Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain 
Its Workforce Through Retirement (09-MAR-05, GAO-05-230).	 
                                                                 
The President's vision for space exploration (Vision) directs the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to retire	 
the space shuttle following completion of the International Space
Station, planned for the end of the decade. The retirement	 
process will last several years and impact thousands of 	 
critically skilled NASA civil service and contractor employees	 
that support the program. Key to implementing the Vision is	 
NASA's ability to sustain this workforce to support safe space	 
shuttle operations through retirement. Because of the potential  
workforce issues that could affect the safety and effectiveness  
of operations through the space shuttle's retirement, GAO was	 
asked to identify (1) the progress of efforts to develop a	 
strategy for sustaining the space shuttle workforce through	 
retirement and (2) factors that may have impeded these efforts.  
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-230 					        
    ACCNO:   A18936						        
  TITLE:     Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to 
Sustain Its Workforce Through Retirement			 
     DATE:   03/09/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Human capital					 
	     Human capital management				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Space exploration					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Federal employees					 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Space Shuttle					 
	     Titan IV Rocket					 
	     NASA International Space Station Program		 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-230

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2005

SPACE SHUTTLE

    Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce through
                                   Retirement

GAO-05-230

[IMG]

March 2005

SPACE SHUTTLE

Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce through
Retirement

What GAO Found

The Space Shuttle Program has made limited progress toward developing a
detailed long-term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the space
shuttle's retirement. The program has taken preliminary steps, including
identifying the lessons learned from the retirement of programs comparable
to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program, to
assist in its workforce planning efforts. Other efforts have been
initiated or are planned, such as enlisting the help of human capital
experts and revising the acquisition strategy for updating the space
shuttle's propulsion system prime contracts; however, actions taken thus
far have been limited. NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle
operations has also taken some preliminary steps to begin to prepare for
the impact of the space shuttle's retirement on its workforce, such as
working with a consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its
workforce. However, its ability to progress with these efforts is reliant
on NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the
remainder of the program. Making progress toward developing a detailed
strategy, however, will be important given the potential impact that
workforce problems would have on NASA-wide goals. For example, a delay to
the space shuttle's schedule due to workforce problems would delay the
agency's ability to proceed with space exploration activities. NASA and
its prime contractor for space shuttle operations have already indicated
that they could face challenges sustaining their critically skilled
workforces if a career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is not
apparent. In addition, governmentwide fiscal realities call into question
whether funding will be available to support the use of incentives, such
as retention bonuses, that could help NASA sustain its space shuttle
workforce.

Several factors hamper the Space Shuttle Program's ability to develop a
detailed long-term strategy to sustain the critically skilled workforce
necessary to support safe space shuttle operations through retirement. For
example, because of the program's near-term focus on returning the space
shuttle to flight, other efforts, such as assessing hardware and facility
needs that will ultimately aid the program in determining workforce
requirements, are being delayed. In addition, program officials indicated
that they are faced with uncertainties regarding the implementation of
future aspects of the Vision and lack the requirements needed on which to
base their workforce planning efforts. Despite these factors, our prior
work on strategic workforce planning has shown that there are steps, such
as scenario planning, that successful organizations take to better
position themselves to address future workforce needs.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents �

Letter

Results in Brief�Background�Progress toward Developing a
Strategy to Sustain the Space �

Shuttle Workforce Is Limited Several Factors Have Impeded Efforts to
Develop a Long-Term

Strategy to Sustain a Critically Skilled Space Shuttle Workforce
Conclusions Recommendation for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation

                                       1

                                      3 4

                                       9

15 17 17 18

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II	Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable to the
Space Shuttle Program

Appendix III	Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 25

GAO Contact 25 Staff Acknowledgments 25

    Table                                                                  
            Table 1: Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable 
                            to the Space Shuttle Program                   22 
Figures                                                                 
           Figure 1: Estimated Timeline for the Process of Retiring NASA's 
                                    Space Shuttle                           5 
                       Figure 2: NASA Space Operations Centers              6 

Abbreviations

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act�ISS International Space
Station �JSC Johnson Space Center �KSC Kennedy Space Center
�MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center �NAPA National Academy of
Public Administration �NASA National Aeronautics and Space
Administration �SFOC Space Flight Operations Contract�

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

March 9, 2005 �

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye �Co-Chairman�Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation �United States Senate
�

The Honorable John McCain�United States Senate �

On January 14, 2004, the President articulated a new vision for space
�exploration (Vision) for the National Aeronautics and Space
�Administration (NASA). Part of the Vision includes the goal of
retiring the �space shuttle following completion of the
International Space Station �(ISS), planned for the end of the
decade.1 The space shuttle, NASA's �largest individual program,2 is
an essential element of NASA's ability to �implement this Vision,
because it is the only launch system presently �capable of
transporting the remaining components necessary to complete
�assembly of the ISS. NASA currently projects that it will need to
conduct�an estimated 28 flights over the next 5 to 6 years to
complete assembly of �and provide support to the ISS. However,
because of the tragic loss of the �Space Shuttle Columbia and its
crew in February 2003, NASA will do so �with an overriding focus on
ensuring safety of operations.3�

The safety of the space shuttle is largely contingent on NASA's ability to
�sustain the critically skilled workforce necessary to support
space shuttle �

1The Vision includes a return to the moon that is intended to ultimately
enable future exploration of Mars and other destinations. To accomplish
this, NASA plans to (1) complete its work on the ISS by 2010, fulfilling
its commitment to 15 international partner countries; (2) begin developing
a new manned exploration vehicle to replace the space shuttle; and (3)
return to the moon as early as 2015 and no later than 2020 in preparation
for future, more ambitious missions.

2The Space Shuttle Program accounted for 27 percent of NASA's fiscal year
2005 budget request.

3Following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board made recommendations to NASA aimed at significantly
reducing the chances of further accidents in the space shuttle's remaining
flights. Since that time, the Space Shuttle Program has worked to
implement these recommendations and has made other efforts aimed at
improving the space shuttle's safety. Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, Report Volume I (Washington, D.C.: August 2003).

operations through retirement. Moving forward, this will be a concern, as
the process of retiring the space shuttle will last several years and
impact thousands of critically skilled NASA civil service and contractor
employees that support the program. This workforce has been the focus of
many reviews4 in the past, which have highlighted significant issues
concerning the depth of critical skills available to the program and other
cultural, organizational, and safety issues that impact the program's
ability to safely support space shuttle operations. These reviews
recommended, among other things, that NASA assess the quantity and quality
of its space shuttle workforce in terms of experience and special skills;
transform its culture; and take steps to strengthen its safety
organization.

As agreed with your offices, we reviewed the status of NASA's efforts to
position itself to sustain the critically skilled space shuttle workforce
necessary to support space shuttle operations through retirement.
Specifically, we identified (1) the progress of NASA's efforts to develop
a strategy for sustaining a critically skilled space shuttle workforce
through retirement and (2) factors that may have impeded these efforts.

To perform our work, we interviewed various NASA officials, including
Space Shuttle Program, Human Resources, and Safety officials. We obtained
and analyzed NASA documents related to human capital management, such as
human capital plans, policies and procedures for workforce planning, and
information on NASA's workforce analysis tools. Further, we obtained and
reviewed Space Shuttle Program documents related to the program's
retirement, such as its lessons learned reports. In addition, we
interviewed officials from NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle
operations, United Space Alliance, and obtained and reviewed contractor
documents related to its workforce and support of space shuttle
operations. We also gathered information from human capital experts and
reviewed GAO human capital reports and guidance regarding strategic
workforce planning. Complete details of our scope and methodology can be
found in appendix I. We performed our work from

4GAO, Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management
Attention, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2000) and GAO,
Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require
Continued Attention, GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 (Washington, D.C.: Aug 15,
2000); Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume I (Washington,
D.C.: August 2003); Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report for
2001 (Washington, D.C.: March 2002); and Behavioral Sciences Technology,
Inc., Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture Change at NASA (Ojai,
Calif.: March 15, 2004).

  Results in Brief

April 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

The Space Shuttle Program has made limited progress toward developing a
detailed long-term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the space
shuttle's retirement. The program has taken preliminary steps, including
identifying the lessons learned from the retirement of programs comparable
to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program, to
assist in its workforce planning efforts. Other efforts have been
initiated or are planned, such as enlisting the help of human capital
experts and revising the acquisition strategy for updating the space
shuttle's propulsion system prime contracts; however, actions taken thus
far have been limited. United Space Alliance has taken some preliminary
steps begin to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle's retirement on
its workforce, such as working with a consulting firm to conduct a
comprehensive study of its workforce. However, its ability to progress
with these efforts is reliant on NASA making decisions that impact
contractor requirements through the remainder of the program. Making
progress toward developing a detailed strategy, however, will be important
given the potential impact that workforce problems would have on NASAwide
goals. For example, a delay to the space shuttle's schedule due to
workforce problems would delay NASA's ability to proceed with space
exploration activities. NASA and United Space Alliance have already
indicated that they could face difficulty in sustaining their critically
skilled workforces if a career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement
is not apparent to employees. In addition, governmentwide fiscal realities
call into question whether funding will be available to support the use of
incentives, such as retention bonuses, that could help NASA sustain its
space shuttle workforce.

Several factors hamper the Space Shuttle Program's ability to develop a
detailed long-term strategy to sustain the critically skilled workforce
necessary to support safe space shuttle operations through retirement. For
example, because of the program's near-term focus on returning the space
shuttle to flight, other efforts, such as assessing hardware and facility
needs that will ultimately aid the program in determining workforce
requirements, are being delayed. In addition, program officials indicated
that they are faced with uncertainties regarding the implementation of
future aspects of the Vision and lack the requirements needed on which to
base their workforce planning efforts. Despite these factors, our prior
work on strategic workforce planning has shown that there are steps, such
as scenario planning, that successful organizations take to better
position themselves to address future workforce needs.

In this report, we are recommending that NASA take steps aimed at better
positioning the Space Shuttle Program to sustain a critically skilled
workforce through retirement. In particular, we are recommending that the
Space Shuttle Program begin identifying its future workforce needs based
upon various future scenarios the program could face. In written and oral
comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our findings,
conclusions, and recommendation.

Background Prior to retiring the program, NASA will need to first return
the space shuttle to flight5 and execute the remaining missions needed to
complete assembly of and provide support for the ISS. At the same time,
NASA will need to begin the process of closing out or transitioning to
other NASA programs the space shuttle's assets, such as its workforce,
hardware, and facilities, which are no longer needed to support the
program. The process of closing out or transitioning the program's assets
will extend well beyond the space shuttle's final flight (see fig. 1).

5To return the space shuttle to flight, NASA will conduct two flights. The
planning window for the first flight is May 12 through June 3, 2005, and
the planning window for the second flight is July 10 through August 2,
2005. The purpose of these flights is to test and evaluate new procedures
for flight safety implemented as a result of the Space Shuttle Columbia
accident.

Figure 1: Estimated Timeline for the Process of Retiring NASA's Space
Shuttle

Source: NASA; GAO (presentation).

aThe planning window for the first flight is May 12 through June 3, 2005.
The planning window for the second flight is July 10 through August 2,
2005.

Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the
Vision, will require that the Space Shuttle Program rely on its most
important asset-its workforce. The space shuttle workforce consists of
approximately 2,000 civil service6 and 15,600 prime contractor7 personnel,
including a large number of engineers and scientists. In addition to these
personnel, there are a large number of critical, lower level
subcontractors and suppliers throughout the United States who support the
program. The program's workforce is responsible for conducting such things
as space

6Number is based on a full-time equivalent calculation. Full-time
equivalent is a measure of staff hours equal to those of an employee who
works 40 hours per week in 1 year; therefore, the actual number of
employees who work part-time or full-time on the Space Shuttle Program is
greater than 2,000. The number was calculated by averaging the number of
civil service employees over fiscal year 2004.

7The number was calculated by averaging the number of contractor employees
over fiscal year 2004. This number includes data from NASA's prime
contractor for space shuttle operations, United Space Alliance, and other
NASA contractors. United Space Alliance, established in 1996 as a joint
venture between Lockheed Martin and Boeing to consolidate NASA's various
Space Shuttle Program contracts under a single entity, and its
approximately 10,400 employees are responsible for conducting the space
shuttle's ground and flight operations under the Space Flight Operations
Contract. The remaining contractor personnel are associated with other
space shuttle components, such as its propulsion systems.

shuttle payload processing, mission planning and control, ground
operations, and for managing the space shuttle's propulsions systems.
While each of the NASA centers support the Space Shuttle Program to some
degree, the vast majority of this workforce is located at three of NASA's
Space Operations Centers-Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center (KSC),
and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) (see fig. 2).

                    Figure 2: NASA Space Operations Centers

                             Sources: GAO and NASA.

The space shuttle workforce and NASA's human capital management has been
the subject of many GAO8 and other reviews9 in the past. These reviews
showed that the space shuttle workforce had suffered from agency
downsizing in the mid 1990s and that NASA faced challenges recruiting and
training new employees, sufficiently staffing its workforce with qualified
workers, and dealing with an aging workforce and signs of overwork and
fatigue in its remaining workforce. In the past, NASA officials said that
these challenges posed significant flight safety risks for the program.
While the Space Shuttle Program had taken some steps to address these
issues, sustaining critical skills in many key areas such as subsystems
engineering remained a problem. In addition, in 2003 the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board noted that years of workforce reductions and
outsourcing negatively impacted NASA's experience and systems knowledge
base. Further, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board noted that safety
and mission assurance personnel were eliminated and careers in safety lost
organizational prestige. Additional studies highlighted recent trends
affecting the science and engineering labor pool from which employers like
NASA draw from. For example, the National Science Board reported in 2004
that worldwide competition for individuals with science and engineering
skills was increasing, while the potential pool of individuals with these
skills was decreasing.10 NASA's former Administrator has testified that
this situation poses a significant challenge to the agency's ability to
maintain a world-class workforce, because it relies on a highly educated
and broad science and engineering workforce to accomplish its mission.

Over the past few years, GAO and others in the federal government have
underscored the importance of human capital management and strategic
workforce planning. For example, we designated strategic human capital
management as a governmentwide, high-risk area in 2001, 2003, and 2005,
and continue to highlight it as a major management challenge specifically

8GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133 and GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186.

9Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume I (Washington, D.C.:
August 2003); Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report for 2001
(Washington, D.C.: March 2002); and Behavioral Sciences Technology, Inc.,
Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture Change at NASA (Ojai,
Calif.: March 15, 2004).

10National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2004. Volume
1, NSB 04-1 (Arlington, Va.: National Science Foundation, 2004).

for NASA.11 Strategic Management of Human Capital was also placed at the
top of the President's Management Agenda,12 and the Office of Management
and Budget and Office of Personnel Management have made efforts to improve
governmentwide human capital management and strategic workforce
planning.13 Recognizing the need for guidance related to strategic human
capital management, GAO has issued various reports that outline a
strategic human capital approach and provided tools, such as a Model of
Strategic Human Capital Management and Human Capital Self Assessment
Checklist for Agency Leaders,14 that agencies can use to aid in addressing
this challenge.

In response to an increased focus governmentwide on strategic human
capital management, NASA has taken several steps to improve its human
capital management. These include steps such as devising an agencywide
strategic human capital plan, developing workforce analysis tools to
assist in identifying critical skills needs, and requesting and receiving
additional human capital flexibilities to help the agency compete
successfully with

11GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: January
2001); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2003); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2005); GAO, Performance Accountability Series-Major
Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective,
GAO-01-241 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001); GAO, Major Management
Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-03-95
(Washington, D.C.: January 2003); GAO, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-01-258
(Washington, D.C.: January 2001); and GAO, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-03-114
(Washington, D.C.: January 2003). See also www.gao.gov/pas/2005.

12The President's Management Agenda was launched in fiscal year 2002 as a
strategy for improving the management and performance of the federal
government. It focuses on five governmentwide initiatives, including
strategic human capital management, where deficiencies were most apparent
and where the government could begin to deliver concrete, measurable
results. Executive branch agencies continue to be evaluated quarterly
based upon their progress in implementing actions to address the five
initiatives.

13Based on an Office of Management and Budget standard of strategic
management of human capital and developed in conjunction with GAO, the
Office of Personnel Management issued its Human Capital Assessment and
Accountability Framework in October 2002, which lists six "Human Capital
Standards for Success," including one on workforce planning.

14GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002) and GAO, Human Capital: A
Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 1, 2000).

the private sector in attracting and retaining employees and to reshape
and redeploy its workforce to support its mission.15

GAO's prior work on strategic human capital management has shown that
workforce planning is needed to ensure that the right people with the
right skills are in the right place at the right time. Workforce planning
addresses two critical needs: (1) aligning an organization's human capital
program with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals and
(2) developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and
retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals. Although approaches to such
planning may vary according to an organization's specific needs and
mission, our work suggests that, irrespective of the context in which
workforce planning is done, such a process should address five key
elements. These include (1) involving top management, employees, and other
stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing the strategic
workforce plan; (2) determining the critical skills and competencies that
will be needed to achieve the future programmatic results; (3) developing
strategies tailored to address critical skills and competency gaps that
need attention; (4) building the capability needed to address
administrative, educational, and other requirements important to
supporting workforce strategies; and (5) monitoring and evaluating the
agency's progress toward its human capital goals and the contribution that
human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic goals.

The Space Shuttle Program has made limited progress toward developing a
detailed long-term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the space
shuttle's retirement. While NASA recognizes the importance of having in
place a strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce to support
the space shuttle's operations, it has only taken preliminary steps, such
as identifying lessons learned from the retirement of programs comparable
to the space shuttle, to do so. Other efforts have been initiated or are
planned, such as enlisting the help of human capital experts and revising
the acquisition strategy to update the space shuttle's propulsion system
prime contracts; however, actions taken thus far have been limited. NASA's
prime contractor for space shuttle operations has also taken some
preliminary steps, but its ability to progress with these efforts is
reliant on

15Enacted in February 2004, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-201) amends title 5, United States Code, by inserting a new chapter 98
in that title, which provides new authorities to NASA. On March 26, 2004,
NASA submitted a written workforce plan for using its new authorities to
Congress.

  Progress toward Developing a Strategy to Sustain the Space Shuttle Workforce
  Is Limited

NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the
remainder of the program. Making progress toward developing a detailed
strategy, however, will be important given the potential impact that
workforce problems would have on NASA-wide goals.

The Space Shuttle Program Has Taken Preliminary Steps toward Developing a
Strategy for Sustaining a Critically Skilled Workforce

To begin its planning efforts for the space shuttle's retirement, the
program identified the lessons learned from the retirement of programs
comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV Rocket
Program, the Navy Base Realignment and Closure activity, and the NASA
Industrial Facility closure. Among other things, the lessons learned
reports highlight the practices used by other programs when making
personnel decisions, such as the importance of developing transition
strategies and early retention planning to the success of the space
shuttle's retirement. (See app. II for a summary of NASA's reports to date
on the lessons learned that are applicable to the retirement of the space
shuttle.) Program officials said that this preliminary effort is the first
step in an approach they expect to take to plan for retiring the space
shuttle. According to these officials, they plan to use the information
collected from this preliminary effort to guide in the development of a
management plan for retiring the space shuttle. This management plan is
expected to include such things as the overall plan, processes, schedule,
and roles and responsibilities related to retiring the space shuttle. To
inform this management plan, the program expects sometime around mid-2005
to assess its hardware and facility needs through retirement to determine
whether to maintain, closeout, or transition assets to other NASA
programs-such as space exploration activities.16 Once these hardware and
facility assessments have been completed, the program plans to conduct an
assessment of its workforce needs. Officials said that they must
understand the program's hardware and facility needs before they can
conduct an assessment of its workforce needs through retirement.

While Other Efforts Have Been Initiated or Are Planned, Limited Actions
Have Been Taken

In addition to the Space Shuttle Program's preliminary work to prepare for
sustaining its workforce through retirement, the program has contracted
with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to assist it in
planning for the space shuttle's retirement and transitioning to future

16Prior to conducting these assessments, NASA will hold an Integrated
Space Operations Summit to evaluate space shuttle and ISS assets and
devise a set of strategic implementation plans to meet the agency's future
needs.

programs. Specifically, NAPA is to (1) benchmark the best practices of
public and private sector organizations that have dealt with workforce
issues resulting from the retirement, transition, or elimination of
programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as in number of employees
affected; (2) assess and review the workforce aspects of the program's
retirement strategy throughout the course of its development to ensure
that it is addressing the problem adequately; and (3) to the extent
possible, assist the program in devising innovative strategies for
mitigating the impact of the space shuttle's retirement on the workforce.
According to NAPA officials, it has conducted preliminary benchmarking
efforts and is awaiting further direction from NASA for its next steps
with regard to this task. Although the additional tasks NAPA is to
undertake have been identified, it has yet to undertake efforts associated
with these tasks. Because NAPA will be reviewing NASA's management plan
for retiring the space shuttle as it is developed, the majority of its
efforts will not be undertaken until NASA begins to plan more earnestly
for sustaining its critically skilled workforce through the program's
retirement, which, according to NASA, will likely occur after the space
shuttle's return to flight.

In addition, because the Space Shuttle Program is heavily reliant on its
contractor workforce to support the space shuttle's operations, NASA
officials said that they could include provisions in future Space Shuttle
Program contracts that require contractors to take steps to prepare for
sustaining their workforces through the space shuttle's retirement.
However, the program has yet to do so. For example, in September 2004 the
Space Shuttle Program exercised the final 2-year option of its Space
Flight Operations Contract (SFOC).17 At this point, NASA did not require
that United Space Alliance take any steps to prepare for sustaining its
workforce, such as by submitting a critical skills retention plan. A
senior NASA official recognized the need for United Space Alliance to
devise such a plan, and said that this type of requirement would likely be
included as part of the new contract NASA intends to award to United

17NASA has extended the SFOC through September 2006 and has begun
proceedings with United Space Alliance to award the follow-on contract to
be effective on October 1, 2006, through the end of the program. NASA
chose to exercise the 2-year extension under the current SFOC to allow the
Space Shuttle Program to remain focused on returning the space shuttle to
flight. Further, this option was exercised to provide better clarity into
the content for the follow-on contract necessary to safely complete ISS
assembly and support and retire the space shuttle.

Space Alliance in 2006, once workforce requirements for the remainder of
the program have been determined.

Separate from the SFOC, the Space Shuttle Propulsion Office at MSFC has
begun devising an acquisition strategy for updating its propulsion system
prime contracts to take into account the Vision's goal of retiring the
space shuttle following completion of the ISS. Although at the time of our
review this acquisition strategy was not yet complete, officials said that
the updated contracts will likely include a requirement for the contractor
to submit a critical skills retention plan. This plan would outline the
strategies the contractor plans to implement to sustain the critical
skills necessary to support the program through retirement. In addition,
officials said that they could take advantage of the award fee18
provisions available in the space shuttle's propulsion prime contracts to
incentivize contractors to put in place strategies for sustaining a
critically skilled workforce through retirement and monitor their success
in doing so.

NASA's Prime Contractor for Space Shuttle Operations Has Taken Preliminary
Steps to Prepare for the Space Shuttle's Retirement

United Space Alliance has taken preliminary steps to begin to prepare for
the space shuttle's retirement and its impact on the company's workforce.
For example, the company has begun to define its critical skills needs to
continue to support the Space Shuttle Program; has devised a communication
plan; contracted with a human capital consulting firm to conduct a
comprehensive study of its workforce; and continues to monitor indicators
of employee morale and workforce stability. While these efforts are
underway, contractor officials said that further efforts to prepare for
the space shuttle's retirement and its impact on their workforce are on
hold until NASA first makes decisions that impact the space shuttle's
remaining flight schedule and thus the time frames for retiring the
program and transitioning its assets. Once these decisions have been made
and United Space Alliance's contract requirements have been defined, these
officials said that they would then be able to proceed with their
workforce planning efforts for the space shuttle's retirement, a process
that will likely take 6 months to complete.

18Award-fee provisions may be used in fixed-price contracts when the
government wishes to motivate a contractor and other incentives cannot be
used because contractor performance cannot be measured objectively.
Federal Acquisition Regulation P:16.404 (a).

The Potential Impact of Workforce Problems and Other Challenges the Space
Shuttle Program Faces Highlight the Need for Workforce Planning

Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a
critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the program's
retirement will be important given the potential impact that workforce
problems could have on NASA-wide goals. According to NASA officials, if
the Space Shuttle Program faces difficulties in sustaining the necessary
workforce, NASA-wide goals, such as implementing the Vision and proceeding
with space exploration activities, could be impacted. For example,
workforce problems could lead to a delay in flight certification for the
space shuttle, which could potentially result in a delay to the program's
overall flight schedule, thus compromising the goal of completing assembly
of the ISS by 2010. In addition, officials said that space exploration
activities could slip as much as 1 year for each year that the space
shuttle's operations are extended because NASA's ability to progress with
these activities is reliant on funding and assets that are expected to be
transferred from the Space Shuttle Program to other NASA programs.

One workforce issue that has already been identified that could impact the
program's ability to support space shuttle operations through retirement
is an inadequate safety workforce. For example, Safety and Mission
Assurance Directorate officials at KSC indicated that they already face
difficulties in maintaining a sufficient number of safety personnel to
support the Space Shuttle Program. An analysis done by the Safety and
Mission Assurance Directorate at KSC shows that it lacks an adequate
number of employees to fully perform all of its required functions for the
Space Shuttle Program, which increased due to additional safety
requirements put in place following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident.
Due to this analysis, some additional workforce was added to provide
support in this area. Although the Safety and Mission Assurance
Directorate now believes that it can meet its inspection schedule,
officials said that should the Directorate be unable to complete all of
its required inspections, they would deny the space shuttle's
certification for flight readiness. This would delay the program's flight
schedule.

NASA officials told us they expect to face various challenges in
sustaining the critically skilled workforce necessary to support the space
shuttle's operations through its retirement, including retaining the
current workforce, many of whom may want to participate in or will be
needed to support future phases of implementing the Vision, and providing
a transition path to other programs for the workforce that is needed to
support the Space Shuttle Program through retirement. Additional
challenges that could affect the program's ability to support space
shuttle operations include:

o  Impact on the prime contractor for space shuttle operations. United
Space Alliance may not be able to offer a long-term career path to its
employees beyond the space shuttle's final flight. This problem results
from the company having been established specifically to perform ground
and flight operations for the Space Shuttle Program. As such, its future
following the space shuttle's retirement remains uncertain. Given this
uncertainty, contractor officials stated that they will likely face
difficulty recruiting and retaining employees to continue supporting the
space shuttle as it nears retirement because of the perceived lack of
long-term job security. In addition, they said that the lack of job
security may be reflected in poor morale, inattention to details, errors,
accidents, absences, and attrition. In addressing problems that may result
from this challenge, United Space Alliance has the ability to outplace
some employees who work with the Space Shuttle Program to its parent
companies. However, contractor officials said that other steps it may have
to take to address workforce issues, such as paying retention bonuses, are
likely to require funding above normal levels.

o  Governmentwide budgetary constraints. Throughout the process of
retiring the space shuttle, NASA, like other federal agencies, will have
to contend with urgent challenges facing the federal budget that will put
pressure on discretionary spending-such as investments in space
programs-and require it to do more with fewer resources. As a result, the
Space Shuttle Program's ability to make use of tools that require
additional funding-such as certain aspects of NASA's new workforce
flexibilities like recruitment or retention bonuses-may be limited.
Further, GAO has reported that NASA has had difficulties in accurately
estimating the costs of its programs.19 Given this, the agency may not be
able to provide a sound and accurate business case to support the use of
such tools. Workforce planning efforts that identify gaps in critical
skills based upon expected future needs and support the use of strategies
to address these gaps could provide the information needed to support a
sound business case.

19See GAO, NASA: Lack of Disciplined Cost-Estimating Processes Hinders
Effective Program Management, GAO-04-642 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).

  Several Factors Have Impeded Efforts to Develop a Long-Term Strategy to
  Sustain a Critically Skilled Space Shuttle Workforce

While the Space Shuttle Program is still in the early stages of planning
for the program's retirement, its development of a detailed long-term
strategy to sustain its future workforce is being hampered by several
factors. These include (1) the program's primary near-term focus on
returning the space shuttle to flight and (2) uncertainties with respect
to implementing the Vision. Space Shuttle Program officials assert that
these factors limit the steps they are able to take at this time to plan
for the program's future workforce needs. However, our prior work on
strategic workforce planning has shown that there are steps that
successful organizations take to better position themselves to address
future workforce needs, even when faced with uncertainties.

Near-Term Focus on Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight Has Left Future
Workforce Needs Unaddressed

Since the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the program has focused on its
near-term goal of returning the space shuttle to flight. While this focus
is understandable given the importance of the space shuttle's role in
completing assembly of the ISS, it has led to the program delaying efforts
to determine future workforce needs. For example, in developing the
management plan for retiring the space shuttle, program officials said
that the majority of the assessments the program is to complete to support
decisions regarding whether to maintain, closeout, or transition the
program's assets will not be undertaken until after the space shuttle has
returned to flight. According to these officials, one reason for this
delay is that personnel needed to conduct the assessments are currently
focused on supporting return to flight activities. Because the workforce
assessment will not be conducted until after the program determines its
hardware and facility requirements, its future workforce needs will likely
remain unidentified until well after the space shuttle has returned to
flight.

Uncertainties with Respect to Implementing the Vision Limit the Space
Shuttle Program's Ability to Identify Future Workforce Needs

While the Vision has provided the Space Shuttle Program with the goal of
retiring the space shuttle by 2010 upon completion of the ISS, the program
lacks well-defined objectives or goals on which to base its workforce
planning efforts. For example, NASA has not yet determined the final
configuration of the ISS or the type of vehicle that will replace the
space shuttle and be used for space exploration. These decisions are
important because they affect the time frames for retiring the space
shuttle. Once made, these decisions will also provide important
information that officials have said will be used to guide Space Shuttle
Program retirement planning efforts, including efforts to determine
whether to maintain, closeout, or transition the program's facilities,
hardware, and workforce as they are no longer needed to support the
program. Lacking this

information, officials have said that their ability to progress with
detailed long-term workforce planning is limited.

Despite Uncertainties, the Space Shuttle Program Could Follow a Strategic
Human Capital Management Approach to Plan for Sustaining Its Critically
Skilled Workforce

Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that
successful organizations in both the public and private sectors follow a
strategic human capital management approach, even when faced with an
uncertain future environment. For example, following a strategic human
capital management approach can help an organization to (1) prepare its
workforce to meet present and future mission requirements, (2) plan for
future human capital needs in an uncertain environment, and (3) address
future human capital issues that could jeopardize the accomplishment of
goals.20 As part of this approach, strategic workforce planning begins
with establishing a strategic direction and setting goals to guide
planning efforts for the organization early on in the planning process.21
When this is not possible due to an uncertain future environment, scenario
planning is one approach that can be used as part of a strategic workforce
planning process.

Scenario planning is used to describe different future environments that
an organization may face and can provide a basis for developing and
planning strategies to meet the challenges posed by those scenarios rather
than planning to meet the needs of a single view of the future. For
example, following the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, and
during the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Coast
Guard undertook scenario planning to guide its short-term operational and
human capital planning efforts due to uncertainties. For the Space Shuttle
Program, scenario planning could guide workforce planning efforts because
it can be undertaken despite uncertainties the program faces and without
having definitive requirements for program hardware and facility needs
through retirement. Scenario planning could

20GAO-02-373SP and GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective
Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

21A strategic direction is a clear set of organizational intents-including
a clearly defined mission, set of core values, goals and objectives, and
strategies to achieve these. Setting a strategic direction and program
goals is part of the general performance management principles that
Congress expects federal agencies to follow under the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Pub. L. No. 103-62. GPRA calls
for agencies to address human capital in the context of performance
management and requires annual performance plans for each program activity
in the agency's budget, which describes how agencies will use resources to
accomplish their strategic direction and program goals.

Conclusions

Recommendation for Executive Action

also provide the space shuttle program with flexibility in its workforce
planning efforts because it does not rely on information provided by
hardware and facility assessments and could be undertaken by NASA
personnel not currently focused on returning the space shuttle to flight.
The information provided by scenario planning could then be used by
program officials to support workforce assessments once decisions about
the programs hardware and facility needs have been made.

This is one of the most challenging periods in the history of the Space
Shuttle Program. Not only must NASA demonstrate that the space shuttle can
safely fly again, it must begin the process of retiring its largest
program while preparing for the uncertain future of space exploration. The
necessity to plan for sustaining a critically skilled space shuttle
workforce at this time is critical given the impact that expected
workforce problems would have on the program and other larger NASA goals.
While the Space Shuttle Program acknowledges that sustaining its
critically skilled workforce through the program's retirement is
important, the absence of a detailed long-term strategy for doing so makes
it unclear how the program will actually accomplish this. By delaying
steps to address future workforce needs until other decisions have been
made, the program is not taking advantage of valuable time that it could
use to better position itself to implement workforce strategies to address
expected future challenges and sustain a critically skilled workforce
through retirement. Approaches to workforce planning that take in to
account uncertainties and provide the program with flexibility in
determining future workforce requirements would be particularly relevant
to the Space Shuttle Program given the issues that must be resolved before
the program can proceed with more detailed workforce planning efforts.

To better position the agency to sustain a critically skilled space
shuttle workforce through retirement, we recommend that the Acting
Administrator direct the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space
Operations to implement an approach, as part of its preliminary planning
efforts, for identifying the program's future workforce needs that takes
into account various future scenarios the program could face. The program
should then use this information to develop strategies for meeting the
needs of its potential future scenarios. The information collected and
strategies devised during scenario planning will then be readily available
to be incorporated into the program's detailed workforce planning efforts
once any uncertainties have been resolved.

  Agency Comments �and Our Evaluation �

In written and oral comments on a draft of this report, NASA indicated
that it concurred with our findings, conclusions, and recommendation. NASA
reiterated that its primary near-term focus is on safely returning the
space shuttle to flight, but stated that the agency is laying the
foundation needed to move forward with a comprehensive approach for
transitioning the Space Shuttle Program through its Integrated Space
Operations Summit process. NASA plans to use this process to provide the
agency with an independent view of the respective issues surrounding the
mission execution and transition of the Space Shuttle Program and its
assets. According to NASA, the information provided by this process will
allow the agency to review the risks and opportunities related to a number
of alternate scenarios that the Space Shuttle Program might support within
the Vision.

We are encouraged that NASA is laying the foundation needed for
transitioning the Space Shuttle Program. NASA has the opportunity to use
the Integrated Space Operations Summit process, specifically the alternate
future scenarios for the Space Shuttle Program that it will provide, to
proceed with identifying the program's future workforce needs based upon
such scenarios. As our recommendation stated, this information could then
be readily available to support the program's detailed workforce planning
efforts once any uncertainties have been resolved. NASA's comments are
reprinted in appendix III.

NASA also provided technical comments, which we addressed throughout the
report as appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier, we
will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date. At
that time, we will send copies to NASA's Acting Administrator and
interested congressional committees. We will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
�contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Key contributors to
this�report are acknowledged in appendix IV. �

Allen Li, Director�Acquisition and Sourcing Management�

                   Appendix I: Scope and Methodology �

To identify the progress that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and United Space Alliance have made toward
developing a strategy for sustaining their critically skilled workforces
through the space shuttle's retirement, we:

o  Obtained and analyzed NASA documents and briefing slides related to
human capital management, including NASA's Strategic Human Capital Plan
and Implementation Plan, NASA center Strategic Human Capital
Implementation Plans, NASA's Workforce Plan for Use of the NASA
Flexibility Act of 2004 Authorities, policies and procedures for workforce
planning, and information on NASA's integrated human capital management
tools-such as its Competency Management System, Workforce Integrated
Management System, and workforce analysis tools.

o  Obtained and reviewed NASA documents and briefing slides related to the
space shuttle's operations and retirement, including reports identifying
the "lessons learned" from the Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program, Navy
Base Realignment and Closure activity, NASA Industrial Facility closure,
and the Boeing A/V-8B and F/A-18 production line transition, and plans and
projected schedules for future space shuttle flights and manifests.

o  Interviewed United Space Alliance officials regarding their support of
space shuttle operations and involvement with space shuttle retirement
planning efforts. We also obtained and analyzed documents related to
United Space Alliance's workforce, including demographic data, workforce
strategies, and critical skills identification.

o  Reviewed previous GAO reports on NASA, the Space Shuttle Program, and
on human capital and workforce planning best practices. We also reviewed
human capital reports and guidance from the Office of Personnel Management
and the Office of Management and Budget, and interviewed officials from
the National Academy of Public Administration regarding human capital
management. In addition, we reviewed a report issued by the National
Science Board on issues facing the U.S. science and engineering workforce.

o  Interviewed NASA and United Space Alliance officials and received
written and oral responses to questions regarding the space shuttle
workforce, its demographics, space shuttle operations, and space shuttle
retirement planning efforts; NASA operations and management; NASA and
United Space Alliance human capital and workforce planning practices; the
NASA Flexibility Act of 2004; NASA Safety and

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Mission Assurance activities; and space shuttle contracts, including the
Space Flight Operations Contract.

To identify any factors that may have impeded efforts to develop a
strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce through retirement,
we:

o  Interviewed NASA and United Space Alliance officials to obtain an
understanding of the challenges they face in planning for the space
shuttle's retirement and in addressing workforce issues that may arise as
a result of the decision to retire the space shuttle.

o  Obtained and analyzed NASA and United Space Alliance responses to
questions that asked for information regarding their goals and strategies
for retiring the space shuttle, the processes they expect to follow to
achieve these goals, and the tools and strategies they might use to
address workforce issues through the space shuttle's retirement.

To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials responsible
for space shuttle operations at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; and
at three NASA centers designated as Space Operations Centers, including
Johnson Space Center (JSC), Texas; Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida;
and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Alabama. These centers were
chosen because they maintain primary responsibility for conducting space
shuttle operations and are the centers at which the vast majority of the
space shuttle workforce is located. The offices we met with at each of
these centers included Safety and Mission Assurance and Human Resources.
Additional information was attained from the Space Shuttle Program Office
at JSC; the Space Shuttle Processing Directorate and Space Shuttle
Strategic Planning Office at KSC; the Space Shuttle Propulsion Office,
Customer and Employees Relations Directorate, and Space Transportation
Directorate at MSFC; and the Offices of Space Operations, Exploration
Systems, and Procurement at NASA Headquarters.

We conducted our review from April 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable to the Space
Shuttle Program

To prepare for the space shuttle's retirement, NASA identified the lessons
learned from the closeout or retirement of programs comparable to the
space shuttle, including the Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program, the Navy
Base Realignment and Closure activity, and the NASA Industrial Facility
closure.1 NASA's reports capture lessons learned that might be applicable
to the Space Shuttle Program's retirement planning. NASA's highlights from
these studies are shown in table 1.

  Table 1: Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable to the Space
                    Shuttle Program Report NASA's highlights

Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program Closeout

Navy Base Realignment and Closure Activity: Closure of Naval Station
Roosevelt Roads

o  Successful program mission execution is the goal. This is a large
consideration, as mission success is the top priority, focusing on safety
and quality. Implicit in this is the successful retention of personnel, as
well as retention through closeout to follow-on programs.

o  A fundamental change in mindset must occur to ensure successful mission
execution. Because the supply line of spares will terminate, the Space
Shuttle Program must establish the mindset that identifies and preserves
all materials necessary for mission execution.

o  Management information should not be based on rumors. The ground rules
for the retirement effort should be established early with buy-in from the
stakeholders and be carried through the entire program. These rules can
change over the program, but should only be from official direction, such
as from congressional directive.

o  Environmental assessment and remediation will be a large consideration
for resources. Informed and active planning will require knowledge and
ongoing effort with regulations, local laws, and Federal Acquisition
Regulations.

o  Communication with stakeholders, Space Shuttle Program managers, and
particularly all Space Shuttle Program personnel must be consistent and
clear from the start of planning through program retirement.

o  Most importantly, begin the planning process early.

o  Develop an overarching, long-term strategic plan involving integration
of the Space Shuttle Program retirement and follow-on programs to optimize
NASA resources by minimizing costs and ensuring that planned milestones do
not slip.

o  Consider special legislation to earmark funds from property sales to
return to NASA.

o  Know the environmental conditions and liabilities of all closeout
sites. Perform environmental baseline surveys early so that the results
can be used in strategic planning.

o  Environmental assessment and remediation require time and will be a
considerable portion of the closeout budget.

o  Develop and implement a strong communication plan that is proactive and
open with all audiences-internal, congressional, and external.

1NASA also identified the lessons learned from the closeout of the Boeing
A/V-8B and F/A-18 production line transition. This report, however, was
not completed in time for our reporting purposes.

Appendix II: Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable to the
Space Shuttle Program

                            Report NASA's highlights

NASA Industrial Facility Closure in Downey, California

o  Major decision drivers will be the congressional direction for closing
and transitioning the Space Shuttle Program, the disposition of tooling,
transitioning or retaining critical capabilities, and possibly personnel
issues.

o  The Space Shuttle Program needs to perform a strategic assessment of
the total program's assets, skills, and capabilities. Identify phase-out
candidates and streamline operations to gain efficiencies.

o  The challenges in the closeout effort include environmental
remediation, historical preservation, personnel retention, and property
disposition.

o  Significant costs were for personnel relocation, moving equipment, and
environmental remediation.

o  A significant challenge will be to determine the extent to which NASA's
activities contributed to the current environmental condition of each site
and the extent to which NASA is responsible for remediation of the site.

o  The closeout team should include representatives of external
organizations such as historical, environmental, and political (local,
state, and federal) organizations, the General Services Administration,
the Defense Contract Audit Agency, etc., and internal contractors.

o  Communicate internally and externally with honesty and clarity. Prevent
rumors with an effective communication process. A public relations firm
may provide expertise in strategic communication to garner goodwill with
the surrounding community.

                                 Source: NASA.

Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

  Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Allen Li (202) 512-4841

Staff 	In addition to the individual named above, Wesley A. Johnson,
Robert Lilly, James Morrison, Shelby S. Oakley, and T.J. Thomson made key

    Acknowledgments contributions to this report.

      GAO's Mission