Defense Aquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program 
in 2004 (31-MAR-05, GAO-05-243).				 
                                                                 
Since 1985, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested $85	 
billion in ballistic missile defense programs, with $66.5 billion
more anticipated over the next 7 years through 2011. As a major  
result of this investment, the Department is on the verge of	 
activating our nation's first missile defense system for	 
protecting the United States from intercontinental ballistic	 
missile attacks out of Northeast Asia. This initial		 
capability--referred to as Limited Defensive Operations (LDO)--is
the first step of a national priority to develop, field, and	 
evolve over time an overarching ballistic missile defense system 
(BMDS). To fulfill a congressional mandate, GAO assessed how well
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) met its cost, schedule, testing,
and performance goals during fiscal year 2004. GAO assessed the  
program last year and will continue to provide assessments of MDA
progress through 2006.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-243 					        
    ACCNO:   A20537						        
  TITLE:     Defense Aquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense 
Program in 2004 						 
     DATE:   03/31/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Air defense systems				 
	     Ballistic missiles 				 
	     Budget activities					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Defense appropriations				 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Intercontinental ballistic missiles		 
	     Internal controls					 
	     National defense operations			 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Performance management				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Budget requests					 
	     DOD Ground-based Midcourse Defense 		 
	     Element						 
                                                                 
	     DOD Space Tracking and Surveillance		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     MDA Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     MDA Airborne Laser Program 			 
	     MDA Ballistic Missile Defense System		 
	     MDA Kinetic Energy Interceptor System		 
	     MDA Terminal High Altitude Area Defense		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     SDI Battle Management/Command, Control,		 
	     and Communication System				 
                                                                 
	     SPY-1 Radar					 
	     SM-3 Missile					 
	     Patriot-MEADS Missile Defense Program		 

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GAO-05-243

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Committees

March 2005

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

              Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004

GAO-05-243

[IMG]

March 2005

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004

                                 What GAO Found

By the end of fiscal year 2004, MDA carried out activities needed to field
an initial missile defense capability, as planned. These included delivery
and emplacement of Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors; upgrades
of ground-based radars; enhancements to Aegis Navy ships for improved
surveillance and tracking; development of command and control software for
system operation; and tests to verify that components of this initial
capability can communicate as part of an integrated whole. However, the
performance of the system remains uncertain and unverified, because a
number of flight tests slipped into fiscal year 2005 and MDA has not
successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using
operationallyrepresentative hardware and software. Additionally, based on
our analysis of prime contractor cost and schedule performance, the
development of BMDS elements cost approximately $370 million more than
planned during fiscal year 2004. To cover much of this cost overrun, MDA
deferred work planned for fiscal year 2004, redirected funds earmarked for
other programs, and requested additional funds in its fiscal year 2005
budget to cover the cost of deferred work.

In the future, MDA will likely face increased funding risks. MDA plans to
request about $10 billion annually from DOD for BMDS development,
procurement, and sustainment. However, DOD's acquisition programs are
likely to be competing for a decreasing share of the total federal budget
and MDA's programs are competing against hundreds of other DOD programs.
Also, MDA continues to budget for unanticipated cost growth. For example,
the Airborne Laser program plans to spend an additional $1.5 billion to
develop and demonstrate a prototype aircraft. Furthermore, procurement and
sustainment will demand increased funding as more missile defense
components are fielded over time.

MDA policy defines a block as an integrated set of capabilities fielded
during the 2-year block cycle, but we observed that MDA's fielding goals
do not consistently match its cost goals. For example, Block 2004 funds
are used to procure 32 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense missiles, but of
these missiles, 11 will be delivered in 2004-2005 and the remaining
missiles will be delivered during 2006-2007. MDA officials intend to
clarify the block policy in the near future to better align the cost and
fielding goals.

Elements of Ballistic Missile Defense System

First fielded block Future blocks

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Airborne Laser

Command, Control, Battle Management, and Kinetic Energy
InterceptorsCommunications

Ground-based Midcourse Defense Space Tracking and Surveillance System

Patriot Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Assessment of Scheduled Activities in Fiscal Year 2004
Assessment of Testing in Fiscal Year 2004
Assessment of System Performance in Fiscal Year 2004
Assessment of System Cost in Fiscal Year 2004
Funding Risks Expected to Increase for Ballistic Missile Defense

Program
MDA Is Not Consistently Matching Cost and Fielding Goals
Conclusion
Recommendation for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

1

3

4 10 14 18 22

26 29 30 31 31

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II Summary

Appendix II Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

Element Description
History
Developmental Phases
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004
Assessment of Scheduled Activities
Assessment of Element Performance
Assessment of Element Cost

36

37

37 37 37 39 39 46 47

Appendix III Summary 52

Appendix III Airborne Laser 53

Element Description 53
History 54
Developmental Phases 54
Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments 56
Assessment of Scheduled Activities 56
Assessment of Element Performance 58
Assessment of Element Cost 59

Appendix IV
Appendix IV

Summary

Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications

Element Description
History
Developmental Phases
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004
Assessment of Scheduled Activities
Assessment of Element Performance
Assessment of Element Cost

64

65

65 65 66 67 67 69 69

Appendix V
Appendix V

Summary

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Element Description
History
Developmental Phases
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004
Assessment of Scheduled Activities
Assessment of Element Performance
Assessment of Element Cost

74

75

75 76 77 78 78 85 86

Appendix VI Summary 90

Appendix VI Kinetic Energy Interceptors 91

Element Description 91
History 91
Developmental Phases 92
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004 93
Assessment of Scheduled Activities 93
Assessment of Element Performance 96
Assessment of Element Cost 97

Appendix VII Appendix VII Summary

Space Tracking and Surveillance System

Element Description
History
Developmental Phases
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004
Assessment of Scheduled Activities
Assessment of Element Performance
Assessment of Element Cost

100

101

101 101 102 102 102 104 105

                          Appendix VIII Appendix VIII

Summary

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Element Description
History
Developmental Phases
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004
Assessment of Scheduled Activities
Assessment of Element Performance
Assessment of Element Cost

110

111

111 111 112 113 113 116 117

Appendix IX Information on the Army's Missile Defense Programs 120

Background 120 Combined Aggregate Program 121 Patriot/MEADS CAP Funding
122

Appendix X Scope and Methodology

             Appendix XI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 127

Tables

Table 1: BMDS Elements 6 Table 2: MDA Block 2004 Fielded Configuration
Goals 9 Table 3: Progress toward Achieving LDO 11

Table 4: Progress toward Achieving Block 2004 Fielded

Configuration Goals\ 12
Table 5: Status of Element Testing-Planned and Achieved 14
Table 6: Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance in

Fiscal Year 2004 23
Table 7: Status of Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned

Accomplishments-Fielding Activities 40
Table 8: Aegis Ship Availability for the BMD Mission (Block 2004) 41
Table 9: SM-3 Missile Deliveries 41
Table 10: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-

Flight Test and LRS&T Activities 44
Table 11: Planned Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2005 Accomplishments-
Remaining Block 2004 Flight Tests 45
Table 12: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-

Design Reviews 45
Table 13: Aegis BMD Cost 47
Table 14: Status of ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Planned

Accomplishments-BC/FC Segment 56
Table 15: Status of ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Planned

Accomplishments-Laser Segment 57
Table 16: ABL Cost 59
Table 17: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Accomplishments-Software

Development and Testing 68
Table 18: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-

Making System Operational 69
Table 19: C2BMC Cost 70
Table 20: Status of GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Component Development 79
Table 21: Status of Major GMD Flight Tests (Fiscal Year 2004) 81
Table 22: Status of GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned

Accomplishments-Fielding Initial Capability 84
Table 23: GMD Cost 86
Table 24: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned

Accomplishments-Contract Award and Planning 94

Table 25: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned
Accomplishments-Design Activities

Table 26: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned
Accomplishments-Key Test Activities

Table 27: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned
Accomplishments-Risk Reduction Activities

Table 28: KEI High-Risk Areas

Table 29: KEI Cost

95

95

96 96 98

Table 30: Status of STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Space
Segment

Table 31: Status of STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Ground
Segment

Table 32: STSS Cost

Table 33: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Design
Activities

Table 34: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Build
Activities

Table 35: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned

                                      103

                                    104 106

                                      113

                                      114

Accomplishments-Integration and Test Activities 114 Table 36: Planned
THAAD Flight Testing 116 Table 37: THAAD Cost 117 Table 38: Patriot/MEADS
CAP Planned Costs 123

Figures

Figure 1: Phases of a Ballistic Missile's Trajectory
Figure 2: Breakout of MDA Budget
Figure 3: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule

Performance Figure 4: ABL Block 2004 Prime Contract Figure 5: ABL Fiscal
Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance Figure 6: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004
Cost and Schedule Performance Figure 7: Components of the GMD Element
Figure 8: GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance Figure 9:
STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance Figure 10: THAAD
Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule

Performance 5 9

                                                        49 61 62 72 76 88 107

119

Abbreviations

ABL Airborne Laser
Aegis BMD Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
AI&T Assembly, Integration, and Testing
BC/FC Beam Control / Fire Control
BILL Beacon Illuminator Laser
BMC2 Battle Management, Command and Control
BMC4I Battle Management, Command, Control,

Communications, Computer, and Intelligence BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense
System

BV Booster Validation
C2BMC Command, Control, Battle Management, and

Communications CAP Combined Aggregate Program COIL Chemical Oxygen-Iodine
Laser CONOPS Concept of Operations CONUS Continental United States CTF
Control Test Flight DOD Department of Defense DOT&E Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation EVM Earned Value Management FM Flight Mission FT
Flight Test FY fiscal year GMD Ground-based Midcourse Defense IBR
Integrated Baseline Review ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IFICS
In-Flight Interceptor Communications System IFT Integrated Flight Test IGT
Integrated Ground Test IT Integrated Test KEI Kinetic Energy Interceptors
LDO Limited Defensive Operations LRS&T Long-Range Surveillance and
Tracking MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System MDA Missile Defense
Agency MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile MSE Missile Segment Enhancement
NFIRE Near Field Infrared Experiment O&S Operations and Support OSC
Orbital Sciences Corporation OTA Other Transaction Agreement PAC-3 Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 PMRF Pacific Missile Range Facility RDT&E Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation SBIRS Space-Based Infrared System SBX
Sea-Based X-band Radar SCF Seeker Characterization Flight SDACS Solid
Divert and Attitude Control System SICO System Integration and Checkout
SIL System Integration Laboratory SM Standard Missile SRBM Short Range
Ballistic Missile SRR System Requirements Review

STSS Space Tracking and Surveillance System
TILL Target Illuminator Laser
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
UEWR Upgraded Early Warning Radar
USNORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command
USPACOM U.S. Pacific Command
USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command
VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base
WSMR White Sands Missile Range

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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

March 31, 2005

Congressional Committees

Our nation's first missile defense system for protecting the United States
from intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attacks is expected to be
activated for defensive operations in the coming months. This initial
capability is the culmination of efforts on the part of the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) and other Department of Defense (DOD) components in
response to the President's December 2002 directive to begin fielding an
initial set of missile defense capabilities to meet the near-term
ballistic missile threat to our nation. It also represents a major result
of the $85 billion invested in ballistic missile defense programs since
fiscal year 1985. DOD's investment in missile defense continues, as
indicated by proposed budgets for the next few years. The Department
estimates MDA will need $66.5 billion between fiscal years 2005 and 2011
to continue work in this area, with fiscal year 2005 appropriations of
$8.8 billion accounting for 13 percent of DOD's total research and
development budget.1

The initial capability, which DOD refers to as Limited Defensive
Operations (LDO), is the first step of a national priority to develop,
field, and evolve over time an overarching Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS). While DOD envisions a BMDS capable of protecting the United
States, deployed forces, friends, and allies from ballistic missile
attacks of all ranges, the LDO capability is primarily designed to provide
some protection of the United States against long-range ballistic missile
attacks out of Northeast Asia.

In developing the BMDS, MDA is attempting to follow an evolutionary
acquisition strategy in which the development and fielding of capabilities
is pursued in 2-year blocks. The configuration of a given block builds on
the work completed in previous blocks. Block 2004, being deployed during
the calendar years 2004-2005, is the first biennial increment of the BMDS

1DOD also funds missile defense activities outside of MDA. The Army
requested approximately $4.5 billion for the development and procurement
of its Combined Aggregate Program-consisting of Patriot and the Medium
Extended Air Defense System- during fiscal years 2006 through 2011.
Appendix IX provides additional information on this program.

to provide an integrated set of capabilities. LDO represents an interim
capability on the path to full Block 2004 fielding.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 directed DOD
to establish schedule, testing, performance, and cost goals for its
ballistic missile defense programs.2 As established by DOD, the goals
highlight, by block, overall cost, schedule, and performance objectives
for BMDS development and specify the quantities and locations of specific
BMDS components3 planned for operational use. The act also directed us to
assess, at the conclusion of each of fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the
extent to which MDA achieved the goals it established. We delivered an
assessment covering fiscal year 2003 to Congress in April 2004.4

Congress has since continued to require our assessment through fiscal year
2006.5 To fulfill this mandate, we examined the progress that MDA made in
fiscal year 2004 toward its stated goals. For example, many activities
completed in fiscal year 2004 by the various element programs pertain to
the completion of the LDO capability, which is an integral part of the
Block 2004 goals. While conducting this review, we identified issues
associated with MDA's ability to fund future development and fielding of
its missile defense capabilities and with MDA's application of the block
approach. Our report includes these observations.

The accomplishment of MDA program goals is ultimately achieved through the
efforts of individual BMDS elements, such as Ground-based Midcourse
Defense and Airborne Laser. Therefore, we based our assessment on the
progress made in fiscal year 2004 by those elements that are under the
management of MDA and that are being developed as part of a block
capability. The elements we reviewed accounted for 72 percent of MDA's
fiscal year 2004 research and development budget. Details of our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix X.

2 Pub. L. No. 107-107, section 232.

3 Functional pieces of system equipment, such as radars and interceptors,
are referred to as "components."

4 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).

5 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, section 233.

Results in Brief

By the end of fiscal year 2004, MDA carried out activities needed to field
an initial missile defense capability, as planned. This included delivery
and emplacement of Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors; upgrades
of ground-based radars; enhancements to Aegis Navy ships for improved
surveillance and tracking; development of command and control software for
system operation; and tests to verify that components of this initial
capability can communicate as part of an integrated whole. However, the
performance of the system remains uncertain and unverified, because MDA
has not successfully completed a flight test using
operationallyrepresentative hardware and software. Additionally, the
development of system elements cost approximately $370 million more than
planned during fiscal year 2004. To cover much of this cost overrun, MDA
deferred work planned for fiscal year 2004, redirected funds earmarked for
other programs, and requested additional funds in its fiscal year 2005
budget to cover the cost of deferred work.

Two issues have relevance for decision makers in Congress and DOD when
considering future budget decisions for the missile defense program.
First, although MDA has received nearly all funding requested in the past
few years, the agency is expected to face increased funding risks-arising
from sources both outside and within DOD-in the years ahead. MDA plans to
request, on average, about $10 billion in research and development funding
per year over the 2006-2011 time period to support continued development,
procurement, and sustainment of hardware and software that MDA is
fielding.6 However, DOD's acquisition programs are likely to be competing
for a decreasing share of the total federal budget that is allocated to
discretionary (non-mandatory) spending. Also, within DOD, MDA's programs
are competing against hundreds of technology development and acquisition
programs for DOD's research and development budget-$70 billion in fiscal
year 2005-and cost growth of existing weapon programs7 puts even more
pressure on MDA's share of research and development dollars. Additionally,
funding risks can be expected from cost growth of ongoing MDA programs.
For example, as part of the restructuring of MDA's Airborne Laser program,
the cost to

6 Congress authorized DOD's use of funds appropriated for MDA research,
development, test, and evaluation for the fielding of ballistic missile
defense capabilities. Pub. L. No. 108-136, section 222; Pub. L. No.
108-375, section 231.

7 We found, for example, that research and development cost estimates grew
$6.7 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter in calendar year 2003 and $9.2
billion for the Future Combat System in fiscal year 2004.

accomplish the objective of developing and demonstrating a prototype
aircraft increased by $1.5 billion. Finally, procurement and sustainment
will demand increasing levels of MDA's funding as more components are
fielded over time.

Second, we observed that MDA's cost goal for a given block-which, by
definition, is MDA's budget for all developmental and fielding activities
associated with the block-is not aligned with the block's fielding goals.
According to MDA policy, for example, interceptors identified with the
Block 2004 fielding goals and fielded during calendar years 2004-2005
should be funded as part of the Block 2004 cost goal. However, we found
that MDA has not been consistently matching a block's cost and fielding
goals. For example, Block 2004 funds are used to procure 32 Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense missiles, but of these missiles, 11 will be
delivered in 2004-2005 and the remaining missiles will be delivered during
2006-2007. Also, counter to the definition of a block as an integrated set
of capabilities fielded during the 2-year block window, the Airborne Laser
program will not field any capabilities during Block 2004 although Block
2004 funds are used in the program's development.

We are recommending that MDA clarify its block policy to ensure that a
block's cost and fielding goals are consistently aligned. DOD concurred
with our recommendation.

Background 	Ballistic missile defense is a challenging mission for DOD,
requiring a unique combination of defensive components-space-based
sensors, surveillance and tracking radars, advanced interceptors, command
and control, and reliable communications-working together as an integrated
system. A typical scenario to engage an ICBM is expected to unfold as
follows:

o  	Overhead satellites detect a missile launch and alert the command
authority of a possible attack.

o  	Upon receiving the alert, the BMDS directs its land- and sea-based
radars to track the missile complex and (if so designed) to identify the
warhead from decoys and associated objects.

o  	Based on accurate track data, an interceptor-consisting of a "kill
vehicle" mounted atop a booster-is launched. The interceptor boosts itself
toward the predicted intercept point and releases its kill vehicle to
engage the threat.

o  	The kill vehicle uses its onboard sensors and divert thrusters to
acquire, identify, and steer itself into the warhead. With a combined
closing speed on the order of 10 kilometers per second (22,000 miles per
hour), the warhead is destroyed through a "hit-to-kill" collision with the
kill vehicle.

To meet this challenge, DOD intends to develop and field a ballistic
missile defense system capable of defeating ballistic missiles during all
phases of flight (see fig. 1).

Booster Burnout Boost phase Midcourse phase Midcourse phase Boost phase is 
the first phase of a ballistic missile's trajectory, during which a        
missile's rocket motors are thrusting. This phase typically lasts 3-5      
minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles. Midcourse phase is the    
phase after which the missile has stopped thrusting and the deployed       
warhead and associated objects (e.g., decoys) travel through space on a    
predictable path. This phase can last 20 minutes for intercontinental      
ballistic missiles and provides the largest window of opportunity for      
intercepting the enemy missile. Terminal phase is the final phase of a     
ballistic missile's trajectory, lasting about a minute or less. This is    
when the warhead reenters the atmosphere. To defend against a ballistic    
missile attack during this phase, the defensive capability must be         
positioned close to the warhead's intended target. (100 km                 
altitude)Reentry                                                           
                                 Terminal phase                               

Source: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Under the evolutionary, capabilities-based acquisition strategy being
pursued by DOD, the BMDS has no fixed design or final architecture, and
there are no firm requirements. According to DOD, this approach gives MDA
increased flexibility to develop a system that can more readily respond to
a changing threat and more easily insert new technologies for enhancing
system performance.

The missile defense capability of Block 2004 is primarily one for
defending the United States against ICBM attacks from Northeast Asia and
the Middle East. It is built around the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) element, augmented by shipboard Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(Aegis BMD) radars, and integrated by the Command, Control, Battle
Management, and Communications (C2BMC) element. The Block 2004

BMDS also includes the Army's Patriot element for point defense of
deployed U.S. forces against short-and medium-range ballistic missiles.
The Block 2006 program builds directly upon Block 2004. It continues
element development and funds the next increment of fielding that adds
interceptors, new radars, and enhanced battle management capabilities.

MDA is also carrying out an extensive research and development effort to
expand its current operational capability into future blocks. During
fiscal year 2004, MDA funded the development of four other major BMDS
elements-Airborne Laser (ABL), Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI), Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), and Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD)-in addition to those elements comprising the Block 2004
defensive capability. MDA intends to integrate these elements, when ready,
into future BMDS blocks. Table 1 provides a brief description of these
elements, and more information about them is provided in appendixes II
through VIII of this report.8

              Table 1: BMDS Elements Element Missile defense role

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense	Aegis BMD is a ship-based system designed
to destroy short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles during the midcourse
phase of flight. Its mission is twofold: to protect deployed U.S. forces,
allies, and friends against ballistic missile attacks, and to serve as a
forward-deployed BMDS sensor, especially in support of the GMD mission.
MDA has plans to deliver up to 66 Aegis BMD missiles- the Standard Missile
3-and 18 ships by the end of fiscal year 2009.

Airborne Laser 	ABL is an air-based system designed to destroy all classes
of ballistic missiles during the boost phase of flight. ABL employs a
high-energy chemical laser to rupture a missile's motor casing, causing
the missile to lose thrust or flight control. MDA plans to demonstrate
proof of concept in a system demonstration no earlier than 2008. The
availability of a militarily useful capability is contingent on the
success of the demonstration.

Command, Control, Battle Management, and C2BMC is the integrating and
controlling element of the BMDS. Although it is

Communications 	part of the Block 2004 defensive capability, its role
during this period is limited to mission planning and situational
awareness-monitoring system status and missile trajectories.

8 Table 1 lists those elements of the BMDS for which we completed a
detailed review of progress achieved in fiscal year 2004. Because we were
directed to assess MDA's progress in achieving its program goals and MDA
does not have funding and management responsibility for the Patriot
system, our review of this program-provided in appendix IX-is not as
detailed. Rather, we provide information on how Patriot's eventual
replacement, Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), will be inserted
into fielded Patriot units.

                          Element Missile defense role

Ground-based Midcourse Defense 	GMD is a ground-based system designed to
destroy ICBMs during the midcourse phase of flight. Its mission is to
protect the U.S. homeland against ballistic missile attacks from Northeast
Asia and the Middle East. GMD is part of the Block 2004 defensive
capability and has plans to field 18 interceptors by 2005. MDA plans to
field 20 additional interceptors in Alaska by 2010.

Kinetic Energy Interceptors	KEI is a land-based element designed to
destroy ICBMs during the boost and ascent phases of flight. MDA expects to
demonstrate a defensive capability through flight testing during Block
2012 and expand this capability to sea basing in subsequent blocks.

Space Tracking and Surveillance System	The Block 2006 STSS element
consists of a constellation of two demonstration satellites. MDA intends
to use these satellites for testing missile warning and tracking
capabilities. Any real operational capability of next-generation
satellites, however, will not be available until the next decade.

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 	THAAD is a ground-based element
designed to destroy short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles during the
late-midcourse and terminal phases of flight. Its mission is to defend
deployed U.S. forces and population centers. MDA plans to field a Block
2006/2008 unit consisting of 24 missiles in 2009.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

As part of MDA's planning process, MDA defines overarching program goals
for the development and fielding of BMDS block configurations. The goals
describe the composition of a block (components and elements under
development and planned for fielding), provide the costs and schedules
associated with element development and fielding, and summarize
performance capabilities at the component and system levels.9 A block's
cost goal is the portion of MDA's budget dedicated to development and
fielding activities associated with the block.

MDA has established Block 2004 and 2006 "Development Goals" for the
continued development and testing of six BMDS elements-ABL, Aegis BMD,
C2BMC, GMD, STSS, and THAAD-and stand-alone components such as
forward-deployed radars.10 These goals identify the developmental areas
MDA is funding as part of the Block 2004 and 2006 programs. The associated
cost goals, which are the planned budgets for these activities, are
approximately $5.7 billion and $12.2 billion for Block 2004 and 2006,
respectively.

9 MDA goals are formally detailed in the agency's budget estimates and in
the top-level MDA document, Statement of Goals.

10 The KEI program is funded by the Block 2012 program and, accordingly,
is not part of the Block 2004 and 2006 goals.

MDA also established a complementary set of goals-referred to as "Fielded
Configuration" Goals11-in response to the President's December 2002
direction to begin fielding a limited ballistic missile defense
capability. The fielding goals build directly upon the Development Goals
but aim to deliver an operational missile defense capability during a
given block's time frame. For example, Block 2004 goals identify the
components of the BMDS available for defensive operations by the end of
December 2005. MDA states that the cost goals associated with the Block
2004 and 2006 fieldings are $1.7 billion and $3.8 billion, respectively.
Therefore, the total cost goals for Block 2004 and 2006 are $7.4 billion
and $16.0 billion, respectively.

Figure 2 depicts MDA's total budget between fiscal years 2005 and 2011
broken out by block.12 As illustrated, funding for a given block spans
more than the 2-year period. For example, MDA estimates it will need about
$12.0 billion to fund Block 2008 activities over the next 7 years through
2011.

11 In budget documentation submitted in February 2004, MDA referred to
these goals as "Operational Alert Configuration" Goals. "Fielded
Configuration" is new terminology.

12 Mission area investment noted in figure 2 represent funding of major
mission areas that contribute to the development and enhancement of all
blocks. For example, these investments fund system design and engineering
activities, testing, advanced concept development, and other special
programs.

                        Figure 2: Breakout of MDA Budget

                              Dollars in millions

10,000

                                     8,000

                                     6,000

                                     4,000

                                     2,000

                                       0

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

                       Block 2014 Mission area investment

Block 2008 Block 2006 Block 2004

Block 2012

Block 2010 Source: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Note: MDA's total budget for a given fiscal year is represented by the
expenditures for all block activities plus mission area investments. For
example, MDA's fiscal year 2005 budget of $8.806 billion is comprised of
$1.605 billion for mission area investments, $2.854 billion for Block 2004
activities, $3.216 billion for Block 2006 activities, $817 million for
Block 2008 activities, $48 million for Block 2010 activities, and $267
million for Block 2012 activities.

Many activities completed in fiscal year 2004 by the various element
programs pertain to the completion of the LDO capability-the initial
capability fielded by MDA. Although LDO is not formally listed by MDA as a
Block 2004 goal, it does include the delivery of a capability on the path
to meeting the fielding goals. Table 2 summarizes MDA's fielding goals.

              Table 2: MDA Block 2004 Fielded Configuration Goals

LDO Block 2004 BMDS element Functionality (Sept. 30, 2004) (Dec. 31, 2005)

GMD        Defend the U.S. o    5 Interceptors    o     20 Interceptors    
             homeland against                           
            ICBM attacks      o  Upgraded Cobra Dane o   Upgraded Cobra Dane  
                                        radar                   radar         
                              o   1 Upgraded early   o       2 Upgraded early 
                                    warning radar              warning radars 
                                       (Beale)          (Beale, Fylingdales)  
                              o  Fire control nodes  o    Sea-based X-band    
                                                                radar         
                                                     o   Fire control nodes   

LDO Block 2004 BMDS element Functionality (Sept. 30, 2004) (Dec. 31, 2005)

Aegis BMD Sea-based engagement capability  o  3 Aegis destroyers
(long-range  o  Up to 9 missiles

against short- and medium-range surveillance and tracking only)  o  10
Aegis destroyers (long-rangeballistic missiles; early tracking of
surveillance & tracking only)ICBMs as a BMDS sensor

o  3 Aegis cruisers (engagement)

C2BMC Integrating element of the BMDS;  o  Software Build 4.3  o  Software
Build 4.5

situational awareness; mission  o  Suites (command centers) and  o  Suites
(command centers) and planning supporting hardware at various supporting
hardware at various locations locations

Assessment of Scheduled Activities in Fiscal Year 2004

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Note: Performance goals are not presented in this report because they are
classified.

The GMD, Aegis BMD, and C2BMC programs completed scheduled activities in
fiscal year 2004 necessary to support the fielding of LDO, an integral
part of Block 2004. Most notably, the GMD program completed construction
activities at GMD sites, delivered and emplaced five GMD interceptors in
their silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and completed the upgrade of the Cobra
Dane radar. The Aegis BMD program upgraded three destroyers for the
long-range surveillance and tracking mission that supports homeland
defense against ICBMs. In addition, the C2BMC program completed software
development, activated control centers, and worked to integrate elements
of the system.

These programs also continued developmental and fielding activities in
early fiscal year 2005 to enhance LDO so that the full Block 2004
capability could be realized by the end of calendar year 2005. For
example, the GMD program delivered a sixth interceptor at Fort Greely in
October and two interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base in December,
completed the upgrade of the Beale early warning radar, and initiated the
upgrade of the Fylingdales early warning radar. In addition, the Aegis BMD
program completed the assembly of five missiles and continued with
software development in the upgrade of its cruisers and destroyers.
Similarly, the C2BMC program continued with software development and
testing leading to the final Block 2004 version.

Progress made toward achieving program goals relative to the fielding of
the LDO and Block 2004 capabilities is summarized in tables 3 and 4,
respectively. Detailed evaluations of activities completed in fiscal year
2004 by all BMDS elements are given in appendices II through VIII of this
report.

Table 3: Progress toward Achieving LDO

BMDS LDO
element Functionality (Sept. 30, 2004) Progress assessment

GMD	Defend the U.S. homeland  o  5 Interceptors against ICBM attacks from 
o  Upgraded Cobra Dane Northeast Asia radar

o  	1 Upgraded early warning radar (Beale)

o  Fire control nodes

Aegis BMD	Early tracking of ICBMs as  o  3 Aegis destroyers (longa BMDS
sensor range surveillance and

The GMD program emplaced 5 interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, by
September 2004. Many site preparation activities, including the
construction of facilities and interceptor silos at Fort Greely to prepare
the system for LDO, were completed.

The GMD program completed the upgrade of the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya
Island, Alaska. The upgrades, which consist of hardware and software
improvements, enable the radar to more accurately track launched missiles
for the planning of intercept engagements.

The upgrade of the early warning radar at Beale Air Force Base,
California, was completed in December 2004. Although radar hardware
installation is complete, final software installation and testing are
ongoing with completion expected in the middle of fiscal year 2005.

Aegis BMD will be used as a forward-deployed sensor to provide
surveillance and early tracking of long-range ballistic missiles to
support the GMD mission. This is being accomplished through the
improvement of Aegis BMD software and hardware. The Aegis BMD program
office completed the upgrade of 2 destroyers for this role in September
2004; a third destroyer became available in October 2004. All 3 destroyers
are available for operations.

                                 tracking only)

C2BMC Integrating element of o        Software Build 4.3 The C2BMC program 
         the                            office completed activities needed to 
                                     Suites (command centers) ready the C2BMC 
           BMDS; situational        element for LDO. Of significance, the and 
           awareness; mission   o       supporting hardware at LDO "build" of 
                planning            C2BMC, known as spiral 4.3, was delivered 
                                           various locations and C2BMC suites 
                                          activated. The program also carried 
                                     out a number of activities enabling BMDS 
                                                              integration and 
                                              warfighter training.            

                    Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Table 4: Progress toward Achieving Block 2004 Fielded Configuration Goals\

BMDS Block 2004
element Functionality (Dec. 31, 2005) Progress assessment

GMD	Defend the U.S. homeland against ICBM attacks from Northeast Asia and
the Middle East  o  20 Interceptors

o  Upgraded Cobra Dane radar

o  	2 Upgraded early warning radars (Beale, Fylingdales)

o  Sea-based X-band radar

o  Fire control nodes The GMD program continued to add interceptors to its
inventory. As of December 2004, 6 interceptors are in silos at Fort
Greely, Alaska, and 2 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The GMD
program aims to increase its inventory of interceptors for the Block 2004
defensive capability to 20 by December 2005. However, MDA designated 2
interceptors as test assets. Therefore, the Block 2004 GMD inventory will
consist of 18 interceptors.

The GMD program began upgrading the early warning radar at Fylingdales
Airbase in England. Facility modifications are on track to be completed by
the first quarter of fiscal year 2006.

The GMD program office completed a variety of activities in the
development of the sea-based X-band radar but assesses its planned
completion by the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 as high risk.

Aegis BMD	Sea-based engagement capability against short-and medium-range
ballistic missiles; early tracking of ICBMs as a BMDS sensor  o  Up to 9
missiles

o  	10 Aegis destroyers (longrange surveillance & tracking only)

o  3 Aegis cruisers (engagement) As of December 2004, the Aegis BMD
program completed assembly of 5 missiles, which are available for
fielding. Program officials stated that the program expects to have
available a slightly smaller inventory of missiles by December 2005 than
was originally planned.

The Aegis BMD program aims to increase to 10 by December 2005 the number
of upgraded destroyers providing surveillance and early tracking of
long-range ballistic missiles in support of the GMD mission. As of January
2005, 5 had been upgraded.

The Aegis BMD program is also upgrading Aegis cruisers for the element's
engagement role; that is, to defend against short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles. This requires physical modification to the ships as
well as software upgrades for the engagement role. As of December 2004, 1
cruiser-a ship dedicated to testing- has been upgraded. The program
expects to complete the upgrade of 1 additional cruiser (rather than 2) by
December 2005.

C2BMC Integrating element o  Software Build 4.5  The C2BMC program office  
                          of                        continued with activities 
                                                    needed to ready the C2BMC 
         the BMDS;                                       element for the full 
         situational            Suites (command     Block 2004 capability. In 
         awareness; mission  o  centers) and          particular, development 
         planning               supporting hardware     of the interim build, 
                                at various          spiral 4.4, was completed 
                                locations               in November 2004. The 
                                                    program office            
                                                    anticipates that          
                                                    development of the final  
                                                    Block 2004 build, spiral  
                                                    4.5, will be completed in 
                                                    March                     
                                                    2005, after which testing 
                                                           will begin.        

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

DOD did not activate the LDO capability MDA developed and fielded.
Although the LDO capability was expected to be placed on alert by the end
of September 2004, officials from the office of the Commander of U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) told us that September 30, 2004, was a
planning date rather than a "hard date." The officials indicated that the
system had not been put on alert for the following reasons:

o  	Shakedown. Since October 2004, the system has been undergoing a
"shakedown"-a necessary transition phase between development and
operations. During this time, the system is exercised as though an attack
is under way. It enables the warfighter to become familiar with the system
and, importantly, to plan for unexpected failures.

o  	Training. While initial training of operators has been completed, more
is needed. For weapon systems in general, the warfighter does not have a
military capability without trained operators, and training cannot begin
until a weapon system is delivered (or at least far along in development).

o  	Policy. USSTRATCOM must receive an Execution Order from the Secretary
of Defense before the LDO capability is declared operational. This order,
which would reflect DOD policy, is to include a clear identification of
command and control relationships. USSTRATCOM plans to advise the
Secretary of Defense on the military utility of the system and could
advise against declaring the system operational if, for example, more
testing were needed to increase the command's confidence in the system's
effectiveness. Also, the concept of operations (CONOPS) was not finalized,
and issues such as the integration of defensive and offensive operations
still had to be worked out.

USSTRATCOM officials further explained that the declaration of LDO may or
may not mean the system is "on alert" for defensive operations-LDO
operation is more complicated than "being on" or "being off" alert. For
example, the system could be in "developmental mode" when operated by MDA
for testing but capable of being transitioned to an "operational mode" for
defensive operations given sufficient time.13 As of March 2005, DOD had
not announced a specific date for activating the initial missile defense
capability.

13 Additional details on system availability and readiness are classified.

Assessment of Testing in Fiscal Year 2004

MDA completed a number of ground tests and exercises in fiscal year 2004,
but key flight tests using LDO-configured components were delayed. For
example, MDA verified integration and connectivity between its GMD, Aegis
BMD, and C2BMC elements, and the warfighter participated in several
missile defense exercises (wargames) as part of their training to
understand and operate the system. However, the GMD program office
conducted two booster tests (non-intercept attempts) in fiscal year 2004
even though six flight tests were planned. As a result, GMD interceptors
were emplaced in silos before flight testing was completed to verify that
LDO hardware and software could function in an operational environment.

Significant Testing Was A summary of significant testing completed during
fiscal year 2004 by each

Completed 	of the respective element programs is presented in table 5.
More thorough discussions of element testing are given in appendices II
through VIII of this report.

            Table 5: Status of Element Testing-Planned and Achieved

Element Key testing accomplished

Aegis BMD	The Aegis BMD program conducted Flight Mission 6 (FM-6) in
December 2003, during which an SM-3 missile successfully intercepted a
short-range ballistic missile target. In addition, the Aegis BMD element
participated in non-intercept test events to assess the element's
long-range tracking and surveillance (LRS&T) function-that is, using its
shipboard SPY-1 radar to track long-range ballistic missiles-and to verify
connectivity with the BMDS, that is, pass track data to the C2BMC and GMD
elements.

The program also conducted a series of ground tests focused on validating
design updates to its Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS)-a
collection of solid-fuel thrusters used to steer the kinetic warhead (kill
vehicle) into its designated target. In response to a flight test failure
in 2003, the program modified the design of this subcomponent to improve
its performance and reliability during high-energy pulse operation.

ABL 	The ABL program demonstrated "First Light"-the combined operation of
individual laser modules to generate a single laser beam-in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005 (Nov. 2004). Although the achievement of
"First Light" is a key milestone for the program, it was not intended to
be an operational demonstration of a high-power laser, that is, at full
power and for the length of time needed to shoot down a boosting missile.
Rather, the laser's operation for a fraction of a second demonstrated
successful integration of subsystems.

The ABL program also completed "First Flight" in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2005 (Dec. 2004). Also a key milestone for the program, "First
Flight" demonstrated the flight worthiness of the demonstrator aircraft
with its newly installed laser beam control system.

C2BMC	The C2BMC program conducted system-level testing of its LDO
software, spiral 4.3, during fiscal year 2004 and into fiscal year 2005.
Spiral 4.3 was tested in a number of venues, including Pacific

ac

Explorer III, Glory Trip 185,b a GMD-focused System Integration and
Checkout, and wargames that enabled the warfighter to exercise the C2BMC
in a simulated operational environment.

Element Key testing accomplished

GMD	During fiscal year 2004, the GMD program conducted two non-intercept
flight tests-one for each of its Lockheed and Orbital Sciences Corporation
(OSC) boosters. Booster objectives were achieved in both flight tests,
however, the mock kill vehicle failed to deploy from the Lockheed booster.
The Lockheed booster test was conducted 11 months late because of problems
with a propellant vendor. The OSC booster test was conducted 6 months
late.

GMD conducted a series of integrated ground tests in fiscal year 2004.
These tests employed

actual GMD-component processors integrated together in a
hardware-in-the-loop facility that

emulated GMD operation in a simulated environment. They also included
warfighter participation to

aid in the development of operational concepts. c

Finally, the GMD program performed a series of System Integration and
Checkouts of its fielded components. While these checkouts did not assess
element performance, they demonstrated connectivity, functionality, and
integration as part of final preparations for defensive operations.

KEI 	The KEI program initiated element development in December 2003 when
MDA selected Northrop Grumman as the prime contractor. At this early stage
of development, no significant testing has been conducted by the program
office.

Because of the need to restructure the prime contract in response to
reduced funding, KEI's first integrated flight test is planned for no
earlier than 2010, depending on the outcome of the program's re-planning.

STSS 	MDA is currently working on the first increment of STSS, which is
focused on the preparation and launch of two demonstration satellites
partially built under the former Space Based Infrared System Low program.
MDA plans to launch these satellites in 2007. At that time, testing will
be conducted to assess how well the satellites perform surveillance and
tracking functions.

THAAD	The THAAD flight-test program consists of 15 flight-test events
divided among Blocks 2006 and 2008. Because of delays in booster
deliveries arising from the need for a new propellant vendor, the first
set of flight tests have been delayed 3-5 months. The element's first
test, a control test flight of the missile (non-intercept attempt), is
planned to be conducted in the third quarter of fiscal year 2005, a
two-quarter slip. The element's first intercept attempt, Flight Test 4, is
scheduled to be conducted during the second quarter of fiscal year 2006, a
two-quarter slip.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

aPacific Explorer exercises are field exercises to demonstrate BMDS
connectivity. An Aegis destroyer participates by tracking an actual
missile (or a simulated target) and passes track data to the C2BMC.

bGlory Trips are live flight tests during which a Minuteman III missile is
launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base as part of Follow-on Test and
Evaluation.

cSystem Integration and Checkouts are conducted by the GMD program to
verify connectivity, functionality, and integration of system components.
They are not used to assess system performance.

                            Delays and Cancellations
                            of GMD Flight Tests Slow
                            Attainment of Knowledge

The GMD program conducts integrated flight tests (IFT) to realistically
demonstrate element operation using actual hardware and software. MDA
planned to conduct several flight tests during fiscal year 2004 to gain
knowledge about the element's effectiveness and operation under realworld
conditions. However, only two of six flight tests scheduled to occur in
fiscal year 2004 were conducted. As noted in table 5, these were
nonintercept tests of the Lockheed and OSC boosters. A second Lockheed
booster test (IFT-13A) was deferred indefinitely; two intercept attempts

utilizing LDO-configured hardware and software (IFT-14 and -15) were
either delayed or cancelled; and, IFT-13C, the first flight test in 2
years with the potential for an intercept,14 was delayed 9 months. When
IFT-13C was conducted in December 2004, the interceptor failed to launch,
which precluded the fulfillment of key test objectives associated with the
LDOconfigured interceptor.

IFT-13C was of particular significance because it was to have demonstrated
operational aspects of the LDO capability for the first time in a flight
test environment. For example:

o  	IFT-13C was the first flight test to utilize LDO hardware and
software. Previous intercept attempts employed a surrogate booster and an
earlier configuration of the kill vehicle. In particular, IFT-13C was to
have launched a GMD interceptor comprised of the operational kill vehicle
mated to an OSC booster.

o  	IFT-13C offered the opportunity to exercise Aegis BMD tracking and
connectivity in a manner consistent with an actual defensive mission, that
is, to demonstrate Aegis BMD's ability to serve as a fire-control radar15
for ICBM engagements. However, because weather exceeded peacetime
operational safety limits, Navy commanders withdrew Aegis BMD
participation from IFT-13C; the program office concurred with the
decision.

The delay of IFT-13C by 9 months demonstrates that MDA is responsibly
following an event-driven test program, that is, conducting tests only
when ready. IFT-13C was delayed more than once to correct technical
problems with the interceptor and to upgrade the test interceptor to a
configuration that matches the ones deployed. However, the event-driven
approach was not carried over into fielding. Eight GMD interceptors were
in their silos by the end of December 2004 before flight testing was
completed to verify that LDO hardware and software could function in an
operational environment. If future flight testing identifies problems with
the

14 IFT-13C was a "zero-offset flyby." Although intercepting the target was
not a test objective, no action was taken to prevent an intercept.

15 The fire control radar is the primary radar for providing the necessary
targeting data to the fire control node (battle management component). In
particular, data provided by the fire control radar are used to generate
an interceptor flyout solution that guides the interceptor to the target.

interceptor, MDA could incur added costs to recall and update fielded
assets.

Aegis BMD Conducted Limited Testing of Its Long-Range Surveillance and
Tracking Capability

In anticipation of fielding for LDO, the Aegis BMD flight test program
focused on long-range surveillance and tracking-that is, to operate the
element as a forward-deployed BMDS sensor-in support of the GMD mission.
To this end, by October 2004, the Aegis BMD program completed software
development and upgraded three Aegis destroyers for this role; they are
available for operations. However, the surveillance and tracking function
has only been partially demonstrated. For example:

o  	Aegis BMD participated in Glory Trip 185, during which an Aegis
destroyer successfully tracked a Minuteman III ICBM launched from
Vandenberg Air Force Base. However, the test did not exercise Aegis BMD
tracking and connectivity in a manner needed for an actual defensive
mission, that is, as an integral part of the system during which the
destroyer acts as a fire control radar. In addition, the software tested
was not the version installed on fielded destroyers.

o  	During the Pacific Explorer II field exercise, a destroyer in the Sea
of Japan successfully passed track data of a simulated target, thereby
demonstrating connectivity with the BMDS. In Pacific Explorer III, an
Aegis destroyer planned to track an actual missile and pass track data to
the BMDS. Although the destroyer tracked the live target missile, a
malfunction with the target limited the amount of data collected by the
Aegis destroyer. Specifically, the target ended its flight before Aegis
BMD could send the GMD element all of the information needed for engaging
the target.

o  	Finally, delays in the GMD flight test program precluded Aegis BMD
from participating in two planned integrated flight tests, IFT-13C and
IFT-14, during fiscal year 2004. Without these tests, MDA has not verified
that the element's long-range surveillance and tracking capability will
perform as desired in an actual defensive mission.

MDA Mandated to Conduct Operationally Realistic Testing

The 2005 Defense Authorization Act, section 234, directed DOD to conduct
an operationally realistic test of the BMDS by October 1, 2005, and
required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),16 to prescribe appropriate test
objectives. Such a test is expected to exercise the LDO and Block 2004
configuration in a more realistic manner. Officials from the office of
DOT&E told us that the test would be derived from an existing flight test
with objectives focused more on operational than developmental aspects.

DOT&E recently approved the operational test portion of MDA's Integrated
Master Test Plan. The Integrated Master Test Plan establishes the
framework for BMDS ground and flight testing through Block 2006. It is an
overarching document that defines the test plans for the BMDS and its
elements, identifies operational test objectives to support continuous
characterization of demonstrated operational capability, and identifies
associated test resources.

Assessment of System Performance in Fiscal Year 2004

MDA has conducted various ground and flight tests that provide some degree
of confidence that the LDO capability-consisting of the GMD element, Aegis
BMD destroyers for surveillance and tracking, and C2BMC for command and
control-will operate as intended. In addition, MDA predicts that the LDO
capability, although limited in inventory, will be effective17 in
providing some protection of the United States against ICBM attacks from
Northeast Asia. However, the agency has not verified that the LDO
capability can operate as an integrated system without range-test
limitations and artificialities (for example, using surrogate components
to emulate missile defense functions), and operational testers within DOD
state that there is not enough data to accurately characterize system
performance.

16 DOT&E is responsible for providing independent oversight of operational
test and evaluation of major defense acquisition programs to verify their
operational effectiveness and suitability for combat use. The Director is
the principal operational test and evaluation official within DOD and
advises the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on operational test and evaluation.
The Director also provides responsible officials with advice on
developmental testing.

17 The term "effective" means that the BMDS can destroy an ICBM with a
high probability of success. The exact figures, which depend on scenario,
are classified.

Assessment of LDO Effectiveness Subject to Interpretation

MDA and DOT&E differ on derived estimates of LDO effectiveness. Both
offices employed similar methodologies-that is, they identified critical
functions needed to carryout a BMD engagement, estimated the probability
of success for each function, and combined results into a "probability
chain" to calculate a total probability of success for a given scenario.
However, the assessments made by MDA and DOT&E differ in that they are
based on different types and sources of information.

MDA's assessment is based on the output from BMDS-level simulations using
data derived from a variety of sources, including design specifications
and output from high-fidelity simulations of various components (such as
radars and interceptors). By employing digital simulations, estimates of
system effectiveness are obtained over a wide range of conditions,
scenarios, and system architectures. These simulations are anchored by
data collected during flight testing so that their underlying models are
reflective of real-world operation.

DOT&E generated its estimates of system effectiveness by also
approximating each factor of the "probability chain," but it relied on
historical data and results from recent ground and flight tests. Based on
this methodology, DOT&E concluded that there is not enough test data to
accurately characterize system effectiveness-that is, the estimates are
too uncertain to make definitive conclusions. In commenting on MDA's
methodology, DOT&E officials made the following points:

o  	MDA's computer-based assessments are appropriate for a developmental
program, but there could be difficulty in interpreting results for
operational considerations.

o  	A noteworthy limitation of MDA's assessment is the lack of systemlevel
performance data. Although its models provide a good representation of the
system being built, fundamentally they are not predictive of actual system
performance.

The uncertainty in LDO effectiveness has a direct impact on how the
warfighter operates the system. As noted by officials from USSTRATCOM, the
uncertainty limits the warfighter's ability to formulate tactics and
procedures in operating the system, especially with limited inventory.

In addition, knowledge of component performance can play a useful role in
fielding decisions by assisting decision makers in determining whether the
capability available at the time warrants the cost of fielding, operating,

and sustaining the system, or whether additional investment and
development to enhance the capability are needed.

Integrated Operation of LDO Capability Remains Unverified

MDA has conducted a variety of tests that provide some degree of
confidence that the LDO capability will operate as intended. For example,
since 1999, the GMD program has conducted eight flight tests (intercept
attempts)18 that emulated system operation against ICBM attacks. In
addition, based on MDA documentation, the various functions of the BMD
engagement-such as launch detection, tracking, interceptor launch, and
intercept-have been demonstrated in a variety of venues, including
simulations, ground tests, and flight tests. Technical indicators
monitored by GMD, Aegis BMD, and C2BMC show that the elements' various
components are on track to function as expected during a BMD engagement.
For example, the Aegis BMD program projects that the Aegis SPY-1 radar is
able to deliver adequate performance in support of the GMD mission.
Furthermore, based on past flight tests, MDA states that discrimination
performance of the GMD kill vehicle is adequate to meet system-level
objectives relative to the Block 2004 threat.

However, collectively, these accomplishments do not verify integrated
system operation of the LDO capability because of inherent limitations and
artificialities. An end-to-end test of system operation-beginning with
launch detection and ending with intercept confirmation-should incorporate
operational test objectives such as test realism, lack of scripting, and
the utilization of production-representative hardware. Although MDA has
progressed in demonstrating such objectives in a ground-test setting, they
have yet to be demonstrated in end-to-end flight tests. As we reported in
February 2004,19 GMD flight tests to date have demonstrated basic
functionality of a representative missile defense system using surrogate
and prototype components. In addition, they have shown success in
intercepting a mock reentry vehicle in a developmental test environment.
However, as developmental tests, they were scripted, did not use
production-representative hardware and software, and

18 GMD's December 2004 flight test, IFT-13C, and its February 2005 flight
test, IFT-14, are not counted.

19 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed, GAO-04-254 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 26, 2004).

required the placement of a C-band transponder20 on the target reentry
vehicle. The transponder was essential for the execution of the flight
tests-no ground radar of sufficient accuracy for guiding the interceptor
to the intercept point was available.

Although MDA has conducted many tests to exercise separate functions of
the BMD mission, component-level testing in preparation for LDO has been
incomplete. For example, MDA conducted wargames that enabled the
warfighter to exercise the C2BMC in a simulated operational environment to
gain insight in and provide feedback on C2BMC capabilities. Also, GMD
radars and Aegis BMD destroyers took advantage of other DOD missions21
that enabled these elements to exercise radar and battle management
operations. However, some components have not been fully tested:

o  	The Cobra Dane radar is located at Eareckson Air Station in Shemya,
Alaska, at the western end of the Aleutian chain. Its close proximity to
Russia allows it to perform its primary mission of collecting data on
ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched into the
Kamchatka impact area. In fiscal year 2004, the GMD program completed
hardware installation and software upgrades to the Cobra Dane radar. To
test these upgrades, Cobra Dane tracked a foreign missile launch and
participated in an integrated ground test. However, the upgraded Cobra
Dane radar has not participated in a flight test event as the primary fire
control radar-a role it would need to fill in the event of a real threat.
MDA may conduct a test during the third quarter of fiscal year 2005 using
a long-range air-launched target to demonstrate the upgraded Cobra Dane
under more operationally realistic conditions.

o  	Aegis destroyers upgraded for the long-range surveillance and tracking
capability have not been exercised in a manner consistent with an actual
defensive mission. That is, the Aegis BMD element has not provided track
data of a target, in real time, for use in planning a BMD mission against
a target ICBM. Aegis BMD will first participate in a

20 A transponder is a receiver-transmitter that will generate a reply
signal under proper interrogation. The missile defense community also
refers to the transponder as the "C-band beacon."

21 Most notably are Glory Trips, which are live flight tests during which
a Minuteman III missile is launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base as part
of Follow-on Test and Evaluation.

Assessment of System Cost in Fiscal Year 2004

GMD flight test in this role in fiscal year 2005.22 Despite this concern,
DOT&E officials believe that Aegis BMD can adequately perform its
detection and tracking functions.

We used contractor Cost Performance Reports in combination with Earned
Value Management (EVM)23 analysis to assess progress made by the various
element prime contractors toward MDA's cost and schedule goals during
fiscal year 2004. The government routinely uses such reports to
independently evaluate these aspects of the prime contractors'
performance. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and schedule
relative to expectations established under the contract. Contractors refer
to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are generally associated
with the accomplishment of activities under cost or ahead of schedule,
while negative variances are often associated with the accomplishment of
activities over cost or behind schedule. Cost Performance Reports provide
program mangers and others with information on a contractor's ability to
perform work within estimated cost and schedule. When reports show that
the contractor is encountering problems that cause cost growth, program
officials can then take actions to prevent further growth.

We assessed MDA fiscal year 2004 cost performance by reviewing the cost
performance of each system element, which, in turn, is based on the cost
performance of its element prime contractor. We used this methodology
because a large percentage of MDA's budget is allocated to prime
contractors that develop the various BMDS elements. As summarized in table
6, prime contractors responsible for developing three of the seven BMDS
elements we reviewed-C2BMC, KEI, and THAAD-completed their fiscal year
2004 work at or near budgeted costs. Activities cost more than budgeted
for the ABL, GMD, and the STSS elements by $114 million, $220 million, and
$35 million, respectively. Also, our analysis of cost and schedule
performance for the entire Aegis BMD element could not be conducted,
because Cost Performance Reports for the Standard Missile 3 contract were
not issued until September 2004. Our detailed findings are presented in
appendices II through VIII of this report.

22 With the objective of acting as the fire control radar for an ICBM
engagement, Aegis BMD planned to participate in GMD flight test IFT-14 in
February 2005. The test could not be fully executed because the GMD
interceptor failed to launch.

23 The EVM system is a management tool widely used by DOD to compare the
value of a prime contractor's work performed to the work's actual cost.
The tool measures the contractor's actual progress against its expected
progress and enables the government and contractor to estimate the
program's remaining cost.

  Table 6: Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance in Fiscal Year 2004

Dollars in millions

Percent of BMDS Cost Schedule contract element variance variancea
completed Comments

ABL ($114.4) ($47.6) N/Ab	Variances reflect cumulative prime contractor
cost and schedule performance for the first half of fiscal year
2004-October 2003 through March 2004. Program officials indicated that
hardware delivery delays, design problems, and integration issues were the
primary drivers of the cost variances. After this time, the program was
restructured and the prime contract rebaselined. Program officials
directed the contractor to suspend normal contractor performance reporting
between April and July 2004, during which the contractor expended $129
million. During this time, the contractor provided forecasts of
expenditures to the program. The contractor resumed normal cost
performance reporting in August 2004. As of September 2004, the contractor
was performing work under budget but slightly behind schedule.

As part of the restructuring, the prime contract's cost increased by $1.5
billion and its term extended over 3 years to accomplish the objective of
developing a prototype aircraft. In total, ABL prime contract costs have
increased from $1.0 billion at the time of contract award in 1996 to $3.6
billion in 2004.

Aegis BMD 3.5 (2.0) 43	The Aegis BMD element has two prime contracts: the
Aegis Weapon System contract, consisting of software and hardware upgrades
of existing Navy cruisers and destroyers to make them BMD capable; and the
Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) contract for the development of the element's
missile. Both were awarded in the second half of 2003. Variances shown are
of the Aegis Weapon System contract only, which shows that the contractor
completed fiscal year 2004 work under budget. The contractor who develops
the SM-3 missile began reporting cost and schedule performance in the last
month of fiscal year 2004; therefore, this contractor's cost and schedule
performance for the year is not reported.

C2BMCc (3.6) (5.7) 100 (Part 2) Overall, the prime contractor is under
budget. But when considering 31 (Part 3) performance in fiscal year 2004
alone, the contractor performed work slightly over budget and behind
schedule. The declining performance is largely attributed to issues
pertaining to algorithm development and site integration.

GMD (219.6) (59.9) 69	Developmental issues with the GMD
interceptor-booster and kill vehicle- remain the leading cause of negative
cost and schedule variances. In fiscal year 2004, interceptor-related work
cost $204 million more than budgeted, of which the kill vehicle accounted
for 40 percent of the variance. Flight test delays also contributed to
unfavorable cost and schedule performance.

KEI 0.04 (1.6) 1	The KEI prime contractor performed work in fiscal year
2004 near its budgeted costs. Program officials indicated that the
slightly unfavorable schedule variance was the result of the contractor
delaying activities so that it could conduct trade studies on new
requirements imposed by MDA.

Because of plans to restructure the KEI program-to defer the land-based
capability from Block 2010 to Block 2012-the long-term performance
measurement baselined is no longer relevant. In August 2004, the program
suspended contractor cost and schedule performance reporting until a
reliable baseline to reflect the full extent of the program's restructure
became available. The contractor is reporting actual costs until program
restructure efforts are complete.

Dollars in millions

Percent of BMDS Cost Schedule contract element variance variancea
completed Comments

STSS (34.6) (20.7)e 29	Prime contract cost and schedule performance eroded
throughout fiscal year 2004. The erosion in cost performance was largely
attributed to cost overruns by a subcontractor who had a number of quality
and systems-engineering problems. Delays in software and hardware
deliveries were the major causes for the unfavorable schedule variance.
Despite these issues, the program office maintains that the prime
contractor is expected to complete the contract early and with minimal
cost overruns.

THAAD $0.7 $8.1 61	Overall, the prime contractor is under budget and ahead
of schedule. However, the contractor's favorable cost and schedule
performance eroded somewhat during the second half of fiscal year 2004.
The declining performance was largely driven by issues in missile
development. Specifically, two explosions at a subcontractor's propellant
mixing facility resulted in the need to find a new vendor.

Sources: Contractors (data); GAO (analysis).

Note: Negative variances are shown with parentheses around the dollar
amounts.

aSchedule variance represents the value of planned work by which the prime
contractor is behind schedule.

bAs of March 2004, the program completed 88 percent of the contract under
the former contract structure. However, because the prime contract was
extended over 3 years, this figure is no longer accurate.

cC2BMC development is being carried out through a contractual vehicle
known as an Other Transaction Agreement, which functions much like a prime
contract. Values reflect the combined variances incurred during fiscal
year 2004 by parts 2 and 3 of the C2BMC contract.

dA performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work tasks,
designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each work task,
schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets, and
allocates budget to the scheduled work.

eThe contractor implemented a performance measurement baseline that
reflects a 6-month accelerated schedule. This means the contractor might
be performing work on schedule, allowing it to complete all the work by
the end of the contract, but schedule performance data would show
otherwise.

Negative Cost Variances Incurred by ABL, GMD, and STSS Prime Contractors

ABL incurred a negative cost variance of $114 million during the first
half of fiscal year 2004, before the program was restructured to make its
cost and schedule targets more realistic. This variance stemmed primarily
from two sources. First, the program encountered unanticipated complexity
in manufacturing and in integrating advanced optics and laser components
for the prototype system. Second, the push to rapidly develop the
prototype aircraft caused the program to limit testing of subcomponents,
which, in turn, generated rework and modified requirements. To address the
negative variance for ABL, program officials told us that they redirected
funds originally earmarked for other program efforts.

GMD incurred a negative cost variance of $220 million. The contractor
originally underestimated the cost of readying the element for LDO and
experienced unexpected problems requiring some rework of its kill vehicle.
Additionally, in response to explosions at a subcontractor's propellant
mixing facility, the program incurred cost to transition operations to a
new vendor. To address its negative cost variance for GMD, MDA deferred
some work planned for completion in fiscal year 2004 into fiscal year
2005, and, to cover these increased costs, requested and received
additional money in its fiscal year 2005 budget. MDA also directed other
programs within the agency, such as Test and Evaluation, to pick up GMD's
portion of the cost of work tasks that benefited both programs. Employing
established EVM analysis techniques, we estimate that the GMD
contract-which ends in September 2007-will overrun its budget by between
$593 million and $950 million at its completion assuming no corrective
actions are taken.

The negative STSS cost variance was largely attributed to a subcontractor
who had a number of quality and systems-engineering problems in developing
the payload-sensors and supporting subsystems-onboard the two STSS
demonstration satellites. The program office maintains that there is
enough management reserve to cover the overrun at the end of the contract,
assuming that the reserve is not used for other purposes before then.

Lack of Cost Performance Data for ABL, Aegis BMD, and KEI Elements
Prevented Full Assessment

ABL program officials' insight of their prime contractor's cost and
schedule performance between April and July 2004 was somewhat limited.
During this time, program officials directed the contractor to suspend
normal cost performance reporting while they restructured the ABL prime
contract to make its target cost and schedule more realistic. In lieu of
providing normal Cost Performance Reports, the contractor provided the
program office with monthly forecast expenditure plans, detailed work
activities, and the number of staff needed to complete planned tasks. The
program office relied on these metrics to determine the program's status
and to provide insight into the contractor's cost and schedule
performance. In the 5 months since cost reporting resumed, the cost and
schedule variance has been relatively stable.

We could not fully assess cost performance for the Aegis BMD program in
fiscal year 2004. The prime contractor developing the SM-3 missile did not
generate Cost Performance Reports until September 2004, even though the
prime contract was awarded in August 2003. Program officials told us that,
instead, they monitored contractor performance through monthly

management and business meetings where cost performance, milestones, and
future performance were reviewed. Program officials indicated that the
delay in issuing Cost Performance Reports stemmed from the late
establishment of the contract's performance management baseline. It was
established 7 months after contract award because of the need for the
program office to react to funding issues. In addition, the program
suspended contractor cost and schedule performance reporting until after
the Aegis BMD program office completed an integrated baseline review24 5
months later.

KEI program officials also had reduced insight into its prime contractor's
work efforts for a portion of fiscal year 2004. After contract award in
December 2003, the prime contractor began submitting Cost Performance
Reports in May 2004. Program officials suspended cost performance
reporting after August 2004 because of the need to restructure the prime
contract in response to reduced funding. Program officials told us that
the contractor will resume reporting in 2005 after a reliable baseline
that reflects the full extent of the program's restructure is available.

Funding Risks Expected to Increase for Ballistic Missile Defense Program

A number of factors portend an increasing level of funding risk for the
ballistic missile defense program in the years ahead. Based on DOD's
Future Years Defense Plan for fiscal years 2006-2011, MDA plans to
request, on average, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
funding of about $10 billion annually. This funding supports continued
development, procurement, and sustainment of hardware and software that
MDA is fielding.25 However, sources outside and within DOD are expected to
put pressure on MDA's share of research and development dollars.

24 An integrated baseline review is the program manager's review of a
contractor's performance measurement baseline. The review is conducted by
the program manager and the manager's technical staff. It verifies the
technical content of the baseline and ensures that contractor personnel
understand and have been adequately trained to collect earned value
management data. The review also verifies the accuracy of the related
budget and schedules, ensures that risks have been properly identified,
assesses the contractor's ability to implement earned value management
properly, and determines if the work identified by the contractor meets
the program's objective.

25 Congress authorized DOD's use of funds appropriated for MDA research,
development, test, and evaluation for the fielding of ballistic missile
defense capabilities. Pub. L. No. 108-136, section 222; Pub. L. No.
108-375, section 231.

One factor for the increasing pressure is that DOD's acquisition programs
such as ballistic missile defense are likely to be competing for a
decreasing share of the federal budget. These programs are categorized as
"discretionary spending" as opposed to "mandatory spending," such as
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. In fiscal year 2004,
discretionary spending accounted for about 39 percent of the federal
budget. The Congressional Budget Office projects that discretionary
spending is likely to decrease to 36 percent of the federal budget by
fiscal year 2009 and to 32 percent in by fiscal year 2014.26

A second factor is competing demands for funding within DOD. For example,
although missile defense is seen as a national priority and has been
funded nearly at requested levels in the past few years, MDA is facing
budget cuts. Indeed, DOD's Program Budget Direction of December 2004
called for MDA to plan for a $5 billion reduction in funding over fiscal
years 2006-2011. In addition, MDA is receiving about 13 percent of the $70
billion RDT&E budget in fiscal year 2005 but must continue to compete with
hundreds of existing and planned technology development and acquisition
programs for RDT&E funding. Cost growth of existing weapon programs puts
additional pressure on MDA's share. We found, for example, that RDT&E cost
estimates grew $6.7 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter in calendar year
2003 and $9.2 billion for the Future Combat System in fiscal year 2004.

The third factor comes from within MDA itself. The agency continues to
respond to cost growth of ongoing programs to enhance the components and
elements of the BMDS. As noted above, ABL, GMD, and STSS incurred a
collective negative cost variance of approximately $370 million in fiscal
year 2004 and, as we reported last year, MDA elements incurred a
collective negative cost variance of about $380 million in fiscal year
2003.27 Unless MDA can mitigate these cost variances, significant cost
overruns could occur on these contracts in the future. Estimating cost and
schedule targets of new and complex technologies can be difficult and, as
demonstrated, are often underestimated. Furthermore, hardware made
available for operational purposes is not being fully tested before being

26 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2004).

27 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).

fielded. If the need arises to correct problems identified in subsequent
testing, removing and recalling this hardware could prove costly.

A fourth factor for the increasing pressure on MDA's RDT&E budget is that
MDA is starting to field components of the BMDS, whose production,
operation, and sustainment are also funded by RDT&E dollars. A flat RDT&E
budget combined with growing fielding costs would result in a decrease in
investment in research and development-MDA's primary mission. According to
program documentation, MDA's budget for its fielding activities between
fiscal years 2006 and 2011 includes an average of $1.76 billion per year
for procuring BMDS assets and an additional $400 million per year for
sustaining the fielded capability. However, the fielding costs can be
expected to increase in the years to come as more components of GMD, Aegis
BMD, and THAAD are integrated into the BMDS.

Operations and support (O&S) costs of fielded systems are generally
significant and can be expected to be substantial for operational
capabilities of the BMDS. In our 2003 report on total-ownership
(life-cycle) cost,28 we found that the cost to develop and procure a
weapon system usually represents about 28 percent of the weapon system's
life-cycle cost; O&S costs typically account for the remaining 72 percent
of a weapon's systems total life-cycle cost. The only BMDS element thus
far with a lifecycle cost estimate, the Army's Patriot-MEADS missile
defense program, has comparable life-cycle cost percentages. According to
the Army's Lower-Tier Project Office, the Patriot-MEADS development cost
accounts for 6.4 percent, procurement accounts for 21.2 percent, and O&S
costs account for 72.4 percent of the total life-cycle cost of $151
billion.

DOD officials cautioned us that estimating life-cycle costs of missile
defense capabilities involves considerable uncertainty. For example, O&S
costs depend on the state of readiness of the fielded system, which is
difficult to predict. In addition, historical data of component
reliability in the field and the cost to repair operational missile
defense assets are essentially nonexistent. Furthermore, life-cycle cost
estimates of standard DOD weapon systems assume O&S costs apply for long
periods of time, on the order of 20 years. Components of the BMDS,
however, might be in the

28 GAO, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce
Weapon Systems' Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
11, 2003).

MDA Is Not Consistently Matching Cost and Fielding Goals

field for shorter durations. Finally, our previous work29 recognized that
life-cycle cost estimates for revolutionary systems such as the ABL
program, which utilize new technologies in unproven applications, are
unknown. When fielded, operation and support efforts for ABL could be
substantial because ABL will require unique support for its laser and
beam-control components and ground infrastructure for chemical storage,
mixing, and handling.30

In assessing the extent MDA achieved its stated goals in fiscal year 2004,
we observed that MDA's cost goal for a given block is not consistently
aligned with that block's fielding goals. According to MDA policy, for
example, interceptors identified with the Block 2004 fielding goals and
fielded during calendar years 2004-2005 should be funded as part of the
Block 2004 cost goal. As originally designed, the block approach would
provide MDA with the flexibility to deliver a basic capability initially
and enhance it during subsequent blocks to respond to the changing threat
and to insert new technologies for enhanced performance. The block
approach also would provide for accountability, because MDA would identify
for decision makers the promised capabilities to be delivered by the end
of each block for a specified investment of funds.

In the following instances, however, we found that MDA has not been
consistently matching a block's cost and fielding goals thereby obscuring
the relationship between requested funding and delivered capabilities:

o  	Funds accounted for in the Block 2004 cost goal are being used to
procure 32 Aegis BMD SM-3 missiles. Of these missiles, 11 will be
delivered in 2004-2005, and the remaining missiles will be delivered
during 2006-2007. Similarly, funds accounted for in the Block 2006 cost
goal are being used to procure 40 missiles. Of these missiles, 7 will be
delivered in 2006-2007, and the remaining delivered during 2008-2009.

29 GAO, Uncertainties Remain Concerning the Airborne Laser's Cost and
Military Utility, GAO-04-643R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).

30 The ABL program manager agrees that operating costs of the ABL element
are not well defined due to its technical maturity. However, as with the
fielding of any new technology, the initial operating costs may be
substantial. As the support concept matures, the ABL program manager
expects these costs to decrease and be comparable with other Air Force
high-value assets.

Conclusion

o  	The THAAD program is funding a "fire unit" as part of its Block 2006
program. Operated by the Army, it will consist of a radar, a battle
management unit, 3 launchers, 24 missiles, and equipment for support,
maintenance and training. Even though MDA refers to this fire unit as a
Block 2006 fielding, it will not be delivered until 2009 (i.e., during
Block 2008).31

In addition, counter to the definition of a block as an integrated set of
capabilities fielded during the 2-year block window, the Airborne Laser
program will not field any capabilities during Block 2004 although Block
2004 funds are used in the program's development. Rather, the ABL program
is focused on developing a prototype aircraft for use in a lethality
demonstration-a flight test in which the ABL aircraft will attempt to
shoot down a short-range ballistic missile. However, ABL's funding is
broken out by block-2004, 2006, and 2008-even though the program is
developing a single configuration of the element that will not be
integrated into the BMDS earlier than Block 2008.

MDA delivered much of what it planned in fiscal year 2004, and DOD is on
the verge of standing up an initial capability against long-range
ballistic missiles launched from Northeast Asia. Despite this success, the
performance of the system remains uncertain and unverified because of
recurrent test delays and failures. Also, Ground-based Midcourse Defense
developmental costs continue to increase and the Airborne Laser program
was restructured when it became clear that much more time and money would
be needed to develop and demonstrate a prototype aircraft.

Looking to the future, decision makers in Congress and DOD face billion
dollar investment decisions in allocating funds both within MDA's RDT&E
activities and between MDA and other DOD programs. In exercising their
funding and oversight responsibilities, these decision makers would
benefit from a consistent implementation of a block policy for which
delivered capability is aligned with tax dollars received.

31 With the submission of the fiscal year 2006 President's Budget in
February 2005, MDA implemented a new BMDS baseline approach for the THAAD
program. The agency now refers to the fielding of the fire unit as a Block
2006/2008 fielding.

Recommendation for Executive Action

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

To assist decision makers in Congress and DOD in exercising their
oversight of MDA's acquisition plans and in evaluating MDA's budget
requests, we recommend that the Director, MDA, clarify and modify, as
needed, its block policy to ensure that a block's cost and fielding goals
are consistently aligned.

DOD's comments on our draft report are reprinted in appendix I. DOD
concurred with our recommendation. Acknowledging our observations, the
Department noted that the policy for ballistic missile defense block
definitions should provide for consistent accounting of the various
features of each block. MDA is taking steps to clarify and modify the
block definitions for that purpose.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and to
the
Director, MDA. We will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix XI.

Robert E. Levin
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

An Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System

Appendix II Summary

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment

The Aegis BMD program completed work planned for fiscal year 2004
generally on schedule and is largely on track to upgrade system software
and expand missile inventory for an enhanced capability by the end of
December 2005 (Block 2004). However, Aegis destroyers upgraded for the
long-range surveillance and tracking (LRS&T) mission had limited
opportunities to be exercised in a manner consistent with an actual
defensive mission.

Schedule: In fiscal year 2004 and early 2005, the Aegis BMD program
completed the upgrade of three Aegis destroyers for the LRS&T mission-all
are available for operations. In addition, the program delivered five
missiles, known as the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2005 for the element's Block 2004 engagement capability.
Because of funding constraints and ship availability, missile deliveries
and ship upgrades were delayed. In particular, the program expects to have
available a slightly smaller inventory of SM-3 missiles by December 2005
than was originally planned. Also, the program expected to upgrade three
cruisers by the end of Block 2004, but only two will be completed by this
time.

Testing: Aegis BMD flight testing conducted in fiscal year 2004 focused on
the LRS&T mission, including the element's connectivity with the BMDS.
Because there were limited opportunities to track actual targets using the
fielded version of the LRS&T system, this capability was only partially
demonstrated prior to the destroyers' fielding. The Aegis BMD program also
conducted one successful intercept attempt against a short-range ballistic
missile target during fiscal year 2004. Finally, design changes to the
missile's divert system underwent ground testing and are planned to be
tested in flight in fiscal year 2005.

Performance: The Aegis BMD program has demonstrated the capability to
intercept a non-separating target through its successes in five of six
flight tests. The root cause of a failure in the missile's divert system
during the one unsuccessful attempt is understood, and design changes are
expected to be tested in flight in fiscal year 2005. Although the program
has exercised the element's LRS&T capability in a small number of
flight-test events, it has not yet used the fielded version of the system
software to provide real-time track data of a target for use in planning a
BMD mission, as it would need to do in an actual defensive operation.

Cost: We could not fully assess cost performance for the Aegis BMD program
in fiscal year 2004 based on an analysis of prime contractor Cost
Performance Reports. We found that the contractor responsible for
upgrading existing Aegis ships for the BMD mission completed fiscal year
2004 work $3.5 million under budget but was unable to complete $2.0
million worth of work. However, we were unable to assess cost and schedule
performance of the prime contractor who develops the SM-3 missile because
Cost Performance Reports were not available during fiscal year 2004.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

Element Description 	The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD)
element is a sea-based missile defense system being developed to protect
deployed U.S. forces, allies, and friends from short-and medium-range
ballistic missile attacks. It will also be used as a forward-deployed
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) sensor, employing its shipboard
SPY-1 radar, to perform surveillance and tracking of long-range ballistic
missiles in support of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) mission.

The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of
Aegisequipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software
upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the missile defense
mission in addition to their current role of protecting U.S. Navy ships
from air, surface, and subsurface threats. The program is also developing
the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)-the system's interceptor missile, which is
designed to destroy enemy warheads through hit-to-kill collisions above
the atmosphere. The SM-3 is comprised of a kill vehicle1 mounted atop a
3-stage booster.

History 	In 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Navy
Theater Wide program, the predecessor to Aegis BMD. The Navy Theater Wide
system was to be a ship-based missile defense system capable of destroying
shortrange ballistic missiles above the atmosphere. At the time, plans
called for deploying the first increment of the Navy Theater Wide system
in 2010 and a final increment with an improved kill vehicle at a later,
undefined date.

Developmental 	The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) currently manages and
funds the Aegis BMD program, although the U.S. Navy has a role in its
development and

Phases 	management. Accordingly, the Aegis BMD element is being developed
under MDA's acquisition approach, which delivers system capabilities in
2-year block increments. The first increment of the Aegis BMD element,
Block 2004, is expected to deliver a limited operational capability in the
2004-2005 time frame. It provides for surveillance and tracking of
longrange ballistic missiles and an intercept capability (engagement role)
against shorter-range ballistic missiles. The Block 2004 capability is
being rolled out in three phases:

1 The program office refers to the kill vehicle as the "kinetic warhead."

Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

o  	Initial fielding of the surveillance and tracking capability. By
October 2004, the program office upgraded three Aegis destroyers with the
ability to perform the long-range surveillance and tracking (LRS&T)
function as a BMDS sensor in support of the GMD mission. All three
destroyers are available for operations. This capability is the element's
contribution to MDA's fielding of Limited Defensive Operations (LDO),
MDA's first increment of fielded capability.

o  	Initial fielding of an intercept capability. By April 2005, MDA plans
to have available two cruisers, along with a combined inventory of
approximately five SM-3 missiles. The cruisers are expected to be capable
of performing its two BMD missions, LRS&T and the engagement of short-and
medium-range ballistic missiles. This configuration could be deployed
operationally if so directed in an emergency.

o  	Completion of the Block 2004 element. The program expects to increase
the number of Aegis destroyers capable of providing LRS&T from 3 to 10 by
the end of December 2005.2 In addition, the program plans to deliver eight
SM-3 missiles available to be deployed on upgraded cruisers available for
the engagement role.3

Future block configurations of the Aegis BMD element build upon the Block
2004 capability. In Block 2006, MDA plans to add the capability to defeat
intermediate-range ballistic missiles with limited countermeasures and to
increase Aegis BMD's role as a remote sensor by upgrading radar
capabilities. The Aegis BMD Block 2008 configuration will incorporate
upgrades to the SPY-1 radar to improve the radar's discrimination
capability and to enhance the element's command and control component so
that the element can engage multiple threats simultaneously. Finally, the
Aegis BMD Block 2010 and 2012 configurations are expected to incorporate
missile enhancements, improve discrimination capability against advanced
countermeasures, and improve planning and coordination as part of the
BMDS.

2 Five additional destroyers will be upgraded during Block 2006, bringing
the total number of upgraded destroyers to 15, which was MDA's original
Block 2004 goal.

3 MDA program goals called for the delivery of nine SM-3 missiles by the
end of calendar year 2005.

                  Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004

Assessment of Scheduled Activities

The Aegis BMD program establishes annual element-level goals by outlining
specific activities the program plans to complete during a given fiscal
year. In fiscal year 2004, the program focused largely on delivering the
LRS&T capability for LDO and continuing with activities leading to the
full Block 2004 capability. These activities can be grouped into three
categories: fielding, testing, and design reviews.

o  	Fielding. The Aegis BMD program planned to install the initial version
of the operational computer program and make associated hardware upgrades
on three Aegis destroyers enabling them to perform the LRS&T mission. In
addition, the program planned to continue its activities leading to the
initial delivery of SM-3 missiles during fiscal year 2005.

o  	Testing. The Aegis BMD program office planned to conduct an intercept
attempt against a short-range ballistic missile-Flight Mission 6
(FM-6)-and to participate in other events that exercise the system's LRS&T
functionality and connectivity with the BMDS.

o  	Design reviews. The program planned to conduct design reviews of the
final Block 2004 Aegis Weapon System software, the final Block 2004
missile configuration, and the SM-3 missile's shipboard launch system.

In fiscal year 2004, the Aegis BMD program completed the upgrade of three
Aegis destroyers4 for the LRS&T mission. In addition, the program was
completing the final assembly of the first five SM-3 missiles for the
Block 2004 engagement capability, which were delivered in early fiscal
year 2005. The program is largely on track to upgrade software, expand
missile inventory, and conduct flight tests to deliver an enhanced
capability for Block 2004 by the end of December 2005. However, funding
modifications and ship availability delayed final missile deliveries and
ship upgrades. In particular, although the program expected to field nine
SM-3 missiles by the end of Block 2004, only eight will be delivered by
this time. Also, the program expected to upgrade three cruisers by the end
of Block 2004, but only two will be completed by this time. Specific
progress made in fiscal year 2004 relative to fielding, testing, and
design is given in the narrative below and summarized in tables 7 to 12.

              4 The third destroyer was upgraded in October 2004.

                  Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

                              Fielding Activities

The Aegis BMD program has plans to eventually upgrade 18 Aegisequipped
Navy ships (15 destroyers and 3 cruisers) with enhanced planning,
surveillance, tracking, and engagement functions to make them capable of
performing the BMD mission. These upgrades will improve the capability of
the element's SPY-1 radar to discriminate a missile's warhead from decoys,
enable tracking of long-range ballistic missiles as a BMDS sensor, plan
engagements, and launch SM-3 missiles to engage ballistic missiles. To
achieve this enhanced functionality, the Aegis BMD program office is
upgrading the Aegis Weapon System on designated ships through a series of
software builds and hardware upgrades, referred to as BMD 3.0E, BMD 3.0,
and BMD 3.1.

Each BMD upgrade will increase the element's capability. The Aegis BMD
program has successfully installed BMD 3.0E in three destroyers, which
enables the ships to carry out long-range surveillance and tracking.
However, the ships are not yet capable of launching missiles to engage
ballistic missiles. Rather, the next software build, BMD 3.0, will be
needed to provide the preliminary engagement capability for Aegis
cruisers. It is expected to be approved for use in April 2005 and could be
deployed operationally if so directed in an emergency. The third version
of the BMD upgrade-BMD 3.1-will eventually enable the destroyers to also
launch missiles, but because other hardware upgrades are needed, only
Aegis cruisers will be equipped to do so by the end of Block 2004. BMD 3.1
is the last weapon system upgrade planned for the Block 2004 time frame.
Table 7 summarizes the principal software development and installation
activities completed in fiscal year 2004.

 Table 7: Status of Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Fielding
                                   Activities

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Complete and deliver long-range surveillance and tracking (LRS&T) software
BMD 3.0E

The program completed BMD 3.0E development for the initial fielding of the
LRS&T capability.

                     Install LRS&T BMD 3.0E on three Aegis

destroyers The program installed BMD 3.0E on two Aegis destroyers by
September 30, 2004, and on a third Aegis destroyer in October 2004.

                  Begin training Aegis destroyer crews for the

LRS&T mission Crew training was completed on schedule, which included
tactical operations and team certification, personnel standards, and BMD
3.0E familiarization.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

As software builds and hardware upgrades are completed and installed, Navy
cruisers and destroyers will become available to perform their expected
missions. Table 8 summarizes the availability of Aegis ships for the BMD
mission in the Block 2004 time frame. Although MDA program

                  Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

goals specified that three cruisers would be available by the end of Block
2004 (December 2005), only two are expected to be upgraded by this time;
the third is expected to be upgraded in early 2006, depending on ship
availability.

       Table 8: Aegis Ship Availability for the BMD Mission (Block 2004)

September December April December Ship function 2004 2004 2005

c

Destroyers 3b 5b 9 10

Capable of only LRS&T. Engagement capability will be added starting in
2006.

a

Cruisers 0 1 2 Capable of surveillance, tracking, and engagement.

Total destroyers and cruisers available for BMD mission 3 6 11

Source: MDA.

aThe total number of Aegis cruisers includes one being used as a test
ship, which was scheduled to begin installation of BMD 3.0 in December
2004.

bThe third LRS&T ship was completed in October 2004, and the fifth was
completed in January 2005.

c15 LRS&T "equipment sets" will be available at this time, but
installations may not be completed owing to the ships' operational
schedules. The remaining five upgrades are planned for the Block 2006 time
frame.

In fiscal year 2004, the Aegis BMD program office continued to procure
SM-3 missiles for delivery in the 2004-2005 time frame. In particular, 11
"Block I" SM-3 missiles are expected to be delivered by the end of
calendar year 2005, some of which will be used in flight testing. Table 9
summarizes the status of SM-3 deliveries through December 2005.

                        Table 9: SM-3 Missile Deliveries

Sept. 2004 -Dec. 2004 -Apr. 2005 -Total Dec. 2004 Apr. 2005 Dec. 2005
(Dec. 2005)

                            SM-3 deliveries 5 1 5 11

Source: MDA.

Prior to September 2004, three SM-3 missiles of an earlier configuration
were delivered and subsequently used in flight missions (intercept
attempts), FM-4, FM-5, and FM-6. "Block I" SM-3 missiles, which are being
fielded during 2004-2005, are an operational configuration that evolved
from this earlier design. Fiscal year 2004 funding modifications impacted
SM-3 missile integration and delivery; consequently, the Aegis BMD

                  Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

program expects to have available a slightly smaller inventory of SM-3
missiles by December 2005 than was originally planned.

                               Testing Activities

Ground Testing

Flight Testing

The Aegis BMD program conducts both ground and flight tests to demonstrate
and validate element performance. Ground tests serve to reduce risk and,
in some cases, are conducted under conditions that are difficult to
replicate in flight. Flight tests verify the element's ability to engage
ballistic missile targets using actual equipment, computer programs, and
an operational ship with a Navy crew.

Ground tests completed during fiscal year 2004 included those focused on a
subcomponent of the missile's divert system-the Solid Divert and Attitude
Control System (SDACS). This subcomponent is a collection of solid-fuel
thrusters used to steer the kill vehicle into its designated target. When
an updated SDACS design proved successful in earlier ground tests, the
program flight-tested it during Flight Mission 5 (FM-5) in June 2003.
However, during this test, the subassemblies supporting the energetic
pulse-mode failed, causing the kill vehicle to be less maneuverable and
miss its target. Program officials stated that the failure likely stemmed
from a "diverter ball" in the SDACS, which acts as a valve to control
pulses that allow the missile to maneuver quickly. The exercising of the
high-energy pulse mode of the SDACS increased internal operating
pressures, and, under the thermal stress, the protective coating of the
diverter ball cracked, disabling normal SDACS operation. The root cause of
this failure has been traced to a material failure under intense
temperature and pressure.

In response to this failure, during fiscal year 2004, the program modified
the SDACS design to improve its switching performance and reliability
during high-energy pulse operation. A series of ground tests and
engineering analysis is ongoing to validate the design updates. Following
completion of ground tests and analysis, future flight tests are planned
to demonstrate operation of the SDACS using its high-energy pulse mode.

Since 1999, there have been six intercept attempts using variants of the
SM-3 missile. In five of the six, the SM-3 successfully intercepted
targets. In fiscal year 2004, the program conducted one of these
successful intercept attempts-FM-6.5 Additionally, the Aegis BMD element

5 The program also conducted FM-7 in February 2005, which resulted in a
successful intercept of a short-range ballistic missile target.

Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

participated in other non-intercept test events to assess the Aegis
destroyer's ability to track targets of opportunity and pass data to the
BMDS. Because of the technical issues associated with the SDACS
reliability that arose in FM-5, the program office delayed FM-6 from
September 2003 to December 2003 and did not exercise the SDACS highenergy
pulse mode as originally planned.

After the FM-6 flight mission in December 2003, Aegis BMD flight testing
conducted in fiscal year 2004 focused on the LRS&T mission although there
were limited opportunities to track actual targets using the fielded
version of the LRS&T software, BMD 3.0E. For example, delays in the GMD
flight test program prevented Aegis BMD from participating in two
integrated flight tests, IFT-13C and IFT-14, during fiscal year 2004. In
addition, the Aegis BMD program participated in Glory Trip 185, during
which an Aegis destroyer successfully tracked a Minuteman III ICBM
launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. However, it exercised an earlier
version of the LRS&T software, rather than BMD 3.0E, which is installed on
fielded destroyers. Finally, in Pacific Explorer III, an Aegis destroyer
planned to track an actual missile and pass track data to the BMDS.
Although the destroyer tracked the live target missile, a malfunction with
the target limited the amount of data collected by the Aegis destroyer.
Specifically, the target ended its flight before Aegis BMD could send the
GMD element enough information needed for engaging the target.

Although there were limited opportunities to track actual targets, Aegis
BMD participated in other tests that verified connectivity with the BMDS.
For example, in Pacific Explorer II, Glory Trip 185, Pacific Explorer III,
and Pacific Explorer IV (conducted in fiscal year 2005), simulated or real
ballistic missile target track data was successfully transmitted to the
BMDS.

Table 10 summarizes the flight test and LRS&T activities completed in
fiscal year 2004 by the Aegis BMD program.

                  Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

  Table 10: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Flight Test and
                                LRS&T Activities

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Flight Mission 6 (FM-6) An SM-3 missile successfully intercepted a short
range ballistic missile (SRBM) target Occurred: Dec. 2003 (SDACS used in
sustain-mode only).

Participate in GMD integrated flight tests GMD flight tests were deferred
until fiscal year 2005. IFT-13C was conducted in as a surveillance and
tracking sensor December 2004 and would have offered Aegis BMD the
opportunity to exercise its LRS&T Planned: Throughout FY2004 role.
However, because of rough seas caused by severe weather that exceeded
safety

limits, the element did not participate. IFT-14 was conducted in February
2005, but this test failed to execute fully because the interceptor did
not launch from its silo.

Pacific Explorer II An Aegis destroyer in the Sea of Japan and an Aegis
destroyer in Hawaii established full

Occurred: Mar. 2004 	satellite communication connectivity with the BMDS
across the Pacific Ocean to multiple land-based participants in Hawaii and
the Continental United States. Although no actual target was launched, the
ship successfully passed track data of a simulated target to exercise
system connectivity.

Glory Trip 185 Aegis BMD successfully exercised its role as a
forward-deployed sensor. During this test,

Occurred: June 2004 	an Aegis destroyer detected and tracked a Minuteman
III ICBM launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base and provided track and
covariance data to GMD. However, the test did not exercise Aegis BMD
tracking and connectivity in a manner consistent with an actual defensive
mission; that is, as an integral part of the system during which the
destroyer acts as a fire control radar. In addition, the Aegis destroyer
was not upgraded with the newer, LDO version of the long-range
surveillance and tracking software.

Pacific Explorer III This event provided exposure and training to the crew
of an Aegis BMD destroyer.

Occurred: July 2004 	Although the destroyer tracked the live target
missile, a malfunction with the target limited the amount of data
collected by the Aegis destroyer-the target's flight was terminated early.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

In fiscal year 2005, the program office scheduled three more Block 2004
flight tests, all of which are planned as intercept attempts. These tests
aim to progressively demonstrate the element's capability against
short-and medium-range unitary and separating targets, as well as
demonstrate that Aegis BMD can support the BMDS as a forward-deployed
sensor. FM-7 was the first flight test to use BMD 3.0 and the Block I SM-3
missile, which is the configuration of the first set of SM-3 missiles that
will be made available for fielding. Table 11 provides a summary of the
Block 2004 flight tests the program expects to conduct through fiscal year
2005.

                  Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

  Table 11: Planned Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2005 Accomplishments-Remaining Block
                     2004 Flight Tests Activity Description

FTM 04-1 (FM-7) FM-7 was successfully conducted. An SM-3 missile
intercepted an SRBM target Date: Feb 24, 2005 (SDACS used in sustain-mode
only).

                        FTM 04-2 (FM-8) Date: 3Q FY2005a

FM-8 is an intercept attempt against a separating, medium-range ballistic
missile (MRBM) target. The target will fly a trajectory more distant from
the Aegis cruiser than in previous tests. Pending the results of ground
testing, the SDACS will be tested in highenergy pulse mode.

FTM 04-3 (FM-9)

                                Date: 4Q FY2005

FM-9 is an intercept attempt against a separating, MRBM target. The target
will include additional decoys and clutter. The SDACS could be tested in
high-energy pulse mode.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

aWe use the notation "3Q FY2005" to mean the third quarter of fiscal year
2005 and an identical format for other time periods.

Design Reviews 	The Aegis BMD program scheduled four component-level
design reviews in fiscal year 2004 to evaluate the design maturity of the
Aegis Weapon System software, launch system, and upgraded SM-3 missile,
known as "Block IA." The program successfully completed three of these
design reviews but delayed the fourth until early 2005. Table 12
summarizes the principal activities related to each review.

Table 12: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Design
Reviews

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Aegis BMD 3.1 The system design disclosure for the final version of Block
2004 software, BMD 3.1, was System Design Disclosure successfully
completed. This review evaluated the performance of BMD 3.1 for the
Completed Jan. 2004 LRS&T mission as well as engagement scenarios with
both sustain-mode and pulse

mode SDACS.

Vertical Launch System Phase I Critical Design Review

Completed Feb. 2004

Vertical Launch System Phase II Preliminary Design Review

Completed June 2004

SM-3 Block IA Critical Design Review

Completed Oct. 2004 The critical design review of the vertical launch
system phase I was successfully completed. The review examined the
expected performance of the Vertical Launch System associated with BMD
3.0.

The preliminary design review of the vertical launch system phase II was
successfully completed. This review presented requirements (design
specifications) and early designs for the Vertical Launch System
associated with BMD 3.1.

The initial critical design review of the SM-3 Block IA-the upgraded
configuration of the Block I missile-was successfully completed and gave
the program permission to begin missile assembly and testing. This review
examined the maturity of the design and expected performance of the Block
IA SM-3 missile configuration. A "close out" critical design review is
planned to be conducted in April 2005.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

                  Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

Assessment of Element Performance

We identified areas for which the Aegis BMD program has not fully
demonstrated element performance and reliability. First, the program has
demonstrated its intercept capability under limited conditions; second,
the program has not successfully demonstrated, in a flight test, SDACS
operation using its high-energy pulse mode; and third, the program has
only exercised the element's LRS&T capability in a small number of
flighttest events.

The Aegis BMD program demonstrated the capability to intercept a
nonseparating target through its successes in FM-2, FM-3, FM-4, FM-6, and
FM-7. Although these tests were scripted, they are noteworthy, given the
difficulty of "hit-to-kill" intercepts. Officials with the office of
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), pointed out that the
Aegis BMD program has conducted the most operationally realistic testing
of all BMDS elements, especially because they utilize an operational U.S.
Navy cruiser. They recognize, however, that the targets in FM-2 and FM-3
flew trajectories that facilitated radar detection and tracking. More
realistic engagement scenarios will be tested in Block 2006, for example,
tests with multiple simultaneous engagements.

As we reported last year,6 the Aegis BMD program faced challenges with
ensuring the reliability of SDACS operation; the issue continues to be
relevant. The root causes of the SDACS failure in FM-5 are understood and
the program is implementing four design changes to correct the problem.
After completing ground tests to verify these changes, the program plans
to flight test the modified multi-pulse SDACS no earlier than FM-8,
scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2005. Even if the design
changes prove to resolve the SDACS issue, program officials do not expect
to implement any design changes in the first 11 Block 2004 missiles being
delivered. Program officials believe that these missiles provide a
credible defense against a large population of the threat even with
reduced divert capability.

The program has exercised the element's LRS&T capability in a limited
number of flight-test events, as noted above. Nonetheless, the Aegis BMD
program predicts that the Aegis SPY-1 radar is able to deliver adequate
performance in support of the BMD mission, and DOT&E officials believe
that Aegis BMD can adequately perform its detection and tracking

6 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).

                  Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

functions. Although the Aegis destroyers have been upgraded for the LRS&T
capability, they have not been exercised in a manner consistent with an
actual defensive mission. That is, the Aegis BMD element has not provided
track data of a target, in real time, to plan a BMD mission and launch GMD
interceptors.

DOD's planned investment in the Aegis BMD program from program inception
in 1996 through 2011 is approximately $10 billion. As broken out in table
13, DOD expended $3.67 billion between fiscal years 1996 and 2004,7
Congress appropriated $1.14 billion for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is
budgeting about $5.22 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2011 for Aegis
BMD development, procurement, and operations. Budgeted activities in the
"cooperative work" column include SM-3 component development between the
United States and Japan.

Assessment of

Element Cost

Table 13: Aegis BMD Cost

                    Dollars in millions of then-year dollars

                           Other Block 2004 Block 2006 Block 2008       Total 
                                 Block 2010 Cooperative work          
     FY 1996a - FY 2003   $2,985                       $0 $0 $0 $0 $0  $2,985 
     FY 2004 (Actuals)         0                      606 24 0 0 51.8 
FY 2005 (Appropriated)      0                     943 122 0 0 71.3   1,136 
          FY 2006              0                   101 575 135 0 24.8 
          FY 2007              0                    15 547 354 0 52.8 
          FY 2008              0                    0 69 637 20 112.5 
          FY 2009              0                   0 15 546 185 131.5 
          FY 2010              0                    0 0 205 576 129.5 
          FY 2011              0                     0 0 44 644 100.0 
     FY 1996 - FY 2011    $2,985     $1,665 $1,352 $1,921 $1,425 $674 $10,022 
                                             Source: MDA.             
                                        Notes: Aegis BMD budget as of 
                                   February 2005. Numbers may not add 
                                                     due to rounding. 
                                    aProgram inception (FY 1996).     

Contract Activities 	In the second half of 2003, two new prime contracts
for the Aegis BMD element were awarded, one for the Aegis Weapon System
and one for the

7 Includes funds expended to develop the Navy Theater Wide system.

                  Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

SM-3 missile. Aegis Weapon System efforts, previously part of five Navy
contracts, were merged into one contract, which was awarded to Lockheed
Martin in October 2003. This contract covers Block 2004 activities,
including upgrades to BMD software, upgrades to the SM-3 missile launch
system, and planning activities for future blocks. The two previous Navy
SM-3 contracts were merged into a new contract, which was awarded to
Raytheon in August 2003. It covers development and delivery of SM-3
missiles and related engineering efforts.

Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance

The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate a prime contractor's cost and schedule performance.
Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and schedule relative to
expectations established under the contract. Contractors refer to
deviations as "variances." Positive variances are generally associated
with the accomplishment of activities under cost or ahead of schedule,
while negative variances are often associated with the accomplishment of
activities over cost or behind schedule.

We used the Cost Performance Reports to evaluate the cost and schedule
performance of the Aegis Weapon System prime contractor but had
insufficient data to assess the performance of the SM-3 contractor. Our
analysis of the Aegis Weapon System found that the prime contractor
performed at or near budgeted cost and schedule during fiscal year 2004.
Specifically, since contract inception in October 2003 through September
2004, the prime contractor was $3.5 million under budget. However, it was
unable to complete $2 million of work because of fluctuations in ship and
testing schedules (see fig. 3).

Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

Figure 3: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance

Dollars in millions

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

                                      2004

Cumulative cost variance

Cumulative schedule variance

Sources: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

The Defense Contract Management Agency is concerned with the delay that
occurred in the implementation of the SM-3 contract's performance
measurement baseline,8 which reflects the schedule and budget for all work
tasks that must be performed to meet contract objectives. Although the
contract was awarded to the prime contractor, Raytheon, in August 2003,
the contract's baseline was not reviewed at an Integrated Baseline Review
(IBR)9 until almost a year after contract award. Program officials
indicated that the delay stemmed from the late establishment of the

8 A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work tasks,
designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each task,
schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets, and
allocates budget to the scheduled work.

9 An integrated baseline review is the program manager's review of a
contractor's performance measurement baseline. The review is conducted by
the program manager and the manager's technical staff. It verifies the
technical content of the baseline and ensures that contractor personnel
understand and have been adequately trained to collect earned value
management data. The review also verifies the accuracy of the related
budget and schedules, ensures that risks have been properly identified,
assesses the contractor's ability to implement earned value management
properly, and determines if the work identified by the contractor meets
the program's objectives.

Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

contract's performance management baseline, which was established 7 months
after contract award because of the need for the program office to react
to funding issues. Raytheon was allowed to postpone issuing Cost
Performance Reports until after the Aegis BMD program office held an IBR 5
months after establishment of the baseline.

Until the completion of the Raytheon IBR, program officials monitored
contractor performance through monthly management and business meetings
where cost and performance data, milestones, and projections of future
performance were reviewed. The program office stated that these monthly
meetings provided sufficient data to monitor contractor performance.
Nonetheless, without these reports, it is difficult for the program office
(and other independent agencies) to monitor cost and schedule performance
of the contract's various components and, therefore, to identify areas in
need of corrective action. Additionally, although we are aware of past
problems with SDACS performance on the SM-3 contract, we did not have any
data to evaluate its impact on the contract's cost and schedule.

               An Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System

Appendix III Summary

Airborne Laser

Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment

During fiscal year 2004, MDA restructured the ABL program to focus on
nearterm milestones and to improve confidence in longer-term schedule and
cost projections. The restructuring placed the near-term focus on two
events: (1) the combined operation of individual laser modules to generate
a single laser beam, known as "First Light," and (2) a flight test of the
prototype aircraft with an installed laser beam control system, known as
"First Flight." In light of the program's restructure, ABL completed most
of its planned fiscal year 2004 activities on schedule. However, total
contract costs through calendar year 2008 increased by approximately $1.5
billion, and the program's schedule was extended over 3 years.

Schedule: The program completed on schedule most of its fiscal year 2004
activities associated with the preparation for "First Light" and "First
Flight." However, as a result of the recent program restructuring, the
demonstration to shoot down a short-range ballistic missile-the focus of
the program-was delayed from 2005 and is now scheduled to occur no earlier
than 2008.

Testing: Both "First Light" and "First Flight" were achieved in early
fiscal year 2005. Although the achievement of "First Light" is a key
milestone for the program, it was not intended as an operational
demonstration of a high-power laser, that is, at full power and for the
length of time needed to shoot down a boosting missile. Rather, the
laser's operation for a fraction of a second demonstrates successful
integration of subsystems. "First Flight" is also a key milestone for the
program. It is the first of a series of flights to demonstrate the
completion of design, safety, and verification activities that are
necessary to assure flight worthiness of the aircraft with the laser beam
control system installed.

Performance: At this stage of ABL development-before the laser has been
operated at full power or critical technologies have been demonstrated in
flight tests-any assessment of effectiveness is questionable. Nonetheless,
the program office monitors performance indicators to assess the element's
readiness for successfully completing the lethality demonstration. One
indicator in particular-atmospheric compensation, the process whereby a
system of deformable mirrors and electronics is used to minimize the
degradation of the laser beam as it travels through the atmosphere-is not
meeting its performance objectives. Program officials told us that a
recovery plan for this indicator is in place.

Cost: ABL program costs continue to grow. During the first half of fiscal
year 2004, prior to the restructuring of the program, the ABL prime
contractor incurred a negative cost variance of $114 million and could not
complete $47 million of planned work. MDA's restructuring of the ABL
program increased program cost by about $1.5 billion-the prime contract is
currently valued at approximately $3.6 billion, more than three times its
original value of $1.02 billion-although overall program objectives did
not change.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Appendix III: Airborne Laser

Element Description 	The Airborne Laser (ABL) is a missile defense system
designed to shoot down enemy missiles during the boost phase of flight,
the period after launch during which the missile's rocket motors are
thrusting. By engaging ballistic missiles during the boost phase, ABL
destroys enemy missiles early in their trajectory before warheads and
countermeasures can be released. ABL plans to use a high-energy chemical
laser to defeat enemy missiles by rupturing a missile's fuel or oxidizer
tanks, causing the missile to lose thrust or flight control. ABL's
objective is to prevent the delivery of the missile's warhead to its
intended target.

ABL was initially conceived as a theater system to defeat short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles. However, its role has been expanded to
include the full range of ballistic missile threats, including
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).1 In addition, ABL could be
used as a forwarddeployed Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) sensor
to provide launch point, impact point, and trajectory data of enemy
missiles in support of engagements by other system elements.

The ABL element consists of the following three major components
integrated onboard a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft. In addition, the
element includes ground support infrastructure for storing, mixing, and
handling the chemicals used in the laser.

o  	High-energy chemical oxygen-iodine laser (COIL). The laser, which
generates energy through chemical reactions, consists of six laser modules
linked together to produce megawatt levels of power. Because the laser
beam travels at the speed of light, ABL is expected to destroy missiles
quickly, giving it a significant advantage over conventional boost-phase
interceptors.

o  	Beam control/fire control (BC/FC). The BC/FC component's primary
mission is to maintain the beam's quality as it travels through the
aircraft and atmosphere. Through tracking and stabilization, the BC/FC
ensures that the laser's energy is focused on a targeted spot of the enemy
missile.

o  	Battle management/command and control (BMC2). The BMC2 component plans
and executes the element's defensive engagements. It is being designed to
work autonomously using its own sensors for launch

1 The terms "intercontinental ballistic missile" and "long-range ballistic
missile" are used interchangeably.

                          Appendix III: Airborne Laser

History

Developmental Phases

detection, but it could also receive early warning data from other
external sensors.

In 1996, the Air Force initiated the ABL program to develop a defensive
system that could destroy enemy missiles from a distance of several
hundred kilometers. Developmental testing of the first prototype aircraft
was originally planned to conclude in 2002 with an attempt to shoot down a
short-range ballistic missile target.

In 2002, management authority and funding responsibility transferred from
the Air Force to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In accordance with MDA
planning, the ABL program restructured its acquisition strategy to conform
to an evolutionary, capabilities-based approach.

The ABL program is focused on developing a prototype aircraft for use in a
lethality demonstration-a flight test in which the ABL aircraft will
attempt to shoot down a short-range ballistic missile. If this test is
successful, MDA believes it will prove out the concept of using directed
energy for missile defense. Although ABL's funding is broken out by
block-2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010-the program is developing a single
configuration of the element leading to the lethality demonstration, which
will occur no earlier than 2008. A specific date for the demonstration has
not been scheduled and depends on the success of ground testing.
Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to when ABL will provide an initial
operational capability. MDA plans to provide this capability through the
development of a second aircraft, but the purchase of this aircraft is
contingent upon the successful test of the prototype aircraft.

In January 2004, MDA restructured the ABL program to focus on near-term
milestones and to improve confidence in longer-term schedule and cost
projections. The near-term focus of the program was shifted toward two
events: (1) the achievement of a key laser demonstration known as "First
Light"-the first demonstration of the integration of six individual laser
modules to produce a single beam of laser energy-and (2) the initial
flight test of the prototype aircraft with the BC/FC installed, which is
referred to

Appendix III: Airborne Laser

as "First Flight."2 Key provisions of the restructure call for the program
office to complete the following activities during the next few years:

o  	Ground test and flight test the BC/FC segment independent of
highenergy laser testing activities. BC/FC testing would utilize a
low-power, substitute laser in place of the high-energy laser, as needed.

o  	Ground test the high-energy laser independent of BC/FC testing
activities.

o  	Integrate and ground test the complete ABL weapon system (i.e.,
combined laser, BC/FC, and battle management segments).

o  	Flight test the ABL weapon system, culminating in a lethality
demonstration against a boosting missile.

The lethal demonstration has been delayed by about 6 years. This event was
originally scheduled to occur in 2002 and, as we reported last year,3 was
later rescheduled to be conducted in early 2005. However, as a result of
the January 2004 restructuring of the program, the event is now scheduled
to occur no earlier than 2008.

In its report accompanying the 2005 Defense Authorization Act, the House
Armed Services Committee noted its approval of the restructured program.
However, the Committee also recognized that the future of the ABL program
depended upon successful completion of "First Light" and "First Flight."
The Committee stated that these milestones must be completed in order for
the Committee to further support the program after fiscal year 2005.

2 "First Flight" was planned as a "passive" flight test, that is, without
the use of the Track Illuminator Laser (TILL) and the Beacon Illuminator
Laser (BILL). The TILL and BILL are part of the laser-beam control system
used to focus the laser beam on the target and to mitigate the effects of
the atmosphere on beam quality.

3 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).

                          Appendix III: Airborne Laser

Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments

Assessment of Scheduled Activities

The program planned to complete several activities during fiscal year 2004
commensurate with the program's restructuring. As noted above, the program
shifted its near-term focus toward key demonstrations within the BC/FC and
laser segments. The following activities were identified as the key
milestones for the fiscal year.

o  	BC/FC Segment. Complete ground integration and testing of the BC/FC
segment and begin integration of beam control segment into the ABL
prototype aircraft in preparation for "First Flight."

o  	Laser Segment. Complete integration of the six laser modules in the
System Integration Laboratory (SIL)-a ground-test facility located at
Edwards Air Force Base, California-in preparation for "First Light."

In fiscal year 2004, the program completed most of its planned activities
on schedule. Tables 14 and 15 summarize the progress made toward
completing BC/FC and laser activities in fiscal year 2004.

Table 14: Status of ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-BC/FC
Segment

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Complete ground integration and testing of In September 2004, the program
completed this activity, which is comprised of a BC/FC

the BC/FC	ground test and a test of the aircraft's flight turret. These
tests were conducted in an effort to demonstrate the functionality of the
full-up BC/FC and turret segments with flight hardware.

                    Begin integration of BC/FC segment into

the ABL aircraft In October 2004, the last major BC/FC component-the
flight turret-was installed on the aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base in
preparation for "First Flight."

Aircraft Readiness for Flight 	In November 2004, the program verified the
air-worthiness of the ABL with the BC/FC and BMC4I components installed.

Conduct "First Flight" 	"First Flight" was conducted in December 2004, the
first of 22 planned flight tests with the BC/FC segment. The flight test
was originally planned for 2- 1/2 hours but was terminated early due to
erroneous instrument readings. These readings were corrected and a full
duration flight was achieved the following week. One of its objectives was
to demonstrate that all necessary design, safety, and verification
activities to assure flight worthiness had been completed. "First Flight"
also began the process of expanding the aircraft flight envelope-types and
combinations of flight conditions-in which the ABL can operate. Finally,
"First Flight" was designed to measure the environment of the BC/FC system
while the aircraft is in flight.

                    Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

                          Appendix III: Airborne Laser

 Table 15: Status of ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Laser Segment

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Complete integration of the 6 laser The integration of individual modules
in preparation for "First Light" was completed

modules in the SIL 	successfully. The completion of this activity enabled
testing of the six integrated modules in the ground-test facility.

Achieve "First Light" in the SIL "First Light" was successfully conducted
in fiscal year 2005 (November 2004).

"First Light" refers to the ABL ground-test event during which individual
laser modules are successfully integrated and operated to generate a
single laser beam.

Continue large optics fabrication and Efforts to complete studies of
technologies are ongoing.

optical coating efforts 	Long-lead optics production is ongoing and
improvements to the production process are being studied.

Continue jitter reduction and illuminator Efforts to upgrade hardware to
reduce jitter-vibrations onboard the ABL aircraft that improvement
degrades the focus of the high-energy laser beam-are still ongoing.

Use of advanced cooling methods to improve the power, efficiency, beam
quality, and start-up time of the illuminator laser are also still
ongoing.

Demonstration of "First Light"

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

The demonstration of "First Light"-to prove that individual laser modules
can be successfully integrated and operated to generate a single laser
beam-was achieved on November 10, 2004, at the SIL ground facility. In
general, "First Light" is an important milestone for any laser system
because it demonstrates the ability to get all major laser subsystems to
work together.

Although the achievement of "First Light" is a key milestone for the
program, it was not intended as an operational demonstration of a
highpower laser, that is, at full power and for the length of time needed
to shoot down a boosting missile. Rather, the laser's operation for a
fraction of a second demonstrates successful integration of subsystems.
"First Light" demonstrated that the six modules are aligned optically and
the flow system is functioning, but program officials noted that the
operation of the laser was too short to make meaningful predictions of
power and beam quality.4 The program plans to conduct a series of tests
that will gradually increase the length and power of the laser operation
until full power lasing objectives are achieved.

4 The quality of a laser beam is measured by attributes such as beam
width, coherency, and sustained power.

                          Appendix III: Airborne Laser

Demonstration of "First Flight"

The achievement of "First Flight"-the first of 22 planned tests-is also a
key milestone for the program. This flight test was conducted on December
3, 2004, and served as the functional check of the aircraft with its newly
installed laser beam control system. This event is critical because:

o  	It demonstrates that all necessary design, safety, and verification
activities to assure flight worthiness have been completed.

o  	It begins the process of expanding the aircraft flight envelope-types
and combinations of flight conditions-in which the ABL can operate.

o  	It offers the program the opportunity to collect data on the effects
of the environment on the BC/FC system while the aircraft is in flight.
The data gathered during this test will be used to address jitter issues.

Although "First Flight" was conducted, the program was unable to achieve
all of its intended test objectives. The test was originally planned for
2- 1/2 hours but was terminated early due to some erroneous
instrumentation readings. Program officials made several attempts to
resolve the readings in flight but were unsuccessful and the aircraft was
landed early. However, the instrumentation anomalies were all fixed and
the program conducted a second flight test on December 9, 2004, which
lasted the intended duration of 2- 1/2 hours. The primary objective of the
second test was the same as that for "First Flight"-to perform all
necessary in-flight functional checks to ensure flight worthiness of the
aircraft. The flight test was completed and all remaining test points not
completed during "First Flight" were completed successfully.

Assessment of Element Performance

The program office monitors performance indicators to determine the
program's readiness for successfully completing the lethality
demonstration in 2008. Based on its assessment, 11 of 15 of these
indicators point to some risk in achieving this goal. For example, one
indicator-atmospheric compensation5-is not meeting its performance
objectives. Program officials identified a shortfall in the bandwidth of
the adaptive optics control system-the system of deformable mirrors and
electronics that focus the laser beam on the target-as the primary cause

5 Atmospheric compensation is the process whereby the high-energy laser
beam uses a system of deformable mirrors to minimize the degradation of
the laser caused by distortions in the atmosphere.

                          Appendix III: Airborne Laser

of this deficiency. Program officials told us that a recovery plan for
this indicator is already in place and that the contractor is in the
process of fixing the shortfall.

Another important indicator pertaining to the technology of controlling
and stabilizing the high-energy laser beam so that vibration unique to the
aircraft does not degrade aimpoint-a phenomenon referred to as
"jitter"-was identified as a risk item by the program office early on and
continues to be a program risk. Jitter control is crucial to the operation
of the laser because the laser beam must be stable enough to impart
sufficient energy on a fixed spot of the missile target to rupture its
fuel or oxidizer tank. Because jitter is among the least mature of ABL's
critical technologies, the program office is conducting ground tests and,
in the future, flight tests to learn more about jitter control.

DOD's planned investment in the ABL program from program inception in 1996
through 2011 is approximately $7.3 billion. As broken out in table 16, DOD
expended $2.52 billion between fiscal years 1996 and 2004, Congress
appropriated $458 million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about
$4.32 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2011 for ABL research and
development.

Assessment of
Element Cost

                               Table 16: ABL Cost

                    Dollars in millions of then-year dollars

                         Other   Block     Block     Block     Block    Total 
                                 2004      2006      2008      2010    
    FY 1996a - FY 2003  $2,058        $0        $0        $0        $0 $2,058 
    FY 2004 (Actuals)        0       459         0         0         0 
         FY 2005             0       458         0         0         0 
      (Appropriated)                                                   
         FY 2006             0         0       465         0         0 
         FY 2007             0         0       630         0         0 
         FY 2008             0         0         0       601         0    601 
         FY 2009             0         0         0       669         0    669 
         FY 2010             0         0         0         0       792    792 
         FY 2011             0         0         0         0     1,163  1,163 
    FY 1996 - FY 2011   $2,058      $917    $1,095    $1,270    $1,955 $7,295 

Source: MDA.
Note: ABL budget as of February 2005.
aProgram inception (FY 1996).

                          Appendix III: Airborne Laser

ABL was funded as an Air Force program from 1996 through 2001 and during
that time a little over $1 billion was spent. After the program was
transferred to MDA in fiscal year 2002, MDA expended approximately $1
billion in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 on ABL development.

Major Contracting Activity in Fiscal Year 2004

The cost of the ABL program continues to grow. In May 2004, we reported
that the prime contractor's costs for developing ABL had nearly doubled
from the Air Force's original estimate.6 In addition, the program incurred
cost overruns. In fiscal year 2003 alone, the contractor overran its
budget by $242 million, which resulted primarily from integration and
testing issues.

The program office recognized that the contractor's unfavorable cost and
schedule performance would eventually cause the contract to reach its
ceiling price by May 2004. Consequently, MDA considered three alternatives
to the contract: (1) continue to work toward the planned schedule, (2)
develop a new schedule that scaled back planned activities, or (3)
discontinue the contract. Agency officials decided to continue with the
existing contract and refocus the program on near-term technical progress.
In an effort to continue with the current contract, program officials
reevaluated the program schedule and extended the contract period of
performance, established a new estimate to complete the contract, and
increased the contract cost ceiling by about $1.5 billion. Prior to the
recent program restructure, the Block 2004 prime contract was valued at
approximately $2.1 billion and was scheduled to end six months after the
lethality demonstration in June 2005. However, as a result of the recent
program changes, the lethality demonstration is now expected to occur no
earlier than 2008 and the contract's period of performance was extended
through December 2008. The prime contract to conduct the lethality
demonstration is currently valued at approximately $3.6 billion-more than
three times its original value of $1.02 billion. Figure 4 summarizes the
major activity for the program's prime contract since inception.

6 GAO, Uncertainties Remain Concerning the Airborne Laser's Cost and
Military Utility, GAO-04-643R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).

                          Appendix III: Airborne Laser

                    Figure 4: ABL Block 2004 Prime Contract

                    Source: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Prime Contractor Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance

The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate prime contractor performance relative to cost and
schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and schedule
relative to expectations established under the contract. Contractors refer
to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are generally associated
with the accomplishment of activities under cost or ahead of schedule,
while negative variances are often associated with the accomplishment of
activities over cost or behind schedule.

Our analysis of prime contractor Cost Performance Reports indicates that
ABL cost and schedule performance declined during the first half of fiscal
year 2004 even though the program implemented a new performance
measurement baseline7 at the beginning of the fiscal year. As illustrated
in figure 5, the program incurred a negative cost variance of $114 million
and a negative schedule variance of $47 million during the first 6 months
of fiscal year 2004. Program officials indicated that delays in hardware
delivery, design problems, and integration issues were the primary drivers
of cost growth.

7 A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work tasks,
designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each task,
schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets, and
allocates budget to the scheduled work.

Appendix III: Airborne Laser

Figure 5: ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance

Dollars in millions

0

-20

-40

-60

-80

-100

-120

Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

                                   2003 2004

Cumlative cost variance

Cumlative schedule variance

Sources: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

Note: Insufficient data is available to perform earned value management
analysis beyond March 2004. Contractor performance reporting was suspended
from April 2004 through July 2004 because the program was re-planning its
efforts and implementing a new performance measurement baseline.

Between April and July 2004, while the contractor was re-planning its work
effort, the program was unable to fully evaluate the contractor's progress
against its cost and schedule objectives. During this time, program
officials directed the contractor to suspend normal cost performance
reporting and redirected resources to complete the replanning effort.
Since the contractor was not required to provide program officials with
full Cost Performance Reports, the program was unable to perform
meaningful Earned Value Management (EVM) analysis.8 However, in the
absence of these reports, program officials took steps to ensure that some
insight into the contractor's progress was maintained throughout the

8 The EVM system is a management tool widely used by DOD to compare the
value of the prime contractor's work performed to the work's actual cost.
The tool measures the contractor's actual progress against its expected
progress and enables the government and contractor to estimate the
program's remaining cost.

                          Appendix III: Airborne Laser

re-planning effort. For example, the program measured schedule progress by
comparing actual progress against the completion of detailed activities
associated with "First Light" and "First Flight" and gauged the
contractor's cost performance by comparing contractor forecasted
expenditures to the actual costs of the work performed.

The contractor resumed normal cost performance reporting in August 2004.
As of September 2004, the contractor was performing work under budget but
slightly behind schedule-the program had a positive cost variance of $6.6
million and a negative schedule variance of $1.6 million. According to
Cost Performance Reports, the program experienced delays associated with
the integration and checkout of the turret assembly-a subcomponent of the
BC/FC system-which caused schedule slips through the end of the fiscal
year. The late delivery of laser spare material and assembly parts caused
additional schedule delays for the program.

Award Fee Plan Although the program was restructured in spring 2004 and
the ABL prime

Unchanged 	contract modified to extend the contract period and increase
its value, the associated award fee plan was not adjusted. Therefore, the
contractor currently has no opportunity to earn any fee for successful
demonstration, since the current award fee plan was tied to a successful
completion of shoot down by December 2004.

An Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System

Appendix IV Summary

Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment

The C2BMC team executed the program within budget but slightly behind
schedule in fiscal year 2004. Important activities-such as the completion
of software development and testing, integration activities, and operator
training continued in fiscal year 2004 to ready the element for Limited
Defensive Operations (LDO)-were completed.

Schedule: By the end of September 2004, the C2BMC program office completed
activities needed to ready the C2BMC element for LDO. The LDO software
"build" (spiral 4.3) was delivered. The program office also carried out a
number of activities enabling BMDS integration and communications.
Finally, C2BMC suites at U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command
were activated, and "web browsers" providing summary screens of the
unfolding battle (such as trajectories of attacking missiles and launched
interceptors) were installed at U.S. Pacific Command and locations in the
National Capital Region.

Testing: Testing to evaluate C2BMC functionality, interoperability, and
system-level integration for LDO was completed. For example, Cycle-3
testing-the third of four cycles of testing to verify that C2BMC
interfaces with each BMDS element individually-was completed in August
2004. Cycle-4 testing, which is ongoing, is the final cycle of testing to
verify system-level integration. During these tests, the C2BMC element
participates in flight tests planned and conducted by MDA.

Performance: During testing of its software, the C2BMC program uncovered a
performance issue with its "track correlation and association" algorithm
in scenarios involving multiple tracks. The program monitored this issue
as a high-risk item because it had the potential to impact situational
awareness. In particular, threat information could be displayed
differently at C2BMC suites and GMD fire control nodes, possibly causing
confusion within the command structure. The problem was resolved with
software fixes and the issue retired in July 2004.

Cost: Our analysis of the prime contractor's Cost Performance Reports
shows that the contractor continued to carry a positive cost variance,
that is, in total it completed work under budget. However, the contractor
experienced a modest erosion in cost performance in fiscal year 2004. In
particular, it completed fiscal year 2004 activities slightly over budget,
incurring a negative cost variance of $3.6 million. The prime contractor's
schedule performance was slightly, yet consistently, behind schedule for
most of fiscal year 2004. In total, the contractor incurred a negative
schedule variance of $5.7 million because of unanticipated technical
issues.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

Element Description 	The Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC) element is being developed as the integrating and
controlling entity of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). It is
designed to provide connectivity between the various BMDS elements and to
manage their operation as part of an integrated, layered missile defense
system.

C2BMC has neither a sensor nor weapon. As a software system housed in
command centers known as suites,1 C2BMC provides network-centric warfare
capabilities that provide the warfighter with the capability to plan and
monitor the missile defense mission. The C2BMC element will track
ballistic missile threats-utilizing all available sensors from the various
elements-and direct weapons systems to engage the threat.

As the name indicates, the C2BMC is comprised of three major components:

o  	Command and control. The command and control component enables the
warfighter to monitor the operational status of each BMDS component,
display threat information, such as missile trajectory and impact point,
and control defensive actions. In other words, it provides the situational
awareness and planning tools to assist the command structure in
formulating and implementing defensive actions.

o  	Battle management. The battle management component formulates the
detailed instructions (task plans) for executing various missile defense
functions, such as tracking enemy missiles, discriminating the warhead
from decoys and associated objects, and directing the launch of
interceptors. Once implemented, the battle manager will direct the
operation of system elements and components, especially under evolving
battle conditions.

o  	Communications. Leveraging existing infrastructure, the communications
component manages the exchange and dissemination of information necessary
for carrying out the battle management and command and control objectives.

History 	The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) initiated the C2BMC program in
2002 as a new element of the BMDS. Program officials noted that initial

1 The C2BMC element also consists of supporting hardware, such as
workstations and communications equipment.

Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

Developmental Phases

versions of C2BMC software are based on existing Air Force and
GMDdeveloped fire control (battle management) software.

The C2BMC element is being developed under MDA's evolutionary acquisition
approach, which delivers system capabilities in 2-year blocks, beginning
with Block 2004. Within each block, C2BMC software is developed
incrementally through a series of software builds known as "spirals." Over
time, the C2BMC element will be enhanced to provide overarching control
and execution of missile defense engagements with the aim of implementing
layered defense through the collective use of individual BMDS elements.

The principal function of the Block 2004 C2BMC element is to provide
situational awareness, that is, to monitor the operational status of each
BMDS component and to display threat information such as missile
trajectories and impact points. The program expects to develop this
capability incrementally through spirals 4.1 - 4.5. The interim delivery,
spiral 4.3, is available for Limited Defensive Operations (LDO) and is on
the path to full Block 2004 functionality.

The incorporation of battle management capabilities in the C2BMC element
begins with Block 2006. In the 2006-2007 time frame, the element is
expected to track that ballistic missile threat throughout its entire
trajectory and select the appropriate elements to engage the threat. For
example, the Block 2006 C2BMC configuration would be able to generate a
single, more precise track from multiple radars and to transmit it to the
other elements. Together, this functionality enables each element to "see
farther" than it could using its own radar system. This allows elements to
launch interceptors earlier, which provides more opportunity to engage
incoming ballistic missiles.

Block 2006 is also expected to make a significant improvement over Block
2004 with respect to BMDS communications. During this time, the C2BMC
program office will work to establish communications to all elements of
the BMDS, overcome limitations of legacy satellite communications
protocols, and establish redundant communications links to enhance
robustness. Such upgrades serve to improve operational availability and
situational awareness.

Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004

o

o

o

Assessment of Scheduled Activities

Planned accomplishments for the C2BMC program in fiscal year 2004 centered
on completing activities to ready the element for LDO by the end of
September 2004. To achieve this goal, the C2BMC element planned to
complete the following specific activities:

Software development. Complete the design, development, and testing of LDO
C2BMC software spirals 4.1 - 4.3.

BMDS integration and communications. Integrate the C2BMC element into the
BMDS; install and activate global communications capabilities.

Make BMDS operational. Complete and activate C2BMC suites; train
operators.

By the end of September 2004, the C2BMC program office completed
activities needed to ready the C2BMC element for LDO. The LDO "build" of
C2BMC (spiral 4.3) was delivered and installed at the various suites. The
program office also carried out a number of activities enabling BMDS
integration and communications. Finally, C2BMC suites at U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) were
activated, and "web browsers" providing summary screens of the unfolding
battle (such as trajectories of attacking missiles and launched
interceptors) were installed at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and
locations in the National Capital Region (such as the White House).

Status of C2BMC Software Development

Table 17 summarizes the principal development and testing activities for
the first three spirals of Block 2004 C2BMC element software. Most
notably, development of the LDO build, spiral 4.3, was completed in May
2004. Testing to evaluate C2BMC functionality, interoperability, and
system-level integration was also completed. For example, Cycle-3
testing-the third of four cycles of testing to verify that C2BMC
interfaces with each BMDS element individually-was completed in August
2004. Cycle-4 testing, the final cycle of testing to verify system-level
integration, is ongoing. During these tests, the C2BMC element
participates in flight tests planned and conducted by MDA.

Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

Table 17: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Accomplishments-Software Development and
                                    Testing

Software build Activity Completion date Comments

Spiral 4.1 	Development Mar. 2003 All functional and performance testing
was completed successfully. Testing Oct. 2003

Spiral 4.2 Development Sept. 2003 Spiral 4.2 was tested in a number of
venues, including Missile Testing Cycle-3: Feb. 2004 Defense Integration
Exercise 04a (Mar. 2004), Integrated Missile Defense War Game 03.2 (Nov.
2003), and Pacific Explorer II

a,b,c

                                  (Mar. 2004).

Spiral 4.3 Development May 2004 Spiral 4.3 is the LDO build. It was tested
in Pacific Explorer III (Jul. Testing Cycle-3: Aug. 2004 2004), Glory Trip
185 (June 2004), Integrated Missile Defense War Games 04.2 - 04.4 (June -
Sept 2004), System Integration and Cycle-4: Ongoing Checkout 6A (Sept.
2004), and other tests.b,c,d

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

aMissile Defense Integration Exercises are hardware-in-the-loop ground
tests conducted to characterize the degree of integration and
interoperability between BMDS elements.

bIntegrated Missile Defense War Games are ground tests that enable the
warfighter to exercise the C2BMC in a simulated operational environment.
In general, the warfighter community uses them to gain insight in, and
provide feedback on, C2BMC capabilities.

cPacific Explorers are field exercises to demonstrate BMDS connectivity.
An Aegis destroyer participates by tracking an actual missile (or a
simulated target) and passes track data to the C2BMC.

dGlory Trips are live flight tests during which a Minuteman III missile is
launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base as part of Follow-on Test and
Evaluation. C2BMC objectives are geared to evaluating the element's
interfacing with, and processing of track data from, forward-deployed
radars.

The program office plans to complete, by the end of calendar year 2005,
key activities pertaining to the development and testing of spirals 4.4
and 4.5-the final two builds of Block 2004 C2BMC element software. For
example, development of spiral 4.4 was completed in November 2004 and
Cycle-3 testing is expected to be completed in April 2005. In addition,
the program office expects to complete development of spiral 4.5 in March
2005 and begin Cycle-3 testing in June 2005. Cycle-4 testing of spiral 4.5
is scheduled to begin during the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 with
completion coinciding with the completion of Block 2004.

Status of BMDS The C2BMC program office carried out a number of activities
in fiscal year Integration and 2004 related to C2BMC's role in BMDS
integration and communications. Communications For example, interface
specifications between C2BMC and other elements

were completed. In addition, communications software and hardware were
installed at the various C2BMC sites, including USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM,
and USPACOM. Finally, the C2BMC element participated in a number of MDA
test events to verify system integration.

Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

Status of Steps Taken to The C2BMC program completed a variety of
activities in fiscal year 2004 to

Make BMDS Operational 	make the BMDS operational. These activities
included activation of C2BMC suites at the various command sites and the
training of military operators for conducting ballistic missile defense
missions. Table 18 summarizes the program's efforts in making the system
available for LDO.

Table 18: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Making System
Operational

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Site Activation	C2BMC suites at USSTRATCOM and USNORTHCOM were fully
activated to support defensive operations. Furthermore, so-called "web
browsers" that provide situational awareness are ready to support LDO at
USPACOM and three National Capital Region sites. At all sites, hardware
installation, software installation, testing, and a readiness review were
completed by Sept. 30, 2004.

Training 	C2BMC operator training was completed at USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM,
USPACOM, and three National Capital Region sites by Sept. 30, 2004, to
support LDO. The warfighter completed a number of training courses-Joint
Defense Planner Class, Situational Awareness Class, and Flag Officer
Class-at all locations and participated in training events. Operator
training continued through the beginning of fiscal year 2005 as part of
the "shakedown" process.

Assessment of Element Performance

Assessment of Element Cost

Source: MDA.

During testing of C2BMC software, the C2BMC program uncovered a
performance issue with its "track correlation and association" algorithm
in scenarios involving multiple tracks. During a portion of fiscal year
2004, the program monitored this issue as a high-risk item because it had
the potential to impact situational awareness. In particular, threat
information could be displayed differently at C2BMC suites and GMD fire
control nodes, possibly causing confusion within the command structure.2
The program implemented a mitigation plan to resolve this issue, including
the formation of a "Blue Ribbon Panel" in June 2004 to analyze the
problem. The problem was resolved with software fixes and the issue
retired in July 2004.

DOD's planned investment in the C2BMC program from program inception in
2002 through 2011 is approximately $2.2 billion. As broken out in table
19, DOD expended $343 million between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, Congress
appropriated $191 million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is

2 Details of this issue are classified.

      Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

budgeting $1.65 billion for C2BMC development and operations between
fiscal years 2006 and 2011.

                              Table 19: C2BMC Cost

                    Dollars in millions of then-year dollars

                      Other  Block    Block    Block   Block  Core b    Total 
                              2004     2006    2008    2010          
     FY 2002a - FY   $179.4       $0       $0      $0      $0     $0   $179.4 
         2003                                                        
FY 2004 (Actuals)      0     92.4     52.5     0.7       0  18.3     163.9 
        FY 2005           0    154.0     24.0    10.8       0  1.7      190.5 
    (Appropriated)                                                   
        FY 2006           0     22.5    142.2    75.9       0      0    240.6 
        FY 2007           0     16.2    153.0   100.0    11.5      0    280.7 
        FY 2008           0        0     23.8   197.0    60.6      0    281.4 
        FY 2009           0        0     16.7   166.0   104.6      0    287.3 
        FY 2010           0        0        0    65.7   217.8      0    283.5 
        FY 2011           0        0        0    56.0   223.7      0    279.7 
FY 2002 - FY 2011 $179.4   $285.1   $412.2  $672.1  $618.2 $20.0  $2,187.0 

Source: MDA.

Note: C2BMC budget as of February 2005.

aProgram inception (FY 2002).

bCore funding is part of Program Element 0603890C, "BMD Project." Core
activities involve the hiring of skilled individuals to aid in the
development of the C2BMC element.

Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance

C2BMC development is being carried out through a contractual vehicle known
as an Other Transaction Agreement (OTA),3 which functions much like a
prime contract. MDA believes that an OTA allows the C2BMC element to take
advantage of more collaborative relationships between industry, the
government, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, and
University Affiliated Research Centers. OTAs generally are not subject to
federal procurement laws and regulations. The OTA did implement the earned
value management system used to assess the cost and schedule performance
of contractors developing large weapon systems. The C2BMC Missile Defense
National Team, for which Lockheed

3 An OTA refers to transactions other than contracts, grants, or
cooperative agreements. OTAs are entered into under the authority of 10
U.S.C. S: 2371 (2000 & Supp. II 2004) for basic, applied, and advanced
research projects or under the authority of section 845 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (10 U.S.C. S: 2371 note)
for prototype projects.

Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

Martin Integrated System and Solutions serves as the industry lead, is
developing and fielding the C2BMC element of the BMDS.

The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate a prime contractor's cost and schedule performance.
Generally, these reports detail deviations in cost and schedule relative
to expectations established under the contract. Contractors refer to
deviations as "variances." Positive variances are usually associated with
the accomplishment of activities under cost or ahead of schedule, while
negative variances are often associated with the accomplishment of
activities over cost or behind schedule.

During fiscal year 2004, C2BMC development was performed under two parts
of the existing OTA-Part 2, for which work was completed in March 2004,
and Part 3, for which work began in March 2004. As illustrated in figure
6, Cost Performance Reports show that Lockheed Martin, the industry lead
for the OTA, continued to carry a positive cost variance, that is, in
total it completed work under budget. However, Lockheed experienced a
modest erosion in cost performance in fiscal year 2004. In particular, it
completed fiscal year 2004 activities slightly over budget, incurring a
negative cost variance of $3.6 million on combined Part 2 and Part 3 work
efforts.

Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

Figure 6: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance

Dollars in millions

Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

2003 2004

Cumulative cost variance

Cumulative schedule variance

Sources: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

The prime contractor's schedule performance was slightly, yet
consistently, behind schedule for most of fiscal year 2004. However,
beginning in May 2004, schedule performance sharply declined. In total,
Lockheed incurred a negative schedule variance of $5.7 million for
combined Part 2 and Part 3 work performed in fiscal year 2004.

The C2BMC program office reported the following two drivers as
contributing to fiscal year 2004 cost and schedule variances.

o  	Track association algorithm. As noted in the performance section, the
C2BMC program uncovered a performance issue with its "track correlation
and association" algorithm during spiral testing. Resources allocated to
spiral 4.4 development were used to address this problem, including the
convening of a Blue Ribbon panel to analyze it. In the course of analyzing
and correcting this issue, more time and money were needed for additional
testing of spiral 4.3 and associated risk reduction efforts on developing
an alternative algorithm.

o  	Site activation. C2BMC suites are being integrated with existing
systems at USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and USPACOM. The

Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications

integration efforts, particularly those aspects pertaining to information
assurance, were considerably more difficult that anticipated. The result
was the need for more travel by the engineering team to field, install,
and troubleshoot problems at the three activation sites.

An Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System

Appendix V Summary

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment

By the end of fiscal year 2004, GMD carried out planned activities needed
to field an initial missile defense capability, including, as summarized
below, the emplacement of interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska. However,
delays of flight tests prevented MDA from demonstrating the operation of
the integrated system in a realistic environment before placing
interceptors in silos for defensive operations. The program also showed
unfavorable trends in contractor cost and schedule performance in fiscal
year 2004.

Schedule: The GMD program completed construction of missile silos and
facilities at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California; emplaced five GMD interceptors in their silos at Fort Greely
by the end of September 2004; and completed the upgrade of the Cobra Dane
radar. MDA is on track to add additional interceptors and radar
capabilities throughout Block 2004, although there is some risk that the
sea-based X-band radar will not be completed by the first quarter of
fiscal year 2006, as planned.

Test: The GMD program office conducted two flight tests (non-intercept
booster tests) in fiscal year 2004 out of six events that were planned-no
intercept attempts were conducted. Accordingly, GMD interceptors were
fielded before flight testing was performed to verify that LDO hardware
and software could function in an operational environment. In preparation
for defensive operations, the GMD program also completed a series of
System Integration and Checkouts that demonstrated connectivity,
functionality, and integration of its fielded components.

Performance: While ground and flight tests have demonstrated each step of
the missile defense engagement sequence-detect, track, launch/engage, and
intercept-collectively, these accomplishments do not verify integrated
operation of the GMD capability. For example, BMDS and GMD radars have not
performed their primary function as a fire control radar in a flight test
event.

Cost: Our analysis of the prime contractor's Cost Performance Reports
shows that the contractor overran its budgeted costs in fiscal year 2004
by $219.6 million and was unable to complete $59.9 million worth of
scheduled work. Developmental issues with the interceptor's booster and
kill vehicle remain the leading causes of cost overruns and schedule
slips. For example, interceptor development cost $204 million more in
fiscal year 2004 than the contractor budgeted. Flight test delays also
contributed to unfavorable cost and schedule performance.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Element Description 	The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is a
missile defense system designed to protect the U.S. homeland against
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)1 attacks. As an integral part of
the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), GMD functions to destroy
long-range ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of flight, the
period after booster burnout when the warhead travels through space on a
predictable path.

The GMD element relies on a broad array of components, including (1)
space-and ground-based sensors to provide early warning and tracking of
missile launches; (2) ground-and sea-based radars to identify and refine
the tracks of threatening objects; (3) ground-based interceptors to
destroy enemy missiles through "hit-to-kill" impacts outside the
atmosphere; and (4) fire control and communications nodes for battle
management and execution of the GMD mission. Figure 7 illustrates GMD
components, current and planned, which are situated at several locations
within and outside of the United States.

The program office produced, emplaced, and upgraded all GMD components
needed for an initial capability by the end of September 2004 and is
working to augment this initial capability with additional interceptors
and radars by the end of calendar year 2005. This first block of
capability-Block 2004-is estimated to provide the U.S. with protection
against ICBMs launched from Northeast Asia and the Middle East.

1 The terms "intercontinental ballistic missile" and "long range ballistic
missile" are used interchangeably. They are, by definition, ballistic
missiles with ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers (3,400 miles).

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

                    Figure 7: Components of the GMD Element

History

MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

The Department of Defense (DOD) established the National Missile Defense
program in 1996 to develop a missile defense system capable of protecting
the United States from ICBM attacks. The program was to be in a position
to deploy the system by 2005, if the threat warranted. Many of the
components used in the current GMD program are based directly on the
research and development conducted by the National Missile Defense
program.

In response to the President's December 2002 directive to field a missile
defense system, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) accelerated its
developmental activities to make the GMD element operational-that is, to

                   Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Developmental Phases

field a working system operated by trained warfighters. GMD remains a
capabilities-based research and development program with enhanced
capabilities delivered periodically in block upgrades.

GMD's development and fielding are proceeding in a series of planned 2year
blocks, which incrementally increase the element's capability by maturing
the design of element components and upgrading software. Block 2004, the
first increment, is being rolled out in two major phases:

o  	Limited Defensive Operations (LDO). The GMD program completed an
initial capability in September 2004, which is available for limited
defensive operations. The principal components include five interceptors
at Fort Greely, Alaska; GMD fire control and communications nodes for
battle management and execution at Fort Greely and Schriever Air Force
Base, Colorado; an upgraded Cobra Dane radar at Eareckson Air Station,
Alaska; and connectivity to Aegis BMD for additional radar tracking. DOD
will use this initial capability to provide the United States with
protection against a limited ballistic missile attack launched from
Northeast Asia. This capability was expanded by the end of calendar year
2004 with the addition of three interceptors-one at Fort Greely and two at
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), California-and an upgraded early warning
radar (UEWR) at Beale Air Force Base, California.

o  	Block 2004 Defensive Capability. By the end of calendar year 2005, MDA
plans to augment the LDO capability by installing 10 additional
interceptors at Fort Greely (for a total of 18 interceptors at Fort Greely
and VAFB); deploying a sea-based X-band radar; and upgrading the early
warning radar at Fylingdales, England. These enhancements are expected to
provide additional protection against ICBMs launched from the Middle East.

Future block configurations of the GMD element build upon the Block 2004
capability. As part of its Block 2006 program, MDA expects to field 10
additional interceptors at Fort Greely and upgrade the early warning radar
located at Thule Airbase, Greenland. MDA also plans to conduct more
realistic flight tests to demonstrate performance against more complex
missile threats and environments.

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004

Assessment of Scheduled Activities

The GMD element plays a central role in the Block 2004 BMDS. In general,
planned accomplishments for GMD in fiscal year 2004 centered on continuing
development of element components, conducting ground and flight testing,
and fielding components for LDO. Specific planned accomplishments include:

o  	Component Development. The program office planned to continue
development of all element components for LDO, Block 2004, and the
incremental improvement of block capability.

o  	Testing. The program planned to conduct six flight tests (three
booster tests, one "fly-by" test, and two intercept attempts), two
integrated ground tests, and System Integration and Checkouts in
preparation for LDO.

o  	Fielding Initial Capability. The program planned to complete
construction of facilities and the installation of five ground-based
interceptors at Fort Greely, complete upgrades of the Cobra Dane radar,
and activate its fire control and communications component.

MDA met its fielding goals for LDO and is on track, with some schedule
risk, to add additional interceptors and radar capabilities throughout
Block 2004. Ground tests were conducted to ensure interoperability of
element components and to verify operation and performance of component
software. However, several key flight tests needed to verify the
effectiveness of LDO hardware and software, originally scheduled for
fiscal year 2004, were delayed into fiscal year 2005.

GMD Component In fiscal year 2004, a large portion of the GMD program
focused on the

Development 	development of its Block 2004 components, some of which will
be fielded as part of LDO. Summaries of progress made by the GMD program
office during fiscal year 2004 in developing its components are given in
table 20.

                   Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

         Table 20: Status of GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Component Development

Component Description Fiscal Year 2004 progress

GMD Fire Control and The fire control component integrates and controls
Communications the other components of the GMD element. With Component
input from operators, the fire control software plans

engagements and directs GMD components, such as its radars and
interceptors, to carry out a mission to destroy enemy ballistic missiles.
The in-flight interceptor communications system (IFICS), which is part of
the fire control component, enables the fire control component to
communicate with the kill vehicle while it is en route to engage a threat.

Upgraded Early Warning The early warning radar is an upgraded version of
Radars existing Ultra High Frequency surveillance radars (Beale and
Fylingdales) used by the Air Force for strategic warning and

attack assessment. For Block 2004, the GMD program is upgrading two early
warning radars- one at Beale AFB and another at Fylingdales Airbase-to
enable the radars to more accurately track enemy missiles. The upgrades
include improvements to both the hardware and software.

Upgraded Cobra Dane The Cobra Dane radar, located at Eareckson Air Radar
Station on Shemya Island, Alaska, was primarily In fiscal year 2004, the
GMD program completed software development and testing of the LDO build.
MDA also completed construction of IFICS Data Terminals at Shemya and Fort
Greely and activated the CONUSa fiber optic ring, which connects all the
command, control, and communications networks of the GMD element.
Additionally, connectivity to Aegis BMD and the C2BMC were completed.

In fiscal year 2004, Beale UEWR ground support facilities and radar
hardware installation were completed. Although radar hardware installation
is complete, final software installation and testing are ongoing with
completion expected in the middle of fiscal year 2005.

MDA also began facility construction and upgrades to the early warning
radar at Fylingdales, which is on track to be completed by the first
quarter of fiscal year 2006.

In fiscal year 2004, the GMD program completed hardware installation and
software upgrades to the Cobra Dane radar. The radar also tracked a
foreign missile launch and participated in an integrated ground test.
While Cobra Dane met most of the data collection objectives in these
tests, the upgraded Cobra Dane radar has not participated in a flight test
event as the primary fire control radar- a role it would need to fill in
the event of a real threat. MDA may perform a radar certification flight
test using a long-range air-launched target during the third quarter of
2005. The primary objective of this test is to demonstrate the upgraded
Cobra Dane in a more operationally realistic environment.

being used to collect data on ICBM test launches out of Russia. Cobra
Dane's surveillance mission did not require real-time communications and
dataprocessing capabilities; therefore, it was upgraded to be capable of
performing the missile defense mission as part of the Block 2004
architecture. As an upgraded radar, Cobra Dane is expected to operate much
like the upgraded early warning radar at Beale AFB. Although its hardware
required minor modifications, Cobra Dane's mission software is being
revised for its new application. The program plans to use existing
software and develop new software to integrate Cobra Dane into the GMD
architecture. It is also modifying the Cobra Dane facility to accommodate
enhanced communications functions.

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

                Component Description Fiscal Year 2004 progress

Sea-Based X-Band Radar 	The GMD program office is managing the development
of a sea-based X-band radar (SBX) to be delivered and integrated into the
BMDS by the end of Block 2004. SBX will consist of an X-band radar-based
on the technologies of the X-band radar prototype located at Reagan Test
Site- positioned on a sea-based platform, similar to those used for
offshore oil drilling. The radar is designed to track and discriminate
enemy missiles with high accuracy and assess whether an intercept was
successful.

During fiscal year 2004, MDA completed most platform modifications and
assembly of the radar structure. Key electronic components have been
completed, and all software design reviews conducted.

The program office assesses the delivery of SBX by the first quarter of
fiscal year 2006 as the program's only significant risk item. If
complications occur in final integration, checkout, or verification,
delivery could be delayed.

MDA plans to exercise the SBX in flight tests beginning in fiscal year
2006.

Ground-Based Interceptor 	The ground-based interceptor-the weapon In
fiscal year 2004, MDA placed the first five component of the GMD
element-consists of a kill interceptors into silos at Fort Greely; a sixth
vehicle mounted atop a three-stage booster. The interceptor was delivered
in October 2004. booster, which is essentially an ICBM-class missile, MDA
continued to work toward building anddelivers and deploys the kill vehicle
into a trajectory integrating pieces of additional missiles that will be
to engage the threat. Once deployed, the kill vehicle delivered throughout
2005. For example, uses its onboard guidance, navigation, and control
interceptors #7 and #8 were placed into VAFB silossubsystem (along with
target updates from the fire control node component) to detect, track, and
steer during December 2004, as scheduled. itself into the enemy warhead,
destroying it above the atmosphere through a hit-to-kill collision.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

aCONUS refers to the Continental United States, i.e., the lower 48 states.

In our April 2004 report on missile defense,2 we noted that MDA is
pursuing the development of two types of boosters for the GMD interceptor,
one referred to as the Lockheed BV+ booster and the other known as the
Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) booster. We also described how problems
with the development and delivery of Lockheed's BV+ booster contributed to
cost growth and schedule slips for the program. For example, BV+
production was temporarily suspended because of two separate explosions at
a subcontractor's propellant-mixing facility.

Despite these problems, MDA is dedicated to pursuing a dual-booster
strategy. However, the problems with Lockheed's booster in fiscal year
2003 had ramifications for the program's fiscal year 2004 activities. For
example, MDA planned to use BV+ boosters in alternating Block 2004 flight
tests and in about half of the interceptors fielded. However, because

2 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

of BV+ development and production problems, MDA deferred BV+ participation
in integrated flight tests into Block 2006, and the Block 2004 inventory
of GMD interceptors will consist entirely of those utilizing OSC boosters.
MDA plans to restart the manufacturing of BV+ boosters in fiscal year 2005
and to field the first BV+ booster in 2007.

                                  GMD Testing

The GMD program conducts a variety of tests, the most visible being flight
test events. For example, the program conducted booster validation (BV)
flight tests to assess the operation of GMD's two booster designs. In
addition, the program conducts integrated flight tests (IFT) to more
realistically demonstrate the GMD element using actual hardware and
software. IFTs are reflective of the environment in which the GMD element
would operate for a given threat trajectory and given set of conditions.

Although MDA hoped to gain knowledge about the element's effectiveness by
conducting several integrated flight tests throughout fiscal year 2004,
only two of six scheduled tests-non-intercept tests of the Lockheed BV+
booster and the OSC booster-were executed. Table 21 summarizes the major
GMD flight tests that MDA planned to conduct in fiscal year 2004.

         Table 21: Status of Major GMD Flight Tests (Fiscal Year 2004)

Test event      Date             Description               Outcome         
     BV-5a                       BV+ Booster Test      All booster objectives 
              Original date:                                   were achieved. 
              Feb. 20, 2003                            However, the mock kill 
                                                               vehicle failed 
                                    Objectives:              to deploy.       
               Actual date:  o  Characterize           
                             Lockheed's BV+ booster    
               Jan. 9, 2004         performance        

IFT-13A Original date:        BV+ Booster Test        The program deferred 
                                                              this test until 
              May 2003                                      BV+ production    
                                                               resumes.       
                                    Objectives:          
            Planned date:   o  Characterize booster and  
                                   kill vehicle          
              Deferred             environments          
            indefinitely                                 
                           o  Engage simulated target as 
                           part of an                    
                                 integrated system       

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

                      Test event Date Description Outcome

IFT-13B Original date:     OSC Booster Testb     The test was a successful 
             July 2003                               demonstration of the OSC 
                                                                     booster- 
                                                    all test objectives were  
                                 Objectives:        achieved.                 
            Actual date:   o  Characterize booster  
                              and kill vehicle      
           Jan. 26, 2004        environments        
                          o  Engage simulated       
                          target as part of an      
                              integrated system     

                              Non-intercept attempt  Because the interceptor  
IFT-13C Original date: (zero-offset flyby)c with         failed to         
                                                the 
             Mar. 2004           OSC booster        launch from its silo,     
                                                    test objectives           
                                                     associated with booster  
                                                            and kill          
                                                    vehicle functioning could 
                                                    not be assessed. The root 
            Actual date:       Configuration:               cause of the test 
           Dec. 14, 2004    o  Target launch from   failure was attributed to 
                                   Kodiak                   a timing          
                          o  Interceptor launch     problem with the          
                          from Reagan Test Site  o  interceptor's flight      
                          Interceptor: LDO          computer, which caused    
                          configuration             the interceptor to abort  
                                                    its launch.               

IFT-14 Original date:    System test (intercept  Because the interceptor   
                         attempt) with OSC booster         failed to          
            Oct. 2003                              launch from its silo, test 
                                                   objectives                 
                                                    associated with booster   
                                                            and kill          
                         Configuration:  o  Target  vehicle functioning could 
           Actual date:  launch from Kodiak  o           not be assessed. The 
          Feb. 14, 2005  Interceptor launch from        reason for the launch 
                         Reagan Test Site                    failure is under 
                                                               investigation. 
                            o  Interceptor: LDO    
                               configuration       

FTG-04-1 Planned date:        System test (intercept attempt) with OSC TBD 
                                                                  booster 
            4Q FY2005d                                                    
                          Configuration:                                  
                          o  Target launch from Kodiak                    
                          o  Interceptor launch from VAFB                 
                          o  Interceptor: LDO configuration               

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Note: Test schedule as of October 2004.

aBV-5 was the last flight test to use Lockheed's BV+ booster.

bOrbital Sciences Corporation builds the OSC boost vehicle. MDA
accelerated the production of OSC boosters to compensate for the
undelivered BV+ boosters. All of the Block 2004 interceptors use OSC
boosters.

cA "zero-offset flyby" means that intercepting the target is not a test
objective. However, no action is taken to prevent an intercept.

dWe use the notation "4Q FY2005" to mean the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2005 and an identical format for other time periods.

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

IFT-13C, which was the first flight test in 2 years with the potential for
an intercept,3 was delayed several times during fiscal year 2004. Part of
the delay was attributed to technical problems with the interceptor. In
addition, MDA upgraded the test interceptor to a configuration that more
closely matches the ones deployed. The test was conducted in December
2004, but failed to execute fully because the interceptor did not launch
from its silo. IFT-13C was of particular significance, because it was to
have demonstrated operational aspects of the LDO capability for the first
time in a flight test environment. For example, it was to have
demonstrated: (1) the operation of LDO hardware and software; (2) the
operation of the kill vehicle mated with an OSC booster; and (3)
"real-time" connectivity between Aegis destroyers and the C2BMC. IFT-14
was conducted in February 2005 as a repeat of IFT-13C but with the added
objective to achieve an intercept. However, as in IFT-13C, it failed to
execute fully because the interceptor did not launch from its silo.

MDA relies heavily on its ground test program to characterize element and
system performance (especially under a broad set of conditions not
testable in flight), to demonstrate interoperability, and to develop
operational doctrine. MDA conducted two integrated ground tests (IGT) in
fiscal year 2004, IGT-2 and IGT-4a. These tests employed actual
GMDcomponent processors integrated together in a hardware-in-the-loop
facility that emulated GMD operation in a simulated environment. They also
included warfighter participation to aid in the development of operational
concepts. Although the tests demonstrated that GMD components could work
together, its utility in assessing element performance was limited.
Officials in the office of DOT&E told us that such assessments should be
anchored by flight test data so that models and simulations accurately
characterize the system. Delays in the GMD flight test program precluded
these tests from being adequately anchored and, therefore, limited its
usefulness in assessing element performance.

The GMD program also participated in a series of System Integration and
Checkouts (SICO) of its fielded components. While these checkouts do not
assess element performance, they do demonstrate connectivity,
functionality, integration, and configuration in preparation for defensive
operations. During fiscal year 2004, MDA successfully conducted SICOs 1,
3, 5, and 6A. SICO 3 demonstrated the integration of non-LDO interceptor

3 Technically, IFT-13C was a "zero-offset flyby." Although intercepting
the target was not a test objective, no action was taken to prevent an
intercept.

                   Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

equipment at Fort Greely into the overall BMDS; SICO 5 confirmed that the
upgraded Cobra Dane radar was properly connected to the Communications
Network; and SICO 6A confirmed integration of LDO interceptor equipment at
Fort Greely into the BMDS. Finally, SICO 6B was successfully conducted in
the beginning of fiscal year 2005 (December 2004). It demonstrated the
integration of interceptor equipment at Vandenberg into the BMDS.

                          Fielding Initial Capability

The GMD program completed the development, emplacement, and/or upgrade of
element components planned for LDO, including ground-based interceptors,
the Cobra Dane radar, the Beale UEWR (in fiscal year 2005), and the GMD
fire control and communications. Most notably, five interceptors were
placed in silos at Fort Greely and are available for defensive operations.
GMD also completed hardware and software upgrades to the Cobra Dane and
Beale radars, both of which met objectives in ground tests and tracked
targets of opportunity. Fire control and communications nodes have been
activated and linked to all GMD locations. Finally, facility construction
at Fort Greely and other GMD sites was completed. Table 22 summarizes main
accomplishments made in fiscal year 2004 for each activity.

Table 22: Status of GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Fielding
                               Initial Capability

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Ground Based Interceptor: 	Five interceptors were delivered and installed
at Fort Greely by September 30, 2004. Three additional interceptors were
delivered (1 to Fort Greely; 2 to VAFB) by December 2004.

Deliver and install 5 interceptors at Fort MDA plans to have 18
interceptors available for defensive operations by the end of the

Greely 	first quarter of fiscal year 2006, two less than the agency's
Block 2004 fielding goal. Of the 20 interceptors originally planned, two
were designated as test assets.

Cobra Dane Radar: 	Installation and checkout of Cobra Dane's mission
equipment was completed ahead of schedule. Cobra Dane software development
was also completed. The radar successfully tracked a foreign missile
launch but has not participated in any BMDS flight

Complete upgrades, checkout, and tests that demonstrate real-time tracking
and communications as part of an integrated activation system.

Beale UEWR: 	All planned hardware upgrades and GMD software for LDO were
completed. The Beale UEWR is now integrated with the BMDS. Although radar
hardware installation is complete, final software installation and testing
are ongoing with completion expected in

Complete upgrades, checkout, and the middle of fiscal year 2005.

activation The upgraded radar successfully tracked a Titan missile
launched out of VAFB and several satellites but has not participated in
any MDA-dedicated tests like radar certification flights or integrated
flight tests in its upgraded configuration. The full checkout of the
upgraded software will not be verified in a flight test until fiscal year
2005.

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Activity Description/Progress assessment

GMD fire control and communications: 	GMD fire control and communications
were completed on schedule to support fielding of the GMD element. The
CONUS fiber optic ring and spurs to all GMD locations were activated.
Satellite communication links were established and all IFICS Data
Terminals

Complete installation, checkout, and were completed.

activation

Construction: 	All facilities required for alert at Fort Greely were
completed, including the first missile field, Readiness and Control
Building, Mechanical Electrical Building, and the on-site IFICS Data
Terminals. The Missile Assembly Building and the interim power plant,

Complete construction and installation at although not required for LDO,
were also completed. Fort Greely and Shemya

Assessment of Element Performance

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

GMD, the centerpiece of the BMDS Block 2004 defensive capability, has
demonstrated its ability to intercept target warheads in several flight
tests since 1999. Indeed, the program has achieved five successful
intercepts out of eight attempts.4 In addition, according to MDA
officials, ground and flight tests have demonstrated each step of the
engagement sequence- detect, track, launch/engage, and
intercept-collectively, although these accomplishments do not verify
integrated operation of the GMD capability.

Although GMD flight tests have demonstrated basic functionality of a
representative missile defense system using surrogate and prototype
components, the tests were developmental in nature and relied on
artificialities to overcome test-range limitations. For example, flight
tests required the placement of a C-band transponder and Global
Positioning System instrumentation on the target reentry vehicle. In
addition, engagement conditions were limited to low closing velocities and
short interceptor fly-out ranges. Finally, the tests were scripted and did
not use production-representative hardware and software.

In its push to field the first eight GMD interceptors by the end of
December 2004, MDA is assuming both performance and cost risk. As noted
above, the GMD program emplaced interceptors in silos before successfully
conducting a flight test utilizing components with the LDO configuration.
For example, the program did not demonstrate that the kill vehicle could
operate with the OSC booster prior to placing it in the silo for future
operational use (even though this booster puts more stress on the kill
vehicle). If future flight testing identifies problems with fielded

4 The December 2004 flight test, IFT-13C, and the February 2005 flight
test, IFT-14, are not counted.

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

interceptors, the need for corrective actions could be costly, but
confidence would increase as corrections are made and capability is
understood.

DOD's planned investment in the GMD program from program inception in 1996
through 2011 is approximately $31.6 billion. As broken out in table 23,
DOD expended $15.3 billion between fiscal years 1996 and 2004,5 Congress
appropriated $3.3 billion for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about
$13.0 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2011 for GMD development,
procurement, and operations.

                                 Assessment of

                                  Element Cost

                    Dollars in millions of then-year dollars

                               Table 23: GMD Cost
                                      FY                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              FY                                              
 Other Block Block Block Block Total 1996a $12,370 $0 $0 $0 $0 $12,370  FY 2004  0 1,357 1,587 0 0 2,944    FY 2005     0 2,756 563 0 0 3,319  FY  0 0 2,224 74 0 2,298  FY  0 0 2,232 281 189 2,702  FY  0 0 331 1,425 717 2,473  FY  0 0 234 1,176 655 2,065  FY  0 0 0 338 1,557 1,895  FY  0 0 0 213 1,350 1,563 1996                                     
       2004  2006  2008  2010        - FY                              (Actuals)                         (Appropriated)                       2006                      2007                         2008                         2009                         2010                       2011                       - FY                                     
                                     2003                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            2011 $12,370 $4,113 $7,171 $3,507 $4,468 $31,629

Source: MDA. Note: GMD budget as of February 2005. aProgram inception (FY
1996).

Prime Contractor Fiscal GMD's prime contract consumes the bulk of the
program's budget. The Year 2004 Cost and contract originally covered Block
2004 and Block 2006 developmental Schedule Performance activities, not the
procurement and fielding of interceptors for the initial

defensive capability. Therefore, the program significantly modified the
contract in October 2003. The $823 million modification directed the
delivery of Block 2004 interceptors 6-20. The program is expected to

5 Includes funds expended to develop the National Missile Defense system.

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

modify the contract again to procure additional interceptors. The added
cost of these interceptors is already reflected in the planned GMD budget
and MDA cost goals.

The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate prime contractor performance relative to cost and
schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and schedule
relative to expectations established under the contract. Contractors refer
to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are usually associated
with the accomplishment of activities under cost or ahead of schedule,
while negative variances are often associated with the accomplishment of
activities over cost or behind schedule.

The GMD program showed an unfavorable trend in contractor performance in
fiscal year 2004. According to our analysis, the contractor exceeded its
budgeted costs during fiscal year 2004 by $219.6 million, which equates to
11.6 percent of the contract value over the fiscal year. In addition, the
contractor fell behind schedule in its work plan. In fiscal year 2004, the
contractor was unable to complete $59.9 million of planned work. Figure 8
shows how the contractor's cumulative cost and schedule performance
declined during fiscal year 2004.

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Figure 8: GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance

Dollars in millions

Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

2003 2004

Cumulative cost variance

Cumulative schedule variance Sources: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

Our analysis shows that developmental issues with the interceptor continue
to be the leading contributor to cost overruns and schedule slips.
Interceptor-related work cost $204 million more than budgeted in fiscal
year 2004, with the kill vehicle accounting for approximately 40 percent
of this overrun. Delays in flight tests IFT-13C and IFT-14 also caused
unfavorable cost and schedule variances.

Based on the contractor's cost and schedule performance in fiscal year
2004, we estimate that the current GMD contract-which ends in September
2007-will overrun its budget by between $593 million and $950 million. The
contractor, in contrast, estimates a $200 million overrun at contract
completion. However, as of the end of fiscal year 2004, the contractor had
already incurred a negative cumulative cost variance of approximately $348
million. In order for the prime contractor to complete the contract within
the established budget, the contractor must not incur any additional cost
overruns through contract completion and recoup at least $148 million. The
Defense Contract Management Agency believes that the prime contractor is
optimistic in projecting that it can limit further cost growth and
schedule slips. Indeed, the Defense Contract Management

Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Agency predicts that the contractor will continue to fall behind and be
unable to recover from past cost growth and schedule slips.

An Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System

Appendix VI Summary

Kinetic Energy Interceptors

Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment

KEI program activities completed in fiscal year 2004 include the selection
of Northrop Grumman as prime contractor for KEI development, associated
planning activities, and experimental work geared toward collecting data
of boosting missiles. Of significance, the amount appropriated by Congress
for missile defense in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 did not include the
amount of funding for KEI that was requested in the President's Budget. As
a result, the program delayed its land-based capability from the
originally planned Block 2008 time frame to Block 2012.

Schedule: In December 2003, MDA awarded Northrop Grumman a $4.6 billion
prime contract to develop and test the KEI element over the next 8 years.
The award follows an 8-month concept design effort between competing
contractor teams, each of which was awarded $10 million contracts to
design concepts for KEI.

Testing: In fiscal year 2004, the KEI program office continued with
activities designed to reduce technical risks in developing the KEI
interceptor. In particular, the program office is working on an experiment
to collect data on boosting missiles, known as the Near Field Infrared
Experiment. At this early stage of development, however, no significant
testing of the land-based capability has been conducted by the program
office.

Performance: Because this element is still in its infancy, data are not
yet available to make a performance assessment. However, the program
office identified areas of high risk that could have an impact on the
element's future performance. All risks are associated with interceptor
development- including motor development and plume-to-hardbody
handover-stemming from the demands required of the boost phase intercept
mission.

Cost: Our analysis of the prime contractor's cost performance report shows
that the contractor completed planned work under budget but was slightly
behind schedule in performing planned activities. Specifically, during
fiscal year 2004, the contractor could not complete about $1.6 million
worth of work. The program was unexpectedly tasked to complete trade
studies of how to incorporate new requirements being imposed by MDA. Due
to plans to restructure the KEI program, the prime contract's long-term
baseline is no longer relevant; a reliable baseline will not be available
until 2005.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors

Element Description 	The Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) element is a
missile defense system designed to destroy ballistic missiles during the
boost phase of flight, the period after launch during which the missile's
rocket motors are thrusting. KEI is also planned to engage enemy missiles
in the early ascent-phase, the period after booster burnout before the
missile releases warheads and countermeasures. Unlike the Airborne Laser
element, which utilizes directed energy to disable boosting missiles, the
KEI element launches interceptors to engage and destroy these threats
through hit-to-kill collisions.

The KEI program is currently focused on developing a mobile, land-based
system-to be fully demonstrated by the Block 2012 time frame-to protect
the United States against long-range ballistic missile attacks.1 The
land-based system will be a deployable unit consisting of a command and
control/battle management unit, mobile launchers, and interceptors. The
KEI element has no sensor component, such as radars, for detecting and
tracking boosting missiles. Instead, it will rely on Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) sensors, such as space-based infrared sensors and
forward-deployed radars, for such functions.

Concurrent with KEI development, the program is proceeding with its Near
Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE). The experiment consists of launching an
experimental satellite in fiscal year 2006 to collect infrared imagery of
boosting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The data it collects
will support the program's efforts in developing the software that
operates the interceptor's kill vehicle, in addition to enhancing plume2
models and boost-phase simulations.

History 	In fiscal year 2003, MDA initiated the KEI program as part of its
Boost Defense Segment. To select a contractor and a concept for the
element, the KEI program office awarded competitive contracts to teams
headed by Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin. Each contractor was given
the flexibility to design a system that met only one broad
requirement-that

1 In our report, GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance
Testing and Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004),
we stated that the landbased system would be available in the Block 2010
time frame. Because of budget cuts and a restructuring of the program, the
land-based KEI capability will not be available until Block 2012.

2 The plume is the hot exhaust gas emanating from the missile during boost
phase.

                    Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors

Developmental Phases

the KEI element be capable of reliably intercepting missiles in their
boost/ascent phases. MDA did not set cost or schedule requirements or
specify how the contractors should design the system.

MDA initially requested funds for the KEI element along with other
boostphase defense elements, such as the Airborne Laser, in its Boost
Defense Segment. However, in fiscal year 2004, MDA budgeted the KEI
program under a new area known as BMDS Interceptors.

The KEI element is being developed under MDA's acquisition approach, which
delivers system capabilities in 2-year block increments. When the KEI
concept was first being pursued in fiscal year 2003-during which Northrop
Grumman and Lockheed Martin were competing for the prime contract-the
program planned on developing a mobile, land-based system to be available
in the Block 2008 time frame and expanding it to sea-based platforms in
Block 2010. However, the amount appropriated by Congress for missile
defense in fiscal year 2004 did not include the amount of funding for KEI
that was requested in the President's Budget. As a result, the program
delayed completion of its land-based capability into Block 2010 and
delayed the expansion of the sea-based capability into Block 2012.

In fiscal year 2004, the KEI program underwent a second re-plan to
compensate for anticipated fiscal year 2005 funding cuts and the addition
of new requirements (such as nuclear hardening) imposed by MDA. In the
re-plan, the land-based capability was combined with the sea-based
capability of Block 2012, both of which utilize the same interceptor.

The KEI program has undergone further restructuring, as reflected in the
fiscal year 2006 President's Budget submitted in February 2005. Based on
revised funding levels beyond fiscal year 2005, the program deferred the
sea-based capability into Block 2014 (2014-2015 time frame), removed the
international program, and initiated plans for a Space Test Bed.

The program now expects to develop KEI capabilities as follows:

o  	Block 2012-land. MDA envisions that the first-generation land based
interceptors would be launched from trucks that can be driven up close to
the border of the threatening nation. An initial land-based capability
will be declared after the final flight test, Integrated Test 5 (IT-5), is
conducted by the end of 2013.

                    Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors

Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004

Assessment of Scheduled Activities

o  	Block 2014-sea. This block increment expands KEI's land-based
capabilities to include the capability to launch KEI interceptors from
sea-based platforms, such as Aegis cruisers. The sea-based capability will
use the same interceptor as the land-based capability.

o  	Blocks 2012/2014-space test bed. Development of the space test bed is
planned to be carried out concurrently with the development of KEI's
terrestrial (land and sea) capabilities. Consisting of a limited
constellation of space-based interceptors, the test bed is envisioned to
provide an additional layer of defense against ICBMs. MDA plans to
initiate a concept design phase in fiscal year 2008 and conduct spacebased
intercept tests in the Block 2012/2014 time frame.

The KEI program planned to accomplish several activities during fiscal
year 2004 associated with the land-based capability, with its primary
focus being the selection of a prime contractor for KEI's developmental
phase. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, the program selected
Northrop Grumman as its prime contractor and awarded the company a
contract valued at $4.6 billion that covers a 98-month performance period.

The program office also planned to complete design, test, and risk
reduction efforts in fiscal year 2004. However, budget reductions forced
Northrop Grumman to delay several of these planned activities until fiscal
year 2005. The program office originally told the contractor to plan for a
$90 million budget during fiscal year 2004, but only $47 million was
available. Because program funding in fiscal year 2004 was much less than
requested, several design and test activities were postponed into fiscal
year 2005. For example, the program's System Requirements Review (SRR)-a
review during which mission objectives are documented, critical components
are identified, and program planning is established-was postponed into
fiscal year 2005.

While the program completed a number of its planned activities, overall,
the KEI program progressed much more slowly than anticipated. As noted
above, Northrop Grumman was forced to re-plan several scheduled activities
because of reduced funding for the KEI program in fiscal years 2004 and
2005. Progress made toward achieving scheduled activities is summarized in
tables 24 through 27.

A key program accomplishment in fiscal year 2004 was the selection of
Northrop Grumman as the KEI prime contractor. The KEI program office

                    Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors

employed a unique acquisition strategy in the award of the contract by
making mission assurance-the successful operation of the element to
perform its mission-the basis for the amount of the contractor's profit
from the performance of the contract. MDA built incentives into the
contract that require the prime contractor to assure mission assurance
through a disciplined execution of quality processes. For example, the
contractor earns an award fee only if flight tests are successful, and the
percentage of the award fee earned is determined by whether the tests are
conducted on schedule. The program's intention is to maximize the
contractor's incentives to develop a quality product on schedule and at
the originally proposed price.

Table 24: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Contract Award
                                  and Planning

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Award KEI Block 2010 Development and In December 2003, Northrop Grumman
was awarded the prime contract for KEI

Test Contract 	development. The cost-plus-award-fee contract is valued at
$4.6 billion and covers a 98month performance period (Dec. 2003 to Jan.
2012).

Conduct Integrated Baseline Review (IBR)a	The IBR for the Development and
Test Contract was completed in March 2004. The review concluded with a
decision to re-plan work given the funding constraints and to have the
contractor address the cost of adding additional MDA-imposed requirements,

b

such as anti-tampering, nuclear hardening, and insensitive munitions.

Conduct Block 2010 System Requirements The SRR is being deferred until
April 2005. At that time, program officials will set specific Review (SRR)
requirements for the KEI element based on detailed design trades, risk
reduction tests, and performance assessments at both the element and
component level.

Conduct "Continuation Review" 	The fiscal year 2004 Continuation Review-a
review to assess whether the program should continue-was deferred until
the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2005. The program office reasoned that the
value offered by such a review would be limited with only eight months of
performance toward a 98-month contract.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

aAn integrated baseline review is the program manager's review of a
contractor's performance measurement baseline. The review is conducted by
the program manager and the manager's technical staff. It verifies the
technical content of the baseline and ensures that contractor personnel
understand and have been adequately trained to collect earned value
management data. The review also verifies the accuracy of the related
budget and schedules, ensures that risks have been properly identified,
assesses the contractor's ability to implement earned value management
properly, and determines if the work identified by the contractor meets
the program's objectives.

bAn insensitive munition is one that will not detonate under any condition
other than its intended mission to destroy a target.

                    Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors

Table 25: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Design
Activities

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Develop element simulations and models 	The Kinetic Energy Interceptors
Simulation was delivered by Northrop Grumman to MDA in July 2004. The
simulation will be used to evaluate the end-to-end performance of the KEI
element.

Develop interface requirements between KEI and C2BMC

The KEI program completed an initial draft of the KEI-to-C2BMC Interface
Control Document in June 2004.

                    Finalize acquisition plans for sea-based

test bed platform The KEI program is investigating the use of a CG-47
class vessel to be used as a test asset so that a better understanding of
the effects of the sea environment on KEI operation is gained. A survey is
underway to determine the condition of the vessel and whether the vessel
could accommodate a launcher.

                    Initiate Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

development with the warfighter

The KEI program provided a draft CONOPS to the Army community for review
in May 2004. Additionally, the program office commissioned the Navy to
conduct a CONOPS study to determine the feasibility of integrating and
operating KEI from cruisers, destroyers, and/or submarines. The Navy
completed this study in August 2004.

Initiate launcher control electronic As a result of program re-planning,
this activity was deferred into fiscal year 2005. assembly development

Design and fabricate Special Test As a result of program re-planning, this
activity was deferred into fiscal year 2005.
Equipment for interceptor design
verification testing

Establish interceptor manufacturing As a result of program re-planning,
this activity was deferred into fiscal year 2005. process laboratory

                    Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Table 26: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Key Test
                                   Activities

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Initiate range planning 	Northrop Grumman continues to work on facilities
as well as environmental and commercial support agreements with the
ranges.

Establish target requirements 	The KEI program office initiated a draft
Target System Requirements Document in January 2004. Working with Northrop
Grumman, KEI will deliver the final version to the MDA Configuration
Control Board following the SRR in April 2005.

Establish Developmental Master Test Plan	The delay in the SRR resulted in
a delay in Developmental Master Test Plan delivery. Based on the current
schedule, the program expects to deliver the test plan in July 2005, 90
days after the SRR.

Static booster motor firing 	This activity, which would have been the
first firing of booster motors for the interceptor, was deferred into
fiscal year 2005.

                    Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

                    Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors

Table 27: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Risk
Reduction Activities

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Continue collection of boost/ascent The KEI program received
high-resolution data sets from several Target of Opportunity phenomenology
data data collections during fiscal year 2004. These series of data
collections provide realistic, high-resolution data sets of plumes for a
variety of missile launches.

NFIRE activities	MDA directed the program to proceed with the experiment
but remove the kill vehicle payload from the experiment's satellite,
thereby reducing funding needs for fiscal year 2005.

Liquid Divert and Attitude Control System As a result of program
re-planning, this activity was deferred into fiscal year 2005.
demonstration activities

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Assessment of 	At this early stage of element development, data are not
available to evaluate element performance through the use of technical
indicators.

Element Performance 	However, the program office identified areas of high
risk3 that may have an impact on the element's future performance. Table
28 summarizes these risks. All risks are associated with interceptor
operation for the boostphase intercept mission.

         Table 28: KEI High-Risk Areas Technology Risk/Area of concern

Motor Development 	According to program officials, there is significant
risk in achieving the required booster thrust and burn time performance to
meet element requirements.

a

Plume-to-hardbody handover	The risk pertaining to plume-to-hardbody
handover arises from a lack of phenomenology data. The program initially
planned to utilize a 1-color infrared seeker for the kill vehicle, a plan
driven by schedule constraints. However, because of program changes
resulting in more time for element development, the program is proceeding
with a 2-color seeker that enables the kill vehicle to better
differentiate between the plume and hardbody.

Thrust Vector Control 	The thrust vector control component of the booster
is used to steer the interceptor during its boost phase. Program officials
rated its development as a high-risk item. The risk stems from the need
for highly capable steering of the boosting interceptor under stressing
scenarios.

Predicted Impact Point / Divert Trades 	This risk pertains to maintaining
a balanced design trade to enable the kill vehicle to intercept the
missile given targeting uncertainty. The design trade is between (1)
predicted impact point accuracy (achieved by the KEI battle manager
component) and (2) kill-vehicle divert requirements to compensate for
targeting errors.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

aPlume-to-hardbody handover refers to the identification of the actual
missile from among the plume of hot exhaust gas that obscures the body of
the boosting missile.

3 High risk means that the program will not meet its objectives without
priority management actions and risk reduction activities.

                    Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors

In its July 2003 report on the boost-phase intercept mission,4 the
American Physical Society indicated that "time line" is a major challenge
for boost phase defense systems. In particular, boost phase defense
against ICBMs hinges (in large part) on the length of time an attacking
missile is in boost phase and on the speed of the defending interceptor.
Accordingly, KEI program officials recognize the time constraints of the
boost phase intercept mission and the challenge in developing quicker
interceptors-as is evident by the first high-risk item of table 28.

This same report also questions the feasibility of a land-based
boost-phase intercept concept, especially against large nations. For
example, the report states that a boost-phase intercept system employing
terrestrial-based interceptors would generally be ineffective against
ICBMs launched from the interiors of large countries-those having
dimensions greater than 1,000 kilometers. Nonetheless, the program office
contends sufficient coverage is possible given adequate numbers and
stationing of KEI units. Furthermore, sea basing, which offers more
options for boost phase defense, builds directly upon the investments
being made in the landbased capability.

Finally, a scientific study on boost phase defense commissioned by MDA5

focused on selected issues of high risk. Plume-to-hardbody handover was

identified as high risk because of a lack of plume phenomenology data

available for determining the appropriate sensor combination for the

interceptor. The program office recognizes this challenge, as noted in
table

28. As a result, the KEI program is proceeding with a 2-color seeker,
better enabling the kill vehicle to differentiate between the plume and
hardbody of a missile. In addition, the program is sponsoring NFIRE and
participating in targets of opportunity to collect data of boosting
missiles.

Assessment of DOD's planned investment in the KEI program from program
inception in 2003 through 2011 is approximately $6.0 billion. As broken
out in table 29,Element Cost DOD expended $192 million between fiscal
years 2003 and 2004, Congress appropriated $267 million for fiscal year
2005, and MDA is budgeting about

4 Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost Phase
Defense Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense (July 2003).

5 Battleson, Kirk, et al., Phase One Engineering Team, Parameters
Affecting Boost Phase Intercept System (February 2002).

                    Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors

$5.5 billion for KEI research and development between fiscal years 2006
and 2011.

                               Table 29: KEI Cost

                    Dollars in millions of then-year dollars

                          Other Block 2010 Block 2012 Space Test Bed    Total 
          FY 2003a        $91.5         $0         $0             $0    $91.5 
     FY 2004 (Actuals)        0      100.6          0              0    100.6 
FY 2005 (Appropriated)     0          0   267.4                 0    267.4 
          FY 2006             0          0   218.7                 0    218.7 
          FY 2007             0          0   420.2                 0    420.2 
          FY 2008             0          0   604.6              45.0    649.6 
          FY 2009             0          0   961.1             150.0  1,111.1 
          FY 2010             0          0  1,189.3            248.0  1,437.3 
          FY 2011             0          0  1,453.5            230.0  1,683.5 
     FY 2003 - FY 2011    $91.5     $100.6  $5,114.8          $673.0 $5,978.9 

Source: MDA.

Note: KEI budget as of February 2005.

aProgram inception (FY 2003).

Table 29 reflects the planned funding profile of the KEI program as
presented in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2006, which was
submitted in February 2005. When compared with the fiscal year 2005
President's Budget-submitted last year in February 2004-KEI's current
funding level is considerably less. Indeed, last year MDA budgeted $7.87
billion for KEI program activities between fiscal years 2004 and 2009. The
current budget of $2.77 billion over the same time period represents a 65
percent reduction in program funding.

Prime Contractor Cost and The government routinely uses contractor Cost
Performance Reports to

Schedule Performance 	independently evaluate prime contractor performance
relative to cost and schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in
cost and schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.
Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are
usually associated with the accomplishment of activities under cost or
ahead of schedule, while negative variances are often associated with the
accomplishment of activities over cost or behind schedule.

Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors

The KEI prime contractor performed work in fiscal year 2004 near its
budgeted costs. From contract inception through August 2004 (which covers
less than 1 percent of the contract), the contractor completed work
slightly under budget but was behind schedule in performing about $1.6
million worth of planned work. Program officials indicated that the
negative schedule variance was the result of the contractor delaying
activities so that it could conduct trade studies on new requirements
imposed by MDA. For example, the contractor has been directed to determine
the cost of adding requirements for anti-tampering, nuclear hardening, and
insensitive munitions.

Because of plans to restructure the KEI program, the long-term performance
measurement baseline6 is no longer relevant. Near-term work is still being
performed according to plan, but the program suspended contractor cost and
schedule performance reporting for current work efforts after August 2004.
As a result, KEI program officials had reduced insight into its prime
contractor's work efforts for a portion of fiscal year 2004. The program
office told us that the contractor will resume reporting in 2005 after a
reliable baseline that reflects the full extent of the program's
restructure is available.

6 A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work tasks,
designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each task,
schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets, and
allocates budget to the scheduled work.

An Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System

Appendix VII Summary

Space Tracking and Surveillance System

Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment

The STSS program office accomplished all but one of the principal Block
2006 activities planned for completion in fiscal year 2004 and initiated
work planned for completion in fiscal year 2005. Although the prime
contractor is working to an accelerated delivery schedule, quality and
systemsengineering problems with a subcontractor are jeopardizing the
early delivery of a satellite's payload.

Schedule: Program activities completed in fiscal year 2004 include the
complex tasks of systems integration, testing, and software development.
The program office completed a critical design review on time. Hardware
modifications to the satellites were completed, but a heat problem
resulting from the redesign of the electrical power subsystem caused a
delay of three months. Software development activities were also
completed, and reviews to ensure that the design for the STSS ground
system could accommodate a larger constellation of satellites were
conducted.

Testing: Functional tests on components of the second technology
demonstration satellite were completed several months late because of
minor problems with the spacecraft's computer processor and other
components. Planned integration tests on the track sensor were not
completed, and integration testing of an interim version of the software
that controls the sensors onboard the satellites took longer than planned.
Although final acceptance testing for the ground software is expected to
be completed 2 months late, all software development tasks are scheduled
to be completed two years before satellite launch.

Performance: Data provided by MDA indicate that two STSS performance
indicators do not meet their respective requirements-one pertaining to the
acquisition sensor and a second pertaining to the tracking sensor. Program
officials stated that degradation in performance is within acceptable
limits. The program considers the demonstration of STSS functionality more
critical than verifying the effectiveness of the demonstrator satellites.

Cost: Our analysis of prime contractor Cost Performance Reports shows that
the contractor completed work in fiscal year 2004 over budget by about
$34.6 million. In addition, the contractor could not complete $20.7
million of scheduled work (relative to a 6-month accelerated schedule).
Quality and systems-engineering problems with a subcontractor contributed
to the overruns in cost and schedule.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System

Element Description 	The Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) is
being developed as a space-based sensor for the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS). As envisioned by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the full
STSS element will be comprised of a constellation of low-orbiting
satellites1 designed to detect and track enemy missiles throughout all
phases of flight. Each satellite making up the program's "space segment"
includes a space vehicle and a payload of two infrared sensors-the
acquisition sensor to watch for the bright plumes (hot exhaust gas) of
boosting missiles, and the tracking sensor to follow the missile through
midcourse and reentry. The STSS element also has supporting ground
infrastructure, known as the "ground segment," which includes a ground
station and mission software to support the processing and communication
of data from the satellites to the BMDS.

MDA is currently working on the first increment of STSS, known as Block
2006, which is focused on the preparation and launch of two technology
demonstration satellites2 partially built under the Space Based Infrared
System Low (SBIRS-Low) program. MDA plans to launch these satellites in
2007, in tandem, in an effort to assess how well they perform surveillance
and tracking functions. Using data collected by the satellites, MDA will
determine what capabilities are needed and what goals should be set for
the next generation of STSS satellites. Any real operational capability,
however, would not be realized until the next decade.

Initiated in 1996, SBIRS-Low was the latest in a series of Department of
Defense (DOD) satellite programs attempting to deliver an operational
capability for detecting and tracking missiles from low-earth orbits. The
program experienced cost and schedule growth and performance shortfalls.
In response, DOD cancelled the accompanying demonstration program in 1999
and put the partially constructed satellite equipment into storage.

In October 2000, Congress directed the Air Force to transfer the SBIRS-Low
program to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (MDA's predecessor).
When MDA inherited SBIRS-Low, the agency decided to

1 The satellites are expected to orbit the earth at an altitude much less
than satellites in geo-synchronous orbit.

2 The two technology demonstration satellites were part of the Flight
Demonstration System.

History

Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System

Developmental Phases

Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004

Assessment of Scheduled Activities

make use of the equipment that was partially built under the SBIRS-Low
technology demonstrator program. By completing the assembly of the two
satellites and launching them in 2007, MDA intends to use the satellites
in missile defense flight tests. At the end of 2002, the SBIRS-Low program
was renamed STSS.

STSS's development is proceeding in a series of 2-year blocks, namely,
Blocks 2006, 2008, and beyond. As noted above, Block 2006 involves the
assembly, integration, testing, and launch of two research and development
satellites in 2007. The first satellite is expected to be ready in
September 2005 and the second in early fiscal year 2007. Block 2008 is
primarily an upgrade of the Block 2006 ground stations, which are used to
collect and analyze data from the two satellites. As technology matures
and as lessons are learned from the first satellites, more capable
satellites will be designed and launched in subsequent blocks.3

The STSS program office intended to accomplish several activities during
fiscal year 2004 related to the preparation of the two demonstration
satellites for launch in 2007. Specifically, the program office planned to
complete the following space- and ground-segment activities:

o  	Space Segment. The program planned to complete a design review to
ensure the STSS design can support the BMDS mission; complete the
reactivation of hardware components for the second satellite; modify two
satellite hardware components to enhance spacecraft performance; continue
to develop the payload software; and start the assembly, integration, and
testing of satellite components.

o  	Ground Segment. The program planned to complete activities to ensure
that the STSS element has a mature ground system design and to continue
with the development of software for the ground segment of the program.

The STSS program office completed all but one of the principal Block 2006
activities planned for fiscal year 2004, including the complex tasks of
systems integration, testing, and software development. Moreover, the

3 Program content of Block 2010 and beyond is classified.

              Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System

program office initiated work planned for completion in fiscal year 2005.
The contractor has been performing to an accelerated delivery schedule,
that is, attempting to complete all contracted activities six months
earlier than required by the contract. However, according to the program
office, quality and systems-engineering problems at the payload
subcontractor are jeopardizing the early delivery. Progress made toward
achieving the space-and ground-segment activities is summarized in tables
30 and 31, respectively.

    Table 30: Status of STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Space
                                    Segment
                                                                                  quarter of               
                                                                                      fiscal               
                                                                                  year 2004.               
                                                                                     Sixteen               
                                                                                      issues               
                                                                                        were               
                                                                                  identified               
                                                                       (Completed during the   
 Actual/Planned  Activity completion Comments          Nov.            on            review,   
                             date                      2003 The STSS   schedule)     and all   
                                                             program                    were   
                                                             office                satisfied   program
                                                            conducted             and closed   office, the
                                                                a                     out in   review was
                                                            critical                   March   on time and
                                              Critical       design                    2004.   the outcome
                                               Design       review in              According   was
                                               Review       the first                 to the   successful.

Reactivation of   Oct. 2003   The second satellite has been completely     
      Satellite                  reactivated, which involved the              
                                 contractor taking 58 hardware components out 
     #2 Hardware   (Completed 5       of storage and running tests on them to 
                   months late)   determine if they still worked. All but one 
                                                            of the components 
                                   passed the appropriate functional tests.   
                                        Functional tests for the final        
                                 component-the spacecraft computer            
                                 processor-are being deferred until           
                                            the next higher-level of hardware 
                                 integration. During the reactivation of this 
                                  hardware, the contractor experienced minor  
                                              problems with some              
                                  components. Though these issues have since  
                                             been resolved, they              
                                 contributed to the five-month delay in the   
                                 reactivation schedule. Overall,              
                                   however, the components survived storage   
                                          rather well, according to           
                                              program officials.              

Hardware Modifications 	Performance modifications to the Sun Shield were
completed as planned, but modifications to the Electrical Power Subsystem
were completed three months later than expected. Although the upgrades to
the power system are

o  Electrical Power  o  Sept. 2003 (Completed 3 to result in a 200 percent
improvement in on-orbit operation, the redesign

Subsystem months late) was more complex than originally planned and
resulted in the problem of removing excess heat produced by the power
system. To resolve the heat

o  	Sun Shield  o  Sept. 2004 (Completed problem, the contractor had to
use $2-3 million from its management on schedule) reserve to add air ducts
to the spacecraft.

Payload Software

o  	Build 2  o  July 2004 (Completed 1 month late)

o  May 2005 (Ongoing)

o  	Closed Loop Testing of Sensor Payload Software Software builds for the
space and ground segments are proceeding as planned. The program office
characterized software development as being the "gem" of the program.
Version 2 of the software that controls the sensors onboard the satellite
was completed in mid-August 2004. Although the software team encountered
problems while integrating and testing this version, the problems were
resolved in time to limit the delay to one month in building the software.
At the end of fiscal year 2004, the contractor had completed about half of
Version 3 software for the payload data processor. A partial build of this
version is undergoing integration testing and is scheduled for completion
in May 2005. According to the program office, the software is on schedule
to be completed two years before the satellites are launched.

              Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System

Actual/Planned Activity completion date Comments

Assembly, Integration, and Testing (AI&T)

o  Track Sensor  o  Aug. 2004 (Ongoing)

o  	Spacecraft #1  o  July 2004 (Completed 1 month late)

o  Payload #1  o  Jan. 2005 (Ongoing) The STSS program scheduled several
assembly, integration, and testing activities for completion in fiscal
years 2004 and 2005, which were (or expected to be) completed behind
schedule. First, the program office had planned to assemble, integrate,
and test the track sensor for the first satellite by the end of August
2004. Second, the program office had planned to integrate and test the
spacecraft for the first payload by the end of July 2004, but did not
complete the task until mid-August 2004. The objective of the tests was to
demonstrate the electrical integration of the spacecraft. Third, the
program office planned to start integrating and testing the payload for
the first STSS space vehicle. The testing of the payload components was
expected to be completed by January 2005. However, the program office
reported that the schedule will be tight and will likely slip by a couple
of months primarily because of quality and systems engineering problems at
the payload subcontractor.

                    Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Table 31: Status of STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Ground Segment

Actual/Planned Activity completion date Comments

Mature Ground     Oct. 2003      Reviews were conducted to ensure that the 
      System                        STSS program has a mature                 
                                      ground system design. Because of issues 
      Design     (Completed 1 month    related to paperwork, the reviews were 
                 late)                     completed about a month later than 
                                            planned. The contractor presented 
                                        a detailed design for the STSS ground 
                                         system at the November 2003 critical 
                                    design review, and according to the       
                                    program office, the proposed design is    
                                    robust enough to accommodate a larger     
                                    STSS constellation in the future.         

Develop Ground Dec. 2005          The STSS ground software development was 
                                                  completed in December 2005. 
      Software              The contractor is following a "build a little"    
                            and "test a little" approach in                   
                            order to catch defects early in the process       
                            before they are costly to fix,                    
                                     according to program officials.          

Assessment of Element Performance

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

The Block 2006 STSS satellites will be used as technology demonstrators
(rather than for operational missions) and have an in-orbit life of 18-24
months. To keep costs within budget, the program considers the
demonstration of STSS functionality more critical than the demonstration
of STSS effectiveness in performing the functions. MDA decided to fly
these demonstration satellites before developing and producing them in
larger numbers to see how components and subsystems work together as a
system in a realistic environment before a greater investment of resources
is made, thereby reducing program risk. As noted above, each satellite
contains two infrared sensors-an acquisition sensor to detect a missile
launch and a tracking sensor to track the missile through space once it
has been detected. The tracking sensor would continue tracking

Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System

Assessment of
Element Cost

the missile after the acquisition sensor has completed its detection
function. The ability of one satellite to detect or "acquire" a missile
launch and to transmit this data to its internal tracking sensor has not
yet been demonstrated in space, although DOD has had successes in
demonstrating some related on-orbit capabilities through experimental
satellites.

Even with a focus on system functionality over effectiveness, the prime
contractor continues to track 12 system level technical parameters that
are critical to the performance of the sensors onboard the Block 2006
satellites. Data provided to us by MDA indicate that 2 of the 12
indicators do not meet their respective requirements. The details on these
issues, including the impact on STSS performance, are classified. However,
shortfalls in performance involve both sensors. The ability of the
acquisition sensors to properly detect a missile launch is falling below
performance margins and the accuracy of the tracking sensor is getting
close to the margin. Program officials stated that the degradation in
acquisition sensor performance is within allowable limits and steps are
being taken to improve tracking sensor performance.

DOD's planned investment in the STSS program from program inception in
2002 through 2011 is approximately $4.5 billion.4 As broken out in table
32, DOD expended $819 million between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, Congress
appropriated $302 million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about
$3.35 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2011 for element development.
MDA's planned budget for the next 6 years through 2011 funds activities
associated with the assembly and launch of the two demonstrator satellites
(Block 2006), ground segment upgrades (Block 2008), and the development of
an operational constellation of satellites (Block 2012).

4 Prior to 2002, the SBIRS-Low program invested $686 million to develop
the demonstration satellites that are now part of the STSS program.

              Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System

                              Table 32: STSS Cost

                    Dollars in millions of then-year dollars

                         Other Block 2006   Block    Block     Block    Total 
                                            2008      2010     2012    
    FY 2002a - FY 2003    $544         $0        $0       $0        $0   $544 
     FY 2004 (Actuals)       0        263         0       12         0 
          FY 2005            0        254         0       48         0 
      (Appropriated)                                                   
          FY 2006            0        231         0        0         1 
          FY 2007            0        208        45        0       167 
          FY 2008            0         65        29        0       440 
          FY 2009            0         11        24        0       579 
          FY 2010            0          8        14        0       737 
          FY 2011            0          7        14        0       773 
     FY 2002 - FY 2011    $544     $1,046      $127      $60    $2,697 $4,474 

Source: MDA.
Note: STSS budget as of February 2005. Numbers may not add due to
rounding.
aProgram inception (FY 2002).

Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance

The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate prime contractor performance relative to cost and
schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and schedule
relative to expectations established under the contract. Contractors refer
to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are usually associated
with the accomplishment of activities under cost or ahead of schedule,
while negative variances are often associated with the accomplishment of
activities over cost or behind schedule.

Figure 9 shows the STSS contractor's cost and schedule performance during
fiscal year 2004. According to Cost Performance Reports, the work
completed during this time cost more than budgeted and was behind schedule
relative to a 6-month accelerated schedule. Specifically, during fiscal
year 2004, the work cost about $34.6 million more than expected, and the
contractor could not complete approximately $20.7 million of scheduled
work.

Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System

Figure 9: STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance

Dollars in millions

Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

2003 2004

Cumulative cost variance

Cumulative schedule variance Sources: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

The erosion of cumulative cost variance throughout fiscal year 2004 was
largely attributed to cost overruns by the payload subcontractor, whose
costs comprise about one-third of the total STSS contract. During the past
year, the subcontractor has had a number of quality and systemsengineering
problems that contributed to overruns in cost and schedule. These problems
are largely the result of unclear systems engineering procedures and the
subcontractor's lack of experience with space hardware. In response to
these problems, the prime contractor conducted a thorough review of the
subcontractor's quality assurance program for the assembly, integration,
and testing of satellite components. In addition, the subcontractor added
technicians who have more experience working with space hardware and
brought in systems engineers to work with the technicians. Despite these
issues, the program office still expects the prime contractor to complete
the contract early and with minimal cost overruns.

The cumulative schedule variance also eroded during fiscal year 2004. The
delay in the delivery of the payload is the major driver of the
unfavorable schedule variance. In addition to these drivers, performance
upgrades to

Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System

the Electrical Power Subsystem were completed three months later than
planned due to a heat-removal problem. A factor complicating our analysis
of schedule variance is that the contractor implemented a performance
measurement baseline5 that reflects a six-month accelerated schedule. This
means the contractor might be performing work on a schedule that would
allow it to complete all the work by the end of the contract, but schedule
performance data would show that work was falling behind schedule.

Our assessment of fiscal year 2004 activities did not identify any
evidence that the STSS program would be unable to launch the two
demonstration satellites in 2007. Although the payload subcontractor
experienced schedule delays and cost overruns arising from quality issues,
the program office is still confident that the satellites will be
delivered early. In addition, the reactivation of components from storage
went better than anticipated and, accordingly, the program office reduced
the risk level associated with hardware and software furnished by the
government. Furthermore, the prime contractor is making progress on the
parts obsolescence issue. For example, the prime contractor located most
replacement parts and is assembling a database to track them.

5 A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work tasks,
designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each task,
schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets, and
allocates budget to the scheduled work.

An Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System

Appendix VIII Summary

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment

The bulk of fiscal year 2004 activities focused on developing and
groundtesting THAAD components in preparation for the first round of
flight tests in mid-fiscal year 2005. At the end of fiscal year 2004 with
61 percent of the THAAD prime contract completed, THAAD's prime contractor
was under budget and ahead of schedule. However, the contractor's
favorable cost and schedule performance eroded somewhat during fiscal year
2004. Our analysis indicates that problems with missile development were a
major driver of the deteriorating performance.

Schedule: During fiscal year 2004, the THAAD program accomplished key
activities ahead, on, or slightly behind schedule. The program conducted
the missile-component design readiness review ahead of schedule, completed
radar assembly on schedule, but was behind schedule on missile delivery
for the element's first flight test, Flight Test 1. In addition, the
program successfully conducted ground tests in preparation for the initial
flight test.

Testing: Two explosions in the summer of 2003 at a subcontractor's
propellant mixing facility impacted THAAD's fiscal year 2004 funding,
delayed the start of flight testing, and led to a revision of the flight
test program.

Performance: The program office told us that key indicators show that
THAAD is on track to meet operational performance goals. However, an
assessment of THAAD's effectiveness remains uncertain until the program
conducts flight tests with updated hardware and software. Data from flight
testing are needed to "anchor" simulations of THAAD's performance and to
more confidently predict the element's effectiveness.

Cost: Our analysis of prime contractor cost performance reports shows that
the contractor's favorable cost and schedule performance eroded somewhat
during fiscal year 2004. The declining schedule performance was largely
driven by unfavorable performance in the missile component-caused by two
separate explosions at a subcontractor's propellant mixing facility-but
offset by other THAAD components with favorable performance. Overall, the
prime contractor is under budget and ahead of schedule.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Element Description 	The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
element1 is being developed as a ground-based missile defense system to
protect forward-

  History

deployed military forces, population centers, and civilian assets from
short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD provides the
opportunity to engage ballistic missiles-outside or inside the earth's
atmosphere-not destroyed earlier in the boost or midcourse phases of
flight by other elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

A THAAD unit consists of a command, control, battle management, and
communications (C2/BMC) component for controlling and executing a
defensive mission, truck-mounted launchers, ground-based radar,
interceptor missiles, and ground support equipment. The ground-based radar
is a solid-state, phased-array, X-band radar that performs search, track,
discrimination, and other fire-control functions. The THAAD missile is
comprised of a kill vehicle mounted atop a single-stage booster and is
designed to destroy enemy warheads through hit-to-kill collisions.

The THAAD program entered the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase
of acquisition in 1992 but was plagued by missed intercepts in its first
six attempts. As noted in our 1999 report,2 THAAD's failures were caused
by a combination of a compressed test schedule and quality control
problems. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), reported
in his Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Report to the Congress that the sense of
urgency to deploy a prototype system resulted in an overly optimistic
development schedule.

The THAAD program conducted two successful intercept attempts in 1999
after devoting substantial time to pretest activities. The program then
transitioned to the product development phase3 of acquisition, in which
program activities shifted from technology development and demonstration
to missile redesign and engineering. The Department of

1 In early 2004, MDA changed the name of the THAAD element from "Theater
High Altitude Area Defense" to "Terminal High Altitude Area Defense."

2 GAO, THAAD Restructure Addresses Problems but Limits Early Capability,
GAO/NSIAD-99-142 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1999).

3 "Product development" is referred to by DOD as the "System Development
and Demonstration" phase of acquisition and formerly as "Engineering and
Manufacturing Development."

Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

  Developmental Phases

Defense (DOD) transferred the THAAD program from the U.S. Army to the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (now MDA) on October 1, 2001.

The THAAD program is pursuing its goals within the MDA block approach,
which incrementally increases the element's capability against the
ballistic missile threat. We reported4 last year that THAAD's development
was structured around a Block 2004-2006-2008 program, with program funding
aligned accordingly. However, with the submission of the fiscal year 2006
President's Budget in February 2005, MDA implemented a new BMDS baseline
approach for the THAAD program. Under this new program, THAAD development
is structured around a Block 2006-2008-2010 program, with funding broken
out by Block 2006/2008 and Block 2010.

o  	Block 2006. Block 2006 incorporates the activities of the former Block
2004 program. The Block 2006 THAAD program is expected to demonstrate an
engagement capability against short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles
above the atmosphere.

o  	Block 2008. By the end of Block 2008, the THAAD element will have
completed additional flight tests (including attempts employing a
salvofiring doctrine), demonstrated an engagement capability inside and
above the atmosphere, and be configured to accept data from other BMDS
sensors for launching its interceptor missiles. THAAD's integration with
the BMDS is expected to increase its defended area by more than a factor
of three.

The THAAD program includes a "fire unit" for delivery in fiscal year 2009.
Operated by the Army, it will consist of a radar, a C2/BMC unit, 3
launchers, 24 missiles, and equipment for support, maintenance and
training. The Army has "signed on" to receive the equipment and is
planning to allocate nearly 100 soldiers for training and operations.

o  	Block 2010. The THAAD program plans to enhance the element's ability
to interoperate with other elements and sensors of the BMDS. By engaging
threats with external BMDS data, THAAD is expected to increase its
defended area by more than a factor of ten.

4 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).

Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004

  Assessment of Scheduled Activities

The bulk of the fiscal year 2004 activities focused on developing and
ground-testing THAAD components in preparation for the first round of
flight tests in mid-fiscal year 2005. We grouped activities into three
categories: (1) design, (2) build, and (3) integration and test. Progress
on key activities scheduled for fiscal year 2004 is discussed below.

During fiscal year 2004, the THAAD program accomplished key activities
ahead, on, or slightly behind schedule. As examples, the program conducted
the missile-component design readiness review ahead of schedule, completed
radar assembly on schedule, but delivery of the missile for Flight Test 1
slipped into fiscal year 2005. Specifics regarding progress in achieving
these and other key scheduled activities are summarized below in tables 33
through 35.

Table 33: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Design
Activities

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Missile-component This event was accomplished ahead of schedule. The
missile component design readiness design readiness review review
demonstrated that the missile-component design, including internal and
external interfaces, met all applicable design requirements with
acceptable risk.

Planned: 1Q FY2004a Completed: 4Q FY2003

THAAD element This event was accomplished on schedule. The stakeholders
agreed during the design

design readiness review	readiness review that they understood the THAAD
system and its final integrated design, and that the design met BMDS
objectives. Stakeholders included the THAAD Project Office, supporting
contractors, representatives of the Army Air Defense School, and MDA.

Planned: 1Q FY2004

Completed: 1Q FY2004

Radar This event was accomplished on schedule. The radar block process
validation examined

block process validation 	the contractor's operations to determine
adequacy of production planning, processes, and controls; the existence of
suitable production facilities; and the radar's design stability.

Planned: 2Q FY2004

Completed: 2Q FY2004

C2/BMC The C2/BMC block process validation was delayed to address
defective government

block process validation 	furnished C2/BMC shelters and was somewhat
behind schedule at the end of fiscal year 2004. Significant progress was
made toward its completion, but the remaining work is planned to carry
over into fiscal year 2005. The purpose of the validation is to assess the

Planned: 4Q FY2004 contractor's ability to manufacture C2/BMC production
representative hardware to support Completed: Under revision future
fielding decisions.

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

aWe use the notation "1Q FY2004" to mean the first quarter of fiscal year
2004 and an identical format for other time periods.

               Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

    Table 34: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Build
                                   Activities

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Radar assembly 	This event was accomplished on schedule. The radar was
assembled in the first quarter of fiscal year 2004.

Planned: 1Q FY2004

Completed: 1Q FY2004

Missile delivery for Delivery of the FT-01 missile to White Sands Missile
Range (WSMR)a was delayed to

Flight Test 1 (FT-01) 	respond to a new program schedule that addresses
funding shortfalls and two separate explosions at a subcontractor's
propellant mixing facility. Delivery is now scheduled for the second
quarter of fiscal year 2005.

Planned: 4Q FY2004

Scheduled: 2Q FY2005

WSMR activation This event was accomplished on schedule. All THAAD facilities at
         WSMR were activated by March 2004 and are preparing for FT-01.

Planned: 2Q FY2004

Completed: 2Q FY2004

WSMR safety qualification tests 	Although this event was completed 1
quarter behind schedule, there was no impact on FT-01's schedule.

Planned: 3Q FY2004

Completed: 4Q FY2004

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

aWSMR is a U.S. Army missile test range in New Mexico. Because of test
range limitations at WSMR, flight testing will be conducted at the Pacific
Missile Range Facility, a U.S. Navy missile test range in Kauai, Hawaii,
beginning with FTT-06-1 (formerly FT-05) in the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 2006.

 Table 35: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-Integration
                              and Test Activities

Activity Description/Progress assessment

Kill vehicle destruct test

Planned: 1Q FY 2004

Completed: 1Q FY2004

Integrate launch and test support equipment at SILa

Planned: 2Q FY2004 Completed: 3Q FY2004

This event was accomplished on schedule. Testing of the kill vehicle
flight termination system met objectives.

Because of two separate explosions at a subcontractor's propellant mixing
facility in the summer of 2003, this event was accomplished about one
quarter behind schedule. The launch and test support equipment completed
its system checkout in June 2004. The THAAD program reports that the
launch and test support equipment is on schedule to support the revised
schedule of FT-01 planned for the third quarter of fiscal year 2005.

Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

                    Activity Description/Progress assessment

Kill vehicle qualification tests 	Kill vehicle qualification testing in
preparation for FT-01 was completed in September 2004.

Planned: 4Q FY2004

Completed: 4Q FY2004

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

aThe System Integration Lab (SIL) refers to ground facilities at Lockheed
Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, California.

THAAD Flight Test Program Delayed 3-5 Months

The THAAD flight-test program consists of 15 flight-test events divided
among Blocks 2006 and 2008. Two explosions in the summer of 2003 at a
subcontractor's propellant mixing facility impacted THAAD's fiscal year
2004 funding, delayed the start of flight testing, and led to revisions of
the flight test plans.

The first set of flight tests have been delayed 3-5 months. The first
flight test, referred to as a control test flight (CTF), is a
missile-only, nonintercept test that focuses on how the missile operates
under high endoatmospheric environmental conditions. The second flight
test is an integrated system test with a "virtual target" to demonstrate
system performance under conditions comparable to the next flight test
(first flight test utilizing a real target). The third flight test is a
seeker characterization flight (SCF), which ensures proper functioning of
the seeker. This SCF is also a non-intercept test, but the seeker will
demonstrate the ability to view a real target. The fourth flight test,
FT-04, is the first intercept attempt with a configuration-target and
engagement geometry-comparable to that used in flight tests conducted
during the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase of development.
Table 36 summarizes the first six flight test events, including current
and prior flight test dates with their objectives.

Compared to test plans of fiscal year 2004, the THAAD program deferred two
test events. A second control test flight conducted at WSMR- formerly
FT-02-and an intercept attempt against a threat-representative target at
the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF)-formerly FT-05-have been
deferred to a later time.

               Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

                     Table 36: Planned THAAD Flight Testing

      Flight test event        Date                  Objectives               
                             Current:   o  Validate missile performance in a  
     FT-01 (CTF) at WSMR                high-endoatmospheric flight           
    Non-intercept flight    3Q FY2005      environment  o  Verify missile     
test (missile only / no Previously:          integration with WSMR         
           target)                      
                            1Q FY2005   
        FT-02 at WSMR        Current:     o  Integrated system test dry run   
                                                  (virtual target)            
Integrated system test   4Q FY2005       o  Demonstrate missile launch and 
      - virtual target     Previously:   control for conditions comparable to 
                                                                        FT-03 
                               N/A      
         (New test)                     

FT-03 (SCF) at WSMR   Current:   o   Characterize seeker in flight against 
                                               a high-endoatmospheric unitary 
Non-intercept flight  1Q FY2006  o  target Verify element integration with 
           test                                         WSMR                  
                        Previously:    
                         3Q FY2005     

       FT-04 at WSMR       Current:   o            Demonstrate exoatmospheric 
                                            discrimination and intercept of a 
First intercept flight                   separating target Demonstrate     
            test           2Q FY2006      lethality assessment of recovered   
                                      o                 debris                
                          Previously:    
                           4Q FY2005     

                         Current:   o   Characterize missile performance in a 
FT-05 (CTF) at WSMR                             low-endoatmospheric flight 
Non-intercept flight  2Q FY2006      environment Assesses effects of heat  
           test                     o             on seeker window            
                                    o   Tests performance in a high dynamic   
     (Formerly FT-02)   Previously:               pressure fly-out            
                         2Q FY2005     

FTT-06-1 at PMRF Current:  o  Demonstrate exoatmospheric aimpoint
selection and intercept Second intercept flight test 4Q FY2006 against a
non-separating liquid-fueled target

o  Demonstrate integration with PMRF

(Formerly FT-05) Previously: 1Q FY2006

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

                    Note: Test schedule as of December 2004.

Assessment of Any assessment of THAAD's effectiveness is uncertain at this
time. The program office told us that key indicators show that THAAD is on
track to Element Performance meet operational performance goals. However,
the THAAD program has not conducted any recent flight tests and, as a
result, performance

Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

indicators5 used to gauge progress toward meeting performance objectives
are based only on engineering analysis and ground testing. Until data
collected during flight tests are used to "anchor" simulations of THAAD
operation, the program cannot be confident that current indicators
accurately predict THAAD's performance in actual combat conditions.

DOD's planned investment in the THAAD program from program inception in
1992 through 2011 is approximately $12.3 billion. As broken out in table
37, DOD expended $7.2 billion between fiscal years 1992 and 2004, Congress
appropriated $760 million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about
$4.3 billion for THAAD development and procurement between fiscal years
2006 and 2011.

                                 Assessment of

                                  Element Cost

                              Table 37: THAAD Cost

                    Dollars in millions of then-year dollars

                                                  Block      Block 
                                      Other  2006/2008        2010      Total 
                FY 1992a - FY 2003   $6,500          $0         $0     $6,500 
                 FY 2004 (Actuals)        0       717.9          0      717.9 
            FY 2005 (Appropriated)        0       759.7          0      759.7 
                           FY 2006        0   1,046.1            0    1,046.1 
                           FY 2007        0       931.0          0      931.0 
                           FY 2008        0       779.4          0      779.4 
                           FY 2009        0       353.0      168.0      521.0 
                           FY 2010        0           0      635.1      635.1 
                           FY 2011        0           0      395.0      395.0 
                 FY 1992 - FY 2011   $6,500  $4,587.1    $1,198.1   $12,285.2 

Source: MDA.

Note: THAAD budget as of February 2005. MDA implemented a new BMDS
baseline approach that redirected funding from Block 2004 and 2006 to
Block 2006/2008.

aProgram inception (FY 1992).

5 The THAAD program monitors numerous performance indicators as part of
its management process. For example, element effectiveness, as measured by
the probability of a successful kill, is one such indicator.

Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Prime Contractor Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance

The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate the prime contractor's performance relative to cost
and schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and
schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.
Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are
usually associated with the accomplishment of activities under cost or
ahead of schedule, while negative variances are often associated with the
accomplishment of activities over cost or behind schedule. At the end of
fiscal year 2004, the THAAD prime contractor was carrying a positive
cumulative cost and schedule variance of $3.9 million and $14.7,
respectively.6 That is, overall, the prime contractor was under budget and
ahead of schedule.

As figure 10 shows, declining cumulative schedule variance during the
latter portion of fiscal year 2004 was eroding overall performance. The
decline in the positive schedule variance was largely caused by problems
with the missile component, which were the result of two explosions at a
subcontractor's propellant mixing facility. In January 2004, these
incidents and efforts to reestablish booster production caused MDA to
revise THAAD's baseline.7 The new baseline recognizes the inevitable delay
to initial flight testing and all supporting tasks.8 It also provides a
new starting point for measuring the prime contractor's schedule
performance. Therefore, even though the prime contractor completed $8.1
million worth above that scheduled for fiscal year 2004 (that is, incurred
a positive schedule variance of $8.1 million), the variance would have
been less favorable had the contractor not established a new baseline.

6 The cost and schedule variance incurred during fiscal year 2004 was
$0.673 million and $8.1 million, respectively.

7 A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work tasks,
designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each task,
schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets, and
allocates budget to the scheduled work.

8 The explosions caused the program to seek an alternate source. According
to the program office's current risk assessment, "source replacements have
the potential for delaying booster delivery during the fight test program
and into production."

Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Figure 10: THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance

Dollars in millions

Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

2003 2004

Cumulative cost variance

Cumulative schedule variance Sources: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

The favorable cumulative cost variance incurred during fiscal year 2004
masks problems with the cost variance incurred by the missile component,
which was unfavorable for the year. Major factors contributing to the
missile's unfavorable cost variance include explosions at a
subcontractor's facility used to mix missile propellant and the cost of
efforts to reestablish booster production, as noted above; delays in
activating a test facility at the Air Force Research Laboratory; and
re-design efforts on a faulty valve thrust vector assembly. Favorable cost
variances in other THAAD areas, such as the radar segment, offset the
missile's unfavorable cost variance.

Appendix IX: Information on the Army's Missile Defense Programs

Background 	The Army is responsible for funding and managing two missile
defense programs. The programs-which ultimately will be fielded as a
single missile defense system-include the Patriot missile defense system
including its newest missile variant, the Patriot Advanced Capability-3
(PAC-3), and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), which is
currently under development. The Army intends to incrementally replace
fielded Patriot components with more-capable MEADS components as they
become available. The resulting system is expected to better protect
deployed U.S. forces and critical assets from short-and medium-range
tactical ballistic missile attacks. The Army's Lower Tier Project Office
manages Patriot and MEADS development, procurement, and fielding.

Now operational with the U.S. Army, Patriot with its PAC-3 missiles is the
latest evolution of the Patriot air and missile defense system. The
Patriot system has four basic components: (1) ground-based radar to detect
and track targets; (2) engagement control station to provide command,
control, and communications; (3) launcher; and (4) interceptor missiles.
Compared with earlier versions of the Patriot missile, PAC-3 provides
improved performance against short-and medium-range tactical ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. The PAC-3 missile is in
production and successfully achieved initial fielding1 in September 2001.

MEADS is an international co-development program between the United
States, Germany, and Italy with a cost share of 58, 25, and 17 percent,
respectively. MEADS expands upon Patriot capability with four new
components: (1) a launcher; (2) battle management, command, control,
communications, computer and intelligence (BMC4I) equipment; (3) a
surveillance radar; and (4) a multi-function fire control radar. MEADS is
expected to offer significant improvements in tactical mobility and
strategic deployability over existing Patriot units. In addition, MEADS is
designed to be interoperable with other airborne and ground-based sensors
and utilize a netted architecture to provide a robust, 360-degree defense
against cruise missiles, unmanned-aerial-vehicles, tactical air to surface
missiles, rotary-wing and fixed-wing threats, and very short and medium
range theater ballistic missiles.

1 Initial fielding, sometimes called First Unit Equipped, refers to the
date a system and support elements are issued to the designated unit and
specified training has been accomplished.

Appendix IX: Information on the Army's Missile Defense Programs

  Combined Aggregate Program

In 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics approved plans for combining management, development, and
fielding of the Patriot and MEADS programs.2 The approach calls for
incremental fielding and early insertion of MEADS components within
existing Patriot batteries rather than delivering MEADS as a single
system. The Army uses the term "Combined Aggregate Program (CAP)" to refer
to the transitional activities leading up to full fielding of the MEADS
and replacement of Patriot components. CAP also includes an enhanced PAC-3
missile-funded 100 percent by the United States-called the Missile Segment
Enhancement (MSE). The MSE missile is intended to operate at higher
altitudes and longer ranges than existing PAC-3 missiles.

The plan calls for MEADS components to be inserted into Patriot battalions
in three time-phased increments, as follows:

o  	Increment one. Scheduled for initial fielding in fiscal year 2009,
increment one consists of the insertion of the MEADS BMC4I to begin
replacing the Patriot engagement control station component and associated
equipment. This increment is considered the highest acquisition priority
because it (a) integrates with existing sensors to provide 360-degree
coverage to counter cruise missiles, and (b) supports targeting by using
data from external sensors, which is referred to as "engage on remote."

o  	Increment two. Scheduled for initial fielding in fiscal year 2011,
increment two consists of the insertion of the MEADS launcher to begin
replacing the Patriot launcher. This increment is expected to enhance
system mobility and be capable of firing either the existing PAC-3 missile
or the new MSE missile. The MSE missile is scheduled for initial fielding
in 2011. It does not replace the PAC-3 missile but, rather, supplements
fielded inventory.

o  	Increment three. Scheduled for initial fielding in fiscal year 2015,
increment three consists of the insertion of the MEADS Ultra High
Frequency surveillance radar and the X-band multifunction fire control
radar to replace the Patriot C-band radars. These radars are expected to
provide (a) 360-degree coverage for defense against cruise missiles and
fire control to engage low-altitude, stressing targets; and

2 Evolution from Patriot to MEADS-Acquisition Decision Memorandum, dated
August 12, 2003.

        Appendix IX: Information on the Army's Missile Defense Programs

  Patriot/MEADS CAP Funding

(b) surveillance and fire control for high-value asset defense against
short-range ballistic missiles.

The overall Patriot/MEADS CAP is scheduled for initial fielding in 2015
when increment three is available. MEADS production is scheduled to
continue through fiscal year 2028. The 2015 fielding date, approved by the
Under Secretary for Defense, represents a three-year delay from the
fielding date planned in the previous MEADS program. According to a Lower
Tier Project Office spokesperson, constraints in developmental funding
caused the delay in initial fielding of MEADS components. Specifically,
out-year Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding was
insufficient to field MEADS in fiscal year 2012.

The Army's Lower Tier Project Office estimates that the life-cycle cost
for the United States' portion of the Patriot/MEADS CAP program-which
includes PAC-3 and MEADS-component development, procurement, and
operations and support (O&S) costs-will be $150.6 billion through
approximately fiscal year 2048. Of this amount:

o  $109 billion (72.4 percent) is for O&S.

o  $31.9 billion (21.2 percent) is for procurement.

o  $9.7 billion (6.4 percent) is for RDT&E.

Operations and support costs are a large proportion of the total cost
largely because of the length of time a fielded unit is supported.
Although production is scheduled to end in fiscal year 2028, these newest
units are expected to be in the field for another 20 years.

Table 38 summarizes the funding requested by the U.S. Army to fund
development and missile procurement of the Patriot/MEADS Combined
Aggregate Program over the Future Years Defense Plan (fiscal years
20062011). The requested funding supports the procurement of 108 PAC-3
missiles per year.

Appendix IX: Information on the Army's Missile Defense Programs

                   Table 38: Patriot/MEADS CAP Planned Costs

Dollars in millions of then-year dollars

                           RDT&E Missile procurement

                          FY 2006        $288.8                        $489.7 
                          FY 2007         326.4                         494.8 
                          FY 2008         454.5                         466.0 
                          FY 2009         510.7                         471.8 
                          FY 2010         510.4                           N/A 
                          FY 2011         490.4                           N/A 

Source: Department of the Army.

Note: Budget as of February 2005.

                       Appendix X: Scope and Methodology

The accomplishment of Missile Defense Agency (MDA) program goals is
ultimately achieved through the efforts of individual Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) elements. Therefore, we based our assessment on the
progress made in fiscal year 2004 by those seven elements that (1) are
under the management of MDA and (2) are being developed as part of a block
capability. The elements we reviewed accounted for 72 percent of MDA's
fiscal year 2004 research and development budget. We compared each
element's completed activities, test results, demonstrated performance,
and prime contractor cost and schedule performance in fiscal year 2004
with those planned for the year. We also completed an abbreviated
evaluation of an eighth BMDS element, the U.S. Army's Combined Aggregate
Program, which consists of Patriot and the Medium Extended Air Defense
System.

Many activities completed in fiscal year 2004 by the various element
programs pertained to the completion of Limited Defensive Operations,
which is an integral part of the Block 2004 goals. To assess progress
toward schedule goals-that is, program activities including test events
scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2004-we examined each element's
prime contractor Cost Performance Reports, Defense Contract Management
Agency's analyses of these reports (if available), quarterly reviews of
element progress (known as System Element Reviews), and other agency
documents to determine whether key activities were accomplished as
planned. We also developed a data collection instrument, which was
submitted to MDA, to gather detailed information on completed program
activities, including tests, design reviews, prime contracts, and
estimates of element performance.

We assessed MDA's fiscal year 2004 cost performance by separately
reviewing the cost performance of each BMDS element's prime contractor. We
used this methodology because MDA allocates a large percentage of its
budget to fund prime contractors that develop system elements. To make
these assessments, we applied established earned value management
techniques to data captured in contractor Cost Performance Reports.
Results were presented in graphical form to determine trends. We also used
established earned value management formulas to project the likely costs
of the contracts at completion.

To assess MDA's progress toward its performance goals, we analyzed data
provided by MDA on the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense, and Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications elements-the elements that comprise the Block 2004
defensive capability. We supplemented this information by holding

Appendix X: Scope and Methodology

discussions with, and attending overview briefings presented by, various
program office officials. Furthermore, we interviewed officials from the
office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, within the
Department of Defense (DOD) to learn more about their assessment of the
operational capability of the initial BMDS. Finally, we met with officials
from U.S. Strategic Command to discuss the initial capability's military
utility from the warfighter's perspective.

During our review, we observed that MDA is expected to face increasing
funding risks-arising from sources both within and outside DOD-in the
years ahead as MDA attempts to enhance and field its missile defense
capabilities. To examine this issue further, we reviewed life-cycle cost
documentation from the U.S. Army Lower Tier Project Office, our report on
total ownership costs,1 a Congressional Budget Office report,2 and MDA
documentation on the agency's plans for development and fielding.

We also observed inconsistencies in how MDA is implementing its block
approach. To gain insight into this issue, we examined element-level
documents and answers to a data collection instrument that we generated to
extract specific information on planned deliveries of fielded assets. We
also examined MDA's Statement of Goals, budget statements for fiscal years
2004 and 2005, and other documents provided by MDA, such as Missile
Defense Plan II.

To ensure that MDA-generated data used in our assessment are reliable, we
evaluated the agency's internal management control processes. We discussed
these processes extensively with MDA upper management. In addition, we
confirmed the accuracy of MDA-generated data with multiple sources within
MDA and, when possible, with independent experts. To assess the validity
and reliability of prime contractors' Earned Value Management systems and
reports, we analyzed audit reports prepared by the Defense Contract Audit
Agency. Finally, we assessed MDA's internal accounting and administrative
management controls by reviewing MDA's Federal Managers' Financial
Integrity Report for Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004.

1 GAO, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce
Weapon Systems' Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
11, 2003).

2 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2004).

Appendix X: Scope and Methodology

Our work was performed primarily at MDA headquarters in Arlington,
Virginia. At this location, we met with officials from the Kinetic Energy
Interceptors Program Office; Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Program
Office; Airborne Laser Program Office; Command, Control, Battle
Management, and Communications Program Office; and Ground-based Midcourse
Defense Program Office. In addition, we met with officials from the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System Program Office, Los Angeles, California;
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Project Office, Huntsville, Alabama;
and the U.S. Army Lower Tier Program Office, Huntsville, Alabama. We also
interviewed officials from the office of the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation, Arlington, Virginia; U.S. Strategic Command, Omaha,
Nebraska; and the Joint Theater Air Missile Defense Organization,
Arlington, Virginia.

We conducted our review from May 2004 through February 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Acknowledgments

(120360)

Barbara Haynes (256) 922-7500

In addition to the individual named above, Tony Beckham, Ivy Hu:bler, Stan
Lipscomb, LaTonya Miller, Karen Richey, Adam Vodraska, Jonathan Watkins,
and Randy Zounes (Analyst-in-Charge) made key contributions to this
report.

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