for the STARS program in May 2004, changing the
acquisition to a phased approach that divides large programs into smaller
phases to allow the agency to evaluate other alternatives of system
implementation. For Phase 1, STARS was approved for deployment to 51
Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities. Following the
system's release and FAA's concurrence with the November 23, 2004, report
from the DOT Inspector General, FAA reduced STARS' deployment to 47 TRACON
facilities. STARS is fully operational at 29 FAA terminal radar control
facilities and 21 DOD radar control facilities. If approved in 2005, DOD
plans to deploy STARS to 106 Radar Approach and Control (RAPCON)
facilities and 75 towers nationally and worldwide. With completion of
DOD's transition in 2004 to FAA's new STARS' configuration, both DOD and
FAA are operating together on a single national software and hardware
configuration baseline.
During STARS' development, schedule slippages and cost increases occurred
because the original commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) acquisition strategy
focused on early adoption of commercial technology by FAA and DOD could
avoid the increasing cost of supporting legacy systems by quickly
deploying STARS to the highest-priority air traffic control facilities,
and then making further improvements. FAA had compressed STARS'
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
original development and testing schedule from 32 to 25 months, leaving
only limited time for human factors evaluations. Allowing insufficient
time to involve stakeholders, FAA and the contractor had to restructure
the contract to address technicians' and controllers' concerns, including
an inconsistency in visual warning alarms and color codes between the old
and the new systems. However, the STARS initial system configuration was
satisfactory for use by DOD as deployed. The FAA modified the COTS
strategy and suspended STARS deployments until FAA controller and
technician requirements were developed. FAA estimates the COTS acquisition
strategy, which limited involvement of controllers and maintenance
technicians in the system's development added 3 years and $500 million to
the development of more than 160 system requirements. The first phase of
the three-phase deployment plan comprises 47 systems. FAA and the DOT are
currently determining a safe, economical, and affordable site mix for
follow-up phases.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
Source: Photo courtesy of FAA.
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
Purpose and Status
WAAS uses global positioning system satellites to provide precise
navigation and landing guidance to aircraft at all airports, including
thousands that have no ground-based instrument landing capability. WAAS
also provides safer and more efficient arrival, en route, and departure
operations by allowing user equipment to augment the global positioning
system while increasing its position accuracy and reliability, among other
things.
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
Initial operating capability
Full operating capability
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
aSeptember 1999 and May 2004 estimates for WAAS development exclude $1.3
billion in satellite communications leases.
When WAAS has full operating capability, it will provide en route
navigation guidance from the surface up to 100,000 feet and instrument
landing guidance down to 200 feet. It currently provides full en route
navigation up to 100,000 feet and instrument landing guidance down to 250
feet at all qualified airports in the continental United States. FAA has
begun to publish WAAS instrument flight procedures for some runways;
however, pilots cannot use WAAS for landing guidance on those runways for
which FAA has not written guidance. To achieve full operating capability,
a second civil aviation frequency must be added to new global positioning
system satellites to allow aircraft to conduct precision runway approach
operations during ionospheric interruptions, such as "solar storms." The
Department of Defense, which is responsible for providing this frequency,
plans to add it between 2013 and 2019.
FAA encountered cost, schedule, and performance problems because its
scheduling was accelerated, coordination among its offices proved
insufficient, and technical challenges delayed its meeting the integrity
requirement-a requirement that pilots be alerted in a timely manner when
the system should not be used. At the urging of government and aviation
industry groups in the early 1990s, FAA accelerated WAAS' schedule by
attempting to develop, test, and deploy the system within 28 months, even
though software development alone was expected to take 24 to 28 months.
Rather than shortening the total development time, these steps contributed
to schedule delays. FAA also set development milestones before
Appendix I Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions We
Reviewed in Detail
completing the research and development required to prove WAAS'
capability. Since officials on WAAS' integrated product development team
within the aircraft certification office did not participate regularly
during design and development, FAA did not recognize its difficulty in
meeting the integrity requirement or its lack of scientific and technical
expertise. FAA eventually acquired the expertise, and a team of satellite
navigation experts solved the problem. These actions resulted in unplanned
work and contributed to the rise in WAAS's cost from the original estimate
of $509 million in 1994 to $2.036 billion in 2005, and to a 6-year
extension in its commissioning date. According to FAA, adding 6 years to
the program's life cycle also contributed to increased costs.8
8FAA also transferred $1.3 billion--the cost of satellite leases--from the
operations account to the facilities and equipment account, bringing the
total estimate at completion cost to $3.3 billion.
Appendix II
Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC Modernization Program
Table 4: Cost and Schedule Information for Nine Additional Major Systems under
the ATC Modernization Program
Dollars in millions
Original Current Original Current
schedule schedule schedule schedule
Original Current Last year initial initial last last
cost cost 1st
year funding deployment deployment deployment deployment
Program/system description target target funded planned target target
target target
HOST/Oceanic Computer $424.10 $368.50 FY 97 FY 05 December December June
2004 April 2004
System Replacement 1998 1998
(HOCSR): Replaces the main
ATC computer processor and
some peripherals and ensures
supportability of other
peripherals until replaced by
ERAM.
En Route System $201.90 $201.90 FY 00 FY 09 N/A N/A May 2009 N/A
Modification: Will
replace
obsolete components,
upgrade
controllers' displays and
supporting
infrastructure, and
configure consoles to
accommodate additional
processors.
Initial FY FY
Academy $23.35 $23.35 03 08 September September September September
Training
System
(IATS): 2005 2005 2005 2005
Enables the
training of
an
increasing
number of
new air
traffic
controllers
at the FAA
Academy.
Ultra High Frequency $85.15 $85.15 FY 01 Beyond FY 03 FY 10 FY 10 FY 10
(UHF)
Radio Replacement: FY 09
Replaces aging
equipment
used to communicate
with
Department of Defense
aircraft
in support of military
operations.
Command Center Conference Control System (CCS) - Replace Operational
Telephone Voice Switch (OTS): Replaces the existing telephone system at
the FAA Air Route Control System Command Center in Herndon, Va. The
existing telephone system is becoming unsupportable and can no longer
perform required functions.
$12.70 $12.70 FY 02 FY 05 FY 05 FY 05 FY 05 FY 05
Appendix II Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC Modernization
Program
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dollars in millions
Original Current Original Current schedule schedule schedule schedule
Original Current Last year initial initial last last cost cost 1st year
funding deployment deployment deployment deployment Program/system
description target target funded planned target target target target
Capstone Phase I (a part of $18.55 $18.55 N/A N/A FY 00 N/A FY 03 N/A
the Safe Flight 21 program):
A demonstration program,
intended to improve aviation
system safety in Alaska
through the introduction of new
communications, navigation,
and surveillance technologies,
as well as improving aviation
system capacity and efficiency.
Automated Surveillance Radar-Model 9 (ASR-9)/Mode Service Life Extension
(SLEP): Extends the service life of the radar by replacing obsolete
components to sustain existing system capabilities, such as providing
aircraft detection and separation services to reduce aircraft delays and
improve safety at congested airports.
$186.50 $186.50 FY 01 Beyond TBD TBD TBD TBD FY 09
Aviation Surface $350.90 $403.80 FY Beyond September N/A September N/A
Weather 98
Observation Network FY 09 2002 2010
(ASWON): A suite of
five
weather systems
that provides
automated surface
weather
observation to meet
the needs
of pilots,
operators, and air
traffic
controllers.
Precision Runway Monitor (PRM): An electronic scan radar that tracks and
processes aircraft targets at a 1-second update rate and allows
simultaneous approaches on runways spaced less than 4,300 feet apart,
thereby increasing capacity and reducing delays during adverse weather
conditions.
$145.80 $145.80 FY 88 FY 07 October October January January 1997 1997 2007
2007
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
Appendix II Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC
Modernization Program
Table 5: Cost and Schedule Information for the 30 Buy-It-by-the-Pound Systems
under the ATC Modernization Program
Dollars in millions
1st initial
Last
operating initial
capability/ operating
Appropriated Appropriated Last operational capability/
year
funding for funding 1st funding readiness operational
1st year
Program/system through FY funded date readiness
description year 04 planned date
En Route Enhancements: Maintains $5.30 $36.50 FY 01 Beyond N/A N/A
current software systems and supports FY 09
development, integration, and
implementation of upgrades to, among
other things, the Host software.
Terminal Sustainment: Will maintain $6.30 $73.60 FY 00 Beyond N/A N/A
the existing FAA terminal automation FY 09
systems, such as Common Automated
Radar Terminal System (CARTS)
ARTS IIEs and IIIEs, until the Terminal
Automation Modernization and
Replacement program replaces or
upgrades the systems.a
Current Enhanced Traffic $13.40 $116.50 FY 98 FY 05 N/A N/A
Management System (ETMS) OPS:
Maintains and supports mission-critical
traffic flow management (TFM)
operations in 85 ATC facilities and
makes necessary upgrades to support
enhanced traffic management services.
Traffic Flow Management $8.50 $30.40 FY 02 Beyond February N/A
Infrastructure (TFM-I) FY 09 2008
Modernization: Modernizes the TFM
decision support systems and tools
that
help balance growing flight demands
with NAS capacity within an
environment.
Departure Spacing Program $7.50 $48.50 FY 01 FY 06 Prior to FY Prior to FY
(DSP): 03 03
Assists controllers in
the more efficient
management of departures
from
multiple airports within
the New York
and Philadelphia
metropolitan areas.
NAS Resources/Notice to Airmen $1.70 $10.90 FY 04 Beyond N/A N/A
(NOTAM): Provides an automated, FY 09
centralized, standardized, and timely
distribution system for NOTAMS using a
dedicated telecommunications network.
Appendix II Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC Modernization
Program
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dollars in millions
Appropriated Appropriated Last year funding for 1st funding 1st year
funding
1st initial operating Last initial capability/ operating operational
capability/ readiness operational
Program/ system description year through FY 04 funded planned date
readiness date
Voice Switching and Control System $13.60 $60.00 FY 01 Beyond October 2006
N/A
(VSCS)b: Upgrade and tech refresh to FY 09
ensure that the air-to-ground and
ground-to-ground communications
capabilities are reliable and available
for separating aircraft, coordinating
flight plans, and transferring information
between en route ATC facilities.
Weather Message Switching Center $2.50 $8.50 FY 01 FY 05 N/A N/A
Replacement (WMSCR) Transition:
Will upgrade obsolete processors,
output devices, display screens, backup
systems and software. This will allow
pilots quick and accurate access to
weather data and NOTAMS.
Enhanced Terminal Voice Switch $2.00 $95.40 FY 95 FY 09 May 1998 N/A
(ETVS): Replaces obsolete voice
switches in the ATC Towers and
Terminal Radar Approach Control
facilities. Voice switches enable
air
traffic controllers to communicate
with
aircraft as well as other ATC
facilities.
Communications Facilities $6.00 $53.00 FY 91 Beyond N/A N/A
Expansion (CFE): Provides a vehicle FY 09
for facilities to improve communications
coverage to meet specific operational
requirements based upon, among other
things, air traffic demand.
Air/Ground Communications $1.20 $26.40 FY 89 Beyond 1st delivery Ongoing
Radio on
Frequency Interference FY 09 current
(RFI)
Elimination: Provides contract June
equipment to
improve air and/or ground 1996
communications and
provides support
for remote communication
facilities.
The equipment will reduce
the need for
inter-modulation products,
thus
eliminating the major
source of radio
frequency interference at
congested
sites.
Appendix II Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC Modernization
Program
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dollars in millions
Appropriated funding through FY 04
1st year funded
Last year funding planned 1st initial operating capability/ operational
readiness date Last initial operating capability/ operational readiness
date
Program/ system description
Appropriated funding for 1st year
Critical Telecommunications Support (CTS): Enables FAA to nationally
manage programmed, unprogrammed, and emergency telecommunications network
requirements for the NAS.
$9.90 $63.00 FY 89 FY 05 N/A N/A
Recovery Communications (RCOM ) - Command and Control Communications (C3):
Provides FAA with the minimum command-andcontrol communications capability
necessary to direct the management, operation, and reconstruction of the
NAS during regional or local emergencies when normal common carrier
communicationsare interrupted. C3 also provides minimum capabilities for
continuity of operations for FAA.
$6.30 $51.10 FY 92 Beyond June 2003 N/A FY 09
Aeronautical Data Link (ADL) -Flight $3.30 $8.50 FY 99 FY 08 June 2000 N/A
Information Service (FIS): Provides
data link broadcasts of graphic and
text
flight information service data to
the
cockpit that are consistent with
information available to air traffic
controllers and flight service
specialists
in the NAS.
Tower Data Link Services (TDLS):
Displays the clearances received from Air Route Traffic Control Centers
(ARTCC) to the tower, distributes flight plan data, weather information,
and general information messages from the ARTCC National Airspace Center
computer to ARTCC printers and Air Traffic Control Towers (ATCT) remote
sites. In addition, the system displays weather information received via
ATCT weather interface.
$2.30 $10.80 FY 00 FY 05 Tech refresh N/A start May 2002
Appendix II Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC Modernization
Program
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dollars in millions 1st initial operating capability/ operational
readiness date Last initial operating capability/ operational readiness
date
Appropriated funding for 1st year Appropriated funding through FY 04
1st year funded
Last year funding planned
Program/ system description
Voice Recorder Replacement Program (VRRP): Replaces a total of 530 aging
analog systems with modern digital systems that will reduce both lifecycle
maintenance costs and maintenance staffing requirements.
$3.60 $24.80 FY 97 Beyond FY 09
January 1996 N/A
Houston Area Air Traffic System $12.00 $52.10 FY 01 FY 08 N/A N/A
(HAATS): Provides the focal point and
support for infrastructure, national
airspace improvements, and
implementation of the new procedures
and airspace design for the Houston
area.
Instrument Landing Systems $5.70 $455.30 FY 89 Beyond April 1995, N/A
(ILS):c
Provides precision guidance FY 09 February 2007
(horizontal, vertical, and
distance)
information to allow category
I, II, and
III landing approaches at
large and
medium airports.
Visual Navaids for New Qualifiers: $9.80 $40.90 FY 93 Beyond June 2006 N/A
Procures and installs visual FY 09
navigational aids approach
lighting
systems to enhance landing
capabilities at designated
airports
throughout the United States.
Approach Lighting System $5.80 $183.20 FY 93 Beyond September N/A
Improvement (ALSIP) Continuation: FY 09 1996
Retrofits rigid lighting systems
with
lightweight and low-impact
resistant
structures that collapse or break
apart
at impact, thereby reducing
damage to
aircraft that may strike these
structures
during departure or landing.
Visual Navaids-Sustain, Replace, $3.00 $6.00 FY 02 Beyond N/A N/A
Relocate: Replaces aging, obsolete FY 09
visual navigational aids and other
ground-based navigation and landing
aids to maintain current en route,
approach, and landing capabilities at
various airports throughout the United
States.
Appendix II Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC Modernization
Program
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dollars in millions
1st initial operating Last initial capability/ operating
Appropriated Appropriated Last year operational capability/ funding for
1st funding 1st year funding readiness operational
Program/ system description year through FY 04 funded planned date
readiness date
Very High Frequency Omni-$1.60 $27.00 FY 93 Beyond NA N/A
directional Range (VOR) Collocated FY 09
with Tactical Air Navigation (VORTAC): Replaces, relocates, or
converts VORTAC facilities used for
aerial navigation. General aviation,
commercial carriers, and other groups
use this navigation capability for en
route navigation and approach
operations into airports.
Runway Visual Range (RVR) - $2.80 $42.50 FY 98 Beyond N/A N/A
Replacement/Establishment: FY 09
Replaces aging, maintenance-
intensive, and difficult-to-support RVR
legacy systems. Pilots receive critical
meteorological visibility data that are
used to decide whether it is safe to
take
off or land when visibility is limited.
Sustain Distance Measuring $1.20 $13.90 FY 99 Beyond August 2003 N/A
Equipment (DME): Replaces older FY 09
DME, which is difficult and
expensive to
maintain because replacement
parts
are largely unavailable, and
provides
current technology electronics
to
improve operations and
facilities
performance.
Long Range Radars (LRR) $1.00 $20.20 FY 00 FY 09 N/A N/A
Improvements -Infrastructure
Upgrades: Sustains and improves
LRRs, many of which are over 50 years
old, and require upgrades to prevent
outages and reduce maintenance
costs.
Runway Incursion Reduction $1.40 $35.40 FY 99 Beyond N/A N/A
Program (RIRP) -ATDP: Provides FY 09
research, development, and
operational evaluation of technologies
to improve runway safety.
Appendix II Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC Modernization
Program
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dollars in millions
1st initial
operating Last initial
capability/ operating
Appropriated Appropriated Last operational capability/
year
1st readiness
funding for 1st funding year funding operational
Program/ system description year through FY 04 funded planned date
readiness date
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-$3.50 $14.30 FY 99 FY 09 N/A N/A
Broadcast (ADS-B): Broadcasts
derived aircraft position data from an
onboard navigation system such as
global navigation satellite system
thereby allowing pilots and air traffic
controllers to "see" location of nearby
aircraft and engage in collaborative
decisionmaking.
Next Generation Weather Radar $2.00 $32.90 FY 98 FY 06 February 2000 N/A
(NEXRAD) Open Systems Upgrades:
Detects, processes,
distributes, and
displays hazardous and routine
weather information on air
traffic
controller consoles.
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) - Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP): Maintains the current level of service until 2020 and improves
deteriorating system reliability. The service provides air traffic
controllers with reports of hazardous windshear and other severe weather
in and near an airport's terminal approach and departure zone at
higher-density airports with high occurrences of thunderstorms.
$3.30 $3.30 FY 03 FY 09 September N/A 2004
Corridor Integrated Weather System $5.00 $9.10 FY 02 Beyond N/A N/A
(CIWS): Will improve airspace capacity FY 09
during adverse weather in congested
airspace. The key approach is to
provide accurate and timely prediction
of hazardous weather activity.
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
aTerminal Automation Modernization and Replacement program is intended to
replace aging automation and display systems at the Nation's terminal air
traffic control facilities.
bThe VSCS tech refresh does not have a baseline; an investment analysis is
pending.
cThe April 1995 operational readiness data (ORD) is under the original
contract, while the new contract will be in effect in fiscal year 2006.
Additional systems added in appropriations may affect the last ORD.
Appendix III
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) FAA's experience in meeting cost, schedule, and/or
performance targets for major system acquisitions under its ATC
modernization program, (2) the steps FAA has taken to address longstanding
challenges with the ATC modernization program and additional steps that
are needed, and (3) the potential effects of the constrained budget
environment on FAA's ability to modernize the ATC system.
To address the first objective, we selected 16 of the 55 system
acquisitions in the ATC modernization program to review in detail.1 We
selected these 16 systems in July 2004, when this review was still a part
of our broader work on FAA's efforts to modernize the National Airspace
System (NAS).2 Specifically, we selected the 16 ATC system acquisitions
with the largest life-cycle costs that met the following criteria: each
system had cost, schedule, and/or performance targets, was discussed in
our prior and Department of Transportation Inspector General reports, had
not been fully implemented or deployed by 2004, and received funding in
2004. We reviewed this list with FAA officials to ensure that we did not
exclude any significant system.3 (See app. I for additional information on
these 16 systems.) FAA does not have a formal definition of major systems
under its Acquisition Management System; however, agency officials told us
that if a system acquisition has a formally approved baseline, we could
consider it "major." Using this definition, we determined that 25 of the
55 system acquisitions under the ATC modernization program are major. The
remaining 30 system acquisitions are generally what FAA refers to as
buy-itby-the-pound systems that are commercially available and ready to
use without modification, such as those to replace a system that has
reached the end of its useful life.
For fiscal year 2005, the 55 systems accounted for about 55 percent of
FAA's facilities and equipment (F&E) budget, or $1.38 billion of the $2.52
billion appropriated for the F&E budget. The 16 major systems accounted
for 36 percent ($917.3 million), and the other 39 system acquisitions
accounted for about 19 percent ($460 million). The remaining 45 percent of
1According to FAA officials, the number of system acquisitions in the ATC
modernization program can vary annually, when Congress earmarks funds for
a specific system acquisition. As of March 2005, the number of system
acquisitions under the program was 55.
2Our review of FAA's NAS modernization efforts will be issued later this
year.
3To make the report as current as possible, we have used fiscal year 2005
funding levels where appropriate, including the status sheets for each of
the 16 systems in appendix I.
Appendix IIIObjectives, Scope, and Methodology
the F&E budget will be spent on facilities, mission support, and
personnelrelated activities ($1.14 billion).
To assess the 16 major system acquisitions, we relied largely on data
collected from FAA and contracting officials for two engagements we issued
in November 2004 on FAA's acquisition and certification processes.4 In
turn, we updated this information and collected data on the remaining 39
systems under the modernization program, primarily through interviews with
FAA officials and analyses of the data they provided, including key
acquisition documents. (See app. II for additional information on these 39
system acquisitions.) In addition, we reviewed our past reports and those
of the Department of Transportation's Inspector General. Furthermore, we
interviewed FAA officials within the recently created ATO and collected
and analyzed the documents they provided. We also interviewed officials
with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Air Transport
Association, Department of Defense, National Air Traffic Controllers
Association, and RTCA.5 Furthermore, we convened a panel of international
aviation experts6 to obtain their views on, among other things, the
factors that have affected the cost, schedule, and/or performance of FAA's
ATC modernization program.
In addition, we assessed the reliability of FAA's cost and schedule
estimates. Through interviews with FAA officials about their data system
and quality controls, we determined that the cost and schedule estimates
were appropriate for use in our report. Specifically, the estimates are
sufficiently authoritative, appropriate, and reliable to allow us to use
them without conducting any further assessment. The estimates appear to be
based on reasonable assumptions. Our review did not focus on FAA's efforts
to modernize its facilities.
4GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Ensure Better Coordination When
Approving Air Traffic Control Systems, GAO-05-11 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
17, 2004); GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has
Improved, but Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure
Results, GAO-05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004).
5Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics, RTCA is today known just by its acronym. RTCA is a private,
not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based performance
standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee,
and its recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA's policy,
program, and regulatory decisions.
6GAO, Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic Control
Modernization Program, GAO-05-333SP (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
Appendix IIIObjectives, Scope, and Methodology
To address the second objective, we interviewed FAA officials, primarily
within the recently created ATO, and collected and analyzed the documents
they provided. We also interviewed officials with the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association, Air Transport Association, Department of Defense,
National Air Traffic Controllers Association, and RTCA.
We also reviewed past GAO reports and those of the Department of
Transportation's Inspector General. In addition, we obtained the views of
the international aviation experts who participated in our panel on what
steps the ATO could take in the short term to address the factors that
have affected the cost, schedule, and/or performance of FAA's ATC
modernization program.
To address the third objective, we interviewed officials within FAA's ATO
and obtained and analyzed data on FAA's capital investments and annual
budgets. We also interviewed officials with other organizations cited
above. In addition, we obtained the views of the international aviation
panelists on how federal budget constraints have affected ATC
modernization and what steps the ATO could take in the short term to
address these constraints. We conducted our review from November 2004
through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Appendix IV
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. (202) 512-2834
Staff In addition to the person named above, Beverly L. Norwood, Tamera
Dorland, Seth Dykes, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Brandon Haller, Bert Japikse,
Acknowledgments Maren McAvoy, and Ed Menoche made key contributions to
this report.
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