    Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges
    and Management Concerns Remain (31-JAN-05, GAO-05-161).

    For years, the Coast Guard has conducted search and rescue
    operations from its network of stations along the nation's coasts
    and waterways. In 2001, reviews of station operations found that
    station readiness--the ability to execute mission requirements in
    keeping with standards--was in decline. The Coast Guard began
    addressing these issues, only to see its efforts complicated by
    expanded post-September 11, 2001, homeland security
    responsibilities at many stations. GAO reviewed the impact of
    changing missions on station needs, the progress made in
    addressing station readiness needs, and the extent to which plans
    are in place for addressing any remaining needs.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-161
        ACCNO:   A16476
      TITLE:     Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource
    Challenges and Management Concerns Remain
         DATE:   01/31/2005
      SUBJECT:   Agency missions
    	     Coast Guard personnel
    	     Harbors
    	     Marine safety
    	     National preparedness
    	     Personnel management
    	     Physical security
    	     Standards
    	     Homeland security
    	     Personal protection equipment
    	     Workloads

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    GAO-05-161

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

              Report to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    January 2005

    COAST GUARD

      Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and Management Concerns
                                         Remain

    GAO-05-161

    [IMG]

    January 2005

    COAST GUARD

    Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and Management Concerns
    Remain

                                     What GAO Found

    The Coast Guard does not yet know the extent to which station readiness
    needs have been affected by post-September 11 changes in mission
    priorities, although increases in homeland security operations have
    clearly affected activities and presumably affected readiness needs as
    well. Following the attacks, stations in and near ports received the bulk
    of port security duties, creating substantial increases in workloads. The
    Coast Guard is still in the process of defining long-term activity levels
    for homeland security and has yet to convert the homeland security mission
    into specific station readiness requirements. Until it does so, the impact
    of these new duties on readiness needs cannot be determined. The Coast
    Guard says it will revise readiness requirements after security activity
    levels have been finalized.

    Increased staffing, more training, new boats, more personal protection
    equipment (such as life vests), and other changes have helped mitigate
    many long-standing station readiness concerns. However, stations have been
    unable to meet current Coast Guard standards and goals in the areas of
    staffing and boats, an indication that stations are still significantly
    short of desired readiness levels in these areas. Also, because Coast
    Guard funding practices for personal protection equipment have not
    changed, stations may have insufficient funding for such equipment in the
    future.

    The Coast Guard does not have an adequate plan in place for addressing
    remaining readiness needs. The Coast Guard's strategic plan for these
    stations has not been updated to reflect increased security
    responsibilities, and the agency lacks specific planned actions and
    milestones. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable annual
    goals that would allow the agency and others to track stations' progress.

                     A Coast Guard Boat and a Multimission Station

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    Added Security Responsibilities Had Impact on Readiness Needs

    but Extent of Impact Unknown Progress Made in Addressing Readiness
    Concerns but Stations Are Still Unable to Meet Standards and Goals
    Strategic Plan for Improving Station Readiness Lacks Key

    Components for Measuring Progress Conclusions Recommendations Agency
    Comments and Our Evaluation

                                           1

                                          4 6

    11

    18

    37 41 42 43

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    Appendix II	Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

      Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 58

    GAO Contacts 58 Staff Acknowledgments 58

      Tables

    Table 1: Selected Types of Positions and Occupations at Stations 7 Table
    2: Selected Types of Boats Operated by Stations 8 Table 3: Selected
    Findings from OIG, Coast Guard, and Senate

    Reports on Multimission Station Readiness Concerns 10 Table 4: Examples of
    Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station

    Staffing Needs 19 Table 5: Comparison of the 68- and 84-Hour Workweek
    Schedules 23 Table 6: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station

    Training Needs 30 Table 7: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address
    Station Boat Needs 32 Table 8: Selected Examples of Coast Guard Strategic
    Goals, Objectives, and Initiatives for Multimission Stations 38

    Table 9: Workweek Results of August 2003 Station Survey 48 Table 10:
    Additional Examples of Implemented or Planned

    Initiatives to Address Station Staffing Needs 49 Table 11: Examples of
    Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station

    Training Needs 51 Table 12: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address
    Station Boat

    Needs 55 Table 13: Concerns Regarding Coast Guard Processes and

    Practices for Identifying and Funding Station PPE Needs 57

      Figures

    Figure 1: Total Boat Hours for All Station Programs, Pre-September 11
    Baseline through 2004 12 Figure 2: Boat Hours for Selected Programs,
    Pre-September 11 Baseline through 2004 13 Figure 3: Coast Guard 47-Foot
    Motor Lifeboat (left) and 41-Foot

    Utility Boat 53 Figure 4: Response Boat Small 54 Figure 5: Station Crew
    Member Wearing Cold Weather PPE 56

    Abbreviations

    GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
    MARSEC Maritime Security Condition
    MSO Marine Safety Offices
    MSST Maritime Safety and Security Teams
    OIG Office of Inspector General
    PPE personal protection equipment
    PWCS Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

    January 31, 2005

    The Honorable Thad Cochran
    Chairman
    The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Appropriations
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Jerry Lewis
    Chairman
    The Honorable David R. Obey
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Appropriations
    House of Representatives

    The 188 Coast Guard multimission stations located along the nation's
    coastlines and interior waterways have been a mainstay of one of the
    Coast Guard's oldest missions-finding and rescuing mariners in danger.1
    In 2001, after a series of search and rescue mishaps, the Coast Guard and
    others conducted reviews of station operations. These reviews showed
    that station readiness had been declining for more than 20 years and was
    continuing to decline.2 In response to these findings, the Coast Guard
    began a long-term effort to address station needs. The response focused in
    large part on reconfiguring operations and bolstering resources in four
    areas-staffing, training, boats, and the personal protection equipment
    used by personnel during operations, such as life vests and survival
    suits.

    1Multimission stations perform all Coast Guard missions.

    2Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation, Audit of the
    Small Boat Station Search and Rescue Program, MH-2001-094 (Washington,
    D.C.: Sept. 14, 2001) and June 13, 2001, testimony by Kenneth M. Mead,
    Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation, CC-2001-184. In
    2001, the Coast Guard issued its own internal report-the Project Kimball
    Report-on the operational readiness of all its boat units, including
    stations. The findings of the report were largely consistent with the
    issues identified by the Inspector General.

    This effort, which began prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
    2001, was complicated by the new and increased homeland security
    responsibilities stations assumed in the wake of the attacks. With the
    intensification of maritime security operations, the Coast Guard faces
    additional challenges in reorganizing resources to meet potential maritime
    threats and at the same time reach new and sustainable levels of
    readiness.

    The term "readiness," as used by the Coast Guard, involves more than the
    ability to carry out required operations, such as a rescue or a security
    patrol; it involves the ability to do so at a sustainable level while
    adhering to agency standards. For example, a station may have enough
    personnel to carry out rescues and other required missions, but not enough
    to meet agency standards that specify the number of hours personnel should
    work. In this scenario, the station is not considered fully ready because
    it is not complying with agency standards and, therefore, may have
    difficulty maintaining its performance over an extended period. However,
    as the example illustrates, a lack of full readiness should not be
    interpreted as an inability to meet basic mission responsibilities.
    Moreover, readiness requirements can change depending on the needs of the
    mission. While some assets at a station may not fully meet readiness
    requirements for certain missions, they can be used to perform other
    missions. For example, a rescue boat with a mechanical problem that
    precluded operating it at top speed would not meet full readiness
    requirements for rescues or high-speed chases, but it could meet
    requirements for missions that did not typically require high speeds, such
    as patrols or vessel escorts. Thus, a lack of full readiness does not
    affect all missions equally.

    This report, the second of two reviews directed by Congress on
    multimission station operations,3 focuses on the Coast Guard's progress in
    addressing long-standing station readiness needs4 while balancing changing
    mission demands. Specifically, this report addresses the extent to which
    the Coast Guard:

    3Our first report addressed whether the Coast Guard's outlays for stations
    in fiscal year 2003 exceeded those in fiscal year 2002 by the designated
    amount of $15.7 million, as directed in P.L. 108-7, Division 1, Title 1
    (Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003). See GAO, Coast Guard:
    Station Spending Requirements Met, but Better Processes Needed to Track
    Designated Funds, GAO-04-704 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).

    4"Readiness needs" refers to the resources, people, training, and
    equipment that stations require to execute mission requirements in
    accordance with standards.

    o  	has experienced a change in multimission station readiness needs as a
    result of post-September 11 changes in mission priorities;

    o  	has been able to address readiness concerns through the addition of
    resources in the areas of personnel, training, boats, and personal
    protection equipment; and

    o  has plans in place for addressing any readiness needs that may still
    exist.

    To address these objectives, we analyzed Coast Guard data, reviewed
    relevant documents, and interviewed headquarters and field officials. The
    key data we reviewed included (1) station resource (boat) hour data, used
    to track the number of hours spent on individual missions; (2) port
    activities data, used to monitor security operations at key ports; (3)
    various operations data (in the areas of staffing, training, boats, and
    personal protection equipment), used to monitor station needs; and (4)
    fiscal year 2003 results from the Coast Guard's annual station workload
    survey, used to assess changes in personnel workloads. On the basis of
    interviews with knowledgeable agency officials, data assessments from
    previous reports, and reviews of existing documentation, we determined
    that these data were sufficiently reliable for this report. To better
    understand stations' readiness needs and how those needs have changed over
    time, we also visited 8 multimission stations on the Pacific and Atlantic
    coasts and interviewed relevant field officials. The stations were
    selected based on geographic location, proximity to a strategic port,5 and
    the number of station resource hours expended on various missions during
    fiscal year 2003. To further explore how changes in mission priorities
    after September 11 affected stations, we interviewed by telephone
    officials responsible for operations at 8 additional stations, located at
    various strategic ports, which we selected based on the number of station
    resource hours expended on port security operations. For security
    purposes, the 16 stations we visited or reviewed through telephone
    interviews are not identified in this report. On the basis of input from
    station personnel, we also interviewed officials from 13 local and state
    organizations that have partnerships with 8 of the stations we reviewed.
    Appendix I explains in more detail the scope of our work and the
    methodology we used. We conducted our work for this second report

    5"Strategic ports" are ports having critical assets and infrastructure of
    economic, environmental or national security significance.

      Results in Brief

    from September 2003 through December 2004 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards.

    The Coast Guard does not yet know the extent to which station readiness
    needs-primarily resource levels-have been affected by post-September 11
    changes in mission priorities. However, increases in homeland security
    operations after the September 11 terrorist attacks clearly affected
    stations' mission activities and presumably the readiness needs related to
    those activities. Following the attacks, the Coast Guard elevated the
    homeland security mission to a level commensurate with the search and
    rescue mission, and stations were assigned the brunt of the Coast Guard's
    port security responsibilities. These new responsibilities led to
    substantial increases in the stations' security workloads. In addition,
    these workload levels may change in the future once the Coast Guard has
    established longterm security activity standards for stations and other
    units. Currently, the Coast Guard is operating under interim homeland
    security guidelines, which establish recommended security activities for
    field units according to each maritime security threat level. These
    guidelines are not, according to Coast Guard officials, considered
    requirements because the recommended operations established by the
    guidelines exceed current resource levels. Because the Coast Guard is
    still in the process of defining long-term, risk-based standards for
    security activities, it has yet to translate the impact of
    security-related mission responsibilities into specific station readiness
    requirements, such as staffing standards. Until it does so, the impact of
    these new homeland security responsibilities on readiness needs cannot be
    determined. Further, without specific requirements, neither the Coast
    Guard nor others can measure the progress made in meeting station
    readiness needs. Officials said they plan to start revising station
    readiness requirements once long-term homeland security requirements have
    been finalized, which the Coast Guard expects to occur in February 2005.
    Because the interim security guidelines exceed available resources,
    officials told us stations and other units are expected to perform
    security operations as allowed for by their existing resources. Given
    these factors, Coast Guard data indicate that stations and other units are
    meeting most of the port security activities expected of them.

    Operational improvements in staffing, training, boats, and personal
    protection equipment, as well as increases in resource levels at stations,
    have helped mitigate a number of long-standing readiness concerns.
    However, even without the new readiness requirements as a gauge to measure
    progress, it is clear that stations have been unable to meet current Coast
    Guard standards and goals related to staffing, boats, and equipment, which
    indicates that stations are still significantly short of

    desired readiness levels in some areas. Since 2001, the Coast Guard has
    increased station staffing by 25 percent and realigned the stations'
    staffing structure, expanded training programs, embarked on an extensive
    program to replace and standardize aging boats, and provided all station
    personnel with personal protection equipment. However, there are
    indications that station personnel continue to work significantly longer
    hours than are allowed for under the Coast Guard's work standards, which
    are in place to ensure that personnel do not become overly fatigued.
    Regarding boats, although the Coast Guard has replaced old boats and
    increased the number of boats at many stations, Coast Guard inspections
    showed that about five boats in every six inspected at selected stations
    in 2003 did not initially meet readiness requirements. Finally, while
    station personnel appear to have been outfitted with sufficient personal
    protection equipment as of fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard's processes
    and practices for determining funding needs-such as not basing funding
    estimates on the number of personnel assigned to stations and historically
    funding only about half of identified needs-raise concerns that the Coast
    Guard may not allot sufficient funds in the future for station equipment.

    The Coast Guard does not have an adequate plan in place for achieving and
    assessing station readiness in its new post-September 11 operating
    environment. The Boat Forces Strategic Plan-the Coast Guard's strategy for
    maintaining and improving essential multimission station capabilities over
    the next 10 years-is the agency's primary tool for measuring progress in
    meeting station readiness requirements. Although the plan outlines a
    significant array of long-term goals, objectives, and initiatives for
    addressing station readiness needs, it has not been updated to reflect
    increased homeland security responsibilities imposed on stations in the
    wake of September 11. The plan also lacks key elements, such as specific
    planned actions and milestones that would help assure Congress and others
    that the Coast Guard will continue to make progress in restoring station
    readiness. For example, the plan does not identify what actions will be
    needed to ensure that station personnel are placed in positions that are
    appropriate with their experience, or to increase the actual length of
    time personnel are assigned to stations. In addition, the plan lacks a
    clear link between objectives and required funding levels. Furthermore,
    the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable annual goals that would
    allow the agency to track its progress in achieving long-term goals and
    objectives, allow others to effectively monitor and measure progress, and
    provide accountability. Coast Guard officials told us that changing
    priorities can make it difficult to adhere to long-term strategic plans
    and to maintain program consistency; they also noted that the Coast Guard
    intends to review the Boat Forces Strategic Plan on an annual basis.

    To assist the Coast Guard in addressing past and future readiness
    concerns, we are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of
    Homeland Security, in consideration of any revised homeland security
    requirements, direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to ensure that the
    Boat Forces Strategic Plan is revised to (1) reflect the impact of
    homeland security requirements on station needs and (2) identify specific
    actions, milestones, and funding requirements for meeting those needs and
    responsibilities. We are also recommending that the Coast Guard develop
    measurable annual goals for stations and revise funding practices for
    personal protection equipment to reliably identify annual station funding
    needs and to use this information when making future funding decisions.

                                       Background

        What Are Multimission Stations?

    As shore-based units located along the nation's coasts and interior
    waterways, the Coast Guard's 188 multimission stations conduct a wide
    range of operations, from rescuing mariners in distress to patrolling
    ports against acts of terrorism. The stations are involved in all Coast
    Guard programs,6 including search and rescue, port security, recreational
    and commercial fishing vessel safety, marine environmental response, and
    law enforcement (drug and migrant interdiction). Their involvement varies
    geographically from one Coast Guard district to the next, depending on
    differing conditions among regions.7 Some program operations also vary
    depending on the season-for example, search and rescue operations are
    greater in the summer when recreational boating is more active and lower
    in the winter. Because stations are traditionally associated with search
    and rescue operations, they can be compared to fire stations, in the sense
    that crew members remain at the station for extended periods, on duty,
    ready to respond to an emergency.8

    Stations range in size from as few as 4 personnel at seasonal stations to
    as many as 60 personnel at larger stations. Individual stations are
    usually

    6The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall into 11 programs within
    two broad missions-homeland security and nonhomeland security.

    7For example, in South Florida migrant interdiction is a major program at
    some stations, but it is virtually nonexistent in the Great Lakes region.

    8Coast Guard standards require that boat crews be able to launch a boat
    within 30 minutes of a distress call.

    commanded by a command cadre consisting of an officer-in-charge-such as a
    senior chief petty officer-an executive petty officer, and an engineering
    petty officer. The command cadre is responsible for overseeing personnel,
    equipment, and mission-related issues. In support of operations, the
    stations also provide unit-level (on-the-job) training as well as
    equipment and minor boat maintenance. As shown in table 1, stations employ
    personnel in numerous occupations, but the principal staff usually
    consists of boatswain's mates-those who operate the boats and carry out
    many station duties. In addition to performing essential station
    responsibilities, boatswains' mates can undergo additional training for
    more advanced occupations, such as a coxswain (a boat driver) or a surfman
    (a coxswain who is qualified to operate boats in heavy weather and high
    surf conditions).

    Table 1:Selected Types of Positions and Occupations at Stations

    Rate
    (occupation)/position Rank and gradea Description

    Seaman apprentice/seaman

    Seaman apprentice/seaman (E-2 - E-3) 	Personnel who are in training for
    deck, weapons, administrative, and certain electronics positions.

    Fireman apprentice/fireman Fireman apprentice/fireman (E-2 -
    E-3)	Personnel who are in training for engineering and certain hull
    positions.

    Machinery technician Starts at petty officer 3rd class (E-4) 	Personnel
    who operate, maintain, and repair engines, gas turbines, and transmissions
    equipment, as well as auxiliary, refrigeration, air conditioning, and
    electrical equipment.

    Boatswain's mate Starts at petty officer   Personnel who are proficient in
                        3rd class (E-4)                  deck and boat seamanship
                                                and have a working knowledge of
                                                all Coast Guard
                                                            programs.
           Coxswain     Starts at petty officer A boatswain's mate who is in
                        3rd class (E-4)         charge of a boat and is
                                                     qualified to drive it.

     Surfman Starts at petty officer 2nd class (E-5) A coxswain-boat driver-who is
                              qualified to drive boats in

    b

    heavy weather and high surf conditions.

    Communications Starts at seaman (E-3)  Personnel who stand watch-that is,
                                                           who staff
        watchstander                                   communications systems and
                                                      towers-for specific periods
                                                           of time.
                      Starts at petty officer Personnel who budget, order,
        Storekeeper   3rd class (E-4)         receive, inventory, and
                                               account for station purchases and
                                                         requisitions.

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    aThe grade E-1, which is not listed, applies to seaman recruits-personnel
    who are undergoing recruit training to become oriented to the Coast Guard
    and a military environment.

    bSurfmen are usually stationed at designated surf stations, which are
    defined as stations that experience surf greater than 8 feet for 37 or
    more days during a calendar year.

    Like the number of personnel, the number of boats at stations varies.
    Small, seasonal stations may have only one boat, while larger stations can
    have as many as nine. Table 2 describes the type of boats stations
    typically operate. (see app. II for pictures of selected boats). All
    station personnel are required to wear personal protection equipment
    (PPE), while operating or riding in a boat. Coast Guard personnel use PPE
    to protect against various dangers, such as inclement weather and cold
    water exposure. PPE includes items such as life vests, helmets, goggles,
    gloves, cold weather protection suits, thermal underwear, and electronic
    location devices. (See app. II for more information on the nature and use
    of PPE.)

                 Table 2: Selected Types of Boats Operated by Stations

        Type of boat       Specifications                    Purpose
                      25-foot, maximum speed of Used to conduct high-speed
    Response boat  43 knots,                 maneuvering tactics, including
          (small)     maximum seas of 6 feet,     homeland security operations.
                      brought into
                          service in 2003a
        Utility boat  41-foot, maximum speed of   Designed to operate in moderate
           (big)      26 knots,                        weather and sea conditions
                      maximum seas of 8 feet,     (commonly referred to as the
                      brought into                    station "workhorse").
                          service in 1973b

    Motor lifeboat 	47-foot, maximum speed 25 knots, maximum seas of 30 feet
    and surf of 20 feet, started production in 1997 Designed as a
    fast-response rescue boat for high seas, surf, and heavy weather
    conditions, it is used in extreme at-sea weather conditions.

     Nonstandard boats Varies from 9-foot to 30-foot, with a Used for a variety of
                     missions, including search and rescue and law

    c

                           range of capabilities enforcement.

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    aThe Coast Guard plans to continue purchasing these boats through 2009, to
    replace nonstandard boats.

    bThe Coast Guard is planning to replace these boats with more versatile
    and faster response boat mediums and plans to award a contract for
    production in 2005.

    cNonstandard boats include a variety of small boats purchased at the field
    level; these boats were purchased based on the preference and discretion
    of the local commander rather than through a centralized, coordinated
    effort.

        What Are the Roles of Multimission Stations in Port and Nonport Areas?

    Following the events of September 11, the Coast Guard created a new
    program area for homeland security operations-the Ports, Waterways, and
    Coastal Security (PWCS) program.9 The type and frequency of PWCS
    activities performed by stations varies depending on whether a station is
    located in a port area or in a nonport area. Stations located in or near a
    port tend to perform more PWCS tasks, such as patrolling, escorting
    vessels, and other duties.10 The responsibilities can vary by port,
    however, depending on several factors, including the availability of other
    Coast Guard units to share in operations, the strategic importance of the
    port, and the support of non-Coast Guard entities-such as state and local
    agencies-in both homeland and nonhomeland security activities. Although
    stations located in nonport areas also conduct PWCS operations, such as
    patrolling waterways, they tend to have fewer PWCS responsibilities. In
    general, stations located in nonport areas do not have the responsibility
    of maintaining the security of critical infrastructure, high-profile
    vessels, or shore operations as do stations located in port areas. As
    tactical units,11 stations do not determine the nature or frequency of
    their tasks; rather, they carry out the tasks assigned to them by
    operational units,12 which provide oversight as well as operational and
    administrative support to the stations.

        Why Is Readiness a Concern?

    In 2001, studies by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and a Coast
    Guard internal review team found that readiness conditions at multimission
    stations had been deteriorating for over 20 years.13 The studies, which
    had largely consistent findings, identified readiness concerns in the
    areas of staffing, training, and boats and presented recommendations for
    addressing these concerns. Table 3 presents selected findings from these
    studies, as well as congressional concerns regarding station readiness. In
    December 2002, in response to a

    9The PWCS program includes activities such as conducting harbor patrols,
    vulnerability assessments, and other activities to prevent terrorist
    attacks and minimize the damage from attacks that occur.

    10For security purposes, the specific duties of these stations are not
    identified.

    11In this sense, the term "tactical" refers to procedures or maneuvers
    carried out in pursuit of a goal.

    12Operational units, which can include a group, activity, or a sector,
    serve as a parent unit for overseeing station operations and for providing
    guidance on policy and administrative matters.

    13OIG, MH-2001-094 and U.S. Coast Guard, Project Kimball Report.

    recommendation from the OIG and at the direction of the Senate
    Appropriations Committee,14 the Coast Guard developed a draft strategic
    plan to maintain and improve essential capability of all its boat force
    units, including stations.15 The plan recognized that stations did not
    have sufficient resources to be fully capable of meeting all their
    workload requirements and that it would take both increases in resources
    as well as "more judicious tasking by operational commanders" to address
    the imbalance.16 In its 2003 report on station operations, the OIG
    criticized the plan for being too general in nature, specifically
    regarding how and when the Cost Guard will increase staffing, training,
    equipment, and experience levels at stations.

    Table 3: Selected Findings from OIG, Coast Guard, and Senate Reports on
    Multimission Station Readiness Concerns

    Category Concern Explanation/impact

    Staffing A shortage of personnel 	Increases workweek hours for crew and
    compels command cadre to fill in during operations

    Declining levels of experienced personnel 	Reduces the number of qualified
    staff available to supervise, provide on-the-job training, and conduct
    necessary operations

    Shortened tours of duty (high personnel Exacerbates the impact of
    personnel shortages and lack of turnover) senior personnel for on-the-job
    training and supervision Inadequate mix of positions, skills, and
    expertise across stations

    Affects mission performance Positions filled with uncertified or Increases
         workweek hours and affects mission performance inexperienced personnel
    Insufficient number of qualified surfmen Increases workweek for crew and command
                                         cadre

    Training Lack of formal entry-level training for boatswain's mates
    Increases the training burden for senior station personnel

    Results in nonstandard training techniques and knowledge gaps among
    personnel

    Lack of standardized training in boat operations	Increases the number of
    boat mishaps and training burden for senior station personnel

    14Senate Report 107-38, Senate Committee on Appropriations, accompanying
    the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
    2002 (P.L. 107-87).

    15U.S. Coast Guard, Report on Boat Forces Strategic Plan (Washington,
    D.C.: July 7, 2004). Although a draft of the plan was provided to the OIG
    for comment in 2002, it was not released to Congress until 2004.

    16United States Coast Guard, Boat Forces Strategic Plan, p. 5.

    Category Concern Explanation/impact

    Boats Nonstandard boats 	Contributes to boat mishap rates (in part because
    of lack of adequate training)

    a

    Aging boats Reduces operational and maintenance effectiveness

    Boats failing to meet operational inspection Reduces mission capability
    standards

    Personal protection Shortage of adequate equipment Reduces crew safety
    during search and rescue missions equipment

      Added Security Responsibilities Had Impact on Readiness Needs but Extent of
      Impact Unknown

    Source: OIG, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Senate Committee on
    Appropriations.

    aBoats nearing the end of their service life.

    Added security responsibilities after the September 11 attacks had a
    definite-but as yet unmeasured-impact on stations' readiness needs.
    Stations have seen a substantial increase in their security workload,
    along with a shifting of activity levels in other missions. The effect of
    these changes on readiness needs is still largely undetermined, mainly
    because the Coast Guard has not yet translated the security-related
    mission responsibilities into specific staffing standards and other
    requirements. Until it does so, the impact of increased responsibilities
    on readiness cannot be determined nor can the Coast Guard or others
    measure progress made in meeting station needs. With the support of state
    and local entities, stations and other units appear to be meeting the
    majority of port security responsibilities identified in the Coast Guard's
    interim guidelines.

        Stations Have Increased Operations to Address Homeland Security
        Responsibilities

    After September 11, the Coast Guard's multimission stations experienced a
    substantial rise in overall activity levels. Following the attacks, the
    Coast Guard elevated the priority of the homeland security program to a
    level commensurate with search and rescue, and according to field and
    headquarters officials, stations were assigned the brunt of the Coast
    Guard's port security responsibilities. These responsibilities led to
    considerable increases in the stations' security workloads. One way to see
    this change is in the number of hours that station boats were operated
    before and after September 11. Station boat hours increased by 44 percent
    from a level of about 217,000 hours prior to the terrorist attacks to more

    than 300,000 hours by the end of fiscal year 2004 (see fig. 1). 17 Coast
    Guard officials explained that increases in boat hours were due to
    increased homeland security responsibilities and the 160 additional boats
    and personnel stations received from fiscal years 2002 to 2004.18

    Figure 1: Total Boat Hours for All Station Programs, Pre-September 11
    Baseline through 2004

    Resource hours 350,000

                                 313,462302,529 300,779

    300,000

    250,000

    200,000

    150,000

    100,000

    50,000 0

    Pre-9/11 baseline

                            2001 2002 2003 2004 Fiscal years

                     Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

    Note: Data for "Pre-9/11 baseline" represents a 2-year average of boat
    hours expended in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.

    17We calculated a resource hour baseline from which the change in resource
    hours following the September 11 attacks could be estimated. This baseline
    is an average of the 2 complete fiscal years preceding the attacks, fiscal
    years 1999 and 2000. We did not include 2001 data because these data were
    not available on a monthly basis. We developed this baseline as a more
    representative depiction of boat hours expended by stations prior to the
    events of September 11. For the purposes of this report, we refer to this
    calculation as the pre-September baseline or as pre-September 11 levels.
    Coast Guard officials agreed with this approach to this analysis.

    18According to officials, stations received 50 new boats in fiscal year
    2002, 34 in fiscal year 2003, and 76 in fiscal year 2004. Each of these
    boats was allotted approximately 500 to 600 hours of operating time per
    year. Stations also received additional boats as part of replacement
    needs, but these boats would not account for increases in overall boat
    hours for the time period we reviewed.

    While total boat hours for stations increased following September 11, the
    trend among specific programs varied greatly, with some programs
    experiencing substantial increases and others experiencing declines (see
    fig. 2). Most notably, boat hours for the PWCS program increased by almost
    1,900 percent between pre-September 11 levels and fiscal year 2004. Coast
    Guard officials attributed the increases in PWCS hours to (1) stations'
    expanded homeland security responsibilities, (2) several elevations in the
    Maritime Security Condition (MARSEC) after 2001,19 and (3) acquisition of
    new boats and additional personnel stations received in fiscal years 2002
    through 2004. Conversely, during the same period, hours dedicated to
    nonhomeland security programs decreased. For example, boat hours expended
    for search and rescue decreased by 15 percent, while hours for living
    marine resources decreased by 61 percent.

     Figure 2: Boat Hours for Selected Programs, Pre-September 11 Baseline through
                                          2004

    Percent change in selected programs

    Ports, waterways, and coastal security

    Defense readiness

    Foreign fish enforcement and other law enforcement

    Migrant interdiction

    Search and rescue

    Aids to navigation

    Living marine resources

    Ice operations Drug interdiction

    1,885.73

    -61.37

    -67.94

                    0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800

    Programs with decreasing resource hours Programs with increasing resource
    hours

    Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

    Note: Data for "Pre-September 11 Baseline" represents a 2-year average of
    boat hours expended in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.

    19MARSEC, the Coast Guard's security assessment system, corresponds to the
    Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Advisory System, which
    uses a series of colors to inform the nation about the federal
    government's perception of the terror threat level. As MARSEC levels rise,
    so does the level of security activities the Coast Guard is expected to
    conduct.

    Similar trends emerge in the limited data available about how Coast Guard
    personnel spend their time at stations. While the Coast Guard does not
    formally track the number of work hours station personnel spend on each
    program (either when operating a boat or while at the station), it does
    administer a survey each year to personnel at selected stations, asking
    them to estimate how they spent their time over an average week or week
    period in August.20 Survey results indicated that the number of hours
    spent on PWCS activities increased for those responding by about 29
    percent between calendar years 2002 and 2003, while the number of hours
    spent on search and rescue activities decreased by about 12 percent.

    Coast Guard officials told us that although the stations' workload has
    increased since September 11, mission performance has not suffered. This
    does not mean that they believe stations' readiness needs were not
    affected by the increase in operations, only that stations have been able
    to sustain expected performance despite increased workloads. Officials
    responsible for overseeing operations at the stations we contacted
    explained that stations have been able to sustain performance levels by
    achieving greater efficiencies in operations, specifically by (1)
    conducting multiple missions during port security operations and (2)
    coordinating their efforts with state and local organizations. They also
    noted that stations have received additional boats and personnel since
    September 11. It is likely that other factors also play a role in this
    issue. Our prior work on the Coast Guard's overall use of resources
    suggests an additional possible factor, such as decreases in search and
    rescue responsibilities over time.21 This work also showed that even in
    those program areas in which the number of boat hours declined following
    September 11, the Coast Guard was generally able to meet performance
    goals.

        Effect of Homeland Security Responsibilities on Readiness Needs Not Yet
        Known

    The Coast Guard has not yet determined the extent to which changes in
    post-September 11 mission priorities-specifically, increases in homeland
    security responsibilities-have affected station readiness needs. Coast
    Guard officials told us there are two reasons for this. First, the Coast
    Guard's maritime homeland security requirements are being revised to

    20The Coast Guard has administered this survey each year since 1991, with
    the exception of years 1999-2001. The response rate in 2003 was 54
    percent.

    21See GAO, Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results
    Achieved Needs to Be Clearer, GAO-04-432, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22,
    2004). This work addressed all Coast Guard operations, not just station
    operations.

    better align with current resource levels. The Coast Guard is currently
    working under Operation Neptune Shield, an interim set of guidelines that
    establishes Coast Guard's homeland security activity levels-taskings-
    under each MARSEC level. However, because the guidelines call for a level
    of operations that exceeds the Coast Guard's current resource levels, the
    Coast Guard is in the process of revising the guidelines. Officials told
    us they expect the new, long-term, risk-based requirements to establish
    more realistic activity levels that better align with existing resources
    and take into account support from state and local organizations at
    strategic ports.22 Officials told us they expect to have new activity
    level standards finalized by February 2005. Under these new
    standards-requirements-it is possible that station workload levels may
    change. Officials also told us that although the new requirements, known
    as the Strategic Deployment Plan, will better align security operations
    with existing resources, the Coast Guard will need to monitor this balance
    in the future given the dynamic nature of homeland security issues.

    Second, because homeland security requirements have yet to be finalized,
    the Coast Guard has begun, but not yet completed, efforts to update
    station staffing standards and other requirements to reflect
    post-September 11 changes in mission priorities and station readiness
    needs. Officials told us that once homeland security requirements have
    been finalized under the Strategic Deployment Plan, they will revise
    station staffing standards and other requirements to better reflect
    readiness needs. Although station staffing levels have been increased in
    response to the new homeland security priorities and past reports of
    staffing readiness concerns, the staffing standards are still based upon
    pre-September 11 mission priorities (i.e., search and rescue operational
    levels). Until the Coast Guard can translate the impact of
    security-related activities into specific station requirements, the impact
    of the new homeland security responsibilities on station readiness needs
    cannot be determined. Furthermore, without specific requirements, neither
    the Coast Guard nor others can measure the progress made in meeting
    station readiness needs.

    22Officials told us that because units may not have the resources to carry
    out the responsibilities outlined in Operation Neptune Shield, they are
    considered to be "guidelines." However, the new responsibilities, because
    they will more closely align with resources, will be considered
    "requirements."

        With Assistance from Other Entities, Most Stations Can Perform Expected Port
        Security Operations

    While the impact of new responsibilities on overall readiness needs
    remains unknown, there is evidence that most stations have been able to
    meet the port security responsibilities-i.e., activity levels-expected of
    them given their available resources and, in some cases, all security
    responsibilities with the help of other entities. Since the level of
    security activities established under the interim guidelines exceeds
    available resources, the Coast Guard has communicated to stations and
    other units that they are expected to carry out security operations within
    the constraints of existing resources.23 The Coast Guard does not track
    stationspecific performance regarding port security responsibilities, but
    in 2003 it developed an unofficial evaluation system that indicates that
    current security responsibilities for major ports-for which stations bear
    significant responsibility-are largely being met. This evaluation system-
    referred to as the Scorecard system-captures activity levels for selected
    PWCS standards at ports of high military and economic significance.24
    However, it is important to note that the Scorecard results are not
    stationspecific in that (1) they do not separate tasks handled by stations
    from those of other entities (either Coast Guard or other) that address
    port security needs and (2) stations that do not contribute to port
    security are not included. Nonetheless, the Scorecard results do provide
    some indication that at least some stations are for the most part able to
    meet their current port security responsibilities. Furthermore, of the 16
    stations we reviewed, officials from all but 1 told us that PWCS
    responsibilities-as identified by the interim guidelines-were being met.
    In most instances, stations reported meeting PWCS responsibilities with
    the assistance of state and local entities, which were either directly
    performing PWCS tasks or performing other mission responsibilities-such as
    fisheries enforcement or search and rescue-that allowed station personnel
    to focus on PWCS responsibilities.

    23According to senior officials, the Coast Guard does not expect units,
    including stations, to fully meet the taskings identified in the interim
    guidelines. Senior headquarters officials told us that operational
    commanders are responsible for executing Operation Neptune Shield's
    operational guidelines within station resource levels. However, the
    officials responsible for operations at the majority of the 16 stations we
    reviewed said that they interpreted these operational responsibilities to
    be required tasks.

    24The Scorecard reflects efforts of all entities involved in waterborne
    activities, and in some cases includes support from state, local, and
    other federal agencies. The scorecard assigns one of three ratings for
    ports based on the level of PWCS activities attained: (1) "green" when 90
    percent or more of security responsibilities are completed, (2) "yellow"
    when the majority of responsibilities are completed, and (3) "red" when
    less than 70 percent of responsibilities are completed.

    There are also clear signs that partnerships with other agencies and other
    Coast Guard units play an essential role in the stations' ability to meet
    assigned homeland security tasks. Most of the officials responsible for
    overseeing operations at the 16 stations we reviewed told us that their
    stations have been able to meet increased operational responsibilities
    only by sharing overall tasks-nonhomeland security-related as well as
    homeland security-related-with state and local partners as well as other
    Coast Guard entities. Officials explained that they have developed two
    main types of partnerships. First, they have established partnerships with
    local organizations such as police, fire, and marine patrol units to
    conduct port security operations as well as nonhomeland security
    activities. Officials at the majority of stations we contacted told us
    that they rely on assistance from marine patrol units to conduct patrols
    of key infrastructure, such as harbor docks; officials from several
    stations also indicated that these units assist with vessel escorts.
    Officials also told us that stations rely on partner organizations to
    conduct nonhomeland security activities, such as search and rescue, and
    that expanded partnership efforts have resulted in operational
    efficiencies. For example, officials representing one station located at a
    major port told us that a local partner increased its search and rescue
    operations following September 11, allowing the Coast Guard station to
    focus more of its efforts on homeland security operations.

    Second, stations have relied on varying levels of support from other Coast
    Guard components, namely, Marine Safety Offices (MSO)25 and Maritime
    Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs),26 to conduct port security operations.
    Station officials we interviewed told us that the level of support
    provided by both components varied. For example, MSST support varied by
    geographic location. One official told us that certain MSSTs located on
    the Pacific Coast each set aside 5,000 hours a year to perform port
    security operations, while those on the East Coast do not. Headquarters
    officials told us that because the Coast Guard is still considering the
    role MSSTs will play in port security operations, the amount of support
    they provide to

    25MSOs are the Coast Guard's primary operational units for promoting safe
    boating practices. MSO responsibilities include establishing and enforcing
    standards and regulations for vessel operations; licensing mariners;
    conducting boating safety outreach efforts, and investigating marine
    accidents. There are 47 MSO offices in the United States.

    26The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) directed
    the formation of MSSTs to provide fast deployment capability in response
    to domestic threats in U.S. ports and waterways. As of January 2005, 12 of
    13 MSSTs had been commissioned; the Coast Guard expects the 13th MSST to
    be operational in 2005.

    stations will vary. One senior headquarters official told us that newly
    established MSSTs can generally provide only a limited amount of support
    because of initial training requirements. As the MSSTs mature, they are
    usually able to assume greater responsibilities for port security
    operations.

    While stations' efforts to leverage external support are commendable, the
    extent to which they can continue to rely on that support is unclear. To
    better understand the potential for support levels to change, we contacted
    a number of state and local organizations that partner with the stations
    we interviewed. We asked them if they expected their level of support
    would change in the future. Of the 13 organizations we contacted,
    officials from 12 organizations told us that since the September 11
    attacks, they have either directly increased port security operations or
    increased other operations-such as search and rescue-that enable Coast
    Guard stations to focus on port security and other missions. One of the
    organizations we contacted explained that they had plans to decrease
    resource levels allocated to port security in future years. In addition,
    another 6 organizations we contacted emphasized that while they did not
    have plans in place to reduce funding levels for port security, they were
    not confident that future funding would continue at current levels.

    The Coast Guard has made progress in addressing multimission station
    readiness concerns identified prior to September 11. The Coast Guard has
    increased station staffing levels by 25 percent, expanded formal training
    programs and increased training capacity, begun modernizing its small boat
    fleet, and as of fiscal year 2003 appeared to have provided station
    personnel with appropriate amounts of PPE. However, despite this progress,
    the Coast Guard has yet to meet existing readiness standards and goals in
    the areas of staffing and boats and does not have adequate processes in
    place to help ensure the future funding of station PPE, a shortcoming that
    could result in an insufficient supply of PPE at stations in future years.

      Progress Made in Addressing Readiness Concerns but Stations Are Still Unable
      to Meet Standards and Goals

    Station Staffing Levels Since 2001, the Coast Guard has developed a
    variety of initiatives aimed at Have Increased but Key resolving
    long-standing staffing concerns at multimission stations. Table 4 Staffing
    Standards and presents a selection of the initiatives, either planned or
    under way, that we Goals Have Not Yet Been identified as noteworthy in
    addressing station staffing needs. (App. II Met contains a more detailed
    description of the initiatives.)

    Table 4: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Staffing Needs

    Concern Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

    A shortage of personnel Staffing levels increased

    o  	In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the number of personnel assigned to
    stations increased by 1,109 active duty personnel, or 25 percent.

    o  	An additional 451 personnel were added in fiscal year 2004 for
    stations and command centers.

    o  	According to one senior official, no additional personnel will be
    assigned to stations in fiscal year 2005.

    Number of authorized positions increased

    o  	In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the number of full-time positions at
    stations increased by 482.

    o  An additional 317 positions were added in fiscal year 2004.

    o  	According to one senior official, no additional positions will be
    added to stations in fiscal year 2005.

    Declining levels of experienced personnel New direct retention initiatives
    initiated

    o  	In fiscal year 2003, $5.9 million was expended on 312 selective
    reenlistment bonuses to station boatswain's mates and machinists.

    o  	Between fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the surfman pay premium was
    increased by 33 percent.

    Shortened tours of duty (high personnel Assignment practices modified

    turnover)  o  	New personnel assignment practices are being implemented to
    allow for increased tour lengths for surfman-qualified personnel and to
    reduce turnover in all personnel assignments.

    Inadequate mix of skills, expertise, and Staffing mix being reconfigured
    positions across stations  o  In fiscal year 2001, an occupation (rating)
    review was concluded.

    o  Reconfiguring of station staffing standard is expected to begin in
    2005.

                  Number of specialized and senior positions increased

    o  In fiscal years 2002-2004, 99 support positions were added (with 19
    more needed).

    o  In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 486 senior petty officer positions were
    added.a

    Positions filled with uncertified or Assignment and incentive systems
    being revised

    inexperienced personnel  o  	Plans are under way to (1) establish officer
    and enlisted career paths, (2) base station assignments on position
    requirements and personnel experience, and (3) develop motivation and
    incentive systems for enlisted personnel.

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    aSenior personnel are considered to be petty officer 2nd class (grade E-5)
    and above.

    Adherence to Workweek Standards

    In addition to increasing the number of personnel and positions allotted
    to stations by 25 and 12 percent,27 respectively, the Coast Guard has
    begun to reconfigure aspects of the station staffing program to provide
    more effective operations. For example, in an effort to provide a more
    appropriate mix of positions and skills at stations and to address
    concerns about insufficient numbers of senior personnel, the Coast Guard
    added 99 support officer positions in fiscal years 2002 through 2004, and
    486 senior petty officer positions in fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
    According to one official, the additional support positions will allow
    station command cadre to spend less time on administrative work and more
    time on operations. Recognizing that in the past a significant number of
    positions had been initially filled with unqualified personnel, the Coast
    Guard plans to take steps to base assignments on position requirements and
    experience. Furthermore, once long-term homeland security responsibilities
    have been determined, the Coast Guard plans to complete steps it has
    already begun to reconfigure its station staffing standards, which define
    the number and type of positions at stations based on mission
    requirements. The reconfiguration is expected to better align staffing
    resources with mission activities. Despite this progress, the Coast Guard
    has yet to meet five key standards and goals related to staffing at the
    stations. Each is discussed below.

    Most notably, despite increases in station staffing levels over the past 2
    years and other actions, average station workweek hours continue to
    exceed, by significant levels, the 68-hour standard established by the
    Coast Guard in 1988 to limit fatigue and stress among station personnel.28
    According to the Coast Guard's Boat Forces Strategic Plan, excessive
    workweek hours is symptomatic of "the adverse operational trends,
    identified lack of resources, and general reduction in ...readiness"
    experienced by stations in recent years.29 Moreover, the plan also notes
    that the high number of stations working in excess of 68 hours shows that
    "staffing continues to be a significant problem at stations." According to

    27See pages 28 and 36 for a discussion of the relationship between station
    positions and personnel.

    28The Coast Guard cites the 68-hour work-week standard as the objective
    for Coast Guard shore units with 24-hour operational readiness
    requirements, such as multimission stations and air stations. Although it
    holds out the 68-hour workweek as the standard, the Coast Guard also
    allows station officers-in-charge the discretion to choose longer workweek
    schedules that may better meet readiness and performance requirements.

    29The United States Coast Guard Boat Forces Strategic Plan, July 7, 2004,
    p. 27.

    estimates from Coast Guard surveys of station personnel, although the
    average work week at stations decreased somewhat between 1998 and 2003,
    since 1994 it has not dropped below 81 hours per week.30 It should be
    noted that these survey data, although the best source of information
    available on station workweek hours, may have limitations. That is, the
    survey is administered every August-during both the peak search and rescue
    season and the Coast Guard's period for rotating personnel-and it may be
    that a year-round average, which would include off-peak, winter hours,
    would be lower. In addition, although response rates for every year were
    not readily available, the 2003 response rate was relatively low, with
    only a little over half of the personnel surveyed responding.31

    An explanation of how workweek hours are measured may be helpful in
    interpreting this workweek information. The way in which the workweek is
    measured at stations is similar to the way it is measured in professions
    such as firefighting, in that personnel are on duty for an extended amount
    of time-such as 24 hours-to respond to emergencies but may spend part of
    it in recreation, sleep, exercise, training, or other activities.
    Personnel can thus be on duty or off duty for consecutive periods of time
    during a week. Workweek hours are calculated by totaling the amount of
    hours spent on duty or at a station, over a 1-week period, or averaging
    the amount of time spent on duty over a 2-week period. The Coast Guard's
    2003 survey of stations indicated that slightly less than half of all
    respondents reported working either an average 77-or 84-hour workweek.
    Approximately 6 percent of respondents reported working a 68-hour
    workweek. (See app. II for more information regarding these results.)

    30Since 1991(with the exception of years 1999-2001), the Coast Guard has
    conducted an annual survey of station workweek hours. The Coast Guard has
    used the results of the surveys to try to gauge changes in the average
    number of hours personnel work each week. Personnel are asked to report
    the number of hours spent among 49 predefined activities during an average
    workweek in August.

    31In 2003, personnel at 77 of the 188 stations were surveyed, with
    personnel from 64 stations responding (a total response rate of 54 percent
    of all personnel surveyed). One possible reason for this low response rate
    may be that nonrespondents did not have time to complete the survey, which
    could mean that workweek hours were under-reported. However, it is also
    possible that personnel who were working longer hours per week were more
    inclined to report that condition, leading to an over-reporting of
    workweek hours.

    According to the Coast Guard, working excessively long hours leads to
    injury and illness.32 Officials told us that station personnel can exceed
    the 68-hour work week standard in one of two ways.33 First, they can be
    assigned to a work schedule that averages to more than 68 hours a week,
    such as an 84-hour schedule. The work schedule, which is determined by the
    officer-in-charge, defines the number of days personnel spend on duty and
    is therefore the primary driver of whether personnel will consistently
    work an average of 68 hours per week or some number above that amount.34
    There are advantages and disadvantages associated with each of the many
    possible schedules stations can adopt-table 5 shows a comparison of the
    68- and 84-hour work schedules. For example, a potential disadvantage to
    having personnel work the 68-hour schedule is that it requires stations to
    retain more qualified personnel for duty work than the 84-hour schedule,
    which could be one reason why officers-incharge who are short of qualified
    personnel would use the higher hour schedule. The 84-hour schedule, in
    contrast, requires smaller numbers of qualified personnel, which could be
    of benefit to stations with high workloads and too few qualified
    personnel. It could also be preferred by some personnel because it
    provides for 3-day weekends. However, a significant disadvantage to the
    84-hour schedule, as noted in the station operations and training
    manual,35 is that it puts personnel "at significant

    32It should be noted that long work hours do not necessarily entail long
    hours underway (i.e., operating a boat). According to officials, station
    crew members can work an 84-hour schedule that does not include more hours
    underway than what crewmembers working a 68-hour schedule experience.
    However, the Coast Guard's Boat Operations and Training Manual cautions
    that an 84-hour work schedule should be restricted to units with "low
    response mission workloads," meaning units that do not have a high launch
    rate. Thus, although it does not automatically follow that working longer
    hours puts personnel at a greater risk of exceeding agency fatigue
    standards, it is possible. The Coast Guard has established fatigue
    standards that limit the number of hours crew members can be underway in
    order to reduce the likelihood of accidents due to overwork. For example,
    crew members operating in heavy weather-seas and swell conditions
    combining to exceed 8 feet or winds exceeding 30 knots-cannot operate a
    boat for more than 6 hours in a 24-hour period and require 8 hours of
    rest, leaving 10 hours for other activity.

    33According to Coast Guard officials, there are no penalties to exceeding
    the 68-hour work week, as long as fatigue standards are not exceeded. The
    Coast Guard accepts that local operations requirements and unit
    characteristics allow command discretion on alternative schedules that
    meet readiness and performance requirements; while these schedules may be
    more attractive to personnel, they may also require more hours at the
    unit.

    34Although personnel can work less than a 68-hour workweek under some
    circumstances, officials told us the 68-hour workweek should be considered
    the threshold of hours worked.

    35U.S. Coast Guard Boat Operations and Training (BOAT) Manual, Volume I,
    Part 3, Chapter 1, Section G, p. 3-25.

    risk of exceeding fatigue standards," which is why it is normally
    restricted to stations with low numbers of response-driven cases. In other
    words, personnel at stations that have a greater number of response
    operations- such as rescue cases-are at a higher risk of exceeding fatigue
    standards because they are underway (that is, operating a boat) more
    often. The Coast Guard's 1991 staffing study found that long hours on duty
    resulted in lost time among personnel because of illness and injury, as
    well as increased attrition levels.36 According to officials, in the late
    1990s the Coast Guard switched from an 84-hour standard-which it had
    adopted to better meet significant staffing shortages-to the present
    68-hour standard because of concerns about crew fatigue and an increasing
    number of boat accidents.

    Table 5: Comparison of the 68- and 84-Hour Workweek Schedules

    68-hour workweek Average 84-hour workweek

    b

    Workweek is divided into duty work, nonduty work, and off-duty Workweek is
    divided into duty work and off-duty hours.

    a

    hours.

    Crew accomplish training and maintenance tasks during nonduty Crews
    perform all work-mission- and nonmission-related- work hours. during duty
    hours.

    Does not provide for 3-day weekends. Provides for two 3-day weekends each
    month.

    Reduces unproductive work time (that is, time spent eating and Since crews
    are at the station for longer periods of time, they sleeping). spend more
    time eating and sleeping.

    Reduces the potential for crew on duty to exceed fatigue standards.

    Crews are at significant risk of exceeding fatigue standards. Therefore,
    this work schedule is normally restricted to stations that do not have
    high numbers of response-driven cases (higher numbers of such cases
    increase the likelihood that crew members will become overly fatigued).

      Requires more qualified personnel because each person spends Requires fewer
     qualified personnel because each person spends less time in duty status. more
                                  time in duty status.

    Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

    aPersonnel who are in "duty" status must remain at a station-usually for
    24 hours or longer-and be available to perform mission requirements and
    operations. Depending on the schedule, personnel can also perform
    "nonduty" work (called "day work"), which consists of any work other than
    watchstanding, certain administrative and personal tasks, and unit
    training. Personnel in nonduty status usually spend a limited number of
    hours-a normal workday-at the station. While on duty or nonduty status,
    personnel can perform watchstanding, which is the performance of certain
    operational tasks that require personnel to be at specific places for
    specified amounts of times (e.g., communications, security). Personnel
    standing watch may, depending on the nature of the watch, also perform
    collateral tasks.

    36U.S. Coast Guard Station Staffing Study In Pursuit of Excellence:
    Building a Better Station (Washington, D.C.; July 31, 1991).

    bUnder this schedule, crew members work 120 hours during 1 week (2 days on
    duty, 2 days off, and 3 days on) and 48 hours the next (2 days off duty, 2
    days on, 3 days off). Over a 2-week period, the crew average 84 hours on
    duty and 84 hours off duty a week.

    A second way personnel can exceed the 68-hour schedule is by working
    overtime, which, if significant, can also lead to lost time due to illness
    and injury. Overtime generally occurs when required operations exceed the
    number of qualified, available personnel. As with the 84-hour work
    schedule, significant amounts of overtime can increase the likelihood that
    personnel will exceed Coast Guard fatigue standards and can lead to lower
    retention levels for trained personnel.

    Field and headquarters officials told us that at most stations, the high
    number of hours worked is being driven by the following factors:

    o  an increase in homeland security responsibilities;

    o  an increase in the number of inexperienced personnel;

    o  	the formation of MSSTs, which siphoned experienced and qualified
    crewmembers from stations; and

    o  	a lack of sufficient support for training, building and equipment
    maintenance, and administrative duties.

    Of these factors, the primary one is the increased homeland security role.
    One senior official told us that although increased staffing levels may
    have been sufficient to meet pre-September 11 mission needs, the homeland
    security mission has greatly expanded the stations' workload, and it is
    unknown whether current staffing levels will be sufficient to meet
    operational requirements as well as the 68-hour work week standard.
    According to senior Coast Guard officials, it may take 5 to 10 years
    before the 68-hour standard is attained at all stations because of the
    high levels of inexperienced personnel and other issues previously
    discussed. In fact, one senior official questioned whether stations will
    ever reach the goal given competing Coast Guard priorities.37 Officials
    told us that the Coast Guard will not be able to determine optimum station
    staffing levels until (1) long-term homeland security requirements have
    been identified,

    37The Coast Guard does not plan to add either positions or personnel to
    stations in fiscal year 2005 because, according to one official, the
    stations need time to adjust to the influx of new personnel they have
    received, as well as their increased homeland security responsibilities.

    Appropriate Mix of Junior and Senior Personnel

    Adherence to Full Assignment Length

    (2) inexperienced staff have grown into senior positions,38 and (3) all
    new staffing initiatives (such as increased administrative support) have
    taken effect. Until these issues have been addressed, officials said it is
    likely that stations with high workloads and resource constraints will
    continue to work longer work weeks.

    The Office of Boat Forces' targeted goal for senior personnel, as a
    percentage of total station personnel, is 50 percent;39 as of March 2004,
    senior staff comprised about 37 percent of total staff. Officials told us
    that in recent years stations have received a significant number of
    relatively inexperienced personnel, which has skewed staffing proportions,
    and that it will take at least 3 years to increase the number of senior
    personnel to desired levels.

    The Coast Guard has yet to meet its goal of an average 48-month station
    assignment (tour of duty) for experienced personnel.40 According to Coast
    Guard data, the average tour of duty length for boatswain's mates
    increased from 33 months in 1999 to 35 months in 2000, but has remained
    fairly constant between 35 and 36 months through 2003.41 Although
    assignment practices have been modified for some personnel to allow for
    longer tour lengths at stations, officials told us that meeting the
    48-month goal will be a challenge given that stations draw upon a pool of
    personnel they share with other units-such as ships-that generally require
    shorter tours of duty.42 Thus, significant changes to station assignment
    policies will affect these other units. One senior official told us that
    although the stations may not meet the 48-month goal in the foreseeable
    future, given

    38According to the Coast Guard, it takes approximately 5 years for a new
    recruit to advance to petty officer 2nd class rank (E-5) and approximately
    10 years to advance to petty officer 1st class (E-6).

    39The Office of Boat Forces oversees station operations and resource
    needs.

    40According to officials, this goal does not apply to inexperienced
    personnel (E-2 and E-3), who are in the process of qualifying for their
    jobs These personnel have shorter duty lengths than experienced personnel
    because of the need to expose them to as many different experiences as
    possible during their training period. One senior official told us that
    this practice may be revisited given the training burden it places on
    senior station personnel.

    41Data represent average tour lengths for boatswain's mates E-4 through
    E-6.

    42For example, sea duty (on ships) is considered "arduous duty" and,
    therefore, is limited to 1, 2, or 3 years. Stations, for the most part,
    are considered nonarduous duty, and therefore, assigned personnel
    generally have longer tour-of-duty assignments.

    Sufficient Levels of Qualified Surfmen

    competing personnel needs from other units, even extending the average
    tour length to 36 months would be a significant improvement. Increasing
    the tour length lessens the training burden on senior station personnel
    (i.e., they end up training fewer new personnel) and allows a station to
    reap the benefits of the training it has already invested in junior
    personnel.43

    Stations continue to experience a shortage of qualified surfmen. As of
    June 2004, approximately 42 percent of surfman positions were not filled
    with qualified personnel. According to training and program officials, in
    the past this shortage stemmed from difficulties in recruiting sufficient
    numbers of applicants, because of several factors: (1) a long training
    process of 3 to 6 years (deters potential applicants); 44 (2) higher
    workloads (because of the shortage of qualified personnel); (3) remote
    assignment locations (surfman stations are largely located in remote areas
    of the Northwest); (4) obstacles to promotion (promotion to senior
    enlisted ranks requires a year of sea duty, which surfmen, who are needed
    at stations, have difficulty obtaining); and (5) program challenges (make
    it difficult to retain bonus pay benefits).

    To address these challenges, the Coast Guard has revised relevant
    personnel policies to facilitate career advancement and to clarify the
    process for becoming a surfman. The Coast Guard has also revamped the
    surfman training program by developing courses that that address training
    needs. Regarding the former, the Coast Guard has (1) eased requirements
    for advancement (waived the requirement for 1 year of sea duty for
    promotion to senior positions) and (2) allowed surfmen to retain special
    pay status after they transfer to a new station and are in the process of
    certifying for their new area of operation.45 Beginning in May 2005,

    43According to officials, personnel who are within 1 year of their full
    tour of duty are usually eligible for reassignment. Generally, the Coast
    Guard will look first to transfer personnel who have completed their full
    tour of duty, but if this is not possible, it will next evaluate those who
    are closest to completing their tour.

    44Hands-on surfman training can take place only in the winter, when surf
    conditions are appropriately severe. In some years, trainees do not have
    the opportunity to practice surfman skills under appropriate weather
    conditions, a fact that can prolong the time it takes to qualify.

    45Surfmen receive a special pay status-a salary bonus-as an incentive for
    continuing to serve as a qualified surfman. Changes in personnel policy
    now allow surfmen to retain their special pay status after they transfer
    to a different station and are in the process of certifying-learning the
    area of operations-at their new station assignment.

    surfmen will also receive additional points on their service-wide exams,
    the scores of which are used to determine promotions. Regarding training,
    the Coast Guard has concentrated on a two-pronged approach. First, to
    increase the number of trainees who actually qualify as surfmen, in 2004
    the Coast Guard implemented a new 2-year intensive training program that
    will require trainees to reside at the surfman training center; this will
    allow trainees to concentrate more fully on the training process.
    Officials told us they would not know the impact of this new training
    initiative until 2006, when the first class of resident trainees
    graduates. Second, to improve formal training for personnel who are
    qualifying through on-the-job training at their stations, in November
    2004, the Coast Guard implemented a new 2-week surfman course. Because the
    course was designed in part to relieve the training burden on stations
    (which are short of qualified surfmen who can serve as instructors),
    trainees will complete most of their qualification requirements during
    training. Officials expected 18 students to take the course during the
    winter of 2004.

    The Coast Guard has not met its goal of aligning the number of individuals
    assigned to stations with the number of designated positions, making it
    unclear whether station staffing levels (individuals assigned to
    stations), which are currently greater than designated positions, will
    remain at current levels or decrease, potentially affecting station
    workweek hours and other issues.46 At the end of fiscal year 2004, the
    estimated number of personnel assigned to stations exceeded the number of
    Coast Guarddesignated positions by an estimated 1,019 (or about 17 percent
    of total estimated personnel assigned to stations).47 Because the 1,019
    personnel are not assigned to permanent positions, and thus their
    assignment is potentially more temporary than that of other personnel, the
    Coast Guard could not assure us that the estimated fiscal year 2004
    station staffing level of 5,925 personnel will be maintained in the
    future.48 In contrast, the

    Matching Number of Personnel with Number of Positions

    46The OIG raised this issue as a concern in its 2003 report (MH-2003-028,
    pp. 5 and 10), noting that the shorter average tour length for entry-level
    personnel (9 to 23 months) added to the uncertainty of permanent dedicated
    staffing levels. In responding to these findings, the Coast Guard agreed
    that all personnel assigned to stations should be placed in permanent
    positions.

    47This figure was calculated by comparing the number of positions
    designated to stations in fiscal year 2004 with the estimated number of
    personnel assigned. It does not reflect attrition, transfers, or other
    actions that may have occurred during the year.

    48This figure was calculated by adding the estimated number of personnel
    assigned to stations and command centers in fiscal year 2004 (451
    personnel) to the number of personnel assigned during fiscal year 2003
    (5,474 personnel). It does not reflect attrition, transfers, or other
    actions.

    number of designated positions-4,906 at the end of fiscal year 2004-is
    considered permanent. Officials told us that although the Coast Guard's
    goal is to align personnel and position levels, it has been necessary to
    assign a greater number of less experienced staff to the stations, above
    designated staffing levels, to develop required numbers of senior staff
    (officials estimate it takes three junior personnel to produce one senior
    crew member). Attrition patterns, limited space on ships, and the need to
    expose junior personnel to on-the-job-training are driving factors in this
    decision. The Coast Guard does not plan to add either additional personnel
    or positions to stations in fiscal year 2005; rather, it will use this
    time to evaluate current station resource levels and give junior personnel
    time to gain experience and become fully trained. It is unclear how this
    decision may affect staffing levels-if staffing levels drop, the number of
    hours station personnel work might increase. On the other hand, if lower
    staffing levels are accompanied by higher levels of experienced personnel,
    then workweek hours might be unaffected or even decline. The impact will
    also depend in part on other factors, such as the implementation of
    remaining staffing initiatives-such as the station staffing standards-and
    the nature of future homeland security responsibilities.

        Coast Guard Has Formalized the Majority of Its Training and Taken Steps to
        Increase Training Capacity at National Training Centers

    Since 2001, the Coast Guard has made progress in developing a more
    formalized training program and in expanding the number of training slots
    available for the majority of station occupations. As late as August 2003,
    when we began our work, the Coast Guard had yet to determine whether
    formal training delivered in a classroom environment was preferable to
    on-the-job training-administered by senior personnel at stations-or
    whether it should utilize a combination of both on a long-term basis.
    Subsequently, the Coast Guard identified formal training as its preferred
    training method because, according to officials, it provides greater
    accountability for consistent and uniform training across all occupations
    and stations.49 To date, the Coast Guard has taken steps to formalize or
    augment several aspects of station training, including boatswain's mate
    and boat driver training. With respect to boatswain's mate training, in

    49Coast Guard operations officials told us that although formal training
    has been recognized as the preferred training mechanism for station
    personnel, on-the-job training, which is also an important component of
    station training, will still be maintained. Our previous work in the area
    of training design has shown that federal agencies can use a variety of
    training delivery mechanisms as long as criteria are used that link agency
    goals with training efforts. See GAO, Human Capital: Selected Agencies'
    Experiences and Lessons Learned in Designing Training and Development
    Programs, GAO-04-291 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).

    fiscal year 2002 the Coast Guard instituted a formal training center with
    the capacity to train 120 trainees per year; during fiscal year 2003 it
    more than tripled the center's capacity to 450 training slots. Training
    officials told us they plan to further expand the capacity of the center
    each year through 2006, when its annual capacity is expected to reach
    1,000 slots, the estimated number of new boatswain's mates needed each
    year. Furthermore, in conjunction with efforts to modernize its boat
    fleet, in fiscal year 2003 the Coast Guard increased the amount of formal
    training available to boat drivers who were learning to operate new
    response boats and nonstandard boats. Training officials told us that they
    employed a two-pronged approach to train operators on the new boats using
    on-site training teams, which conduct training at the stations, and a new
    2-week national training center course. Table 6 provides additional
    information regarding the Coast Guard's initiatives to address training
    needs. (See app. II for a more detailed discussion of the Coast Guard's
    planned and ongoing initiatives regarding station training needs.)

    Table 6: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Training Needs

    Need Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

    Boatswain's mate training Boatswain's mate training center reinstituted

    o  	The boatswain's mate training center was reinstituted in fiscal year
    2002; boatswain's mates' trainee positions were increased from 120 in
    fiscal year 2002 to 450 in fiscal year 2003.

    o  	Four additional classrooms and 51 personnel were added at the training
    center in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, at a cost of $3.5 million, to meet
    training throughput goals.

    Training center to augment on-the-job training established

    o  A provisional training center was established in fiscal year 2003 to
    augment station

                                           a

                                  on-the-job training.

    Coxswain (boat driver) training On-site response boat training developed

    o  	Training teams were established to provide on-site training to station
    personnel in boat handling techniques.

    Boat driving course established

    o  	In fiscal year 2004, a 2-week training course on driving, law
    enforcement, and boat operations was implemented.

    Surfman training Efforts to expedite surfman training initiated

    o  	A 2-year training program was instituted in fiscal year 2004 to
    accelerate the surfman training process for 10 surfman trainees.

    New surfman training course established

    o  	A new surfman training course was established in fiscal year 2004 to
    provide intensive training in heavy weather conditions.

    Boarding officer and boarding team member Formal law enforcement training
    expanded

    training  o  	Efforts were initiated to increase training slots for
    boarding officers and boarding team members by over one-fourth (between
    fiscal years 2004 and 2005) by relocating maritime law enforcement
    training to the Department of Homeland

    b

                  Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

    Evaluation of job performance Written examinations reconfigured

    o  	In 2004, to better assess knowledge levels regarding station
    operations, written examinations that are administered to station
    personnel biennially were revised.

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    aThis training center also provides training to boatswain's mates assigned
    to cutters.

    bThe Federal Law Enforcement Training Center provides basic, advanced,
    specialized, and refresher training for law enforcement officers from 75
    federal agencies. The Maritime Law Enforcement Center, which provides
    boarding officer and boarding team member training to all Coast Guard
    personnel, was relocated to increase capacity and to develop training
    partnerships with other federal agencies.

    According to officials, the Coast Guard's efforts to train boat drivers
    were developed to address missions with greatest priority as well as for
    training needs for new boats going into service. For example, in 2003 and
    2004, training teams were deployed to all strategic ports to provide
    training in tactical operations, an emerging requirement following the
    attacks of September 11. In addition, to address safety concerns
    associated with the operation of nonstandard boats, officials told us that
    training efforts were targeted at stations that would retain nonstandard
    boats, while the Coast Guard completes its program to replace stations'
    nonstandard boats.

        Progress Made in Modernizing Boat Fleet, but Inspection Results Indicate
        Weaknesses in Boat Readiness

    Since 2001, the Coast Guard has made progress in restructuring the
    stations' boat fleet to address safety and operational concerns resulting
    from aging and nonstandard boats. The Coast Guard has focused a major part
    of its efforts on replacing an assorted variety of nonstandard small boats
    with new, standardized boats. Officials told us that although the Coast
    Guard had just started planning the acquisition of the new boats in 2001,
    following the attacks of September 11, it expedited the purchase of 100 of
    the new boats to meet stations' increased homeland security
    responsibilities. Approximately 50 of these boats were distributed to
    stations located at strategic ports, to provide quick response
    capabilities for port security operations, and to stations in critical
    need of new boat replacement. The remaining 50 boats were distributed to
    MSSTs. In 2003, the Coast Guard developed a multiyear contract to replace
    the remainder of stations' aging and nonstandard boats with an estimated
    350 new boats. The Coast Guard has also initiated efforts to replace the
    aging 41-foot utility boat fleet, which will reach the end of its 25-year
    service life beginning in 2005, with a medium-size utility boat. Officials
    told us that as of August 2003 the Coast Guard was in the process of
    reviewing three medium boat prototypes and that they expect to select a
    manufacturer in 2005. In addition, in 2003, the Coast Guard completed the
    replacement of the 30-year old 44-foot motor lifeboat with a fleet of new
    47-foot motor life boats. Table 7 describes the Coast Guard's actions to
    address concerns regarding the stations' boat fleet. (See app. II for a
    more detailed discussion of ongoing and planned efforts for addressing
    station boat needs.)

    Table 7: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Boat Needs

                    Need Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

    a

    Aging and nonstandard small boats New small boats acquired to address
    increased security responsibilities

    o  	One hundred small response boats were purchased following the attacks
    of September 11 to augment security capability at strategic ports and to
    replace nonstandard boats.

    Multiyear contract to purchase small boats was developed

    o  	A contract was signed allowing for the purchase of up to an additional
    700 small response boats through fiscal year 2009 to replace the remainder
    of the aging nonstandard boats and to supplement stations' multimission
    response capability.

    Aging medium-sized boats Efforts to replace medium boats initiated

    o  Efforts were initiated to replace 41-foot utility boats with a new
    medium response boat;

    b

    $12 million was requested in its fiscal year 2005 budget to begin
    production.

    Inspection of small boats Inspection teams for small boats instituted

    o  	In fiscal year 2004 the Coast Guard instituted teams to inspect new
    standardized small boats, at a cost of $637,000.

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    aThe Coast Guard expects to replace approximately 350 nonstandard small
    boats in use at stations. Approximately 50 nonstandard boats used by
    stations for unique geographic or weather-specific operational
    requirements-such as 14-foot skiffs and 30-foot special purpose craft
    boats-will be retained.

    bThe Coast Guard has determined that the 41-foot utility boat-acquired
    between 1973 and 1980-is approaching the end of its service life.

    Despite this progress, the Coast Guard has yet to meet mission readiness
    goals for medium-sized boats (utility and motor life boats), as indicated
    by internal inspection results.50 The Office of Boat Forces' goal is for
    80 percent of boats inspected to meet readiness standards at the initial
    inspection. Results from the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2003 inspections
    indicate that only 16 percent of the motor lifeboats and utility boats
    inspected met mission readiness goals when initially inspected.51 After a
    1day opportunity to correct identified problems, approximately 81 percent
    had met readiness goals. It is important to note that the majority of the
    discrepancies cited were not of such severity that they would prevent the
    boats from being used in most mission operations. For example, the failure
    of navigation lights on a 41-foot utility boat could preclude the boat

    50As of 2004, the Coast Guard had conducted inspections of stations'
    medium boats (utility and motor life boats). The Coast Guard plans to
    begin inspecting its new small response boats in 2005.

    51In fiscal year 2003, teams inspected 49 motor lifeboats and 37 utility
    boats at 84 of the 188 Coast Guard multimission stations.

    from being operated (i.e., disable it) until the lights were fixed or the
    operational commander issued a waiver outlining the conditions under which
    the boat could be operated. Boats that receive waivers are considered able
    to "perform some missions, but not all missions safely."52 In this
    scenario, the boat's failure to meet full readiness standards would not
    necessarily affect the station's operational readiness. Officials also
    told us that in order to ensure that operational readiness is maintained
    at stations when a boat is disabled, all multimission stations have more
    than one boat.

    Officials attributed the inability of stations to meet full readiness
    standards for boats to the following:

    o  	Junior engineers did not have the necessary experience to perform
    maintenance in compliance with operating manuals and configuration updates
    from the manufacturer.

    o  	Engineers lacked sufficient time to perform maintenance because of
    increased operational hours (that is, the boats are being used more often,
    and the engineers assigned to perform maintenance are spending more time
    conducting boat operations).

    o  	Station utility boats were reaching the end of their service life and
    had deteriorated to the point that they required more maintenance to meet
    mission readiness standards.

    o  	New boats are more technologically advanced (e.g., satellite
    navigation systems) requiring specialized technical training in order to
    perform maintenance.

    Officials told us that they are taking various steps to respond to these
    issues. First, to compensate for the lack of experience among junior
    engineers, the Coast Guard intends to intensify the training that is
    provided to engineers for the motor lifeboat. In November 2004, the Coast
    Guard implemented a 2-week course focused specifically on motor

    52According to the Coast Guard's boat operations manual, when issuing a
    waiver, operational commanders can decide whether a boat should be
    restricted from performing certain missions. Operational commanders have
    the flexibility to determine whether a boat can perform some missions or
    whether it could perform all missions with certain restrictions. In the
    case of inoperable navigation lights, Coast Guard officials told us that a
    commander would likely issue a waiver to restrict the boat from being
    operated at night but would allow crews to operate and perform all
    missions during daytime hours.

    lifeboat operations and maintenance. The Coast Guard does not have plans,
    however, to provide specialized training for utility boat maintenance,
    given that these boats are at the end of their life span and will be
    replaced within a few years with new medium response boats. Likewise, the
    replacement of the utility boats will address low scores related to their
    deteriorating condition. Regarding the lack of time engineers have to
    perform maintenance, officials told us that this issue will be examined
    after the Coast Guard has reassessed changes in station workloads
    following September 11.

        Processes and Practices for Estimating PPE Funding Needs Result in
        Allocation Shortfalls

    As of the end of fiscal year 2003, station personnel appeared to have
    sufficient PPE, but the Coast Guard does not have adequate processes and
    practices in place to help prevent funding shortfalls from recurring. The
    Coast Guard's continued use of these processes and practices in fiscal
    year 2004 resulted in a $1.9 million shortfall in estimated PPE funding
    needs for that year. As we discussed in our previous report,53 following
    the expenditure of an additional $5.6 million on PPE in fiscal year 2003
    to address perceived shortfalls, active and reserve station personnel
    appeared to possess sufficient PPE. However, the Coast Guard's processes
    and practices for estimating station PPE needs and allocating funds have
    historically resulted in an underfunding of station PPE, despite
    congressional direction to provide adequate supplies of PPE.54 If these
    funding practices are not modified, funding shortfalls could continue to
    occur in the future. Moreover, such funding shortages would affect the
    Coast Guard's ability to meet one of its strategic objectives for
    stations- namely, to ensure that station personnel are properly outfitted
    with mission-specific equipment, such as PPE.55 A shortfall in estimated
    PPE funding needs of $1.9 million occurred in fiscal year 2004, although
    the actual impact of the shortfall-in terms of PPE that was needed but not
    purchased-is not known, since the purchase of PPE is not tracked at the

    53GAO-04-704, p. 8.

    54Congress has repeatedly identified the importance of PPE. In fiscal
    years 2002 and 2003, Congress earmarked a total of $30.2 million for
    station readiness needs, including PPE needs. See P.L. 107-87, Title 1,
    (Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
    2002) and P.L. 108-7. (An earmark refers to funds set aside within an
    appropriation for a specified purpose.) The Maritime Transportation
    Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) also directs the Commandant to ensure
    that all Coast Guard personnel are equipped with adequate safety equipment
    while performing search and rescue missions.

    55This objective is identified in the Coast Guard's Boat Forces Strategic
    Plan, July 7, 2004,

    p. 41.

    headquarters level. A shortfall of $1.9 million is projected for fiscal
    year 2005.

    Following a mishap in 2001 in which the improper use of PPE was found to
    have contributed to the death of two station personnel, the adequacy of
    PPE took on added importance.56 The Coast Guard has emphasized the
    importance of PPE, both through a Commandant directive and in its policy
    manual,57 stating that the proper supplies and use of PPE is one of the
    top priorities of Coast Guard management.

    Although these measures are important, several aspects of the Coast
    Guard's processes for estimating and allocating station PPE funds raise
    concerns. Appendix II discusses these concerns in detail, but they are
    summarized as follows:

    o  	The Coast Guard's forecasting models do not recognize PPE funding
    needs for personnel assigned to stations over and above the number of
    designated positions. This is because the forecasting models are
    predicated on the number of positions designated for stations, rather than
    the number of personnel assigned (in fiscal year 2004 the estimated number
    of personnel assigned to stations exceeded positions by an estimated
    1,019). According to program officials, historically the amount of funds
    allotted by the Coast Guard each fiscal year for station PPE has not been
    sufficient to fund the estimated needs of all assigned station personnel.
    For example, in 2003, the OIG reported that the Coast Guard had not
    provided PPE funding for 541 (69 percent) of the 789 personnel it had
    added to stations during fiscal year 2002.58

    56Chief of Staff's Final Decision Letter on a Class "A" Mishap: Coast
    Guard Station Niagara CG-214341 Capsizing and Subsequent Fatalities on 23
    March 2001 (Feb. 6, 2002). Following this mishap, the Coast Guard began
    requesting additional funds for station PPE with each budget request that
    included additional positions. Officials also revised the qualification
    guide to require boat crewmen to don and manipulate each piece of survival
    equipment required of them in the conditions for which the equipment was
    designed. Moreover, the training manual now requires crewmen to annually
    demonstrate proficiency in survival techniques if lost overboard or
    involved in a capsizing. The Coast Guard has also taken steps to ensure
    that personnel performing boat operations are either outfitted with a
    personal location device or that their boats are equipped with a
    float-free location device.

    57May 2003 Commandant Directive 10470 and Rescue and Survival Systems
    Manual, chapters 3 and 4. In the directive, the Commandant cited an
    internal research report that attributed 20 percent of the total risk
    facing boat personnel to exposure to extreme weather conditions.

    58OIG, MH-2003-028, p. 4.

    o  	Even when funding is narrowed to just designated positions, the Coast
    Guard's traditional practice has been to fund only about half of PPE
    station needs, according to program officials.59 For example, in fiscal
    year

    2003, the Coast Guard initially allocated $1.8 million, or 56 percent, of
    the estimated $3.2 million needed to provide PPE for personnel in
    designated station positions.60 Stations also receive general operating
    funds that may

    be used to purchase PPE, although these funds are also used for other
    purposes, such as boat maintenance.

    o  	Assumptions used in PPE forecasting models have not been validated,
    according to officials.61 Without validated assumptions, the Coast Guard
    could be either underestimating or overestimating the life span and
    replacement cycle of the PPE. According to one official, the assumptions
    were based on input from station personnel.

    o  	The Coast Guard does not require that PPE funds allocated to stations
    and oversight units actually be spent on PPE, according to program
    officials. Officials told us that in the interests of command flexibility
    units are allowed to spend allocated PPE funds on various operational
    expenses. Although such flexibility may be needed, the former PPE program
    manager told us that it was possible that oversight units have not been
    passing PPE funds on to stations as intended (i.e., the amount expended
    for PPE may be less than the amount allocated). To help address this
    possibility, the official said that in recent years he has disclosed to
    stations the total amount of PPE funding available to them, including
    funds held by oversight units.

    Officials told us the Coast Guard has no immediate plans to revise the
    traditional PPE funding allocation process because they believe it has
    been sufficiently reliable for the agency's purposes. However, the process
    may change once long-term homeland security requirements have been
    identified. Given the historic shortages in PPE funding that have resulted

    59The Coast Guard was unable to provide data on historical modeling
    estimates; the program manager told us that these data are not retained.

    60During fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard allotted an additional $5.6
    million in earmarked funds to address-according to officials-accumulated
    PPE shortfalls. The $5.6 million was part of $15.7 million in specially
    designated funds appropriated in fiscal year 2003 to address station
    readiness needs.

    61According to officials, the forecasting models assume that PPE for
    active duty station personnel will need to be replaced every 3 years, PPE
    for reserve personnel every 5 years, and PPE for auxiliary personnel every
    7 years.

      Strategic Plan for Improving Station Readiness Lacks Key Components for
      Measuring Progress

    from the Coast Guard's allocation processes, as witnessed by the onetime
    increase in funding during fiscal year 2003, it seems likely that stations
    will experience shortfalls in the future if PPE allocation processes and
    practices are not adjusted.

    The Coast Guard Guard's Boat Forces Strategic Plan,62 its 10-year plan for
    maintaining and improving readiness at stations and other boat units,
    lacks key components for achieving and assessing station readiness in the
    post-September 11 operating environment. The plan, although extensive, has
    not been updated to include the impact of post-September 11 homeland
    security requirements on station operations. The plan also does not
    identify the specific actions, milestones, and funding amounts needed to
    assure Congress and others that the Coast Guard is committed to achieving
    identified readiness levels. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop
    measurable annual goals for stations that would (1) allow it to track its
    progress in achieving long-term goals and objectives, (2) allow others to
    effectively monitor and measure progress, and (3) provide accountability.
    Without these key planning elements, the strategic plan's effectiveness as
    a management tool, as well as the Coast Guard's ability to ensure desired
    progress in meeting station readiness needs, is limited.

        Current Strategic Plan Outlines Numerous Goals, Objectives, and Initiatives

    The Boat Forces Strategic Plan identifies strategic goals in four areas:
    (1) leadership and management; (2) personnel and staffing; (3) training
    and expertise; and (4) equipment, support, and technology. These goals are
    supported by objectives and initiatives, the latter of which are
    prioritized, by fiscal year, in a summary implementation plan. Table 8
    presents examples of goals, objectives, and initiatives, as well as the
    targeted time frames, pertaining to each of the four readiness categories
    (staffing, training, boats, and PPE). The initiatives contained in the
    plan are designed to address station readiness concerns identified in
    2001. For example, to address the concern that stations' have not received
    the appropriate number of positions or qualified personnel, the plan
    contains

    62The Coast Guard's Boat Forces Strategic Plan, July 7, 2004. The Boat
    Forces Strategic Plan is designed to support the Coast Guard's overall
    strategic plan, the United States Coast Guard Strategic Plan 1999. The
    Boat Forces Strategic Plan presents a strategic approach for all Coast
    Guard boat forces units, including stations, groups, aids to navigation,
    and other units. For this discussion, we focus only on those sections of
    the plan that apply to multimission stations.

    an initiative to revise station staffing standards as well as an
    initiative regarding the need to staff stations according to these revised
    standards.

    Table 8: Selected Examples of Coast Guard Strategic Goals, Objectives, and
                         Initiatives for Multimission Stations

                                                                           Fiscal
                                                                             year
    Category     Goals        Objectives           Initiatives            time
                                                                           frames
                Provide        Ensure that    Establish a mechanism that
                leadership to  tasking can be outlines
    Staffing ensure         met by
                effective boat   available      intended capabilities of
                  operations     resources             resources
                                                  provided to stations

    Ensure the right number of positions/ people, with appropriate experience
    and skills Ensure sufficient numbers of personnel-with appropriate
    experience/skills-are assigned

    Revise station staffing standards Staff stations according to standards

    2003-2007 Training

     Deliver new training in a Establish a system to provide Increase staffing and
    throughput at standardized manner appropriate operations training training
                                   centers 2003-2005

    Ensure personnel receive training Coordinate with training centers to
    appropriate to each mission provide mission-specific training

    Boats 	Acquire and maintain capital assets, facilities, equipment, and
    technology

    Acquire capital assets (boats) Recapitalize small and mediumsized boats
    2003-2006

    PPE Acquire and maintain capital Coordinate, enable, align, and Coordinate with
                              program managers 2005, 2006,

    assets, facilities, equipment, and technology

    monitor mission-specific equipment to ensure appropriate outfitting

    to fully fund mission-specific equipment

                                      2008, 2010,

                     Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

        Lack of Key Planning Elements

    Although the strategic plan provides an indication of what overall
    measures may be needed to restore station readiness, the Coast Guard has
    not developed key planning elements in four areas-either pertaining to the
    strategic plan or related to it-that are essential to setting clear
    expectations about what will be achieved, and translating the expectations
    into specific funding needs. In four key areas, as discussed later, the
    Coast Guard does not follow practices that we and others have identified
    as necessary to effectively measure performance and hold agencies
    accountable for results.63

    o  	Plan not updated to reflect homeland security responsibilities: The
    plan has not been updated to reflect the impact of post-September 11
    homeland security requirements on stations. Although it incorporates
    performance goals for other Coast Guard programs,64 the plan does not
    incorporate-because they have yet to be finalized-goals and requirements
    for the PWCS program, a major driver of station operations.65 Until those
    requirements have been developed, the capability and resources stations
    will need to address one of their most significant operational
    responsibilities, and hence overall readiness needs, cannot be fully
    determined. For example, the plan cites two important initiatives in the
    category of staffing-(1) revise station staffing standards (i.e.,
    determine the optimal number and type of personnel needed at each station)
    and (2) staff stations according to those standards. According to the
    plan's implementation summary, these standards were to be revised in
    fiscal year 2003 and station staffing completed by fiscal year 2007. As of
    January 2005, officials had yet to revise the standards because long-term
    homeland security responsibilities had not been finalized. Until the
    staffing standards have been revised, the bigger picture-when stations
    staffing needs will be met-cannot be determined.

    63We have issued numerous reports on results-oriented management,
    including guides to developing and reviewing strategic plans. The criteria
    presented in these guides stem from the Government Performance and Results
    Act (GPRA) of 1993 (P.L. 103-62). See Executive Guide: Effectively
    Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118
    (Washington, D.C.: June 1996) and Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA:
    Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16
    (Washington, D.C.: May 1997, Version 1). Other entities have also used
    GPRA to provide guidance for strategic planning; see, for example, Office
    of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, Part 6, Sections 200
    (Overview of Strategic Plans, Performance Budgets, and Performance and
    Accountability Reports) and 210 (Preparing a Strategic Plan: The Main
    Elements).

    64According to the Coast Guard, the plan's goals and objectives were based
    on the estimated station capacity required to meet individual program
    performance goals.

    65As previously discussed, the Coast Guard has been operating under
    interim homeland security guidelines and is in the process of identifying
    long-term requirements.

    o  	Plan contains insufficient details on specific planned actions and
    milestones: The plan does not identify, in sufficient detail, planned
    actions and milestones.66 Effective strategic plans should show an obvious
    link between objectives and the specific actions that will be needed to
    meet those objectives. These actions, in turn, should be clearly linked to
    milestones. Although the plan includes a summary implementation schedule,
    it does not clearly identify what steps will be taken to implement the
    initiatives and when they will be completed. For example, the plan does
    not identify what actions will be needed to ensure that station personnel
    are placed in positions that are appropriate for their experience, or to
    increase the actual length of time personnel are assigned to stations.

    o  	Plan's objectives not linked with budget: The plan lacks a clear link
    between objectives and required funding levels. Without a clear
    understanding of the funding needed each year, there is little assurance
    that initiatives will be implemented and long-term objectives realized.67
    Clearly identifying funding needs would also help to ensure that projected
    goals and objectives are commensurate with available resource levels.68
    Because the plan does not identify the funding needed to carry out key
    objectives and initiatives, even in the short term, it is unclear whether
    the Coast Guard will be able to fund initiatives according to proposed
    time frames.

    66In 2002, the OIG reviewed a draft of the strategic plan and found it too
    general to be useful in guiding Coast Guard efforts or in measuring the
    progress of those efforts (see MH2003-028, p. 6). In light of these
    limitations, the OIG recommended that the Coast Guard revise the plan to
    identify specific actions, time frames, and responsibilities required for
    meeting long-term objectives, such as the 68-hour workweek standard.
    Although the Coast Guard generally agreed with the recommendations,
    officials told us the plan was not revised to include the OIG's
    recommendations nor does the Coast Guard have plans to incorporate them in
    the future.

    67In 1993, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs stressed that a
    multiyear strategic plan not only lay out long-term goals for implementing
    an organization's mission but include the resources needed to achieve
    these goals. (Senate Report 103-58, accompanying GPRA of 1993, P.L.
    103-62.)

    68The Coast Guard notes in the strategic plan that resource proposals
    should reference the goals of the plan. The Coast Guard also notes that
    the plan should serve as the foundation for new budget initiatives, for
    reprioritizing and reallocating existing resources (positions, boats, and
    funding), and for adjusting taskings to available resource levels.

    o  	Lack of measurable annual goals: The Coast Guard has not established
    measurable annual goals linked to the long-term goals identified in the
    strategic plan. Without annual goals, Congress, the Coast Guard, and
    others cannot effectively and readily measure an agency's progress in
    meeting its long-term goals.

    The above planning elements would help the Coast Guard and Congress use
    the strategic plan as a more effective tool for monitoring station
    readiness needs and identifying areas of continuing concern. As with any
    strategic plan, Coast Guard officials agree that it will also need to be
    revisited and revised to keep pace with changing events and, thus, the
    plan will be reviewed on an annual basis. The Coast Guard's plan may be
    particularly susceptible to changing circumstances, given that it must
    deal with so many unpredictable events, ranging from natural disasters and
    accidents to the uncertainties of terrorist threats. A senior headquarters
    official told us that while the Coast Guard should more clearly identify
    expectations regarding annual goals, continually changing priorities often
    make it difficult for the agency to adhere to-and fund-long-term strategic
    plans and in some cases to even maintain program consistency. We
    acknowledge that these difficulties exist and must be considered in
    developing and using the plan, but even with these difficulties,
    incorporating the key elements discussed above would improve the plan's
    effectiveness as a management tool.

    Conclusions 	It has been 3 years since the September 11 terrorist attacks
    changed the mission priorities for multimission stations, and there is no
    doubt that station readiness requirements need to be updated to reflect
    this new reality. The Coast Guard's decision to hold off updating these
    requirements until they can be aligned with homeland security
    responsibilities Coast Guard-wide is sensible. The readiness of
    multimission stations is but one of the many competing demands the Coast
    Guard must balance as it attempts to meet increased homeland security
    responsibilities while continuing to support other missions. Nonetheless,
    the Coast Guard still needs to have the necessary plans, processes, and
    safeguards in place to help ensure that it can continue the impressive
    progress made thus far in addressing 20 years of operational deterioration
    at stations. In particular, indications of high workweek hours for many
    personnel and inadequate processes and practices used to estimate and fund
    needs for personal protection equipment may limit the stations' readiness.
    Historic shortages in station PPE funding allocations, which continued in
    fiscal years 2004 and are estimated for 2005, indicate that stations will
    continue to experience funding shortfalls in the future

    Recommendations

    unless PPE allocation processes and practices are adjusted. Perhaps more

    significantly, it remains unclear where station readiness falls in the
    Coast

    Guard's list of priorities, as evidenced by a lack of measurable annual

    goals related to stations and the lack of detail-in terms of both specific

    actions as well as necessary funding-in the Boat Forces Strategic Plan,

    the Coast Guard's strategy for addressing station readiness issues. The

    lack of specificity on the Coast Guard's part thus far is perhaps

    understandable given the challenges it has faced in the wake of September

    11. However, continuing in this way will make it difficult to know what
    the Coast Guard intends as a readiness baseline, how close or far away it
    is from achieving this level, and what it thinks will be needed to get
    there.

    To help ensure that the Coast Guard and Congress have the information
    necessary to effectively assess station readiness needs and track progress
    in meeting those needs, and that multimission station personnel receive
    sufficient personal protection equipment to perform essential and
    hazardous missions as specified by Congress, we recommend that the
    Secretary of Homeland Security, in consideration of any revised homeland
    security requirements, direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to take
    the following three actions:

    o  	Revise the Boat Forces Strategic Plan to (1) reflect the impact of
    homeland security requirements on station needs and (2) identify specific
    actions, milestones, and funding needs for meeting those needs.

    o  Develop measurable annual goals for stations.

    o  	Revise the processes and practices for estimating and allocating
    station PPE funds to reliably identify annual funding needs and use this
    information in making future funding decisions.

    Agency Comments

    and Our Evaluation

    We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security
    and the Coast Guard for their review and comment. The Department of
    Homeland Security and the Coast Guard generally concurred with our
    findings and recommendations and did not provide formal comments for
    inclusion in the final report. The Coast Guard, however, provided
    technical clarifications as well as suggested contextual adjustments,
    which we incorporated to ensure the accuracy of the report.

    We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
    committees and subcommittees. We will also make copies available to others
    on request.

    If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (415) 904-2200 or Steven N. Calvo at (206) 287-4839. Key
    contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. This report will
    also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    Margaret T. Wrightson, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

                           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    To examine the extent to which multimission station readiness needs
    changed as a result of post-September 11 changes in mission priorities, we
    reviewed relevant Coast Guard documents, including Operation Neptune
    Shield, the agency's interim guidelines for implementing homeland security
    operations; the Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security; and mission
    planning guidance used to establish fiscal year 2004 mission priorities.
    We also reviewed our previous work on the Coast Guard's efforts to balance
    its homeland security and nonhomeland security missions.69 In addition, we
    interviewed headquarters officials regarding trends in station operations
    and the agency's plans for addressing the homeland security mission. To
    better understand how station performance was affected by changes in
    mission priorities, we reviewed data from the Coast Guard's Scorecard
    System, its unofficial process for monitoring security operations at
    strategic ports. We interviewed officials responsible for analyzing and
    compiling these data at the field and headquarters levels and determined
    that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report,
    given the parameters of the system. We also reviewed boat hour data from
    the Coast Guard's Abstract of Operations database to determine trends in
    the number of hours station boats were operated, by program, both before
    and after September 11. Boat hour data, reported by station crews,
    represent the number of hours that boats were operated by station
    personnel. To develop a more representative estimate of pre-September 11
    boat hours and to normalize for fluctuations in hours that might occur in
    a single year, we averaged the number of boat hours expended during fiscal
    years 1999 and 2000 to create a pre-September 11 baseline.70 The Coast
    Guard agreed with our use of this 2-year average as an appropriate
    baseline of pre-September 11 boat hours. To determine the reliability of
    the data, we used assessments from our previous report,71 which consisted
    of (1) a review of existing documentation regarding the data and the
    systems that produced them and (2) interviews with knowledgeable agency
    officials. On the basis of these assessments, we determined that the data
    were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

    69See GAO, Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results
    Achieved Needs to Be Clearer, GAO-04-432 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2004)
    and GAO, Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department
    of Homeland Security, GAO-03-594T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2003).

    70We did not include fiscal year 2001 data because these data were not
    available on a monthly basis.

    71See GAO-04-432.

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    We visited 8 multimission stations on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, as
    well as the four groups and activities responsible for overseeing their
    operations, to better understand how stations' readiness needs changed
    following September 11.72 These stations were selected on the basis of
    geographic location, proximity to a strategic port, and the number of boat
    hours expended in fiscal year 2003 on homeland security, search and
    rescue, and law enforcement operations. To further explore how increased
    homeland security operations had affected stations, we conducted telephone
    interviews with field officials responsible for overseeing operations at 8
    additional stations located at strategic ports. We selected these
    additional 8 stations based on the number of station resource hours
    expended on port security operations. To assess the levels of support
    provided to stations by state and local organizations, we contacted 13
    organizations identified as key partners for 8 of the stations we
    reviewed.

    To address multimission station readiness concerns identified prior to
    September 11, we reviewed the Department of Transportation's Office of
    Inspector General (OIG) reports on station readiness,73 the Coast Guard's
    internal review of station operations,74 and various congressional
    reports. We also spoke with Coast Guard headquarters officials from the
    Offices of Boat Forces; Budget and Programs; and Workforce Performance,
    Training, and Development. To identify actions the Coast Guard has taken
    or is planning to take regarding station readiness concerns, we reviewed
    available Coast Guard data regarding station staffing, training, boats,
    and personal protection equipment (PPE). In the areas of staffing and PPE,
    we used data from our May 2004 report-such as the number of staff and
    positions added to stations in fiscal year 2003 and the estimated amount
    of funds expended on station PPE in fiscal year 2003-which we had
    determined were sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. To assess
    the reliability of training and boat data, we (1) reviewed existing
    documentation regarding the data and how they were developed and (2)
    interviewed knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the data
    were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Furthermore,

    72For security purposes, we are not identifying the ports we visited.

    73Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation, Audit of the
    Small Boat Station Search and Rescue Program, MH-2001-094 (Washington,
    D.C.: Sept. 14, 2001) and Audit of the Use of Fiscal Year 2002 Funds to
    Improve the Operational Readiness of Small Boat Stations and Command
    Centers, MH-2003-028 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003).

    74U.S. Coast Guard, Project Kimball Report, October 11, 2001.

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    we interviewed officials responsible for overseeing operations at the 16
    stations we reviewed, as well as at relevant oversight units. To review
    the Coast Guard's training programs and identify progress made in
    expanding formal training opportunities for station personnel, we visited
    the following Coast Guard training centers: the Motor Life Boat School;
    the Boatswain's Mate School, the Boat Forces Center, the Boat Engineering
    School; and the Maritime Law Enforcement Center. In addition, we
    interviewed officials from the Coast Guard's internal inspection teams to
    discuss biennial inspections of station operations and reviewed station
    inspection results for fiscal years 2002 and 2003.

    To obtain a better understanding of personnel workloads and how those
    workloads may be changing, we also reviewed fiscal years 2002 and 2003
    survey results from the Coast Guard's annual survey of station personnel
    activities. With some exceptions, the Coast Guard has conducted an annual
    survey of station workweek hours since 1991. The Coast Guard uses the
    survey results to gauge changes in the average number of hours personnel
    work each week, and thus have not validated the survey. Personnel are
    asked to report the number of hours spent among 49 predefined activities
    during an average workweek in August. In 2003, personnel at 77 of the 188
    stations were surveyed, with personnel from 64 stations responding, for a
    total response rate of 54 percent of all personnel surveyed. (Response
    rate data were not readily available for other survey years.) One possible
    reason for this low response rate may be that nonrespondents did not have
    time to complete the survey, which could mean that workweek hours were
    under-reported. However, it is also possible that personnel who were
    working longer hours per week were more inclined to report that condition,
    leading to an over-reporting of workweek hours. To assess the reliability
    of the data, we interviewed the headquarters officials who oversee the
    survey as well as available documentation. Recognizing the limitations of
    the data-such as the low response rate-we determined that the data were
    sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. That is, as an
    indicator of average station workweek hours, and general trends in those
    hours over time, the survey results are sufficiently reliable.

    To assess the extent to which Coast Guard's plans address station
    readiness needs, we reviewed the Coast Guard's Boat Forces Strategic Plan,
    the agency's strategy for maintaining and improving essential operations
    capabilities for all boat units, including multimission stations.

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    We also reviewed the Department of Transportation OIG's assessment of the
    draft plan.75 To identify practices for effectively measuring program
    performance, we reviewed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
    of 1993,76 our prior work on results-oriented management,77 and Office of
    Management and Budget circulars.78

    We conducted our work between September 2003 and December 2004 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    75OIG, MH-2003-028.

    76GPRA of 1993 (P.L. 103-62).

    77See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
    Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996)
    and Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate
    Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16 (Washington, D.C.: May 1997, Version
    1).

    78Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, Part 6, Sections 200
    (Overview of Strategic Plans, Performance Budgets, and Performance and
    Accountability Reports) and 210 (Preparing a Strategic Plan: The Main
    Elements).

    Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

    This appendix presents additional information regarding the four
    categories of multimission station operations we reviewed-staffing,
    training, boats, and PPE. The appendix also contains additional
    information regarding the initiatives the Coast Guard has either started
    or plans to develop to address concerns in each of these categories.

      Staffing

    Survey of Station Workweek Hours

    The Coast Guard has initiated multiple efforts to address staffing
    concerns at multimission stations. This section provides additional
    information regarding Coast Guard (1) station survey results regarding
    workweek hours and (2) initiatives to address staffing concerns.

    Approximately 44 percent of the individuals who responded to the Coast
    Guard's 2003 station staffing survey indicated that they worked an average
    workweek that was in excess of the 68-hour standard (see table 9).79
    Approximately 6 percent of those questioned indicated they worked a
    standard 68-hour work week.

    Table 9: Workweek Results of August 2003 Station Survey

                    Average workweek hours       Number of responses      Percent
                                        84                       393
                                        77                       202
                                        68                        87
                                    Othera                       408
                           bNot applicable                       118
                            Did not answer                       158
                                     Total                     1,366

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    Note: Percentages do not total to 100 because of rounding.

    aIndicates individual worked some combination of hours other than the
    three listed (i.e., 68, 77, or 84).

    79Since 1991, with the exception of years 1999-2001, the Coast Guard has
    conducted an annual survey of station workweek hours. The Coast Guard has
    used the results of the survey to try to gauge changes in the average
    number of hours personnel work each week. In 2003, personnel at 77 of the
    188 stations were surveyed, with personnel from 64 stations responding (a
    total response rate of 54 percent of all personnel surveyed). One possible
    reason for this low response rate may be that nonrespondents did not have
    time to complete the survey, which could mean that workweek hours were
    under-reported. However, it is also possible that personnel who were
    working longer hours per week were more inclined to report that condition,
    leading to an over-reporting of workweek hours.

         Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

    bNumber of responses for which the question was not relevant, usually
    because the individual's schedule did not match the options provided.

    Initiatives to Address Staffing Table 10 presents additional information
    on initiatives the Coast Guard Concerns has under way or plans to develop
    with regard to station staffing needs.

    Table 10: Additional Examples of Implemented or Planned Initiatives to
    Address Station Staffing Needs

    Area of concern Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

    A shortage of personnel Staffing levels increased

    o  	To address a perceived shortage of personnel, in fiscal years 2002 and
    2003, the Coast Guard added 1,109 personnel to stations, an increase of 25
    percent. In fiscal year 2004, another 451 personnel were added to stations
    and command centers and 80 personnel to groups in support of station
    search and rescue activities. These increases addressed staffing
    inequities between stations, especially those with high operational tempos
    and high workweek hours. The Coast Guard reported in fiscal year 2003 that
    increased staffing levels had reduced the average workweek for station
    personnel by 3.18 percent from 1998 to 2002.

    Number of positions increased

    o  	The number of personnel assigned to stations exceeds the number of
    full-time positions authorized (in fiscal year 2003, the number of
    assigned personnel exceeded full-time positions by 885). To address this
    imbalance and better match the number of assigned positions with required
    operational tasking levels, the Coast Guard added 482 full-time positions
    to stations in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and an additional 317 positions
    in fiscal year 2004.

    Declining levels of experienced personnel Direct retention initiatives
    initiated

    o  	In fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard expended $5.9 million on 312
    selective reenlistment bonuses to station boatswain's mates and machinists
    ($4.2 million for boatswain's mates and $1.7 million to machinery
    technicians).

    o  	Between fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the surfman pay premium was
    increased by 33 percent.a

    o  	Beginning in fiscal year 2002, enlisted personnel have been entitled
    to a basic allowance for food.

    o  	The average portion of housing costs paid by personnel has decreased
    from 18.3 percent in fiscal year 2000 to 3.5 percent in 2004; in 2005,
    this expense will be reduced to zero.

    Indirect retention initiatives

    o  	Individual stations have also invested in projects that indirectly
    contribute to retention through improved staff morale. At our request, the
    Coast Guard asked 29 (15 percent) of the 188 multimission stations to
    provide data on estimated expenditures for such projects. The 24 stations
    that responded reported expenditures of $350,000 in fiscal year 2003 for
    infrastructure and lifestyle improvements such as new furniture, sports

                                           b

                         equipment, and entertainment systems.

         Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

    Area of concern Initiatives undertaken to address concerns

    Shortened tours of duty (high personnel Assignment practices modified

    turnover)  o  	New personnel assignment practices are being implemented to
    allow for increased tour lengths for surfman-qualified personnel and to
    reduce turnover in all personnel assignments.

    o  	Plans to set policy for average assignment length for enlisted
    personnel at grades E-4 through E-6 for 48 months or longer, or as
    identified for specific units.

    Inadequate mix of skills, expertise, and positions across stations

    Staffing mix being reconfigured

    o  	To ensure consistency across stations, address mission performance
    needs, and provide necessary skills, the Coast Guard concluded an
    occupation (rating) review in fiscal year 2001 and expects to begin
    reconfiguring the station staffing standard (staffing model) in fiscal
    year 2005.

    Number of specialized and senior positions increased

    o  	To ease the administrative burden on stations, in fiscal years
    2002-2004, the Coast Guard added 99 support positions (with 19 more
    needed).

    o  To better meet unit tasking and responsibilities, in fiscal years 2002
    and 2003, the

    c

    Coast Guard added 486 senior petty officer positions at stations.

    Positions filled with uncertified or Assignment and incentive systems
    being revised
    inexperienced personnel  o  Plans to establish officer and enlisted
    (boatswain's mate and machinist) career paths.

    o  Plans to base station assignments on position requirements and
    personnel experience.

    o  	Plans to identify work factors that reduce the incentive of personnel;
    develop ways to mitigate the impact of these factors on personnel.

    o  Develop motivation and incentive systems for personnel.

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    aA surfman is a coxswain-boat driver-who is qualified to pilot boats in
    heavy weather and high surf conditions.

    bAccording to a Coast Guard official, the source of funds for these
    improvements can be station, group, or district operating budgets or
    donations by Coast Guard support groups.

    cSenior personnel are considered to be petty officer 2nd class (E-5) and
    above.

      Training

    Initiatives to Increase Formal Since 2001, the Coast Guard has taken steps
    to increase training capacity Training Opportunities for at national
    training centers. Two efforts to expand formal training slots Station
    Personnel have been the reinstituting of the boatswain's mate training
    center and the

    implementation of response boat training courses. Additional information

    regarding training efforts are summarized in table 11.

    Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

    Table 11: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Training Needs Need
                                      Initiatives

    Boatswain's mate training Boatswain's mate training center reinstituted

    o  	Reinstituted the boatswain's mate training center in fiscal year 2002,
    which more than tripled the number of boatswain's mates training slots,
    from 120 in 2002 to 450 in fiscal year 2003, plans to train 800
    boatswain's mates in fiscal year 2005.

    Training capacity at boatswain's mate training center increased

    o  	Added four additional classrooms and personnel to the center in fiscal
    years 2003 and 2004 at a total cost of $3.5 million.

    o  	Condensed the training curriculum from 12 weeks in 2002 to 9 weeks in
    2003 to increase the number of students trained.

    Training center to augment on-the-job training established

    o  Established, at a cost of $960,000, a provisional training center in
    fiscal year 2003 to

    a

    augment station on-the-job training; trained 300 station personnel in
    2003.

    Training curriculum for station trainees amended

    o  	Initiated new training curriculum for boatswain's mate trainees at
    stations that better links tasks with qualification requirements and
    improves command cadre oversight of training efforts.

    Coxswain (boat driver) training On-site response boat training developed

    o  	Established training teams to provide on-site training to station
    personnel on boat handling techniques.

    Response boat driving course established

    o  	In fiscal year 2004, at a cost of $500,000, implemented a 2-week
    training course on driving and boat operations.b The Coast Guard expects
    to train approximately 100 students in fiscal year 2004 and projects it
    will train 300 students in fiscal year 2005.

    Surfman training Efforts to address shortage of qualified surfmen
    initiated

    o  	Instituted, at a cost of $667,000, a 2-year training program in fiscal
    year 2004 to expedite the surfman training process for 10 surfman
    trainees.

    New surfman training course established

    o  Established a new surfman training course in fiscal year 2004.

    Capacity at training center increased

    o  Expanded training facilities to add one new classroom at a cost of
    $500,000.

    Boat engineer training New engineering training course established

    o  Established a new 47-foot boat engineer-training course in 2004.

    Boarding officer and boarding team Formal law enforcement training
    expanded

    member training  o  	Initiated plans to increase training slots for
    boarding officers and boarding team members by over one-fourth between
    fiscal years 2004 and 2005.

    Law enforcement training center relocated to increase capacity

    o  	Relocated the Maritime Law Enforcement Center-which provides training
    to boarding officers and boarding team members-to the Federal Law
    Enforcement Training Center

    c

               at Charleston, South Carolina, at a cost of $2.2 million.

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    aThis training center also provides training to boatswain's mates assigned
    to cutters.

         Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

               Initiatives to Evaluate Station Personnel Knowledge Levels

    bFunds provided a new boat docking facilities and personal protective
    equipment for students.

    cThe Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, a component of the
    Department of Homeland Security, provides basic, advanced, specialized,
    and refresher training for law enforcement officers from 75 federal
    agencies. The Maritime Law Enforcement Center, which provides boarding
    officer and boarding team member training to all Coast Guard personnel,
    was relocated to increase capacity and to develop training partnerships
    with other federal agencies. Expenses included new boat facilities, a new
    training simulator, and the relocation of training boats.

    The Coast Guard has also taken steps to improve the way it evaluates job
    performance for station personnel. To monitor knowledge levels and provide
    insight on areas of training that may need improvement,80 every 2 years
    station personnel are tested on requisite areas of job performance.81 In
    an effort to improve how the examinations measure station personnel
    knowledge levels, the Coast Guard employed professional test writers in
    2004 to revise the examinations.82 Over the past few years test scores for
    station personnel have shown mixed trends. For example, between fiscal
    years 2002 and 2003 assessment results for boat drivers and motor lifeboat
    engineers improved somewhat, while results for crew members (boat
    personnel other than the boat driver or engineer) and for utility boat
    engineers decreased slightly. Coast Guard officials told us that they are
    exploring the reasons for these results, but in general, increases in test
    results can be attributed to improvements made in on-the-job training.
    Conversely, decreases can be attributed to a continued lack of experience

    80This exercise is in addition to the initial and recurring testing
    requirements that personnel face when they qualify for a rating and a job.
    As well as being required to recertify for their rating every 6 months,
    station personnel must be certified when they move to a new station.
    Station senior personnel are responsible for ensuring that on-the-job
    training satisfies training requirements.

    81Test scores are not tracked by individual and there are no consequences
    for a low score. Rather, results are examined in total, and low scores are
    used to examine the appropriateness of the training provided to stations
    in specific areas.

    82The Coast Guard administers separate examinations to station personnel,
    by type of boat, to three different groups: (1) boat drivers, (2)
    engineers, and (3) crew members. These examinations are in addition to the
    on-the-job training and formal training station personnel receive when
    training to qualify for a job. Written examinations assess overall
    training provided to station personnel through formal and on-the-job
    training. We did not evaluate the adequacy of the training provided to
    station personnel, as this was not identified as an area of concern in
    either the OIG or internal Coast Guard studies. In its 2001 report, the
    Inspector General highlighted that the Coast Guard does not assign a pass
    or fail score to examination results. In response, Coast Guard officials
    told us that the intent of the examinations is to assess stations' overall
    performance and not identify individual performance levels.

         Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

    on the part of junior personnel, the number of which have increased in the
    past few years, and to high levels of personnel turnover at stations.

    Boats 	Multimission station personnel use a variety of boats to support
    operations. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate three of the primary boats used by
    station personnel.

    Figure 3: Coast Guard 47-Foot Motor Lifeboat (left) and 41-Foot Utility
    Boat

                               Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

    Figure 4: Response Boat Small

    Source: GAO.

    The Coast Guard has made progress in replacing nonstandard and aging boats
    to support station operations. Table 12 presents additional information
    regarding the Coast Guard's initiatives to modernize stations' boat fleet.

    Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

      Table 12: Examples of Coast Guard Efforts to Address Station Boat Needs Need
                                      Initiatives

    a

    Aging and nonstandard small boats	New small boats acquired immediately
    after September 11 to address increased security responsibilities

    o  	Purchased 100 small response boats following the attacks of September
    11, to augment security capability at strategic ports and to replace
    nonstandard boats in a critical state of deterioration;b 50 went to
    stations and 50 to Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs).

    Multiyear contract to purchase small boats developed

    o  	In May 2003, the Coast Guard signed a contract allowing for the
    purchase of up to an additional 700 small response boats through fiscal
    year 2009, at a cost of $145 million. These boats are intended to replace
    the remainder of the aging nonstandard boats and to supplement stations'
    multimission response capability for search and rescue and homeland
    security operations. Boat acquisition is also a component of the Coast
    Guard's initiative to enhance security operations in support of its
    maritime strategy for homeland security.

    o  	As of January 2005, the Coast Guard had purchased 205 boats, with
    plans to purchase an additional 30 boats by March 2005. Of these, 31 went
    to MSSTs, 10 to training centers, and 164 to stations.

    Response boat training implemented

    o  	Implemented on-site training at stations and a 2-week course at the
    national boat training center to provide training in boat handling
    techniques.

    Aging medium-sized boats Efforts to replace medium boats initiated

    o  	Initiated efforts to replace 41-foot utility boats with a new medium
    response boat; requested $12 million in its fiscal year 2005 budget
    request to begin production on 6

    d

    boats.

    o  Tested three prototypes and expects to award a contract in 2005 for
    fleet replacement.

    Inspection of small boats Inspection teams for small boats instituted

    o  	In fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard instituted teams to inspect new
    standardized small boats, at a cost of $637,000 (includes a staff of eight
    inspectors).

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    aThe Coast Guard expects to replace approximately 300 of the 350
    nonstandard small boats in use at stations in 2001. Approximately 50
    nonstandard boats used by stations for unique geographic or
    weather-specific operational requirements-such as 14-foot skiffs and
    30-foot special purpose craft boats-will be retained.

    bThe Coast Guard purchased these boats in 2002 for stations and MSSTs to
    address port security responsibilities at strategic ports; they were not a
    part of the May 2003 contract Coast Guard developed to replace nonstandard
    boats.

    cThese boats are essentially the same as those purchased immediately after
    September 11-both are off-the-shelf.

    dThe Coast Guard has determined that the 41-foot utility boat-acquired
    between 1973 and 1980-is approaching the end of its service life.

    Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

    PPE 	As we previously reported,83 anecdotal and quantitative data indicate
    that as of fiscal year 2003 active and reserve station personnel possessed
    sufficient levels of PPE. During fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard spent
    $7.5 million to address PPE shortfalls for station personnel, of which
    $5.6 million came from specially designated funds. In fiscal year 2003,
    the cost of a total basic PPE outfit was $1,296. The cost of a cold
    weather PPE outfit, which is used by personnel working at stations where
    the outdoor temperature falls below 50 degrees Fahrenheit, was $1,431.
    (Fig. 5 shows a station crew member in cold weather PPE.) According to the
    Coast Guard, personnel at 135 (72 percent) of the 188 multimission
    stations require cold weather PPE in addition to basic PPE.

    Figure 5: Station Crew Member Wearing Cold Weather PPE

                               Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    Despite indications that the Coast Guard had met its goal in fiscal year
    2003 of providing sufficient amounts of PPE to all active duty and reserve
    station personnel, concerns remain as to whether the Coast Guard will
    provide sufficient funding for station PPE in the future. The Coast
    Guard's processes for estimating station PPE needs and allocating funds
    have historically resulted in an under funding of station PPE. See table
    13 for concerns regarding the Coast Guard's processes and practices for
    allocating funds for station PPE.

    83See GAO, Coast Guard: Station Spending Requirements Met, but Better
    Processes Needed to Track Designated Funds, GAO-04-704 (Washington, D.C.:
    May 28, 2004).

         Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs

    Table 13: Concerns Regarding Coast Guard Processes and Practices for Identifying
                   and Funding Station PPE Needs Concern Explanation

    Forecasting models do not recognize PPE  o  Officials told us that
    historically the amount of funds allocated each fiscal year for funding
    needs for personnel assigned over station PPE was not sufficient to fund
    the estimated needs of all personnel.a Because and above the number of
    designated the forecasting models are predicated on the number of
    positions designated rather positions than the number of personnel
    assigned, it does not recognize PPE funding needs for

    personnel assigned over and above the designated number of positions.

    o  	In fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard allocated $5.6 million to address
    PPE shortfalls at stations but did not adjust its forecasting models.b
    Officials told us that in addition to receiving specific PPE allocations
    for designated positions, each year stations receive general operating
    funds, which can be used toward PPE for personnel assigned over and above
    the designated number of positions.

    Historically the Coast Guard has funded approximately half of all PPE
    needs associated with designated positions  o  According to officials, the
    Coast Guard has historically funded between 50 and 60

    c

    percent of the identified recurring PPE costs for designated positions. In
    fiscal year 2004, approximately 55 percent of estimated PPE needs
    associated with designated active and reserve positions were funded,
    leaving a shortfall of approximately $6 million in estimated needs.

            Assumptions used in forecasting models have not been validatedd

    o  	According to officials, the assumptions used in PPE forecasting models
    were based on input from station personnel and have not been validated or
    reassessed in light of current operations.

    Units are not required to spend allocated  o  According to officials, the
    total amount of funds allocated for PPE are distributed

    PPE funds on PPE	among stations and their oversight units, but in the
    interests of command flexibility units are not required to spend these
    funds on PPE.e When stations need PPE, they are to communicate this need
    to the oversight units.

    o  	According to the former PPE program manager, it is possible that
    oversight units may not pass the funds onto stations as intended (i.e.,
    the amount allocated for PPE may not be the amount expended). To address
    this possibility, in recent years the official had disclosed to stations
    the total amount of PPE funding available to them, including funds held by
    oversight units.

    Coast Guard headquarters does not track  o  Although the Coast Guard
    tracks overall PPE expenditures, the category tracked

    the expenditure of survival PPE funds 	includes items other than survival
    PPE, such as body armor and toxic mask protectors. It is the
    responsibility of field commanders to ensure that station PPE requirements
    are met.

    Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.

    aIn its fiscal year 2002 audit (MH-2003-028, p. 5), the OIG reported that
    the Coast Guard did not provide PPE funding for 69 percent of the
    personnel added to stations during fiscal year 2002.

    bIn fiscal year 2003, Coast Guard allocated $5.6 million in designated
    appropriation funds for PPE purchases. According to officials, fiscal year
    2003 was the first year in which the Coast Guard provided PPE funds for
    personnel assigned to stations over and above designated positions.

    cIn fiscal year 2003, the forecasting models estimated PPE needs of $3.2
    million for personnel in designated positions, but the Coast Guard
    initially allocated $1.8 million, or 56 percent, of the identified need to
    fund PPE.

    dAccording to officials, the forecasting models assume that PPE for active
    duty station personnel will need to be replaced every 3 years, PPE for
    reserve personnel every 5 years, and PPE for auxiliary personnel every 7
    years.

    eAs an exception to this practice, in fiscal year 2003, Coast Guard
    headquarters advised field units that the additional $5.6 million could be
    used only for the purchase of station PPE.

    Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contacts

      Staff Acknowledgments

    (440334)

    Margaret T. Wrightson (415) 904-2200
    Steven N. Calvo (206) 287-4839

    In addition to those named above, Randy B. Williamson, Barbara A. Guffy,
    Joel Aldape, Marisela Perez, Stan G. Stenersen, Dorian R. Dunbar,
    Ben Atwater, Michele C. Fejfar, Elizabeth H. Curda, and Ann H. Finley
    made key contributions to this report.

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