Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges
and Management Concerns Remain (31-JAN-05, GAO-05-161). 	 
                                                                 
For years, the Coast Guard has conducted search and rescue	 
operations from its network of stations along the nation's coasts
and waterways. In 2001, reviews of station operations found that 
station readiness--the ability to execute mission requirements in
keeping with standards--was in decline. The Coast Guard began	 
addressing these issues, only to see its efforts complicated by  
expanded post-September 11, 2001, homeland security		 
responsibilities at many stations. GAO reviewed the impact of	 
changing missions on station needs, the progress made in	 
addressing station readiness needs, and the extent to which plans
are in place for addressing any remaining needs.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-161 					        
    ACCNO:   A16476						        
  TITLE:     Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource   
Challenges and Management Concerns Remain			 
     DATE:   01/31/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Coast Guard personnel				 
	     Harbors						 
	     Marine safety					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Physical security					 
	     Standards						 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Personal protection equipment			 
	     Workloads						 

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GAO-05-161

                 United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

          Report to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

January 2005

COAST GUARD

  Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and Management Concerns
                                     Remain

GAO-05-161

[IMG]

January 2005

COAST GUARD

Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and Management Concerns
Remain

                                 What GAO Found

The Coast Guard does not yet know the extent to which station readiness
needs have been affected by post-September 11 changes in mission
priorities, although increases in homeland security operations have
clearly affected activities and presumably affected readiness needs as
well. Following the attacks, stations in and near ports received the bulk
of port security duties, creating substantial increases in workloads. The
Coast Guard is still in the process of defining long-term activity levels
for homeland security and has yet to convert the homeland security mission
into specific station readiness requirements. Until it does so, the impact
of these new duties on readiness needs cannot be determined. The Coast
Guard says it will revise readiness requirements after security activity
levels have been finalized.

Increased staffing, more training, new boats, more personal protection
equipment (such as life vests), and other changes have helped mitigate
many long-standing station readiness concerns. However, stations have been
unable to meet current Coast Guard standards and goals in the areas of
staffing and boats, an indication that stations are still significantly
short of desired readiness levels in these areas. Also, because Coast
Guard funding practices for personal protection equipment have not
changed, stations may have insufficient funding for such equipment in the
future.

The Coast Guard does not have an adequate plan in place for addressing
remaining readiness needs. The Coast Guard's strategic plan for these
stations has not been updated to reflect increased security
responsibilities, and the agency lacks specific planned actions and
milestones. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable annual
goals that would allow the agency and others to track stations' progress.

                 A Coast Guard Boat and a Multimission Station

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Added Security Responsibilities Had Impact on Readiness Needs

but Extent of Impact Unknown Progress Made in Addressing Readiness
Concerns but Stations Are Still Unable to Meet Standards and Goals
Strategic Plan for Improving Station Readiness Lacks Key

Components for Measuring Progress Conclusions Recommendations Agency
Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      4 6

11

18

37 41 42 43

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II	Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

  Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 58

GAO Contacts 58 Staff Acknowledgments 58

  Tables

Table 1: Selected Types of Positions and Occupations at Stations 7 Table
2: Selected Types of Boats Operated by Stations 8 Table 3: Selected
Findings from OIG, Coast Guard, and Senate

Reports on Multimission Station Readiness Concerns 10 Table 4: Examples of
Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station

Staffing Needs 19 Table 5: Comparison of the 68- and 84-Hour Workweek
Schedules 23 Table 6: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station

Training Needs 30 Table 7: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address
Station Boat Needs 32 Table 8: Selected Examples of Coast Guard Strategic
Goals, Objectives, and Initiatives for Multimission Stations 38

Table 9: Workweek Results of August 2003 Station Survey 48 Table 10:
Additional Examples of Implemented or Planned

Initiatives to Address Station Staffing Needs 49 Table 11: Examples of
Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station

Training Needs 51 Table 12: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address
Station Boat

Needs 55 Table 13: Concerns Regarding Coast Guard Processes and

Practices for Identifying and Funding Station PPE Needs 57

  Figures

Figure 1: Total Boat Hours for All Station Programs, Pre-September 11
Baseline through 2004 12 Figure 2: Boat Hours for Selected Programs,
Pre-September 11 Baseline through 2004 13 Figure 3: Coast Guard 47-Foot
Motor Lifeboat (left) and 41-Foot

Utility Boat 53 Figure 4: Response Boat Small 54 Figure 5: Station Crew
Member Wearing Cold Weather PPE 56

Abbreviations

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
MARSEC Maritime Security Condition
MSO Marine Safety Offices
MSST Maritime Safety and Security Teams
OIG Office of Inspector General
PPE personal protection equipment
PWCS Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

January 31, 2005

The Honorable Thad Cochran
Chairman
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable David R. Obey
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The 188 Coast Guard multimission stations located along the nation's
coastlines and interior waterways have been a mainstay of one of the
Coast Guard's oldest missions-finding and rescuing mariners in danger.1
In 2001, after a series of search and rescue mishaps, the Coast Guard and
others conducted reviews of station operations. These reviews showed
that station readiness had been declining for more than 20 years and was
continuing to decline.2 In response to these findings, the Coast Guard
began a long-term effort to address station needs. The response focused in
large part on reconfiguring operations and bolstering resources in four
areas-staffing, training, boats, and the personal protection equipment
used by personnel during operations, such as life vests and survival
suits.

1Multimission stations perform all Coast Guard missions.

2Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation, Audit of the
Small Boat Station Search and Rescue Program, MH-2001-094 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 14, 2001) and June 13, 2001, testimony by Kenneth M. Mead,
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation, CC-2001-184. In
2001, the Coast Guard issued its own internal report-the Project Kimball
Report-on the operational readiness of all its boat units, including
stations. The findings of the report were largely consistent with the
issues identified by the Inspector General.

This effort, which began prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, was complicated by the new and increased homeland security
responsibilities stations assumed in the wake of the attacks. With the
intensification of maritime security operations, the Coast Guard faces
additional challenges in reorganizing resources to meet potential maritime
threats and at the same time reach new and sustainable levels of
readiness.

The term "readiness," as used by the Coast Guard, involves more than the
ability to carry out required operations, such as a rescue or a security
patrol; it involves the ability to do so at a sustainable level while
adhering to agency standards. For example, a station may have enough
personnel to carry out rescues and other required missions, but not enough
to meet agency standards that specify the number of hours personnel should
work. In this scenario, the station is not considered fully ready because
it is not complying with agency standards and, therefore, may have
difficulty maintaining its performance over an extended period. However,
as the example illustrates, a lack of full readiness should not be
interpreted as an inability to meet basic mission responsibilities.
Moreover, readiness requirements can change depending on the needs of the
mission. While some assets at a station may not fully meet readiness
requirements for certain missions, they can be used to perform other
missions. For example, a rescue boat with a mechanical problem that
precluded operating it at top speed would not meet full readiness
requirements for rescues or high-speed chases, but it could meet
requirements for missions that did not typically require high speeds, such
as patrols or vessel escorts. Thus, a lack of full readiness does not
affect all missions equally.

This report, the second of two reviews directed by Congress on
multimission station operations,3 focuses on the Coast Guard's progress in
addressing long-standing station readiness needs4 while balancing changing
mission demands. Specifically, this report addresses the extent to which
the Coast Guard:

3Our first report addressed whether the Coast Guard's outlays for stations
in fiscal year 2003 exceeded those in fiscal year 2002 by the designated
amount of $15.7 million, as directed in P.L. 108-7, Division 1, Title 1
(Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003). See GAO, Coast Guard:
Station Spending Requirements Met, but Better Processes Needed to Track
Designated Funds, GAO-04-704 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).

4"Readiness needs" refers to the resources, people, training, and
equipment that stations require to execute mission requirements in
accordance with standards.

o  	has experienced a change in multimission station readiness needs as a
result of post-September 11 changes in mission priorities;

o  	has been able to address readiness concerns through the addition of
resources in the areas of personnel, training, boats, and personal
protection equipment; and

o  has plans in place for addressing any readiness needs that may still
exist.

To address these objectives, we analyzed Coast Guard data, reviewed
relevant documents, and interviewed headquarters and field officials. The
key data we reviewed included (1) station resource (boat) hour data, used
to track the number of hours spent on individual missions; (2) port
activities data, used to monitor security operations at key ports; (3)
various operations data (in the areas of staffing, training, boats, and
personal protection equipment), used to monitor station needs; and (4)
fiscal year 2003 results from the Coast Guard's annual station workload
survey, used to assess changes in personnel workloads. On the basis of
interviews with knowledgeable agency officials, data assessments from
previous reports, and reviews of existing documentation, we determined
that these data were sufficiently reliable for this report. To better
understand stations' readiness needs and how those needs have changed over
time, we also visited 8 multimission stations on the Pacific and Atlantic
coasts and interviewed relevant field officials. The stations were
selected based on geographic location, proximity to a strategic port,5 and
the number of station resource hours expended on various missions during
fiscal year 2003. To further explore how changes in mission priorities
after September 11 affected stations, we interviewed by telephone
officials responsible for operations at 8 additional stations, located at
various strategic ports, which we selected based on the number of station
resource hours expended on port security operations. For security
purposes, the 16 stations we visited or reviewed through telephone
interviews are not identified in this report. On the basis of input from
station personnel, we also interviewed officials from 13 local and state
organizations that have partnerships with 8 of the stations we reviewed.
Appendix I explains in more detail the scope of our work and the
methodology we used. We conducted our work for this second report

5"Strategic ports" are ports having critical assets and infrastructure of
economic, environmental or national security significance.

  Results in Brief

from September 2003 through December 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

The Coast Guard does not yet know the extent to which station readiness
needs-primarily resource levels-have been affected by post-September 11
changes in mission priorities. However, increases in homeland security
operations after the September 11 terrorist attacks clearly affected
stations' mission activities and presumably the readiness needs related to
those activities. Following the attacks, the Coast Guard elevated the
homeland security mission to a level commensurate with the search and
rescue mission, and stations were assigned the brunt of the Coast Guard's
port security responsibilities. These new responsibilities led to
substantial increases in the stations' security workloads. In addition,
these workload levels may change in the future once the Coast Guard has
established longterm security activity standards for stations and other
units. Currently, the Coast Guard is operating under interim homeland
security guidelines, which establish recommended security activities for
field units according to each maritime security threat level. These
guidelines are not, according to Coast Guard officials, considered
requirements because the recommended operations established by the
guidelines exceed current resource levels. Because the Coast Guard is
still in the process of defining long-term, risk-based standards for
security activities, it has yet to translate the impact of
security-related mission responsibilities into specific station readiness
requirements, such as staffing standards. Until it does so, the impact of
these new homeland security responsibilities on readiness needs cannot be
determined. Further, without specific requirements, neither the Coast
Guard nor others can measure the progress made in meeting station
readiness needs. Officials said they plan to start revising station
readiness requirements once long-term homeland security requirements have
been finalized, which the Coast Guard expects to occur in February 2005.
Because the interim security guidelines exceed available resources,
officials told us stations and other units are expected to perform
security operations as allowed for by their existing resources. Given
these factors, Coast Guard data indicate that stations and other units are
meeting most of the port security activities expected of them.

Operational improvements in staffing, training, boats, and personal
protection equipment, as well as increases in resource levels at stations,
have helped mitigate a number of long-standing readiness concerns.
However, even without the new readiness requirements as a gauge to measure
progress, it is clear that stations have been unable to meet current Coast
Guard standards and goals related to staffing, boats, and equipment, which
indicates that stations are still significantly short of

desired readiness levels in some areas. Since 2001, the Coast Guard has
increased station staffing by 25 percent and realigned the stations'
staffing structure, expanded training programs, embarked on an extensive
program to replace and standardize aging boats, and provided all station
personnel with personal protection equipment. However, there are
indications that station personnel continue to work significantly longer
hours than are allowed for under the Coast Guard's work standards, which
are in place to ensure that personnel do not become overly fatigued.
Regarding boats, although the Coast Guard has replaced old boats and
increased the number of boats at many stations, Coast Guard inspections
showed that about five boats in every six inspected at selected stations
in 2003 did not initially meet readiness requirements. Finally, while
station personnel appear to have been outfitted with sufficient personal
protection equipment as of fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard's processes
and practices for determining funding needs-such as not basing funding
estimates on the number of personnel assigned to stations and historically
funding only about half of identified needs-raise concerns that the Coast
Guard may not allot sufficient funds in the future for station equipment.

The Coast Guard does not have an adequate plan in place for achieving and
assessing station readiness in its new post-September 11 operating
environment. The Boat Forces Strategic Plan-the Coast Guard's strategy for
maintaining and improving essential multimission station capabilities over
the next 10 years-is the agency's primary tool for measuring progress in
meeting station readiness requirements. Although the plan outlines a
significant array of long-term goals, objectives, and initiatives for
addressing station readiness needs, it has not been updated to reflect
increased homeland security responsibilities imposed on stations in the
wake of September 11. The plan also lacks key elements, such as specific
planned actions and milestones that would help assure Congress and others
that the Coast Guard will continue to make progress in restoring station
readiness. For example, the plan does not identify what actions will be
needed to ensure that station personnel are placed in positions that are
appropriate with their experience, or to increase the actual length of
time personnel are assigned to stations. In addition, the plan lacks a
clear link between objectives and required funding levels. Furthermore,
the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable annual goals that would
allow the agency to track its progress in achieving long-term goals and
objectives, allow others to effectively monitor and measure progress, and
provide accountability. Coast Guard officials told us that changing
priorities can make it difficult to adhere to long-term strategic plans
and to maintain program consistency; they also noted that the Coast Guard
intends to review the Boat Forces Strategic Plan on an annual basis.

To assist the Coast Guard in addressing past and future readiness
concerns, we are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, in consideration of any revised homeland security
requirements, direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to ensure that the
Boat Forces Strategic Plan is revised to (1) reflect the impact of
homeland security requirements on station needs and (2) identify specific
actions, milestones, and funding requirements for meeting those needs and
responsibilities. We are also recommending that the Coast Guard develop
measurable annual goals for stations and revise funding practices for
personal protection equipment to reliably identify annual station funding
needs and to use this information when making future funding decisions.

                                   Background

    What Are Multimission Stations?

As shore-based units located along the nation's coasts and interior
waterways, the Coast Guard's 188 multimission stations conduct a wide
range of operations, from rescuing mariners in distress to patrolling
ports against acts of terrorism. The stations are involved in all Coast
Guard programs,6 including search and rescue, port security, recreational
and commercial fishing vessel safety, marine environmental response, and
law enforcement (drug and migrant interdiction). Their involvement varies
geographically from one Coast Guard district to the next, depending on
differing conditions among regions.7 Some program operations also vary
depending on the season-for example, search and rescue operations are
greater in the summer when recreational boating is more active and lower
in the winter. Because stations are traditionally associated with search
and rescue operations, they can be compared to fire stations, in the sense
that crew members remain at the station for extended periods, on duty,
ready to respond to an emergency.8

Stations range in size from as few as 4 personnel at seasonal stations to
as many as 60 personnel at larger stations. Individual stations are
usually

6The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall into 11 programs within
two broad missions-homeland security and nonhomeland security.

7For example, in South Florida migrant interdiction is a major program at
some stations, but it is virtually nonexistent in the Great Lakes region.

8Coast Guard standards require that boat crews be able to launch a boat
within 30 minutes of a distress call.

commanded by a command cadre consisting of an officer-in-charge-such as a
senior chief petty officer-an executive petty officer, and an engineering
petty officer. The command cadre is responsible for overseeing personnel,
equipment, and mission-related issues. In support of operations, the
stations also provide unit-level (on-the-job) training as well as
equipment and minor boat maintenance. As shown in table 1, stations employ
personnel in numerous occupations, but the principal staff usually
consists of boatswain's mates-those who operate the boats and carry out
many station duties. In addition to performing essential station
responsibilities, boatswains' mates can undergo additional training for
more advanced occupations, such as a coxswain (a boat driver) or a surfman
(a coxswain who is qualified to operate boats in heavy weather and high
surf conditions).

Table 1:Selected Types of Positions and Occupations at Stations

Rate
(occupation)/position Rank and gradea Description

Seaman apprentice/seaman

Seaman apprentice/seaman (E-2 - E-3) 	Personnel who are in training for
deck, weapons, administrative, and certain electronics positions.

Fireman apprentice/fireman Fireman apprentice/fireman (E-2 -
E-3)	Personnel who are in training for engineering and certain hull
positions.

Machinery technician Starts at petty officer 3rd class (E-4) 	Personnel
who operate, maintain, and repair engines, gas turbines, and transmissions
equipment, as well as auxiliary, refrigeration, air conditioning, and
electrical equipment.

Boatswain's mate Starts at petty officer   Personnel who are proficient in 
                    3rd class (E-4)                  deck and boat seamanship 
                                            and have a working knowledge of   
                                            all Coast Guard                   
                                                        programs.             
       Coxswain     Starts at petty officer A boatswain's mate who is in      
                    3rd class (E-4)         charge of a boat and is           
                                                 qualified to drive it.       

 Surfman Starts at petty officer 2nd class (E-5) A coxswain-boat driver-who is
                          qualified to drive boats in

b

heavy weather and high surf conditions.

Communications Starts at seaman (E-3)  Personnel who stand watch-that is,  
                                                       who staff              
    watchstander                                   communications systems and 
                                                  towers-for specific periods 
                                                       of time.               
                  Starts at petty officer Personnel who budget, order,        
    Storekeeper   3rd class (E-4)         receive, inventory, and             
                                           account for station purchases and  
                                                     requisitions.            

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

aThe grade E-1, which is not listed, applies to seaman recruits-personnel
who are undergoing recruit training to become oriented to the Coast Guard
and a military environment.

bSurfmen are usually stationed at designated surf stations, which are
defined as stations that experience surf greater than 8 feet for 37 or
more days during a calendar year.

Like the number of personnel, the number of boats at stations varies.
Small, seasonal stations may have only one boat, while larger stations can
have as many as nine. Table 2 describes the type of boats stations
typically operate. (see app. II for pictures of selected boats). All
station personnel are required to wear personal protection equipment
(PPE), while operating or riding in a boat. Coast Guard personnel use PPE
to protect against various dangers, such as inclement weather and cold
water exposure. PPE includes items such as life vests, helmets, goggles,
gloves, cold weather protection suits, thermal underwear, and electronic
location devices. (See app. II for more information on the nature and use
of PPE.)

             Table 2: Selected Types of Boats Operated by Stations

    Type of boat       Specifications                    Purpose              
                  25-foot, maximum speed of Used to conduct high-speed        
Response boat  43 knots,                 maneuvering tactics, including    
      (small)     maximum seas of 6 feet,     homeland security operations.   
                  brought into              
                      service in 2003a      
    Utility boat  41-foot, maximum speed of   Designed to operate in moderate 
       (big)      26 knots,                        weather and sea conditions 
                  maximum seas of 8 feet,     (commonly referred to as the    
                  brought into                    station "workhorse").       
                      service in 1973b      

Motor lifeboat 	47-foot, maximum speed 25 knots, maximum seas of 30 feet
and surf of 20 feet, started production in 1997 Designed as a
fast-response rescue boat for high seas, surf, and heavy weather
conditions, it is used in extreme at-sea weather conditions.

 Nonstandard boats Varies from 9-foot to 30-foot, with a Used for a variety of
                 missions, including search and rescue and law

c

                       range of capabilities enforcement.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

aThe Coast Guard plans to continue purchasing these boats through 2009, to
replace nonstandard boats.

bThe Coast Guard is planning to replace these boats with more versatile
and faster response boat mediums and plans to award a contract for
production in 2005.

cNonstandard boats include a variety of small boats purchased at the field
level; these boats were purchased based on the preference and discretion
of the local commander rather than through a centralized, coordinated
effort.

    What Are the Roles of Multimission Stations in Port and Nonport Areas?

Following the events of September 11, the Coast Guard created a new
program area for homeland security operations-the Ports, Waterways, and
Coastal Security (PWCS) program.9 The type and frequency of PWCS
activities performed by stations varies depending on whether a station is
located in a port area or in a nonport area. Stations located in or near a
port tend to perform more PWCS tasks, such as patrolling, escorting
vessels, and other duties.10 The responsibilities can vary by port,
however, depending on several factors, including the availability of other
Coast Guard units to share in operations, the strategic importance of the
port, and the support of non-Coast Guard entities-such as state and local
agencies-in both homeland and nonhomeland security activities. Although
stations located in nonport areas also conduct PWCS operations, such as
patrolling waterways, they tend to have fewer PWCS responsibilities. In
general, stations located in nonport areas do not have the responsibility
of maintaining the security of critical infrastructure, high-profile
vessels, or shore operations as do stations located in port areas. As
tactical units,11 stations do not determine the nature or frequency of
their tasks; rather, they carry out the tasks assigned to them by
operational units,12 which provide oversight as well as operational and
administrative support to the stations.

    Why Is Readiness a Concern?

In 2001, studies by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and a Coast
Guard internal review team found that readiness conditions at multimission
stations had been deteriorating for over 20 years.13 The studies, which
had largely consistent findings, identified readiness concerns in the
areas of staffing, training, and boats and presented recommendations for
addressing these concerns. Table 3 presents selected findings from these
studies, as well as congressional concerns regarding station readiness. In
December 2002, in response to a

9The PWCS program includes activities such as conducting harbor patrols,
vulnerability assessments, and other activities to prevent terrorist
attacks and minimize the damage from attacks that occur.

10For security purposes, the specific duties of these stations are not
identified.

11In this sense, the term "tactical" refers to procedures or maneuvers
carried out in pursuit of a goal.

12Operational units, which can include a group, activity, or a sector,
serve as a parent unit for overseeing station operations and for providing
guidance on policy and administrative matters.

13OIG, MH-2001-094 and U.S. Coast Guard, Project Kimball Report.

recommendation from the OIG and at the direction of the Senate
Appropriations Committee,14 the Coast Guard developed a draft strategic
plan to maintain and improve essential capability of all its boat force
units, including stations.15 The plan recognized that stations did not
have sufficient resources to be fully capable of meeting all their
workload requirements and that it would take both increases in resources
as well as "more judicious tasking by operational commanders" to address
the imbalance.16 In its 2003 report on station operations, the OIG
criticized the plan for being too general in nature, specifically
regarding how and when the Cost Guard will increase staffing, training,
equipment, and experience levels at stations.

Table 3: Selected Findings from OIG, Coast Guard, and Senate Reports on
Multimission Station Readiness Concerns

Category Concern Explanation/impact

Staffing A shortage of personnel 	Increases workweek hours for crew and
compels command cadre to fill in during operations

Declining levels of experienced personnel 	Reduces the number of qualified
staff available to supervise, provide on-the-job training, and conduct
necessary operations

Shortened tours of duty (high personnel Exacerbates the impact of
personnel shortages and lack of turnover) senior personnel for on-the-job
training and supervision Inadequate mix of positions, skills, and
expertise across stations

Affects mission performance Positions filled with uncertified or Increases
     workweek hours and affects mission performance inexperienced personnel
Insufficient number of qualified surfmen Increases workweek for crew and command
                                     cadre

Training Lack of formal entry-level training for boatswain's mates
Increases the training burden for senior station personnel

Results in nonstandard training techniques and knowledge gaps among
personnel

Lack of standardized training in boat operations	Increases the number of
boat mishaps and training burden for senior station personnel

14Senate Report 107-38, Senate Committee on Appropriations, accompanying
the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2002 (P.L. 107-87).

15U.S. Coast Guard, Report on Boat Forces Strategic Plan (Washington,
D.C.: July 7, 2004). Although a draft of the plan was provided to the OIG
for comment in 2002, it was not released to Congress until 2004.

16United States Coast Guard, Boat Forces Strategic Plan, p. 5.

Category Concern Explanation/impact

Boats Nonstandard boats 	Contributes to boat mishap rates (in part because
of lack of adequate training)

a

Aging boats Reduces operational and maintenance effectiveness

Boats failing to meet operational inspection Reduces mission capability
standards

Personal protection Shortage of adequate equipment Reduces crew safety
during search and rescue missions equipment

  Added Security Responsibilities Had Impact on Readiness Needs but Extent of
  Impact Unknown

Source: OIG, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations.

aBoats nearing the end of their service life.

Added security responsibilities after the September 11 attacks had a
definite-but as yet unmeasured-impact on stations' readiness needs.
Stations have seen a substantial increase in their security workload,
along with a shifting of activity levels in other missions. The effect of
these changes on readiness needs is still largely undetermined, mainly
because the Coast Guard has not yet translated the security-related
mission responsibilities into specific staffing standards and other
requirements. Until it does so, the impact of increased responsibilities
on readiness cannot be determined nor can the Coast Guard or others
measure progress made in meeting station needs. With the support of state
and local entities, stations and other units appear to be meeting the
majority of port security responsibilities identified in the Coast Guard's
interim guidelines.

    Stations Have Increased Operations to Address Homeland Security
    Responsibilities

After September 11, the Coast Guard's multimission stations experienced a
substantial rise in overall activity levels. Following the attacks, the
Coast Guard elevated the priority of the homeland security program to a
level commensurate with search and rescue, and according to field and
headquarters officials, stations were assigned the brunt of the Coast
Guard's port security responsibilities. These responsibilities led to
considerable increases in the stations' security workloads. One way to see
this change is in the number of hours that station boats were operated
before and after September 11. Station boat hours increased by 44 percent
from a level of about 217,000 hours prior to the terrorist attacks to more

than 300,000 hours by the end of fiscal year 2004 (see fig. 1). 17 Coast
Guard officials explained that increases in boat hours were due to
increased homeland security responsibilities and the 160 additional boats
and personnel stations received from fiscal years 2002 to 2004.18

Figure 1: Total Boat Hours for All Station Programs, Pre-September 11
Baseline through 2004

Resource hours 350,000

                             313,462302,529 300,779

300,000

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000 0

Pre-9/11 baseline

                        2001 2002 2003 2004 Fiscal years

                 Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

Note: Data for "Pre-9/11 baseline" represents a 2-year average of boat
hours expended in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.

17We calculated a resource hour baseline from which the change in resource
hours following the September 11 attacks could be estimated. This baseline
is an average of the 2 complete fiscal years preceding the attacks, fiscal
years 1999 and 2000. We did not include 2001 data because these data were
not available on a monthly basis. We developed this baseline as a more
representative depiction of boat hours expended by stations prior to the
events of September 11. For the purposes of this report, we refer to this
calculation as the pre-September baseline or as pre-September 11 levels.
Coast Guard officials agreed with this approach to this analysis.

18According to officials, stations received 50 new boats in fiscal year
2002, 34 in fiscal year 2003, and 76 in fiscal year 2004. Each of these
boats was allotted approximately 500 to 600 hours of operating time per
year. Stations also received additional boats as part of replacement
needs, but these boats would not account for increases in overall boat
hours for the time period we reviewed.

While total boat hours for stations increased following September 11, the
trend among specific programs varied greatly, with some programs
experiencing substantial increases and others experiencing declines (see
fig. 2). Most notably, boat hours for the PWCS program increased by almost
1,900 percent between pre-September 11 levels and fiscal year 2004. Coast
Guard officials attributed the increases in PWCS hours to (1) stations'
expanded homeland security responsibilities, (2) several elevations in the
Maritime Security Condition (MARSEC) after 2001,19 and (3) acquisition of
new boats and additional personnel stations received in fiscal years 2002
through 2004. Conversely, during the same period, hours dedicated to
nonhomeland security programs decreased. For example, boat hours expended
for search and rescue decreased by 15 percent, while hours for living
marine resources decreased by 61 percent.

 Figure 2: Boat Hours for Selected Programs, Pre-September 11 Baseline through
                                      2004

Percent change in selected programs

Ports, waterways, and coastal security

Defense readiness

Foreign fish enforcement and other law enforcement

Migrant interdiction

Search and rescue

Aids to navigation

Living marine resources

Ice operations Drug interdiction

1,885.73

-61.37

-67.94

                0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800

Programs with decreasing resource hours Programs with increasing resource
hours

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

Note: Data for "Pre-September 11 Baseline" represents a 2-year average of
boat hours expended in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.

19MARSEC, the Coast Guard's security assessment system, corresponds to the
Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Advisory System, which
uses a series of colors to inform the nation about the federal
government's perception of the terror threat level. As MARSEC levels rise,
so does the level of security activities the Coast Guard is expected to
conduct.

Similar trends emerge in the limited data available about how Coast Guard
personnel spend their time at stations. While the Coast Guard does not
formally track the number of work hours station personnel spend on each
program (either when operating a boat or while at the station), it does
administer a survey each year to personnel at selected stations, asking
them to estimate how they spent their time over an average week or week
period in August.20 Survey results indicated that the number of hours
spent on PWCS activities increased for those responding by about 29
percent between calendar years 2002 and 2003, while the number of hours
spent on search and rescue activities decreased by about 12 percent.

Coast Guard officials told us that although the stations' workload has
increased since September 11, mission performance has not suffered. This
does not mean that they believe stations' readiness needs were not
affected by the increase in operations, only that stations have been able
to sustain expected performance despite increased workloads. Officials
responsible for overseeing operations at the stations we contacted
explained that stations have been able to sustain performance levels by
achieving greater efficiencies in operations, specifically by (1)
conducting multiple missions during port security operations and (2)
coordinating their efforts with state and local organizations. They also
noted that stations have received additional boats and personnel since
September 11. It is likely that other factors also play a role in this
issue. Our prior work on the Coast Guard's overall use of resources
suggests an additional possible factor, such as decreases in search and
rescue responsibilities over time.21 This work also showed that even in
those program areas in which the number of boat hours declined following
September 11, the Coast Guard was generally able to meet performance
goals.

    Effect of Homeland Security Responsibilities on Readiness Needs Not Yet
    Known

The Coast Guard has not yet determined the extent to which changes in
post-September 11 mission priorities-specifically, increases in homeland
security responsibilities-have affected station readiness needs. Coast
Guard officials told us there are two reasons for this. First, the Coast
Guard's maritime homeland security requirements are being revised to

20The Coast Guard has administered this survey each year since 1991, with
the exception of years 1999-2001. The response rate in 2003 was 54
percent.

21See GAO, Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results
Achieved Needs to Be Clearer, GAO-04-432, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22,
2004). This work addressed all Coast Guard operations, not just station
operations.

better align with current resource levels. The Coast Guard is currently
working under Operation Neptune Shield, an interim set of guidelines that
establishes Coast Guard's homeland security activity levels-taskings-
under each MARSEC level. However, because the guidelines call for a level
of operations that exceeds the Coast Guard's current resource levels, the
Coast Guard is in the process of revising the guidelines. Officials told
us they expect the new, long-term, risk-based requirements to establish
more realistic activity levels that better align with existing resources
and take into account support from state and local organizations at
strategic ports.22 Officials told us they expect to have new activity
level standards finalized by February 2005. Under these new
standards-requirements-it is possible that station workload levels may
change. Officials also told us that although the new requirements, known
as the Strategic Deployment Plan, will better align security operations
with existing resources, the Coast Guard will need to monitor this balance
in the future given the dynamic nature of homeland security issues.

Second, because homeland security requirements have yet to be finalized,
the Coast Guard has begun, but not yet completed, efforts to update
station staffing standards and other requirements to reflect
post-September 11 changes in mission priorities and station readiness
needs. Officials told us that once homeland security requirements have
been finalized under the Strategic Deployment Plan, they will revise
station staffing standards and other requirements to better reflect
readiness needs. Although station staffing levels have been increased in
response to the new homeland security priorities and past reports of
staffing readiness concerns, the staffing standards are still based upon
pre-September 11 mission priorities (i.e., search and rescue operational
levels). Until the Coast Guard can translate the impact of
security-related activities into specific station requirements, the impact
of the new homeland security responsibilities on station readiness needs
cannot be determined. Furthermore, without specific requirements, neither
the Coast Guard nor others can measure the progress made in meeting
station readiness needs.

22Officials told us that because units may not have the resources to carry
out the responsibilities outlined in Operation Neptune Shield, they are
considered to be "guidelines." However, the new responsibilities, because
they will more closely align with resources, will be considered
"requirements."

    With Assistance from Other Entities, Most Stations Can Perform Expected Port
    Security Operations

While the impact of new responsibilities on overall readiness needs
remains unknown, there is evidence that most stations have been able to
meet the port security responsibilities-i.e., activity levels-expected of
them given their available resources and, in some cases, all security
responsibilities with the help of other entities. Since the level of
security activities established under the interim guidelines exceeds
available resources, the Coast Guard has communicated to stations and
other units that they are expected to carry out security operations within
the constraints of existing resources.23 The Coast Guard does not track
stationspecific performance regarding port security responsibilities, but
in 2003 it developed an unofficial evaluation system that indicates that
current security responsibilities for major ports-for which stations bear
significant responsibility-are largely being met. This evaluation system-
referred to as the Scorecard system-captures activity levels for selected
PWCS standards at ports of high military and economic significance.24
However, it is important to note that the Scorecard results are not
stationspecific in that (1) they do not separate tasks handled by stations
from those of other entities (either Coast Guard or other) that address
port security needs and (2) stations that do not contribute to port
security are not included. Nonetheless, the Scorecard results do provide
some indication that at least some stations are for the most part able to
meet their current port security responsibilities. Furthermore, of the 16
stations we reviewed, officials from all but 1 told us that PWCS
responsibilities-as identified by the interim guidelines-were being met.
In most instances, stations reported meeting PWCS responsibilities with
the assistance of state and local entities, which were either directly
performing PWCS tasks or performing other mission responsibilities-such as
fisheries enforcement or search and rescue-that allowed station personnel
to focus on PWCS responsibilities.

23According to senior officials, the Coast Guard does not expect units,
including stations, to fully meet the taskings identified in the interim
guidelines. Senior headquarters officials told us that operational
commanders are responsible for executing Operation Neptune Shield's
operational guidelines within station resource levels. However, the
officials responsible for operations at the majority of the 16 stations we
reviewed said that they interpreted these operational responsibilities to
be required tasks.

24The Scorecard reflects efforts of all entities involved in waterborne
activities, and in some cases includes support from state, local, and
other federal agencies. The scorecard assigns one of three ratings for
ports based on the level of PWCS activities attained: (1) "green" when 90
percent or more of security responsibilities are completed, (2) "yellow"
when the majority of responsibilities are completed, and (3) "red" when
less than 70 percent of responsibilities are completed.

There are also clear signs that partnerships with other agencies and other
Coast Guard units play an essential role in the stations' ability to meet
assigned homeland security tasks. Most of the officials responsible for
overseeing operations at the 16 stations we reviewed told us that their
stations have been able to meet increased operational responsibilities
only by sharing overall tasks-nonhomeland security-related as well as
homeland security-related-with state and local partners as well as other
Coast Guard entities. Officials explained that they have developed two
main types of partnerships. First, they have established partnerships with
local organizations such as police, fire, and marine patrol units to
conduct port security operations as well as nonhomeland security
activities. Officials at the majority of stations we contacted told us
that they rely on assistance from marine patrol units to conduct patrols
of key infrastructure, such as harbor docks; officials from several
stations also indicated that these units assist with vessel escorts.
Officials also told us that stations rely on partner organizations to
conduct nonhomeland security activities, such as search and rescue, and
that expanded partnership efforts have resulted in operational
efficiencies. For example, officials representing one station located at a
major port told us that a local partner increased its search and rescue
operations following September 11, allowing the Coast Guard station to
focus more of its efforts on homeland security operations.

Second, stations have relied on varying levels of support from other Coast
Guard components, namely, Marine Safety Offices (MSO)25 and Maritime
Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs),26 to conduct port security operations.
Station officials we interviewed told us that the level of support
provided by both components varied. For example, MSST support varied by
geographic location. One official told us that certain MSSTs located on
the Pacific Coast each set aside 5,000 hours a year to perform port
security operations, while those on the East Coast do not. Headquarters
officials told us that because the Coast Guard is still considering the
role MSSTs will play in port security operations, the amount of support
they provide to

25MSOs are the Coast Guard's primary operational units for promoting safe
boating practices. MSO responsibilities include establishing and enforcing
standards and regulations for vessel operations; licensing mariners;
conducting boating safety outreach efforts, and investigating marine
accidents. There are 47 MSO offices in the United States.

26The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) directed
the formation of MSSTs to provide fast deployment capability in response
to domestic threats in U.S. ports and waterways. As of January 2005, 12 of
13 MSSTs had been commissioned; the Coast Guard expects the 13th MSST to
be operational in 2005.

stations will vary. One senior headquarters official told us that newly
established MSSTs can generally provide only a limited amount of support
because of initial training requirements. As the MSSTs mature, they are
usually able to assume greater responsibilities for port security
operations.

While stations' efforts to leverage external support are commendable, the
extent to which they can continue to rely on that support is unclear. To
better understand the potential for support levels to change, we contacted
a number of state and local organizations that partner with the stations
we interviewed. We asked them if they expected their level of support
would change in the future. Of the 13 organizations we contacted,
officials from 12 organizations told us that since the September 11
attacks, they have either directly increased port security operations or
increased other operations-such as search and rescue-that enable Coast
Guard stations to focus on port security and other missions. One of the
organizations we contacted explained that they had plans to decrease
resource levels allocated to port security in future years. In addition,
another 6 organizations we contacted emphasized that while they did not
have plans in place to reduce funding levels for port security, they were
not confident that future funding would continue at current levels.

The Coast Guard has made progress in addressing multimission station
readiness concerns identified prior to September 11. The Coast Guard has
increased station staffing levels by 25 percent, expanded formal training
programs and increased training capacity, begun modernizing its small boat
fleet, and as of fiscal year 2003 appeared to have provided station
personnel with appropriate amounts of PPE. However, despite this progress,
the Coast Guard has yet to meet existing readiness standards and goals in
the areas of staffing and boats and does not have adequate processes in
place to help ensure the future funding of station PPE, a shortcoming that
could result in an insufficient supply of PPE at stations in future years.

  Progress Made in Addressing Readiness Concerns but Stations Are Still Unable
  to Meet Standards and Goals

Station Staffing Levels Since 2001, the Coast Guard has developed a
variety of initiatives aimed at Have Increased but Key resolving
long-standing staffing concerns at multimission stations. Table 4 Staffing
Standards and presents a selection of the initiatives, either planned or
under way, that we Goals Have Not Yet Been identified as noteworthy in
addressing station staffing needs. (App. II Met contains a more detailed
description of the initiatives.)

Table 4: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Staffing Needs

Concern Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

A shortage of personnel Staffing levels increased

o  	In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the number of personnel assigned to
stations increased by 1,109 active duty personnel, or 25 percent.

o  	An additional 451 personnel were added in fiscal year 2004 for
stations and command centers.

o  	According to one senior official, no additional personnel will be
assigned to stations in fiscal year 2005.

Number of authorized positions increased

o  	In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the number of full-time positions at
stations increased by 482.

o  An additional 317 positions were added in fiscal year 2004.

o  	According to one senior official, no additional positions will be
added to stations in fiscal year 2005.

Declining levels of experienced personnel New direct retention initiatives
initiated

o  	In fiscal year 2003, $5.9 million was expended on 312 selective
reenlistment bonuses to station boatswain's mates and machinists.

o  	Between fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the surfman pay premium was
increased by 33 percent.

Shortened tours of duty (high personnel Assignment practices modified

turnover)  o  	New personnel assignment practices are being implemented to
allow for increased tour lengths for surfman-qualified personnel and to
reduce turnover in all personnel assignments.

Inadequate mix of skills, expertise, and Staffing mix being reconfigured
positions across stations  o  In fiscal year 2001, an occupation (rating)
review was concluded. 	

o  Reconfiguring of station staffing standard is expected to begin in
2005.

              Number of specialized and senior positions increased

o  In fiscal years 2002-2004, 99 support positions were added (with 19
more needed).

o  In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 486 senior petty officer positions were
added.a

Positions filled with uncertified or Assignment and incentive systems
being revised

inexperienced personnel  o  	Plans are under way to (1) establish officer
and enlisted career paths, (2) base station assignments on position
requirements and personnel experience, and (3) develop motivation and
incentive systems for enlisted personnel.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

aSenior personnel are considered to be petty officer 2nd class (grade E-5)
and above.

Adherence to Workweek Standards

In addition to increasing the number of personnel and positions allotted
to stations by 25 and 12 percent,27 respectively, the Coast Guard has
begun to reconfigure aspects of the station staffing program to provide
more effective operations. For example, in an effort to provide a more
appropriate mix of positions and skills at stations and to address
concerns about insufficient numbers of senior personnel, the Coast Guard
added 99 support officer positions in fiscal years 2002 through 2004, and
486 senior petty officer positions in fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
According to one official, the additional support positions will allow
station command cadre to spend less time on administrative work and more
time on operations. Recognizing that in the past a significant number of
positions had been initially filled with unqualified personnel, the Coast
Guard plans to take steps to base assignments on position requirements and
experience. Furthermore, once long-term homeland security responsibilities
have been determined, the Coast Guard plans to complete steps it has
already begun to reconfigure its station staffing standards, which define
the number and type of positions at stations based on mission
requirements. The reconfiguration is expected to better align staffing
resources with mission activities. Despite this progress, the Coast Guard
has yet to meet five key standards and goals related to staffing at the
stations. Each is discussed below.

Most notably, despite increases in station staffing levels over the past 2
years and other actions, average station workweek hours continue to
exceed, by significant levels, the 68-hour standard established by the
Coast Guard in 1988 to limit fatigue and stress among station personnel.28
According to the Coast Guard's Boat Forces Strategic Plan, excessive
workweek hours is symptomatic of "the adverse operational trends,
identified lack of resources, and general reduction in ...readiness"
experienced by stations in recent years.29 Moreover, the plan also notes
that the high number of stations working in excess of 68 hours shows that
"staffing continues to be a significant problem at stations." According to

27See pages 28 and 36 for a discussion of the relationship between station
positions and personnel.

28The Coast Guard cites the 68-hour work-week standard as the objective
for Coast Guard shore units with 24-hour operational readiness
requirements, such as multimission stations and air stations. Although it
holds out the 68-hour workweek as the standard, the Coast Guard also
allows station officers-in-charge the discretion to choose longer workweek
schedules that may better meet readiness and performance requirements.

29The United States Coast Guard Boat Forces Strategic Plan, July 7, 2004,
p. 27.

estimates from Coast Guard surveys of station personnel, although the
average work week at stations decreased somewhat between 1998 and 2003,
since 1994 it has not dropped below 81 hours per week.30 It should be
noted that these survey data, although the best source of information
available on station workweek hours, may have limitations. That is, the
survey is administered every August-during both the peak search and rescue
season and the Coast Guard's period for rotating personnel-and it may be
that a year-round average, which would include off-peak, winter hours,
would be lower. In addition, although response rates for every year were
not readily available, the 2003 response rate was relatively low, with
only a little over half of the personnel surveyed responding.31

An explanation of how workweek hours are measured may be helpful in
interpreting this workweek information. The way in which the workweek is
measured at stations is similar to the way it is measured in professions
such as firefighting, in that personnel are on duty for an extended amount
of time-such as 24 hours-to respond to emergencies but may spend part of
it in recreation, sleep, exercise, training, or other activities.
Personnel can thus be on duty or off duty for consecutive periods of time
during a week. Workweek hours are calculated by totaling the amount of
hours spent on duty or at a station, over a 1-week period, or averaging
the amount of time spent on duty over a 2-week period. The Coast Guard's
2003 survey of stations indicated that slightly less than half of all
respondents reported working either an average 77-or 84-hour workweek.
Approximately 6 percent of respondents reported working a 68-hour
workweek. (See app. II for more information regarding these results.)

30Since 1991(with the exception of years 1999-2001), the Coast Guard has
conducted an annual survey of station workweek hours. The Coast Guard has
used the results of the surveys to try to gauge changes in the average
number of hours personnel work each week. Personnel are asked to report
the number of hours spent among 49 predefined activities during an average
workweek in August.

31In 2003, personnel at 77 of the 188 stations were surveyed, with
personnel from 64 stations responding (a total response rate of 54 percent
of all personnel surveyed). One possible reason for this low response rate
may be that nonrespondents did not have time to complete the survey, which
could mean that workweek hours were under-reported. However, it is also
possible that personnel who were working longer hours per week were more
inclined to report that condition, leading to an over-reporting of
workweek hours.

According to the Coast Guard, working excessively long hours leads to
injury and illness.32 Officials told us that station personnel can exceed
the 68-hour work week standard in one of two ways.33 First, they can be
assigned to a work schedule that averages to more than 68 hours a week,
such as an 84-hour schedule. The work schedule, which is determined by the
officer-in-charge, defines the number of days personnel spend on duty and
is therefore the primary driver of whether personnel will consistently
work an average of 68 hours per week or some number above that amount.34
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with each of the many
possible schedules stations can adopt-table 5 shows a comparison of the
68- and 84-hour work schedules. For example, a potential disadvantage to
having personnel work the 68-hour schedule is that it requires stations to
retain more qualified personnel for duty work than the 84-hour schedule,
which could be one reason why officers-incharge who are short of qualified
personnel would use the higher hour schedule. The 84-hour schedule, in
contrast, requires smaller numbers of qualified personnel, which could be
of benefit to stations with high workloads and too few qualified
personnel. It could also be preferred by some personnel because it
provides for 3-day weekends. However, a significant disadvantage to the
84-hour schedule, as noted in the station operations and training
manual,35 is that it puts personnel "at significant

32It should be noted that long work hours do not necessarily entail long
hours underway (i.e., operating a boat). According to officials, station
crew members can work an 84-hour schedule that does not include more hours
underway than what crewmembers working a 68-hour schedule experience.
However, the Coast Guard's Boat Operations and Training Manual cautions
that an 84-hour work schedule should be restricted to units with "low
response mission workloads," meaning units that do not have a high launch
rate. Thus, although it does not automatically follow that working longer
hours puts personnel at a greater risk of exceeding agency fatigue
standards, it is possible. The Coast Guard has established fatigue
standards that limit the number of hours crew members can be underway in
order to reduce the likelihood of accidents due to overwork. For example,
crew members operating in heavy weather-seas and swell conditions
combining to exceed 8 feet or winds exceeding 30 knots-cannot operate a
boat for more than 6 hours in a 24-hour period and require 8 hours of
rest, leaving 10 hours for other activity.

33According to Coast Guard officials, there are no penalties to exceeding
the 68-hour work week, as long as fatigue standards are not exceeded. The
Coast Guard accepts that local operations requirements and unit
characteristics allow command discretion on alternative schedules that
meet readiness and performance requirements; while these schedules may be
more attractive to personnel, they may also require more hours at the
unit.

34Although personnel can work less than a 68-hour workweek under some
circumstances, officials told us the 68-hour workweek should be considered
the threshold of hours worked.

35U.S. Coast Guard Boat Operations and Training (BOAT) Manual, Volume I,
Part 3, Chapter 1, Section G, p. 3-25.

risk of exceeding fatigue standards," which is why it is normally
restricted to stations with low numbers of response-driven cases. In other
words, personnel at stations that have a greater number of response
operations- such as rescue cases-are at a higher risk of exceeding fatigue
standards because they are underway (that is, operating a boat) more
often. The Coast Guard's 1991 staffing study found that long hours on duty
resulted in lost time among personnel because of illness and injury, as
well as increased attrition levels.36 According to officials, in the late
1990s the Coast Guard switched from an 84-hour standard-which it had
adopted to better meet significant staffing shortages-to the present
68-hour standard because of concerns about crew fatigue and an increasing
number of boat accidents.

Table 5: Comparison of the 68- and 84-Hour Workweek Schedules

68-hour workweek Average 84-hour workweek

b

Workweek is divided into duty work, nonduty work, and off-duty Workweek is
divided into duty work and off-duty hours.

a

hours.

Crew accomplish training and maintenance tasks during nonduty Crews
perform all work-mission- and nonmission-related- work hours. during duty
hours.

Does not provide for 3-day weekends. Provides for two 3-day weekends each
month.

Reduces unproductive work time (that is, time spent eating and Since crews
are at the station for longer periods of time, they sleeping). spend more
time eating and sleeping.

Reduces the potential for crew on duty to exceed fatigue standards.

Crews are at significant risk of exceeding fatigue standards. Therefore,
this work schedule is normally restricted to stations that do not have
high numbers of response-driven cases (higher numbers of such cases
increase the likelihood that crew members will become overly fatigued).

  Requires more qualified personnel because each person spends Requires fewer
 qualified personnel because each person spends less time in duty status. more
                              time in duty status.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

aPersonnel who are in "duty" status must remain at a station-usually for
24 hours or longer-and be available to perform mission requirements and
operations. Depending on the schedule, personnel can also perform
"nonduty" work (called "day work"), which consists of any work other than
watchstanding, certain administrative and personal tasks, and unit
training. Personnel in nonduty status usually spend a limited number of
hours-a normal workday-at the station. While on duty or nonduty status,
personnel can perform watchstanding, which is the performance of certain
operational tasks that require personnel to be at specific places for
specified amounts of times (e.g., communications, security). Personnel
standing watch may, depending on the nature of the watch, also perform
collateral tasks.

36U.S. Coast Guard Station Staffing Study In Pursuit of Excellence:
Building a Better Station (Washington, D.C.; July 31, 1991).

bUnder this schedule, crew members work 120 hours during 1 week (2 days on
duty, 2 days off, and 3 days on) and 48 hours the next (2 days off duty, 2
days on, 3 days off). Over a 2-week period, the crew average 84 hours on
duty and 84 hours off duty a week.

A second way personnel can exceed the 68-hour schedule is by working
overtime, which, if significant, can also lead to lost time due to illness
and injury. Overtime generally occurs when required operations exceed the
number of qualified, available personnel. As with the 84-hour work
schedule, significant amounts of overtime can increase the likelihood that
personnel will exceed Coast Guard fatigue standards and can lead to lower
retention levels for trained personnel.

Field and headquarters officials told us that at most stations, the high
number of hours worked is being driven by the following factors:

o  an increase in homeland security responsibilities;

o  an increase in the number of inexperienced personnel;

o  	the formation of MSSTs, which siphoned experienced and qualified
crewmembers from stations; and

o  	a lack of sufficient support for training, building and equipment
maintenance, and administrative duties.

Of these factors, the primary one is the increased homeland security role.
One senior official told us that although increased staffing levels may
have been sufficient to meet pre-September 11 mission needs, the homeland
security mission has greatly expanded the stations' workload, and it is
unknown whether current staffing levels will be sufficient to meet
operational requirements as well as the 68-hour work week standard.
According to senior Coast Guard officials, it may take 5 to 10 years
before the 68-hour standard is attained at all stations because of the
high levels of inexperienced personnel and other issues previously
discussed. In fact, one senior official questioned whether stations will
ever reach the goal given competing Coast Guard priorities.37 Officials
told us that the Coast Guard will not be able to determine optimum station
staffing levels until (1) long-term homeland security requirements have
been identified,

37The Coast Guard does not plan to add either positions or personnel to
stations in fiscal year 2005 because, according to one official, the
stations need time to adjust to the influx of new personnel they have
received, as well as their increased homeland security responsibilities.

Appropriate Mix of Junior and Senior Personnel

Adherence to Full Assignment Length

(2) inexperienced staff have grown into senior positions,38 and (3) all
new staffing initiatives (such as increased administrative support) have
taken effect. Until these issues have been addressed, officials said it is
likely that stations with high workloads and resource constraints will
continue to work longer work weeks.

The Office of Boat Forces' targeted goal for senior personnel, as a
percentage of total station personnel, is 50 percent;39 as of March 2004,
senior staff comprised about 37 percent of total staff. Officials told us
that in recent years stations have received a significant number of
relatively inexperienced personnel, which has skewed staffing proportions,
and that it will take at least 3 years to increase the number of senior
personnel to desired levels.

The Coast Guard has yet to meet its goal of an average 48-month station
assignment (tour of duty) for experienced personnel.40 According to Coast
Guard data, the average tour of duty length for boatswain's mates
increased from 33 months in 1999 to 35 months in 2000, but has remained
fairly constant between 35 and 36 months through 2003.41 Although
assignment practices have been modified for some personnel to allow for
longer tour lengths at stations, officials told us that meeting the
48-month goal will be a challenge given that stations draw upon a pool of
personnel they share with other units-such as ships-that generally require
shorter tours of duty.42 Thus, significant changes to station assignment
policies will affect these other units. One senior official told us that
although the stations may not meet the 48-month goal in the foreseeable
future, given

38According to the Coast Guard, it takes approximately 5 years for a new
recruit to advance to petty officer 2nd class rank (E-5) and approximately
10 years to advance to petty officer 1st class (E-6).

39The Office of Boat Forces oversees station operations and resource
needs.

40According to officials, this goal does not apply to inexperienced
personnel (E-2 and E-3), who are in the process of qualifying for their
jobs These personnel have shorter duty lengths than experienced personnel
because of the need to expose them to as many different experiences as
possible during their training period. One senior official told us that
this practice may be revisited given the training burden it places on
senior station personnel.

41Data represent average tour lengths for boatswain's mates E-4 through
E-6.

42For example, sea duty (on ships) is considered "arduous duty" and,
therefore, is limited to 1, 2, or 3 years. Stations, for the most part,
are considered nonarduous duty, and therefore, assigned personnel
generally have longer tour-of-duty assignments.

Sufficient Levels of Qualified Surfmen

competing personnel needs from other units, even extending the average
tour length to 36 months would be a significant improvement. Increasing
the tour length lessens the training burden on senior station personnel
(i.e., they end up training fewer new personnel) and allows a station to
reap the benefits of the training it has already invested in junior
personnel.43

Stations continue to experience a shortage of qualified surfmen. As of
June 2004, approximately 42 percent of surfman positions were not filled
with qualified personnel. According to training and program officials, in
the past this shortage stemmed from difficulties in recruiting sufficient
numbers of applicants, because of several factors: (1) a long training
process of 3 to 6 years (deters potential applicants); 44 (2) higher
workloads (because of the shortage of qualified personnel); (3) remote
assignment locations (surfman stations are largely located in remote areas
of the Northwest); (4) obstacles to promotion (promotion to senior
enlisted ranks requires a year of sea duty, which surfmen, who are needed
at stations, have difficulty obtaining); and (5) program challenges (make
it difficult to retain bonus pay benefits).

To address these challenges, the Coast Guard has revised relevant
personnel policies to facilitate career advancement and to clarify the
process for becoming a surfman. The Coast Guard has also revamped the
surfman training program by developing courses that that address training
needs. Regarding the former, the Coast Guard has (1) eased requirements
for advancement (waived the requirement for 1 year of sea duty for
promotion to senior positions) and (2) allowed surfmen to retain special
pay status after they transfer to a new station and are in the process of
certifying for their new area of operation.45 Beginning in May 2005,

43According to officials, personnel who are within 1 year of their full
tour of duty are usually eligible for reassignment. Generally, the Coast
Guard will look first to transfer personnel who have completed their full
tour of duty, but if this is not possible, it will next evaluate those who
are closest to completing their tour.

44Hands-on surfman training can take place only in the winter, when surf
conditions are appropriately severe. In some years, trainees do not have
the opportunity to practice surfman skills under appropriate weather
conditions, a fact that can prolong the time it takes to qualify.

45Surfmen receive a special pay status-a salary bonus-as an incentive for
continuing to serve as a qualified surfman. Changes in personnel policy
now allow surfmen to retain their special pay status after they transfer
to a different station and are in the process of certifying-learning the
area of operations-at their new station assignment.

surfmen will also receive additional points on their service-wide exams,
the scores of which are used to determine promotions. Regarding training,
the Coast Guard has concentrated on a two-pronged approach. First, to
increase the number of trainees who actually qualify as surfmen, in 2004
the Coast Guard implemented a new 2-year intensive training program that
will require trainees to reside at the surfman training center; this will
allow trainees to concentrate more fully on the training process.
Officials told us they would not know the impact of this new training
initiative until 2006, when the first class of resident trainees
graduates. Second, to improve formal training for personnel who are
qualifying through on-the-job training at their stations, in November
2004, the Coast Guard implemented a new 2-week surfman course. Because the
course was designed in part to relieve the training burden on stations
(which are short of qualified surfmen who can serve as instructors),
trainees will complete most of their qualification requirements during
training. Officials expected 18 students to take the course during the
winter of 2004.

The Coast Guard has not met its goal of aligning the number of individuals
assigned to stations with the number of designated positions, making it
unclear whether station staffing levels (individuals assigned to
stations), which are currently greater than designated positions, will
remain at current levels or decrease, potentially affecting station
workweek hours and other issues.46 At the end of fiscal year 2004, the
estimated number of personnel assigned to stations exceeded the number of
Coast Guarddesignated positions by an estimated 1,019 (or about 17 percent
of total estimated personnel assigned to stations).47 Because the 1,019
personnel are not assigned to permanent positions, and thus their
assignment is potentially more temporary than that of other personnel, the
Coast Guard could not assure us that the estimated fiscal year 2004
station staffing level of 5,925 personnel will be maintained in the
future.48 In contrast, the

Matching Number of Personnel with Number of Positions

46The OIG raised this issue as a concern in its 2003 report (MH-2003-028,
pp. 5 and 10), noting that the shorter average tour length for entry-level
personnel (9 to 23 months) added to the uncertainty of permanent dedicated
staffing levels. In responding to these findings, the Coast Guard agreed
that all personnel assigned to stations should be placed in permanent
positions.

47This figure was calculated by comparing the number of positions
designated to stations in fiscal year 2004 with the estimated number of
personnel assigned. It does not reflect attrition, transfers, or other
actions that may have occurred during the year.

48This figure was calculated by adding the estimated number of personnel
assigned to stations and command centers in fiscal year 2004 (451
personnel) to the number of personnel assigned during fiscal year 2003
(5,474 personnel). It does not reflect attrition, transfers, or other
actions.

number of designated positions-4,906 at the end of fiscal year 2004-is
considered permanent. Officials told us that although the Coast Guard's
goal is to align personnel and position levels, it has been necessary to
assign a greater number of less experienced staff to the stations, above
designated staffing levels, to develop required numbers of senior staff
(officials estimate it takes three junior personnel to produce one senior
crew member). Attrition patterns, limited space on ships, and the need to
expose junior personnel to on-the-job-training are driving factors in this
decision. The Coast Guard does not plan to add either additional personnel
or positions to stations in fiscal year 2005; rather, it will use this
time to evaluate current station resource levels and give junior personnel
time to gain experience and become fully trained. It is unclear how this
decision may affect staffing levels-if staffing levels drop, the number of
hours station personnel work might increase. On the other hand, if lower
staffing levels are accompanied by higher levels of experienced personnel,
then workweek hours might be unaffected or even decline. The impact will
also depend in part on other factors, such as the implementation of
remaining staffing initiatives-such as the station staffing standards-and
the nature of future homeland security responsibilities.

    Coast Guard Has Formalized the Majority of Its Training and Taken Steps to
    Increase Training Capacity at National Training Centers

Since 2001, the Coast Guard has made progress in developing a more
formalized training program and in expanding the number of training slots
available for the majority of station occupations. As late as August 2003,
when we began our work, the Coast Guard had yet to determine whether
formal training delivered in a classroom environment was preferable to
on-the-job training-administered by senior personnel at stations-or
whether it should utilize a combination of both on a long-term basis.
Subsequently, the Coast Guard identified formal training as its preferred
training method because, according to officials, it provides greater
accountability for consistent and uniform training across all occupations
and stations.49 To date, the Coast Guard has taken steps to formalize or
augment several aspects of station training, including boatswain's mate
and boat driver training. With respect to boatswain's mate training, in

49Coast Guard operations officials told us that although formal training
has been recognized as the preferred training mechanism for station
personnel, on-the-job training, which is also an important component of
station training, will still be maintained. Our previous work in the area
of training design has shown that federal agencies can use a variety of
training delivery mechanisms as long as criteria are used that link agency
goals with training efforts. See GAO, Human Capital: Selected Agencies'
Experiences and Lessons Learned in Designing Training and Development
Programs, GAO-04-291 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).

fiscal year 2002 the Coast Guard instituted a formal training center with
the capacity to train 120 trainees per year; during fiscal year 2003 it
more than tripled the center's capacity to 450 training slots. Training
officials told us they plan to further expand the capacity of the center
each year through 2006, when its annual capacity is expected to reach
1,000 slots, the estimated number of new boatswain's mates needed each
year. Furthermore, in conjunction with efforts to modernize its boat
fleet, in fiscal year 2003 the Coast Guard increased the amount of formal
training available to boat drivers who were learning to operate new
response boats and nonstandard boats. Training officials told us that they
employed a two-pronged approach to train operators on the new boats using
on-site training teams, which conduct training at the stations, and a new
2-week national training center course. Table 6 provides additional
information regarding the Coast Guard's initiatives to address training
needs. (See app. II for a more detailed discussion of the Coast Guard's
planned and ongoing initiatives regarding station training needs.)

Table 6: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Training Needs

Need Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

Boatswain's mate training Boatswain's mate training center reinstituted

o  	The boatswain's mate training center was reinstituted in fiscal year
2002; boatswain's mates' trainee positions were increased from 120 in
fiscal year 2002 to 450 in fiscal year 2003.

o  	Four additional classrooms and 51 personnel were added at the training
center in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, at a cost of $3.5 million, to meet
training throughput goals.

Training center to augment on-the-job training established

o  A provisional training center was established in fiscal year 2003 to
augment station

                                       a

                              on-the-job training.

Coxswain (boat driver) training On-site response boat training developed

o  	Training teams were established to provide on-site training to station
personnel in boat handling techniques.

Boat driving course established

o  	In fiscal year 2004, a 2-week training course on driving, law
enforcement, and boat operations was implemented.

Surfman training Efforts to expedite surfman training initiated

o  	A 2-year training program was instituted in fiscal year 2004 to
accelerate the surfman training process for 10 surfman trainees.

New surfman training course established

o  	A new surfman training course was established in fiscal year 2004 to
provide intensive training in heavy weather conditions.

Boarding officer and boarding team member Formal law enforcement training
expanded

training  o  	Efforts were initiated to increase training slots for
boarding officers and boarding team members by over one-fourth (between
fiscal years 2004 and 2005) by relocating maritime law enforcement
training to the Department of Homeland

b

              Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Evaluation of job performance Written examinations reconfigured

o  	In 2004, to better assess knowledge levels regarding station
operations, written examinations that are administered to station
personnel biennially were revised.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

aThis training center also provides training to boatswain's mates assigned
to cutters.

bThe Federal Law Enforcement Training Center provides basic, advanced,
specialized, and refresher training for law enforcement officers from 75
federal agencies. The Maritime Law Enforcement Center, which provides
boarding officer and boarding team member training to all Coast Guard
personnel, was relocated to increase capacity and to develop training
partnerships with other federal agencies.

According to officials, the Coast Guard's efforts to train boat drivers
were developed to address missions with greatest priority as well as for
training needs for new boats going into service. For example, in 2003 and
2004, training teams were deployed to all strategic ports to provide
training in tactical operations, an emerging requirement following the
attacks of September 11. In addition, to address safety concerns
associated with the operation of nonstandard boats, officials told us that
training efforts were targeted at stations that would retain nonstandard
boats, while the Coast Guard completes its program to replace stations'
nonstandard boats.

    Progress Made in Modernizing Boat Fleet, but Inspection Results Indicate
    Weaknesses in Boat Readiness

Since 2001, the Coast Guard has made progress in restructuring the
stations' boat fleet to address safety and operational concerns resulting
from aging and nonstandard boats. The Coast Guard has focused a major part
of its efforts on replacing an assorted variety of nonstandard small boats
with new, standardized boats. Officials told us that although the Coast
Guard had just started planning the acquisition of the new boats in 2001,
following the attacks of September 11, it expedited the purchase of 100 of
the new boats to meet stations' increased homeland security
responsibilities. Approximately 50 of these boats were distributed to
stations located at strategic ports, to provide quick response
capabilities for port security operations, and to stations in critical
need of new boat replacement. The remaining 50 boats were distributed to
MSSTs. In 2003, the Coast Guard developed a multiyear contract to replace
the remainder of stations' aging and nonstandard boats with an estimated
350 new boats. The Coast Guard has also initiated efforts to replace the
aging 41-foot utility boat fleet, which will reach the end of its 25-year
service life beginning in 2005, with a medium-size utility boat. Officials
told us that as of August 2003 the Coast Guard was in the process of
reviewing three medium boat prototypes and that they expect to select a
manufacturer in 2005. In addition, in 2003, the Coast Guard completed the
replacement of the 30-year old 44-foot motor lifeboat with a fleet of new
47-foot motor life boats. Table 7 describes the Coast Guard's actions to
address concerns regarding the stations' boat fleet. (See app. II for a
more detailed discussion of ongoing and planned efforts for addressing
station boat needs.)

Table 7: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Boat Needs

                Need Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

a

Aging and nonstandard small boats New small boats acquired to address
increased security responsibilities

o  	One hundred small response boats were purchased following the attacks
of September 11 to augment security capability at strategic ports and to
replace nonstandard boats.

Multiyear contract to purchase small boats was developed

o  	A contract was signed allowing for the purchase of up to an additional
700 small response boats through fiscal year 2009 to replace the remainder
of the aging nonstandard boats and to supplement stations' multimission
response capability.

Aging medium-sized boats Efforts to replace medium boats initiated

o  Efforts were initiated to replace 41-foot utility boats with a new
medium response boat;

b

$12 million was requested in its fiscal year 2005 budget to begin
production.

Inspection of small boats Inspection teams for small boats instituted

o  	In fiscal year 2004 the Coast Guard instituted teams to inspect new
standardized small boats, at a cost of $637,000.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

aThe Coast Guard expects to replace approximately 350 nonstandard small
boats in use at stations. Approximately 50 nonstandard boats used by
stations for unique geographic or weather-specific operational
requirements-such as 14-foot skiffs and 30-foot special purpose craft
boats-will be retained.

bThe Coast Guard has determined that the 41-foot utility boat-acquired
between 1973 and 1980-is approaching the end of its service life.

Despite this progress, the Coast Guard has yet to meet mission readiness
goals for medium-sized boats (utility and motor life boats), as indicated
by internal inspection results.50 The Office of Boat Forces' goal is for
80 percent of boats inspected to meet readiness standards at the initial
inspection. Results from the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2003 inspections
indicate that only 16 percent of the motor lifeboats and utility boats
inspected met mission readiness goals when initially inspected.51 After a
1day opportunity to correct identified problems, approximately 81 percent
had met readiness goals. It is important to note that the majority of the
discrepancies cited were not of such severity that they would prevent the
boats from being used in most mission operations. For example, the failure
of navigation lights on a 41-foot utility boat could preclude the boat

50As of 2004, the Coast Guard had conducted inspections of stations'
medium boats (utility and motor life boats). The Coast Guard plans to
begin inspecting its new small response boats in 2005.

51In fiscal year 2003, teams inspected 49 motor lifeboats and 37 utility
boats at 84 of the 188 Coast Guard multimission stations.

from being operated (i.e., disable it) until the lights were fixed or the
operational commander issued a waiver outlining the conditions under which
the boat could be operated. Boats that receive waivers are considered able
to "perform some missions, but not all missions safely."52 In this
scenario, the boat's failure to meet full readiness standards would not
necessarily affect the station's operational readiness. Officials also
told us that in order to ensure that operational readiness is maintained
at stations when a boat is disabled, all multimission stations have more
than one boat.

Officials attributed the inability of stations to meet full readiness
standards for boats to the following:

o  	Junior engineers did not have the necessary experience to perform
maintenance in compliance with operating manuals and configuration updates
from the manufacturer.

o  	Engineers lacked sufficient time to perform maintenance because of
increased operational hours (that is, the boats are being used more often,
and the engineers assigned to perform maintenance are spending more time
conducting boat operations).

o  	Station utility boats were reaching the end of their service life and
had deteriorated to the point that they required more maintenance to meet
mission readiness standards.

o  	New boats are more technologically advanced (e.g., satellite
navigation systems) requiring specialized technical training in order to
perform maintenance.

Officials told us that they are taking various steps to respond to these
issues. First, to compensate for the lack of experience among junior
engineers, the Coast Guard intends to intensify the training that is
provided to engineers for the motor lifeboat. In November 2004, the Coast
Guard implemented a 2-week course focused specifically on motor

52According to the Coast Guard's boat operations manual, when issuing a
waiver, operational commanders can decide whether a boat should be
restricted from performing certain missions. Operational commanders have
the flexibility to determine whether a boat can perform some missions or
whether it could perform all missions with certain restrictions. In the
case of inoperable navigation lights, Coast Guard officials told us that a
commander would likely issue a waiver to restrict the boat from being
operated at night but would allow crews to operate and perform all
missions during daytime hours.

lifeboat operations and maintenance. The Coast Guard does not have plans,
however, to provide specialized training for utility boat maintenance,
given that these boats are at the end of their life span and will be
replaced within a few years with new medium response boats. Likewise, the
replacement of the utility boats will address low scores related to their
deteriorating condition. Regarding the lack of time engineers have to
perform maintenance, officials told us that this issue will be examined
after the Coast Guard has reassessed changes in station workloads
following September 11.

    Processes and Practices for Estimating PPE Funding Needs Result in
    Allocation Shortfalls

As of the end of fiscal year 2003, station personnel appeared to have
sufficient PPE, but the Coast Guard does not have adequate processes and
practices in place to help prevent funding shortfalls from recurring. The
Coast Guard's continued use of these processes and practices in fiscal
year 2004 resulted in a $1.9 million shortfall in estimated PPE funding
needs for that year. As we discussed in our previous report,53 following
the expenditure of an additional $5.6 million on PPE in fiscal year 2003
to address perceived shortfalls, active and reserve station personnel
appeared to possess sufficient PPE. However, the Coast Guard's processes
and practices for estimating station PPE needs and allocating funds have
historically resulted in an underfunding of station PPE, despite
congressional direction to provide adequate supplies of PPE.54 If these
funding practices are not modified, funding shortfalls could continue to
occur in the future. Moreover, such funding shortages would affect the
Coast Guard's ability to meet one of its strategic objectives for
stations- namely, to ensure that station personnel are properly outfitted
with mission-specific equipment, such as PPE.55 A shortfall in estimated
PPE funding needs of $1.9 million occurred in fiscal year 2004, although
the actual impact of the shortfall-in terms of PPE that was needed but not
purchased-is not known, since the purchase of PPE is not tracked at the

53GAO-04-704, p. 8.

54Congress has repeatedly identified the importance of PPE. In fiscal
years 2002 and 2003, Congress earmarked a total of $30.2 million for
station readiness needs, including PPE needs. See P.L. 107-87, Title 1,
(Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2002) and P.L. 108-7. (An earmark refers to funds set aside within an
appropriation for a specified purpose.) The Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) also directs the Commandant to ensure
that all Coast Guard personnel are equipped with adequate safety equipment
while performing search and rescue missions.

55This objective is identified in the Coast Guard's Boat Forces Strategic
Plan, July 7, 2004,

p. 41.

headquarters level. A shortfall of $1.9 million is projected for fiscal
year 2005.

Following a mishap in 2001 in which the improper use of PPE was found to
have contributed to the death of two station personnel, the adequacy of
PPE took on added importance.56 The Coast Guard has emphasized the
importance of PPE, both through a Commandant directive and in its policy
manual,57 stating that the proper supplies and use of PPE is one of the
top priorities of Coast Guard management.

Although these measures are important, several aspects of the Coast
Guard's processes for estimating and allocating station PPE funds raise
concerns. Appendix II discusses these concerns in detail, but they are
summarized as follows:

o  	The Coast Guard's forecasting models do not recognize PPE funding
needs for personnel assigned to stations over and above the number of
designated positions. This is because the forecasting models are
predicated on the number of positions designated for stations, rather than
the number of personnel assigned (in fiscal year 2004 the estimated number
of personnel assigned to stations exceeded positions by an estimated
1,019). According to program officials, historically the amount of funds
allotted by the Coast Guard each fiscal year for station PPE has not been
sufficient to fund the estimated needs of all assigned station personnel.
For example, in 2003, the OIG reported that the Coast Guard had not
provided PPE funding for 541 (69 percent) of the 789 personnel it had
added to stations during fiscal year 2002.58

56Chief of Staff's Final Decision Letter on a Class "A" Mishap: Coast
Guard Station Niagara CG-214341 Capsizing and Subsequent Fatalities on 23
March 2001 (Feb. 6, 2002). Following this mishap, the Coast Guard began
requesting additional funds for station PPE with each budget request that
included additional positions. Officials also revised the qualification
guide to require boat crewmen to don and manipulate each piece of survival
equipment required of them in the conditions for which the equipment was
designed. Moreover, the training manual now requires crewmen to annually
demonstrate proficiency in survival techniques if lost overboard or
involved in a capsizing. The Coast Guard has also taken steps to ensure
that personnel performing boat operations are either outfitted with a
personal location device or that their boats are equipped with a
float-free location device.

57May 2003 Commandant Directive 10470 and Rescue and Survival Systems
Manual, chapters 3 and 4. In the directive, the Commandant cited an
internal research report that attributed 20 percent of the total risk
facing boat personnel to exposure to extreme weather conditions.

58OIG, MH-2003-028, p. 4.

o  	Even when funding is narrowed to just designated positions, the Coast
Guard's traditional practice has been to fund only about half of PPE
station needs, according to program officials.59 For example, in fiscal
year

2003, the Coast Guard initially allocated $1.8 million, or 56 percent, of
the estimated $3.2 million needed to provide PPE for personnel in
designated station positions.60 Stations also receive general operating
funds that may

be used to purchase PPE, although these funds are also used for other
purposes, such as boat maintenance.

o  	Assumptions used in PPE forecasting models have not been validated,
according to officials.61 Without validated assumptions, the Coast Guard
could be either underestimating or overestimating the life span and
replacement cycle of the PPE. According to one official, the assumptions
were based on input from station personnel.

o  	The Coast Guard does not require that PPE funds allocated to stations
and oversight units actually be spent on PPE, according to program
officials. Officials told us that in the interests of command flexibility
units are allowed to spend allocated PPE funds on various operational
expenses. Although such flexibility may be needed, the former PPE program
manager told us that it was possible that oversight units have not been
passing PPE funds on to stations as intended (i.e., the amount expended
for PPE may be less than the amount allocated). To help address this
possibility, the official said that in recent years he has disclosed to
stations the total amount of PPE funding available to them, including
funds held by oversight units.

Officials told us the Coast Guard has no immediate plans to revise the
traditional PPE funding allocation process because they believe it has
been sufficiently reliable for the agency's purposes. However, the process
may change once long-term homeland security requirements have been
identified. Given the historic shortages in PPE funding that have resulted

59The Coast Guard was unable to provide data on historical modeling
estimates; the program manager told us that these data are not retained.

60During fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard allotted an additional $5.6
million in earmarked funds to address-according to officials-accumulated
PPE shortfalls. The $5.6 million was part of $15.7 million in specially
designated funds appropriated in fiscal year 2003 to address station
readiness needs.

61According to officials, the forecasting models assume that PPE for
active duty station personnel will need to be replaced every 3 years, PPE
for reserve personnel every 5 years, and PPE for auxiliary personnel every
7 years.

  Strategic Plan for Improving Station Readiness Lacks Key Components for
  Measuring Progress

from the Coast Guard's allocation processes, as witnessed by the onetime
increase in funding during fiscal year 2003, it seems likely that stations
will experience shortfalls in the future if PPE allocation processes and
practices are not adjusted.

The Coast Guard Guard's Boat Forces Strategic Plan,62 its 10-year plan for
maintaining and improving readiness at stations and other boat units,
lacks key components for achieving and assessing station readiness in the
post-September 11 operating environment. The plan, although extensive, has
not been updated to include the impact of post-September 11 homeland
security requirements on station operations. The plan also does not
identify the specific actions, milestones, and funding amounts needed to
assure Congress and others that the Coast Guard is committed to achieving
identified readiness levels. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop
measurable annual goals for stations that would (1) allow it to track its
progress in achieving long-term goals and objectives, (2) allow others to
effectively monitor and measure progress, and (3) provide accountability.
Without these key planning elements, the strategic plan's effectiveness as
a management tool, as well as the Coast Guard's ability to ensure desired
progress in meeting station readiness needs, is limited.

    Current Strategic Plan Outlines Numerous Goals, Objectives, and Initiatives

The Boat Forces Strategic Plan identifies strategic goals in four areas:
(1) leadership and management; (2) personnel and staffing; (3) training
and expertise; and (4) equipment, support, and technology. These goals are
supported by objectives and initiatives, the latter of which are
prioritized, by fiscal year, in a summary implementation plan. Table 8
presents examples of goals, objectives, and initiatives, as well as the
targeted time frames, pertaining to each of the four readiness categories
(staffing, training, boats, and PPE). The initiatives contained in the
plan are designed to address station readiness concerns identified in
2001. For example, to address the concern that stations' have not received
the appropriate number of positions or qualified personnel, the plan
contains

62The Coast Guard's Boat Forces Strategic Plan, July 7, 2004. The Boat
Forces Strategic Plan is designed to support the Coast Guard's overall
strategic plan, the United States Coast Guard Strategic Plan 1999. The
Boat Forces Strategic Plan presents a strategic approach for all Coast
Guard boat forces units, including stations, groups, aids to navigation,
and other units. For this discussion, we focus only on those sections of
the plan that apply to multimission stations.

an initiative to revise station staffing standards as well as an
initiative regarding the need to staff stations according to these revised
standards.

Table 8: Selected Examples of Coast Guard Strategic Goals, Objectives, and
                     Initiatives for Multimission Stations

                                                                       Fiscal 
                                                                         year 
Category     Goals        Objectives           Initiatives            time 
                                                                       frames 
            Provide        Ensure that    Establish a mechanism that   
            leadership to  tasking can be outlines                     
Staffing ensure         met by                                      
            effective boat   available      intended capabilities of   
              operations     resources             resources           
                                              provided to stations     

Ensure the right number of positions/ people, with appropriate experience
and skills Ensure sufficient numbers of personnel-with appropriate
experience/skills-are assigned

Revise station staffing standards Staff stations according to standards

2003-2007 Training

 Deliver new training in a Establish a system to provide Increase staffing and
throughput at standardized manner appropriate operations training training
                               centers 2003-2005

Ensure personnel receive training Coordinate with training centers to
appropriate to each mission provide mission-specific training

Boats 	Acquire and maintain capital assets, facilities, equipment, and
technology

Acquire capital assets (boats) Recapitalize small and mediumsized boats
2003-2006

PPE Acquire and maintain capital Coordinate, enable, align, and Coordinate with
                          program managers 2005, 2006,

assets, facilities, equipment, and technology

monitor mission-specific equipment to ensure appropriate outfitting

to fully fund mission-specific equipment

                                  2008, 2010,

                 Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

    Lack of Key Planning Elements

Although the strategic plan provides an indication of what overall
measures may be needed to restore station readiness, the Coast Guard has
not developed key planning elements in four areas-either pertaining to the
strategic plan or related to it-that are essential to setting clear
expectations about what will be achieved, and translating the expectations
into specific funding needs. In four key areas, as discussed later, the
Coast Guard does not follow practices that we and others have identified
as necessary to effectively measure performance and hold agencies
accountable for results.63

o  	Plan not updated to reflect homeland security responsibilities: The
plan has not been updated to reflect the impact of post-September 11
homeland security requirements on stations. Although it incorporates
performance goals for other Coast Guard programs,64 the plan does not
incorporate-because they have yet to be finalized-goals and requirements
for the PWCS program, a major driver of station operations.65 Until those
requirements have been developed, the capability and resources stations
will need to address one of their most significant operational
responsibilities, and hence overall readiness needs, cannot be fully
determined. For example, the plan cites two important initiatives in the
category of staffing-(1) revise station staffing standards (i.e.,
determine the optimal number and type of personnel needed at each station)
and (2) staff stations according to those standards. According to the
plan's implementation summary, these standards were to be revised in
fiscal year 2003 and station staffing completed by fiscal year 2007. As of
January 2005, officials had yet to revise the standards because long-term
homeland security responsibilities had not been finalized. Until the
staffing standards have been revised, the bigger picture-when stations
staffing needs will be met-cannot be determined.

63We have issued numerous reports on results-oriented management,
including guides to developing and reviewing strategic plans. The criteria
presented in these guides stem from the Government Performance and Results
Act (GPRA) of 1993 (P.L. 103-62). See Executive Guide: Effectively
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118
(Washington, D.C.: June 1996) and Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA:
Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16
(Washington, D.C.: May 1997, Version 1). Other entities have also used
GPRA to provide guidance for strategic planning; see, for example, Office
of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, Part 6, Sections 200
(Overview of Strategic Plans, Performance Budgets, and Performance and
Accountability Reports) and 210 (Preparing a Strategic Plan: The Main
Elements).

64According to the Coast Guard, the plan's goals and objectives were based
on the estimated station capacity required to meet individual program
performance goals.

65As previously discussed, the Coast Guard has been operating under
interim homeland security guidelines and is in the process of identifying
long-term requirements.

o  	Plan contains insufficient details on specific planned actions and
milestones: The plan does not identify, in sufficient detail, planned
actions and milestones.66 Effective strategic plans should show an obvious
link between objectives and the specific actions that will be needed to
meet those objectives. These actions, in turn, should be clearly linked to
milestones. Although the plan includes a summary implementation schedule,
it does not clearly identify what steps will be taken to implement the
initiatives and when they will be completed. For example, the plan does
not identify what actions will be needed to ensure that station personnel
are placed in positions that are appropriate for their experience, or to
increase the actual length of time personnel are assigned to stations.

o  	Plan's objectives not linked with budget: The plan lacks a clear link
between objectives and required funding levels. Without a clear
understanding of the funding needed each year, there is little assurance
that initiatives will be implemented and long-term objectives realized.67
Clearly identifying funding needs would also help to ensure that projected
goals and objectives are commensurate with available resource levels.68
Because the plan does not identify the funding needed to carry out key
objectives and initiatives, even in the short term, it is unclear whether
the Coast Guard will be able to fund initiatives according to proposed
time frames.

66In 2002, the OIG reviewed a draft of the strategic plan and found it too
general to be useful in guiding Coast Guard efforts or in measuring the
progress of those efforts (see MH2003-028, p. 6). In light of these
limitations, the OIG recommended that the Coast Guard revise the plan to
identify specific actions, time frames, and responsibilities required for
meeting long-term objectives, such as the 68-hour workweek standard.
Although the Coast Guard generally agreed with the recommendations,
officials told us the plan was not revised to include the OIG's
recommendations nor does the Coast Guard have plans to incorporate them in
the future.

67In 1993, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs stressed that a
multiyear strategic plan not only lay out long-term goals for implementing
an organization's mission but include the resources needed to achieve
these goals. (Senate Report 103-58, accompanying GPRA of 1993, P.L.
103-62.)

68The Coast Guard notes in the strategic plan that resource proposals
should reference the goals of the plan. The Coast Guard also notes that
the plan should serve as the foundation for new budget initiatives, for
reprioritizing and reallocating existing resources (positions, boats, and
funding), and for adjusting taskings to available resource levels.

o  	Lack of measurable annual goals: The Coast Guard has not established
measurable annual goals linked to the long-term goals identified in the
strategic plan. Without annual goals, Congress, the Coast Guard, and
others cannot effectively and readily measure an agency's progress in
meeting its long-term goals.

The above planning elements would help the Coast Guard and Congress use
the strategic plan as a more effective tool for monitoring station
readiness needs and identifying areas of continuing concern. As with any
strategic plan, Coast Guard officials agree that it will also need to be
revisited and revised to keep pace with changing events and, thus, the
plan will be reviewed on an annual basis. The Coast Guard's plan may be
particularly susceptible to changing circumstances, given that it must
deal with so many unpredictable events, ranging from natural disasters and
accidents to the uncertainties of terrorist threats. A senior headquarters
official told us that while the Coast Guard should more clearly identify
expectations regarding annual goals, continually changing priorities often
make it difficult for the agency to adhere to-and fund-long-term strategic
plans and in some cases to even maintain program consistency. We
acknowledge that these difficulties exist and must be considered in
developing and using the plan, but even with these difficulties,
incorporating the key elements discussed above would improve the plan's
effectiveness as a management tool.

Conclusions 	It has been 3 years since the September 11 terrorist attacks
changed the mission priorities for multimission stations, and there is no
doubt that station readiness requirements need to be updated to reflect
this new reality. The Coast Guard's decision to hold off updating these
requirements until they can be aligned with homeland security
responsibilities Coast Guard-wide is sensible. The readiness of
multimission stations is but one of the many competing demands the Coast
Guard must balance as it attempts to meet increased homeland security
responsibilities while continuing to support other missions. Nonetheless,
the Coast Guard still needs to have the necessary plans, processes, and
safeguards in place to help ensure that it can continue the impressive
progress made thus far in addressing 20 years of operational deterioration
at stations. In particular, indications of high workweek hours for many
personnel and inadequate processes and practices used to estimate and fund
needs for personal protection equipment may limit the stations' readiness.
Historic shortages in station PPE funding allocations, which continued in
fiscal years 2004 and are estimated for 2005, indicate that stations will
continue to experience funding shortfalls in the future

Recommendations

unless PPE allocation processes and practices are adjusted. Perhaps more

significantly, it remains unclear where station readiness falls in the
Coast

Guard's list of priorities, as evidenced by a lack of measurable annual

goals related to stations and the lack of detail-in terms of both specific

actions as well as necessary funding-in the Boat Forces Strategic Plan,

the Coast Guard's strategy for addressing station readiness issues. The

lack of specificity on the Coast Guard's part thus far is perhaps

understandable given the challenges it has faced in the wake of September

11. However, continuing in this way will make it difficult to know what
the Coast Guard intends as a readiness baseline, how close or far away it
is from achieving this level, and what it thinks will be needed to get
there.

To help ensure that the Coast Guard and Congress have the information
necessary to effectively assess station readiness needs and track progress
in meeting those needs, and that multimission station personnel receive
sufficient personal protection equipment to perform essential and
hazardous missions as specified by Congress, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consideration of any revised homeland
security requirements, direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to take
the following three actions:

o  	Revise the Boat Forces Strategic Plan to (1) reflect the impact of
homeland security requirements on station needs and (2) identify specific
actions, milestones, and funding needs for meeting those needs.

o  Develop measurable annual goals for stations.

o  	Revise the processes and practices for estimating and allocating
station PPE funds to reliably identify annual funding needs and use this
information in making future funding decisions.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security
and the Coast Guard for their review and comment. The Department of
Homeland Security and the Coast Guard generally concurred with our
findings and recommendations and did not provide formal comments for
inclusion in the final report. The Coast Guard, however, provided
technical clarifications as well as suggested contextual adjustments,
which we incorporated to ensure the accuracy of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and subcommittees. We will also make copies available to others
on request.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (415) 904-2200 or Steven N. Calvo at (206) 287-4839. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. This report will
also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Margaret T. Wrightson, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To examine the extent to which multimission station readiness needs
changed as a result of post-September 11 changes in mission priorities, we
reviewed relevant Coast Guard documents, including Operation Neptune
Shield, the agency's interim guidelines for implementing homeland security
operations; the Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security; and mission
planning guidance used to establish fiscal year 2004 mission priorities.
We also reviewed our previous work on the Coast Guard's efforts to balance
its homeland security and nonhomeland security missions.69 In addition, we
interviewed headquarters officials regarding trends in station operations
and the agency's plans for addressing the homeland security mission. To
better understand how station performance was affected by changes in
mission priorities, we reviewed data from the Coast Guard's Scorecard
System, its unofficial process for monitoring security operations at
strategic ports. We interviewed officials responsible for analyzing and
compiling these data at the field and headquarters levels and determined
that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report,
given the parameters of the system. We also reviewed boat hour data from
the Coast Guard's Abstract of Operations database to determine trends in
the number of hours station boats were operated, by program, both before
and after September 11. Boat hour data, reported by station crews,
represent the number of hours that boats were operated by station
personnel. To develop a more representative estimate of pre-September 11
boat hours and to normalize for fluctuations in hours that might occur in
a single year, we averaged the number of boat hours expended during fiscal
years 1999 and 2000 to create a pre-September 11 baseline.70 The Coast
Guard agreed with our use of this 2-year average as an appropriate
baseline of pre-September 11 boat hours. To determine the reliability of
the data, we used assessments from our previous report,71 which consisted
of (1) a review of existing documentation regarding the data and the
systems that produced them and (2) interviews with knowledgeable agency
officials. On the basis of these assessments, we determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

69See GAO, Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results
Achieved Needs to Be Clearer, GAO-04-432 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2004)
and GAO, Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department
of Homeland Security, GAO-03-594T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2003).

70We did not include fiscal year 2001 data because these data were not
available on a monthly basis.

71See GAO-04-432.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We visited 8 multimission stations on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, as
well as the four groups and activities responsible for overseeing their
operations, to better understand how stations' readiness needs changed
following September 11.72 These stations were selected on the basis of
geographic location, proximity to a strategic port, and the number of boat
hours expended in fiscal year 2003 on homeland security, search and
rescue, and law enforcement operations. To further explore how increased
homeland security operations had affected stations, we conducted telephone
interviews with field officials responsible for overseeing operations at 8
additional stations located at strategic ports. We selected these
additional 8 stations based on the number of station resource hours
expended on port security operations. To assess the levels of support
provided to stations by state and local organizations, we contacted 13
organizations identified as key partners for 8 of the stations we
reviewed.

To address multimission station readiness concerns identified prior to
September 11, we reviewed the Department of Transportation's Office of
Inspector General (OIG) reports on station readiness,73 the Coast Guard's
internal review of station operations,74 and various congressional
reports. We also spoke with Coast Guard headquarters officials from the
Offices of Boat Forces; Budget and Programs; and Workforce Performance,
Training, and Development. To identify actions the Coast Guard has taken
or is planning to take regarding station readiness concerns, we reviewed
available Coast Guard data regarding station staffing, training, boats,
and personal protection equipment (PPE). In the areas of staffing and PPE,
we used data from our May 2004 report-such as the number of staff and
positions added to stations in fiscal year 2003 and the estimated amount
of funds expended on station PPE in fiscal year 2003-which we had
determined were sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. To assess
the reliability of training and boat data, we (1) reviewed existing
documentation regarding the data and how they were developed and (2)
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Furthermore,

72For security purposes, we are not identifying the ports we visited.

73Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation, Audit of the
Small Boat Station Search and Rescue Program, MH-2001-094 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 14, 2001) and Audit of the Use of Fiscal Year 2002 Funds to
Improve the Operational Readiness of Small Boat Stations and Command
Centers, MH-2003-028 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003).

74U.S. Coast Guard, Project Kimball Report, October 11, 2001.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

we interviewed officials responsible for overseeing operations at the 16
stations we reviewed, as well as at relevant oversight units. To review
the Coast Guard's training programs and identify progress made in
expanding formal training opportunities for station personnel, we visited
the following Coast Guard training centers: the Motor Life Boat School;
the Boatswain's Mate School, the Boat Forces Center, the Boat Engineering
School; and the Maritime Law Enforcement Center. In addition, we
interviewed officials from the Coast Guard's internal inspection teams to
discuss biennial inspections of station operations and reviewed station
inspection results for fiscal years 2002 and 2003.

To obtain a better understanding of personnel workloads and how those
workloads may be changing, we also reviewed fiscal years 2002 and 2003
survey results from the Coast Guard's annual survey of station personnel
activities. With some exceptions, the Coast Guard has conducted an annual
survey of station workweek hours since 1991. The Coast Guard uses the
survey results to gauge changes in the average number of hours personnel
work each week, and thus have not validated the survey. Personnel are
asked to report the number of hours spent among 49 predefined activities
during an average workweek in August. In 2003, personnel at 77 of the 188
stations were surveyed, with personnel from 64 stations responding, for a
total response rate of 54 percent of all personnel surveyed. (Response
rate data were not readily available for other survey years.) One possible
reason for this low response rate may be that nonrespondents did not have
time to complete the survey, which could mean that workweek hours were
under-reported. However, it is also possible that personnel who were
working longer hours per week were more inclined to report that condition,
leading to an over-reporting of workweek hours. To assess the reliability
of the data, we interviewed the headquarters officials who oversee the
survey as well as available documentation. Recognizing the limitations of
the data-such as the low response rate-we determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. That is, as an
indicator of average station workweek hours, and general trends in those
hours over time, the survey results are sufficiently reliable.

To assess the extent to which Coast Guard's plans address station
readiness needs, we reviewed the Coast Guard's Boat Forces Strategic Plan,
the agency's strategy for maintaining and improving essential operations
capabilities for all boat units, including multimission stations.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We also reviewed the Department of Transportation OIG's assessment of the
draft plan.75 To identify practices for effectively measuring program
performance, we reviewed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
of 1993,76 our prior work on results-oriented management,77 and Office of
Management and Budget circulars.78

We conducted our work between September 2003 and December 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

75OIG, MH-2003-028.

76GPRA of 1993 (P.L. 103-62).

77See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996)
and Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate
Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16 (Washington, D.C.: May 1997, Version
1).

78Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, Part 6, Sections 200
(Overview of Strategic Plans, Performance Budgets, and Performance and
Accountability Reports) and 210 (Preparing a Strategic Plan: The Main
Elements).

Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

This appendix presents additional information regarding the four
categories of multimission station operations we reviewed-staffing,
training, boats, and PPE. The appendix also contains additional
information regarding the initiatives the Coast Guard has either started
or plans to develop to address concerns in each of these categories.

  Staffing

Survey of Station Workweek Hours

The Coast Guard has initiated multiple efforts to address staffing
concerns at multimission stations. This section provides additional
information regarding Coast Guard (1) station survey results regarding
workweek hours and (2) initiatives to address staffing concerns.

Approximately 44 percent of the individuals who responded to the Coast
Guard's 2003 station staffing survey indicated that they worked an average
workweek that was in excess of the 68-hour standard (see table 9).79
Approximately 6 percent of those questioned indicated they worked a
standard 68-hour work week.

Table 9: Workweek Results of August 2003 Station Survey

                Average workweek hours       Number of responses      Percent 
                                    84                       393 
                                    77                       202 
                                    68                        87 
                                Othera                       408 
                       bNot applicable                       118 
                        Did not answer                       158 
                                 Total                     1,366 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

Note: Percentages do not total to 100 because of rounding.

aIndicates individual worked some combination of hours other than the
three listed (i.e., 68, 77, or 84).

79Since 1991, with the exception of years 1999-2001, the Coast Guard has
conducted an annual survey of station workweek hours. The Coast Guard has
used the results of the survey to try to gauge changes in the average
number of hours personnel work each week. In 2003, personnel at 77 of the
188 stations were surveyed, with personnel from 64 stations responding (a
total response rate of 54 percent of all personnel surveyed). One possible
reason for this low response rate may be that nonrespondents did not have
time to complete the survey, which could mean that workweek hours were
under-reported. However, it is also possible that personnel who were
working longer hours per week were more inclined to report that condition,
leading to an over-reporting of workweek hours.

     Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

bNumber of responses for which the question was not relevant, usually
because the individual's schedule did not match the options provided.

Initiatives to Address Staffing Table 10 presents additional information
on initiatives the Coast Guard Concerns has under way or plans to develop
with regard to station staffing needs.

Table 10: Additional Examples of Implemented or Planned Initiatives to
Address Station Staffing Needs

Area of concern Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

A shortage of personnel Staffing levels increased

o  	To address a perceived shortage of personnel, in fiscal years 2002 and
2003, the Coast Guard added 1,109 personnel to stations, an increase of 25
percent. In fiscal year 2004, another 451 personnel were added to stations
and command centers and 80 personnel to groups in support of station
search and rescue activities. These increases addressed staffing
inequities between stations, especially those with high operational tempos
and high workweek hours. The Coast Guard reported in fiscal year 2003 that
increased staffing levels had reduced the average workweek for station
personnel by 3.18 percent from 1998 to 2002.

Number of positions increased

o  	The number of personnel assigned to stations exceeds the number of
full-time positions authorized (in fiscal year 2003, the number of
assigned personnel exceeded full-time positions by 885). To address this
imbalance and better match the number of assigned positions with required
operational tasking levels, the Coast Guard added 482 full-time positions
to stations in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and an additional 317 positions
in fiscal year 2004.

Declining levels of experienced personnel Direct retention initiatives
initiated

o  	In fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard expended $5.9 million on 312
selective reenlistment bonuses to station boatswain's mates and machinists
($4.2 million for boatswain's mates and $1.7 million to machinery
technicians).

o  	Between fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the surfman pay premium was
increased by 33 percent.a

o  	Beginning in fiscal year 2002, enlisted personnel have been entitled
to a basic allowance for food.

o  	The average portion of housing costs paid by personnel has decreased
from 18.3 percent in fiscal year 2000 to 3.5 percent in 2004; in 2005,
this expense will be reduced to zero.

Indirect retention initiatives

o  	Individual stations have also invested in projects that indirectly
contribute to retention through improved staff morale. At our request, the
Coast Guard asked 29 (15 percent) of the 188 multimission stations to
provide data on estimated expenditures for such projects. The 24 stations
that responded reported expenditures of $350,000 in fiscal year 2003 for
infrastructure and lifestyle improvements such as new furniture, sports

                                       b

                     equipment, and entertainment systems.

     Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

Area of concern Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

Shortened tours of duty (high personnel Assignment practices modified

turnover)  o  	New personnel assignment practices are being implemented to
allow for increased tour lengths for surfman-qualified personnel and to
reduce turnover in all personnel assignments.

o  	Plans to set policy for average assignment length for enlisted
personnel at grades E-4 through E-6 for 48 months or longer, or as
identified for specific units.

Inadequate mix of skills, expertise, and positions across stations

Staffing mix being reconfigured

o  	To ensure consistency across stations, address mission performance
needs, and provide necessary skills, the Coast Guard concluded an
occupation (rating) review in fiscal year 2001 and expects to begin
reconfiguring the station staffing standard (staffing model) in fiscal
year 2005.

Number of specialized and senior positions increased

o  	To ease the administrative burden on stations, in fiscal years
2002-2004, the Coast Guard added 99 support positions (with 19 more
needed).

o  To better meet unit tasking and responsibilities, in fiscal years 2002
and 2003, the

c

Coast Guard added 486 senior petty officer positions at stations.

Positions filled with uncertified or Assignment and incentive systems
being revised
inexperienced personnel  o  Plans to establish officer and enlisted
(boatswain's mate and machinist) career paths.

o  Plans to base station assignments on position requirements and
personnel experience.

o  	Plans to identify work factors that reduce the incentive of personnel;
develop ways to mitigate the impact of these factors on personnel.

o  Develop motivation and incentive systems for personnel.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

aA surfman is a coxswain-boat driver-who is qualified to pilot boats in
heavy weather and high surf conditions.

bAccording to a Coast Guard official, the source of funds for these
improvements can be station, group, or district operating budgets or
donations by Coast Guard support groups.

cSenior personnel are considered to be petty officer 2nd class (E-5) and
above.

  Training

Initiatives to Increase Formal Since 2001, the Coast Guard has taken steps
to increase training capacity Training Opportunities for at national
training centers. Two efforts to expand formal training slots Station
Personnel have been the reinstituting of the boatswain's mate training
center and the

implementation of response boat training courses. Additional information

regarding training efforts are summarized in table 11.

Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

Table 11: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Training Needs Need
                                  Initiatives

Boatswain's mate training Boatswain's mate training center reinstituted

o  	Reinstituted the boatswain's mate training center in fiscal year 2002,
which more than tripled the number of boatswain's mates training slots,
from 120 in 2002 to 450 in fiscal year 2003, plans to train 800
boatswain's mates in fiscal year 2005.

Training capacity at boatswain's mate training center increased

o  	Added four additional classrooms and personnel to the center in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004 at a total cost of $3.5 million.

o  	Condensed the training curriculum from 12 weeks in 2002 to 9 weeks in
2003 to increase the number of students trained.

Training center to augment on-the-job training established

o  Established, at a cost of $960,000, a provisional training center in
fiscal year 2003 to

a

augment station on-the-job training; trained 300 station personnel in
2003.

Training curriculum for station trainees amended

o  	Initiated new training curriculum for boatswain's mate trainees at
stations that better links tasks with qualification requirements and
improves command cadre oversight of training efforts.

Coxswain (boat driver) training On-site response boat training developed

o  	Established training teams to provide on-site training to station
personnel on boat handling techniques.

Response boat driving course established

o  	In fiscal year 2004, at a cost of $500,000, implemented a 2-week
training course on driving and boat operations.b The Coast Guard expects
to train approximately 100 students in fiscal year 2004 and projects it
will train 300 students in fiscal year 2005.

Surfman training Efforts to address shortage of qualified surfmen
initiated

o  	Instituted, at a cost of $667,000, a 2-year training program in fiscal
year 2004 to expedite the surfman training process for 10 surfman
trainees.

New surfman training course established

o  Established a new surfman training course in fiscal year 2004.

Capacity at training center increased

o  Expanded training facilities to add one new classroom at a cost of
$500,000.

Boat engineer training New engineering training course established

o  Established a new 47-foot boat engineer-training course in 2004.

Boarding officer and boarding team Formal law enforcement training
expanded

member training  o  	Initiated plans to increase training slots for
boarding officers and boarding team members by over one-fourth between
fiscal years 2004 and 2005.

Law enforcement training center relocated to increase capacity

o  	Relocated the Maritime Law Enforcement Center-which provides training
to boarding officers and boarding team members-to the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center

c

           at Charleston, South Carolina, at a cost of $2.2 million.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

aThis training center also provides training to boatswain's mates assigned
to cutters.

     Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

           Initiatives to Evaluate Station Personnel Knowledge Levels

bFunds provided a new boat docking facilities and personal protective
equipment for students.

cThe Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, a component of the
Department of Homeland Security, provides basic, advanced, specialized,
and refresher training for law enforcement officers from 75 federal
agencies. The Maritime Law Enforcement Center, which provides boarding
officer and boarding team member training to all Coast Guard personnel,
was relocated to increase capacity and to develop training partnerships
with other federal agencies. Expenses included new boat facilities, a new
training simulator, and the relocation of training boats.

The Coast Guard has also taken steps to improve the way it evaluates job
performance for station personnel. To monitor knowledge levels and provide
insight on areas of training that may need improvement,80 every 2 years
station personnel are tested on requisite areas of job performance.81 In
an effort to improve how the examinations measure station personnel
knowledge levels, the Coast Guard employed professional test writers in
2004 to revise the examinations.82 Over the past few years test scores for
station personnel have shown mixed trends. For example, between fiscal
years 2002 and 2003 assessment results for boat drivers and motor lifeboat
engineers improved somewhat, while results for crew members (boat
personnel other than the boat driver or engineer) and for utility boat
engineers decreased slightly. Coast Guard officials told us that they are
exploring the reasons for these results, but in general, increases in test
results can be attributed to improvements made in on-the-job training.
Conversely, decreases can be attributed to a continued lack of experience

80This exercise is in addition to the initial and recurring testing
requirements that personnel face when they qualify for a rating and a job.
As well as being required to recertify for their rating every 6 months,
station personnel must be certified when they move to a new station.
Station senior personnel are responsible for ensuring that on-the-job
training satisfies training requirements.

81Test scores are not tracked by individual and there are no consequences
for a low score. Rather, results are examined in total, and low scores are
used to examine the appropriateness of the training provided to stations
in specific areas.

82The Coast Guard administers separate examinations to station personnel,
by type of boat, to three different groups: (1) boat drivers, (2)
engineers, and (3) crew members. These examinations are in addition to the
on-the-job training and formal training station personnel receive when
training to qualify for a job. Written examinations assess overall
training provided to station personnel through formal and on-the-job
training. We did not evaluate the adequacy of the training provided to
station personnel, as this was not identified as an area of concern in
either the OIG or internal Coast Guard studies. In its 2001 report, the
Inspector General highlighted that the Coast Guard does not assign a pass
or fail score to examination results. In response, Coast Guard officials
told us that the intent of the examinations is to assess stations' overall
performance and not identify individual performance levels.

     Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

on the part of junior personnel, the number of which have increased in the
past few years, and to high levels of personnel turnover at stations.

Boats 	Multimission station personnel use a variety of boats to support
operations. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate three of the primary boats used by
station personnel.

Figure 3: Coast Guard 47-Foot Motor Lifeboat (left) and 41-Foot Utility
Boat

                           Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

Figure 4: Response Boat Small

Source: GAO.

The Coast Guard has made progress in replacing nonstandard and aging boats
to support station operations. Table 12 presents additional information
regarding the Coast Guard's initiatives to modernize stations' boat fleet.

Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

  Table 12: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Boat Needs Need
                                  Initiatives

a

Aging and nonstandard small boats	New small boats acquired immediately
after September 11 to address increased security responsibilities

o  	Purchased 100 small response boats following the attacks of September
11, to augment security capability at strategic ports and to replace
nonstandard boats in a critical state of deterioration;b 50 went to
stations and 50 to Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs).

Multiyear contract to purchase small boats developed

o  	In May 2003, the Coast Guard signed a contract allowing for the
purchase of up to an additional 700 small response boats through fiscal
year 2009, at a cost of $145 million. These boats are intended to replace
the remainder of the aging nonstandard boats and to supplement stations'
multimission response capability for search and rescue and homeland
security operations. Boat acquisition is also a component of the Coast
Guard's initiative to enhance security operations in support of its
maritime strategy for homeland security.

o  	As of January 2005, the Coast Guard had purchased 205 boats, with
plans to purchase an additional 30 boats by March 2005. Of these, 31 went
to MSSTs, 10 to training centers, and 164 to stations.

Response boat training implemented

o  	Implemented on-site training at stations and a 2-week course at the
national boat training center to provide training in boat handling
techniques.

Aging medium-sized boats Efforts to replace medium boats initiated

o  	Initiated efforts to replace 41-foot utility boats with a new medium
response boat; requested $12 million in its fiscal year 2005 budget
request to begin production on 6

d

boats.

o  Tested three prototypes and expects to award a contract in 2005 for
fleet replacement.

Inspection of small boats Inspection teams for small boats instituted

o  	In fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard instituted teams to inspect new
standardized small boats, at a cost of $637,000 (includes a staff of eight
inspectors).

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

aThe Coast Guard expects to replace approximately 300 of the 350
nonstandard small boats in use at stations in 2001. Approximately 50
nonstandard boats used by stations for unique geographic or
weather-specific operational requirements-such as 14-foot skiffs and
30-foot special purpose craft boats-will be retained.

bThe Coast Guard purchased these boats in 2002 for stations and MSSTs to
address port security responsibilities at strategic ports; they were not a
part of the May 2003 contract Coast Guard developed to replace nonstandard
boats.

cThese boats are essentially the same as those purchased immediately after
September 11-both are off-the-shelf.

dThe Coast Guard has determined that the 41-foot utility boat-acquired
between 1973 and 1980-is approaching the end of its service life.

Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

PPE 	As we previously reported,83 anecdotal and quantitative data indicate
that as of fiscal year 2003 active and reserve station personnel possessed
sufficient levels of PPE. During fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard spent
$7.5 million to address PPE shortfalls for station personnel, of which
$5.6 million came from specially designated funds. In fiscal year 2003,
the cost of a total basic PPE outfit was $1,296. The cost of a cold
weather PPE outfit, which is used by personnel working at stations where
the outdoor temperature falls below 50 degrees Fahrenheit, was $1,431.
(Fig. 5 shows a station crew member in cold weather PPE.) According to the
Coast Guard, personnel at 135 (72 percent) of the 188 multimission
stations require cold weather PPE in addition to basic PPE.

Figure 5: Station Crew Member Wearing Cold Weather PPE

                           Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

Despite indications that the Coast Guard had met its goal in fiscal year
2003 of providing sufficient amounts of PPE to all active duty and reserve
station personnel, concerns remain as to whether the Coast Guard will
provide sufficient funding for station PPE in the future. The Coast
Guard's processes for estimating station PPE needs and allocating funds
have historically resulted in an under funding of station PPE. See table
13 for concerns regarding the Coast Guard's processes and practices for
allocating funds for station PPE.

83See GAO, Coast Guard: Station Spending Requirements Met, but Better
Processes Needed to Track Designated Funds, GAO-04-704 (Washington, D.C.:
May 28, 2004).

     Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

Table 13: Concerns Regarding Coast Guard Processes and Practices for Identifying
               and Funding Station PPE Needs Concern Explanation

Forecasting models do not recognize PPE  o  Officials told us that
historically the amount of funds allocated each fiscal year for funding
needs for personnel assigned over station PPE was not sufficient to fund
the estimated needs of all personnel.a Because and above the number of
designated the forecasting models are predicated on the number of
positions designated rather positions than the number of personnel
assigned, it does not recognize PPE funding needs for

personnel assigned over and above the designated number of positions.

o  	In fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard allocated $5.6 million to address
PPE shortfalls at stations but did not adjust its forecasting models.b
Officials told us that in addition to receiving specific PPE allocations
for designated positions, each year stations receive general operating
funds, which can be used toward PPE for personnel assigned over and above
the designated number of positions.

Historically the Coast Guard has funded approximately half of all PPE
needs associated with designated positions  o  According to officials, the
Coast Guard has historically funded between 50 and 60

c

percent of the identified recurring PPE costs for designated positions. In
fiscal year 2004, approximately 55 percent of estimated PPE needs
associated with designated active and reserve positions were funded,
leaving a shortfall of approximately $6 million in estimated needs.

        Assumptions used in forecasting models have not been validatedd

o  	According to officials, the assumptions used in PPE forecasting models
were based on input from station personnel and have not been validated or
reassessed in light of current operations.

Units are not required to spend allocated  o  According to officials, the
total amount of funds allocated for PPE are distributed

PPE funds on PPE	among stations and their oversight units, but in the
interests of command flexibility units are not required to spend these
funds on PPE.e When stations need PPE, they are to communicate this need
to the oversight units.

o  	According to the former PPE program manager, it is possible that
oversight units may not pass the funds onto stations as intended (i.e.,
the amount allocated for PPE may not be the amount expended). To address
this possibility, in recent years the official had disclosed to stations
the total amount of PPE funding available to them, including funds held by
oversight units.

Coast Guard headquarters does not track  o  Although the Coast Guard
tracks overall PPE expenditures, the category tracked

the expenditure of survival PPE funds 	includes items other than survival
PPE, such as body armor and toxic mask protectors. It is the
responsibility of field commanders to ensure that station PPE requirements
are met.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

aIn its fiscal year 2002 audit (MH-2003-028, p. 5), the OIG reported that
the Coast Guard did not provide PPE funding for 69 percent of the
personnel added to stations during fiscal year 2002.

bIn fiscal year 2003, Coast Guard allocated $5.6 million in designated
appropriation funds for PPE purchases. According to officials, fiscal year
2003 was the first year in which the Coast Guard provided PPE funds for
personnel assigned to stations over and above designated positions.

cIn fiscal year 2003, the forecasting models estimated PPE needs of $3.2
million for personnel in designated positions, but the Coast Guard
initially allocated $1.8 million, or 56 percent, of the identified need to
fund PPE.

dAccording to officials, the forecasting models assume that PPE for active
duty station personnel will need to be replaced every 3 years, PPE for
reserve personnel every 5 years, and PPE for auxiliary personnel every 7
years.

eAs an exception to this practice, in fiscal year 2003, Coast Guard
headquarters advised field units that the additional $5.6 million could be
used only for the purchase of station PPE.

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

  Staff Acknowledgments

(440334)

Margaret T. Wrightson (415) 904-2200
Steven N. Calvo (206) 287-4839

In addition to those named above, Randy B. Williamson, Barbara A. Guffy,
Joel Aldape, Marisela Perez, Stan G. Stenersen, Dorian R. Dunbar,
Ben Atwater, Michele C. Fejfar, Elizabeth H. Curda, and Ann H. Finley
made key contributions to this report.

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