Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships
for Injured Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers (17-FEB-05, 
GAO-05-322T).							 
                                                                 
In light of the recent mobilizations associated with the Global  
War on Terrorism, GAO was asked to determine if the Army's	 
overall environment and controls provided reasonable assurance	 
that soldiers who were injured or became ill in the line of duty 
were receiving the pay and other benefits to which they were	 
entitled in an accurate and timely manner. This testimony	 
outlines pay deficiencies in the key areas of (1) overall	 
environment and management controls, (2) processes, and (3)	 
systems. It also focuses on whether recent actions the Army has  
taken to address these problems will offer effective and lasting 
solutions.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-322T					        
    ACCNO:   A17858						        
  TITLE:     Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial  
Hardships for Injured Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers	 
     DATE:   02/17/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Armed forces reserves				 
	     Army personnel					 
	     Fringe benefits					 
	     Health care programs				 
	     Health care services				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Management information systems			 
	     Military pay					 
	     Military reserve personnel 			 
	     Mobilization					 
	     National Guard					 
	     Timeliness 					 
	     Army Medical Retention Processing			 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 
	     Global War on Terrorism				 
	     Operation Enduring Freedom 			 
	     Operation Noble Eagle				 

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GAO-05-322T

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                                 GAO Testimony

Before the House Committee on Government Reform

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. Thursday, February 17, 2005

MILITARY PAY

 Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships for Injured Army National
                           Guard and Reserve Soldiers

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Director Financial Management and Assurance

                                       a

GAO-05-322T

[IMG]

February 17, 2005

MILITARY PAY

Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships for Injured Army National
Guard and Reserve Soldiers

                                 What GAO Found

Injured and ill reserve component soldiers-who are entitled to extend
their active duty service to receive medical treatment-have been
inappropriately removed from active duty status in the automated systems
that control pay and access to medical care. The Army acknowledges the
problem but does not know how many injured soldiers have been affected by
it. GAO identified 38 reserve component soldiers who said they had
experienced problems with the active duty medical extension order process
and subsequently fell off their active duty orders. Of those, 24
experienced gaps in their pay and benefits due to delays in processing
extended active duty orders. Many of the case study soldiers incurred
severe, permanent injuries fighting for their country including loss of
limb, hearing loss, and back injuries. Nonetheless, these soldiers had to
navigate the convoluted and poorly defined process for extending active
duty service.

Examples of Injured Soldiers with Gaps in Pay and Benefits

The Army's process for extending active duty orders for injured soldiers
lacks an adequate control environment and management controls-including
(1) clear and comprehensive guidance, (2) a system to provide visibility
over injured soldiers, and (3) adequate training and education programs.
The Army has also not established user-friendly processes-including clear
approval criteria and adequate infrastructure and support services. Many
Army locations have used ad hoc procedures to keep soldiers in pay status;
however, these procedures often circumvent key internal controls and put
the Army at risk of making improper and potentially fraudulent payments.
Finally, the Army's nonintegrated systems, which require extensive
errorprone manual data entry, further delay access to pay and benefits.

The Army recently implemented the Medical Retention Processing (MRP)
program, which takes the place of the previously existing process in most
cases. MRP, which authorizes an automatic 179 days of pay and benefits,
may resolve the timeliness of the front-end approval process. However, MRP
has some of the same issues and may also result in overpayments to
soldiers who are released early from their MRP orders. Out of 132 soldiers
the Army identified as being released from active duty, 15 improperly
received pay past their release date-totaling approximately $62,000.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Army's procedures for
providing pay and related benefits, including medical benefits, to Army
National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers being treated for
service-connected injuries or illness. Our related report1 released today
details weaknesses in the Army's control environment, processes, and
automated systems needed to provide reasonable assurance that injured and
ill reserve component soldiers receive the pay and benefits to which they
are entitled without interruption.

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve mobilized and deployed soldiers in support
of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. When mobilized for up to 2
years at a time,2 these soldiers performed search and destroy missions
against Taliban and al Qaeda members throughout Asia and Africa, fought on
the front lines in Afghanistan, and guarded al Qaeda prisoners held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Similarly, reserve component soldiers fought on the
front lines in Iraq and are now assisting in peacekeeping and
reconstruction operations in Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom. Until
recently, reserve component soldiers who were mobilized in support of the
Global War on Terrorism and were injured or became ill were released from
active duty and demobilized when their mobilization orders expired, unless
the Army took steps, at the soldier's request, to extend their active duty
service-commonly referred to as an active duty medical extension (ADME).
During the course of our audit, the Army implemented the Medical Retention
Processing (MRP) program, which takes the place of ADME for soldiers
returning from operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism3 but
is a similar mechanism for providing pay and related benefits to reserve
component soldiers being treated for service-connected injuries or
illness.

1GAO, Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships
for Injured Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers, GAO-05-125
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 17, 2005).

2For the purpose of this testimony, the term mobilized includes all Army
reserve component soldiers called to perform active service.

3ADME will still exist for soldiers who are not mobilized as part of the
Global War on Terrorism-such as soldiers injured in Bosnia or Kosovo or
during annual training exercises.

Because the Army did not maintain reliable, centralized data on the
number, location, and disposition of mobilized reserve component soldiers
who had requested to extend their active duty service because they had
been injured or become ill in the line of duty,4 it was not possible to
statistically test controls or the impact control breakdowns had on
soldiers and their families. Instead, we relied on a case study and
selected site visit approach for this work-performing audit work at 10
Army installations throughout the country, interviewing and obtaining
relevant documentation from officials at the Army Manpower Office5  at the
Pentagon, all four of the Army's Regional Medical Commands (RMC) in the
continental United States, and the Army Human Resource Command (HRC) in
Alexandria, Virginia. We also interviewed 38 reserve component soldiers
who served in the Global War on Terrorism and had experienced problems
with the ADME process at 4 military installations. Using Army pay and
administrative records, we corroborated information provided by soldiers
about disruptions in pay and benefits but were not always able to validate
other assertions made by injured soldiers about their experiences. Further
details on our scope and methodology and the results of the case studies
can be found in our related report.

Today, I will summarize the results of our work with respect to (1) the
problems experienced by selected injured or ill Army Reserve and National
Guard soldiers; (2) the weaknesses in the overall control environment and
management; (3) the lack of clear processes; (4) the lack of integrated
pay, personnel, and medical eligibility systems; and (5) our assessment of
whether the MRP program has resolved deficiencies associated with ADME and
will provide effective and lasting solutions.

Summary	Poorly defined requirements and processes for extending injured
and ill reserve component soldiers on active duty have caused soldiers to
be inappropriately dropped from their active duty orders. For some, this
has led to significant gaps in pay and health insurance, which has created

4The Army maintained data on soldiers who were currently on ADME orders
but did not track soldiers who were applying for ADME or who had been
dropped from their active duty orders.

5Army Manpower is an organization within the Army Deputy Chief of Staff,
G-1, formerly the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. G-1 is the
Army's human resource provider, handling human resource programs,
policies, and systems. The Army Human Resources Command is a field
operating activity that reports directly to G-1.

financial hardships for these soldiers and their families. Based on our
analysis of Army Manpower data during the period from February 1, 2004,
through April 7, 2004, almost 34 percent of the 867 soldiers who applied
to be extended on active duty orders-because of injuries or illness-fell
off their orders before their extension requests were granted. For many
soldiers, this resulted in being removed from active duty status in the
automated systems that control pay and access to benefits, including
medical care and access to the Commissary and Post Exchange-which allows
soldiers and their families to purchase groceries and other goods at a
discount. Through our case study work, we have documented the experiences
of 10 soldiers who were mobilized to active duty for military operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their stories illustrate the tremendous hardships
faced by injured and ill reserve component soldiers applying for ADME.
Many of the soldiers we interviewed had incurred severe, permanent
injuries fighting for their country including loss of limb, hearing loss,
and ruptured disks. Nonetheless, we found that the soldier carries a large
part of the burden when trying to understand and successfully navigate the
Army's poorly defined requirements and processes for obtaining extended
active duty orders.

With respect to the Army's control environment and the management controls
over the ADME process, we found that the Army has not provided (1) clear
and comprehensive guidance needed to develop effective processes to manage
and treat injured and ill reserve component soldiers, (2) an effective
means of tracking the location and disposition of injured and ill
soldiers, and (3) adequate training and education programs for Army
officials and injured and ill soldiers trying to navigate their way
through the ADME process. For example, many of the soldiers we interviewed
said that neither they nor the Army personnel responsible for helping them
clearly understood the process. This confusion resulted in delays in
processing ADME orders and for some, meant that they fell from their
active duty orders and lost pay and medical benefits for their families.

The Army also lacks customer-friendly processes for injured and ill
soldiers who are trying to extend their active duty orders so that they
can continue to receive medical care. Specifically, the Army lacks clear
criteria for approving ADME orders, which may require applicants to
resubmit paperwork multiple times before their application is approved.
For example, one Special Forces soldier we interviewed, who lost his leg
when a roadside bomb destroyed the vehicle he was riding in while on
patrol for Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, missed three pay periods
totaling $5,000 because he fell off his active duty orders. Although this
soldier was clearly

entitled to a medical extension, according to approving officials at Army
Manpower his application was not immediately approved because it did not
contain sufficiently current and detailed information to justify this
soldier's qualifications for ADME. In addition, the Army has not
consistently provided the infrastructure needed-including convenient
support services-to accommodate the needs of soldiers trying to navigate
their way through the ADME process. This, combined with the lack of clear
guidance discussed previously and the high turnover of the personnel who
are responsible for helping injured and ill soldiers through the ADME
process, has resulted in injured and ill soldiers carrying a
disproportionate share of the burden for ensuring that they do not fall
off their active duty orders. This has left many soldiers disgruntled and
feeling like they have had to fend for themselves. While most of the
installations we reviewed took extraordinary steps to keep soldiers in pay
status, these steps often involved overriding required internal controls
in one or more systems. In some cases, the stopgap measures ultimately
caused additional financial hardships for soldiers or put the Army at risk
of significantly overpaying soldiers in the long run.

With respect to the Army's automated systems that control soldiers' pay
and benefits, overall, we found the current stovepiped, nonintegrated
order-writing, personnel, pay, and medical eligibility systems require
extensive error-prone manual data entry and reentry. Because the
orderwriting system does not directly interface with these other systems,
once approved, hard copy or electronic copy ADME orders are distributed
and used to manually update the appropriate systems. However, the Army's
ADME guidance does not address the distribution of ADME orders or clearly
define who is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate pay,
personnel, and medical eligibility systems are updated. As a result, ADME
orders are not sent directly to the individuals responsible for data
input, but instead are distributed via e-mail and forwarded throughout the
Army and the Department of Defense-eventually reaching individuals with
access to the pay, personnel, and medical eligibility systems. Not only is
this process vulnerable to input errors, but not sending a copy of the
orders directly to the individual responsible for input increases the risk
that system updates will not be entered in time to ensure continuation of
the pay and benefits to which soldiers are entitled.

The Army's new MRP program, which went into effect May 1, 2004, and takes
the place of ADME for soldiers returning from operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, should resolve many of the front-end processing delays
experienced by soldiers applying for ADME by simplifying the application

process. However, MRP has not resolved the underlying management control
problems that plague ADME-including problems associated with the lack of
guidance, visibility over soldiers, adequate training and education, and
manual processes and nonintegrated pay and personnel systems-and in some
respects has worsened problems associated with the Army's lack of
visibility over injured soldiers. For example, in September and October
2004, the Army did not know with any certainty how many soldiers were on
MRP orders, how many had returned to active duty, or how many had been
released from active duty early. In addition, although MRP routinely
authorizes 179-day extensions and eliminates the need to reapply for new
orders every 30 days, as was sometimes the case with ADME, it also
presents new challenges.

If the Army treats and releases soldiers from active duty in less than 179
days, our previous work has shown that weaknesses in the Army's process
for releasing soldiers from active duty and stopping the related pay
before their orders have expired-in this case before their 179 days is
up-often resulted in overpayments to soldiers. Although the Army did not
have a complete or accurate accounting of soldiers who were treated and
released from MRP early, of the 132 soldiers that the Army identified as
released from active duty, we found that 15 were improperly paid past
their release date-totaling approximately $62,000.

Our companion report includes 22 recommendations focused on addressing the
weaknesses we identified in the overall control environment;
infrastructure, resources and processes; and automated systems used to
manage and treat injured reserve component soldiers. To its credit, in
response to these recommendations, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
outlined some actions already taken, others that are underway, and further
planned actions to address the weaknesses we identified.

  Injured and Ill Reserve Component Soldiers Experience Gaps in Pay and
  Benefits, Creating Financial Hardships for Soldiers and Their Families

Poorly defined requirements and processes for extending injured and ill
reserve component soldiers on active duty have caused soldiers to be
inappropriately dropped from their active duty orders. For some, this has
led to significant gaps in pay and health insurance, which has created
financial hardships for these soldiers and their families. Based on our
analysis of Army Manpower data during the period from February 1, 2004,
through April 7, 2004, almost 34 percent of the 867 soldiers who applied
to be extended on active duty orders fell off their orders before their
extension requests were granted. This placed them at risk of being removed
from active duty status in the automated systems that control pay and
access to benefits, including medical care and access to the Commissary
and Post Exchange-which allows soldiers and their families to purchase
groceries and other goods at a discount.

While the Army Manpower Office began tracking the number of soldiers who
have applied for ADME and fell off their active duty orders during that
process, the Army does not keep track of the number of soldiers who have
lost pay or other benefits as a result. Although, logically, a soldier who
is not on active duty orders would also not be paid, as discussed later,
many of the Army installations we visited had developed ad hoc procedures
to keep these soldiers in pay status even though they were not on
official, approved orders. However, many of the ad hoc procedures used to
keep soldiers in pay status circumvented key internal controls in the Army
payroll system-exposing the Army to the risk of significant overpayment,
did not provide for medical and other benefits for the soldiers
dependents, and sometimes caused additional financial problems for the
soldier.

Because the Army did not maintain any centralized data on the number,
location, and disposition of mobilized reserve component soldiers who had
requested ADME orders but had not yet received them, we were unable to
perform statistical sampling techniques that would allow us to estimate
the number of soldiers affected. However, through our case study work, we
have documented the experiences of 10 soldiers who were mobilized to
active duty for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Figure 1 provides an overview of the pay problems experienced by the 10
case study soldiers we interviewed and the resulting impact the
disruptions in pay and benefits had on the soldiers and their families.
According to the soldiers we interviewed, many were living from paycheck
to paycheck; therefore, missing pay for even one pay period created a
financial hardship for these soldiers and their families. While the Army
ultimately addressed

The Army Lacks an  The Army has not provided (1) clear and comprehensive
guidance needed

to develop effective processes to manage and treat injured and ill
reserveEffective Control component soldiers, (2) an effective means of
tracking the location and Environment and  disposition of injured and ill
soldiers, and (3) adequate training and Management Controls education
programs for Army officials and injured and ill soldiers trying to

navigate their way through the ADME process.

    Clear and Complete Guidance Lacking

The Army's implementing guidance related to the extension of active duty
orders is sometimes unclear or contradictory-creating confusion and
contributing to delays in processing ADME orders. For example, the
guidance states that the Army Manpower Office is responsible for approving
extensions beyond 179 days but does not say what organization is
responsible for approving extensions that are less than 179 days. In
practice, we found that all applications were submitted to Army Manpower
for approval regardless of the number of days requested. At times, this
created a significant backlog at the Army Manpower Office and resulted in
processing delays. In addition, the Army's implementing guidance does not
clearly define organizational responsibilities, how soldiers will be
identified as needing an extension, how ADME orders are to be distributed,
and to whom they are to be distributed. Finally, according to the
guidance, the personnel costs associated with soldiers on ADME orders
should be tracked as a base operating cost. However, we believe the cost
of treating injured and ill soldiers-including their pay and benefits-who
fought in operations supporting the Global War on Terrorism should be
accounted for as part of the contingency operation for which the soldier
was originally mobilized. This would more accurately allocate the total
cost of these wartime operations.6

6We did not audit these costs for the purpose of determining if the Army
properly recorded them against available funding sources. Instead, we
applied DOD's criteria for contingency operations cost accounting in DOD's
Financial Management Regulation, Vol. 12, Chapter 23 (February 2001).

    The Army Lacks an Effective Means of Tracking the Location and Disposition
    of Injured and Ill Soldiers

As we have reported in the past, the Army's visibility over mobilized
reserve component soldiers is jeopardized by stovepiped systems serving
active and reserve component personnel.7 Therefore, the Army has had
difficulty determining which soldiers are mobilized and/or deployed, where
they are physically located, and when their active duty orders expire. In
the absence of an integrated personnel system that provides visibility
when a soldier is transferred from one location to another, the Army has
general personnel regulations that are intended to provide some limited
visibility over the movement of soldiers. However, when a soldier is on
ADME orders, the Army does not follow these or any other written
procedures to document the transfer of soldiers from one location to
another-thereby losing even the limited visibility that might otherwise be
achievable. Further, although the Army has a medical tracking system, the
Medical Operational Data System (MODS), that could be used to track the
whereabouts and status of injured and ill reserve component soldiers, we
found that, for the most part, the installations we visited did not use or
update that system. Instead, each of the installations we visited had
developed its own stovepiped tracking system and databases.

Although MODS, if used and updated appropriately, could provide some
visibility over injured and ill active and reserve component soldiers-
including soldiers who are on ADME orders-8 of the 10 installations we
visited did not routinely use MODS. MODS is an Army Medical Department
(AMEDD) system that consolidates data from over 15 different major Army
and DOD databases. The information contained in MODS is accessible at all
Army Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) and is intended to help Army
medical personnel administer patient care. For example, as soldiers are
approved for ADME orders, the Army Manpower Office enters data indicating
where the soldier is to receive treatment, to which unit he or she will be
attached, and when the soldier's ADME orders will expire. However, as
discussed previously, the Army has not established written standard
operating procedures on the transfer and tracking of soldiers on ADME
orders. Therefore, the installations we visited were not routinely looking
to MODS to determine which soldiers were attached to them through ADME
orders. When officials at one installation did access MODS, the data in
MODS indicated that the installation had at least 105 soldiers on ADME
orders. However, installation officials were only aware

7GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of
Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21,
2003).

of 55 soldiers who were on ADME orders. According to installation
officials, the missing soldiers never reported for duty and the
installation had no idea that they were responsible for these soldiers.

    The Army Lacks Adequate Training and Education Programs

The Army has not adequately trained or educated Army staff or reserve
component soldiers about ADME. The Army personnel responsible for
preparing and processing ADME applications at the 10 installations we
visited received no formal training on the ADME process. Instead, these
officials were expected to understand their responsibilities through
on-the-job training. However, the high turnover caused by the rotational
nature of military personnel, and especially reserve component personnel
who make up much of the garrison support units that are responsible for
processing ADME applications, limits the effectiveness of on-the-job
training. Once these soldiers have learned the intricacies of the ADME
process, their mobilization is over and their replacements must go through
the same onthe-job learning process. For example, 9 of the 10 medical hold
units at the locations we visited were staffed with reserve component
soldiers.

In the absence of education programs based on sound policy and clear
guidance, soldiers have established their own informal methods-using
Internet chat rooms and word-of-mouth-to educate one another on the ADME
process. Unfortunately, the information they receive from one another is
often inaccurate and instead of being helpful, further complicates the
process. For example, one soldier was told by his unit commander that he
did not need to report to his new medical hold unit after receiving his
ADME order. While this may have been welcome news at the time, the soldier
could have been considered absent without leave. Instead, the soldier
decided to follow his ADME order and reported to his assigned case manager
at the installation.

  Lack of Clear Processes Contributed to Pay Gaps and Loss of Benefits

The Army lacks customer-friendly processes for injured and ill soldiers
who are trying to extend their active duty orders so that they can
continue to receive medical care. Specifically, the Army lacks clear
criteria for approving ADME orders, which may require applicants to
resubmit paperwork multiple times before their application is approved.
This, combined with inadequate infrastructure for efficiently addressing
the soldiers' needs, has resulted in significant processing delays.
Finally, while most of the installations we reviewed took extraordinary
steps to keep soldiers in pay status, these steps often involved
overriding required

internal controls in one or more systems. In some cases, the stopgap
measures ultimately caused additional financial hardships for soldiers or
put the Army at risk of significantly overpaying soldiers in the long run.

    The Army Lacks Criteria for Approving ADME Orders

Although the Army Manpower Office issued procedural guidance in July of
2000 for ADME and the Army Office of the Surgeon General issued a field
operating guide in early 2003, neither provides adequate criteria for what
constitutes a complete ADME application package. The procedural guidance
lists the documents that must be submitted before an ADME application
package is approved; however, the criteria for what information is to be
included in each document are not specified. In the absence of clear
criteria, officials at both Army Manpower and the installations we visited
blamed each other for the breakdowns and delays in the process.

For example, according to installation officials, the Army Manpower Office
will not accept ADME requests that contain documentation older than 30
days. However, because it often took Army Manpower more than 30 days to
process ADME applications, the documentation for some applications expired
before approving officials had the opportunity to review it. Consequently,
applications were rejected and soldiers had to start the process all over
again. Although officials at the Army Manpower Office denied these
assertions, the office did not have policies or procedures in place to
ensure that installations were notified regarding the status of soldiers'
applications or clear criteria on the sufficiency of medical
documentation. For example, one soldier we interviewed at Fort Lewis had
to resubmit his ADME applications three times over a 3-month period- each
time not knowing whether the package was received and contained the
appropriate information. According to the soldier, weeks would go by
before someone from Fort Lewis was able to reach the Army Manpower Office
to determine the status of his application. He was told each time that he
needed more current or more detailed medical information. Consequently, it
took over 3 months to process his orders, during which time he fell off
his active duty orders and missed three pay periods totaling nearly
$4,000.

    The Army Has Not Consistently Provided the Infrastructure Needed to Support
    Injured and Ill Soldiers

The Army has not consistently provided the infrastructure needed-
including convenient support services-to accommodate the needs of soldiers
trying to navigate their way through the ADME process. This, combined with
the lack of clear guidance discussed previously and the high turnover of
the personnel who are responsible for helping injured and ill solders
through the ADME process, has resulted in injured and ill soldiers
carrying a disproportionate share of the burden for ensuring that they do
not fall off their active duty orders. This has left many soldiers
disgruntled and feeling like they have had to fend for themselves. For
example, one injured soldier we interviewed whose original mobilization
orders expired in January 2003 recalls making over 40 trips to various
sites at Fort Bragg during the month of January to complete his ADME
application.

Over time, the Army has begun to make some progress in addressing its
infrastructure issues. At the time of our visits, we found that some
installations had added new living space or upgraded existing space to
house returning soldiers. For example, Walter Reed Army Hospital has
contracted for additional quarters off base for ambulatory soldiers to
alleviate the overcrowding pressure, and Fort Lewis had upgraded its
barracks to include, among other things, wheelchair accessible quarters.
Also, installations have been adding additional case managers to handle
their workload. Case managers are responsible for both active and reserve
component soldiers, including injured and ill active duty soldiers,
reserve component soldiers still on mobilization orders, reserve component
soldiers on ADME orders, and reserve component soldiers who have
inappropriately fallen off active duty orders. As of June 2004, according
to the Army, it had 105 case managers, and maintained a
soldier-to-case-manager-ratio of about 50-to-1 at 8 of the 10 locations we
visited while conducting fieldwork. Finally, to the extent possible,
several of the sites we visited co-located administrative functions that
soldiers would need- including command and control functions, case
management, ADME application packet preparation, and medical treatment.
They also made sure that Army administrative staff, familiar with the
paperwork requirements, filled out all the required paperwork for the
soldier. Centralizing document preparation reduces the risk of
miscommunication between the soldier and unit officials, case managers,
and medical staff. It also seemed to reduce the frustration that soldiers
would feel when trying to prepare unfamiliar documents in an unfamiliar
environment.

    Ad Hoc Procedures to Keep Soldiers in Pay Status Circumvented Key Internal
    Controls and Created Additional Problems for Soldiers

The financial hardships discussed previously that were experienced by some
soldiers would have been more widespread had individuals within the Army
not taken it upon themselves to develop ad hoc procedures to keep these
soldiers in pay status. In fact, 7 of the 10 Army installations we visited
had created their own ad hoc procedures or workarounds to (1) keep
soldiers in pay status and (2) provide soldiers with access to medical
care when soldiers fell off active duty orders. In many cases, the
installations we visited made adjustments to a soldier's pay records
without valid orders. While effectively keeping a soldier in pay status,
this workaround circumvented key internal controls-putting the Army at
risk of making improper and potentially fraudulent payments. In addition,
because these soldiers are not on official active duty orders they are not
eligible to receive other benefits to which they are entitled, including
health coverage for their families. One installation we visited issued
official orders locally to keep soldiers in pay status. However, in doing
so, they created a series of accounting problems that resulted in
additional pay problems for soldiers when the Army attempted to straighten
out its accounting. Further details on these ad hoc procedures are
included in our related report.

  Nonintegrated Systems Contribute to Processing Delays

Manual processes and nonintegrated order-writing, pay, personnel, and
medical eligibility systems also contribute to processing delays which
affect the Army's ability to update these systems and ensure that soldiers
on ADME orders are paid in an accurate and timely manner. Overall, we
found that the current stovepiped, nonintegrated systems were
laborintensive and require extensive error-prone manual data entry and
reentry. Therefore, once Army Manpower approves a soldier's ADME
application and the ADME order is issued, the ADME order does not
automatically update the systems that control a soldier's access to pay
and medical benefits. In addition, as discussed previously, the Army's
ADME guidance does not address the distribution of ADME orders or clearly
define who is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate pay,
personnel, and medical eligibility systems are updated, so soldiers and
their families receive the pay and medical benefits to which they are
entitled. As a result, ADME orders were sent to multiple individuals at
multiple locations before finally reaching individuals who have the access
and authority to update the pay and benefits systems, which further delays
processing.

As shown in figure 2, once Army Manpower officials approve a soldier's
ADME application, they e-mail a memorandum to HRC-St. Louis

authorizing the ADME order. The Army Personnel Center Orders and Resource
System (AORS), which is used to write the order, does not directly
interface nor automatically update the personnel, pay, or medical
eligibility systems. Instead, once HRC-St. Louis cuts the ADME order it
e-mails a copy of the order to nine different individuals-four at the Army
Manpower Office, four at the National Guard Bureau (NGB) headquarters, and
one at HRC in Alexandria Virginia-none of which are responsible for
updating the pay, personnel, or medical eligibility systems.

Figure 2: Transaction Flow Between the Army's Order-Writing, Pay, Personnel, and
                          Medical Eligibility Systems

                                  Walter Reed   
                                Receives copies 
                                 of both Guard  
                                  and Reserve   
                                 ADME orders.   

                                  Source: GAO.

As shown in figure 2, Army Manpower, upon receipt of ADME orders, e-mails
copies to the soldier, the medical hold unit to which the soldier is
attached, and the RMC. Again, none of these organizations has access to
the pay, personnel, or medical eligibility systems. Finally, NGB officials
e-mail copies of National Guard ADME orders to one of 54 state-level Army
National Guard personnel offices and HRC-Alexandria e-mails copies of
Reserve ADME orders to the Army Reserve's regional personnel offices.
HRC-Alexandria also sends all Reserve orders to the medical hold unit at
Walter Reed. When asked, the representative at HRC-Alexandria who forwards
the orders did not know why orders were sent to Walter Reed when many of
the soldiers on ADME orders were not attached or going to be attached to
Walter Reed. The medical hold unit at Walter Reed that received the orders
did not know why they were receiving them and told us that they filed
them.

At this point in the process, of the seven organizations that receive
copies of ADME orders, only two-the ANG personnel office and the Army
Reserve personnel office-use the information to initiate a pay or
benefitrelated transaction. Specifically, the Guard and Reserve personnel
offices initiate a transaction that should ultimately update the Army's
medical eligibility system, the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting
System (DEERS). To do this, the Army National Guard personnel office
manually inputs a new active duty order end date into the Army National
Guard personnel system, the Standard Installation Division Personnel
Reporting System (SIDPERS). In turn, the data from SIDPERS are batch
processed into the Total Army Personnel Database-Guard (TAPDB-G), and then
batch processed to the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System
(RCCPDS). The data from RCCPDS are then batch processed into
DEERS-updating the soldier's active duty status and active duty order end
date. Once the new date is posted to DEERS, soldiers and family members
can get a new ID card at any DOD ID Card issuance facility.8 The Army
Reserve finance office initiates a similar transaction by entering a new
active duty order end date into the Regional Level Application System
(RLAS), which updates Total Army Personnel Database-Reserve (TAPDB-R),
RCCPDS, and DEERS through the same batch process used by the Guard.

8There are over 800 DOD card issuance facilities located in the United
States, many of which are located on Army installations and with Army
National Guard and Reserve units.

As discussed previously, the Army does not have an integrated pay and
personnel system. Therefore, information entered into the personnel system
(TAPDB) is not automatically updated in the Army's pay system, the Defense
Joint Military Pay System-Reserve Component (DJMS-RC).

Instead, as shown in figure 2, after receiving a copy of the ADME orders
from Army Manpower, the medical hold unit and/or the soldier provide a
hard copy of the orders to their local finance office. Using the Active
Army pay input system, the Defense Military Pay Office system (DMO),
installation finance office personnel update DJMS-RC. Not only is this
process vulnerable to input errors, but it is time consuming and further
delays the pay and benefits to which the soldier is entitled.

  The Army's New Medical Retention Program Will Not Solve All the Problems
  Associated with ADME

The Army's new MRP program, which went into effect May 1, 2004, and takes
the place of ADME for soldiers returning from operations in support of the
Global War on Terrorism, has resolved many of the front-end processing
delays experienced by soldiers applying for ADME by simplifying the
application process. In addition, unlike ADME, the personnel costs
associated with soldiers on MRP orders are appropriately linked to the
contingency operation for which they served, and, therefore, will more
appropriately capture the costs related to the Global War on Terrorism.
While the front-end approval process appears to be operating more
efficiently than the ADME approval process, due to the fact that the first
wave of 179-day MRP orders did not expire until October 27, 2004, after we
completed our work, we were unable to assess how effectively the Army
identified soldiers who required an additional 179 days of MRP and whether
those soldiers experienced pay problems or difficulty obtaining new MRP
orders. In addition, the Army has no way of knowing whether all soldiers
who should be on MRP orders are actually applying and getting into the
system. Further, MRP has not resolved the underlying management control
problems that plagued ADME, and, in some respects, has worsened problems
associated with the Army's lack of visibility over injured soldiers.
Finally, because the MRP program is designed such that soldiers may be
treated and released from active duty before their MRP orders expire,
weaknesses in the Army's processes for updating its pay system to reflect
an early release date have resulted in overpayments to soldiers.

According to Army officials at each of the 10 installations we visited,
unlike ADME, they have not experienced problems or delays in obtaining MRP
orders for soldiers in their units. In fact some installation officials
have

said that the process now takes 1 or 2 days instead of 1 or 2 months.
Because there is no mechanism in place to track application processing
times, we have no way of substantiating these assertions. We are not aware
of any soldier complaints regarding the process, which were commonplace
with ADME.

The MRP application and approval process, which rests with HRC-Alexandria
instead of the Army Manpower Office, is a simplified version of the ADME
process. As with ADME orders, the soldier must request that this process
be initiated and voluntarily request an extension of active duty orders.
Both the MRP and ADME request packets include the soldier's request form,
a physician's statement, and a copy of the soldier's original mobilization
orders. However, with MRP, the physician's statement need only state that
the soldier needs to be treated for a serviceconnected injury or illness
and does not require detailed information about the diagnosis, prognosis,
and medical treatment plan as it does with ADME. As discussed previously,
assembling this documentation was one of the primary reasons ADME orders
were not processed in a timely manner. In addition, because all MRP orders
are issued for 179 days, MRP has alleviated some of the workload on
officials who were processing AMDE orders and who were helping soldiers
prepare application packets by eliminating the need for a soldier to
reapply every 30, 60, or 90 days as was the case with ADME.

While MRP has expedited the application process, MRP guidance, like that
of ADME, does not address how soldiers who require MRP will be identified
in a timely manner, how soldiers requiring an additional 179 days of MRP
will be identified in a timely manner, or how soldiers and Army staff will
be trained and educated about the new process. Further, because the Army
does not maintain reliable data on the current status and disposition of
injured soldiers, we could not test or determine whether all soldiers who
should be on MRP orders are actually applying and getting into the system.
In addition, because MRP authorizes 179 days of pay and benefits
regardless of the severity of the injury, the Army faces a new
challenge-to ensure that soldiers are promptly released from active duty
or placed in a medical evaluation board process upon completion of medical
care or treatment in order to avoid needlessly retaining and paying these
soldiers for the full 179 days. However, MRP guidance does not address how
the Army will provide reasonable assurance that upon completion of medical
care or treatment soldiers are promptly released from active duty or
placed in a medical evaluation board process.

MRP has also contributed to the Army's difficulty maintaining visibility
over injured reserve component soldiers. Although the Army's MRP
implementation guidance requires that installations provide a weekly
report to HRC-Alexandria that includes the name, rank, and component of
each soldier currently on MRP orders, according to HRC officials, they are
not consistently receiving these reports. Consequently, the Army cannot
say with certainty how many soldiers are currently on MRP orders, how many
have been returned to active duty, or how many soldiers have been released
from active duty before their 179-day MRP orders expired. As discussed
previously, if the Army used and appropriately updated the agency's
medical tracking system (MODS), the system could provide some visibility
over injured and ill active and reserve component soldiers- including
soldiers on ADME or MRP orders. However, the Army MRP implementation
guidance is silent on the use of MODS and does not define responsibilities
for updating the system. According to officials at HRC-Alexandria, they do
not update MODS or any other database when they issue MRP orders. They
also acknowledged that the 1,800 soldiers reflected as being on MRP orders
in MODS, as of September 2004, was probably understated given that,
between May 2004 and September 2004, HRC-Alexandria processed
approximately 3,300 MRP orders. Further, as was the case with ADME, 8 of
the 10 installations we visited did not routinely use or update MODS but
instead maintained their own local tracking systems to monitor soldiers on
MRP orders.

Not surprisingly, the Army does not know how many soldiers have been
released from active duty before their 179-day MRP orders had expired.
This is important because our previous work has shown that weaknesses in
the Army's process for releasing soldiers from active duty and stopping
the related pay before their orders have expired-in this case before their
179 days is up-often resulted in overpayments to soldiers. According to
HRC-Alexandria officials, as of October 2004, a total of 51 soldiers had
been released from active duty before their 179-day MRP orders expired. At
the same time, Fort Knox, one of the few installations that tracked these
data, reported it had released 81 soldiers from active duty who were
previously on MRP orders-none of whom were included in the list of 51
soldiers provided by HRC-Alexandria. Concerned that some of these soldiers
may have inappropriately continued to receive pay after they were released
from active duty, we verified each soldier's pay status in DJMS-RC and
found that 15 soldiers were improperly paid past their release date-
totaling approximately $62,000.

  Actions to Improve the Accuracy, Timeliness, and Availability of Entitled Pay
  and Benefits

A complete and lasting solution to the pay problems and overall poor
treatment of injured soldiers that we identified will require that the
Army address the underlying problems associated with its all-around
control environment for managing and treating reserve component soldiers
with service-connected injuries or illnesses and deficiencies related to
its automated systems. Accordingly, in our related report (GAO-05-125) we
made 20 recommendations to the Secretary of the Army for immediate action
to address weaknesses we identified including (1) establishing
comprehensive policies and procedures, (2) providing adequate
infrastructure and resources, and (3) making process improvements to
compensate for inadequate, stovepiped systems. We also made 2
recommendations, as part of longer term system improvement initiatives, to
integrate the Army's order-writing, pay, personnel, and medical
eligibility systems. In its written response to our recommendations, DOD
briefly described its completed, ongoing, and planned actions for each of
our 22 recommendations.

Concluding Comments	The recent mobilization and deployment of Army
National Guard and Reserve soldiers in connection with the Global War on
Terrorism is the largest activation of reserve component troops since
World War II. As such, in recent years, the Army's ability to take care of
these soldiers when they are injured or ill has not been tested to the
degree that it is being tested now. Unfortunately, the Army was not
prepared for this challenge and the brave soldiers fighting to defend our
nation have paid the price. The personal toll this has had on these
soldiers and their families cannot be readily measured. But clearly, the
hardships they have endured are unacceptable given the substantial
sacrifices they have made and the injuries they have sustained. While the
Army's new streamlined medical retention application process has improved
the front-end approval process, it also has many of the same limitations
as ADME. To its credit, in response to the recommendations included in our
companion report, DOD has outlined some actions already taken, others that
are underway, and further planned actions to address the weaknesses we
identified.

  Contacts and Acknowledgments

(192156)

For further information about this testimony please contact Gregory D.
Kutz at (202) 512-9095 or [email protected]. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony were Gary Bianchi, Francine DelVecchio,
Carmen Harris, Diane Handley, Jamie Haynes, Kristen Plungas, John Ryan,
Maria Storts, and Truc Vo.

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