    Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon
    Programs (31-MAR-05, GAO-05-301).

    The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of
    efforts to enhance warfighting and the way the department
    conducts business. Major investments are being made to develop
    improved weapon systems to combat various threats to U.S.
    security. While the weapons that DOD ultimately develops have no
    rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition remains a
    long-standing high-risk area. GAO's reviews over the past 30
    years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions
    such as cost increases, schedule delays, and performance
    shortfalls. In addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges
    that underscore the need to deliver its new major weapon programs
    within estimated costs and to obtain the most from those
    investments. DOD can help resolve these problems by using a more
    knowledge-based approach for developing new weapons. This report
    provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an
    independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense
    programs that identifies potential risks and needed actions when
    a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the
    best practice. It can also highlight those programs that employ
    practices worthy of emulation by other programs. GAO plans to
    update and issue this report annually.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-301
        ACCNO:   A20557
      TITLE:     Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major
    Weapon Programs
         DATE:   03/31/2005
      SUBJECT:   Best practices
    	     Best practices methodology
    	     Defense procurement
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Weapons research and development
    	     Weapons systems
    	     Cost analysis
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Schedule slippages
    	     Systems evaluation
    	     Missiles
    	     Defense cost control
    	     Military research and development
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Advanced SEAL Delivery System
    	     Air Force Advanced Extremely High
    	     Frequency Satellite Program

    	     Air Force B-2 Radar Modernization
    	     Program

    	     Air Force E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and
    	     Control Aircraft

    	     Air Force Evolved Expendable Launch
    	     Vehicle Program

    	     Air Force Small Diameter Bomb
    	     Air Force Transformational Satellite
    	     Communications System

    	     Airborne Mine Neutralization System
    	     Army Advanced Precision Kill Weapon
    	     System Program

    	     Army Advanced Threat Infrared
    	     Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning
    	     System

    	     Army Compact Kinetic Energy Missile
    	     Army Excalibur Precision Guided Extended
    	     Range Artillery Projectile

    	     Army Future Combat Systems
    	     Army Land Warrior System
    	     Army Warfighter Information Network
    	     C-130 Avionics Modernization Program
    	     C-5 Avionics Modernization Program
    	     C-5 Reliability Enhancement and
    	     Reengining Program

    	     CH-47F Helicopter
    	     DD(X) Destroyer
    	     DOD Space Tracking and Surveillance
    	     System

    	     E-2 Aircraft
    	     E-2C Aircraft
    	     EA-18G Aircraft
    	     F-22 Raptor Aircraft
    	     F/A-22 Aircraft
    	     Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
    	     Hawkeye E-2C Aircraft
    	     Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
    	     Joint Common Missile
    	     Joint Standoff Weapon
    	     Joint Strike Fighter
    	     Joint Tactical Radio System
    	     Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems
    	     Program

    	     Littoral Combat Ship
    	     Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting
    	     Vehicle

    	     Marine Corps Heavy Lift Replacement
    	     System

    	     MDA Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
    	     Program

    	     MDA Airborne Laser Program
    	     MDA Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
    	     Program

    	     MDA Kinetic Energy Interceptor System
    	     MDA Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
    	     System

    	     Medium Extended-Range Air Defense System
    	     MQ-9 Predator B
    	     Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft
    	     National Polar-Orbiting Operational
    	     Environmental Satellite System

    	     NAVSTAR Global Positioning System II
    	     Modernized Space/OCS

    	     Navy Active Electronically Scanned Array
    	     Radar Program

    	     Navy Cooperative Engagement Capability
    	     System

    	     Navy Extended Range Guided Munition
    	     Navy Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21
    	     Navy Mobile User Objective System
    	     Navy Tactical Tomahawk Missile
    	     Osprey Aircraft
    	     Space Based Infrared System-High
    	     V-22 Aircraft
    	     V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical
    	     Lift Aircraft

    	     Wideband Gapfiller Satellites

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    GAO-05-301

                     United States Government Accountability Office

                         GAO Report to Congressional Committees

    March 2005

    DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

                     Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

                                           a

    GAO-05-301

    [IMG]

    March 2005

    DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

    Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

                                     What GAO Found

    GAO assessed 54 programs, which represent an investment of over $800
    billion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agency's Airborne Laser to the
    Army's Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. GAO's assessments are
    anchored in a knowledge-based approach to product development that
    reflects best practices of successful programs. This approach centers on
    attaining high levels of knowledge in three elements of a new product or
    weapon-technology, design, and production-at key consecutive junctures in
    development. If a program is not attaining these levels of knowledge, it
    incurs increased risk of technical problems, with significant potential
    cost and schedule growth implications (see figure). If a program is
    falling short in one element, like technology maturity, it is harder to
    attain the requisite amount of knowledge to prudently proceed in
    succeeding elements.

    Attainment of Product Knowledge

    Production,design &technology maturity

    Design &technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production

    start design decision Source: GAO. review

    The majority of programs GAO assessed are costing more and taking longer
    to develop than planned. Most of the programs proceeded with less
    knowledge at critical junctures than suggested by best practices, although
    some programs came close to meeting best practice standards. For example,
    technology and design for the F/A-22 matured late in the program
    contributing to large cost growth and schedule delays. The JASSM program,
    in contrast, has achieved a high level of knowledge at critical junctures
    while experiencing minimal cost increases or schedule delays.

    Managing these levels of knowledge takes on additional significance as
    DOD's share of the discretionary budget faces increasing pressure from the
    growth in mandatory spending and the demands of ongoing military
    operations. For these reasons, if DOD approves programs with low levels of
    knowledge and accepts the attendant likely adverse cost and schedule
    consequences, it will probably get fewer quantities for the same
    investment or face difficult choices on which investments it cannot afford
    to pursue.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

      Foreword vii

        Letter 1
        A Challenging Time for Weapon System Investments 1

    Current Programs Are Costing More and Taking Longer to
    Develop 5
    AKnowledge-Based Approach Can LeadtoBetter Acquisition

    Outcomes 6
    Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of
    Knowledge at Critical Junctures 8
    Assessments of Individual Programs 14

    Airborne Laser (ABL) 15

    Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) 17

    Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF) 19

    Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA) 21

    Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) 23

    Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) 25

    Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) 27

    Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile
    Warning System (ATIRCM/CMWS) 29

    B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP) 31

    C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP) 33

    C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP) 35

    C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program
    (C-5 RERP) 37

    Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 39

    CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F) 41

    Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM) 43

    Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21 45

    DD(X) Destroyer 47

    E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A) 49

    E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE) 51

    EA-18G 53

    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) - Atlas V,
    Delta IV 55

            Page i GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Contents

    Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)

    Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM)

    Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery
    Projectile

    F/A-22 Raptor

    Future Combat Systems (FCS)

    Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)

    Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized
    Space/OCS

    Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR)

    Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)

    Joint Common Missile (JCM)

    Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

    Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)

    Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1

    Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5

    Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS)

    Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI)

    Land Warrior

    Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

    Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)

    Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)

    Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)

                                         57 59

    61 63 65 67 69

    71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99

    MQ-9 Predator B 101

    National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
    System (NPOESS) 103

    Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High 105

    Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) 107

    Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) 109

    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 111

    Tactical Tomahawk Missile 113

    Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) 115

    V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft 117

                                        Contents

    Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS) 119 Warfighter Information
    Network-Tactical (WIN-T) 121

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 123 Scope of Our Review 123

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense 126 Appendix II: Scope
    and Methodology 127 Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels 133 Appendix
                                          IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments 135

      Related GAO Products

    Tables      Table 1: Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power      4
                  Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems     5
                  Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs: 2004
                               Assessment and 2005 Assessment                   6
    Figures      Figure 1: RDT&E and Procurement Funding-Major Defense
                                    Acquisition Programs                        2
               Figure 2: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity
                                      at Key Junctures                          9
               Figure 3: Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key
                                          Junctures                            10
                Figure 4: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as
                                Compared with Best Practices                   13

           Page iii GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Contents

    Abbreviations

    ACTS AEHF Comsec/Transec System
    BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
    BTERM Ballistic Trajectory Extended Range Munition
    DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
    DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency
    DOD Department of Defense
    EKV exoatmospheric kill vehicle
    FY fiscal year
    GAO Government Accountability Office
    GEO geosynchronous earth orbit
    GPS Global Positioning System
    HEO highly elliptical orbit
    HLV heavy lift vehicle
    IMIS Integrated Maintenance Information System
    ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
    JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
    JSSEO Joint Single Integrated Air Picture Systems Engineering

    Organization MDA Missile Defense Agency NA not applicable NASA National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration OT&E
    Operational Test and Evaluation PDR Preliminary Design Review RDT&E
    Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation SDACS Solid Divert and
    Attitude Control System SM-3 Standard Missile 3 TBD to be determined TF/TA
    Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance TRL Technology Readiness Level UAV
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UHF ultra high frequency U.S.C. United States Code
    USMC United States Marine Corps

    Contents

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

            Page v GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Comptroller General of the United States

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

    March 31, 2005

    Congressional Committees

    Fiscal realities demand that the Department of Defense (DOD) get better
    outcomes from its weapon system investments. Federal discretionary
    spending, along with other federal policies and programs, will face
    serious budget pressures in the coming years. While providing for the
    common defense is in the Constitution, defense spending is considered
    "discretionary" from a budget sense. Furthermore, investments in new
    capabilities such as weapon systems are more discretionary than other
    aspects of defense spending, such as personnel costs and the costs of
    supporting and maintaining current force operations. As a result, it is
    imperative that DOD's limited resources be allocated to the most
    appropriate weapon system investments based on current and reasonably
    expected threats and that the investments yield the results promised (such
    as performance, cost, and timing) within the constraints imposed by those
    resources.

    We have assessed weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area since 1990.
    Although U.S. weapons are the best in the world, the programs to acquire
    them often take significantly longer and cost significantly more money
    than promised and often deliver fewer quantities and other capabilities
    than planned. It is not unusual for estimates of time and money to be off
    by 20 to 50 percent. When costs and schedules increase, quantities are
    cut, and the value for the warfighter-as well as the value of the
    investment dollar-is reduced. In these times of asymmetric threats and
    netcentricity, individual weapon system investments are getting larger and
    more complex. Just 4 years ago, the top five weapon systems cost about
    $281 billion; today, in the same base year dollars, the top five weapon
    systems cost about $521 billion. If these megasystems are managed with
    traditional margins of error, the financial consequences can be dire,
    especially in light of a constrained discretionary budget.

    Our work on the development of successful commercial and defense products
    has shown that it is possible to get better outcomes from investments if
    decisions are based on high levels of knowledge. Defense acquisition
    policies support such an approach to managing weapon system programs.
    However, actual practice is not yet consistently following written policy.
    As this annual assessment of major weapon acquisitions shows, most
    programs are proceeding with inadequate levels of knowledge, with
    attendant increased risks for traditional rates of cost

    growth, along with schedule delays and performance shortfalls. On the
    other hand, this assessment also includes programs that are proceeding
    with high levels of knowledge, showing that practice can follow policy.

    This is our third annual assessment of weapon system programs. The
    experiences catalogued in this report provide insights on how programs can
    be better positioned to succeed. To the extent that programs are not so
    positioned, the report can be used by decision makers to take actions to
    reduce risks by building higher levels of knowledge.

    David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States

           Page viii GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    A

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

    March 31, 2005

    Congressional Committees

    The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to
    enhance warfighting capabilities. Primary among these efforts are the
    investments being made to develop improved weapon systems with
    technological superiority and enhanced lethality to combat threats to U.S.
    security. Investment in programs such as the Army's Future Combat Systems
    and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, the Missile Defense Agency's
    suite of land, sea, air, and space systems, the Navy's advanced ships such
    as the DD(X) Destroyer, and the Air Force's space systems such as the
    Transformational Satellite Communications System are likely to dominate
    the budget and doctrinal debate well into the next decade. Many of these
    embody the dual challenge of employing complex technology with a rapid
    pace of development. Fiscal realities, coupled with the larger scope of
    key acquisitions, reduce the ability of budgets to accommodate typical
    margins for error in terms of cost increases and schedule delays.
    Identifying risks early and addressing them before they become problems
    can lessen cost increases and schedule delays and thus enable budgets to
    buy what was planned.

    In this report, we assess 54 programs that represent an investment of
    approximately $800 billion.1 Our objective is to provide decision makers
    with independent, knowledge-based assessments of individual systems'
    attained knowledge and potential risks.

    A Challenging Time for DOD has entered a period of high investment. A
    significant portion of this

    investment is for the acquisition of weapon systems that offerWeapon
    System technologically advanced capabilities. The investment in the
    research, Investments development, and procurement of major weapon systems
    is expected to

    rise from $144 billion in fiscal year 2005 to $185 billion in fiscal year
    2009.

    Major Defense Acquisition Programs make up about 45 percent, or

    1 This estimate includes total research, development, test, and evaluation
    (RDT&E); procurement; military construction; and acquisition operation and
    maintenance appropriations to develop the weapon systems.

    $65 billion, as shown in figure 1, of the fiscal year 2005 investment
    request.2 DOD's total planned investment in these programs is
    approximately $1.3 trillion, with about $812 billion of that investment
    yet to be made.

    Figure 1: RDT&E and Procurement Funding-Major Defense Acquisition Programs

                          In millions of constant 2005 dollars

    80,000

    70,000

    60,000

    50,000

    40,000

    30,000

    20,000

    10,000

    0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

    Fiscal year

    Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

    There are several challenges to getting the most from that investment.
    First, because DOD's investment in weapon systems represents one of the
    largest discretionary items in the federal budget, DOD's budget faces

    2 Major Defense Acquisition Programs are programs identified by DOD as
    programs that require eventual RDT&E expenditures of more than $365
    million or $2.19 billion in procurement in fiscal year 2000 constant
    dollars.

    Page 2 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    growing pressures from increases in mandatory federal spending.3 According
    to the Congressional Budget Office, federal deficits are expected to
    average $250 billion through fiscal year 2009 and new budgetary demands
    stemming from demographic trends lie beyond that time frame. In calendar
    year 2004, discretionary spending accounted for about 39 percent of the
    federal budget, and current projections show that because of increases in
    mandatory spending, discretionary spending is likely to decrease to 33
    percent of the federal budget by fiscal year 2009.4 It will be difficult
    for DOD to increase its budget share to cover cost increases in weapon
    programs in that environment.

    Second, DOD faces competing demands within its own budget, such as from
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since September 2001, DOD has needed
    $158 billion in supplemental appropriations to support the global war on
    terrorism.5 The budget implications of these operations further increase
    the demand made of the defense dollar and therefore the investment in new
    weapon programs. For example, current military operations are causing
    faster wear on existing weapons, which will need refurbishment or
    replacement sooner than planned. These needs will compete with the
    investment in new weapon programs.

    Third, DOD programs typically take longer to develop and cost more to buy
    than planned, placing additional demands on available funding. These
    programs increasingly compete for resources and are sometimes forced to
    make trade-offs in quantities, resulting in a reduction of buying power.
    As a result, funds are not available for other competing needs and
    programs yield fewer quantities for the same, if not higher, cost. Table 1
    illustrates seven programs with the greatest reduction of buying power.
    Some of these programs experienced higher costs for the same initial
    quantity.

    3 Mandatory spending is controlled by laws other than appropriation acts.
    Discretionary spending is provided in appropriations acts.

    4 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal
    Years 2006 to 2015. (Washington, D.C.: January 2005.)

    5 Estimate as of May 2004. Another supplemental was expected in January
    2005 to cover costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Table 1: Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power

    Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. Images sourced in their respecitve
    order: JSF Program Office; Program Manager, Unit of Action, U.S. Army;
    F/A-22 System Program Office; (Left) (c) 2003 ILS/Lockheed Martin, (right)
    (c) 2003 The Boeing Company; Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company;
    General Dynamics Land Systems; Naval Gunnery Project Office.

    If DOD cannot deliver its major new programs within estimated costs,
    difficult choices have to be made regarding which investments to pursue
    and which to discontinue.

            Page 4 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Current Programs Are The majority of programs in our assessment are
    costing more and taking

    longer to develop than estimated. As shown in table 2, total RDT&E
    costsCosting More and for 26 common set6 weapon programs increased by
    nearly $42.7 billion, or Taking Longer to 42 percent, over the original
    business case (the first full estimate). The Develop same programs have
    also experienced an increase in the time needed to

    develop capabilities with a weighted-average schedule increase of nearly

    20 percent.7

               Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems

                           Billions of constant 2005 dollars

                                                 First full    Latest     Percent
                                                   estimate   estimate     change
                     Total cost                      $479.6        $548.9
                     RDT&E cost                       102.0         144.7
         Weighted-average acquisition cycle    146.6 months 175.3 months
                       timea

    Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

    aThis is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for the 26
    programs based on total program costs at the first full and latest
    estimates. The simple average for these two estimates was 94.9 months for
    the first full estimate and 114.7 months for the latest estimate,
    resulting in a 20.8 percent change.

    Quantities for 10 of the common set programs have been reduced since their
    first estimate.8 In addition, the weighted-average program acquisition
    unit cost of 25 of the 26 programs increased by roughly 50 percent.9

    6 The common set refers to the 26 weapon system programs that we were able
    to assess since development began and between annual assessment periods.
    The 26 programs are AESA, AEHF, APKWS, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, CH-47F, CEC, E-2
    AHE, EA-18G, Excalibur, EFV, ERGM, F/A-22, FCS, Global Hawk, JASSM, JSOW,
    JSF, JTRS Cluster 1, Land Warrior, NPOESS, Tomahawk, SDB, V-22, WIN-T, and
    WGS. We limited this analysis to these 26 programs because all data
    including cost, schedule, cycle time, and quantities were available for
    comparison between program estimates.

    7 A weighted average gives more expensive programs a greater value.

    8 The 10 programs are AEHF, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, Excalibur, ERGM, F/A-22,
    Global Hawk, JSF, JSOW, and V-22.

    9 This estimate is a weighted average based on total program cost and does
    not include the Excalibur program because of its extreme unit cost growth.
    The simple average program unit cost increase for the same 25 programs is
    40 percent. The weighted average, including the Excalibur, is 52 percent.

    During the last year, cost and schedule estimates for the same 26 programs
    have increased noticeably since our last assessment, as shown in table 3.

      Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs: 2004 Assessment and 2005
                                       Assessment

                           Billions of constant 2005 dollars

                                          2004 assessment 2005 assessment Percent
                                                                           change
                   Total cost                      $480.3          $548.9
                   RDT&E cost                       127.3           144.7
    Weighted-average acquisition cycle    166.1 months  175.3 months
                     timea

    Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

    aThis is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for the 26
    programs based on total program cost estimates for the 2004 assessment and
    the 2005 assessment. The simple average for these two estimates was 110.7
    months for the 2004 assessment and 114.7 months for the 2005 assessment,
    resulting in a 3.6 percent change.

    bThese estimates also include the Land Warrior program. Although this
    program was not included in the 2004 assessment, the program is included
    in the common set because data were available from the December 2002
    Selected Acquisition Report for inclusion in this estimate.

    Some of DOD's largest programs have driven these increases. For example,
    research and development costs for the Army's Future Combat Systems, a
    $108 billion investment, increased by approximately 51 percent over the
    past year while in the midst of a major restructuring of the program.
    Likewise, the Joint Strike Fighter, a $199 billion investment, has
    reported a research and development cost increase of over 19 percent in
    the past year.

      A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes

    Over the last several years we have undertaken a body of work that
    examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective that draws upon
    lessons learned from best system development practices. We found that
    successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that
    their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their production
    processes are in control. Separating technology development from product
    development is important to this effort. Successful programs make a
    science and technology organization, rather than the program or product
    development manager, responsible for maturing technologies. Such steps can
    help to reduce costs and deliver a product on time and within budget.
    DOD's current acquisition guidance embraces the use of evolutionary,
    knowledge-based acquisition practices proven to be more effective and
    efficient in developing new products. By fully implementing these
    practices, DOD can better leverage its investments by shortening the time
    it

            Page 6 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    takes to develop capabilities with more predictable costs and schedules,
    thereby maintaining its buying power.

    Successful product developers ensure a high level of knowledge was
    achieved at key junctures in development. We characterize these junctures
    as knowledge points. These knowledge points and associated indicators are
    defined as follows:

    o 	Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This level of knowledge
    occurs when a sound business case is made for the product-that is, a match
    is made between the customer's requirements and the product developer's
    available resources in terms of knowledge, time, and money. Achieving a
    high level of technology maturity at the start of system development is an
    important indicator of whether this match has been made. This means that
    the technologies needed to meet essential product requirements have been
    demonstrated to work in their intended environment.

    o 	Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This level of knowledge
    occurs when a program determines that a product's design is stable- that
    is, it will meet customer requirements and cost and schedule targets. A
    best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-level critical
    design review, usually held midway through development. Completion of at
    least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the system design review
    provides tangible evidence that the design is stable.

    o 	Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature. This level of
    knowledge is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the product can
    be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A best
    practice is to ensure that all key manufacturing processes are in
    statistical control-that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and capable
    of consistently producing parts within the product's quality tolerances
    and standards-at the start of production.

    The attainment of each successive knowledge point builds on the preceding
    one. While the knowledge itself builds continuously without clear lines of
    demarcation, the attainment of knowledge points is sequential. In other
    words, production maturity cannot be attained if the design is not stable,
    and design stability cannot be attained if the critical technologies are
    not mature.

    Seeking to improve acquisition outcomes, DOD revised its acquisition
    policy in May 2003 to incorporate a knowledge-based, evolutionary
    framework. The policy adopts lessons learned from successful commercial
    companies. For example, the policy attempts to separate technology
    development from product development and requires the demonstration of
    technologies to high readiness levels. The policy also allows managers to
    develop a product in increments rather than trying to incorporate all of
    the desired capabilities in the first version that comes off the
    production line.

    Most Programs Have Most of the programs we reviewed proceeded with lower
    levels of

    knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of
    productProceeded with Lower knowledge later in development than specified
    in DOD policy, which Levels of Knowledge at resulted in cost increases and
    schedule delays.

      Critical Junctures

    Development Start	Our work shows that the demonstration of technology
    maturity by the start of system development is the key measure for
    achievement of knowledge point 1. A program that proceeds into product
    development without demonstrating mature technologies does so with
    increased risk of cost growth and schedule delays throughout the life of
    the program.

    Only 15 percent of the programs we assessed began development having
    demonstrated all of their technologies mature, as illustrated in figure 2.

            Page 8 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Figure 2: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key
    Junctures

    100

    75

    50

    25

    0

    Development DOD Production start design decision review

    Source: GAO analysis.

    More often than not, programs sought to mature technologies well into
    system development when they should have focused on maturing system design
    and preparing for production. The programs that started development with
    mature technologies experienced lower development and unit cost increases
    than those programs that started development with immature technologies.
    For example, RDT&E costs for the programs that started development with
    mature technology increased by an average of 9 percent over the first full
    estimate, whereas the development costs for the programs that started
    development with immature technologies increased an average of 41 percent
    over the first full estimate. Likewise, program acquisition unit costs for
    the programs with mature technology increased by less than 1 percent,
    whereas the programs that started development with immature technologies
    experienced an average program acquisition

    unit cost increase of nearly 21 percent over the first full estimate.10
    Finally, the programs with mature technology experienced an average
    schedule delay of 7 months-a 9 percent increase-whereas the schedule for
    the programs that started development with immature technology increased
    an average of 13 months-a 13 percent increase.

    Design Review	As illustrated in figure 3, 42 percent of the programs that
    held a design review achieved design stability at that key juncture.

    Figure 3: Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key Junctures

    100

    75

    50

    25

    0

    DOD Production design decision review

    Source: GAO analysis.

    10 These percentages are program cost weighted averages. The simple
    average increase for program acquisition unit costs is 0.68 percent for
    the programs that started development with mature technologies and 25
    percent for the programs that started development with immature
    technologies.

            Page 10 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    With the exception of the Navy's V-22, which has experienced significant
    design changes since development start in 1986, these programs have
    experienced a 6 percent increase in development costs and an average
    schedule increase of 11 months since the first full estimate.11 Those
    programs that did not achieve design stability have experienced a
    combined development cost increase of 46 percent and an average
    schedule increase of 29 months since the first full estimate.12

    Design stability cannot be attained if key technologies are not mature.
    Ten programs held design review without demonstrating mature critical
    technologies.13 Out of the 10 programs, 7 had experienced a cost increase,
    schedule delay, or both.14 The unit cost of 5 of these programs increased
    by
    at least 10 percent.15 In contrast, 3 programs entered product development
    with mature technologies. These three programs kept program unit cost
    increases to a minimum, with costs either falling or increasing by single
    digits.16

    11 This estimate does not include cost and schedule data for three
    programs: the V-22, Aegis BMD, and STSS. Aegis BMD and STSS were not
    included in the cost and schedule estimates because they are missile
    defense elements that do not provide baseline cost and schedule estimates
    against which to measure progress.

    12 The cost and schedule estimates do not include the THAAD system or the
    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system because they are missile defense
    elements that do not provide baseline estimates against which to measure
    progress. The schedule estimate does not include the ATIRCM/CMWS because a
    key date is classified.

    13 The 10 programs are AESA, Aegis BMD, APKWS, ATIRCM/CMWS, EFV, ERGM,
    F/A-22, GMD, JTRS 1, and STSS. The F/A-22 held its design review in 1995
    and while we did not formally assess the technology maturity at that
    point, the F/A-22 technologies and design matured late in the program
    (e.g. the F/A-22 program had released 21 percent of drawings at design
    review).

    14 This estimate does not include the missile defense elements (Aegis BMD,
    GMD, and STSS) because they do not provide baseline estimates against
    which to measure progress.

    15 The five programs are AESA, ATIRCM/CMWS, EFV, ERGM, and F/A-22.

    16 The three programs are the C-5 RERP, JASSM, and the Tactical Tomahawk.
    C-5 RERP and JASSM were assessed to have design stability at design
    review. C-5 RERP had a program unit cost increase of 8.2 percent; JASSM
    had a program unit cost of increase of 7.1 percent; and Tactical Tomahawk
    had a decrease of program unit cost of -13.5 percent.

    Nine programs are scheduled to hold their system design review in the next
    year.17 Only two of those programs, the B-2 Radar Modernization and the
    Excalibur program, expect their technologies to be mature at the time of
    their design reviews. The remaining seven programs project that their
    technologies will not attain maturity until after their critical design
    reviews.

    Production Start	To determine if a product's design is reliable and
    producible, successful programs use statistical process control to bring
    manufacturing processes under control so they are repeatable, sustainable,
    and consistently producing parts within quality standards. The collection
    of process control data prior to a production decision can enable a smooth
    transition from product development to the production phase. Of the 19
    programs in production or approaching a production decision in the next
    year, only 2 collected or plan to collect statistical process control data
    to measure the maturity of production processes.18 While the absence of
    the data does not mean that production processes were immature, it does
    prevent an assessment against an objective standard.

        How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed

    We assess each program in 2 pages and depict the extent of knowledge in a
    stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of the
    first page. As illustrated in figure 4, the knowledge graph is based on
    the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the attainment of
    knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange), design stability
    (depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted in blue). A "best
    practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment of the three types
    of knowledge at the three knowledge points. In some cases, we obtained
    projections from the program office of future knowledge attainment. These
    projections are depicted as dashed bars. The closer a program's attained
    knowledge is to the best practice line, the more likely the weapon will be
    delivered within estimated cost and schedule. A knowledge deficit at the
    start of development-indicated by a gap between the technology knowledge
    attained and the best practice line-means the program proceeded with
    immature technologies and faces a greater likelihood of

    17 The nine programs are AMNS, B-2 RMP, C-130 AMP, CVN-21, DD(X), E-2 AHE,
    EA-18G, Excalibur, and WIN-T.

    18 The two programs are APKWS and ASDS.

            Page 12 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    cost and schedule increases as technology risks are discovered and
    resolved.

    Figure4: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared
    with Best Practices

    Source: GAO.

    An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system
    development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing
    knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design review
    as some technologies were still not mature and only a small percentage of
    engineering drawings had been released. Projections for the production
    decision show that the program is expected to achieve greater levels of
    maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that this program would
    have had significant cost and schedule increases.

    We conducted our review from July 2004 through March 2005 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II
    contains detailed information on our methodology.

    Assessments of Our assessments of the 54 weapon systems follow.

      Individual Programs

            Page 14 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

                                    Common Name: ABL

    MDA's ABL element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
    blocks to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of their flight.
    Carried aboard a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL employs a beam
    control/fire control subsystem to focus the beam on a target, a
    high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel tanks of enemy missiles,
    and a battle management subsystem to plan and execute engagements. We
    assessed the Block 2004 design that is under development and expected to
    lead to an initial capability in a future block.

                         Source: Airborne Laser Program Office.

    Program Transition to 6-module Initial beam/fire GAO Lethality Initial
    start MDA laser test control flight test review demonstration capability
    (11/96) (10/01) (11/04) (12/04) (1/05) (TBD) (TBD)

    Although program officials expected ABL to provide an initial capability
    during Block 2006, this event has been delayed and only one of its seven
    critical technologies is fully mature. During Block 2004, the program
    continues work on a prototype that is expected to provide the basic design
    for a future operational capability. Program officials expect to
    demonstrate the other six technologies during a prototype flight test that
    will assess ABL's lethality. Difficulty in integrating prototype
    components could delay this effort from 2005 to 2008. MDA has released
    about 94 percent of the engineering drawings for the prototype's design,
    which will be the basis for an initial operational capability during a
    future block if the test is successful. However, additional drawings may
    be needed if the design is enhanced or if problems encountered during
    flight testing force design changes.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    GAO Development DOD Production review start design decision (1/05) (TBD)
    review (TBD)

                                         (TBD)

    Common Name: ABL

        ABL Program

    Technology Maturity

    Only one of ABL's seven critical technologies- managing the high-power
    beam-is fully mature. The program office assessed three technologies- the
    six-module laser, missile tracking, and atmospheric compensation-as nearly
    mature. The remaining three technologies-transmissive optics, optical
    coatings, and jitter control-are the least mature. According to program
    officials, all of these technologies are needed to provide the system with
    an initial operational capability.

    While the program office has assessed the six-module laser as being close
    to reaching full maturity, the power generated by grouping six laser
    modules together must be demonstrated before full maturity can be
    reasonably assessed. The recent demonstration of the simultaneous firing
    of all six laser modules reduces risk in this area. Additional testing,
    planned over the next 6 months, must still be completed to demonstrate the
    full power and duration of the laser segment prior to installation on the
    aircraft.

    The transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter control are the
    least mature critical technologies and consist of prototypes that have
    only been tested in the laboratory or demonstrated through analysis and
    simulation. The program plans to demonstrate all technologies in an
    operational environment during a flight test of the system prototype,
    referred to as lethal demonstration, in which ABL will attempt to shoot
    down a short-range ballistic missile. Challenges with integrating the
    laser and beam control/fire control subcomponents could delay this test
    into 2008, but the final schedule is to be determined. Upon successful
    completion of this test, MDA expects to develop a second aircraft that
    will provide an initial operational capability.

    Design Stability

    We could not assess the design stability because ABL's initial capability
    will not be fully developed until the second aircraft-what is expected to
    provide an initial capability-is well underway. While the program has
    released 10,280 of the 10,910 engineering drawings for the prototype, it
    is unclear whether the design of the prototype aircraft can be relied upon
    as a good indicator of design stability for the second aircraft. More
    drawings may be needed if the design is enhanced or if problems
    encountered during flight testing force design changes.

    Production Maturity

    We did not assess the production maturity of ABL because MDA has not made
    a production decision. The program is producing a limited quantity of
    hardware for the system's prototype. Program officials explained that they
    continue to experience problems maintaining a stable manufacturing base
    for prototype subcomponents.

    Other Program Issues

    Technological challenges caused the prime contract to approach its cost
    ceiling during fiscal year 2004. In early April 2004, MDA directed the ABL
    program to restructure the contract, increase its cost ceiling, and
    refocus the contractor's efforts on making technical progress. As a
    result, the cost ceiling was increased by $1.5 billion and the period of
    performance was extended to 2008 from 2005. The contract is currently
    valued at approximately $3.6 billion.

    The focus of current work is on two near-term events. The first event was
    the six-module laser test in a ground test facility that the program
    completed in November 2004. The second event was the initial Beam
    Control/Fire Control flight test, which occurred in December 2004.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA maintained that the
    current design is stable despite the assessed technology maturity.
    Officials told us that because the ABL operational environment is
    impractical to duplicate on the ground, the technology maturity assessment
    will understate actual maturity until after 100 percent of the drawings
    are released. While the officials expect changes to future blocks as part
    of capability-based spiral acquisition, they believe the basic design will
    directly migrate to subsequent blocks.

                                  CommonName: AegisBMD

    MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being
    developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed U.S.
    forces and critical assets from short-and medium-range ballistic missile
    attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, hit-to-kill
    interceptors, and command and control systems. It will also be used as a
    forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of intercontinental
    ballistic missiles. We assessed only Block 2004 of the element's
    interceptor-the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3).

    Source: Aegis BMD Program Directorate.

    Program start (10/95)

                                     Transition to
                                          MDA
                                         (1/02)

    Design review (5/03)

                                 Surveillance/tracking
                                       capability
                                         (9/04)

                    GAO review (1/05) Block 2004 completion (12/05)

    According to program officials, the first increment of SM-3 missiles being
    fielded during 2004-2005 has mature technologies and a stable design.
    However, the program has been struggling with the technology that
    maneuvers the missile's kinetic warhead (kill vehicle) to its target.
    Partial functionality of this "divert" technology was successful in 4
    flight tests, but full functionality has only been demonstrated in ground
    tests-it failed during a June 2003 flight test. Design modifications were
    identified but will not be implemented in the first 8 missiles being
    fielded. Program officials noted that even with a reduced capability,
    these missiles provide a credible defense. All drawings for the first
    increment of missiles have been released to manufacturing. The program is
    not collecting statistical data on its production process but is using
    other means to gauge production readiness.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (10/95) review
    (1/05) (TBD) (5/03)

    Common Name: Aegis BMD

        Aegis BMD Program

    Technology Maturity

    Program officials estimate that all three technologies critical to the
    SM-3 are mature. These technologies-the third stage rocket motor, the
    infrared seeker of the kinetic warhead, and the Solid Divert and Attitude
    Control System (SDACS) of the kinetic warhead-were all tested in flight.
    While the first two technologies were fully demonstrated in flight tests,
    the SDACS, which generates divert pulses to steer the kinetic warhead, was
    only partially demonstrated. As noted previously, full "divert" technology
    succeeded in ground testing but partially failed during a June 2003 flight
    test. According to program officials, the test failure was likely caused
    by a defective subcomponent within the SDACS, a problem that should be
    corrected through specific design modifications. Program officials note
    that only partial functionality of the SDACS is required for Block 2004,
    which was successfully demonstrated in flight tests. Although the kinetic
    warhead of these interceptors will have reduced divert capability, they
    provide a credible defense against a large population of the threat and
    can be retrofitted upon the completion of design updates and testing.

    Design Stability

    Program officials reported that the design for the first eight
    interceptors being fielded during Block 2004 is stable with 100 percent of
    its drawings released to manufacturing. The program plans to implement
    design changes in subsequent configurations of the SM-3 (delivered during
    2006-2007) to resolve the SDACS failure witnessed in the June 2003 flight
    test.

    Production Maturity

    We did not assess the production maturity of the missiles being procured
    for Block 2004. Program officials stated that given the low quantity of
    missiles being produced, statistical process control data on the
    production process would have no significance. The Aegis BMD program is
    using other means to assess progress in production and manufacturing-such
    as integrated product teams, risk reviews, and SM-3 metrics-as part of its
    overall development of the SM-3.

    Other Program Issues

    The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of
    Aegis-equipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software
    upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the ballistic
    missile defense mission. In particular, the program is working to upgrade
    Aegis destroyers for surveillance and tracking of intercontinental
    ballistic missiles. Because this function is new to the element-allowed
    only after the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty-the
    program office faced a tight schedule to fully develop and test this added
    functionality, which it completed in September 2004 with the deployment of
    the first destroyer for this mission.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
    that Aegis BMD progress remains on track. For example, the program
    deployed the first operational destroyers (for the long-range surveillance
    and tracking mission) to the Sea of Japan, delivered 5 missiles in
    November, and successfully ground tested the redesigned SDACS. It noted,
    however, that our review focused on the SM-3, a junior portion of the
    overall cost and development of the Aegis BMD system.

    In addition, the program office reiterated that SDACS technology was
    successful in four of five Aegis BMD flight tests. The current SDACS
    configuration is fully capable of defeating the Block 2004 threat set, and
    a design update is in progress to complete the final increment of
    capability. As an application of capabilities-based acquisition, the
    warfighter is provided a significant capability years earlier (albeit
    using partial SDACS functionality) instead of waiting for a perfect
    design.

                                   Common Name: AEHF

    The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing Milstar
    system with higher capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, worldwide, secure
    communication capabilities for strategic and tactical warfighters. The
    program includes satellites and a mission control segment. Terminals used
    to transmit and receive communications are acquired separately by each
    service. AEHF is an international partnership program that includes
    Canada, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and
    mission control segments.

    Source: Advanced EHF Program Office.

    Program start (4/99)

    Design review (4/04)

        Production decision (6/04) GAO review (1/05) First launch (4/08) Initial
                                   capability (6/10)

    According to the program office, the AEHF program's technologies are
    mature and the design is stable. However, the high risk strategy of
    concurrently developing two critical path items has led to further
    schedule delays and cost increases. The program is relying on the
    concurrent development of the AEHF Comsec/Transec System (ACTS) suite of
    cryptological equipment, which limits access to authorized users, and
    terminals used for satellite command and control. Both of these items are
    being developed outside the program office. Delivery delays of the ACTS
    and command and control terminals resulted in an additional 12-month
    launch delay and an estimated 20 percent cost increase, incurring a
    Nunn-McCurdy breach (10 U.S.C. 2433) at the 15 percent threshold.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (NA) review
    (6/04) (1/05)

                                         (4/04)

    Common Name: AEHF

        AEHF Program

    Technology Maturity

    All of the 14 critical technologies are mature, according to the program
    office. In addition, all 19 of the application-specific integrated
    circuits critical to functioning of the communications payload have been
    flight qualified through demonstration and testing.

    Design Stability

    AEHF's design is now stable since more than 97 percent of the design
    drawings have been released. While the program completed its system level
    critical design review in April 2004 with only about two-thirds of the
    drawings released, the AEHF contractor has since resolved all outstanding
    issues from that review.

    Production maturity could not be assessed as the program office does not
    collect statistical process control data. In June 2004, the formal
    decision was made to acquire the third and final satellite.

    Other Program Issues

    The concurrent development of two critical path items-the ACTS and the
    command and control terminals-has led to further schedule delays and cost
    growth. The ACTS is a suite of cryptological equipment installed in both
    the satellite and the terminals to limit access to authorized users and is
    being developed and produced by the National Security Agency. The ACTS has
    already experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays due to
    production problems and changing security requirements. In September 2003,
    ACTS delivery delays and development problems led the program office to
    delay the launch of the first two satellites by 4 months. The second
    critical path item-the command post terminals-is developed and funded by
    another Air Force program office. These terminals must be in place and
    tested prior to the first launch or there will be a day-for-day slip in
    the satellite launch schedule.

    The concurrent development of the AEHF satellites, terminals, and the ACTS
    has led to further delays and cost increases. Delayed delivery of the ACTS
    had resulted in an additional 12-month delay. Launches for the three AEHF
    satellites are now scheduled for April 2008, April 2009, and April 2010.
    The launch delays along with added payload component testing and
    replacement of critical electronic parts are expected to increase the
    overall program cost by about 20 percent. In December 2004, the Air Force
    notified Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy breach at the 15 percent threshold.

    In December 2002, satellites four and five were deleted from the AEHF
    program because the new Transformational Satellite Communications System
    (TSAT), assessed elsewhere in this report, is to replace these satellites
    if they are sufficiently developed. The Air Force scheduled an interim
    review point in November 2004 to determine whether to buy additional AEHF
    satellites or rely on TSAT. However, in light of the 12-month program
    slip, the decision was delayed until November 2005.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
    technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.

                                   Common Name: AESA

    The Navy's AESA radar is one of the top upgrades for the F/A-18E/F
    aircraft. It is to be the aircraft's primary search/track and weapon
    control radar and is designed to correct deficiencies in the current
    radar. According to the Navy, the AESA radar is key to maintaining the
    Navy's air-to-air fighting advantage and will improve the effectiveness of
    the air-to-ground weapons. When completed, the radar will be inserted in
    new production aircraft and retrofitted into lot 26 and above aircraft.

    Source: U.S. Navy.

                           Program/ development start (2/01)

    Design review (8/01)

    Low-rate decision (6/03) GAO review (1/05) Initial capability (10/06) Full-rate
                        decision (1/07) Last procurement (2014)

    The AESA radar's critical technologies were not mature at the start of
    system development or at the design review, but they now appear to be
    mature. The design also appears stable. However, radar development is
    continuing during production. The program is tracking a number of risks
    with the technical performance of the radar. If problems are discovered,
    they could require design changes while the radar is in production. For
    example, the software schedule leaves little room for error or rework, and
    development of the radar simulation model puts training at risk. In
    addition, there are some production risks that could affect the quality of
    the initial radars and the aircraft delivery schedule. Antitamper
    protection for the radar is currently in design. The AESA program also has
    interdependencies with other programs that could make the radar vulnerable
    to delays in their progress.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (2/01) review
    (6/03) (1/05) (8/01)

    Common Name: AESA

        AESA Program

    Technology Maturity

    The latest technology readiness assessment for the radar determined that
    the four critical technologies were mature. To further ensure technology
    maturity, a mini-technology assessment is planned prior to the full-rate
    production decision. By then, the technologies should have been
    demonstrated in their final form and under expected conditions.

    Design Stability

    As of July 2004, all engineering drawings for the radar and its subsystems
    had been released. At the design review in 2001, 59 percent had been
    released. Development of the radar has continued during production. The
    program office has identified some development risks that could result in
    design changes. According to a program office risk assessment, the top
    current challenge involves the software. The lack of timely software
    delivery puts the program at significant risk, and could also require
    radar hardware rework due to delays in the flight test program. Another
    risk is that the radar simulation model integrated into the F/A-18
    training simulator may not accurately represent the operation and
    performance of the radar, which could result in some training that is
    unrealistic. Further, the number of flight tests that can be conducted may
    not be adequate to mature radar software. Other current risks include
    whether the radar: will be able to track sufficient targets
    simultaneously; radiation emissions will interfere with F/A-18E/F weapon
    systems; and will have the capability to detect tail aspect targets at low
    altitude. Mitigation plans are in place to address all design risks.

    Production Maturity

    During 4 low-rate production runs, 84 radars are planned-20 percent of the
    415 radars to be procured. The program is currently in the second
    production run. Most radars are planned to be installed in F/A-18E/Fs on
    the aircraft production line. However, 135 radars will have to be
    retrofitted into already produced F/A-18E/Fs-a more costly process
    upfront, that, according to the Navy, is expected to save money on support
    costs later. We could not assess production maturity because statistical
    process control data are not being collected. Officials said they are
    comfortable with manufacturing processes based on audits and inspections
    conducted at some key manufacturers. Nonetheless, radar production
    currently faces a number of risks. The radar contractor may have
    difficulty transitioning from development to production due to production
    risks, which could cause some late aircraft deliveries. Other risks
    include reliability problems with one of the radar's critical technologies
    may not allow initial radars to meet a specification and qualification
    tests may not be complete in time, resulting in delivering radar hardware
    that is not fully qualified. Moreover, full-rate production costs could
    increase significantly if the projected payoff from cost reduction
    initiatives is not fully realized. However, program officials expect
    significant savings from the cost reduction initiatives.

    Other Program Issues

    The program office is closely tracking interdependencies that could place
    the radar at risk. Successful development of other Navy programs is
    required for the radar to meet key performance parameters. Also, the radar
    program is being developed, in part, with funding from contractors.
    Changes in the flow of this funding would affect the AESA program, but
    program officials stated that almost all of the contractor funding has
    been provided.

    In 1999, DOD directed the services to implement antitamper protection to
    guard against exploitation of critical U.S. technologies. This protection
    was not one of the radar's original requirements. While officials said
    there is a requirement for this protection to have no effect on radar
    performance, operational tests of antitamper models are not planned until
    after operational tests of radars without this protection, which may
    identify problems that require design changes to the protection package.

    The program's strategy for a depot has changed. Plans have been canceled
    to stand up a Navy depot maintenance facility for the radar in 2010 at
    North Island, California. Instead, Raytheon will conduct depot maintenance
    at its facility in El Segundo, California, at substantial cost savings,
    according to program officials.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided technical
    comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                                Common Name: AN/ASQ-235

    The Navy's AMNS is designed to relocate, identify, and neutralize bottom
    or moored sea mines. AMNS consists of an operating console and a launch
    and handling system containing up to four neutralizers. When deployed, the
    MH-60S helicopter hovers near the target mine and lowers AMNS via a tow
    cable into the water. A neutralizer, controlled through fiber-optic cable,
    exits the launch and handling system and uses sonar to find the mine and
    fires a lethal charge, destroying the mine and the neutralizer.

    Source: U.S. Navy.

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (4/03)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (3/05)

                                Low-rate decision (2/06)

                                   Full-rate decision
                           and initial operational capability
                                         (6/07)

                                Last procurement (2011)

    The AMNS program began system development with none of its four critical
    technologies mature. While progress has been made since then, program
    officials do not expect to achieve technology maturity until developmental
    tests are conducted in mid-2005. The AMNS program's design is stable, with
    approximately 90 percent of the drawings complete. However, since the AMNS
    technologies are not expected to demonstrate maturity until developmental
    testing is conducted, the program runs the risk that problems identified
    during that testing will require drawings to be modified. To maintain an
    initial operational capability of June 2007, the program office requested
    a $13 million increase in research and development funds in order to
    support alternate testing on the MH-53E helicopter and to support delayed
    testing on the MH-60S helicopter.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (4/03) (1/05)
    review (2/06) (3/05)

    Common Name: AN/ASQ-235

        AMNS Program

    Technology Maturity

    The AMNS launch and handling system, the deployment subassembly, the
    warhead assembly, and the neutralizer are not fully mature. The
    neutralizer, which was demonstrated in a relevant environment, is
    approaching full maturity. The program office describes the neutralizer as
    a nondevelopmental item because it is already operational. However, it
    needs to undergo safety and performance improvements before it will be
    ready for AMNS. The other three technologies have not been integrated or
    demonstrated outside of a laboratory environment, but program officials
    have stated that no technology hurdles remain, merely engineering
    challenges. Program officials expect all four technologies to demonstrate
    maturity during developmental testing that is scheduled to take place
    between May and October 2005.

    Among risks identified by program officials are concerns that the
    neutralizer will not launch properly in an environment of strong water
    currents. The program office is attempting to mitigate this risk by
    establishing plans and funding for testing the neutralizer in strong water
    currents, including flume tank testing. Additionally, program officials
    noted concerns about the survivability of the launch and handling system
    in an underwater explosives environment. The program office plans for this
    risk to be mitigated through an analysis of launch and handling system
    internal parts and an analysis to prove that the launch and handling
    system can tolerate environments of up to 50G levels.

    Design Stability

    Approximately 90 percent of the AMNS drawings are currently releasable.
    Moreover, the program office projects all drawings to be releasable to
    manufacturing at the completion of the design readiness review in March
    2005. According to program officials, top level assembly drawings will be
    considered at the design readiness review. Detailed designs of AMNS
    components were validated through 17 interim design reviews held by the
    program office.

    Because the AMNS technologies are not expected to demonstrate maturity
    until developmental testing is conducted in mid-2005, the program runs the
    risk that any problems identified during testing would require drawings to
    be modified.

    Other Program Issues

    The program office has requested an approximately $13 million increase in
    research and development funds for the fiscal year 2006 budget. According
    to program officials, this increase is required to support alternate
    testing on the MH-53E helicopter and to support a 16-month delay in
    completion of testing on the MH-60S helicopter. The MH-60S helicopter will
    not be available to support the current AMNS development and test
    schedule. Without alternate testing on the MH-53E helicopter, the program
    will not be able to make a low-rate initial production decision in
    February 2006 or, more importantly, maintain an initial operational
    capability of June 2007. For the MH-60S helicopter, development testing is
    not scheduled to start until 6 months after a low-rate initial production
    decision has been made.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
    program quantity increased from 47 to 61 as a result of a change in Navy
    strategy to deploy the system from Littoral Combat Ships rather than
    aircraft carriers. Regarding technology maturity, it noted that currently
    the program's critical technologies, for example the warhead assembly, are
    slightly more mature than indicated in the assessment. In addition to
    performing an analysis to prove that the launch and handling system can
    tolerate high-pressure underwater environments, the Navy intends to
    conduct Underwater Explosive Testing as further risk mitigation.

    Regarding other program issues, the Navy stated that while alternate
    platform testing on the MH-53E helicopter would enable the program to meet
    its low-rate initial production decision and initial operational
    capability targets, alternate platform testing is pending approval by the
    Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition).
    It also indicated that constraints in the availability of MH-60S test
    assets have the potential to delay the program's schedule and increase its
    cost beyond the projections presented in the assessment.

                                   Common Name: APKWS

    The Army's APKWS is a precision-guided, air-to-surface missile designed to
    engage soft and lightly armored targets. The system will add a new
    laser-based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket System and is expected
    to provide a lower cost, accurate alternative to the Hellfire missile.
    Future block upgrades are planned to improve system effectiveness. We
    assessed the laser guidance technology used in the new seeker.

    Source: (c) 2003 General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products, All
    Rights Reserved.

                                  Program/development
                                         start
                                        (12/02)

    Design review (3/04)

     GAO review (1/05) Low-rate decision (9/05) Full-rate decision (12/07) Initial
                      capability (8/08) Last procurement (unknown)

    The APKWS entered system development and held its design review before
    demonstrating that its critical guidance technology was fully mature.
    While the system's design was otherwise stable at the time of the March
    2004 design review, initial system-level testing identified problems with
    the design. Program plans call for a production decision in September 2005
    and low-rate production contract award in December 2005. We were unable to
    assess the program's production maturity because program officials do not
    expect to begin collecting statistical data on their key manufacturing
    processes until the start of production. Remaining efforts include
    completing developmental and operational testing. If subsequent testing
    identifies further problems with the design, additional costs of redesign
    and modification of drawings late in development could be incurred.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (12/02) review
    (1/05) (9/05) (3/04)

    Common Name: APKWS

        APKWS Program

    Technology Maturity

    The APKWS program has not demonstrated full maturity of its only critical
    technology-laser guidance. Although a prototype guidance system was
    successfully demonstrated under the Low Cost Precision Kill Advanced
    Technology Demonstration, the current design for the guidance system
    includes numerous hardware changes to improve system cost, performance,
    and producibility. The new guidance system will not be fully integrated
    and tested from an aircraft until winter 2005. Program officials noted
    that although the prototype system design exists, reverting to it would
    increase cost and degrade the system's performance and producibility.

    Design Stability

    Program officials released 100 percent of the drawings after a
    system-level design review in March 2004. Recently completed testing,
    however, uncovered the need for design changes. The APKWS, to date, has
    completed two test flights. The first test flight went as planned. The
    second flight test missile, however, experienced a mechanical failure of
    the wing lock mechanism, causing the test missile to veer off target. The
    program office identified a design solution, and flight testing resumed in
    September 2004.

    Production Maturity

    Program officials expect that there will be nine key processes associated
    with manufacturing the APKWS. The program plans to collect statistical
    data on these processes when production begins in fiscal year 2006.

    Other Program Issues

    According to program officials, the Army cut APKWS research, development,
    test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding by 22.1 percent due to other funding
    priorities. These officials noted that this reduction affects planned
    improvements to the warhead, fuze, seeker, and propulsion subsystems.
    Furthermore, the program has experienced a 15.3 percent growth in
    acquisition cycle time as the result of slower initial production of the
    system than originally planned.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army concurred with this
    assessment.

                                   Common Name: ASDS

    The Special Operations Forces' ASDS is a battery-powered, dry interior
    minisubmarine developed for clandestine insertion and extraction of Navy
    SEALs and their equipment. It is carried to its deployment area by a
    specially configured SSN-688 class submarine. It is intended to provide
    increased range, payload, on-station loiter time, and endurance over
    current submersibles. The 65-foot long, 8-foot diameter ASDS is operated
    by a two-person crew and equipped with a lock out/lock in chamber to allow
    divers to exit and reenter the vehicle.

    Source: U.S. Navy.

    Program start (7/89)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (9/94)

                     Initial operational test and evaluation (5/03)

     Initial capability (11/03) GAO review (1/05) Production decision (12/05) Last
                                   procurement (2011)

    One of ASDS's three critical technologies-the lithium ion battery-has not
    reached maturity, and the first boat has required some design changes. The
    production decision has been delayed from June 2004 until December 2005 to
    allow time to produce and test a new battery and develop and test other
    vehicle design changes. The Navy selected a design for the lithium ion
    battery and, in May 2004, it awarded a contract to develop a full shipset
    unit for ASDS. Battery production will take about 1 year, and at-sea
    demonstration is expected in fiscal year 2005. Concurrent with battery
    replacement, other vehicle improvements are being developed and tested and
    design problems are being addressed. Acoustic signature issues are being
    addressed; however, this requirement does not have to be met until
    delivery of the second ASDS boat.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (9/94) review
    (1/05) (12/05) (6/96)

    Common Name: ASDS

        ASDS Program

    Technology Maturity

    Of the three critical technologies identified by the ASDS program office,
    one-the lithium ion battery-has not reached maturity. However, it is
    expected to be mature before the December 2005 production decision for
    additional boats.

    Acoustic, or noise level, problems are being addressed; however, the first
    boat is not quiet enough to meet acoustic stealth requirements. In earlier
    tests, the ASDS propeller was the source of the most significant noise,
    and a new composite propeller was installed before operational test and
    evaluation in 2003. Although program officials believe it meets
    requirements, precise acoustic measurements have not been made and are not
    scheduled to be done before the production decision. Other acoustic issues
    will be addressed on a time-phased basis because the acoustic requirement
    has been deferred until delivery of the second boat.

    Design Stability

    Although all engineering drawings for ASDS have been released to
    manufacturing, ASDS design changes have been required based on additional
    improvements, test results, and other issues since ASDS reached initial
    operational capability in November 2003. An assessment of ASDS
    survivability design features is also underway; however, the Vulnerability
    Assessment Report will not be completed until April 2005.

    An updated ASDS operational requirements document was approved in June
    2004. The number of key performance parameters (those elements that are so
    significant that a failure to meet them could call into question a
    system's ability to perform missions) were reduced from 16 to 8, and they
    include one new requirement (operational availability). Other requirements
    are categorized as system critical requirements.

    Until all requirements are addressed, technical problems are solved, and
    testing is completed, we believe ASDS's final design will remain uncertain
    and may have cost and schedule implications.

    Other Program Issues

    The Navy completed an independent cost estimate, including life-cycle
    costs, in March 2004. However, data were not released, and the estimates
    are now out-of-date because they do not reflect the impact of the 2-year
    delay in production of the second boat. According to the June 2004
    Selected Acquisition Report, the U.S. Special Operations Command was
    preparing a new proposed program plan to account for the delay in the
    production decision and updated cost information was expected to be
    reported in the December 2004 report. However, according to the Navy's
    January 2005 update, the revised program plan and updated cost estimate
    will be developed, reviewed, and approved as part of the production
    decision, which has been delayed until December 2005. Since the program's
    first cost estimate was originally approved in 1994, research and
    development costs have more than tripled.

    The Navy plans to conduct follow-on testing to verify that deficiencies
    and vulnerabilities identified during the May 2003 operational evaluation
    are corrected. However, not all results will be known before the scheduled
    production decision.

    Agency Comments

    The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
    appropriate.

                                Common Name: ATIRCM/CMWS

    The Army's and the Special Operations Command's ATIRCM/CMWS is a component
    of the integrated infrared countermeasures suite planned to defend U.S.
    aircraft from advanced infrared guided missiles. The system will be
    employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. The system includes an
    active infrared jammer, a missile warning system, and a countermeasure
    dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables, such as flares,
    chaff, and smoke.

                                  Source: BAE Systems.

                                  Program/development
                                         start
                                         (6/95)

    Low-rate decision (11/03) GAO review (1/05) Full-rate decision (8/05) Last
                                   procurement (2023)

    The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production in November 2003 with
    technologies mature and designs stable. Currently, the program's
    production processes are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion of
    the program entered limited production in February 2002 to meet urgent
    deployment requirements. However, full-rate production for both components
    was delayed because of reliability problems. Over the past several years,
    the program has had to overcome cost and schedule problems brought on by
    shortfalls in knowledge: key technologies were demonstrated late in
    development and only a small number of design drawings were completed by
    design review. At the low-rate production decision point, the Army
    developed a new cost estimate reducing program procurement cost
    substantially.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (6/95) review
    (11/03) (1/05) (2/97)

    Common Name: ATIRCM/CMWS

        ATIRCM/CMWS Program

    Technology Maturity

    The ATIRCM/CMWS's five critical technologies are mature. However, they did
    not mature until after the design review in February 1997. Most of the
    early technology development effort was focused on the application to
    rotary wing aircraft. When system development began in 1995, the
    requirements were expanded to include Navy and Air Force fixed wing
    aircraft. This change caused problems that largely contributed to cost
    increases of more than 150 percent to the development contract. The Navy
    and the Air Force subsequently dropped out of the program, rendering the
    extra effort needless, but the Navy and the Army are currently pursuing
    future joint production planning.

    Design Stability

    The basic design of the system is complete with 100 percent of the
    drawings released to manufacturing. The design was not stable at the time
    of the design review, with only 22 percent of the drawings complete. This
    was primarily due to the expanded requirements. It was not until 2 years
    after the design review that 90 percent of the drawings were released and
    the design was considered stable. This resulted in inefficient
    manufacturing, rework, additional testing, and a 3-year schedule delay.
    The system design was successfully demonstrated through engineering and
    manufacturing development and transitioned to production.

    Production Maturity

    The production maturity could not be assessed based on the information
    provided by the program office. According to program officials, the
    ATIRCM/CMWS program has 16 key manufacturing processes in various phases
    of control. They stated that ATIRCM statistical process controls are in
    development, control plans are being enhanced and as the program continues
    in production and data are gathered, lessons learned will be included in
    the processes. The Army entered limited CMWS production in February 2002
    to meet an urgent need of the U.S. Special Operations Command.
    Subsequently, full-rate production was delayed for both components due to
    reliability testing failures. The program implemented reliability fixes to
    six production representative subsystems that will be used for initial
    operational test and evaluation.

    These systems were delivered in March 2004. The full-rate production
    decision for the complete system is now scheduled for 2006.

    Other Program Issues

    The Army procured an initial 32 systems in fiscal year 2002 for use on the
    U.S. Special Operations Command's CH-47 helicopters. The Army plans to
    procure a total of 99 systems to outfit special operations aircraft
    between fiscal year 2003 and 2009. Currently, program officials are
    working to integrate CMWS on 16 additional platform types and models,
    which will result in an increase in quantity and funding. The CMWS
    low-rate initial production quantity increased by 141 systems to a total
    of 200. The Army procured all 200 of these systems, and deliveries are on
    schedule.

    At the low-rate production decision point, the Army developed a new cost
    estimate for the program that featured a variety of different program
    assumptions. For example, program officials deleted 17 years of Contractor
    Logistics Support, reducing potential duplication, and deleted 29 training
    systems. As a result, program officials report that procurement cost was
    reduced by 17 percent.

    Agency Comments

    The Army concurred with this assessment and provided technical comments,
    which were incorporated where appropriate. Additionally, the Army
    commented that in January 2004, it directed the acceleration of CMWS for
    deployment on Operation Iraqi Freedom aircraft. Initial operational tests
    and evaluation will be completed during fiscal year 2005 for CMWS and in
    fiscal year 2006 for ATIRCM.

                                  Common Name: B-2 RMP

    The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system to
    resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. To comply with
    federal requirements, the frequency must be changed to a band where the
    B-2 will be designated as a primary user. The modified radar system is
    being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination of
    stealth, range, payload, and near precision weapons delivery capabilities.

    Source: U.S. Air Force, U.S. Edwards Air Force Base, California.

    Program start (10/02)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (8/04)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (6/05)

     Low-rate decision (2/07) Initial capability (10/07) Full-rate decision (2/08)
                                Last procurement (2009)

    The B-2 RMP entered system development in August 2004 with two critical
    technologies mature and two approaching maturity. All critical
    technologies are planned to be mature by the June 2005 design review. The
    program has released 71 percent of its design drawings and plans to have
    85 to 95 percent released by the June 2005 design review. Program
    officials indicated that production maturity metrics will be formulated
    during development and that these metrics may or may not include
    manufacturing process control data. The program plans to build six radar
    units during development for pilot training with the B-2 operational wing
    prior to the planned completion of flight testing. Even though these units
    are necessary, building them early in development adds to the risk of
    later design changes because most of the radar flight-test activity will
    not occur until after these units are built.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (8/04) (1/05)
    review (2/07) (6/05)

    Common Name: B-2 RMP

        B-2 RMP Program

    Technology Maturity

    The B-2 RMP entered development in August 2004 with two of four critical
    technologies mature and two others approaching maturity. Last year the
    program reported having two critical technologies, but a formal technology
    readiness assessment conducted in February 2004 concluded that two
    additional technologies should be considered critical. The additional two
    technologies, the receiver/exciter for the electronic driver cards and
    aspects of the antenna designed to help keep the B-2's radar signature
    low, are not considered fully mature but are approaching maturity. There
    are no backup technologies for two technologies approaching maturity, but
    both completed their design phases in April 2004 and the program office
    estimates that both will be fully mature by the final design review in
    June 2005.

    Design Stability

    The program has completed and released 71 percent of its engineering
    drawings to manufacturing. The program office has scheduled the design
    readiness review for June 2005 and plans to have 85 to 95 percent of its
    drawings released by that time. The program, however, does not use the
    release of design drawings as a measure of design maturity but instead
    uses the successful completion of design events, such as subsystem design
    reviews, as its primary measure of design maturity.

    Production Maturity

    Production maturity metrics are planned to be formulated during
    development. These metrics, which may or may not include manufacturing
    process control data, are planned to be used as measures of progress
    toward production maturity during a production readiness review prior to
    the start of production in February 2007. The program is also involved in
    a proof-of-manufacturing effort to demonstrate that the transmit/receive
    modules can be built to specifications.

    Other Program Issues

    The program plans to build six radar units during development and later
    modify these units for placement on operational B-2 aircraft. The Air
    Force needs these radar units available when the current B-2 radar
    frequency becomes unavailable, in order to continue air crew training and
    proficiency operations. Even though these units are necessary, building
    them early in development adds risk because most of the radar flight-test
    activity will not occur until after these units are built.

    Agency Comments

    The Air Force concurred with this assessment. It commented that the
    program recognizes a level of risk associated with building the six
    development units prior to formal testing in order to satisfy a critical
    schedule constraint. It stated that, as a result, the program office has
    placed a heavy emphasis on risk reduction and that the program is
    progressing well thus far in system development. It further commented that
    it is important to note that these six development units are also planned
    to be used for collection of field level reliability and maintainability
    data. It also noted that the program has successfully completed its
    proofof-manufacturing effort for the transmit/receive modules, has now
    delivered over 600 modules, and has completed and released approximately
    70 percent of its engineering drawings.

                                 Common Name: C-130 AMP

    The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and
    avionics for 14 different mission designs of the C-130 fleet. It
    consolidates and installs the mandated DOD Navigation/Safety
    modifications, the Global Air Traffic Management systems, and the C-130
    broad area review requirements. It also incorporates other reliability,
    maintainability, and sustainability upgrades and provides increased
    situational awareness capabilities and reduces susceptibility of Special
    Operations aircraft to detection/interception.

    Source: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, System Program Office.

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (7/01)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (8/05)

     Low-rate decision (2/06) Full-rate decision (5/08) Last procurement (unknown)

    The C-130 AMP is using primarily commercial and modified off-the-shelf
    technologies, and it entered system development with all but one of its
    six critical technologies mature. The remaining technology is nearing full
    maturity; however, there is concern that it may not meet current
    performance requirements. Program officials reached agreement with the
    user to field a lesser set of requirements equivalent to the current
    capability in fiscal year 2008. Program officials plan to release 90
    percent of engineering drawings by the design review and have made
    progress toward that goal. Currently, 48 percent of the engineering
    drawings are releasable compared to 14 percent a year ago. Additionally,
    the program office recently modified the contract to accelerate the
    installation on Special Operations aircraft by 1 year, placing additional
    pressure on the already compressed schedule.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (7/01) (1/05)
    review (2/06) (8/05)

    Common Name: C-130 AMP

        C-130 AMP Program

    Technology Maturity

    Five of the C-130 AMP's six critical technologies are fully mature, as the
    program is primarily utilizing proven commercial and modified
    off-the-shelf technology for all AMP capabilities. The remaining critical
    technology, the Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA)
    capability, was demonstrated through the Air Force Research Lab's Quiet
    Knight advanced technology demonstration program and is nearing full
    maturity. There is a risk, however, that the TF/TA technology may not meet
    a key requirement to operate at 250 feet. Program officials worked with
    the user to agree on initially fielding TF/TA capability between 250 and
    1,000 feet, which is the current capability of the technology. Program
    officials plan to determine through analysis the residual capability of
    the TF/TA technology to fly lower. However, if such capability cannot be
    achieved, redesign may be necessary or the user will have to accept
    current capability.

    Design Stability

    The program office has made progress toward meeting its goal of releasing
    90 percent of the design drawings by design readiness review, scheduled
    for August 2005. This will be 9 months sooner than anticipated last year,
    due to the acceleration of key program dates to meet Special Operations
    Command requirements. Currently, 48 percent of the design drawings are
    complete and could be released to manufacturing. Program officials stated
    they are committed to meeting the required 90 percent drawing release by
    design review.

    The modernization effort is divided into a number of capability spirals
    due to the various aircraft designs. The first spiral will outfit C-130
    aircraft with core capabilities and an integrated defensive system.
    Special Operations C-130 aircraft will be outfitted first, and future
    spirals are planned for these aircraft because they require additional,
    and unique, defensive systems integration and enhanced situational
    awareness.

    Other Program Issues

    Funding reductions in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the C-130 AMP's
    development program, which resulted in a rescheduling of program
    milestones and rebaselining of the program. The design review, low-rate
    initial production, and production readiness decisions were all delayed.
    While program officials stated that the delay in schedule would provide
    more time to resolve issues with the TF/TA technology and software, the
    delay in fielding was not acceptable to the Special Operations Command.
    They added funding to mature the TF/TA technology through a series of
    flight demonstrations prior to the formal developmental test and
    evaluation period. The system integration schedule was compressed by 9
    months by accelerating installation of core and mission-unique
    capabilities on Special Operations aircraft; however, this allows less
    time to reduce manufacturing risks and further compresses an already
    optimistic time line.

    The program is also at risk if less software is reused than originally
    estimated, which may cause an increase in development costs and delay the
    program's schedule. Software integration remains a risk due to its
    complexity, number of suppliers, potential for developmental growth,
    certification of a secure operating system, and software safety standards.
    The program office is working to mitigate these risks through modeling and
    simulation, utilizing the systems integration laboratory built by the
    contractor, and through flight demonstrations.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
    program officials worked with the user to agree on initially fielding
    TF/TA capability between 250 and 1,000 feet and that an analysis will be
    accomplished to determine residual TF/TA technology capability to fly
    lower. The Air Force also commented that funding reductions in fiscal
    years 2003 and 2004 delayed the C-130 AMP development program. It further
    stated that a delay in fielding MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft until fiscal
    year 2010 was unacceptable to the Special Operations Command, which added
    funding to mature TF/TA technology through flight demonstrations prior to
    a formal developmental test and evaluation period. The Air Force also
    commented that the special operations warfighter needs are driving an
    aggressive schedule.

                                  Common Name: C-5 AMP

    The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5 to
    improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and reduce
    ownership costs. The AMP implements Global Air Traffic Management,
    navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment, and an
    all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the C-5
    Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the
    engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We
    assessed the C-5 AMP.

    Source: Lockheed-Mar tin Aeronautics Company.

                                      Development
                                         start
                                        (11/98)

    Design review (5/01)

      Production decision (2/03) GAO review (1/05) Initial capability (10/05) Last
                                 procurement (unknown)

    The program office considers the C-5 AMP's critical technologies and
    design to be mature as they are relying on commercial-off-the-shelf
    technologies that are installed in other commercial and military aircraft.
    The C-5 AMP plans to complete developmental test and evaluation in
    December 2004, a 2 month slip from last year. The main challenge to the
    program is the development and integration of software-to which this
    schedule delay has been attributed. The Air Force plans to modify 55 of
    the 112 C-5 aircraft. The Air Force is also seeking funding to modify the
    remaining 57 C-5s, however, that decision will not be made until the Air
    Force determines the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft needed to meet
    DOD's airlift needs. If the Air Force decides to use the C-17s, it may not
    upgrade some, or all, of the remaining 57 C-5s.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (11/98) review
    (2/03) (1/05) (5/01)

                                        Desired level of knowledge Not applicable
                                            Data not available
                                            Data not available

    Common Name: C-5 AMP

        C-5 AMP Program

    Technology Maturity

    We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the program
    used commercial technologies that are considered mature. Program officials
    stated that those technologies are in use on other aircraft and that they
    have not significantly changed in form, fit, or function. For example, the
    new computer processors are being used in the Boeing 777, 717, other
    commercial aircraft, the KC-10, and a Navy reconnaissance aircraft.

    Design Stability

    The design appears stable as the contractor has released 100 percent of
    the drawings for the AMP. In addition, seven major subsystem-level design
    reviews were completed, and integration activities are currently ongoing.
    Demonstration of these integration activities is scheduled during
    development test and evaluation, which started in December 2002 and should
    be completed in December 2004.

    Production Maturity

    We could not assess the production maturity because most components are
    readily available as commercial-off-the-shelf items. This equipment is
    being used on other military and commercial aircraft. In addition, the C-5
    AMP is incorporating many other off-the-shelf systems and equipment, such
    as the embedded global positioning system, the inertial navigation system,
    and the multifunction control and display units. To ensure production
    maturity, the program office is collecting data regarding modification kit
    availability and the installation schedules.

    Other Program Issues

    Program officials indicated the greatest risk to the AMP is software
    development and integration. Several new software programs must be
    developed and integrated with several other commercial off-the-shelf
    software packages. According to officials, the 2 month slip in development
    test and evaluation can be attributed to software development delays as
    well as overall systems integration (hardware and software) delays. More
    specifically, program officials stated that the two primary causes for
    delays were (1) the unavailability of systems integration facilities,
    including equipment, simulation software, and engineering simulator, and
    (2) less robust than expected integration test scripts and computer
    software configuration item designs. Program officials stated that they
    have applied lessons learned from the AMP experience to the RERP program.
    The C-5 RERP is assessed elsewhere in this report.

    The overall quantity of the C-5 fleet has been reduced from 126 to 112 due
    to the retirement of 14 aircraft. The C-5 aircraft must undergo the AMP
    modifications prior to the RERP modifications. However, only 55 aircraft
    have been approved for the AMP upgrades, while 112 are awaiting the RERP
    upgrades. The Air Force needs to determine how many of the remaining 57
    C-5s will receive the AMP upgrades. That decision will not be made until
    it determines the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft needed to meet
    DOD's airlift needs. According to program officials, the Air Force is
    currently performing mobility studies that will be used to make a mobility
    mix decision. Until it is decided whether to use C-17s to replace some, or
    all, of the earlier 57 C-5s, the number of aircraft to undergo the AMP and
    RERP modernization will remain uncertain.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
    the unit cost comparison between the November 1998 and the latest AMP
    position does not accurately portray the program's cost growth. The
    November 1998 position represents the original 126-aircraft program. The
    program has since been restructured to a 55-aircraft program. According to
    the Air Force, such a change would increase unit costs by a large amount
    because it would be less expensive, on a unit cost basis, to procure for a
    greater number of aircraft than it would be to procure for fewer aircraft.

    GAO Comments

    While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline
    since the November 1998 decision to begin development, the comparison
    presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major
    decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes,
    our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's
    history.

                                 Common Name: C-5 RERP

    The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The
    RERP is designed to enhance the reliability of the aircraft through the
    replacement of engines and modifications to subsystems such as the
    electrical, fuel, hydraulic and flight controls systems, while the C-5
    Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) is designed to enhance the avionics.
    These upgrades are part of a two-phased modernization effort to improve
    the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and reduce ownership
    costs. We assessed the C-5 RERP.

    Source: Lockheed-Mar tin Aeronautics Company.

    Program start (2/00)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                        (11/01)

    Design review (12/03)

                       GAO review (1/05) Low-rate decision (3/07)

                                   Full-rate decision
                                        B-model
                                         (1/09)

                                   Full-rate decision
                                        A-model
                                         (5/11)

                               Initial capability (7/11)

    The RERP is utilizing demonstrated commercial off-the-shelf components
    that require little or no modification.The program ensured that the
    technology was mature and that the design was stable at critical points in
    development, closely tracking best practice standards. The program is
    currently in system development and plans to enter low-rate production in
    March 2007. The major challenge to the program is software development and
    integration. Also, the program is dependent on the number of aircraft
    approved to undergo the C-5 AMP modernization program. Until additional
    aircraft are approved for the AMP, it is uncertain how many aircraft will
    undergo the RERP.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (11/01) review
    (1/05) (3/07) (12/03)

                                        Desired level of knowledge Not applicable

    Common Name: C-5 RERP

        C-5 RERP Program

    Technology Maturity

    The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent technology
    readiness assessment conducted in October 2001. New engines account for 64
    percent of the expected improvement in mission capability rate for the
    aircraft. The new engines are commercial jet engines currently being used
    on numerous aircraft. According to the Air Force technology assessment,
    these engines have over 70 million flying hours of use.

    Design Stability

    The C-5 RERP's design is stable. As of November 2003, 98 percent of the
    design drawings were complete. In addition, the seven major
    subsystem-level design reviews were completed before the December 2003
    system-level design review.

    According to program officials, the greatest risk to the RERP is software
    development and integration activities. Several new software programs must
    be developed, and these programs as well as other commercial off-the-shelf
    software packages must be integrated. The program has experienced software
    problems in the past and has taken actions to improve software activities.
    The program is taking advantage of AMP-developed products and lessons
    learned in the RERP to reduce the risk of schedule slips associated with
    software development and integration. For example, according to program
    officials, the baseline software and systems integration facilities that
    were developed for the AMP will not have to be completely redeveloped for
    RERP activities.

    Production Maturity

    We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air Force
    is buying commercially available items. However, we expect that production
    maturity would be at a high level because the engines have been
    commercially available for many years.

    Other Program Issues

    The C-5 RERP is dependent on the C-5 AMP (assessed elsewhere in this
    report), as the aircraft has to undergo avionics modernization prior to
    other enhancements. Over the past year, software development resources
    that were planned for the RERP were shifted to the AMP to ensure
    completion of its software activities. According to program officials,
    while shifting of resources currently has not caused a significant
    schedule slip to the RERP, they do acknowledge that it will have a greater
    impact on the RERP if the AMP continues to slip and resources originally
    planned for use on the RERP are retained to complete the AMP work.

    Due to the retirement of 14 aircraft, the quantity of C-5 RERP aircraft
    was reduced from 126 to 112. Although the RERP program has been authorized
    for 112 aircraft, the avionics modernization has only been authorized for
    55 aircraft. Therefore, until the Air Force decides on how many C-5
    aircraft will undergo avionics modernization, it is uncertain how many
    aircraft will undergo the RERP. That decision is contingent upon the
    results of ongoing mobility studies that are examining the appropriate mix
    of C-5 and C-17 aircraft for DOD's overall airlift needs.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
    the unit cost comparison between the November 2001 and the latest RERP
    position does not accurately portray the program's cost growth. The
    November 2001 position represents the original 126-aircraft program. The
    program has since been restructured to a 112-aircraft program. It further
    stated that such a change would increase unit costs by a large amount
    because it would be less expensive, on a unit cost basis, to procure for a
    greater number of aircraft than it would be to procure for fewer aircraft.

    GAO Comments

    While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline
    since the November 2001 decision to begin development, the comparison
    presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major
    decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes,
    our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's
    history.

                                    Common Name: CEC

    The Navy's CEC is designed to connect radar systems to enhance detection
    and engagement of air targets. Ships and planes equipped with their
    version of CEC hardware and software will share real-time data to create
    composite radar tracks-allowing the battle group to see the same radar
    picture. A CEC-equipped ship can then detect and engage targets its radar
    cannot see. We assessed the current shipboard and airborne versions of the
    CEC.

    Source: CEC Program Office.

                                  Program/development
                                         start
                                         (5/95)

    Design review (12/96)

          Low-rate decision-ship (2/98) Low-rate decision-air (5/99) Full-rate
             decision-ship (4/02) GAO review (1/05) Last procurement (2019)

    The CEC's production maturity could not be assessed because the government
    does not collect the necessary data on the commercially available portions
    of the ship-based and airborne versions of the CEC. However, program and
    contractor officials consider the production processes capable of
    producing a quality product on time and within cost. The technologies and
    design of both the ship-based and airborne versions of the CEC are fully
    mature. In April 2002, the shipboard version was approved for full-rate
    production. The airborne version remains in low-rate production and may
    proceed to full-rate production pending a full-rate production decision
    anticipated in September 2005.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (5/95) review
    (2/98) (1/05) (12/96)

                                        Desired level of knowledge Not applicable
                                            Data not available
                                            Data not available

    Common Name: CEC

        CEC Program

    Technology Maturity

    All six of the CEC's critical technologies are mature. While the shipboard
    and airborne versions have different hardware, they share the same
    critical technologies.

    Design Stability

    The CEC's basic design appears stable, as all of the drawings needed to
    build the shipboard and airborne versions have been released to
    manufacturing. Additional drawings for each version continue to be
    released to incorporate advances in commercially available technologies,
    which comprise approximately 60 percent of CEC hardware.

    Production Maturity

    We could not assess production maturity as data were not available.
    According to program officials, CEC production is mature and noncommercial
    portions do not involve critical manufacturing processes. Officials
    indicated that they do not have insight into whether the manufacturing
    processes for the commercial portions are critical and are under
    statistical control. However, program officials are confident that a
    quality product can be delivered on time and within cost given contractor
    past performance.

    The program office plans to seek full-rate production approval for the
    airborne version in September 2005. During operational testing, the
    airborne version was determined to be operationally effective but not
    operationally suitable. According to the program office, it is
    implementing corrections that will be verified in time to support the
    full-rate production decision.

    Other Program Issues

    In November 2003, the Navy announced plans to improve CEC interoperability
    by pursuing open architecture and functionality changes with the Joint
    Single Integrated Air Picture Systems Engineering Organization (JSSEO).
    The CEC Program Office discontinued planning for a Block 2 development
    effort and began working with JSSEO to jointly engineer sensor measurement
    and radar tracking management solutions that will be available to all
    services to ensure optimum interoperability across the battlespace. The
    joint track management software being developed is intended to interface
    with CEC software to improve data sharing throughout different computing
    environments and to facilitate component upgrades without redesigning the
    entire system.

    CEC officials consider the joint track management software a technical
    risk since JSSEO is using a relatively new approach for combat system
    software development. The officials also consider it a schedule risk that
    could impact timely delivery of Navy platforms, including the DD(X) and
    the Littoral Combat Ship, which are to be equipped with CEC. To mitigate
    risks, the CEC program manager is closely monitoring joint track manager
    progress to determine whether the software can be incorporated into the
    CEC on schedule. If JSSEO does not deliver an acceptable product by
    September 2005, the Navy plans to continue using current CEC software and
    explore alternatives.

    With discontinuation of a Block 2 effort, the program also initiated a
    preplanned product improvement effort for CEC hardware. This effort takes
    advantage of advances in technology to reduce size, weight, and cost
    without adding new critical technologies. Improved hardware will operate
    with current CEC software and joint track manager software, once ready.
    The program began testing of the improved hardware in August 2004 and
    plans to obtain Office of the Secretary of Defense approval for
    incorporating improvements by October 2005. The program is also developing
    a miniterminal land version for the Marine Corps.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that it
    generally concurred with our assessment but provided clarifying comments.
    Regarding the schedule risk associated with joint track management, the
    Navy stated that it, along with the other services, is working with JSSEO
    to reach agreement on a joint architecture for track management, combat
    identification, and tactical data link integration. It explained that the
    joint architectural agreement will allow appropriate existing solutions to
    be integrated into the joint track manager and will be extensible to
    multiple networks and different communication devices. The Navy stated
    that this will reduce the risk of providing joint track management
    capability in fiscal year 2008.

                                  Common Name: CH-47F

    The Army's CH-47F heavy lift helicopter is intended to provide
    transportation for tactical vehicles, artillery, engineer equipment,
    personnel, and logistical support equipment. It is also expected to
    operate in both day and night. The program is to enhance performance and
    extend the useful life of the CH-47. This effort includes installing a
    digitized cockpit, rebuilding the airframe, and reducing aircraft
    vibration.

    Source: Boeing Helicopters.

                                  Program/development
                                         start
                                        (12/97)

    Design review (9/99)

     Low-rate decision (12/02) Full-rate decision (11/04) GAO review (1/05) Initial
                       capability (5/07) Last procurement (2017)

    CH-47F production maturity could not be assessed as the program is not
    collecting statistical process control data on key manufacturing
    processes. Program officials believe that CH-47F production is low risk
    because no new technology is being inserted into the aircraft, two
    prototypes have been produced, and the production process was demonstrated
    during the delivery of one low-rate initial production aircraft. The
    CH-47F technologies appear mature and the design stable, with 100 percent
    of the engineering drawings released for manufacturing. The Army has
    regained 6 months of a schedule delay anticipated when it was directed to
    produce additional MH-47s for special operations.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (12/97) review
    (12/02) (1/05) (9/99)

    Common Name: CH-47F

        CH-47F Program

    Technology Maturity

    We did not assess technology maturity or determine
    the number of critical technologies in detail. The
    CH-47F is a modification of the existing CH-47D
    helicopter. Program officials believe that all
    critical technologies are mature and have been
    demonstrated prior to integration into the CH-47F
    development program.

    Design Stability

    The Army completed the CH-47F engineering development and manufacturing
    phase, with 100 percent of the drawings released to manufacturing.
    However, at the design review, only 37 percent of the system's engineering
    drawings were complete. Since that time, the number of drawings completed
    increased substantially. The majority of the new drawings were instituted
    to correct wire routing and installation on the aircraft; changes the
    program office believed could not be determined until after the first
    prototype was delivered.

    Production Maturity

    We did not assess production maturity because the CH-47F program does not
    collect statistical process control data on its production of helicopters.
    The program office relies on inspections as its means to ensure acceptable
    production results.

    According to the program office, the CH-47 production is low risk because
    two prototypes have been produced during development and the Army recently
    took delivery of its first low-rate initial production aircraft. Further,
    the program reported that during low-rate production, it made significant
    advances in the development and refinement of the system that are designed
    to increase production efficiencies. Advances include the implementation
    of the automated management execution system and the introduction of laser
    tracking to identify key mounting points. These enhancements are geared
    toward improving the manufacturing learning curve. However, the program
    office acknowledges that the program will lose some of the learning
    benefits during the anticipated break in production of the CH-47F in favor
    of producing more MG-47s during the next lot of production.

    Other Program Issues

    In 2002, DOD directed the Army to produce 16 MH-47G aircraft for the
    Special Operations Command before the start of the Army's low-rate
    production for the CH-47F helicopters and to deliver those aircraft as
    soon as possible. The Army initially estimated that this transfer of 16
    aircraft for special operations would result in a 15-month delay in its
    first unit equipped date for the CH-47F. However, according to the program
    office, scheduling issues between the Army and the Special Operations
    Command have been resolved. The Army now estimates that the 15-month
    schedule slip has been reduced by about 6 months. The program office
    reported that the CH-47F and MH-47G program strategy has been approved by
    the Defense Acquisition Executive.

    Further, the Army has recently approved the production of additional
    CH-47F aircraft in the most recentProgram Objective Memorandum submission.
    Additionally, the Army included in this submission an escalation of 19
    CH-47F aircraft that had previously been scheduled at the end of the
    program. These quantity changes resulted from the recent Army Aviation
    Transformation Group's recommendations.

    Agency Comments

    The Army concurred with this assessment and provided technical comments,
    which were incorporated where appropriate. Additionally, it commented that
    the full-rate production decision was approved on November 22, 2004, by
    the Army Acquisition Executive. Further, the program was rebaselined to
    include a revised Acquisition Objective of 510 aircraft. Details of this
    rebaselined program will be outlined in the December 2004 Selected
    Acquisition Report.

                                   Common Name: CKEM

    The Army's CKEM is a hypervelocity missile designed to provide superior
    lethality against current tanks, bunkers, buildings, and future advanced
    threat armor. It is designed to provide a high rate of fire and a high
    probability of kill beyond the range of tank guns, and at half the size
    and weight of current kinetic energy missiles. The CKEM is a potential
    candidate for use on the current Stryker Brigade and Future Combat System
    vehicles. The Army is currently developing the CKEM in an Advanced
    Technology Demonstration program.

    Source: Lockheed-Martin--Missiles and Fire Control; Dallas, Texas.

    Design start (9/03)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (TBD)

    Design review (TBD)

                                 Production start (TBD)

    Program officials believe the CKEM technologies will be mature when the
    program enters system development. The Army is using an advanced
    technology demonstration to develop the CKEM technologies to satisfy
    future Army missile requirements. The technologies have already been
    demonstrated in a relevant environment. Work remains to reduce the
    technologies to the right size and show they can withstand the high
    g-force environment. Funding inconsistencies and increased costs have
    hampered technology development efforts and increased program risk.
    Program officials expect at least one design change iteration once the
    CKEM enters system development, which could happen in 2006 after
    full-scale weapon system flight testing.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    GAO Development DOD Production review start design decision (1/05) (TBD)
    review (TBD)

                                         (TBD)

    Common Name: CKEM

        CKEM Program

    Technology Maturity

    Although none of its critical technologies are fully mature, the CKEM is
    over a year from entering system development and all four technologies
    have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Program officials
    believe all CKEM critical technologies will be fully mature when the
    program proceeds with system development. The missile's four critical
    technologies are a solid rocket motor, an attitude control system,
    penetrator/lethality mechanisms, and guidance systems. CKEM engineers are
    pioneering many of the system's technologies to satisfy future missile
    requirements, which include reduced infrared signatures, longer ranges,
    nondetonable propellants, and smaller size and weight.

    Existing missile guidance and control components will not satisfy the size
    and weight requirements and will not withstand the g-forces potentially
    exerted by the CKEM. As a result, CKEM developers are working to
    miniaturize existing components and improve tolerances for use under
    greater velocities. The program completed testing of smaller guidance and
    control prototypes in a high g-force environment. Engineers are also
    designing a motor with an increased burn rate, advanced materials, and
    innovative structural designs. They successfully tested a new solid-fuel
    rocket motor, and they plan to begin controlled flight testing in April
    2005. They also demonstrated the missile's lethality against a tank target
    with advanced armor. However, system officials said that additional
    technology funding is needed to fully develop component technologies and
    produce a missile that will meet the size and performance goals.

    Program officials believe they can mature technologies to the point that
    only a single design iteration will be needed to satisfy Army objective
    requirements during system development. They noted that the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
    instructed them to forego involvement in the development of fire control
    systems and instead focus solely on missile development. This could result
    in integration problems that would require future design changes.

    Other Program Issues

    Program officials believe that inconsistent funding has hampered
    development efforts. Over the last 3 years, the budget has been reduced
    over $21 million. Those reductions were offset by reprogramming $17
    million back into the program. Initially, competitive contracts were
    awarded to two prime contractors. Citing funding discontinuity and
    higher-than-expected contractor proposals, program officials did not
    exercise an option for the second contractor's continued involvement. They
    also cited funding as the reason the Army suspended international
    cooperative agreements for assistance in developing associated
    technologies.

    The Army has not included a CKEM system development program in its future
    funding plans. Nonetheless, program officials hope to have the system
    ready to transition to system development in late 2006. CKEM technologies
    can also be used to improve existing kinetic energy missiles, namely the
    Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank missile.

    Agency Comments

    The Army concurred with our assessment.

                                  Common Name: CVN-21

    The Navy's CVN-21 class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft
    carrier and includes a number of advanced technologies in propulsion,
    aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability. These
    technologies will allow for increased sortie rates and decreased manning
    rates as compared to existing systems. Many of the technologies were
    intended for the second ship in the class, but they were accelerated into
    the first ship in a December 2002 restructuring of the program.

    Source: CVN-21 Program Office.

    Program start (6/00)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (4/04)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (11/05)

    Production decision-1st ship (1/07) Production decision-2nd ship (1/11) Initial
                                   capability (9/15)

    The CVN-21 entered system development in April 2004 with very few of its
    critical technologies fully mature. This is due in part to DOD's decision
    to accelerate the installation of a number of technologies from the second
    ship to the first. The accelerated technologies are at much lower levels
    of maturity. Program officials state that the extended construction and
    design period that ends in 2014 allows further time for technology
    development. Program officials have established a risk reduction strategy
    that includes decision points for each technology's inclusion based on a
    demonstrated maturity level. These points coincide with key design
    milestones and include consideration of the fallback use of mature
    technologies for all but two technologies. The program office has stated
    that those two technologies are already mature and operational.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (4/04) (1/05)
    review (1/07) (11/05)

    Common Name: CVN-21

        CVN-21 Program

    Technology Maturity

    Program officials reported that 3 of the 14 critical technologies were
    mature at development start and that 4 more were approaching maturity. An
    additional 7 were at much lower levels of readiness. The Navy expects that
    10 of the 14 technologies will be mature or close to mature by the design
    review in fiscal year 2006.

    Some of the CVN-21 critical technologies are being developed by other
    programs, not by the CVN-21 program. As a result, events in those programs
    could affect the CVN-21 development time line. Those technologies are the
    Volume Search Radar, Multi-Function Radar, Advanced Arresting Gear,
    Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile and Joint Precision Approach and Landing
    System. CVN-21 program officials reported that they are working closely
    with all critical technology leads in those offices to ensure that their
    time lines are integrated with the needs of the CVN-21 program. In case
    those technologies do not mature in time for insertion into the carrier,
    the CVN-21 program has identified existing or fully mature alternate
    systems as backup technologies.

    Since entering development, the program office has added 9 1,100-ton air
    conditioning plants as a critical technology, and has added them to the
    baseline design for the ship. The plants are not near maturity. The Navy
    added the plants because the CVN 21's requirements for chilled water are
    significantly higher than existing aircraft carriers. The Navy considers
    this a low-risk development effort since they are using a proven
    commercial design with upgrades to meet military shock, vibration, and
    noise requirements.

    Two of the four remaining technologies that are not mature, the
    Omni-Directional Vehicle and Automated Weapons and Materials Movement
    Technologies, are primarily mobile vehicles that can be accommodated late
    in the design and construction schedule because they are not installed as
    part of the ship. In addition, the Advanced Arresting Gear is not near
    maturity, but according to program officials, it does not pose a
    significant risk to the program because it is located high in the ship and
    as such will be integrated in the latter stages of construction.

    Program officials stated that it is not possible to mature some systems to
    the best practices standard this early in development. One such system is
    the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, a replacement for the current
    steam catapult system used to launch aircraft off carriers. This system
    has been in development since the late 1990s, but due to the size and
    complexity of the system, a prototype of it cannot be tested aboard a
    surrogate ship.

    Other Program Issues

    Program cost estimates increased by more than $18 billion over the amount
    reported last year as a result of the development start decision, which
    added a second follow-on ship to the program, for a total production run
    of three ships. Previous estimates were based on a single follow-on ship
    and were not fully developed estimates for the entire program. In
    addition, the cost estimates at development start more accurately reflect
    potential inflation incurred by the shipbuilder during design and
    construction of the ship.

    Agency Comments

    The Navy generally concurred with this assessment and reiterated that the
    time frames for design and construction of an aircraft carrier allow for
    evolving technologies to be brought to the ship later in the construction
    cycle. It stated that if a certain technology does not mature in time for
    ship construction, the technology will be replaced by a fall back
    technology that may not meet projected capability, but it will at least be
    equal to current capability.

                                   Common Name: DD(X)

    The Navy's DD(X) destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to
    provide advanced land attack capability in support of forces ashore and
    contribute to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. The program
    is currently in the system design phase, and the Navy plans to authorize
    detailed design and construction of the lead ship in March 2005. The Navy
    plans to demonstrate the ship's critical technologies by building and
    testing 10 developmental subsystems, referred to as engineering
    development models.

    Source: DD(X)Program Office (PMS 500).

    Program start (1/98)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (3/04)

    GAO review (1/05) Production decision-1st ship (3/05) Initial capability (1/13)

    None of the DD(X) technologies included in the 10 engineering development
    models were mature at the start of development, and none are expected to
    be mature at the March 2005 decision to authorize detailed design and
    construction of the lead ship. Current plans call for demonstrating 3 of
    the 10 subsystems by the end of the program's design review in August 2005
    and an additional 3 in September 2005. Backups are available for only 2 of
    the 10 developmental subsystems. As most of the testing of the engineering
    development models will take place in the months immediately before and
    after the design review, it is not likely that design stability will be
    achieved by the time of that review.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (3/04) (1/05)
    review (3/05) (8/05)

    Common Name: DD(X)

        DD(X) Program

    Technology Maturity

    None of the DD(X) technologies were mature at the start of development,
    and none are expected to be mature at the March 2005 decision to authorize
    detailed design and construction of the lead ship. By the end of the
    design review in August 2005, only three subsystems are expected to
    complete testing: the autonomic fire suppression system, the hull form,
    and the infrared mock-ups. The integrated power system, peripheral
    vertical launch system, and total ship computing environment are expected
    to complete testing in September 2005. The dual band radar and integrated
    deckhouse are to complete testing well after the design review. The
    advanced gun system and undersea warfare system will not be tested as
    fully integrated systems until after installation on the first ship.

    The current plans for the integrated undersea warfare system include
    testing the functionality of components, such as the ability of one of two
    sonar arrays to detect mines, but not demonstrating the system as a whole.

    Component testing of the advanced gun system is ongoing and has resulted
    in changes to some components. The weight of the gun system increased as a
    result of an effort to improve producibility and cost efficiency.
    Land-based testing of the gun system is planned for the summer of 2005,
    and flight tests for the munition are to be completed in September 2005.
    The two technologies will not be tested together until after ship
    installation.

    The dual band radar is not scheduled to complete testing until fiscal year
    2008, well after the design review. Program officials have made some
    assumptions about where in the deckhouse it will be placed. If its weight
    increases or other technical factors cause it to be relocated, a redesign
    effort may be needed. In addition, recent component testing and design
    reviews of portions of the radar have revealed shortfalls in performance.

    The integrated power system recently completed a change in design, which
    helps mitigate previously experienced weight issues. These design changes
    will not be tested until after design review. In addition, technical
    issues with components of the Permanent Magnet Motor have arisen that
    could affect schedule and cost. Plans for the integrated power system do
    include the use of a fallback technology, but would require trade-offs in
    requirements.

    Design Stability

    Most of the testing of the engineering development models will take place
    around the time of design review. Even if tests are successful, they will
    not be completed in time to achieve design stability. Problems found in
    testing could result in changes in the design, delays in product delivery,
    and increases in cost. Detailed knowledge about subsystems and their
    component technologies is necessary for developing the system design. If
    this information is not available and assumptions about operating
    characteristics have to be made, redesign may be necessary when reliable
    information is available.

    Agency Comments

    The Navy acknowledges the aggressive DD(X) schedule but maintains that the
    ability to deliver revolutionary capabilities to the fleet with reduced
    crew necessitates some element of risk. Congress has expressed support for
    the Navy's approach, stating in the report accompanying the fiscal year
    2005 national defense authorization act "the conferees believe that taking
    such risks is warranted to ensure that the DD(X) technologies are not
    obsolete, and that the Navy has taken adequate steps to mitigate the risks
    before ship construction begins."

    The Navy disagrees with the assessment that the DD(X) will not achieve
    design stability prior to design review. It stated that the ship design is
    stable and reflects release of the final baseline leading to design
    review. It also stated that the results from continued engineering
    development model testing will be incorporated in the design and that
    permission to begin design review will be based on meeting specific
    entrance criteria that measure the availability of the appropriate data on
    technologies.

    GAO Comments

    Design stability requires detailed knowledge of the form, fit, and
    function of all technologies as well as the integration of individual,
    fully matured subsystems. As testing for DD(X) technologies continues
    beyond the dates scheduled for design review, this knowledge may not be
    achieved when required.

                                   Common Name: E-10A

    The Air Force's E-10A program is being designed to exploit emerging radar
    sensor technologies for airborne surface surveillance and focused air
    surveillance for cruise missile defense. It will consist of an active
    electronically scanned array radar; a modified Boeing 767 commercial
    airframe; and a battle management, command and control computer mission
    subsystem. Development of the radar has already begun; and while funding
    of the first airframe has begun, the overall program has not yet entered
    development. We assessed the entire system.

                         Source: E-10A/MP-RTIP Program Office.

    GAO review (1/05)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (4/05)

    Design review (7/08)

                   Low-rate decision (7/10) Initial capability (3/15)

    We have not assessed the technology maturity of the overall E-10A program
    because program officials have not yet completed their identification and
    assessment of the system's critical technologies. However, they assessed
    the radar's critical technologies in October 2003, prior to the radar's
    Milestone B decision. At that time, officials determined that six of the
    radar's nine critical technologies were mature. The remaining three radar
    technologies are not expected to reach full maturity until the first E-10A
    flight in 2010. Development challenges for the overall E-10A program
    include the integration of the radar, airframe, and battle management
    subsystems and the software development for the battle management
    subsystem.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    GAO Development DOD Production review start design decision (1/05) (4/05)
    review (7/10)

    (7/08)

                                               Desired level of knowledge

    Common Name: E-10A

        E-10A Program

    Technology Maturity

    Because program officials have not yet completed their identification and
    assessment of the program's critical technologies, we were unable to
    assess the technological maturity of the overall E-10A system. Program
    officials are preparing a technology development strategy as well as a
    technology readiness assessment in support of the upcoming development
    decision for the overall weapon system.

    Program officials have identified and assessed the critical technologies
    associated with the radar subsystem. They determined that six of the nine
    critical technologies were mature. The remaining three radar technologies
    are not expected to reach full maturity until the first E-10A flight in
    2010. Tests on a smaller prototype have demonstrated the functional
    capabilities of the radar, but are not representative of the E-10A radar's
    form or fit. The final form of the radar will be significantly larger and
    will not be integrated on the airframe until flight testing in 2010.

    Design Stability

    We could not assess design stability for the E-10A as the overall system
    has not yet entered system development. As a result, the total number of
    drawings has not yet been determined. However, a final design review of
    the radar subsystem was conducted in June 2004. Program officials stated
    that over 90 percent of the expected drawings for the radar had been
    released at that point. They do not expect the number of radar drawings to
    change significantly because key subsystems for the radar are already
    being produced for other weapon systems.

    Other Program Issues

    In fiscal years 2003 and 2005, the E-10A's proposed budget was reduced by
    Congress. Both budget cuts resulted in a restructuring of the program. As
    part of the last restructuring, program officials requested that the
    system development milestone decision be accelerated from July to April
    2005. However, in a recent budget decision, DOD reduced the program's
    fiscal year 2006 and 2007 budget request by a total of $600 million. If
    this reduction is sustained, the E-10A program will have to undergo yet
    another restructuring.

    According to program officials, the software development for the battle
    management command and control subsystem is the most critical program
    risk. This subsystem will provide the machine-to-machine communications
    capability needed to operate with prospective and legacy command and
    control systems. The development of the battle management subsystem has
    lagged behind the radar and airframe; the Air Force just awarded a
    development contract for the subsystem in September 2004.

    The 767 airframe is a commercial derivative that will be modified to meet
    the E-10A's military requirements. In addition, the integration of the
    large scale radar and the battle management subsystem may necessitate
    additional modifications. The Air Force has only contracted for one
    aircraft, which will be used as a testbed. As a result of the budget cuts,
    the delivery of this aircraft has slipped about 1 year.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that the
    E-10A program has been restructured to accommodate both an Office of the
    Secretary of Defense directed development decision delay and congressional
    budget cuts. It further noted that the restructuring has been accomplished
    with minimal impact to ongoing design activities and has retained the
    radar/E-10A synchronization necessary to deliver an E-10A weapon system
    that is responsive to warfighter requirements. The Air Force also provided
    technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

                                  Common Name: E-2AHE

    The Navy's E-2 AHE is an all-weather, twin engine,
    carrier-based, aircraft designed to extend early
    warning surveillance capabilities. It is the next in a
    series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C
    Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971.
    The E-2 AHE is designed to improve battle space
    target detection and situational awareness,
    especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air
    and Missile Defense operations; and improve
    operational availability.

    Source: Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft Programs (PMA-231).

                  Program/ development start (6/03) GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (11/05)

     Low-rate decision (3/09) Initial capability (4/11) Full-rate decision (12/12)
                                Last procurement (2019)

    The E-2 AHE program entered system development in June 2003 without
    demonstrating that its four critical technologies had reached full
    maturity. Since that time, one of the program's four critical technologies
    has reached full maturity. Program officials do not expect to achieve
    maturity on the remaining three critical technologies until after the
    design review. While more mature backup technologies exist for the three
    critical technologies, use of the backup technologies would result in
    degraded system performance or reduced ability to accommodate future
    system growth. The program office has made progress on completing design
    drawings and plans to have the majority of drawings completed by the time
    of design review in November 2005. However, until the technologies are
    mature, the potential for design changes remains.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (6/03) (1/05)
    review (3/09) (11/05)

    Common Name: E-2 AHE

        E-2 AHE Program

    Technology Maturity

    One of the E-2 AHE's four critical technologies (the space time adaptive
    processing algorithms and associated processor) is mature. The program
    expects the remaining technologies (the rotodome antenna, a silicon
    carbide-based transistor for the power amplifier to support UHF radio
    operations, and the multichannel rotary coupler for the antenna) to be
    fully mature after the November 2005 design review but before the start of
    production in March 2009.

    More mature backup technologies exist for the three technologies (the
    rotodome antenna, the silicon carbide-based transistor, and the
    multichannel rotary coupler) and were flown on a larger test platform in
    2002 and 2003. However, use of the backup technologies would result in
    degraded system performance or reduced ability to accommodate future
    system growth due to size and weight constraints. The next AHE technology
    readiness assessment is to be performed prior to the production decision
    for the system in fiscal year 2008, and the program office anticipates
    that the critical technologies will be mature at that time.

    Design Stability

    The program had completed almost 35 percent of its engineering drawings at
    the time of our review. Program officials project that they will have 81
    percent of the drawings completed by the time of design review in November
    2005, and 100 percent completed by the planned start of production in
    March 2009. However, the technology maturation process may lead to more
    design changes.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the AHE
    program successfully executed Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in October
    2004. The program office also completed PDRs for each of the AHE
    subsystems, to include critical technologies, and documented appropriate
    risks. The Navy noted that all program risks and associated mitigation
    plans, including those for critical technologies, were reviewed for PDR.
    According to the Navy, critical technologies do not currently represent a
    high risk to the AHE program. Navy officials stated that the program is on
    schedule and meeting cost and performance objectives.

    Flight tests of the critical technologies are planned during system design
    and development. The Navy noted that flight tests will inherently increase
    the technology readiness levels (TRLs) of the critical technologies. These
    TRLs will be formally assessed before the production decision in fiscal
    year 2009.

                                  Common Name: EA-18G

    The Navy's EA-18G is an electronic attack aircraft designed to jam enemy
    radar and communications and conduct electronic warfare as part of a
    battle group. The program was approved as a replacement for the EA-6B
    aircraft, and it will integrate its electronic warfare technology and
    components into the F/A-18F platform. Because of the heavy use of the
    aging EA-6B aircraft, a large number are being retired due to wear. To
    prevent a gap in electronic warfighting capabilities, DOD intends to begin
    fielding the EA-18G in 2009.

    Source: F-18 Program Office.

    Program start (8/02)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                        (12/03)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (4/05)

      Low-rate decision (4/07) Full-rate decision (4/09) Initial capability (9/09)
                                Last procurement (2013)

    The EA-18G entered system development without demonstrating that its five
    critical technologies had reached full maturity. Three technologies were
    very close to maturity, and two technologies have not been demonstrated in
    the form they will exist on the aircraft. While the EA-18G's critical
    technologies are similar to mature technologies on the EA-6B and the
    F/A-18F, integrating them into the EA-18G will involve form and fit
    challenges. The EA-18G will rely on planned capability upgrades developed
    for the EA-6B, which could increase program risk. In addition to these
    challenges, the program also faces risks with software integration. The
    program office could not project the number of releasable drawings until
    the design review in April 2005.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (12/03) (1/05)
    review (4/07) (4/05)

    Common Name: EA-18G

        EA-18G Program

    Technology Maturity

    None of the EA-18G's five critical technologies are fully mature. While
    they are similar to the mature technologies found on the EA-6B and the
    F/A-18F, integrating those technologies on the EA-18G will involve form
    and fit challenges. Three of the critical technologies, the ALQ-99 pods,
    the F/A-18F platform, and the tactical terminal system, are approaching
    full maturity. The remaining two technologies, the receiver system and the
    communications countermeasures set, are not mature.

    The Navy is funding a study to develop a new tactical terminal system,
    which it hopes to incorporate into the EA-18G to help reduce weight,
    conserve power, and reduce cooling requirements. According to the program
    office, similar systems are already in use in DOD. For example, the
    Special Operations Forces are using a system the size of a credit card,
    significantly lighter than the current 50-pound system. If the new system
    is not developed in time for the start of aircraft production, the program
    plans to use a modified version of the tactical terminal system currently
    in use on the EA6B.

    Raytheon Systems is developing the communications countermeasures set for
    the EA-18G, which will be based on a similar system currently used on the
    C-130J aircraft. Raytheon is expected to begin delivery of the system in
    January 2005.

    Design Stability

    We could not assess the design stability of the EA-18G as the number of
    releasable drawings is not yet available. The EA-18G Program Office does
    not expect to have an estimate of the number of design drawings until the
    design review, currently planned for April 2005. By not having sufficient
    design drawing information, the program places itself at increased cost
    and schedule risk.

    Other Program Issues

    The EA-18G Program Office plans to build one-third of its aircraft during
    low-rate initial production due to the need to begin replacing retiring
    EA-6Bs by 2009. Any problems identified in testing during production could
    result in costly modifications to the already produced aircraft. The
    program office has indicated it may proceed into production even if minor
    known deficiencies exist.

    Because the EA-18G is using the same airframe as the F/A-18F, the program
    office is conducting a study to determine what impact the increased
    vibration of the EA-18G will have on the life span of the airframe. The
    program office also plans to certify the aircraft to land aboard ship at
    47,000 pounds, which is 3,000 pounds heavier than the similar F/A-18F
    aircraft.

    The F/A-18E/F aircraft has experienced problems with "wing buffet," which
    can affect performance. The F/A-18F Program Office has made design
    changes, which it expects will resolve the issue.

    The ALQ-99 pods successfully completed shake testing, which evaluated
    their ability to handle the increased vibrations of the EA-18G.

    The EA-18G program may experience minor cost growth if cuts are made in
    the number of EA-6Bs that are upgraded because the EA-18G program plans to
    procure some of the same components as those used in the EA-6B ICAP III
    upgrade. Decreased purchases by the EA-6B program would increase unit
    costs of these items, thereby increasing the cost to the EA-18G.

    Agency Comments

    The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
    appropriate.

                                   Common Name: EELV

    The Air Force's EELV program acquires commercial satellite launch services
    from two competitive families of launch vehicles-Atlas V and Delta IV. The
    program is an industry partnership to support and sustain assured access
    to space and reduce the life-cycle cost of space launches by at least 25
    percent over previous systems while meeting the government's launch
    requirements. Different types of lift vehicles may be used, depending on
    the particular mission. We assessed both the Atlas V and Delta IV.

    Source: (Left) (c) 2003 ILS/Lockheed Martin; (right) (c) 2003 The Boeing
    Company.

    Program start (12/96)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                        (10/98)

                             Production decision (unknown)

               First flight-Atlas V (8/02) First flight-Delta IV (11/02)

                       GAO review (1/05) Initial capability (TBD)

    Although the EELV Program Office has access to technology, design, and
    production maturity information, it has not formally contracted for this
    data because it is acquiring the launch service rather than developing the
    system itself. To date, seven successful EELV launches have occurred-two
    government and five commercial. With a history of launch delays, the heavy
    lift vehicle (HLV) had its first demonstration flight in 2004. The EELV
    program's total costs have increased about 86 percent due to a decline in
    the commercial launch market upon which the business case was based.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production

    start design review decision

    (10/98) review (1/05) (unknown)

    (10/99)

                                               Desired level of knowledge

    Common Name: EELV

        EELV Program

    Technology Maturity

    We could not assess the technology maturity of EELV because the Air Force
    has not formally contracted for information on technology maturity from
    its contractors.

    Design Stability

    We could not assess the design stability of EELV because the Air Force has
    not formally contracted for the information needed to conduct this
    assessment.

    Production Maturity

    We could not assess the production maturity of EELV because the Air Force
    has not formally contracted for information that would facilitate this
    assessment.

    Other Program Issues

    The decline in commercial satellite launch needs in the late 1990s
    resulted in program cost increases and a reduction in the anticipated
    number of Atlas V and Delta IV launches. Cost increases greater than 25
    percent over the program's objective triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach (see
    10 U.S.C. 2433), requiring a review by the Secretary of Defense and a
    report to Congress. As provided by the law, DOD certified in April 2004
    that the program is critical to national security and its cost estimates
    are reasonable. In conjunction with the certification, the Air Force is
    updating the 1994 Space Launch Modernization Plan (which examines launch
    alternatives), and it revised its mission model to reflect a reduction of
    launch vehicles. Also, the Air Force is reviewing contract structures that
    could include cost type provisions for the follow-on procurement of EELV
    services.

    The EELV program has continued to experience schedule changes to the Delta
    IV heavy lift vehicles (HLV). The Delta IV heavy-lift demonstration flight
    that was planned for July 2004 did not occur until December 2004 and the
    HLV first operational flight was delayed by 6 months. According to the Air
    Force, these delays occurred due to a number of factors, including other
    launch priorities, slips in launch dates for the first three Delta IV
    missions, modifications to the HLV launch pad, and design problems
    encountered during launch pad testing. In addition, both contractors are
    addressing technical issues related to meeting program requirements. The
    Boeing Company is addressing a Delta IV issue related to the separation of
    the payload fairing device (which encloses and protects the payload).
    Lockheed Martin is dealing with an Atlas V intermediate class booster
    issue regarding the excessive vibration caused by the noise generated at
    liftoff.

    According to DOD, initiatives are in place to reduce EELV risk and ensure
    access to space. The initiatives are aimed at critical rocket components,
    improving the producibility of the upper stage engine, systems engineering
    processes, and the availability of critical staff and facilities. Related
    to these initiatives, there are three technical issues that the Air Force
    is addressing. Parts of the RL-10 upper stage engine are common to both
    the Delta IV and the Atlas V and an engine flaw could potentially ground
    both vehicles. However, the Air Force maintains that the RL-10 has flown
    successfully since the 1960s. Also, the Atlas V continues to rely on the
    Russian-made RD-180 propulsion technology (though the contractor plans to
    start building this technology in the United States with a first military
    launch by 2012). Additionally, until the West Coast launch pad becomes
    operational in 2005 in time for the first U.S. government need in 2006,
    the Air Force is limited to launching the Atlas V from its East Coast
    launch pad.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force acknowledged
    that technology, design, and production maturity data are not required as
    a deliverable, and therefore it does not have the authority to provide
    this information. However, daily interaction with both contractors
    provides insight into the readiness of the launchers as well as the
    potential for cost increases and schedule issues.

                                    Common Name: EFV

    The Marine Corps' EFV (formerly called the Advanced Amphibious Assault
    Vehicle) is designed to transport troops from ships offshore to their
    inland destinations at higher speeds and from farther distances than the
    existing Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV-7A1). It is designed to be
    more mobile, lethal, reliable, and effective in all weather conditions.
    The EFV will have two variants-a troop carrier for 17 combat equipped
    Marines and 3 crew and a command vehicle to manage combat operations in
    the field. We assessed both variants.

    Source: General Dynamics Land Systems.

    Program start (3/95)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                        (12/00)

     GAO review (1/05) Low-rate decision (12/05) Full-rate decision (11/08) Initial
                       capability (12/08) Last procurement (2016)

    The EFV's technology is mature and the design is stable. However, at the
    start of development, only four out of five critical technologies were
    mature. The demonstration of the moving map, the last of these
    technologies, has led to full technology maturation. The design was close
    to meeting best practice standards at the design review, signifying the
    design was relatively stable. Early development of fully functional
    prototypes and other design practices have facilitated design stability.
    Based on the functional prototyping, the program expects changes to
    roughly 12 percent of the drawings. The demonstration of production
    maturity remains a concern because the contractor does not collect
    statistical process control data.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (12/00) review
    (1/05) (12/05) (1/01)

    Common Name: EFV

        EFV Program

    Technology Maturity

    All five of the EFV's critical technologies are mature. The moving map
    navigation technology, which was not mature at the start of product
    development, was recently demonstrated in an operational environment on
    the full-up system prototype. The moving map technology provides
    situational awareness.

    Design Stability

    The program has now released all of its drawings for the troop carrier
    variant. However, 12 percent require design changes to address reliability
    issues. At the time of critical design review in 2001, 84 percent of the
    expected drawings had been released, signifying the design was approaching
    stability. The program is currently seeking to reduce the threshold for
    the reliability key performance parameter based on a USMC reevaluation of
    concept of operations. According to program officials, reliability is a
    moderate risk but may elevate to high risk if the requirement change is
    not approved. Program officials expect the EFV to meet revised reliability
    thresholds by initial operational testing in November 2007.

    According to the program, recent tests of an improved track and wheel
    design demonstrated significant improvements in reducing vibration on the
    vehicle. Program officials estimate that vibration levels have been
    reduced by up to 50 percent over previous measurements. The new track and
    wheel design will be incorporated on the vehicles used for the operational
    assessment in March 2005.

    Production Maturity

    The program expects to enter low-rate production in December 2005. It will
    do so without requiring the contractor to use statistical process controls
    to demonstrate that the 12 critical processes are producing quality and
    reliable products. Instead, the contractor plans to have 95 percent of the
    production tooling and manufacturing processes in place by low-rate
    production start. These processes are being utilized and refined to build
    the prototype vehicles. Additionally, the program and the contractor are
    in planning stages for production readiness reviews that assess production
    processes, identify any additional critical manufacturing processes, and
    determine the benefit of using statistical process controls. Because the
    final EFV production facility is not ready, the contractor is using the
    planned manufacturing processes to build prototypes at the development
    facility. This will provide verification of these manufacturing processes.
    However, when production moves to the new facility, processes will need to
    be validated again to ensure they work as expected.

    Other Program Issues

    The program tracks a number of entrance criteria for low-rate production
    and is on track to meet most of those criteria. One key entrance criterion
    is an operational assessment scheduled for March 2005. The assessment will
    include the demonstration of a launch and recovery from an amphibious
    ship; transportation of Marines on water and on land; and negotiation of
    the vehicle in a 4-foot surf. Another key entrance criterion,
    demonstration of system reliability, is a moderate risk and may delay
    low-rate production.

    Agency Comments

    The EFV Program Office was provided an opportunity to comment on a draft
    of this assessment, but it did not have any comments.

                                   Common Name: ERGM

    The Navy's ERGM is a rocket-assisted projectile that is fired from guided
    missile destroyers. ERGM is one concept the Navy is considering to meet
    its fire support requirement. ERGM can be guided to targets on land at
    ranges of between 15 and 50 nautical miles to provide fire support for
    ground troops. It is expected to offer greater range and accuracy than the
    Navy's current 13 nautical mile gun range. ERGM required modifications to
    the 5-inch gun, a new munitions-handling system, and a new fire control
    system. We assessed the projectile.

    Source: Naval Gunner y Project Office.

                                  Program/development
                                         start
                                         (7/96)

    Design review (5/03)

    GAO review (1/05) ERGM contract ends (12/05) Low-rate decision (10/08) Full-rate
                       decision (1/10) Initial capability (1/10)

    Since our last assessment, the ERGM program has not demonstrated
    additional technology maturity or design stability. Due to problems with
    the rocket motor and propelling charge, flight testing was halted, and the
    program has been unable to demonstrate the maturity of 7 of its 20
    critical technologies. The program plans to resume flight testing in
    February 2005. If that test is successful, four technologies will
    demonstrate maturity. The program also stated that ERGM's design drawings
    will not be completed because of limited program funding. Therefore, ERGM
    will not reach design maturity under Raytheon's current contract. Finally,
    due to concerns about ERGM's inconsistent test performance and projected
    unit cost, the Navy plans to recompete the 5-inch guided projectile
    requirement and restart development by mid-fiscal year 2006. If ERGM is
    not selected, it will cease to be a program.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (7/96) review
    (1/05) (10/08) (5/03)

    Common Name: ERGM

        ERGM Program

    Technology Maturity

    Thirteen of ERGM's 20 critical technologies are mature. The program has
    completed development work on six of the seven remaining technologies, but
    has yet to test them in an operational environment. Program officials
    currently project that four of the remaining technologies, the tactical
    telemeter and the three unitary warhead-related technologies, will be
    demonstrated during a February 2005 flight test. The program's fiscal year
    2005 budget request was reduced from $11.3 million to $4.5 million, and
    the program's funds will be exhausted in March 2005. Unless the program
    receives additional funding, none of the three remaining critical
    technologies- antijam electronics, safe and arm device and fuze, and data
    communication interface-will achieve maturity under the current contract
    since the Navy plans to recompete the 5-inch guided projectile requirement
    and restart development in early to midfiscal year 2006. If the ERGM
    concept is selected, the program office projects that all ERGM critical
    technologies would be demonstrated in an operational environment by 2008.

    Design Stability

    The program has released approximately 51 percent of its 140 production
    representative drawings. None of ERGM's production representative
    engineering drawings were released at its May 2003 design review. Instead,
    the program conducted this review with less mature drawings and used them
    to validate the design of the development test rounds. In our March 2004
    report, the program office stated that it would have a complete and
    updated drawing package by October 2004. However, because of a lack of
    funds and the 5-inch guided projectile competition that will end the
    current ERGM contract, the contractor will not complete this drawing
    package. If the ERGM concept is selected, the option exists to complete
    this drawing package.

    Production Maturity

    Since the future of the ERGM concept will not be determined until January
    2006, it is unclear whether and when the program will proceed to
    production. If the ERGM concept is chosen, the current manufacturing plan
    states the contractor will identify key product characteristics and then
    determine how to implement statistical process control.

    Other Program Issues

    In May 2004, the Navy awarded a contract to ATK to demonstrate an
    alternative precision-guided munition concept-the Ballistic Trajectory
    Extended Range Munition (BTERM). BTERM will likely be one of the concepts
    competing for the new development contract. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005,
    the Navy budgeted $35 million for the BTERM effort. The BTERM technology
    demonstration includes six guided flight tests in 2005. At this point,
    none of the BTERM critical technologies have reached maturity. However,
    according to the project office, the six flight tests, if successful, will
    demonstrate most of BTERM's critical technologies in a relevant or
    operational environment. Finally, the latest ERGM program cost and
    schedule estimates do not reflect the potential cost and time needed to
    complete the 5-inch guided projectile development effort. The Navy is
    currently considering an acquisition strategy that would start a new
    development program with a revised program baseline, which could delay
    initial operational capability until 2011 depending on the maturity of the
    concept selected. The procurement cost of this new program will likely be
    much higher than is currently reported for ERGM because the latest cost
    estimate for the ERGM program is based on the procurement funding
    available in the future year defense plan, not current inventory
    requirements.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that it
    intends to issue a request for proposal in fiscal year 2005 and select an
    Extended Range Munition (ERM) development contractor in fiscal year 2006.
    It will request that the program start the system development phase due to
    the maturity of guided projectile concepts that could meet ERM
    requirements. The Navy also stated that research, development, test, and
    evaluation (RDT&E) funds in fiscal year 2006-2011 will be used for the ERM
    development effort, resulting in an initial operational capability of no
    later than fiscal year 2011. Depending upon the maturity of the concept
    selected, development could end as early as fiscal year 2008 with a fiscal
    year 2009 initial operational capability. In this case, fiscal year
    2006-2008 RDT&E funding (about $58.4 million) would be used to complete
    the program and fiscal year 2009-2011 funding (about $87.3 million) would
    support spiral development and/or product improvement initiatives.

                                 Common Name: Excalibur

    The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based,
    fire-and-forget, 155-mm cannon artillery precision munitions. It is
    intended to improve the accuracy and range of cannon artillery. Also, the
    Excalibur's near vertical angle of fall is intended to reduce the
    collateral damage area around the intended target, making it more
    effective in urban environments than the current artillery projectiles.
    The Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon requires the Excalibur
    to meet its required range.

                                   Source: U.S. Army.

                                  Program/development
                                         start
                                         (5/97)

      GAO review (1/05) Low-rate decision (7/06) Full-rate decision (6/08) Initial
                       capability (9/08) Last procurement (2018)

    The Excalibur program's critical technologies are not fully mature, even
    though product development began over 7 years ago. Program officials
    expect to have technology maturity by June 2005. The program has achieved
    design stability. Currently, almost all of the Excalibur drawings are
    completed and could be released to manufacturing. However, the Excalibur
    is undergoing testing that may lead to design changes. The program has
    encountered a number of challenges since development began, including a
    decrease in planned quantities, a relocation of the contractor's plant,
    early limited funding, technical problems, and changes in program
    requirements. It merged with the Trajectory Correctable Munition program
    in 2002.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (5/97) (1/05)
    review (7/06) (6/05)

    Common Name: Excalibur

        Excalibur Program

    Technology Maturity

    None of the Excalibur's three critical technologies- the guidance control
    system, the airframe, or the warhead-are fully mature. According to
    program officials, all three have been demonstrated in a relevant
    environment, and they are expected to reach full maturity before the
    design review in June 2005. The warhead was not considered a critical
    technology in 1997 because the Excalibur design called for a warhead that
    was under production for other munitions. At the Army's direction, the
    program has undertaken development of a different warhead that is
    currently undergoing testing.

    Design Stability

    The most recent program restructure divided the design review into two
    reviews. The first, scheduled for June 2005, freezes the first article
    test design and the second, scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year
    2006, freezes the production design. The program recently completed an
    Early Fielding Technical Data Package review of the design drawings. The
    review found that about 97 percent of the Excalibur engineering drawings
    are complete and releasable to manufacturing. The program office plans to
    have all of the drawings complete by the June 2005 design review. The
    Excalibur has to complete safety and other testing before it is ready for
    production. This testing could lead to design changes.

    Other Program Issues

    The program has gone through many changes since the beginning of product
    development in May 1997. It was almost immediately restructured due to
    limited funding, and it was restructured again in 2001. The program was
    again restructured and merged with a joint Swedish/U.S. program known as
    the Trajectory Correctable Munition. This merger has helped the Excalibur
    deal with design challenges, including issues related to its original
    folding fin design. In May 2002, due to the cancellation of the Crusader,
    the Army directed the restructure of the program to include the Future
    Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon. In December 2002, the Acting
    Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
    approved an early fielding plan for the unitary version. The plan
    currently includes developing the unitary version of the Excalibur in
    three spirals. In the first spiral, the projectile would meet its
    requirements for accuracy in a nonjammed environment and lethality and
    would be available for fielding to Joint Lightweight 155mm cannon in
    September 2006. In the second spiral, the projectile would be improved to
    meet its requirements for accuracy in a jammed environment and reliability
    and would be available for fielding to the Future Combat Systems'
    non-line-of-sight cannon in September 2008. Finally, in the third spiral,
    the projectile would be improved to meet its range requirement and would
    be available for fielding to all systems in late fiscal year 2011.

    The net effect of these changes has been to increase the program's
    schedule and to substantially decrease planned procurement quantities. As
    a result, the program's overall costs and unit costs have dramatically
    increased.

    Agency Comments

    The Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
    appropriate.

                               Common Name: F/A-22Raptor

    The Air Force's F/A-22, originally planned to be an air superiority
    fighter, will also have air-to-ground attack capability. It is being
    designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to make
    it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for long
    ranges. It also has integrated aviation electronics (avionics) designed to
    greatly improve pilots' awareness of the situation surrounding them. It is
    designed to replace the Air Force's F-15 aircraft.

    Source: F/A-22 System Program Office.

    Program start (10/86)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (6/91)

      Low-rate decision (8/01) GAO review (1/05) Full-rate decision (3/05) Initial
                       capability (12/05) Last procurement (2011)

    The F/A-22 entered production without ensuring that production processes
    were in control. The Air Force expects to have about 27 percent of the
    aircraft on contract prior to the full-rate decision in March 2005, yet
    quality issues remain. For example, the F/A-22 has not achieved important
    reliability goals and some components, like the canopies, are not lasting
    as long as expected. Technology and design matured late in the program and
    have contributed to numerous problems. Avionics problems were discovered
    late in development, which resulted in large cost increases and caused
    testing delays. The potential for further cost increases and schedule
    delays exists until initial operational testing and followon testing are
    completed. Additionally, $7 billion in cost reductions has to be achieved
    to keep cost growth within the congressionally mandated production cost
    limitation.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (6/91) review
    (8/01) (1/05) (2/95)

    Common Name: F/A-22 Raptor

        F/A-22 Raptor Program

    Technology Maturity

    The three critical F/A-22 technologies (supercruise, stealth, and
    integrated avionics) appear to be mature. However, two of these
    technologies, the integrated avionics and stealth, did not mature until
    several years after the start of development. Integrated avionics have
    been a source of major problems, delaying developmental testing and the
    start of initial operational testing. Since 1997 the costs of avionics
    have increased by over $801 million and problems discovered late in the
    program were the major contributor. In April 2004, the Air Force began
    initial operational test and evaluation after reporting that these
    problems were corrected.

    Design Stability

    The F/A-22 design is essentially complete, but it matured slowly, taking
    over 3 years beyond the critical design review to meet best practice
    standards. The late drawing release contributed to parts shortages, work
    performed out of sequence, delayed flight testing and increased costs.
    Design changes resulted from flight and structural tests. For example,
    problems with excessive movement of the vertical tails and overheating
    problems in the fuselage and engine bay required design modifications. The
    Air Force completed development testing in December 2004 and operational
    testing in November 2004. The Air Force is in the process of evaluating
    the results of operational testing. The results of this evaluation could
    result in additional design changes.

    Production Maturity

    The program office stopped collecting process control information in
    November 2000. The contractor estimated that nearly half of the key
    processes had reached a marginal level of control, but not up to best
    practice standards. The Air Force has 67 production aircraft on contract.
    The Air Force relies on the contractor's quality system to verify
    manufacturing and performance requirements are being met. However, the Air
    Force has not demonstrated the F/A-22 can achieve its reliability goal of
    3 hours mean time between maintenance. It does not expect to achieve this
    goal until 2008 when most of the aircraft will have already been bought.
    Best practices call for meeting reliability requirements before entering
    production. As of mid-October 2004, the Air Force had only demonstrated
    about 22 percent of the reliability required.

    Other Program Issues

    The Air Force is counting on future cost reduction plans to offset
    estimated cost growth and enable the program to meet the latest production
    cost estimate. If these cost reduction initiatives are not achieved as
    planned, production costs could increase.

    The Integrated Maintenance Information System (IMIS), a paperless
    computerized maintenance system, is used by the Air Force to maintain the
    F/A-22. The system collects and analyzes problem data and develops a
    maintenance solution. The system has not functioned properly causing
    unnecessary maintenance actions. This has affected the Air Force's ability
    to fly the test aircraft on schedule. The Air Force installed new software
    in February 2004 to address many of the errors generated by IMIS and
    uncovered additional errors. According to the Air Force, these problems
    were resolved in July 2004. In November 2004, the Air Force upgraded IMIS
    to a commercially supportable operating platform and database that added
    new functionality such as wireless connectivity.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
    technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. The Air Force
    also stated that, in coordination with the DCMA and contractor teammates,
    the program is aggressively pursuing cost reduction initiatives to meet
    cost goals. It stated that these goals represent a significant reduction
    in per aircraft cost and include substantial improvements to production by
    the primes and subcontractors. The Air Force disagreed, however, with the
    value we reported in our draft assessment. It stated that the initiatives
    total $2.5 billion. The Air Force also indicated that the reliability of
    the F/A-22, while maturing, is already comparable to legacy Air Force
    fighter aircraft while delivering a required combat capability that cannot
    be achieved by legacy platforms.

    GAO Comments

    We reviewed the Air Force's comments concerning projected production cost
    reduction savings and determined that the Air Force will have to reduce
    the current production estimate by approximately $7 billion to execute the
    program within a congressional mandated cost cap.

                                    Common Name: FCS

    The FCS, a program that will equip the Army's new transformational modular
    combat brigades, consists of a family of systems composed of advanced,
    networked combat and sustainment systems, unmanned ground and air
    vehicles, and unattended sensors and munitions. Within a system-of-systems
    architecture, the first increment of the FCS features 18 major systems and
    other enabling systems along with an overarching network for information
    superiority and survivability.

    Source: Program Manager, Unit of Action, U.S. Army.

    Program start (5/00)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (5/03)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (9/10)

     Low-rate decision (9/12) Initial capability (12/14) Full-rate decision (8/16)
                               Last procurement (unknown)

    The FCS program began a major restructuring in July 2004, which delays
    fielding 4 years, until 2014, and spirals various FCS technologies to the
    current force. The restructuring increased the priority for developing and
    demonstrating the FCS network. The program also continues refining
    requirements. In some cases, the Army has decided to use different
    technologies, which are less mature than the original technologies. The
    program expects all of its 54 critical technologies to be mature by the
    end of fiscal year 2008. Technology maturation will continue throughout
    system development, with an associated increase in the risk of cost growth
    and schedule delays. Since the FCS will dominate Army investment accounts
    over the next decade, cost growth and schedule delays could affect all
    Army acquisitions.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (5/03) (1/05)
    review (9/12) (9/10)

    Common Name: FCS

        FCS Program

    Technology Maturity

    One of the FCS program's 54 critical technologies is currently mature.
    Overall, the program's current technology maturity is slightly less than
    it was in May 2003 when the program began development.

    The program is not appropriately applying best practices to maturing its
    critical technologies. It considers technical risk acceptable as long as
    it can estimate that the technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant
    environment before design review. Also, it does not consistently include
    form or fit in technology maturation because it views sizing the
    technology as an integration risk, not a technology risk. In addition, the
    program could assess a technology as mature simply because it is part of
    another program. For example, it assesses the maturity of the technologies
    enabling the Active Protection System as mature, even though the Army is
    developing the system for a current combat vehicle that is much larger
    than the FCS vehicles. The technologies will need to be reduced in size
    before the system can be incorporated into the FCS vehicles. Overall, the
    program must continue to mature its technologies while developing the FCS.

    In some cases, as the FCS requirements are refined, the Army has decided
    to use different technologies that are less mature than the original
    technologies. For example, in February 2004, the program assessed the
    maturity of ground-to-air combat identification as fully mature primarily
    because similar identification systems were readily available in air
    defense systems. In September 2004, however, it reduced the technology's
    maturity because it refined the FCS requirements and determined that in
    order to provide required interoperability with NATO systems, the program
    would have to use an operating mode that required the development of a new
    interrogator. As a result, it assessed the technology as very immature.

    Design Stability

    The program estimates that 80 percent of its 42,750 drawings will be
    released by the design review scheduled for September 2010.

    Other Program Issues

    The FCS program began a major restructuring in July 2004, which delays
    fielding an initial FCS capability until 2014, 48 months later than
    planned. The revised strategy helps meet the needs of an Army at war by
    making $9 billion available for investment in future capabilities for the
    current force, which include FCS technologies that are expected to be
    transitioned to the current force between 2008 and 2014. It also increases
    the priority of development and demonstration of the FCS network and
    system-of-systems architecture along with munitions, sensors, and unmanned
    vehicles.

    The concept of a modular FCS equipped brigade-sized combat unit, known as
    a Unit of Action, represents a major departure in the way the Army has
    conducted combat operations and is a major part of the Army's
    transformation efforts. To successfully develop the FCS, the Army faces a
    number of technological and programmatic challenges, including equipping
    Units of Action with a common family of networked vehicles and other
    systems. These vehicles and systems are expected to be a fraction of the
    weight of existing heavy fighting vehicles in order to improve
    transportability such as being airlifted by a C-130 transport.

    Agency Comments

    The Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
    appropriate. In addition, it considers technical risk acceptable as long
    as it can estimate that the technologies would be demonstrated in a
    relevant environment before design review. The restructured FCS program
    also includes a process for periodically spiraling out technologies to the
    current force as they reach acceptable levels of maturity. Additional
    efforts to mature these technologies will continue as needed under the
    main program. The Army believes this approach will ensure that all
    technologies are proven before fielding of full FCS-equipped Units of
    Action. Finally, the Army noted that, in addressing transportability
    challenges, the FCS program will continue to develop and analyze
    alternative technical approaches to find the design solution that best
    meets the broad spectrum of user needs.

    GAO Comments

    The Army is holding FCS technologies to a lower maturity standard than
    best practices and DOD policy calls for. This increases the risk of
    program cost growth and schedule delays.

                                Common Name: Global Hawk

    The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high altitude, long endurance
    unmanned aerial vehicle with integrated sensors and ground stations
    providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
    After a successful technology demonstration, the system entered
    development and limited production in March 2001. Considered a
    transformational system, the program was restructured twice in 2002 to
    acquire 7 air vehicles similar to the original demonstrators (the RQ-4A)
    and 44 of a new, larger, and more capable model (the RQ-4B).

    Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.

    Program start (2/94)

    Development start/ low-rate decision (3/01) GAO review (1/05) Initial capability
               (12/05) Full-rate decision (1/07) Last procurement (2011)

    Key product knowledge on Global Hawk is now less than it was in March 2001
    due to the 2002 program restructurings. Officials had planned to first
    produce systems very similar to technology demonstrators and then slowly
    develop and acquire more advanced systems. Technology maturity and design
    stability approached best practice standards for this plan. However,
    program restructurings accelerated deliveries, overlapped development and
    production schedules, and added the new, larger air vehicle with advanced
    sensors. These actions increased development and program unit costs. While
    the platform design is fairly mature, production of the new air vehicle
    began with advanced sensor technologies still immature and operational
    tests not planned until much later. Production maturity cannot be assessed
    using knowledge-based criteria because statistical process control data
    are not used.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

                                              Development  DOD   Development/ GAO
                                                 start    design       production
                                                                           review
                                                 (NA)     review  decision (1/05)
                                                           (NA)       (3/01)

    Common Name: Global Hawk

        Global Hawk Program

    Technology Maturity

    Five of 14 critical technologies associated with the Global Hawk system
    are mature, 3 technologies are approaching maturity, and 6 are less
    mature. Three of the mature technologies are uniquely associated with the
    RQ-4A. Two of the 11 RQ-4B's critical technologies are mature-one more
    than last year. The less mature technologies include the airborne signals
    intelligence payload and the multiplatform radar technology insertion
    program. These desired capabilities largely drove the decision to develop
    and acquire the new RQ-4B air vehicles, which can carry 50 percent more
    payload than the original model, the RQ-4A.

    Production of the first RQ-4B began in July 2004. Integrating and testing
    these advanced sensors on the air vehicle will not be completed until late
    in the program when most of the fleet will already have been bought. There
    is risk that the sensor technologies and final designs may not meet the
    space, weight, and power limitations of the RQ-4B, resulting in extended
    development times, costly reworks, or diminished capabilities. The
    airborne signals intelligence payload currently exceeds its weight
    allocation, and the power requirements for the multiplatform radar
    requirements near the RQ-4B's limit.

    Design Stability

    The RQ-4A design is stable, and 75 percent of RQ-4B engineering drawings
    were completed by the time of its design review in April 2004. By late
    fiscal year 2004, over 90 percent of the engineering drawings were
    completed. However, the Air Force has not built a prototype of the RQ-4B
    to demonstrate a stable design and has not established a reliability
    growth plan prior to initiating production-both characteristics of best
    practices used to assure design maturity. Additionally, the Air Force
    plans to buy almost half the fleet before it completes initial operational
    test and evaluation to verify the air vehicle design works as required.
    This increases the potential that testing may identify a need to redesign
    and retrofit aircraft.

    Production Maturity

    Although production experience and lessons learned on the RQ-4A will
    benefit the RQ-4B program, the new model requires different and more
    complex manufacturing processes and tooling than the original model.
    Officials have not implemented, and do not plan to implement, a
    comprehensive statistical process control program to demonstrate that new
    manufacturing processes are in control and capable of meeting cost,
    schedule, and quality targets. Officials have started to identify critical
    manufacturing processes and will continue to collect performance data such
    as defect and rework rates to measure product quality. There are
    continuing concerns about the quality and timeliness of several key
    subcontractors, which negatively affect cost and schedule of both design
    and production work. We note that the acceptance of the second production
    RQ-4A was delayed due to defects and flight deficiencies.

    Other Program Issues

    Restructuring the Global Hawk program has accelerated planned deliveries
    of advanced capabilities and made development, test, and production cycles
    highly concurrent. Cost increases, schedule slips, and performance
    trade-offs have already occurred. We recently reported that slowing down
    production to enable closing the gaps in product knowledge and
    operationally testing the aircraft should be considered.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that our
    knowledge-based criteria do not effectively assess Global Hawk's
    evolutionary acquisition strategy. It stated that Global Hawk's spiral
    approach fosters efficiency, flexibility, and innovation and includes the
    controls essential to manage program risk and achieve effective program
    results. The Air Force further noted that the Global Hawk program is
    managing development risks as it migrates from the RQ-4A to the larger,
    multiple-intelligence RQ-4B configuration. It noted that the RQ-4B is an
    evolutionary design change, built upon the successful RQ-4A design, years
    of extensive testing, and over 5,000 RQ-4A flight hours, and also stated
    that establishing accurate RQ-4B size, weight, and power constraints
    provides accurate design requirements for development of advanced sensors,
    further reducing future risk. The Air Force further commented that by
    using concurrent development and production processes, the Global Hawk
    program plans to achieve initial operational capability approximately 5
    years after program initiation, fielding greater capability than initially
    planned.

                                    Common Name: GMD

    MDA's GMD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
    blocks to defend the United States against limited long-range ballistic
    missile attacks. The first block consists of a collection of radars and an
    interceptor-a three-stage booster and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle
    (EKV)-integrated by a central control system that formulates battle plans
    and directs the operation of GMD components. We assessed all technologies
    critical to the Block 2004 GMD element, but only the design and production
    maturity of the interceptor.

    Source: Department of Defense.

    Program start (2/96)

     Directive to field initial capability (12/02) Integrated design review (3/03)
    Initial capability (8/04) GAO review (1/05) Block 2004 completion (12/05)

    Three of GMD's 10 critical technologies were fully mature, and its design
    seemed stable in September 2004 when MDA placed five ground-based
    interceptors in silos for the initial capability. The remaining
    technologies were nearing full maturity. However, there is a risk that
    design changes could occur during Block 2004 because a solution to a
    technical problem in the kill vehicle has not been proved in flight tests
    and additional problems could be identified during the flight tests
    scheduled to occur before the end of the block. Although MDA has not made
    a formal production decision, it is currently producing hardware for
    operational use. We could not, however, assess the stability of MDA's
    production processes as the program is not collecting statistical data on
    its production processes.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (NA) review
    (1/05) (TBD)

                                         (3/03)

    Common Name: GMD

        GMD Program

    Technology Maturity

    Program officials estimate that 3 of GMD's 10 critical technologies are
    mature: fire control software, the EKV's infrared seeker, and the Orbital
    Sciences Corporation (OSC) booster. The remaining seven technologies are
    nearing maturity. These technologies are the Lockheed Martin BV+ booster;
    Sea-based X-Band radar; Cobra Dane radar; Beale radar; EKV on-board
    discrimination; EKV guidance, navigation, and control subsystem; and the
    in-flight interceptor communications system. The program expected to
    demonstrate 3 of these technologies by the end of fiscal year 2004, but
    flight test delays prevented the demonstrations. However, program
    officials expect that the maturity of all 7 technologies will be
    demonstrated before the end of Block 2004.

    Design Stability

    The Block 2004 ground-based interceptor design is stable with 100 percent
    of its drawings released to manufacturing. The ongoing effort to mature
    critical technologies and solve an ongoing engineering problem, however,
    may lead to more design changes.

    Production Maturity

    Officials have not made an official production decision, although they are
    delivering interceptors for the Block 2004 emergency capability. We could
    not assess the production maturity of these interceptors because the
    program is not collecting statistical control data on the production
    process. According to program officials, data are not tracked because the
    current quantities of GMD component hardware are small. Instead, the GMD
    element measures production capability and maturity with a monthly
    evaluation process that assesses critical manufacturing indicators for
    both readiness and execution.

    To reduce program risk, MDA is following a dual booster strategy,
    developing the BV+ and the OSC boosters, each of which has a different
    design. Although this strategy offers two different capabilities and has
    helped to mitigate production risks, MDA has experienced ongoing problems
    with the BV+ booster. After an explosion at the facility that mixes
    propellant for the BV+ booster motors, the facility's contractor ceased
    operations.

    A new contract has been awarded for the production of the BV+ 2nd and 3rd
    stage motors. MDA hopes to restart manufacturing in fiscal year 2005.
    Therefore, all Block 2004 interceptors will use the OSC booster.

    EKV and booster delivery is on schedule for the December 2005 initial
    capability. MDA delivered 5 interceptors for initial defensive operations
    by September 2004, and it plans to have a total of 18 on alert by December
    2005. MDA originally planned to have 20 interceptors by this time;
    however, two of these interceptors were later designated as test assets.

    Other Program Issues

    Increased cost of the EKV and the explosions at the BV+ propellant-mixing
    facility were leading causes of $175 million in GMD cost growth during
    fiscal year 2004. To avoid a delay in fielding the initial defensive
    operation on September 30, 2004, MDA funded the cost overrun by having
    other groups within MDA perform some tasks that GMD was budgeted to
    complete.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA stated that a formal
    production decision is not anticipated or planned in the GMD acquisition
    approach. It emphasized that it is not feasible to collect data on most
    GMD production processes due to the extremely low quantities of system
    hardware being procured, but statistical data are collected and available
    on those subsystems/parts produced in sufficient volume. It also pointed
    out that ongoing efforts to mature critical technologies and solve
    technical problems are an inherent part of the capability-based
    acquisition/block development approach and that design changes are to be
    expected as the system is evolved through subsequent blocks. Technical
    comments were also provided and incorporated as appropriate.

                         Common Name: GPS Block IIModernization

    GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department of
    Transportation, National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, United Kingdom,
    and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system nominally
    consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation and timing
    data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000, Congress approved
    the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF satellites. In addition to
    satellites, GPS includes a control system and receiver units. We focused
    our review on the Block IIF.

    Source: Navstar GPS Joint Program Office, Space and Missile Systems
    Center.

    Program start (1/99)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (2/00)

      Production decision (6/02) GAO review (1/05) First satellite launch (12/06)
                                Initial capability (NA)

    According to the program office, the Block IIF technologies are mature.
    Since the start of the GPS program in 1973, GPS satellites have been
    modernized in blocks with the newer blocks providing additional
    capabilities and benefits. The GPS II modernization effort required new
    technology for the atomic clocks on the IIF satellites, and this
    technology has been tested in space on IIR satellites. However, the
    contractor was not required to provide data on design drawings and
    statistical process control techniques are not being used to monitor
    production. As a result, design stability and production maturity could
    not be assessed.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (2/00) review
    (6/02) (1/05) (NA)

                                               Desired level of knowledge

    Common Name: GPS Block II Modernization

        GPS Block II Modernization Program

    Technology Maturity

    The only new critical technology on the Block IIF satellites, the
    space-qualified atomic frequency standards, was tested in space on Block
    IIR satellites, and it is considered mature.

    Design Stability

    We could not assess design stability because the Block IIF contract does
    not require that design drawings be delivered to DOD. However, the program
    office assesses design maturity by reviewing contractor development
    testing, participating in technical interchange meetings and periodic
    program reviews, and conducting contractor development process and
    configuration audits.

    Production Maturity

    We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does not
    collect statistical process control data. However, the program office
    reviews earned valuemanagementreports, integrated master schedules, and
    test dates as a means of monitoring the contractors' production efforts.

    Other Program Issues

    The current Block IIF contract calls for the procurement of 12 satellites.
    The Air Force estimated that this number would be sufficient for
    constellation sustainment until the launch of the first GPS III satellite,
    scheduled for 2010. However, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force
    restructured the GPS III launch schedule and delayed the first launch to
    2012. Consequently, four additional satellites will need to be acquired to
    sustain the GPS constellation due to this delay. To build these additional
    satellites, several subsystems would require parts that are no longer
    available and must be newly manufactured. Additional funding has been
    requested for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to pay for the nonrecurring
    engineering required to manufacture these parts for the additional Block
    IIF satellites.

    The GPS Operational Control System consists of monitor stations that
    passively track the navigation signals of all the satellites and a master
    control station that updates the satellites' navigation messages. Certain
    components of the control system have been delayed because funds from this
    development were reallocated to complete the Block IIF development in
    support of constellation sustainment. Specifically, M-Code and Flex Power
    capabilities, part of the control system, will be delayed 3 years, but
    according to the program office, this will not result in underutilization
    of the satellites on orbit.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that the
    GPS constellation first achieved final operational capability of 24
    healthy and operational satellites in July 1995 and since then has
    consistently exceeded this requirement. It also stated that beginning in
    2000, the joint program office initiated a modernization and upgrade
    program to more rapidly introduce new capabilities for the warfighter and
    civil users. It further stated that, as of December 2004, the joint
    program office's current estimate for launch availability of the first
    modernized satellite (IIR-M) will be April 2005 and that the Block IIF
    will continue the modernization program with its first satellite launch
    availability in September 2006.

                                    Common Name: HLR

    The Marine Corps' HLR system will perform the marine expeditionary
    heavy-lift assault transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and personnel
    to support distributed operations deep inland from a sea-based center of
    operations. The HLR program is expected to replace the current CH-53
    helicopter with a new design to improve range and payload, survivability,
    reliability and maintainability, coordination with other assets, and
    overall cost of ownership.

    Source: PMA-261 Program Office.

    Program start (11/03)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (2/05)

    Design review (9/08)

      Low-rate decision (1/13) Initial capability (8/15) Full-rate decision (1/16)
                                Last procurement (2022)

    The critical technologies for the HLR program are not expected to be fully
    mature before the start of development in February 2005. An initial
    readiness assessment for the program identified 10 critical technologies.
    A subsequent assessment reduced that number to 3-the main rotor blades,
    the main rotor viscoelastic lag damper, and the main gearbox. Elements of
    the 7 eliminated technology areas, including the engines, may still
    present challenges to the program. The gearbox and the rotor blades are
    not expected to reach full maturity until 2011 and 2012, respectfully.
    Currently, an aggressive acquisition strategy is being planned.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    GAO Development DOD Production review start design decision (1/05) (2/05)
    review (1/13)

                                         (9/08)

    Common Name: HLR

        HLR Program

    Technology Maturity

    The three critical technologies for the HLR program-the main rotor blades,
    the main rotor viscoelastic lag damper, and the main gearbox-are not
    expected to be fully mature before the start of development in February
    2005. A lag damper similar to that planned for use is currently in
    operation on another program, but it must be resized for use on the HLR
    and therefore will not reach full maturity until the critical design
    review in 2008. The gearbox and the rotor blades represent new technology
    areas that have only been demonstrated in a low fidelity laboratory
    environment and are not expected to reach full maturity until 2011 and
    2012, respectively.

    Other development items may present future challenges to the HLR program.
    While 10 critical technologies were originally identified for the program,
    an assessment conducted in September 2004 reduced those to the 3 above. Of
    the 7 technologies eliminated, 2 are being developed by the HLR program
    and 5 are being developed by or used on other programs and will then have
    to be integrated onto the HLR platform. In either case, this integration
    can represent potential risks to cost and schedule. For example, the
    program is still considering five different engine design options. While
    the Navy has determined that none of the engine designs are expected to
    use new or novel technology or represent a new relevant environment for
    use, each requires different levels of design change, developmental risk,
    and qualification. For two other technologies, less desirable backup
    systems will have to be used if the technologies are not developed as
    planned.

    Other Program Issues

    In September 2003, the Navy evaluated seven existing aircraft platforms
    and determined that only the CH-53E (with substantial enhancements) was
    capable of meeting requirements for performance, inventory, operational
    capability dates, operating and support costs, and survivability. Previous
    assessments concluded that the CH-53 airframe was experiencing substantial
    fatigue due to age and lack of regular upgrades and modifications. Program
    officials told us that this situation is even worse now due to increased
    operational use in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 2003 analysis evaluated four
    alternative CH-53E designs and recommended one of these to meet range and
    payload requirements and minimize effects to service capability dates,
    inventory, support costs, and risk. However, after refining operational
    requirements for the HLR, the Navy selected a different alternative that
    offered additional performance and reliability improvements but added
    additional schedule and technical risk. To address these challenges, the
    Navy expects to implement an aggressive acquisition strategy for the HLR
    program, including sole-source contracting to Sikorsky Aircraft
    Corporation and a single-step acquisition approach. The program also
    intends to manufacture 50 of the 154 total helicopters (32 percent) during
    low-rate initial production and concurrent with initial operational
    testing. This concurrent production may help to field the systems sooner,
    but it could also result in greater retrofit costs if unexpected design
    changes are required.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the HLR
    program was developed to replace the aged CH-53E and support Marine Corps
    Sea Basing and other 21st Century joint operations. It added that the
    program balances operational and programmatic risks and that delays to the
    current HLR planned schedule will result in significant additional
    procurement and operation and support costs to support the CH-53E legacy
    aircraft and Marine Corps Heavy Lift shortfalls. The Navy noted that the
    Office of Naval Research endorsed the HLR program initiation at Milestone
    B and that the approved HLR Technology Readiness Assessment and maturation
    plan include the application of engineering trade and risk reduction prior
    to program initiation at Milestone B. It also noted critical technology
    item maturation events coincide with key system development events such as
    critical design review and prototype production. As the HLR program
    matures, risk reduction will continue to be abetted through sustained
    selection of nondevelopmental technologies, with an emphasis on employment
    of mature technologies common to Marine, Navy, and DOD weapon systems.

                                   Common Name: JASSM

    The JASSM is a joint Air Force and Navy missile system designed to provide
    a new capability to attack surface targets outside of the range of area
    defenses. The JASSM will be delivered by a variety of aircraft including
    the F-16 C/D, the B-52H, the F/A-18E/F, the B-2, and the B-1B. The system
    includes the missile, software, and software interfaces with the host
    aircraft and mission planning system. We assessed all components.

    Source: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)Program Office
    (Development Test Mission - DT-5).

    Program start (6/96)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                        (11/98)

     Low-rate decision (12/01) Initial capability (9/03) Full-rate decision (7/04)
                       GAO review (1/05) Last procurement (2015)

    The JASSM program entered production in December 2001 without ensuring
    that production processes were in control. However, program officials
    indicated that they have demonstrated the production processes by sampling
    statistical data at the subsystem level and that four missiles are
    selected from each production lot and tested for quality. The JASSM
    program used mature technology, and the missile design was stable at the
    design review. Although there were some test failures in the developmental
    and operational tests run from April 2002 to September 2003, program
    officials incorporated fixes that subsequent tests demonstrated to be
    successful. However, in recent follow-on tests, the program continued to
    have test failures, and the Air Force suspended testing until the causes
    of these failures can be determined. Nevertheless, the JASSM was approved
    for full-rate production in July 2004.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (11/98) review
    (12/01) (1/05) (9/01)

                                               Desired level of knowledge

    Common Name: JASSM

        JASSM Program

    Technology Maturity

    The JASSM program identified three critical technologies-global
    positioning system antispoofing receiver module, low observable
    technology, and composite materials-and stated that all three are mature.
    They are new applications of existing technologies.

    Design Stability

    The contractor has released 100 percent of the drawings to manufacturing.
    The program office completed developmental and operational tests and
    entered follow-on test and evaluation. Fourteen developmental flight tests
    were performed, with three tests failing to meet the test objectives.
    Program officials identified the issues involved and incorporated fixes,
    which were successfully tested in later developmental tests. Fifteen
    operational tests were conducted from June 2002 to September 2003.
    According to the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Command, 7 of
    these were successful, 5 were failures, and 3 were "no test." Based on the
    developmental and operational tests, the Command considered the JASSM to
    be capable against the required targets but not reliable. Therefore, it
    rated the missile as effective and potentially suitable and recommended
    approval of full-rate production. Since that time, in follow-on test and
    evaluation, the missile had three successful tests and three failures. The
    Air Force halted further testing and convened a failure review board to
    determine the causes for the test problems. This board was to report its
    findings in October 2004.

    Production Maturity

    Program officials do not collect production process control data at the
    system level. However, they stated that all production processes had been
    demonstrated and that statistical data are collected at the subsystem
    level and are sampled as required. Program officials indicated that the
    contractor has produced at the rates required for the low-rate initial
    production buy of 176 missiles and that it will be able to produce at the
    full-rate production level of 250 missiles per year. Three production lots
    are on contract and deliveries are on schedule. Program officials believe
    that none of the manufacturing processes that affect critical system
    characteristics are a problem, although there are key production processes
    that have cost implications, such as bonding for the low observable
    materials and the painting/coating application. The missile was approved
    for full-rate production in July 2004.

    Other Program Issues

    A contract for development of an extended range version of the missile was
    awarded in February 2004.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that as
    a result of two test failures this summer, the Air Force Program Executive
    Office for Weapons convened a Reliability Enhancement Team on August 16,
    2004, to investigate ways to improve reliability of the JASSM. It further
    stated that the team completed its work in October and concluded the JASSM
    design was sound, concurred with the joint program office return to test
    plan, and recommended award of the next lot's production contract-awarded
    November 2004. Also, the team recommended the Joint Program
    Office/Lockheed Martin pursue a more focused effort on subtier supplier
    manufacturing process quality controls and implement a robust test program
    to improve missile reliability. The Air Force stated that the key
    stakeholders (Air Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress)
    concurred with the team's recommendations and the joint program office's
    way ahead plan and noted that the JASSM team continues to address
    near-term reliability issues identified by the Reliability Enhancement
    Team.

                           Common Name: Joint Common Missile

    The Joint Common Missile is a joint Army/Navy program with Marine Corps
    participation and United Kingdom involvement. It is an air-launched and
    potentially ground-launched missile designed to target tanks; light
    armored vehicles; missile launchers; command, control, and communications
    vehicles; bunkers; and buildings. It is to provide lineof-sight and beyond
    line-of-sight capabilities and can be employed in a fire-and-forget mode
    or a precision attack mode. The missile will replace systems such as
    Hellfire and Maverick.

    Source: Joint Common Missiles Program Office.

    Program start (10/01)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (4/04)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (3/06)

     Low-rate decision (5/08) Intitial capability (9/09) Full-rate decision (10/10)

    The Joint Common Missile entered system development of the air-launched
    version in April 2004, before any of its critical technologies were fully
    mature. At this time, program officials do not know the number of drawings
    that will be released by design review in March 2006. Program officials
    currently project that the critical technologies will reach maturity 3
    months prior to design review, about half way through product development.
    Until all technologies are demonstrated, the potential for design change
    remains. Mature backup technologies are available should the new
    technologies fail to mature; however, use of backup technologies could
    degrade system performance or increase costs. By beginning integration
    before these technologies have been demonstrated, the potential for cost
    growth, schedule delay, or decreased performance exists.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (4/04) (1/05)
    review (5/08) (3/06)

    Common Name: Joint Common Missile

        Joint Common Missile Program

    Technology Maturity

    None of the Joint Common Missile's three critical technologies have
    demonstrated full maturity according to best practices. These technologies
    include a multimode seeker for increased countermeasure resistance,
    boost-sustain propulsion for increased standoff range, and a multipurpose
    warhead for increased lethality. Program officials noted that many of the
    components of these technologies are currently in production on other
    missile systems, but they have not been fully integrated into a single
    missile. Maturing technologies concurrently with product development
    increases the potential for cost growth and schedule delays. According to
    program officials, while backup technologies exist for each of the
    critical technologies, substituting any of them would result in degraded
    performance or increased costs.

    Design Stability

    Currently, about 16 percent of the drawings for the Joint Common Missile
    have been released to manufacturing. Program officials project that
    approximately 41 percent of the drawings will be released by May 2005, the
    end of what they term a risk mitigation phase. However, program officials
    have not projected the number of drawings that will be released by design
    review in March 2006. Officials project full integration of the subsystems
    into the Joint Common Missile will occur by April 2005, although the
    system will reach technology maturity by December 2005, over a year and a
    half after the start of system development.

    Program officials stated that the program's modular design will reduce
    life-cycle costs, including demilitarization, and will enable continuous
    technology insertion to provide improved capability against advancing
    threats.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
    that during the first and second quarters of fiscal year 2004, a
    comprehensive Technology Maturity and Readiness Assessment, along with a
    risk assessment, was performed by subject matter experts from the Aviation
    and Missile Research and Engineering Center and the Army Test and
    Evaluation Command and coordinated with respective offices within the Army
    and the Navy.

    This assessment was reviewed by the Department of the Army, the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Defense Research and
    Engineering and concluded that the Joint Common Missile technology was at
    an appropriate maturity level to support entry into System Design and
    Development. Further, it is anticipated that progress will continue. The
    system technologies combined with control test vehicle firing(s) will
    substantiate maturity according to best practices by April 2005.

                                    Common Name: JSF

    The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy,
    strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S.
    allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier suitable
    version will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The conventional take-off
    and landing version will primarily be an air-to-ground replacement for the
    Air Force's F-16 and A-10 aircraft, and will complement the F/A-22. The
    short take-off and vertical landing version will replace the Marine Corps'
    F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft.

    Source: JSF Program Office.

    Program start (11/96)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                        (10/01)

                       GAO review (1/05) Low-rate decision (1/07)

                                   Initial capability
                                          USMC
                                         (3/12)

                                   Initial capability
                                          USAF
                                         (3/13)

                                   Initial capability
                                          USN
                                         (3/13)

                                Last procurement (2027)

    The JSF entered system development in 2001 with its critical technologies
    immature, and recent assessments indicate that this is still the case.
    Other risks exist as well. For example, the preliminary design review
    revealed a significant weight problem that led to numerous design and
    requirement changes. This resulted in delays of 16-22 months for the
    design reviews and increased costs. The program expects 35 percent of its
    drawing packages to be completed by the design reviews. Also, the program
    expects to produce a significant number of production aircraft with little
    demonstrated knowledge about performance, reliability, software maturity,
    and producibility. In 2004, the program reported a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C.
    2433) unit cost breach largely due to design maturation efforts, schedule
    extensions, and revised labor and overhead rates.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (10/01) (1/05)
    review (1/07) (2/06)

    Common Name: JSF

        JSF Program

    Technology Maturity

    The JSF entered system development without demonstrating the maturity of
    its 8 critical technologies. Data provided by the program office indicate
    that the technology maturity has not significantly changed. In 2004, an
    independent review team examined the program and identified several
    technical challenges related to the critical technologies. For example, it
    found that the highly integrated subsystems still have risk and that major
    challenges remain with the mission systems and software integration. The
    team reported that prognostics and health management technologies needed a
    focused initiative to mature them.

    Design Stability

    When development began, the design was not well defined, leading to
    changes in requirements and design. The preliminary design review held in
    March 2003 revealed significant airframe weight problems-eventually
    exceeding targets by as much as 25 percent-that affected the aircraft's
    ability to meet key performance requirements. Actions to resolve the
    problem have added 18 months and $4.9 billion to the development program.

    Program officials indicated that no drawings have been completed for any
    production representative variant. Critical design reviews are scheduled
    for the 2006 time frame, a 16- to 22-month delay. At the time of the
    design reviews, the program expects to have released about 85 percent of
    the critical structural drawings but only 35 percent of the total
    engineering drawing packages needed to build the aircraft. This relatively
    low level of design knowledge will continue beyond the production decision
    in 2007. At the time of that commitment, the JSF will (1) have done
    limited flight testing on only one nonproduction representative aircraft;
    (2) not have flight-tested an integrated aircraft (with critical mission
    systems and prognostics technologies); (3) have less than 40 percent of
    the software lines of code needed for expected system functionality
    released. By 2013, when development is scheduled to be complete, DOD plans
    to have bought around 500 low-rate production aircraft at an estimated
    cost over $50 billion. This highly concurrent strategy of producing and
    developing aircraft increases the risks of cost growth and delays in
    delivering capability to the warfighter.

    Production Maturity

    The program office is collecting information on the JSF production
    processes. The contractor is currently in the process of identifying the
    key characteristics, critical manufacturing processes and capturing some
    early data. At the time of the production decision, the program will not
    have demonstrated that the aircraft can be produced efficiently or with
    expected reliability. These uncertainties are major contributors for DOD
    plans to rely on cost reimbursable type contracts for the early production
    buys. Fixed price contracts, the norm for production, are not expected
    until the air vehicle has a mature design, has been demonstrated in flight
    tests, and is producible at established cost targets.

    Other Program Issues

    In 2004, the program reported a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) program unit
    cost breach. According to the program office, total program unit costs
    have increased by 19.4 percent largely due to aircraft design maturation
    efforts, schedule extensions, and revised labor and overhead rates.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided the
    following information. A 2001 DOD review concluded the JSF had
    demonstrated sufficient technical maturity for entry into development.
    Design reviews were completed March 2004 on all areas except the airframe.
    By the airframe design review, 85 percent of the critical structural
    drawings will be complete. Subsystem hardware/software integration in the
    lab is ahead of schedule, occurring sooner than legacy fighter programs.
    Significant progress has been made in weight and performance issues. The
    short take-off and vertical landing variant includes over 2,700 pounds of
    weight reductions achieved through design optimization. More weight
    improvements were achieved by modest requirement changes endorsed by the
    warfighters. Requirements for other variants were not changed. Manufacture
    of the first test aircraft is underway, with assembly times less than
    planned. Over 1,500 test hours have been achieved on seven engines. Some
    replan refinements are in work. Program concurrency reflects spiral
    development strategy.

                                Common Name: JSOWUnitary

    The JSOW is a joint Air Force and Navy guided bomb to attack targets from
    outside the range of most enemy air defenses. A dispenser variant (JSOW A)
    carries submunitions to attack soft targets. In 2002, the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council deferred production of an antiarmor JSOW
    variant (JSOW B). The unitary variant (JSOW C) uses a seeker, autonomous
    targeting acquisition software, and a single warhead to attack targets.
    All the variants use a common air vehicle. We assessed the unitary variant
    and the common air vehicle.

    Source: Raytheon Systems Company.

                                  Program/development
                                         start
                                         (4/95)

     Low-rate decision (6/03) Full-rate decision (11/04) GAO review (1/05) Initial
                       capability (1/05) Last procurement (2014)

    The JSOW program began low-rate production in June 2003 without knowing
    whether production processes were in control. However, the contractor has
    since identified seven critical production processes and has five of the
    seven under statistical process control and performing at an acceptable
    quality level. The contractor is working with the remaining two processes
    to collect enough data to verify that the processes are under control.
    Operational evaluation was completed in September 2004, and the beyond
    low-rate production and live fire test reports required to support the
    full-rate production decision were received in December 2004.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (4/95) review
    (6/03) (1/05) (5/02)

    Common Name: JSOW Unitary

        JSOW Unitary Program

    Technology Maturity

    The JSOW Unitary variant's technology is mature. The program office
    identified the imaging infrared seeker with the autonomous acquisition
    software as the only critical technology for the system. The seeker was
    not mature at the start of development, but it did demonstrate maturity in
    October 2001-about three-fourths through development-when it was flown
    aboard an aircraft in a captive flight test. Program officials stated that
    in seven developmental tests, three free-flight tests with the seeker only
    and four combined seeker/warhead tests, the seeker's performance
    substantially exceeded requirements. The seeker has demonstrated greater
    accuracy than required during operational testing.

    Design Stability

    The JSOW unitary variant's basic design is complete. At the system design
    review in May 2002, the program office had completed 99 percent of the
    drawings. The Navy has completed 10 developmental tests (adding one
    combined seeker/warhead test in 2003) in its development program-3 sled
    tests with the warhead, 3 free-flights with the seeker, and 4 combined
    warhead/seeker tests. After some delay in beginning operational tests due
    to problems with the fuze, the Navy completed operational testing in
    September 2004 and reported that the fuze reliability met requirements.

    Production Maturity

    Raytheon and the Navy identified seven critical processes unique to seeker
    development and collected data during low-rate production to determine
    that five of the seven were in control. Raytheon is working to collect
    data sufficient to characterize the remaining two processes. The Navy
    reports that delivery of the seekers is ahead of schedule and that there
    is low risk to meeting the quantity requirements of 17 per month. Raytheon
    has maintained its on-time deliveries for the common air vehicle for more
    than 33 months.

    Other Program Issues

    The JSOW completed operational testing in September 2004. Preliminary
    analysis of the data indicated that the missile, its seeker, and warhead
    met performance requirements. The final report rated the weapon as
    operationally effective but noted some deficiencies in training affecting
    the rating for suitability. According to a program office official, the
    issues have been resolved and the revised assessment rates the weapon as
    operationally effective and suitable. Reports detailing the analysis of
    the testing and the weapon's operational suitability and effectiveness and
    its live fire test results were received in December 2004.

    Agency Comments

    The Navy provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which
    were incorporated where appropriate.

                              Common Name: JTRS Cluster 1

    The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
    interoperate with existing radios and significantly increase
    communications capabilities. A joint service program office is responsible
    for developing the JTRS architecture and waveforms, while service-led
    program offices will develop and procure radio hardware for platforms with
    similar requirements. This is an assessment of Cluster 1, led by the Army,
    which is developing radios for ground vehicles and helicopters.

    Source: PM WIN-T JTRS Cluster 1.

    JTRS program start (9/97)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (6/02)

    Design review (12/03)

    GAO review (1/05) Low-rate decision (4/06) Full-rate decision (6/07) Last
                                 procurement (unknown)

    The JTRS program's demonstrated knowledge continues to be difficult to
    characterize. Program officials believe that the design is stable and
    production processes are in control. However, design and production
    knowledge are dependent on technology maturity. None of the program's 20
    critical technologies are mature, and the number of drawings has nearly
    tripled since last year. The program is proceeding under an accelerated
    strategy that does not allow for testing the radio's full functionality
    before initial low-rate production begins. Requirements changes are being
    considered that could result in design changes. The Army is proposing to
    restructure the program, which may add time to the development schedule.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (6/02) review
    (1/05) (4/06) (12/03)

    Common Name: JTRS Cluster 1

        JTRS Cluster 1 Program

    Technology Maturity

    While the program office has made some progress in maturing critical
    technologies, none of the JTRS Cluster 1 program's 20 critical
    technologies are mature. Many of these critical technologies have been
    used in other radio applications but cannot be assessed as mature because
    they have not been integrated into a complex radio like Cluster 1. Mature
    backup technologies exist for some critical technologies, but program
    officials have cautioned that substituting them would complicate
    integration or result in degraded performance. Program officials pointed
    out several challenges in achieving technological maturity. In particular,
    the program continues to reconcile size, weight, and power requirements.
    Meeting the performance objectives of the Wideband Networking Waveform is
    also a challenge. Program officials expect to demonstrate maturity of all
    20 critical technologies during an early operational assessment scheduled
    to end in April 2005.

    Design Stability

    The program reports achieving design stability for the basic Cluster 1
    radio design. However, while all drawings have been released to
    manufacturing, the total number of drawings has nearly tripled from last
    year's assessment. Program officials primarily attribute the large
    increase to additional drawings required for certain components as the
    design matured and more specificity of the initial component drawings.
    Furthermore, program officials report that the number of drawings is
    likely to change again as a result of the upcoming operational assessment
    and as they move toward production. Given that the critical technologies
    have yet to mature, the significant changes to the number of drawings
    raise concerns about the program's design stability.

    Production Maturity

    The program reports that all production processes to be utilized in
    manufacturing the JTRS radios are mature and in control. However, as the
    program office expected, the number of processes has decreased from last
    year's assessment. According to the program office, the number has
    decreased because of design enhancements. The program office expects the
    number of processes to change again as further design requirements take
    place.

    Other Program Issues

    The program has a software development plan with insufficient schedule
    reserve to incorporate knowledge gained from initial development
    increments. It also has a compressed test and evaluation phase that leaves
    little room for rework. For example, the production decision is scheduled
    to occur immediately upon completion of an early operational assessment
    limited to pre-engineering development models that are not fully
    functional. The program office also reported an increase in procurement
    costs of over $600 million primarily due to an error in estimating
    manufacturing costs. The JTRS Cluster 1 information security certification
    approach is also unprecedented, and the radios must go though a
    certification process that is outside the program office's control. In
    addition, the joint program office is exploring additional requirements
    including the development of additional waveforms that operate at above
    2GHz-that may be tasked to the JTRS Cluster 1 program and may also
    necessitate hardware modifications. Because of emerging requirements and
    other technical challenges, the Army is considering restructuring the
    program, which may add more time to the development schedule.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office generally
    agreed with the information provided in this report. Program officials
    also provided technical comments, which were incorporated where
    appropriate.

                              Common Name: JTRS Cluster 5

    The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
    interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and
    networking capabilities. A joint service program office is developing the
    architecture and waveforms, while service-led program offices are
    developing radio hardware. The Army-led JTRS Cluster 5 is developing
    handheld, manpack, and small embedded radios for applications such as
    ground sensors. Spiral 1 will field a two-channel manpack. Spiral 2 will
    develop and field all versions. We assessed Spiral 2.

    Source: PM WIN-T JTRS Cluster 5.

                                  Program/development
                                         start
                                         (4/04)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

                                   Spiral 2 low-rate
                                        decision
                                         (3/08)

                     Initial operational capability spiral 2 (5/11)

    JTRS Cluster 5 began system development with one of its six critical
    technologies mature for Spiral 2. The program considers the five other
    technologies low risk and anticipates increased levels of maturity, though
    not full maturity, by the production decision in March 2008. We did not
    assess design stability because no production representative drawings had
    been released at the time of our assessment for either Spiral 1 or Spiral
    2. The total number of drawings has also not been identified.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (4/04) (1/05)
    review (3/08) (4/06)

    Common Name: JTRS Cluster 5

        JTRS Cluster 5 Program

    Technology Maturity

    The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical
    technologies-identical for both of the Cluster 5 spirals. Spiral 1 is
    based on technologies that are either commercial-off-the-shelf or
    nondevelopmental items, and is focused on a two-channel manpack with
    narrowband capability operating seven of the designated JTRS waveforms.
    Spiral 2 is to evolve and expand Spiral 1 two-channel manpack capabilities
    as well as fully developing the one- and two-channel handheld and small
    form fit variants meeting the wideband and networking requirements.

    The program office has assessed one of Cluster 5 critical technologies,
    termed environmental protection, as mature for use in Spiral 2. It has
    also assessed two other critical technologies, antenna and power
    management, at a high level of readiness, although not fully mature.
    However, the power management technology may not be as mature as assessed
    given the Cluster 5 requirement to support a JTRS Wideband Networking
    Waveform. This waveform is essential to providing JTRS networking services
    to ensure interoperability over a wide range of frequencies. While it is
    not designated a Cluster 5 critical technology, the JTRS Operational
    Requirements Document designates it as a key performance parameter.
    Operation of this waveform carries with it a large power requirement.
    Because of that power requirement and the technical challenges of meeting
    that requirement in an acceptable size and weight, the Cluster 5 program
    is seeking some relief from the waveform's requirements, and attempting to
    optimize the software code to increase its power efficiency. It is also
    evaluating alternative waveforms such as the Soldier Radio Waveform to
    provide in a power efficient way the needed networked services for radios
    with limited power and antenna size.

    The remaining Cluster 5 critical technologies- antennas, microelectronics,
    multichannel architecture, and security-require additional development.
    According to the program office, however, all four represent a low level
    of risk and are anticipated to reach increased levels of maturity by the
    production decision.

    Additionally, the program continues to address size, weight, and power
    requirements. The Cluster 5 manpack radios to be fielded in Spiral 2 are
    to have a maximum weight of 9 pounds. In comparison, Spiral 1 units weigh
    up to 13 pounds. With the help of the Army's Communications-Electronics
    Research, Development and Engineering Center, the program is pursuing
    power trade-offs and technical solutions to achieve the Spiral 2
    requirement.

    Design Stability

    We did not assess the design stability of JTRS Cluster 5 because the total
    number of drawings is not known and there are currently no releasable
    drawings complete for either spiral.

    Other Program Issues

    An Acquisition Decision Memorandum in May 2004 authorized the movement of
    the single channel handheld radios requirement from Spiral 1 to Spiral 2.
    The memorandum also expressed concern about the immaturity of the Spiral 2
    definition and required the program to update the cost and affordability
    assessment during the second quarter of fiscal year 2006. Furthermore, in
    recognition of the criticality of JTRS, it directed the Cluster 5 program
    to conduct a review in the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 to assess the
    maturity of the plans for Spiral 2. The JTRS Cluster 5 development
    contract was awarded in July 2004. However, immediately thereafter, the
    contractor was issued a stop-work order because of a bid protest. Work was
    stopped until late October 2004, when we denied the protest and work
    resumed. Impact of the stop-work order is still being assessed by the
    Cluster 5 product manager.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office provided
    some technical comments and suggested a number of editorial changes
    including additional clarifying information, which we incorporated as
    appropriate. The program office indicated the critical technologies will
    reach an acceptable level of maturity by the production decision in 2008.

    GAO Comments

    While the program office commented that the critical technologies will
    reach an acceptable level of maturity by the time of the production
    decision, best practices call for attaining a higher level of maturity by
    the start of development.

                                  Common Name: J-UCAS

    The J-UCAS program is a combined effort of the Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force, and the Navy to demonstrate the
    technical feasibility and operational value of a networked system of high
    performance and weaponized unmanned air vehicles. Expected missions
    include the suppression of enemy air defenses, electronic attack,
    precision strike, and surveillance. The program consolidates two formerly
    separate service projects and is to develop larger, more capable, and
    interoperable aircraft.

    Source: (left) X-45C -The Boeing Company, X-47B - Northrop Grumman
    Corporation, (right) X-45C (c) 2004 The Boeing Company, X-47B (c) 2004
    Northrop Grumman Corporation.

    Program start (10/03)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (FY10)

    The J-UCAS program began in October 2003 with technologies that officials
    project will sufficiently mature to support a possible 2010 start of
    operational system development. The program plans to develop and
    demonstrate the next generations of the original Air Force and Navy
    demonstrators that will have common performance objectives and utilize
    common subsystems and technologies. The program expects to conduct an
    early operational assessment starting in fiscal year 2007 and then provide
    the Air Force and the Navy with several program options for follow-on
    efforts. A December 2004 program budget decision would restructure the
    program and reduce funding. At the time of our review, it was not clear
    how these changes will impact the schedule for achieving key product
    knowledge.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    GAO Development DOD Production review start design decision (1/05) (4/10)
    review (TBD)

    (TBD)

                                               Desired level of knowledge
                                                                       Projection

    Common Name: J-UCAS

        J-UCAS Program

    Technology Maturity

    While none of the J-UCAS' six critical technologies are currently mature,
    program officials project that they will be sufficiently ready to support
    the early operational assessment scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2007
    and to provide options to the Air Force and the Navy for follow-on efforts
    starting in fiscal year 2010. Program officials identified the following
    critical technologies needed to produce a high performance and networked
    system of low observable air vehicles capable of operating in highthreat
    environments for extended periods of time: (1) signature reduction; (2)
    advanced tactical targeting; (3) secure robust communications; (4) force
    integration, interoperability, and global information grid compatibility;
    (5) adaptive autonomous operations; and (6) operations in aircraft
    carrier-controlled airspace. These technologies are still maturing as
    would be expected at this early presystem development stage. The targeting
    and autonomous operations technologies are considered the most mature and
    carrier operations technology the least mature.

    Other Program Issues

    The previous service-specific efforts combined in the joint program had
    different primary missions and operating environments. The Air Force began
    developing its system to suppress and attack enemy air defenses, while the
    Navy's primary interest was for a carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle to
    provide persistent armed surveillance for the battle group. The joint
    program is expected to maintain a competitive environment and continue to
    develop next-generation versions of both Air Force and Navy demonstrators.
    Both versions will be expected to be capable of performing all required
    missions of the two services. By merging the Air Force and Navy efforts,
    DOD hopes for synergy and cost savings by developing interoperable and
    networked systems utilizing common operating systems, sensors, and
    weapons.

    The program cost of over $4 billion from startup in fiscal year 2004
    through fiscal year 2009 does not include the approximately $500 million
    spent on the two service-specific projects prior to consolidation. The
    program will compete for funding with current operational systems such as
    the Predator and the Global Hawk and other unmanned and manned systems in
    varying stages of development, some with similar missions. Congress
    reduced J-UCAS funding in fiscal year 2005 because the program had not
    properly coordinated with the two services and directed that the
    technology demonstrators be completed in support of Air Force and Navy
    requirements.

    A December 2004 program budget decision by DOD restructured J-UCAS by
    realigning adjusted resources to the Air Force to establish a joint
    program with Navy representation. It reduced total funding by about $1.1
    billion from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2011.

    Emerging challenges include adaptation for carrier operations and
    development of the common operating system. The projected weight for the
    new models increased from earlier estimates in order to meet range,
    payload, and persistence requirements. The common operating system is
    expected to integrate and provide for interoperability of J-UCAS air
    vehicles and is required to control groups of vehicles flying in a
    coordinated manner and functioning in the absence of human inputs. The
    program director said the common operating system is the most technically
    challenging aspect of the entire J-UCAS program.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, DARPA stated that the J-UCAS
    program, newly established when Congress considered fiscal year 2005
    funding, is run under the guidance of a high-level executive committee and
    jointly manned with DARPA, Air Force, and Navy personnel. The Air Force
    and the Navy have fully coordinated on the demonstration approach using
    the X-45C and X-47B in support of service priorities. According to
    officials, the J-UCAS concept does not compete directly to replace any
    specific manned or unmanned system but will augment a transformed force
    structure and provide options to better address military needs in deep,
    denied adversary environments. DARPA also stated that in addition to the
    capabilities identified by the services today, J-UCAS will offer insights
    into new warfighting concepts. It will also preserve opportunities for
    competition in follow-on and derivative programs. Finally, DARPA noted
    that the common operating system, while technically challenging,
    encompasses essential mission functionality and offers the greatest
    potential return in flexibility and affordability.

                                    Common Name: KEI

    MDA's KEI element is a new missile defense system designed to destroy
    long-range ballistic missiles during the boost phase of flight, the period
    after launch during which the missile's rocket motors are thrusting. KEI
    would also engage missiles in the early ascent-phase, the period
    immediately after booster burnout. Key components include hit-to-kill
    interceptors, launchers, and battle management units. We assessed the
    proposed land-based KEI capability, which is planned to become available
    during 2012-2013 (Block 2012).

    Source: Artwork developed jointly by KEI contractor and MDA.

    Program Prime contractor GAO Design First integrated Block 2012 start
    selection review review flight test completion (10/02) (12/03) (1/05)
    (TBD) (TBD) (12/13)

    All 7 KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of maturity,
    ranging from proofs of concept established through analytical or
    laboratory studies to new applications of existing technologies. For
    example, the program is leveraging existing interceptor technologies-
    infrared seeker, third stage rocket motor, and divert system-that are
    currently used in other MDA programs. The program office rates the
    development of 2 critical technologies as high risk. The first involves
    one of the interceptor's booster motors, which demands high performance
    for KEI engagements. In addition, the program office judges the algorithm
    enabling the kill vehicle to identify the missile's body from the luminous
    exhaust plume as a high-risk technology. MDA expects to mature these
    technologies and integrate them into a land- and sea-based capability
    under the prime contract awarded in December 2003.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    GAO Development DOD Production review start design decision (1/05) (TBD)
    review (TBD)

    (TBD)

                                               Desired level of knowledge

    Common Name: KEI

        KEI Program

    Technology Maturity

    All 7 KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of maturity.
    These technologies are part of the element's interceptor, the weapon
    component of the element consisting of a kill vehicle mounted atop a boost
    vehicle. Of the 7 technologies, 4 pertain to the boost vehicle that
    propels the kill vehicle into space. They are its 2 types of booster
    motors, attitude control system, and thrust vector control system. The
    remaining 3 technologies pertain to the kill vehicle-its infrared seeker,
    divert system, and plume-to-hardbody algorithms. Although all technologies
    are immature, 3 of the 7 are derived from existing components in other
    missile defense programs. The infrared seeker and the third stage rocket
    motor come from the Aegis BMD program, and the divert system comes from
    the GMD program. Backup technologies exist for all but the infrared
    seeker, however, they are at the same low level of maturity as the
    critical technologies.

    The program office noted that KEI critical technologies are not at a low
    level of maturity in and of themselves. The program's assessment-which
    rated each technology as relatively immature-was made from a systems
    perspective (i.e., it characterized the risk associated with integrating
    and demonstrating these technologies in the KEI environment). The 7
    critical interceptor technologies will be assessed as mature if the
    program successfully completes its first intercept attempt of a boosting
    missile. This flight test is expected to be conducted sometime after 2010.

    Design Stability

    At this time, the KEI program office does not have an estimate for the
    total number of drawings for any of its Block 2012 components
    (interceptor, launcher, and battle management unit). In addition to the
    number of drawings, the program plans to use other metrics to assess
    design maturity. Those metrics will include design, manufacturing,
    producibility, and quality measures for hardware and measures of maturity
    of the system's software.

    Other Program Issues

    In fiscal year 2004, the KEI program underwent a program replan to
    compensate for anticipated fiscal year 2005 funding cuts and the addition
    of new requirements (e.g., nuclear hardening) imposed by MDA. The original
    program called for a Block 2010 land-based capability to be available by
    the end of 2011. In the replan, the land-based capability was combined
    with the sea-based capability of Block 2012, both of which utilize the
    same interceptor. The KEI program is undergoing further restructuring.
    Based on comments received from the program office (see below),
    anticipated funding cuts beyond fiscal year 2005 are delaying the
    sea-based capability into Block 2014 (2014-2015 time frame) and deferring
    other activities indefinitely.

    Because completion of the land-based capability continues to be pushed
    further in the future, the program's funding profile has changed. Under
    the plan to demonstrate an initial capability in the Block 2012 time
    frame, near-term funding through fiscal year 2009 was reduced by about 10
    percent, with the balance shifted into later years. The latest
    restructuring noted by the program office further reduced funding by over
    50 percent.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office provided
    information on the latest restructure of the KEI program. In short,
    program funding through fiscal year 2009 was reduced from $7.8 billion (as
    listed) to $3.6 billion and, accordingly, program activities such as
    development of the sea-based capability were delayed into future blocks.

    In addition, the program office indicated that "mission assurance" is the
    program's number one priority. In other words, the program's approach to
    element development is knowledge-driven, which places an emphasis on
    upfront systems engineering and analysis and other risk reduction
    activities.

                               Common Name: Land Warrior

    The Army's Land Warrior system is a modular, integrated, soldier-worn
    system of systems intended to enhance the lethality, situational
    awareness, and survivability of dismounted combat and support soldiers.
    Land Warrior comprises a computer-radio, integrated helmet assembly,
    weapon, software subsystem, and protective clothing. The Army terminated
    Block I (Land Warrior-Initial Capability) in 2003 due to low reliability
    in developmental testing and proceeded to Block II (Land Warrior-Stryker
    Interoperable). We assessed Block II.

    Source: Program Executive Office Soldier.

                                  Program/development
                                         start
                                         (8/94)

    Design review (11/04)

     GAO review (1/05) Low-rate decision (6/06) Full-rate decision (11/07) Initial
                       capability (6/08) Last procurement (2019)

    Land Warrior entered system development in 1994 and today, two of the
    system's four critical technologies are mature. The program expects one of
    the remaining two-the personal area network-to be mature before the June
    2006 low-rate production decision. The other technology-radio
    communications-is a risk area for the program because JTRS Cluster 5
    embedded radios will not be available when needed. We could not assess the
    design stability of Land Warrior because the program was unable to supply
    complete design data. The program reported significant cost growth in
    2003, due to an increase in the Army's planned procurement of Land Warrior
    systems and to increased Block II software and integration costs. The Army
    recently restructured the program, putting Block II on indefinite hold as
    the program focuses on fielding elements of the Land Warrior system to the
    current force.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (8/94) review
    (1/05) (TBD) (11/04)

    Common Name: Land Warrior

        Land Warrior Program

    Technology Maturity

    Two of the Land Warrior system's four critical technologies (the
    helmet-mounted display and power) are mature. Officials told us that
    despite concerns about the ability of industry to produce the
    helmet-mounted display in the quantities needed, the technology involved
    in the unit (which provides data and video) has been demonstrated and is
    mature. The commercial battery technology that will power Land Warrior is
    also mature, though overall power management remains a challenge due to
    irregularities in components' power consumption.

    The other two critical technologies, the personal area network and radio
    communications, are not mature. The personal area network includes the
    connectors, cables, and interfaces that will link components of the
    soldier-worn ensemble to one another. Although such connections have in
    the past proven difficult, officials expect this technology to reach
    maturity before the June 2006 low-rate production decision. Land Warrior
    will eventually utilize the JTRS Cluster 5 embedded radio (assessed
    elsewhere in this report) when it becomes available in fiscal year 2011.
    Technology for this radio is not mature. In the interim, the Land Warrior
    program intends to use the Raytheon MicroLight Enhanced Position Location
    Reporting System (EPLRS), a single-channel, commercial-off-the-shelf
    radio. Program officials characterize the MicroLight as a cost-effective,
    short-term solution. Technology for the MicroLight could not be assessed
    as fully mature because it has not yet been integrated into the Land
    Warrior ensemble. Program officials said the MicroLight is smaller than
    other EPLRS radios in use today.

    Design Stability

    We could not assess the design stability of the Land Warrior system
    because the program was unable to supply complete data on design drawings.
    The program cited changes resulting from an impending merger with the
    Army's Future Force Warrior technology integration effort as the
    complicating factor.

    Production Maturity

    We could not assess the maturity of production processes for Land Warrior
    because the program is not collecting statistical process control data at
    this time. Officials told us General Dynamics has not fully identified the
    key manufacturing processes, but that the company will measure production
    maturity in the future.

    Other Program Issues

    The Land Warrior program has experienced significant challenges and delays
    in its 10-year history. The program restructured after contractor
    prototypes failed basic certification tests in 1998. Government testing in
    2002 and 2003 revealed technical and reliability problems with Block I.
    The program manager terminated Block I shortly thereafter, and focused on
    developing Block II.

    The Army recently restructured the program again, in response to
    congressional direction to immediately field some Land Warrior
    capabilities to the current force. The restructured program will produce
    capabilities in five spirals and has placed Block II on indefinite hold as
    it moves to field the Commander's Digital Assistant and the MicroLight
    EPLRS radio in "Spiral 0." The Army received a partial waiver in December
    2004 to purchase a limited number of MicroLight radios, but radio
    communications will remain a risk area for the program until this issue is
    fully resolved. Officials said Spiral 0 is now the program's most pressing
    concern, and that the schedule for future spirals is being determined at
    this time. In addition, the program is planning to merge its efforts with
    the Army's Future Force Warrior technology integration effort, as directed
    in the Conference Report accompanying the Department of Defense
    Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Congress also reduced the
    program's fiscal year 2005 budget by $15 million due to anticipated
    efficiencies resulting from this merger.

    The program reported significant cost growth in 2003, due mainly to an
    increase of more than 40,000 units in the Army's planned procurement of
    Block II Land Warrior systems to equip a broader range of soldiers than
    previously envisaged. Development costs also increased nearly 30 percent
    due to software development and vehicle integration requirements for Block
    II.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army generally concurred
    with our assessment and provided technical comments, which we incorporated
    as appropriate.

                                    Common Name: LCS

    The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship is to be a fast, maneuverable, shallow
    draft, surface combatant optimized for littoral warfare. LCS will employ
    innovative hull designs and reconfigurable mission packages to counter
    antiaccess threats in three mission areas: mine, antisubmarine, and
    surface warfare. This review focuses on the technology maturity of the
    mission packages associated with the acquisition of the first group of
    ships. Since competition for the remainder of the ships continues, we
    assessed only the mission modules.

    Source: Littoral Combat Ship Program Office.

    Program start (9/02)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (6/04)

    Production decision-1st design (12/04) GAO review (1/05) Production decision-2nd
                       design (10/05) Initial capability (10/07)

    The program office identified 42 critical technologies. In June 2004, the
    LCS program entered system development with 14 of these 42 technologies
    mature. Five of the remaining 28 technologies are close to being mature.
    However, none of the 28 technologies were projected to demonstrate full
    maturity until after design review in November 2004. The acquisition
    schedule for LCS calls for deploying several critical technologies as
    prototypes or engineering development models for the first group of ships.
    The technologies that have not reached maturity affect all three of the
    littoral warfare missions: mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and
    surface warfare. The program office designated certain information
    competition sensitive. As a result, we have depicted only the level of
    knowledge for the LCS mission packages. The Navy has stated that the total
    program level of knowledge is higher.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (6/04) review
    (NA) (1/05) (11/04)

    Common Name: LCS

        LCS Program

    Technology Maturity

    Nine of the technologies under development for LCS are used in multiple
    applications or mission packages. Since these technologies are used on
    different platforms or in different environments, the program office chose
    to assess each use as a separate technology. This resulted in a total of
    42 critical technologies, 14 of which are currently mature.

    The first set of the mine warfare mission package will align with the
    delivery of the first ship in January 2007. As part of this mission, the
    MH-60S helicopter is to carry subsystems for either the detection or
    neutralization of mines. MH-60S and its technologies for mine detection
    are currently expected to complete testing in fiscal year 2005, after
    first ship design review for LCS. Its mine neutralization technologies
    will complete testing in fiscal year 2007, after delivery of the first
    ship.

    The Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is an unmanned helicopter,
    and will employ the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System
    for detection of mines on the beach. By delivery to LCS in 2006, the
    platform will be an engineering development model and its payload will
    still be in testing. The Unmanned Surface Vehicle will be used for all
    three littoral warfare missions. For mine warfare, it is expected to
    deploy a mine neutralization system, but neither the vehicle nor its
    payload will be fully mature by the design review.

    The first spirals for antisubmarine and surface warfare packages will
    align with delivery of the second ship in fiscal year 2008. MH-60R will be
    used for both these missions. The helicopter and its subsystems are fully
    mature in the antisubmarine warfare configuration and mostly immature in
    the surface warfare configuration. It will complete testing for both
    missions in September 2005.

    The Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is a communications relay
    station for other platforms performing antisubmarine warfare. For surface
    warfare, it may use the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System and an
    Electro-Optical Infrared system. Currently, none of the technologies are
    fully mature and most will remain in testing by the second ship's design
    review in August 2005. In its antisubmarine warfare configuration, the
    Remote Minehunting Vehicle will use subsystems that are currently immature
    and will be delivered to LCS as engineering development models. As an
    antisubmarine warfare platform, the Unmanned Surface Vehicle will carry
    detection systems that are not yet mature. For surface warfare operations,
    the program will use a gun system and a missile system. A nonlethal weapon
    system is also being considered. This vehicle and its technologies are
    currently immature in all of its mission configurations.

    A missile and a gun system for surface warfare will also be on the ship
    itself, but currently neither of these technologies is fully mature.

    Design Stability

    We did not assess design stability due to the competition sensitive nature
    of the ship's designs.

    Other Program Issues

    While the MH-60R and MH-60S complete testing in fiscal years 2005 and
    2007, respectively, they will be unavailable for deployment with LCS until
    fiscal year 2009.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
    primary objectives of LCS Flight 0 (the first group of LCS ships) are the
    harvesting of mission systems to deliver immediate warfighting capability
    in critical gaps and the design and validation of the modular open system
    architecture. It also stated that the key to attaining these objectives is
    the creation of a common interface that enables the independent
    development of sea frames and mission packages and that the use of this
    interface is critical for the development and evaluation of sea frames and
    mission packages to ensure effective interoperability. The result is a
    total system design that is highly adaptable to changes over the life of
    the program, but isolates impact to production schedules. The mission
    package technology risks described in this report are well understood,
    subject to rigorous risk management including appropriate backup
    technologies, and generally independent from the successful achievement of
    LCS Flight 0 key performance parameters.

                                   Common Name: MEADS

    The Army's MEADS is developing a mobile air defense system to protect
    deployed maneuver forces and critical assets against short-and
    medium-range theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
    air-breathing threats. In 2004, the Army combined management, development,
    and fielding of the Patriot air defense missile system and MEADS. Although
    the Army combined the programs, MEADS remains an international development
    effort among the United States, Germany, and Italy. We assessed the MEADS
    fire unit portion of the combined program.

    Source: MEADS NPO, Lower Tier Project Office.

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (7/04)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (9/09)

                                   Initial production
                                        decision
                                        (11/12)

                                    Last production
                                        decision
                                         (3/17)

                               Initial capability (9/17)

    MEADS began development start in July 2004 with two mature critical
    technologies, three critical technologies nearing maturity, and one
    immature critical technology. Program plans call for a system design
    review in 2009, but program estimates currently project that only one of
    the six technologies will be more mature at that time than at development
    start. The program office anticipates that all critical technologies will
    be fully mature by the start of production in the first quarter of fiscal
    year 2013.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (7/04) (1/05)
    review (11/12) (9/09)

    Common Name: MEADS

        MEADS Program

    Technology Maturity

    Only two of the six critical technologies-launcher electronics and PAC-3
    missile integration-were mature at development start in July 2004. Three
    other critical technologies-low noise exciter that manages the radars'
    frequencies, cooling system for the radars, and slip ring that carries
    power and coolants to the radars-were nearing maturity. The remaining
    critical technology-the transmit/receive module that transmits/receives
    signals for the fire control radar-was immature.

    The program office noted that four of the six critical technologies have
    been demonstrated or employed. According to the office, the MEADS launcher
    will employ electronics already being developed for the Theater
    High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and Patriot launcher, and these "common
    launch electronics" completed design review in May 2003. Likewise, the
    integration of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile into MEADS will
    be similar to integrating the missile into the existing Patriot system.
    Furthermore, the office indicated that a prototype of the low noise
    exciter met some 90 percent of its performance specifications during the
    MEADS risk reduction phase that ended in 2004. The office stated that this
    prototype provided the information on exciter design necessary to take
    corrective actions in the MEADS development phase. In addition, the office
    stated that the technology used in the transmit/receive module has been
    employed in THAAD and demonstrated that MEADS performance requirements
    could be met. However, the U.S.-developed technology as demonstrated on
    THAAD is not releasable to the MEADS European partners. The partners are
    developing their own transmit/receive module for MEADS, but the design has
    achieved only about 75-80 percent of the performance needed.

    The program office projects that the transmit/receive module will increase
    in maturity by the time of the system design review planned for 2009. The
    program office expects that the five other critical technologies will be
    at the same maturity levels as they were at development start. The office
    expects all critical technologies to be fully mature by the start of
    production in late 2012. There are no backup technologies for any of the
    MEADS critical technologies, with the exception of the transmit/receive
    module.

    Design Stability

    We could not assess the design stability of MEADS because the number of
    releasable drawings and total drawings expected was not available. The
    program office expects to know the total number of releasable drawings at
    the design review in 2009.

    Other Program Issues

    The program has adopted an incremental acquisition approach. There are
    three increments, with the first beginning in 2008, another in 2010, and
    the final in 2013. The program office plans for each increment to
    introduce new or upgraded capability into the program. The Army expects
    MEADS to achieve initial operational capability in 2017 with four units.

    The contract award for the United States, Italy, and Germany to proceed
    into design and development together has been delayed by about 9 months.
    The Army originally expected the contract award to occur in June/July
    2004, but the award did not occur. In September 2004, the United States
    and Italy signed a memorandum of understanding to proceed to design and
    development, and a letter contract was awarded to initiate that phase. The
    contract has a 6-month period of performance, which coincides with the
    March 2005 date when the Army expects Germany to sign the memorandum.

    Agency Comments

    The Army generally concurred with this assessment. It indicated that we
    addressed critical technologies that were already areas of intense
    management focus. Additionally, it stated that the transmit/receive
    module's maturity assessment changed due to international memorandum of
    understanding negotiations and U.S. National Disclosure Policy that
    changed the source of the modules. The Army also noted that it still
    expects all technologies to be fully mature by production and further
    stated that there are risk mitigation plans for the maturing technologies
    as well as alternate backup technologies now identified for the
    transmit/receive module. Additionally, the Army stated that, at the design
    review in 2009, the design work in the critical technologies will be at
    the maturity level required to fabricate system prototypes and thus
    demonstrate system capabilities.

    GAO Comments

    The MEADS Program Office clarified that the transmit/receive module's
    maturity had decreased and we revised our assessment accordingly.

                                    Common Name: MMA

    The Navy's MMA is one element of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
    (BAMS) family of systems, along with the BAMS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
    (UAV) and Aerial Common Sensor programs. The MMA is manned, and it will
    sustain and improve armed maritime and littoral intelligence surveillance
    and reconnaissance capabilities of the U.S. Navy. The primary roles of the
    MMA are persistent antisubmarine and antisurface warfare. It is the
    replacement for the P-3C Orion. DOD is discussing international partner
    participation in the program.

    Source: Boeing - Integrated Defense Systems, (c) 2004 The Boeing Company.

    Program start (3/00)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (5/04)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (7/07)

      Low-rate decision (5/10) Full-rate decision (4/13) Initial capability (7/13)
                                Last procurement (2017)

    The MMA program entered development with none of its four critical
    technologies mature. According to the program office, these technologies
    will be demonstrated in a relevant environment by design review and tested
    in an operational environment by the production decision. The system's
    technology maturity will be demonstrated at least 3 years later than
    recommended by best practice standards. However, the program has
    identified mature backup technologies.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (5/04) (1/05)
    review (5/10) (7/07)

    Common Name: MMA

        MMA Program

    Technology Maturity

    None of the 4 critical technologies-integrated rotary sonobuoy launcher,
    electronic support measures digital receiver, data fusion, and acoustic
    algorithms-are mature. These technologies have not moved beyond the
    laboratory environment. For three of the technologies, the components have
    not been integrated into a prototype system. The program expects the four
    technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant environment by design review
    in July 2007 and tested in an operational environment by the production
    decision in May 2010. The system's technology maturity will be
    demonstrated at least 3 years later than recommended by best practice
    standards.

    The program office and the contractor developed maturation plans and
    identified mature backup technologies for each of the critical
    technologies. According to program officials, the MMA would lose some
    capabilities but still meet its minimum system requirements if it used
    these backups. For example, one of the biggest technology challenges for
    the MMA identified by program officials is the electronic support measures
    digital receiver. This technology exists as a prototype and has been
    demonstrated in a high fidelity laboratory environment. The program is
    leveraging the digital receivers currently in development on the EA-18G
    program. If the EA-18G digital receiver program is unsuccessful, the
    program will have to use legacy analog off-the-shelf receivers, which
    would prevent them from gaining an increased sensitivity for certain
    signals.

    The four technologies we assessed were identified in the MMA's technology
    readiness assessment. The program evaluated six other technologies but
    decided they were not critical because they had already been demonstrated
    in a relevant or operational environment.

    Design Stability

    We did not assess design stability as the number of releasable drawings is
    not yet available.

    Other Program Issues

    In addition to its primary roles of antisubmarine warfare and antisurface
    warfare, the MMA shares the persistent intelligence surveillance and
    reconnaissance (ISR) role with the BAMS UAV. The BAMS UAV program will not
    start development until fiscal year 2005, and if it does not develop as
    expected, the MMA program is the fall back to perform its mission.
    According to program officials, in order to fulfill this mission, the Navy
    would have to procure 14 additional aircraft by 2018, increasing the
    overall cost of the program. If the MMA fails to develop as expected or
    experiences schedule slippage, the Navy will have to rely on its aging
    P-3C Orion fleet, which, according to DOD, is plagued by serious airframe
    life issues, poor mission availability rates, high ownership costs, and
    limited system growth capacity.

    The MMA program is discussing international participation with Australia,
    Canada, and Italy for the development phase of the program. This
    participation could include both the MMA and BAMS UAV programs. DOD
    expects to benefit from improved interoperability, strengthened allies,
    and lower production costs due to increased sales. Program officials
    stated that they are incorporating lessons learned from the Joint Strike
    Fighter international program, particularly in managing partner
    expectations regarding technology transfer.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy generally concurred
    with our characterization of the MMA program. It stated that the four
    critical technologies are tracking along their current maturation plans
    and that it is confident that by design readiness review, these
    technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant environment. It noted that
    these four technologies are being matured through the MMA risk management
    process.

    With regard to the BAMS mission, the Navy stated that an analysis of
    alternatives conducted in May 2002 concluded that 14 additional aircraft
    would have to be in place by 2018 to replace the Legacy P-3 ISR
    requirements that were allocated to the BAMS UAV. It further stated that
    since that time, a BAMS UAV Operational Requirements Document has been
    approved that identified additional UAV specific missions and requirements
    that were not considered in the May 2002 analysis of alternatives. It
    noted that there is no current completed analysis that encompasses how
    many aircraft, based on new approved BAMS UAV operational requirements
    document, would be required if the BAMS UAV does not develop as expected.

                                   Common Name: MUOS

    The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to provide
    low data rate voice and data communications capable of penetrating most
    weather, foliage, and manmade structures. It is designed to replace the
    Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On satellite system currently in
    operation and provide support to worldwide, multiservice, mobile, and
    fixed-site terminal users. MUOS consists of a network of advanced UHF
    satellites and multiple ground segments. We assessed both the space and
    ground segments.

    Source: Artist rendering of MUOS satellite, Lockheed Martin.

    Program start (9/02)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (9/04)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (4/07)

      Production decision (10/07) Initial capability (3/10) Full capability (3/14)

    In September 2004 the MUOS program was authorized to begin development.
    The program currently has eight of nine critical technologies mature. The
    remaining technology is projected to be mature by April 2007 in time for
    the critical design review. The program intends to order long lead items
    for the first two satellites before achieving a stable design. This early
    procurement could lead to rework causing cost increases and schedule
    delays if relevant designs change prior to critical design review. In
    addition, the MUOS development schedule remains compressed, posing several
    risks to the program.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO Design Production start review review decision (9/04)
    (1/05) (4/07) (10/07)

    Common Name: MUOS

        MUOS Program

    Technology Maturity

    Eight of nine critical technologies were mature at the development start
    decision in September 2004. The remaining technology, a new cryptographic
    chip, is expected to be mature by the time the program reaches its
    critical design review in April 2007. A mature backup technology exists
    for this chip in the event that it fails to mature in time. However, the
    use of the backup technology would increase the vulnerability to attacks
    on the transmissions of signals that are used to ensure the satellites
    remain properly placed in their orbits around the earth.

    Design Stability and Production Maturity

    The MUOS program intends to procure long lead items for the first two
    satellites before achieving a stable design. The September 2004
    development start decision authorized the program to procure long lead
    items for these satellites. According to the program office, ordering of
    long lead items is to begin in 2005 after segment-level preliminary design
    reviews, but well before critical design review in April 2007. This early
    procurement could lead to rework if relevant designs change prior to
    critical design review, causing program cost increases and schedule
    delays. According to the program office, long lead procurement is
    necessary to preserve the program schedule and delaying such procurement
    until after critical design review would cause the program schedule to
    slip. It also noted that the dollar amount of long lead procurement prior
    to critical design review is not large, at $65.9 million.

    In addition, the program office has yet to determine the total number of
    design drawings needed to build the satellites. According to the program
    office, the development contract requires completion of 90 percent of
    design drawings as a condition of conducting critical design review.

    Other Program Issues

    DOD delayed the first MUOS satellite launch as well as its initial
    operational capability by 1 year to fiscal year 2010. Despite the delays,
    the MUOS schedule remains compressed and poses several risks to the
    program. For example, initial operational capability is to be declared
    before on-orbit operational testing is to occur. Usually, the results of
    such testing are used to support decisions for declaring operational
    capability and identifying problems that may necessitate design changes.
    Furthermore, the time period between the critical design review and the
    first satellite launch is shorter for the MUOS program, at about 2.7
    years, than that of the previous UHF Follow-On program, at about 3 years.
    This schedule comparison is important given the significant leap in
    increased capability that MUOS is expected to provide. While the UHF
    Follow-On program increased communications capability by up to a factor of
    3, the MUOS program is expected to increase communications capability by a
    factor of

    20. The program office, however, considers the development of the
    satellite to be low risk. In addition, program officials stated that the
    initial operational capability was changed to mean initial MUOS on-orbit
    capability, and initial operational capability would be declared after
    on-orbit operational testing takes place.

    In addition, an independent program assessment states that the program is
    schedule-driven primarily because of the software development effort.
    According to the program office, software development for the MUOS ground
    segment represents one of the highest risks to the program due to the size
    and complexity of the contractor's design. The program office stated that
    the ground software segment is to be developed incrementally to mitigate
    schedule risk.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided technical
    comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.

                                Common Name: Predator B

    The Air Force's MQ-9 Predator B is a multirole, medium-to-high altitude
    endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at higher
    speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor the MQ-1 Predator A. The
    Predator B is designed to provide a ground attack capability and will
    employ fused multispectral sensors to find and track small ground mobile
    or fixed targets. As envisioned, each Predator B system will consist of
    four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite communication
    suite. We assessed only the air vehicle.

    Source: General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems, Incorporated.

    Program start (1/02)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (2/04)

                                   GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (4/06)

     Full-rate decision (12/07) Initial capability (12/09) Last procurement (2014)

    The Predator B entered system development in February 2004 with three of
    its four critical technologies mature. The fourth, needed for weapons
    launch, has not matured as expected. The Air Force expects this technology
    to be ready in August 2005-a slip of 13 months. No backup technology is
    available. If this technology fails to mature, it will prevent the
    Predator B from performing its primary mission to destroy enemy targets.
    The program recently changed to incrementally develop versions of the
    Predator B. The Air Force believes most drawings for increment one will be
    complete by the 2006 critical design review. The program has also
    concurrently started to produce Predator B aircraft, and operational
    testing is not scheduled to be complete until 2007 when one-third of them
    will be on contract. Concurrency increases the risk of redesign and need
    to retrofit already acquired system.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (2/04) (1/05)
    review (12/07) (4/06)

    Common Name: Predator B

        Predator B Program

    Technology Maturity

    Three of the Predator B's four critical technologies, the synthetic
    aperture radar, the multispectral targeting system, and the air vehicle,
    are fully mature. The avionics subsystem technology designed to integrate
    and store data necessary to launch munitions is still being evaluated in a
    laboratory environment. It is expected to be ready by August 2005, a
    13-month schedule slip. No backup technology is available. If this
    critical technology fails to mature, it will prevent the Predator B from
    performing its primary mission to destroy enemy targets. The Air Force
    plans to retrofit these and other air vehicles that are under production
    once this capability has been fully demonstrated.

    Design Stability

    Subsequent to Milestone B approval in February 2004, the program office
    was directed by Headquarters Air Force to develop Predator B in three
    increments. DOD is in the process of defining the increments. The program
    office expects 94 percent of the expected increment one drawings to be
    completed by the April 2006 critical design review, which has been delayed
    about 7 months since our last report. Program officials acknowledge that
    additional drawings will be needed for subsequent increments. Design
    changes and modification of drawings are likely to occur late in
    development, increasing the need to retrofit already acquired systems.

    Production Maturity

    Program officials said the contractor does not plan to use statistical
    process controls to ensure product quality. Instead, they plan to use
    other quality control measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to track
    product quality. Also, initial operational testing of increment one, which
    is to demonstrate a product is ready for production, is not scheduled to
    be complete until September 2007. Testing for remaining increments has not
    been determined.

    Other Program Issues

    In February 2004, Headquarters Air Force directed the program office to
    quickly field an interim combat capability to the warfighter by fiscal
    year 2006. This delayed the start of the system development and
    demonstration phase by 9 months to November 2004. However, the Air Force
    is already concurrently on contract to produce 15 Predator Bs. The
    decision to make Predator B an incremental development program has also
    extended the completion of development by nearly 4 years. An incremental
    approach is the preferred approach to weapon acquisitions. However, the
    Air Force does not plan to have formal decisions approving entry into
    development for subsequent increments as required by DOD acquisition
    policy. To reduce the risks of concurrently developing and producing
    Predator Bs, the program office lowered annual buy quantities and extended
    production 5 years. The estimated program completion date is now 2014.

    The Air Force is still evaluating a variety of lightweight munitions for
    use on the Predator B. The Air Force is also weighing the possibility of
    adding new system capabilities such as launching very small or micro
    unmanned aerial vehicles from the Predator B and equipping it with
    air-to-air missiles.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force disagreed with
    our evaluation of the Predator B development risks. It stated that the
    stores management system technology is mature and that the system is being
    tested. It also noted that the existing weapons release system provides a
    backup capability. It also disagreed with our assessment that the Predator
    B development had been extended by 4 years. It stated that, as planned,
    the initial operational capability will follow the completion of the first
    increment in December 2009. Future increments are to be determined. Before
    starting future increments, the Air Force stated that proper approval will
    be obtained from the milestone decision authority. Also, its acquisition
    plan has phased production rates to the development effort, and the
    increased concurrent production before operational testing has been driven
    by congressional actions.

    GAO Comments

    The program planned to deliver the full capability Predator B in 2006, but
    due to acquisition approach changes the full capability Predator B is now
    scheduled for delivery in 2010-a 4 year extension.

                                  Common Name: NPOESS

    NPOESS is a triagency National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
    (NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
    satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the year
    2020. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single
    national system. The program consists of five segments: space; command,
    control, and communications; interface data processing; launch; and field
    terminal software. We assessed all segments.

                       Source: NPOESS Integrated Program Office.

    Program start (3/97)

     Development start/ production decision (8/02) GAO review (1/05) 1st satelilite
                        launch (11/09) Initial capability (9/11)

    In August 2002, the NPOESS program committed to the development of
    satellites with operational capability without having demonstrated
    technology maturity or design stability. Only 1 of its 14 critical
    technologies is mature. The program expects that all but 4 of these will
    be mature by the design review in April 2006. The program has released
    about half of its design drawings and expects to complete about 94 percent
    by design review. It is not collecting statistical process control data to
    assess production maturity because of the small number of units being
    produced. At present, the program office considers the three critical
    sensors to be key program risks because of technical challenges. Due to a
    recent program restructuring, the program office estimates that the cost
    of the program will increase to $8.1 billion.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

                                              Development  DOD    Development GAO
                                                 start    design start/production
                                                                           review
                                                 (NA)     review  decision (1/05)
                                                           (NA)       (8/02)

    Common Name: NPOESS

        NPOESS Program

    Technology Maturity

    Only 1 of the program's 14 critical technologies were (and currently are)
    mature at the production decision in August 2002. This is less than
    reported last year due to the program office's more accurate application
    of the technology standards. The program projects that all but 4 of the
    technologies will be mature by the design review in 2006.

    The program undertook the NPOESS Preparatory Project, a demonstration
    satellite, to reduce risk and provide a bridging mission for NASA's Earth
    Observing System. This satellite, scheduled for launch in 2006, is planned
    to demonstrate three critical sensors in an operational environment. This
    will provide data processing centers with an early opportunity to work
    with sensors, ground controls, and data processing systems and allow for
    incorporating lessons learned into the satellites. The three critical
    sensors are experiencing continued technical problems and schedule delays.
    The program office considers these sensors as top program risks.

    Design Stability

    In August 2002, the program committed to the development of two satellites
    with operational capability before achieving design stability or
    production maturity. Program officials indicated that about 50 percent of
    the design drawings were released to manufacturing and expects to release
    about 94 percent by the design review in 2006.

    Production Maturity

    We could not assess production maturity because, according to the program
    office, it does not collect statistical process control data due to the
    small number of units to be built. However, the ground segment contractor
    uses various metrics such as schedule and cost performance indices, rework
    percentages, and defect containment to ensure production is proceeding as
    planned. According to the program office, monthly reviews of these metrics
    reveal acceptable results.

    Other Program Issues

    In 2002, DOD extended the launch date of one of its legacy meteorological
    satellites to 2010, delaying the need for NPOESS. DOD and NOAA thus
    reduced their NPOESS funding by about $144 million through fiscal year
    2007 and the program delayed the launch of the first satellite 7 months,
    to November 2009.

    The recent funding reductions prompted a restructuring of the NPOESS
    program. The program office estimates that the cost will increase to $8.1
    billion. This increase reflects changes to the contract and increased
    program management costs. The program office reports that the increases
    include costs associated with extending the development schedule,
    increased sensor costs, and additional funds needed for mitigating risks.

    The program office is planning to present a new cost estimate to its
    executive oversight committee in January 2005 to ensure the program is
    adequately funded. Other factors could further affect the revised cost and
    schedule estimates. Specifically, the contractor is not meeting expected
    cost and schedule targets of the new baseline because of technical issues
    in the development of key sensors.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the program office stated that it
    lowered its technologies' maturity levels in September 2004 at our
    request. Program officials also commented that since the government can no
    longer afford full-up research and development satellites, few instruments
    can attain technology maturity and systems cannot achieve design stability
    or production maturity prior to entering full-scale development. The
    program office stated that it spent 5 years in the Preliminary Design and
    Risk Reduction phase driving down sensor and system risk, thereby
    significantly increasing the technology and sensor design maturity before
    entering the Acquisition and Operations phase in August 2002. It also
    noted that the current instrument problems highlighted above result from
    design/manufacturing process issues, which are not related to the listed
    critical technologies.

    GAO Comments

    The NPOESS program's technology maturity levels were lowered because the
    program office more accurately applied the technology standards. In
    addition, these standards do not require the launch into space of a
    full-up research and development satellite in order to achieve full
    maturity. Rather, a representative model demonstrating the full
    functionality of the subsystems in a relevant environment is sufficient.

                                Common Name: SBIRS High

    The Air Force's SBIRS High program is a satellite system intended to
    provide missile warning information and to support the missile defense,
    technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions. It also
    is intended to replace the Defense Support Program and to consist of four
    satellites (plus one spare) in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), two
    sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and
    associated fixed and mobile ground stations. We assessed the sensors and
    satellites only.

    Source: Lockheed Mar tin Space Systems Company.

    Program start (2/95)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                        (10/96)

    Design review (8/01)

                     First sensor delivery (8/04) GAO review (1/05)

                                     Second sensor
                                        delivery
                                         (2/05)

                            First satellite delivery (4/08)

    The SBIRS High program's critical technologies have demonstrated
    acceptable levels of maturity after many years of difficult development.
    The design is now mature since approximately 98 percent of the expected
    design drawings have been released. Production maturity could not be
    determined because the contractor does not collect statistical control
    data. In August 2004 the contractor delivered the first payload (the HEO 1
    sensor) after a delay of 18 months. This created additional delays and
    cost increases. As a result, the program is again being replanned.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (10/96) review
    (NA) (1/05) (8/01)

    Common Name: SBIRS High

        SBIRS High Program

    Technology Maturity

    The SBIRS High program's three critical technologies-the infrared sensor,
    thermal management, and on-board processor-are mature. Program officials
    indicated that the hardware was tested in a thermal vacuum chamber under
    expected flight conditions. These technologies were not mature at the
    start of development.

    Design Stability

    The design of SBIRS High was not stable at the critical design review in
    August 2001 since only 30 percent of the expected design drawings had been
    released at that time. The design is now stable with about 98 percent
    released.

    Design stability has been an issue for SBIRS High. The first HEO sensor
    was delivered in August 2004 after a delay of 18 months due to excessive
    electromagnetic interference (radio waves emitted by the sensor's
    electronics that interfered with the host satellite). The program office
    reports that it applied the knowledge gained from the design problems on
    this sensor to the second HEO sensor, which is now due for delivery in
    February 2005-a 13-month delay from the restructured schedule. Initial
    testing of the second sensor revealed one electromagnetic interference
    issue. The program office anticipates the approval of a waiver to this
    deviation.

    Production Maturity

    We could not assess the production maturity of SBIRS High because the
    contractor does not collect statistical process control data. However, the
    program office tracks and assesses production maturity through detailed
    monthly manufacturing and test data and monthly updates on flight hardware
    qualifications. In addition, the program office recently assigned detailed
    entrance criteria to all major manufacturing and test events. These
    criteria must be fully satisfied prior to program office approval to enter
    the specific event. According to the program office, this new
    "eventdriven" philosophy will significantly improve insight into the
    maturity of the production process.

    Other Program Issues

    The delayed delivery of the first HEO sensor affected cost and schedule
    for the remainder of the program. For example, resources needed for the
    second HEO sensor and GEO satellites were instead used on the first HEO
    sensor. The deliveries of the first two GEO satellites have now each been
    delayed by over a year (to April 2008 and April 2009).

    In May 2004, the program incurred a second Nunn-McCurdy breach (10 U.S.C.
    2433), this time at the 15 percent threshold. Since program delays and the
    extension of the contract through 2011 yielded a substantial funding
    shortfall, Congress increased the SBIRS High fiscal year 2005 budget by
    $91 million. The program office reports that future risks are being
    mitigated by addressing high-risk elements earlier in the development
    phase as well as earlier and more robust testing. It also plans to convene
    an independent review team in early 2005 to assess the program's progress
    and future risks.

    Because of the lag time between the procurement of the first two GEO
    satellites and the last three, the Air Force is able to consider upgrading
    the on-board processors for the GEO satellites 3-5. A revised acquisition
    program baseline will be submitted in March 2005 after a decision on this
    upgrade is finalized and the cost impact is determined.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the Air Force stated that the
    February 2005 delivery of the second HEO sensor is well before the need
    date of mid-June 2005. It also noted that the GEO satellite's signal
    processor assembly power supply and the common gyro reference assemblies
    were integrated onto the payload structure (both are key steps toward the
    payload's first thermal vacuum test) and that GEO spacecraft testing has
    been successful in the early identification and mitigation of
    hardware/software integration issues before they become schedule critical
    path concerns. It also commented that the Defense Support Program-capable
    Multi-Mission Mobile Processors are in test and are on track for
    operational certification by December 2005 and that initial SBIRS High
    support to the Missile Defense Agency mission is in place.

                                    Common Name: SDB

    The Air Force's SDB is a small autonomous, conventional, air-to-ground,
    precision bomb able to strike fixed and stationary targets. The weapon
    will be installed on the F-15E aircraft and is designed to work with other
    aircraft, such as the F/A-22. Potential follow-on capabilities, such as
    precision strike against moving targets, are being considered.

    Source: The Boeing Company, St. Louis, Missouri.

    Program start (8/01)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                        (10/03)

    GAO review (1/05) Low-rate decision (4/05) Initial capability (9/06) Last
                        procurement (11/19) Last delivery (9/21)

    The six critical technologies for the SDB appear mature, and the design is
    stable. The program office held the design review prior to starting system
    development and, although data were not collected, the program maintains
    that the contractor released over 90 percent of the production drawings.
    In 2004, the program began a test program, which combines developmental,
    live fire, and operational testing, in an effort to decrease time spent in
    system development. Although the first three flight tests were successful,
    this concurrent approach may increase program risks. A low-rate production
    decision is expected to be made in April 2005.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (10/03) review
    (1/05) (4/05) (NA)

    Common Name: SDB

        SDB Program

    Technology Maturity

    The program office assessed all six critical technologies for the SDB as
    mature. The technologies are the airframe, the Anti-Jam Global Positioning
    System, the fuze, the Inertial Navigation System, the carriage, and
    warhead. Program officials stated that many of the program's critical
    technologies were demonstrated in a free-flight environment. They also
    stated that they have flight-tested the system with the properly sized
    components.

    Design Stability

    The design review was held prior to the start of system development and,
    although data were not collected, the program office maintains that Boeing
    released over 90 percent of the production drawings. According to the
    program office, although the contractor has ultimate responsibility for
    the weapon system and has given the government a 20-year "bumper to
    bumper" warranty, the program office has insight into the contractor's
    configuration control board process and all changes are coordinated with
    the government.

    The SDB program began a program of developmental, live fire, and
    operational testing in 2004. This combined testing approach is designed to
    eliminate or reduce redundant testing. However, this process could expose
    the program to additional risk of design changes, as there may be more
    concurrency between system developmental and operational tests than there
    would be under a traditional test program. As of the date of this review,
    3 of 16 planned flight tests had been conducted, each meeting its
    objectives. These flight tests were conducted with live fuzes but not with
    live warheads. Eleven of the 16 flight tests are planned to be conducted
    prior to the low-rate production decision point.

    Production Maturity

    We could not assess production maturity because statistical process
    control data were not available. In developing the SDB, Boeing used many
    key components that are common with the Joint Direct Attack Munition
    (JDAM). The SDB production line will be colocated in the same facility
    used to produce the JDAM. According to program officials, the production
    line layout is very similar to the processes currently used for the JDAM.
    As of the date of this review, no critical manufacturing processes that
    impact the critical system characteristics had been identified. A low-rate
    production decision is expected to be made in April 2005.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred with
    the information presented and provided technical comments, which were
    incorporated as appropriate.

                                   Common Name: STSS

    MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
    blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The
    initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built under
    the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch these
    satellites in 2007 to assess how well they work within the context of the
    missile defense system. MDA is also studying improvements to the STSS
    program, and it will be building next generation satellites. We assessed
    the two demonstration satellites.

    Source: STSS Program Brief.

    SBIRS-Low program start (1995)

         Transition to MDA (10/00) STSS program start (2002) GAO review (1/05)
             Demonstrator satellite launch (2007) Software upgrades (2008)

    Four of the STSS program's five critical technologies are mature, and the
    remaining technology is expected to reach maturity in March or April 2005.
    The STSS design appears stable, with all drawings released to
    manufacturing. However, until all STSS technologies demonstrate maturity,
    the potential for design changes remains. The program is currently in the
    process of conducting system level assembly, integration, and testing
    activities and software development. Until that work is complete, certain
    risk areas, such as payload hardware and software integration, will
    remain. Additionally, a number of systemic quality and systems engineering
    problems with the payload have persisted. Despite these issues, the
    program office still expects early delivery and launch of the satellites.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (NA) review
    (1/05) (TBD)

                                        (11/03)

    Common Name: STSS

        STSS Program

    Technology Maturity

    Four of five critical technologies-satellite communication cross-links,
    on-board processor, acquisition sensor, and track sensor-are mature. The
    acquisition sensor reached maturity in October 2004 (a month later than
    reported last year) when the thermal vacuum testing was completed. The
    track sensor reached maturity in December 2004 when the payload for the
    first satellite completed thermal vacuum testing, which is 3 months later
    than reported last year. The single-stage cryocooler will be mature when
    the payload for the first satellite completes thermal vacuum testing in
    March or April 2005-about 15 months earlier than reported previously. Last
    year the program had a sixth technology, the two-stage cryocooler, but it
    is no longer considered critical and will not be used on the first
    increment of the STSS program.

    Design Stability

    The STSS program's design is stable, with all drawings released to
    manufacturing. When the STSS program started in 2002, design drawings and
    the satellite components for the partially built satellites from the Space
    Based Infrared System Low effort were released to manufacturing. By the
    time STSS went through its design review in November 2003, the program
    office had released all subsequent design drawings. However, until the
    maturity of the STSS technologies has been demonstrated, the potential for
    design changes remains.

    Other Program Issues

    The STSS program is in the process of completing the assembly,
    integration, and testing of the satellite components and software
    development. Until that work is complete, certain risk areas will remain.
    Some of these include complex infrared payload hardware and software
    integration; completion of the ground segment and infrared sensor software
    development and testing; modifications to the tracking sensor, system
    integration and testing; and handling issues related to parts
    obsolescence.

    In addition, the payload subcontractor has had a number of systemic
    quality and systems engineering problems. These problems have continued
    for the last year and have contributed to some cost and schedule overruns
    on the payload subcontract. The quality and engineering problems are the
    result of the subcontractor's lack of experience and systems engineering
    procedures that are not clearly written. In response, the prime contractor
    reviewed the subcontractor's quality program. During this time, there was
    a 2-month stoppage of work at the subcontractor facility and the majority
    of the subcontractor's effort was concentrated on resolving failures noted
    during assembly, integration, and testing of the satellite components.
    When work restarted at the facility, the subcontractor continued to
    encounter difficulties in assembling the sensors and preparing the
    appropriate test equipment needed for sensor-level testing. Based on these
    factors and the significant remaining tasks, the prime contractor stepped
    up its presence at the subcontractor's facility. In addition, the
    subcontractor added technicians who have more experience working with
    space hardware and brought in systems engineers to work with the
    technicians.

    Despite these issues, the program office still expects the prime
    contractor to deliver and launch the satellites earlier than the contract
    date of July 2007.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA generally concurred with
    our assessment and provided technical comments, which were incorporated
    where appropriate.

                                   Common Name: THAAD

    MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
    blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend
    against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will
    include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a command and
    control/battle management system. We assessed the design for the Block
    2006 initial capability of one fire unit that MDA plans to hand off to the
    Army for concurrent operation and testing in fiscal year 2009.

    Source: THAAD Project Office.

    Program start (1/92)

    Transfer to MDA (10/01)

         GAO review (1/05) 1st intercept attempt, Block 2004 (2nd Q/06) Initial
                         capability available Block 2006 (FY09)

    Program officials assess THAAD's technologies as mature and its design as
    generally stable. The technology assessments, however, are sometimes based
    on tests of earlier component designs. The design of Block 2006, which is
    expected to provide a limited operational capability, is a further
    maturation of THAAD's Block 2004 design. While 91 percent of the Block
    2004 engineering drawings have been released, the total number of drawings
    for the 2006 capability could increase if problems are identified in
    flight tests scheduled to begin early next year.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (6/00) review
    (1/05) (TBD) (12/03)

    Common Name: THAAD

        THAAD Program

    Technology Maturity

    Program officials assess all of THAAD's critical technologies as mature.
    These technologies are included in four major components: the command,
    control, and battle management component; the interceptor; the launcher;
    and the radar.

    After experiencing early test failures, program officials made changes in
    the execution of the THAAD program that allowed it to make progress in
    maturing critical technologies. Officials placed more emphasis on risk
    reduction efforts, including adopting technology readiness levels to
    assess technological maturity.

    Design Stability

    THAAD's basic design is nearing completion, with approximately 91 percent
    of the expected engineering drawings released for the basic design that is
    expected to provide the initial capability. However, the THAAD Program
    Office reported a decrease in the percentage of drawings released this
    year (91 percent) compared to the percentage reported last year (100
    percent). In 2003, the program reported that it had released all of the
    expected 9,852 drawings. However, as the design matured, the program
    office recognized that 11,221 engineering drawings would be required and
    that it had released only 10,221 of those drawings. The number of drawings
    increased as information was gained from testing, the design of
    experimental items was completed, existing drawings were revised, and as
    new subcomponents were needed to replace obsolete ones. The program office
    successfully conducted a design review in December 2003. However, if
    problems are identified during flight testing, the number of drawings may
    increase as the design matures during Block 2006.

    Production Maturity

    We did not assess THAAD's production maturity because MDA does not know
    when it will transition THAAD to the Army for production. The one fire
    unit that will be handed off to the Army in 2009 for limited operational
    use is considered to be primarily a test asset. Prior to a production
    decision, the program office plans to assess production maturity using
    Baseline Manufacturing Readiness Risk Assessments and Block Process
    Verification Reviews for assurance of the contractor's readiness to
    proceed with repeatable processes and quality.

    Other Program Issues

    Although the THAAD program has implemented many procedures to reduce
    program risk, it continues to encounter some problems. For example, the
    program experienced a major workmanship problem in a shelter subsystem
    within the command, control, and battle management component. In addition,
    an explosion at the Pratt & Whitney propellant mix facility is causing the
    program to seek an alternate source. The program office's risk assessment
    states "source replacements have the potential for delaying booster
    delivery during the flight test program and into production."

    MDA officials are examining whether one THAAD component can be deployed
    early. Officials are assessing whether a THAAD-like radar can serve as a
    forward-deployed radar for the Ballistic Missile Defense System.
    Development, customization, and testing of the radar under another MDA
    program have begun in an effort to provide this capability within the next
    2 years.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this report,
    MDA provided technical comments, which were
    incorporated as appropriate.

                                 Common Name: Tomahawk

    The Navy's Tactical Tomahawk Block IV will allow ships and submarines to
    attack land targets. Program officials say it incorporates new subsystem
    features like an improved antijamming global positioning system, in-flight
    retargeting, and transmission of imagery prior to impact. They also said
    it will have greater reliability and its average per unit cost will be
    $729,000 versus the $1.4 million of its predecessor. The Block IV includes
    the missile, the weapon control system, and the mission planning system.
    We assessed only the missile.

    Source: Tomahawk Program Office (PMA-280).

    Program start (12/97)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (6/98)

    Design review (6/00)

    Low-rate decision (9/02) Initial capability (5/04) Full-rate decision (7/04) GAO
                         review (1/05) Last procurement (FY09)

    The Tactical Tomahawk Block IV program entered low-rate production and
    awarded its full-rate production contract without the knowledge needed to
    ensure its production processes were in control but with mature technology
    and design knowledge. The program received its first low-rate production
    missile in May 2004. Other missiles such as those used in operational
    testing, while production representative, were mostly put together one at
    a time, so their manufacture was insufficient for collecting statistical
    data necessary for process control. Officials did not expect that the
    program would produce and test sufficient missile quantities to have the
    necessary knowledge about its production processes until sometime during
    March or April of 2005. Delivery of its first full-rate production
    missiles in January 2006 depends on completing substantial
    testing/verification.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (6/98) review
    (9/02) (1/05) (6/00)

    Common Name: Tomahawk

        Tomahawk Program

    Technology Maturity

    We did not assess the readiness level of the key technologies for the
    Tactical Tomahawk Block IV because its subsystems were derivative from
    other programs or upgrades to preexisting subsystems. Therefore, according
    to program officials, the critical technologies for the missile's key
    subsystems like the antijamming global positioning system, the digital
    scene matching area correlator, and the cruise engine were already mature.

    Design Stability

    The design of the Tactical Tomahawk missile is complete. At the design
    review in June 2000, about 47 percent of the drawings had been released to
    manufacturing. By the end of technical evaluation in October 2003, 100
    percent of the drawings had been released. Technical evaluation was
    successfully completed, and the program entered operational evaluation in
    December 2003. Operational evaluation was completed in 2004, and the
    missile was judged operationally effective and suitable.

    Production Maturity

    We could not assess the production maturity of the Tactical Tomahawk Block
    IV missile because program officials said statistical process data needed
    for production maturity were not available. Although the Block IV uses
    much existing technology to reduce costs, the technology is arranged
    inside the missile in a new manner. The new layout makes the production
    process sufficiently different enough that it requires development of new
    production processes and statistical controls. Officials said the program
    had not yet produced and tested sufficient missile quantities to attain
    this statistical control information. Tomahawk officials currently project
    the program will obtain production maturity prior to January 2006.

    The Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation Force judged the missile
    operationally suitable and effective for combat operations but also
    recommended review of quality assurance processes. Prior to this
    recommendation, the program had engaged outside experts to conduct a
    quality audit. The audit team concluded the audited facilities would
    consistently supply material to meet the program's requisite product and
    process capability requirements. The team also noted opportunities for
    improvement in areas like statistical process control. Officials said a
    follow-up Navy/Raytheon (the prime contractor) review indicated that
    progress had been made in all areas identified for improvement. They also
    said Raytheon had contracted for ongoing outside support for
    implementation of quality initiatives.

    Other Program Issues

    At the time of our review, a full-rate 5-year production contract had been
    awarded, with the multiyear feature designed to provide earliest
    replenishment of inventory at lowest cost. Full-rate production is planned
    for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008.

    Agency Comments

    Commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided technical
    comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. It also noted that
    all Block IV production processes have been fully defined and are
    maturing.

                                   Common Name: TSAT

    The Air Force's TSAT system is designed to provide survivable,
    jam-resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose laser cross-links with
    other air and space systems, including the planned AEHF satellite system,
    reviewed elsewhere in this report. TSAT will serve as the cornerstone of a
    new DOD communications infrastructure by providing high bandwidth
    connectivity to the warfighter. The system consists of a constellation of
    five satellites, plus a sixth satellite to ensure mission availability. We
    assessed the six satellites.

                         Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.

    Program start (8/02)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (1/04)

    Interim review (11/04)

      GAO review (1/05) Production decision (04/08) First satellite launch (11/12)

    TSAT entered the risk reduction and design development phase in January
    2004 with only one of its seven critical technologies mature. The program
    expects to demonstrate technology maturity but not design stability or
    production maturity before awarding a contract to acquire operational
    satellites in 2006.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (1/04) (1/05)
    review (4/08) (NA)

    Common Name: TSAT

        TSAT Program

    Technology Maturity

    The TSAT program is in the risk reduction and design development phase,
    with only one of its seven critical technologies mature. The program is
    being developed in two increments-six of the technologies are associated
    with the first increment and all seven are associated with the second
    increment.

    Of the six technologies associated with the first increment, only one
    technology-the packet processing payloads-is mature. The other five-
    communication-on-the-move nulling antenna, dynamic bandwidth and resource
    allocation technologies, protected bandwidth efficient modulation
    waveforms, information assurance, and single access laser
    communications-are scheduled to reach maturity in early 2006, about 2
    years after the start of development. The single access laser
    communications has no backup technology, and according to program
    officials, any delay in maturing this technology will cause the expected
    first satellite launch date to slip beyond 2012.

    The seventh critical technology, the multiaccess laser communications, is
    part of the second increment. It will not reach maturity until the
    production decision for the last four operational satellites in 2008,
    about 4 years after the planned start of development.

    Other Program Issues

    Unlike current communications satellites, TSAT will be equipped with
    laser-optical payloads for high-capacity links to other air and space
    platforms. AEHF will depend on the first TSAT satellite, now scheduled for
    launch by the end of 2012, to provide full global coverage. Because
    military users are concerned with the aggressive acquisition strategy, the
    Air Force scheduled an interim review point for November 2004 to determine
    whether the technology development had progressed sufficiently to meet the
    required launch date and decided to continue with both AEHF and TSAT
    development. A second interim review point is scheduled for November 2005,
    at which point the Air Force must decide on alternatives, one of which is
    to buy an additional AEHF satellite. Air Force officials are in the
    process of defining the evaluation criteria they intend to use to assess
    TSAT's progress or identify alternatives.

    TSAT is currently being rebaselined as a result of a congressional
    reduction totaling $300 million in research and development funding for
    fiscal year 2005. The defense authorization conference report indicated
    that funding was reduced because of continuing concerns related to the
    risk of the current acquisition approach.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that,
    based on commercial and DOD best practices, all TSAT technologies meet, or
    exceed, the level of maturity appropriate for the current risk reduction
    and design development phase and that this phase provides the data
    (technology readiness and design maturity) necessary for a production
    contract award. It also commented that all key technologies are on
    schedule to achieve maturity 10 months prior to Preliminary Design Review
    and that, to further reduce risk, TSAT has backup technologies in all
    areas in the event that a technology is not ready. It noted that the
    backup technologies would still provide a large increase in warfighter
    capability and allow for technologies to be used on later TSAT satellites.
    It also noted that to be effective, risk reduction and preliminary design
    must be done concurrently and iteratively. If not, the program risks
    maturing technology that does not support the system design, resulting in
    scrap and rework. It believes that this strategy delivers the greatest
    warfighter capability at minimum risk and cost.

    GAO Comments

    Our prior work has shown that technologies should demonstrate a high level
    of maturity before starting development to reduce the risk of cost,
    schedule, and performance problems. Although the program started
    development a year ago, we found that several critical technologies had
    demonstrated very low levels of maturity involving analytical studies and
    the demonstration of nonscale individual components in a laboratory
    environment.

                                   Common Name: V-22

    The V-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor, vertical takeoff and landing aircraft
    being developed by the Navy for Joint Service application. It is designed
    to meet the amphibious/vertical assault needs of the Marine Corps, the
    strike rescue needs of the Navy, and the special operations needs of the
    Air Force and the U.S. Special Operations Command. The MV-22 version will
    replace the CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters of the Marine Corps. We assessed
    the MV-22 Block A, which has been undergoing changes to make it safe and
    operational.

    Source: U.S. Navy.

    Program start (12/82)

                                      Development
                                         start
                                         (4/86)

    Development restart (9/94) GAO review (1/05) Full-rate decision (10/05) Initial
                       capability (2007) Last procurement (2015)

    MV-22 Block A technologies are mature and the design is considered stable.
    Problems identified during recent tests are expected to be resolved prior
    to the next operational test, according to program officials. Some
    redesign efforts have been identified as candidates for preplanned product
    improvements. Parts issues and delayed reporting of test results could
    delay the operational performance certification needed to increase
    production in fiscal year 2006. Decisions on whether to lift current
    flight restrictions, prior to the completion of operational evaluation,
    will be made on a case-by-case basis. Recent tests found interoperability
    and human factors as high-risk issues that may impact this evaluation.
    Also, the contractors were asked to propose cost reduction initiatives
    targeted at reducing aircraft unit cost to $58 million by fiscal year
    2010.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (4/86) review
    (1/05) (10/05) (9/02)

                                               Desired level of knowledge
                                          Data not available

    Common Name: V-22

        V-22 Program

    Technology Maturity

    Although we did not assess the MV-22's technology maturity, the program
    office states that based on DOD criteria, the Block A technologies are
    mature. During recently completed limited operational tests, technology
    maturity was assessed in a range of environmental conditions. Program
    officials state that problems were identified and corrective plans
    implemented to insure a successful operational test and evaluation
    assessment.

    Design Stability

    Design for Block A is considered stable. However, additional changes to
    later blocks of the aircraft have been identified. These changes include
    redesign of the forward cabin; redesign of the rear cabin seating, which
    is considered inadequate for combat equipped troops; redesign of a
    extendable tube for fuel jettison operations; and enhancements to improve
    wheel brake control and effectiveness.

    Production Maturity

    Process management is becoming more robust at the final assembly site on
    each major fixture assembly using Six Sigma. Program officials point to
    the delivery of aircraft as an indication of manufacturing maturity.

    An independent review assessed a V-22 parts problem at one of the
    contractors' plants that could affect its ability to support full-rate
    production and concluded that in the near term they believe the current
    parts shortage could be addressed with heroics. However, the team and
    program officials are concerned with the institutionalization of long-term
    process improvements and recommended development of a plan that addresses
    both short-term part shortages and implementation of a full-rate
    production plan.

    The Navy plans to increase annual production of the aircraft starting in
    fiscal year 2006, provided the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress
    that the program successfully completed operational testing by
    demonstrating several capabilities related to V-22 safety, effectiveness,
    maintainability, and reliability (Section 123, Pub. Law 107-107, Dec. 28,
    2001) through operational test. The certification would allow the program
    to increase annual production above the current minimum sustaining rate.
    Program officials are concerned that the certification cannot be done
    before completion of the fiscal year 2006 budget process and, as a result,
    the request to increase production may not be granted.

    Other Program Issues

    The V-22 is currently being tested with operating limits, such as
    defensive combat maneuver capability. Decisions on whether to relax or
    remove specific restrictions will be made on a case-by-case basis prior to
    the completion of operational evaluation in June 2005. The decisions on
    these restrictions will impact the result of the upcoming operational
    assessment. A recently completed limited assessment concluded that out of
    16 critical operational issues, 2 were at high risk and 6 at medium risk
    of not achieving a satisfactory resolution during upcoming operational
    testing. The high-risk issues are interoperability and human factors. The
    medium-risk issues are reliability, availability, logistics support,
    compatibility, documentation, and diagnostics. Recently, the program
    requested that the contractor submit a proposal for combining cost
    reduction initiatives to reduce the aircraft unit price to a target price
    of $58 million in fiscal year 2010.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the V-22
    Joint Program Office continues to execute a disciplined, event-driven test
    and program schedule. It noted that since returning to flight in 2003, the
    V-22 has flown over 4,000 hours, both in development and operational
    tests. It also stated that the Block A V-22 has demonstrated reliability
    and maintainability on par with fleet aircraft and that multiship sorties
    and operations have been demonstrated for nearly all missions. It further
    commented that the range and speed capability of the V-22 has spawned new
    tactics and realized logistics efficiencies that will reduce time,
    resources and save lives.

    The Navy also stated that it remains committed to fielding a V-22 weapon
    system when it is tested and ready and noted that a talented team of
    government and industry professionals champions the transformational
    capability that the V-22 brings and is committed to its success. It
    further stated that the test and training programs will continue to ensure
    operators and maintainers are ready and capable from day one to ensure the
    warfighter has the best equipment with the best information.

                                    Common Name: WGS

    WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide essential
    communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition
    partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the
    next generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite
    Communications architecture and is composed of the following principal
    segments: space segment (satellites), terminal segment (users), and
    control segment (operators). We assessed the space segment.

    Source: WGS Program Office.

                     Development start/ production decision (11/00)

    Design review (7/02)

    GAO review (1/05) First satellite launch (12/05) Initial capability (2/07) Full
                                   capability (12/11)

    The WGS program's technology, design, and production are now mature.
    Manufacturing problems did contribute to a delay in the launch of the
    first WGS satellite by almost 2 years. The program office is increasing
    its oversight of the contractor to help rectify these issues and believes
    the problems have been resolved. A decision to procure the fourth and
    fifth satellites is expected to add millions of dollars to the program's
    cost, but the program office will not know the cost of these satellites
    until it receives a proposal from the contractor.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

                          Development  DOD    Development/ GAO
                             start    design production review
                             (NA)     review   decision (1/05)
                                       (NA)       (11/00)

                                            Desired level of knowledge

    Common Name: WGS

        WGS Program

    Technology Maturity

    WGS has two technologies that are vital to program success: the digital
    channelizer and the phased array antenna. According to program officials,
    both technologies were mature when the program entered production in
    November 2000.

    Design Stability

    The WGS design is essentially complete, as the program office has released
    over 97 percent of the expected drawings to manufacturing. Last year we
    reported that the contractor had problems integrating the antenna into the
    satellite because experience the contractor expected to gain on commercial
    satellite orders did not materialize. The integration problems have since
    been resolved, and testing of the antenna engineering models demonstrated
    that the design worked as required.

    Production Maturity

    Due to the commercial nature of the WGS acquisition contract, the program
    office does not have access to production process control data. Despite
    not being able to access these data to determine production maturity, unit
    level manufacturing for WGS is essentially complete, as all units have
    been manufactured and delivered for the first satellite. The contractor
    continues to experience difficulties in manufacturing one of the
    components of the phased array antenna, making the antenna production the
    top risk to the program. Approximately 254 of these antenna components
    were being built when thin cracks in the copper striplines were noticed
    during inspection. An early analysis showed that poor handling procedures
    of inexperienced personnel contributed to the cracks, and a screening test
    revealed that inconsistencies in the thickness of the copper trace used to
    build the striplines were also to blame. The contractor replaced all the
    flawed striplines with properly manufactured parts and implemented
    additional process controls. In resolving these production issues, program
    officials stated that they inspected the manufacturing facilities,
    reviewed test plans and procedures, started screening parts, and now hold
    monthly program reviews with the contractor. Manufacturing problems with
    the phased array antenna contributed to delaying the launch of the first
    WGS satellite by almost 2 years. As a result of the delay, the Air Force
    revised its acquisition strategy program baseline, which was approved in
    February 2004.

    Other Program Issues

    In December 2002, DOD directed the addition of WGS satellites four and
    five, with launch dates of fiscal years 2009 and 2010, respectively.
    Therefore, the current contract options must be extended and renegotiated
    to cover the cost of the likely 2-to 3-year production gap between
    satellites three and four. The cost estimate for the additional satellites
    has grown because of a greater than anticipated effect of parts
    obsolescence and loss of manufacturing knowledge to be gained during the
    production of the first three satellites. In addition, the production
    costs of the first three satellites have been higher than expected. The
    procurement of satellites four and five is expected to add millions of
    dollars to the cost of the WGS program, but the exact amount will not be
    known until the program office receives a proposal from the contractor.
    Negotiation for the two satellites is to begin in the second half of
    fiscal year 2006.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
    that even though manufacturing process information is unavailable, it
    believes the production knowledge of WGS is mature based upon similarities
    to the contractor's commercial communications satellites. In addition, the
    delays experienced in the delivery of the first satellite were primarily
    due to inadequate adherence to manufacturing and quality assurance
    standards at subcontractor facilities rather than production knowledge
    immaturity.

                                   Common Name: WIN-T

    WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone communications
    network. It is to provide reliable, secure, and seamless video, data,
    imagery, and voice services, allowing users to communicate simultaneously
    at various levels of security. The network is to have the ability to be
    initialized and modified based upon unit task organization. It is to
    connect Army units with higher levels of command and provide Army's
    tactical portion of the Global Information Grid. WIN-T is being fielded in
    blocks. We assessed the first block.

    Source: PM WIN-T.

                  Program/ development start (7/03) GAO review (1/05)

    Design review (9/05)

                                Low-rate decision (3/06)

                  Full-rate decision (5/09) Initial capability (1/10)

    WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies
    close to full maturity. None of the technologies will be fully mature at
    the time production begins in March 2006. Eight have backup technologies
    available, but only three of these are fully mature, and use of backup
    technologies would degrade system overall robustness and capabilities. Due
    to significant interdependencies among critical technologies, and the fact
    that some determine network functionality, it may not be possible to
    demonstrate that those technologies are fully mature until after
    production begins. Design stability could not be assessed because the
    program office does not track the number of releasable drawings. WIN-T is
    primarily an information technology system integration effort rather than
    a manufacturing effort.

    Production, design & technology maturity

    Design & technology maturity

    Technology maturity

    Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (7/03) (1/05)
    review (3/06) (9/05)

    Common Name: WIN-T

        WIN-T Program

    Technology Maturity

    WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies
    close to reaching full maturity. While program officials do not expect
    these technologies to reach full maturity until the network is built and
    can be demonstrated in an operational environment, they do expect the
    technologies to have been demonstrated in a simulated operational
    environment by the time the critical design review is held in September
    2005. An independent Army technology readiness assessment determined that
    WIN-T would enter system development prior to full definition of the first
    block's design and specific technology-based components, systems, or
    subsystems. WIN-T will include technologies such as mobile and static
    communications nodes, network operations and support centers, transmission
    relays, joint gateway nodes, points of presence for future force and
    command elements, vehicular wireless packages, airborne wireless
    communication packages, and personal communications devices.

    Design Stability

    Design stability could not be assessed because the program office does not
    plan to track the number of releasable drawings as a design metric.
    According to the program, WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort, but
    primarily an information technology system integration effort.
    Consequently, the government does not obtain releasable design drawings
    for many of WIN-T's components, particularly commercial components. The
    WIN-T design will evolve using performance-based specifications and open
    systems design, and it is to conform to DOD's Joint Technical
    Architecture.

    Other Program Issues

    Among other issues, the program will need to pay close attention to the
    interdependent nature of the WIN-T, FCS, and JTRS programs, the
    interrelationship between WIN-T and FCS and Global Information Grid
    requirements, the scalability of WIN-T, the challenge of linking all the
    nodes and networks of the Army's system-ofsystems, and the coordination of
    unmanned relay programs with FCS. The program will also have to track
    external factors that will impact WIN-T such as the DOD Net-Centric Data
    Strategy. WIN-T deployment will be essential for FCS deployment and as
    each system evolves, integration demonstrations will need to be performed
    to ensure WIN-T and FCS interoperability.

    In addition, a major revision to the WIN-T acquisition strategy is
    underway. WIN-T was originally envisioned to support the Army's Future
    Force. However, the global war on terrorism and the lessons learned from
    recent military operations have shifted the Army's focus toward providing
    WIN-T capabilities sooner. To accomplish this, DOD, in September, approved
    a decision to combine the competing contractor teams for WIN-T's system
    design and development. The two originally competing contractors are now
    teaming to establish a single architecture for WIN-T that, according to
    the revised acquisition strategy, will leverage each contractor's proposed
    architecture to provide the Army with a superior technical solution for
    WIN-T. Establishing the single WIN-T architecture a year earlier than
    originally planned is expected to allow other Army programs to begin to
    follow that architecture for near-term force procurements and build on
    that architecture for the Future Force.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army noted that, as a
    result of merging the two competing prime contractors under a new
    acquisition strategy, the "best of breed" critical technologies will be
    used in the updated WIN-T architecture. This new strategy is also expected
    to increase the range of available technical products and developing
    technologies, thereby lowering the risk of maturing critical technologies
    for production and fielding. The Army also provided technical comments,
    which were incorporated where appropriate.

    Agency Comments and 	DOD did not provide general comments on a draft of
    this report, but it did provide technical comments. These comments, along
    with agency

    Our Evaluation	comments received on the individual assessments, were
    included as appropriate. (See app. I for a copy of DOD's response.).

    Scope of Our Review	For the 54 programs, each assessment provides the
    historical and current program status and offers the opportunity to take
    early corrective action when a program's projected attainment of knowledge
    diverges significantly from the best practices. The assessments also
    identify programs that are employing practices worthy of emulation by
    other programs. If a program is attaining the desired levels of knowledge,
    it has less risk-but not zero risk-of future problems. Likewise, if a
    program shows a gap between demonstrated knowledge and best practices, it
    indicates an increased risk-not a guarantee-of future problems. The real
    value of the assessments is recognizing gaps early, which provides
    opportunities for constructive intervention-such as adjustments to
    schedule, trade-offs in requirements, and additional funding-before cost
    and schedule consequences mount.

    We selected programs for the assessments based on several factors,
    including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3)
    congressional interest. The majority of the 54 programs covered in this
    report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. A program
    is defined as major if its estimated research and development costs exceed
    $365 million or its procurement exceeds $2.19 billion in fiscal year 2000
    constant dollars. (See app. II for details of the scope and methodology.)

    We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
    committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
    and Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will
    also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
    will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you have any questions on this report, please contact me at
    (202) 512-4841 or Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to
    this report are listed in appendix IV.

    Katherine V. Schinasi
    Managing Director
    Acquisition and Sourcing Management

           Page 124 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    List of Congressional Committees

    The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

    The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
    States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    The Honorable C. W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha
    Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on
    Appropriations House of Representatives

                                       Appendix I

                        Comments from the Department of Defense

           Page 126 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Appendix II

                                 Scope and Methodology

    In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from each
    of the programs included in this report. We summarized our assessments of
    each individual program in two components-a system profile and a product
    knowledge assessment. We did not validate the data provided by the
    Department of Defense (DOD). However, we took several steps to address
    data quality. Specifically, we reviewed the data and performed various
    quality checks, which revealed some discrepancies in the data. We
    discussed the underlying data and these discrepancies with program
    officials and adjusted the data accordingly. We determined that the data
    provided by DOD were sufficiently reliable for our engagement purposes,
    after reviewing DOD's management controls for assessing data reliability.

    Macro Analysis	Data for major defense acquisition program research,
    development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement funding in
    figure 1 were obtained from DOD's selected acquisition reports or from
    data obtained directly from the program offices and then aggregated across
    programs between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2009. Data used to
    assess the fiscal year 2005 RDT&E and procurement funding plan were drawn
    from the 2003 selected acquisition reports or obtained directly from the
    program office. For the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs for which a
    baseline was not available, we used the latest available cost information.

    To assess the total cost, schedule, and quantity changes of the programs
    included in our assessment, it was necessary to identify those programs
    with all of the requisite data available. Of the 54 programs in our
    assessment, 26 programs constituted the common set of programs where data
    were available for cost, schedule, and quantity at the first full
    estimate, generally milestone B, and the latest estimate. Data utilized in
    this analysis were drawn from information contained in selected
    acquisition reports or data provided by program offices as of January 14,
    2005. We summed the costs associated with RDT&E and total costs consisting
    of research, development testing and evaluation, procurement, military
    construction, and acquisition operation and maintenance. The data were
    also used for a comparison between the 2004 assessment period and the 2005
    assessment period. The schedule assessment is based on the change in the
    average acquisition cycle time, defined as the number of months between
    program start and the achievement of initial operational capability or an
    equivalent fielding date.

    The weighted calculations of acquisition cycle time and program
    acquisition unit cost for the common set of programs were derived by

                           Appendix II Scope and Methodology

    taking the total cost estimate for each of the 26 programs and dividing it
    by the aggregate total cost of all 26 programs in the common set. The
    resulting quotient for each program was then multiplied by the simple
    percentage change in program acquisition unit costs to obtain the weighted
    unit cost change of each program. Next, the sum of this weighted cost
    change for all programs was calculated to get the weighted unit cost
    change for the common set as a whole. To assess the weighted-average
    acquisition cycle time change, we multiplied the weight calculation by the
    acquisition cycle time estimate for each corresponding program. A simple
    average was then taken to calculate the change between the first full
    estimate and the latest estimate, and between the 2004 assessment period
    and the 2005 assessment period. We believe these calculations best
    represent the overall progress of programs by placing them within the
    context of the common set's aggregate cost.

    To assess the number of programs with technology maturity and design
    stability at each critical juncture, we identified programs that had
    actually proceeded through the start of development and the system design
    review and obtained their assessed maturity. This information was drawn
    from data provided by the program office as of January 14, 2005. For more
    information, see the product knowledge assessment section in this
    appendix.

    System Profile 	In the past 4 years, DOD revised its policies governing
    weapon system acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major
    acquisition

    Assessment	events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more consistent
    across the 54 program assessments, we standardized the terminology for key
    program events. In the individual program assessments, program start
    refers to the initiation of a program; DOD usually refers to program start
    as milestone I or milestone A, which begins the concept and technology
    development phase. Similarly, development start refers to the commitment
    to system development that coincides with either milestone II or milestone
    B, which begins DOD's system development and demonstration phase. The
    production decision generally refers to the decision to enter the
    production and deployment phase, typically with low-rate initial
    production. Initial capability refers to the initial operational
    capability, sometimes also called first unit equipped or required asset
    availability. For the MDA programs that do not follow the standard DOD
    acquisition model, but instead develop systems in incremental
    capability-based blocks, we identified the key technology development
    efforts that lead to an initial capability for the block assessed.

           Page 128 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Appendix II Scope and Methodology

    The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal
    2005 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on information from
    selected acquisition reports or on data from the program office. In some
    instances the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by the
    term "to be determined" (TBD), or not applicable, annotated (NA). The
    "Latest" program costs used in cost comparisons are the latest estimates
    provided by the individual programs. The quantities listed only refer to
    procurement quantities. Satellite programs, in particular, produce a large
    percentage of their total operational units as development quantities,
    which are not included in the quantity figure.

    To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we
    reviewed DOD's selected acquisition reports or obtained data directly from
    the program offices. In general, we compared the latest available selected
    acquisition report information with a baseline for each program. For
    systems that have started system development-those that are beyond
    milestone II or B-we compared the latest available selected acquisition
    report to the development estimate from the first selected acquisition
    report issued after the program was approved to enter development. For
    systems that have not yet started system development, we compared the
    latest available data to the planning estimate issued after milestone I or
    A. For systems not included in selected acquisition reports, we attempted
    to obtain comparable baseline and current data from the individual program
    offices. For MDA systems for which a baseline was not available we
    compared the latest available cost information to the amount reported last
    year.

    All cost information is presented in base year 2005 dollars, unless
    otherwise noted, using Office of the Secretary of Defense approved
    deflators to eliminate the effects of inflation. We have depicted only the
    programs' main elements of acquisition cost-research and development and
    procurement; however, the total program costs also include military
    construction and acquisition operation and maintenance costs. Because of
    rounding and these additional costs, in some situations the total cost may
    not match the exact sum of the research and development and procurement
    costs. The program unit costs are calculated by dividing the total program
    cost by the total quantities planned. These costs are often referred to as
    program acquisition unit costs. In some instances, the data were not
    applicable, and we annotate this by using the term "NA." In other
    instances, the current absence of data on procurement funding and
    quantities precludes calculation of a meaningful program acquisition unit
    cost and we annotate this by using the term "TBD." The quantities listed

                           Appendix II Scope and Methodology

    refer to total quantities, including both procurement and development
    quantities.

    The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as the
    number of months between the program start, usually milestone I or A, and
    the achievement of initial operational capability or an equivalent
    fielding date. In some instances, the data were not yet available, and we
    annotate this by using the term TBD, or was classified.

    The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall
    picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum total
    of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those of the
    program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of detailed analyses
    of changes that attempt to link specific changes with triggering events or
    causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such detailed distinctions.

      Product Knowledge Assessment

    To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key points
    in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to each program
    office. The results are graphically depicted in each 2-page assessment. We
    also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such as the operational
    requirements document, the acquisition program baseline, test reports, and
    major program reviews.

    To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a tool,
    referred to as technology readiness levels, for our analysis. The National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration originally developed technology
    readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force Science and Technology
    research organizations use them to determine when technologies are ready
    to be handed off from science and technology managers to product
    developers. Technology readiness levels are measured on a scale of one to
    nine, beginning with paper studies of a technology's feasibility and
    culminating with a technology fully integrated into a completed product.
    (See appendix III for the definitions of technology readiness levels.) Our
    best practices work has shown that a technology readiness level of 7-
    demonstration of a technology in an operational environment-is the level
    of technology maturity that constitutes a low risk for starting a product
    development program. In our assessment, the technologies that have reached
    technology readiness level 7, a prototype demonstrated in an operational
    environment, are considered mature and those that have reached technology
    readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a

           Page 130 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Appendix II Scope and Methodology

    relevant environment, are assessed as attaining 50 percent of the desired
    level of knowledge. Satellite technologies that have achieved technology
    readiness level 6 are assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of
    demonstrating maturity in an operational environment-space.

    In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of
    critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of
    maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those
    cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to
    conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies
    assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always
    possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system at
    key decision points after the passage of many years.

    To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the
    percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for completion
    by the design review, the production decision, and as of our current
    assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the percentage of
    engineering drawings provided by the program office. We sought to clarify
    the percentage of drawings completed in those cases where information
    existed that raised concerns. Completed engineering drawings were defined
    as the number of drawings released or deemed releasable to manufacturing
    that can be considered the "build to" drawings.

    To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify the
    number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to
    quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those processes.
    In most cases, we did not verify or validate this information provided by
    the program office. We sought to clarify the number of critical
    manufacturing processes and percentage of statistical process control
    where information existed that raised concerns. We used a standard called
    the Process Capability Index, which is a process performance measurement
    that quantifies how closely a process is running to its specification
    limits. The index can be translated into an expected product defect rate,
    and we have found it to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as
    scrap and rework trends, in those cases where quantifiable statistical
    control data were unavailable.

    Appendix II Scope and Methodology

    Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of potential
    risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of risk that a
    program encounters during development, such as funding instability. Our
    detailed reviews on individual systems normally provide for a fuller
    treatment of risk elements.

           Page 132 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Appendix III

                              Technology Readiness Levels

    Hardware Demonstration Technology Readiness Level Description Software
    Environment

    1. Basic principles observed and Lowest level of technology readiness.
    None (Paper studies and None

    reported. Scientific research begins to be translated analysis) into
    applied research and development. Examples might include paper studies of
    a technology's basic properties

    2. Technology concept Invention begins. Once basic       None (Paper  None
    and/or                principles                         studies and
    application           are observed, practical            analysis)
    formulated.           applications can
                             be invented. The application is
                             speculative and there is no proof
                             or
                             detailed analysis to support the
                                 assumption. Examples are still
                                                     limited to
                             paper studies.

    3. Analytical and experimental Active research and development is
    Analytical studies and Lab critical function and/or initiated. This
    includes analytical studies demonstration of nonscale characteristic proof
    of concept. and laboratory studies to physically individual components

    validate analytical predictions of separate (pieces of subsystem).
    elements of the technology. Examples include components that are not yet
    integrated or representative.

    4. Component and/or breadboard. Basic technological components are Low
    fidelity breadboard. Lab Validation in laboratory integrated to establish
    that the pieces will Integration of nonscale environment. work together.
    This is relatively "low components to show

    fidelity" compared to the eventual system. pieces will work together.
    Examples include integration of "ad hoc" Not fully functional or form
    hardware in a laboratory. or fit but representative of

    technically feasible approach suitable for flight articles.

    5. Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment.

    Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic
    technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic
    supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a simulated
    environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory integration of
    components.

    High fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent but not necessarily form
    and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc.). Should be approaching
    appropriate scale. May include integration of several components with
    reasonably realistic support elements/subsystems to demonstrate
    functionality.

    Lab demonstrating functionality but not form and fit. May include flight
    demonstrating breadboard in surrogate aircraft. Technology ready for
    detailed design studies.

                        Appendix III Technology Readiness Levels

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Hardware Demonstration Technology Readiness Level Description Software
    Environment

    6. System/subsystem model or Representative model or prototype
    Prototype-Should be very High-fidelity lab prototype demonstration in a
    system, which is well beyond the close to form, fit and demonstration or
    relevant environment. breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a
    function. Probably includes limited/restricted flight

    relevant environment. Represents a major the integration of many
    demonstration for a
    step up in a technology's demonstrated new components and relevant
    environment.
    readiness. Examples include testing a realistic supporting Integration of
    technology is
    prototype in a high fidelity laboratory elements/subsystems if well
    defined.
    environment or in simulated operational needed to demonstrate full
    environment. functionality of the

                                       subsystem.

    7. System prototype demonstration Prototype near or at planned operational
    Prototype. Should be form, Flight demonstration in

    in an operational environment. system. Represents a major step up from fit
    and function integrated representative operational TRL 6, requiring the
    demonstration of an with other key supporting environment such as flying
    actual system prototype in an operational elements/subsystems to test bed
    or demonstrator environment, such as in an aircraft, demonstrate full
    aircraft. Technology is well vehicle or space. Examples include
    functionality of subsystem. substantiated with test testing the prototype
    in a test bed aircraft. data.

        8. Actual system   Technology has been proven to Flight       DT&E in the
         completed and                       work in its qualified  actual system
                                                         hardware
    "flight qualified"  final form and under expected            application
        through test and                     conditions.
         demonstration.   In almost all cases, this TRL
                          represents
                              the end of true system
                                   development.
                          Examples include developmental
                                                test and
                          evaluation of the system in
                          its intended
                          weapon system to determine if
                          it meets
                              design specifications.

    9. Actual system "flight proven" Actual application of the technology in
    its Actual system in final form OT&E in operational through successful
    mission final form and under mission conditions, mission conditions
    operations. such as those encountered in operational

    test and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
    fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
    system under operational mission conditions.

    Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration data.

           Page 134 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Appendix IV

                            GAO Contact and Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841

    Acknowledgments	David B. Best, Alan R. Frazier, and Bruce H. Thomas made
    key contributions to this report. Other key contributors included Robert
    L. Ackley, D. Catherine Baltzell, Maricela Cherveny, Tana M. Davis, Thomas
    J. Denomme, Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, David J. Hand, Michael
    J. Hazard, Barbara H. Haynes, Leslie M. Hickey, John E. Oppenheim,
    Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Nancy Rothlisberger, Rae Ann H. Sapp, James L.
    Morrison, Wendy P. Smythe, Sharon E. Sweeney, Robert S. Swierczek, and
    Karen S. Zuckerstein. The following staff were responsible for individual
    programs:

    System Primary Staff

    Airborne Laser (ABL) LaTonya D. Miller

    Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) Randolph S. Zounes

    Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites Bradley L. Terry/Lisa P.
    Gardner (AEHF)

    Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar Joseph E. Dewechter/Jerry W.
    Clark (AESA)

    Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)	Ian A. Ferguson/Brendan S.
    Culley/ Angela D. Thomas

    Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System John S. Warren/Thomas L. Gordon/
    (APKWS) Michele R. Williamson

    Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) Mary K. Quinlan

    Advanced Threat Infrared Jonathan E. Watkins/ Danny G. Owens
    Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System (ATIRCM/CMWS)

    B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP) Don M. Springman/Arthur L. Cobb

    C-130 Avionics Modernization Program Dayna L. Foster/Christopher A.
    Deperro (C-130 AMP)

    C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 Cheryl K. Andrew/Sameena N.
    Ismailjee AMP)

    C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Sameena N. Ismailjee/Cheryl K.
    Andrew Program (C-5 RERP)

    Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) Johana R. Ayers/W. William Russell

    CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F) Wendy P. Smythe/ Leon S. Gill

    Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM) Marcus C. Ferguson/Wendy P. Smythe

    Appendix IV
    GAO Contact and Acknowledgments

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    System Primary Staff

    Future Aircraft Carrier (CVN-21) Brendan S. Culley/Trevor J. Thomson

    DD(X) Destroyer J. Kristopher Keener/Angela D. Thomas

    E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Rae Ann H. Sapp/David R. Schilling
    Aircraft (E-10A)

    E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE) Gary L. Middleton/Bruce H. Thomas

    EA-18G (EA-18G) Christopher R. Miller/Brian T. Mullins

    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Maria A. Durant/Maricela Cherveny

    Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) Alan R. Frazier/Ronald E. Schwenn

    Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM)	Shelby S. Oakley/Ronald E. Schwenn/
    Margaret B. McDavid

    Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Lawrence D. Gaston/John P. Swain
    Artillery Projectile

    F/A-22 Raptor Marvin E. Bonner/Arthur L. Cobb

    Future Combat Systems (FCS)	John P. Swain/ Lawrence D. Gaston/ Marcus C.
    Ferguson

    Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Bruce D. Fairbairn/Steven M. Hunter

    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Ivy G. Hubler

    Global Positioning System II (GPS II) Jean N. Harker/Michael L. Gorin

    Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) Brian T. Mullins/Wesley A. Johnson

    Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) Beverly A. Breen/Carrie R.
    Wilson

    Joint Common Missile Danny G. Owens/Jonathan E. Watkins

    Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Matthew B. Lea/David R. Schilling

    Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Carol T. Mebane/Bradley J. Trainor

    Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1 Ridge C. Bowman/James P.
    Tallon

    Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5 Subrata Ghoshroy/ Paul G.
    Williams

    Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems Bruce D. Fairbairn/Matthew T. Drerup
    (J-UCAS)

    Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) Randolph S. Zounes

    Land Warrior Joel C. Christenson/Candice N. Wright

    Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) J. Kristopher Keener/Angela D. Thomas

    Medium Extended Air Defense System Tana M. Davis (MEADS)

    Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)	Matthew F. Ebert/Ronald E. Schwenn/
    Heather L. Barker

    Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) Richard Y. Horiuchi/Tony A. Beckham

    MQ-9 Predator B Steven M. Hunter/Travis J. Masters

    National Polar-orbiting Operational Suzanne S. Olivieri/ Carol R. Cha/
    Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) James P. Tallon

    Space Based Infrared System High Nancy Rothlisberger/Maricela Cherveny
    (SBIRS High)

           Page 136 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

    Appendix IV
    GAO Contact and Acknowledgments

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    System Primary Staff

    Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Carrie R. Wilson/ Beverly A. Breen

    Space Tracking and Surveillance System Sigrid L. McGinty/Tony A. Beckham
    (STSS)

    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) William S. Lipscomb

    Tactical Tomahawk Missile Bradley J. Trainor/Carol T. Mebane

    Transformational Satellite Communications Arturo Holguin Jr./Travis J.
    Masters System (TSAT)

    V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden
    Aircraft (V-22)

        Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS) Tony A. Beckham/Richard Y. Horiuchi

    Warfighter Information Network-Tactical James P. Tallon/Ridge C. Bowman
    (WIN-T)

    Source: GAO.

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           Page 138 GAO-05-301 Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

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    Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible.
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    May 5, 1997.

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    Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.:
    August 26, 1996.

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