Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need	 
Better Integration (28-JAN-05, GAO-05-157).			 
                                                                 
Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for	 
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former	 
Soviet Union (FSU). These programs have played a key role in	 
addressing the threats of weapons of mass destruction and are	 
currently expanding beyond the FSU. The National Defense	 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandated that GAO assess  
(1) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE)	 
strategies guiding their threat reduction and nonproliferation	 
programs and (2) efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and Department  
of State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that	 
share similar missions. 					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-157 					        
    ACCNO:   A16096						        
  TITLE:     Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs   
Need Better Integration 					 
     DATE:   01/28/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Chemical and biological agents			 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International relations				 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Nuclear proliferation				 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Agency missions					 
	     Border security					 
	     Program coordination				 
	     DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program		 
	     Soviet Union					 

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GAO-05-157

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                     GAO Report to Congressional Committees

January 2005

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

               Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration

                                       a

GAO-05-157

[IMG]

January 2005

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration

                                 What GAO Found

GAO found that there is no overall strategy that integrates the threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs of the DOD, DOE, and others. DOD
and DOE have strategies governing their respective programs, which
generally contain the elements of a strategy as established by the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. These strategies include a
mission statement and goals, identify external factors that could affect
meeting these goals, establish metrics to evaluate the performance of the
programs, provide cost estimates, and cover a period of at least 5 years.
Given the involvement of multiple agencies, and the expansion of the
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs beyond the FSU, integration
of agencies' strategies is important.

The agencies' implementation of very similar programs has not always been
well coordinated. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are
distinct, GAO found three program areas that perform similar functions in
the FSU. GAO found that the coordination of programs enhancing security at
Russian nuclear warhead sites improved after the National Security Council
(NSC) staff issued guidance. Specifically, the guidance delineates
agencies' roles, interactions, and ways to resolve disputes. The
biological weapons scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State
are well coordinated and also have NSC staff guidance addressing roles,
interactions, and disputes. By contrast, there is no governmentwide
guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing
border security programs. According to DOD and DOE officials managing
these programs, agencies' roles are not well delineated and coordination
could be improved.

DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Program Areas

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
DOD and DOE Strategic Plans for Threat Reduction and

Nonproliferation Programs Are Not Integrated and Do Not Address U.S.
Programs Worldwide

NSC Staff Guidance Delineating Agencies' Roles, Information Sharing, and
Dispute Resolution Results in Improved Program Coordination

Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments
Scope and Methodology

1 3 4

7

17 22 23 24 24

Appendixes

Appendix I:

Appendix II:

Appendix III:

                                        Appendix IV: Appendix V: Appendix VI:

DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Projects, Fiscal Year 2004

DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the Performance of
Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs

DOD, DOE, and State Department Projects Addressing
Similar Missions

Comments from the Department of Energy

Comments from the Department of Defense

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts
Staff Acknowledgments

27

31

34

36

39

41 41 41

Related GAO Products

Tables      Table 1: Selected GPRA Criteria for Strategic Planning       8 
          Table 2: Calls for Governmentwide Plans for Threat Reduction and 
                             Nonproliferation Programs                     16 
               Table 3: Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction 
                                      Projects                             27 
            Table 4: Department of Energy Nonproliferation Projects within 
                          Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation                 29 
                      Table 5: DOD and DOE Performance Metrics             31 

Contents

Table 6: DOD and DOE Warhead Security Projects 34 Table 7: DOD, DOE, and
State Biological Weapons Scientist

Employment Projects 34 Table 8: Overview of Border Security Projects 35

Figures Figure 1:  DOD Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning     
                                      for the CTR Program                   9
           Figure 2:  DOE Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning  
                                              for                          
                                   Nonproliferation Programs               12 
           Figure 3:   DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation   
                                         Program Areas                     18 

Abbreviations

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction
DNN Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
FSU former Soviet Union
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
NSC National Security Council
WMD weapons of mass destruction

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

January 28, 2005

The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU).
These programs encompass a range of projects, including removing nuclear
weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; securing nuclear materials
and warheads in Russia; and paying former weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) scientists to engage in peaceful research. The National Security
Council (NSC) staff has the principal role in coordinating the many U.S.
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that are implemented
primarily through the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE),
although the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland Security
implement related programs. DOD and DOE threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs have played a key role in addressing the threats
posed by WMD in the FSU; these efforts have expanded in size and scope
beyond the FSU states. For example, the United States recently provided
assistance to dismantle WMD infrastructure in Libya, and DOE recently
announced a new program to provide employment opportunities for Iraqi
weapons scientists. Furthermore, in November 2003, the Congress authorized
DOD to allow the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to spend up to
$50 million annually of its existing funding to address proliferation
threats outside the FSU. A bill pending in the Senate would allow DOD
increased flexibility to undertake nonproliferation projects outside of
the FSU.1

1S. 2980, 108th Congress, 2nd Session.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20042 mandated that
we assess the current management of DOD and DOE threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs. We agreed to approach this assessment in two
phases. First, this report assesses (1) DOD and DOE strategies guiding
their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and how
they are integrated with those of other agencies and (2) efforts to
coordinate the implementation of DOD, DOE, and State threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs that share similar missions, goals, and
activities. We included State in assessing the coordination of threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs because it shares responsibility
in coordinating two programs. In the second phase, we plan to issue
individual reports on DOD and DOE internal controls for their threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs. A list of our prior reports
concerning DOD and DOE threat reduction and nonproliferation programs is
included at the end of this report.

To assess DOD and DOE strategies guiding their respective threat reduction
and nonproliferation programs, we assessed the agencies' strategic
plansagainst criteria established by the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). We also relied on our previous reviews of the
CTR program in DOD and nonproliferation programs in DOE. Furthermore, we
met with officials at DOD, DOE, and State and reviewed documents to
determine if a plan exists that integrates the implementation strategies
of DOD, DOE, and other agencies. To assess efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE,
and State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, we reviewed
agency documents and interviewed agency officials. DOD officials included
the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and
Counterproliferation and other senior leaders. DOE officials included the
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and other senior
leaders. We spoke with State Department officials in the Office of the
Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and the Bureau of
Nonproliferation. Although NSC officials did not respond to our requests
to meet, we were able to meet our audit objectives by obtaining records
and having discussions with DOD, DOE, and State officials regarding the
role of the NSC staff and the extent of its participation in coordinating
programs. Additionally, we provided a draft of this report to NSC staff to
obtain their comments. We performed our review in Washington, D.C., from
February 2004 to November 2004 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

2Public Law 108-136, Section 3611.

Results in Brief	While both DOD and DOE have individual strategies
governing their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs,
there is no overall strategy that integrates these plans with one another,
or with those of other agencies. DOD and DOE individual strategies
generally contain the elements of a plan developed using GPRA criteria.
These strategies include a mission statement and goals, identify external
factors that could affect meeting these goals, establish metrics to
evaluate the performance of the programs, provide cost estimates, and
cover a period of at least 5 years. In 2004, DOD and DOE implemented 39
threat reduction and nonproliferation projects costing approximately $1.8
billion. While it is important and valuable for DOD and DOE to have
strategies to guide their respective programs, the expansion of these
programs beyond the FSU and the involvement of multiple agencies make
integration of all agencies' strategies important. Since the mid-1990s,
the Congress, GAO, and others3 have called for the executive branch to
develop governmentwide plans to coordinate U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs worldwide. The NSC staff and State have prepared
plans in response to these calls, but these plans either focus solely on
one agency or on one geographic location. Therefore, these plans do not
address U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs worldwide.

The agencies' implementation of similar threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs has not always been well coordinated.
Coordination requires a delineation of each agency's roles and
responsibilities, regularized interactions, and clear procedures for
resolving interagency disputes. While the majority of programs in DOD and
DOE have distinct missions, we identified one area where DOD and DOE
programs share similar missions, goals, and activities and two areas
shared by DOD, DOE, and State. Both DOD and DOE have programs to improve
the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are stored. Warhead
security programs experienced coordination problems in the past because
DOD and DOE were pursuing different approaches to securing nuclear warhead
sites in Russia.4 On the basis of our review of NSC staff guidance

3Other calls for governmentwide planning include the President's National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Baker-Cutler
Commission, and the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal
Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the
Deutch Commission).

4GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed
to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites,
GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003).

and discussions with programs officials, coordination improved when
guidance specified agencies' roles, interactions, and ways to resolve
disputes. DOD, DOE, and State have programs employing former biological
weapons scientists and enhancing the ability of countries to secure their
borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. The biological weapons
scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well coordinated
and have NSC staff guidance addressing roles, interactions, and disputes.
Furthermore, DOD, DOE, and State Department officials were satisfied with
the coordination of these programs. However, coordination of DOD, DOE, and
State border security programs could be improved. DOD and DOE officials
managing border security programs stated that agencies' roles are not
defined, information sharing is infrequent, and there are no procedures to
resolve differences among agencies.

We are recommending (1) that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in
consultation with other agencies that manage threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs, develop an integrated plan for all U.S. threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs to ensure that the programs are
effectively coordinated and (2) that the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, through the NSC staff, issue clear guidance for
the coordination of DOD, DOE, and State Department border security
programs, as it has done with programs to employ former biological weapons
scientists and warhead security.

DOE agreed with the recommendations in this report, while State and the
NSC staff did not comment on them. DOD concurred with the need for better
integrated threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but did not
specify whether it agreed with the need for an integrated plan. DOD
concurred with the recommendation for NSC staff guidance governing border
security programs. DOD, DOE, and State provided technical comments that we
incorporated as appropriate.

Background	After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited
the world's largest arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
As Russia adopted economic reforms and moved toward an open society, its
economy and central controls deteriorated, thereby making it difficult to
maintain security at its weapons sites. Recognizing these difficulties,
the Congress began authorizing funds in 1992 for programs to help destroy
Russian weapons and improve WMD security. More recently, the events of
September 11, 2001, have increased U.S. concerns that terrorists might

obtain WMD materials or weapons at poorly secured sites. While DOD and DOE
implement most of the U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs,
the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland Security implement
related programs.

The Congress established DOD's CTR program in 1992 to reduce the WMD
threat posed to the United States from weapons remaining in the FSU. The
program was designed to assist the FSU in securing and destroying WMD and
its means of delivery.5 Initial CTR assistance was provided to Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, which had inherited the majority of the
Soviet Union's WMD. The program helped Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
remove nuclear weapons from their soil, eliminating the potential
emergence of three additional nuclear states. CTR also facilitated
Russia's efforts to reduce its massive nuclear weapons arsenal and address
its arms control commitments. In fiscal year 2004, CTR had 22 projects
(see app. I). One of the newest CTR projects-the WMD Proliferation
Prevention Initiative-is designed to strengthen the ability of non-Russian
FSU states to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and
related materials. For example, DOD is providing equipment and training to
Uzbekistan to enhance its ability to monitor its borders for illegal
transport of radioactive material. Additionally, the CTR program has
expanded outside of the FSU, as DOD will use CTR funds to help Albania
eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile. Furthermore, a bill introduced
in the Senate in November 2004 would grant DOD additional flexibility to
expand the CTR program outside the FSU. DOD implements the CTR program
through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which receives policy
guidance from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

In 1993, DOE began implementing programs funded by DOD, to help secure
weapons-usable nuclear materialsin the FSU. DOE also received fundingin
1994 from State to employ former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers
in cooperative research projects with U.S. laboratories and industry to
deter their employment by rogue states. In 1996, with the growth of these
programs, funding shifted directly to DOE. These programs remained focused
on the FSU and were spread throughout DOE. In October 1999, DOE's
nonproliferation programs were consolidated within the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA).6 Since that time, NNSA's

5Missiles, bombers, and missile carrying submarines may deliver WMD. 6NNSA
also manages DOE's nuclear weapons and naval reactors programs.

nonproliferation mission has been implemented by the Office of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), which seeks to detect, prevent, and
reverse WMD proliferation. This mission has now expanded to address
proliferation threats in more than 70 countries to prevent the spread of
WMD. For example, DNN is initiating a new program to provide employment
opportunities to Iraqi scientists, technicians, and engineers. In fiscal
year 2004, DOE had 19 projects addressing nonproliferation threats
worldwide (see app. I). The threat reduction and nonproliferation programs
have evolved from a $400 million DOD program in 1992 to approximately $1.8
billion in programs at DOD and DOE in 2004.7

The State Department also manages its own nonproliferation programs and
coordinates U.S. assistance to the FSU. In 1992, the Freedom Support Act8
established the Office of the Coordinator within the State Department to
coordinate U.S. assistance to the FSU. The coordinator's responsibilities
include resolving program and policy disputes among U.S. government
agencies regarding their programs in the FSU. In 1994, State and DOD
established the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow to
fund peaceful research carried out by otherwise underpaid weapons
scientists.9 The center supplements the income of scientists, purchases
equipment for scientific research, and supports programs to help
scientists identify and develop commercially viable research projects. In
1996, the Congress established State's Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs Account to fund programs addressing the
spread of WMD. For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
supports projects to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery
systems, and related materials.

NSC staff coordinates U.S. policy for threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs and conducted reviews of these programs that
validated the need

7In 2004, DOD programs were appropriated $451 million and DOE programs
were appropriated $1.33 billion, which includes funds for programs in the
United States, the FSU, and countries outside the FSU. Although the DOD
and DOE budget data are being used for background purposes only, we
assessed the reliability of these data and found they were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report.

8Public Law 102-511.

9A similar center was also established in Ukraine.

to maintain them in 2001 and 2002.10 The Proliferation Strategy Policy
Coordinating Committee, chaired by the Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and
Homeland Defense, sets general policy for U.S. nonproliferation programs.
NSC staff establishes guidelines but does not implement programs or
control their budgets.

DOD and DOE Strategic Plans for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Programs Are Not Integrated and Do Not Address U.S. Programs Worldwide

DOD and DOE prepare their own individual strategies to implement their
respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but there is no
governmentwide strategy that integrates them with one another or with
those of other agencies that implement threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs.11 We found that DOD and DOE strategies to
address security issues for their authorized agency missions generally
meet selected criteria for strategic planning established by GPRA.
Recognizing the importance of coordinating U.S. efforts, using resources
effectively,and enhancing agencies' abilities to anticipate growing
nonproliferation concerns, the Congress, GAO, and others have required or
recommended integrated planning among DOD, DOE, and other agencies' threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs. NSC staff and State created plans
in response to the above requirements and recommendations, but these plans
either focus solely on one agency or on one geographic location.
Furthermore, these programs are expanding beyond the FSU and may
potentially involve the response of multiple U.S. agencies.

10The 2001 review focused on programs implemented in Russia; the 2002
review focused on programs in non-Russian FSU states.

11Other agencies involved in threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs include the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland
Security.

DOD and DOE Strategies for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs
Generally Meet Criteria Established by the Government Performance and
Results Act

DOD and DOE each have strategic plans governing their respective threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs.12 We found that each agency's
strategic plan generally meets the selected GPRA criteria for strategic
planning. See table 1 for a listing of the selected GPRA criteria.
Additionally, we found that DOD and DOE have their own methods to
prioritize their respective activities and programs. Furthermore, DOD and
DOE threat reduction and nonproliferation programs undergo periodic
internal and external reviews to improve program management.

             Table 1: Selected GPRA Criteria for Strategic Planning

Strategic plan element Description

Mission	A comprehensive and concise statement describing the basic purpose
of the agency, with a particular focus on its major agency functions and
operations

Goals	Provide clear direction to the work, services, programs, and
activities of an organization and desired outcomes

External factors	Describe the broader environment that can influence
inputs, outputs, and outcomes, such as policy or economic changes

Performance metrics	Provide a succinct and concrete statement of expected
performance for subsequent comparison with actual performance

Cost estimates Describe the resources required to achieve the goals

Covers 5 years A strategic plan covers a period of at least 5 years
forward

Source: GAO analysis of GPRA.

Department of Defense The CTR Policy Office, in conjunction with DTRA,
produces and updates a Cooperative Threat Reduction strategy for the CTR
program.13 We found that this strategy generally Planning contains the
elements of a strategic plan developed using GPRA criteria.

Additionally, all CTR projects develop detailed plans that also contain
these elements. Figure 1 depicts DOD offices that are involved in
strategic planning for the CTR programs.

12The agencies have a variety of planning documents-such as strategies,
annual plans, and multiyear project plans-which we refer to collectively
as strategic plans.

13The CTR Policy Office is located within the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Figure 1: DOD Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for the CTR
Program

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

In accordance with GPRA, the CTR program's mission statement is
comprehensive and concise: that is, to prevent the proliferation of WMD
and related materials, technologies, and expertise from FSU states-
including providing for the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD, associated
delivery systems, and related infrastructure. The CTR program's strategy
also includes the following specific goals: (1) dismantle FSU WMD and
associated infrastructure, (2) consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related
technology and materials, (3) increase transparency and encourage higher
standards of conduct, and (4) support defense and military cooperation
with the objective of preventing proliferation. These goals provide clear
direction to the activities and desired outcomes of the CTR program.

The CTR strategy also cites external factors that could affect the
program, describes how performance will be measured, and states budget
requirements. For example, the level of Russian cooperation is cited as an
external factor that will affect the successful implementation of the
program. The strategy provides metrics by which performance of the program
can be measured, such as the number of missiles destroyed. DOD and DOE
performance metrics are shown in appendix II. In accordance with GPRA
criteria, the CTR plans include cost estimates and cover a period of 5
years. For example, the overall CTR funding request for fiscal year 2005
is $409 million, and the 5-year plan calls for an additional $1.5 billion
between fiscal years 2006 and 2009.

The CTR program has five program areas, with several projects under each
program area. Each project has a plan that details its broad mission,
specific objectives, external factors that could affect the achievement of
these objectives, metrics that are used to evaluate the performance of the
project, and cost estimates. For example, the mission of the Automated
Inventory Control and Management System project, under the nuclear weapons
safety and security program area, is to enhance Russia's capability to
account for and track the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons scheduled
for dismantlement. Specific objectives include installing hardware and
software at 18 sites within Russia and providing initial training and data
entry. External factors cited for this program include whether Russia will
grant sufficient access to the sites and improve the equipment storage
conditions. The project uses milestone dates, which range from the
procurement of the software to the final certification of the system at
all sites, as one method to measure its performance. The project is
estimated to cost $50.2 million.

Additionally, according to agency officials, DOD has not had to prioritize
CTR projects on the basis of available funds. The CTR program generally
receives the funding requested for its projects. DOD develops its budget
request for the CTR program on the basis of funding needed to continue
existing programs and implement new programs. As a result, projects have
not competed for funding.

Furthermore, the CTR program has undergone internal performance reviews in
order to improve management practices. In 2003, the CTR Policy Office
conducted a 6-month, project-by-project review of the program that changed
the scope of several CTR projects to ensure that program activities met
threat reduction goals. The review also resulted in a decision to stop
funding activities that did not contribute directly to threat reduction

goals. For example, the CTR program no longer funds the restoration of the
environment surrounding missile sites but continues to fund the
elimination of the nuclear missiles and silos.

The CTR program also has undergone several external reviews to identify
areas needing improvement. For example, in 1996, we recommended that no
funds should be obligated for constructing a chemical weapons destruction
facility in Russia until reliable cost estimates were completed.14 (See
prior GAO reports listed at the end of this report.) The DOD Inspector
General also recommended that the CTR program adopt numerous controls to
improve program management. For example, the DOD Inspector General
recommended amendments to CTR program implementing agreements with Russia
to ensure that Russia provides its weapons systems and their components
scheduled for destruction, that it grants access rights to DOD, and that
it is penalized for failure to use DOD assistance. As a result of this
recommendation, DOD required Russia to sign an agreement specifying that
all of Russia's declared nerve agents could be destroyed at a facility
under construction by the CTR program.15 However, DOD did not include a
penalty for noncompliance.

Department of Energy DNN produces a broad strategy for DOE's
nonproliferation programs, and

Nonproliferation Planning	DNN's six program offices prepare strategic
plans for their projects. Collectively, these plans generally contain the
elements of a strategic plan developed using GPRA criteria. Figure 2
depicts DOE offices that are involved in strategic planning for DOE's
nonproliferation programs.

14GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, GAO/NSIAD-96-222 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 1996).

15Department of Defense Inspector General, Cooperative Threat Reduction:
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition
Project, Report No. D-2002-154 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2002) and
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Cooperative Threat Reduction Construction
Projects, Report No. D-2004-039 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003).

Figure 2: DOE Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for
Nonproliferation Programs

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

In accordance with GPRA, DNN's strategic plan clearly states its mission-
which is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear weaponsusable
and radiological materials, technologies, and expertise. This plan also
describes broad goals for its nonproliferation mission. For example, one
of its goals is to secure nuclear and radiological materials at
potentially vulnerable sites overseas. DNN's plan identifies external
factors that could affect its program goals, such as delays in its program
to employ weapons scientists due to lengthy Russian government clearance
procedures.

Although DNN's strategic plan does not list performance measures for each
of its nonproliferation projects, DNN maintains a database of goals and
performance metrics for each of its six program areas. For example, to
measure performance in preventing the migration of WMD expertise, DNN
tracks the annual number of former Soviet weapons scientists, engineers,
and technicians engaged by its programs. Appendix II contains performance
metrics for DOE's nonproliferation. In accordance with GPRA criteria, DNN
plans include cost estimates and cover a period of 5 years. For example,
DNN is requesting $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2005 and is projectedto
request an additional $5.7 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2009.

In the past, DNN generally received requested funding for its
nonproliferation programs, but as the scope of these programs expanded,
DNN began to prioritize projects within program areas, according to agency
officials. In fiscal year 2004, DOE first applied several criteria, such
as risk, availability of funding, and legal obligations, to prioritize
projects. The criteria were used to identify activities with the greatest
proliferation risk, on which DOE focused its resources. For example, in
fiscal year 2004, Russia provided access to more nuclear warhead storage
sites than originally planned. DOE diverted funds from lower priority
activities, such as converting weapons-grade uranium16 to uranium that
cannot be used in weapons,17 in order to fund security enhancements at the
new nuclear warhead storage sites.

DNN's nonproliferation programs have undergone internal and external
reviews to identify areas needing improvement. The NNSA Under Secretary
biannually reviews each program's budget, accomplishments, and any other
concerns. DOE also uses the results of external audits to identify areas
needing improvement. For example, audits conducted by the DOE Inspector
General have recommended improvementsto NNSA's process for matching
program requirements with budgetary resources and managing the program to
eliminate weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. In addition, we have
conducted numerous reviews of various aspects of DOE's nonproliferation
programs. For example, in 2001, we found duplication between DOE's two
programs to employ former weapons scientists in Russia and recommended
consolidating the programs.18 In response, DOE merged the programs into a
new program, the Russian Transition Initiatives.

16Weapons-grade uranium is also known as highly enriched uranium.

17Uranium that cannot be used in weapons is also known as low enriched
uranium.

18GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons
Scientists in Russia's Nuclear Cities Face Challenges, GAO-01-429
(Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).

The Congress and Others Have Called for a Governmentwide Plan, but None
Has Been Developed to Address U.S. Programs Worldwide

Since the mid-1990s, the Congress and others have called for the executive
branch to develop governmentwide plans to govern threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs. The Congress found that although U.S.
nonproliferation efforts in the FSU have achieved important results in
securing WMD materials, technology, and knowledge, the effectiveness of
these efforts has suffered from a lack of coordination within and among
agencies.19 Recognizing the importance of integrated planning of threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs, the Congress required the
executive branch to develop three plans. To comply with the requirements
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as
amended,20 the President submitted a plan and an annual report on the
implementation of the plan covering all agency efforts to secure nuclear
weapons, material, and expertise in the FSU. This plan addressed the
specific requirements of the legislation, including identifying the goals
and objectives of the programs and strategies for terminating U.S.
contributions to the programs.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 requires (1) the
State Department to provide the appropriate congressional committees with
a 3-year international arms control and nonproliferation strategy and (2)
the President to provide the Congress with a plan detailing coordination
of nonproliferation programs.21 State submitted the 3-year international
arms control and nonproliferation strategy to the Congress in August 2003.
The strategy focuses on the State Department's programs and activities,
discusses broad U.S. arms control and nonproliferation goals, and
describes State's efforts under way to achieve these goals. For the
coordination plan, the Congress required the establishment of an
interagency committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of
Defense, Energy, State, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Attorney
General and other officials that the President deems necessary. This
committee will exercise responsibility for coordinating all U.S. threat
reduction efforts and enhance the U.S. government's ability to anticipate

19Public Law 107-228, Section 1332. 20Public Law 107-107, Section 1205;
Public Law 107-314, Section 1205. 21Public Law 107-228, Section 1309.

growing nonproliferation areas of concern. This committee is required to
submit a coordination plan in May 2005.22

In past work, we found that the development of a governmentwide strategy
could strengthen the coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs.23 The strategy should identify overall goals, time frames for
meeting those goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating resources
governmentwide to address all U.S. nonproliferation concerns.

The executive branch also called for the development of a governmentwide
plan for U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs.
Specifically, the President's National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction of 2002 calls on the Proliferation Strategy Policy
Coordinating Committee, chaired by NSC staff, to prepare a 5-year
governmentwide plan by March 2003.24 To achieve greater efficiency through
program coordination, the strategy stated that this governmentwide plan
should include all threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the
FSU that are funded wholly or in part by the U.S. government. As of
November 2004, the plan had yet to be developed.

In addition, independent panels have also called for the development of
governmentwide plans. In 1998, the Congress established the Commission to
Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Deutch Commission),
which recommended coordinated and consistent governmentwide strategies to
address nonproliferation threats to the United States. In 2001, the
Baker-Cutler Commission, established by the Secretary of Energy,
recommended the development of a national strategic plan to secure all
Russian nuclear weapons-useable material and prevent WMD expertise from
leaving Russia. No reports have been developed that address either
commission's recommendations. Table 2 is a listing of the various calls
for governmentwide plans and their status.

22The legislation calls for a report to be submitted to the Congress 120
days after each presidential inauguration.

23GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Coordination of U.S. Programs Designed to
Reduce the Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction, GAO-02-180T
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2001).

24For our assessment of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction of 2002, see Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).

        Table 2: Calls for Governmentwide Plans for Threat Reduction and
                           Nonproliferation Programs

                Report name/Requester Requirement/Summary Status

National Defense Requires the President to submit a plan and an annual
report on Authorization Act for fiscal the implementation of the plan for
all agency efforts to secure year 2002, as amended nuclear weapons and
materials and prevent the outflow of WMD

expertise from the FSU.

Initial strategy was due in June 2002 and the annual report on
implementation was due in January 2003, and annually thereafter.

Both the strategy and 2003 annual plan were delivered late to the Congress
on March 11, 2003.

As of November 2004, the 2004 annual implementation report had not been
delivered.

Foreign Relations  Requires the State Department to       State Department 
                      submit a 3-year international        sent report to the 
Authorization Act,  arms control and nonproliferation  Congress on August  
         fiscal            strategy for reducing and           11, 2003.      
       year 2003       controlling the proliferation of   
                         WMD, which includes (1) U.S.     
                      goals for arms control and          
                      nonproliferation of WMD and (2) a   
                        description of State Department   
                             programs intended to         
                            accomplish these goals.       

Foreign Relations Requires the President to submit a strategy to
coordinate the Report is not due until 120 days after the 	Authorization
Act, fiscal threat reduction and nonproliferation objectives of the
executive 2005 inauguration. 	year 2003 branch agencies. 	

National Strategy     Requires the Proliferation     Plan was due in March 
           to           Strategy Policy Coordinating            2003.         
       Combat WMD         Committee to develop a 5-year 
                      plan for all threat reduction and 
                      nonproliferation programs in the  No plan was delivered 
                                    FSU.                       as of November 
                                                                2004.         
Deutch Commission  Recommends developing coordinated    No deadline for    
                               and consistent                submission.      
                      governmentwide strategies that    
                      include country-specific, long-   
                      term plans to reduce the demands  No plan was delivered 
                                  for WMD.                     as of November 
                                                                2004.         

Baker-Cutler CommissionRecommends a plan for securing all nuclear
weapons-usable No deadline for submission. material in Russia and to
prevent the outflow of scientific expertise that could be used for nuclear
or other WMD, which No plan was delivered as of November includes clearly
defined goals and measurable objectives, 2004. associated budgets for each
program, and criteria for success.

Source: GAO description of legislation and reports related to
nonproliferation programs.

None of the existing plans in table 2 integrates agencies' plans with one
another or addresses U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs
worldwide. For example, the plan developed as a result of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 did not address programs to
secure and eliminate chemical weapons in Russia or the infrastructure used
to develop chemical and biological weapons throughout the FSU.

Similarly, the 2003 arms control plan that State prepared addressed U.S.
arms controls efforts, but the plan is limited to a description of DOE's
programs for addressing these goals.

NSC Staff Guidance Delineating Agencies' Roles, Information Sharing, and
Dispute Resolution Results in Improved Program Coordination

On the basis of our review of NSC staff guidance and discussions with DOD
and DOE officials, we found that coordination among programs that share
similar missions, goals, and activities is improved when each agency's
roles and responsibilities are delineated, information sharing is
formalized, and procedures for resolving interagency disputes are clear.
While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, three program
areas perform similar functions in the FSU: (1) improving the security of
sites where Russian nuclear warheads are stored, (2) employing former
biological weapons scientists, and (3) enhancing the ability of countries
to secure their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. The
warhead security programs implemented by DOD and DOE were not well
coordinated in the past, but NSC staff guidance that describes each
agency's role, formalizes meetings, and establishes a dispute resolution
process has improved coordination, according to agency officials. DOD,
DOE, and State officials in the biological weapons scientists programs
understand each agency's roles and responsibilities, meet monthly, and
follow dispute resolution procedures as described in governmentwide
guidance for this program area. By contrast, there is no governmentwide
guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing
border security programs. As a result, DOD and DOE officials managing
border security programs stated that agencies' roles are not defined,
information sharing is infrequent, and there are no procedures to resolve
differences among agencies.

Most DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs Are
Distinct

We found that most threat reduction and nonproliferation projects in DOD
and DOE have distinct missions, goals, and activities. DOD's CTR program
has few projects that are similar to those in DOE and State. Figure 3
folds DOD's projects into broader program areas and distinguishes those
distinct program areas from those that are similar. First, DOD has several
projects in the FSU to destroy strategic weapons systems such as bombers,
missiles, and submarines. Second, DOD funds the safe and secure transport
of the Russian nuclear warheads scheduled for elimination. Third, DOD is
constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye to help
eliminate Russia's declared stockpile of nerve agents. Fourth, DOD is
assisting in the elimination of WMD infrastructure by, for example,

dismantling biological weapons facilities in Kazakhstan. Finally, the CTR
program engages in projects that facilitate contact between U.S. and FSU
defense and military personnel. Program events include conferences,
seminars, and combined military exercises designed to strengthen defense
partnerships between the United States and FSU states.

Figure 3: DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Program Areas

               Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.

aCurrently, DOD only has programs employing biological weapons scientists,
whereas DOE and State's programs employ chemical, nuclear, missile, and
biological weapons scientists.

We also found that most DOE projects have distinct missions, goals, and
activities addressing the proliferation threat posed by nuclear and
radiological materials (see fig. 3). First, fissile materials disposition
projectseliminate weapons-gradenuclear materials. For example, DOE has a
project to eliminate surplus Russian plutonium by turning it into fuel for
use in civilian nuclear power plants. Second, DOE is assisting Russia by
shutting down three nuclear power plants that produce plutonium and
replacing them with power plants fueled by coal. Third, DOE conducts
nonproliferation research and development, such as developing technologies
used to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. Fourth, DOE
consolidates and secures radioactive materials that could be used in dirty
bombs.25 Finally, DOE's highly enriched uranium transparency project
monitors the conversion of material from Russian nuclear warheads into
fuel for civilian nuclear power plants.

We found three program areas where both DOD and DOE have projects that
perform similar activities in the FSU. First, both agencies have projects
to improve the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are
stored, such as installing fences and security systems. Second, both
agencies have projects to employ former biological weapons scientists to
prevent the proliferation of their expertise to states and terrorist
organizations. Third, both agencies have projects to enhance the ability
of countries to secure their borders against the smuggling of WMD
materials. The State Department has its own programs to employ biological
former biological weapons scientists and secure borders against the
trafficking of WMD materials and plays a role in coordinating U.S. efforts
in these areas. See appendix III for more information regarding DOD, DOE,
and State's projects in these areas.

               Warhead Security Program Coordination Has Improved

We have previously reported that DOD and DOE were pursuing different
approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites in Russia.26 DOD and DOE had
plans to upgrade some of the same storage sites, and DOD had already
purchased equipment to upgrade security at some of those sites.
Additionally, DOD and DOE used different vendors to purchase different
equipment to perform the same function, which could have resulted in

25Dirty bombs are designed to disperse radioactive material by packaging
explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive material.

26GAO-03-482.

extra training and maintenance costs. As a result of our work, DOD and DOE
coordinated their efforts to avoid duplication by identifying the agency
with the best access to and cooperation of the Russians to install the
security upgrades. Furthermore, we recommended that an integrated plan be
developed for these programs on issues such as resolving equipment
standardization concerns.

During the course of our audit work, NSC staff issued common policy
guidance for DOD and DOE programs that help Russia secure its nuclear
warheads. The policy guidance prohibited assistance to operational sites
due to concerns that U.S. assistance may enhance Russia's military
capability. Additionally, NSC staff established interagency procedures for
coordinating warhead security assistance activities through a working
group that reviews all requests for assistance, with neither DOD nor DOE
being allowed to implement a project without the group's approval. In the
case of a dispute, an agency can escalate the request for assistance to a
higher level interagency group. According to both DOD and DOE officials,
the guidelines and procedures implemented since our report have improved
coordination, such as holding interagency meetings. In commenting on a
draft of this report, DOE stated that DOD and DOE include representatives
from the other agency on each other's bilateral forums with the Russians.
Other working group participants acknowledged that coordination concerns
have been reduced but stated that information sharing should be improved,
especially about issues escalated above the working group level.

Biological Weapons Scientist Employment Programs Have Elements of Well
Coordinated Programs

We found that the coordination of biological weapons scientist employment
programs is characterized by clearly delineated roles and
responsibilities, regular interaction, and dispute resolution procedures.
In September 2002, NSC staff issued guidelines governing the coordination
of the biological weapons scientist employment programs, which addressed
these three elements. These guidelines state the roles of each agency,
formalize information sharing, and include procedures for resolving
disputes. Additionally, the guidelines describe oversight requirements and
other factors to be considered when implementing these programs.

Agency officials managing the biological weapons scientist employment
programs did not report any difficulties pertaining to coordination or to
the activities of other agencies. These officials stated that the NSC
staff guidelines are valuable in ensuring that activities are undertaken
by the appropriate agency and agencies' programs work toward common U.S.

objectives. These guidelines established the Nonproliferation Interagency
Roundtable, which ensures that all agencies are aware of each other's
activities in employing biological weapons scientists in the FSU and that
the agencies avoid duplication of efforts. Proposals for new projects are
reviewed and voted on monthly by the Nonproliferation Interagency
Roundtable. If disagreements arise after the voting process has occurred,
agencies may escalate the decision to a group chaired by NSC staff.
Officials we spoke with stated that coordination has worked successfully.
DOD, DOE, and State officials all cited the NSC staff guidelines when
discussing their programs with us and confirmed that these guidelines were
applied governmentwide.

Border Security Programs Lack Elements of Well Coordinated Programs

There is no governmentwide guidance for border security programs that
delineates agencies' roles and responsibilities, establishes regular
information sharing, and defines procedures for resolving interagency
disputes, according to DOD and DOE officials. Although the State
Department prepared a strategic plan that identifies and describes border
security programs and interagency coordination mechanisms in Eurasia, the
plan does not clearly establish the departments' roles or how information
is shared.27 The plan also acknowledges that NSC staff will provide policy
oversight and guidance to implement the border security programs, but DOD
and DOE officials with whom we met were unaware of such guidance.

The primary coordination mechanism for all border security programs is an
interagency working group chaired by the State Department's
Nonproliferation Bureau. According to DOD and DOE officials, the group
does not have regularly scheduled meetings.28 DOE officials stated they
would prefer to meet more often to facilitate coordination of their
programs and reduce the amount of informal coordination, such as telephone
conversations and e-mails, which they believe is less efficient. State
Department officials acknowledged that coordination of these

27Eurasia is defined as including the following countries: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

28In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department informed
us that as of December 6, 2004, its Nonproliferation Bureau established a
schedule for regular meetings of the interagency working group on border
security issues. These meetings are scheduled to be held every 2 months
during calendar year 2005.

programs could be better, but stated that they lack the authority to
resolve conflicts over coordination.

In the absence of guidance for coordination, agency officials question the
other agencies' roles and responsibilities. For example, both State and
DOD officials acknowledged that their border security programs conduct
similar activities, such as training border security guards and providing
equipment for detecting illicit trafficking of WMD. Furthermore, State
Department officials questioned whether some aspects of DOD's
International Counterproliferation Program were targeting countries that
may no longer require the type of assistance being provided. For example,
DOD's program provided basic level WMD courses to officials from Bulgaria,
which is beyond the need for basic level training, according to a State
Department official.

In May 2002, we reported problems with the coordination of border security
programs.29 We found that portal monitors provided through the State
Department's border security program did not meet the standards
established by DOE.30 Since our report, the State Department has
transferred responsibility of operation and maintenance of the monitors to
DOE, and State is no longer funding the installation of portal monitors.
According to State and DOE officials, the specific problems we highlighted
have since been resolved, such as the coordination of agencies' border
security activities. We have follow-up work under way regarding this
issue.

Conclusions	DOD and DOE develop their own strategic plans, prioritize
their own program activities, and measure their own program performance.
While this approach helps keep the departments on track to meet their own
objectives, it does not provide governmentwide guidance for U.S. threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs, which would include goals, time
frames for meeting those goals, and mechanisms for establishing priorities
across the various departments involved in program implementation. In
light of the U.S. government's eliminationof nuclear infrastructure in
Libya,

29GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries
Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and
Planning,GAO-02-426(Washington,D.C.: May 16, 2002).

30Portal monitors are stationary equipment designed to detect radioactive
materials carried by pedestrians or vehicles.

recent agreement to eliminate chemical weapons in Albania, and the growing
likelihood of other efforts expanding outside the FSU, overall strategic
guidance becomes increasingly important given the involvement of multiple
agencies. While NSC staff has provided guidance to agencies implementing
programs to secure Russian warheads and employ former Soviet biological
weapons scientists, there is no governmentwide strategy for agencies
implementing threat reduction and nonproliferation programs worldwide. The
requirement in the Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for a Presidential report detailing the coordination of nonproliferation
programs provides an opportunity for the administration to review its
broad array of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs to ensure
that the programs and capabilities of the various departments address all
proliferation threats worldwide. As part of this effort, DOD and DOE can
draw upon lessons learned from programs in the FSU.

In addition, while the majority of threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs do not address similar missions, it is still important for policy
makers and program managers at DOD and DOE to (1) understand how their
efforts contribute to broader U.S. goals and (2) have formal mechanisms
for sharing information and lessons learned that cut across programmatic
boundaries. In those areas where more than one department is addressing a
similar mission, interagency coordination is important to avoid
duplication and collectively meet common goals. We found that interagency
coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs appears to
work best when there is clear guidance from NSC staff regarding the roles
of the various departments, regularized agency interactions, and
resolution of interagency disputes, as is the case with the projects to
employ biological weapons scientists and secure warhead sites. However, we
found that coordination is limited among the border security projects
where there is no NSC staff guidance.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in consultation
with other agencies involved in threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs, develop an integrated plan for all U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs to ensure that the programs are effectively
coordinated and address all threats. The results of this review should be
reported to the Congress as part of the President's response to section
1339 of the Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which
requires the President to submit a report after each presidential
inauguration on threat reduction and nonproliferation objectives and how
executive branch efforts will be coordinated.

We also recommend that the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, through the NSC staff, lead the development of a plan
guiding the implementation and coordination of threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs addressing border security as they have done
with the programs addressing the employment of biological weapons
scientists. This plan should identify U.S. government goals and
objectives, designate departments' roles and responsibilities, and
establish procedures to resolve policy and program disputes.

Agency Comments	DOE and DOD provided comments on a draft of this report,
which are reproduced in appendixes IV and V. DOE agreed with the report
and the corresponding recommendations. DOD concurred with the need for
better integrated nonproliferation and threat reduction programs, but did
not specify whether it agreed with the need for an integrated plan. DOD
concurred with the need for NSC staff guidance governing border security
programs. State Department and the NSC staff did not comment on this
report. DOE, DOD, and State provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and Methodology

To assess DOD and DOE's strategies to implement their respective threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs, we obtained agencies' strategic
plans, project/program planning documents, budget documents, and annual
reports. To assess attempts to integrate these strategies, we consulted
relevant public laws and met with experts at the Nuclear Threat
Initiative, a global initiative that seeks to raise public awareness of
WMD threats and carries out threat reduction work; the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies, a nongovernmentalorganization in the United States thatprovides
research and training on nonproliferation issues; and the U.S. - Russia
Corporate Partnerships Advancing Nonproliferation and National Security, a
congressional bipartisan study group. To assess DOD and DOE strategies to
implement their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, we
compared them against select criteria contained in GPRA and reviewed our
prior work relating to performance metrics and program assessment. We also
interviewed DOD and DOE officials, including the Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, the
Director and Deputy Director of DTRA's CTR program, and senior leadership
from the CTR program office. The DOE officials we interviewed include the
Deputy Administrator for Defense

Nuclear Nonproliferation and senior officials from the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention Program. In addition, we spoke with officials
from the DOD and DOE Inspector's General office, the Office of Management
and Budget, the Congressional Research Service, and the intelligence
community.

To assess efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and State programs with similar
missions, we obtained documents from these agencies regarding their threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs. We also reviewed NSC staff
guidance on biological weapons scientists' employment and warhead security
programs. We also reviewed DOD, DOE, and State documents regarding their
border security programs. Finally, we relied on our previous reviews of
the CTR program and several nonproliferation programs within DOE and the
State Department. We also interviewed numerous officials, including the
Director and Deputy Director of DTRA's CTR program, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense Policy for CTR programs, and the Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and
Counterproliferation. DOE officials include the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, the Assistant Deputy Administrator of
the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, and other
senior officials from the other DNN program areas. At the State
Department, we interviewed the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe
and Eurasia and met with officials from the Bureau of Nonproliferation. We
also met with the managers of programs addressing border security, weapons
security, and employment of biological weapons scientists. NSC officials
did not respond to our requests to meet. However, we discussed the role of
the NSC staff and the extent of its participation in coordinating programs
with DOD, DOE, and State officials.

We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review in
Washington, D.C., from February 2004 to November 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the National Security Council; and the Secretaries of Defense,
Energy, and State. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you have questions regarding this report, please contact Mr. Christoff
at
(202) 512-8979 or [email protected] or Mr. Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
[email protected]. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in
appendix VI.

Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade

Gene Aloise
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment

Appendix I

DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Projects, Fiscal Year
2004

      Table 3: Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Projects

Project Description

Emergency Response Support Provides equipment to Russia for use in an
emergency response train should accidents occur

Equipment	during transportation of ballistic missiles. The equipment,
including a rail-mounted crane, hydraulic tools, concrete pulverizers, and
an excavator, is available to support missile transportation and
dismantlement.

Solid Propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Mobile Launcher Elimination Will
refurbish and operate Russian missile disassembly facilities; provide the
equipment for and operation of, mobile launcher elimination facilities;
and perform destruction of treaty-limited components.

    Liquid Propellant ICBM and Silo Eliminates silos and destroy missiles in
            accordance with treaty requirements. Activities include

Elimination deactivating silos, providing upgrades to the missile
elimination and destruction facility at Surovatikha, and furnishing
equipment to store and transport liquid missile propellant. SLBM Launcher
Elimination/Ballistic Assists Russia in eliminating submarine missile
launchers in accordance with treaty Missile Submarine Dismantlement
requirements and provide assistance to dismantle and eliminate submarine.

Spent Naval Fuel Disposition 	Supports submarine missile launcher
elimination and associated ballistic missile submarine dismantlement
through dry storage of spent nuclear fuel removed when defueling
submarines. In addition to storing the fuel in storage/transportation
containers, a means of transporting the containers by rail from the
shipyard to a final storage/disposition location is included.

Liquid Propellant SLBM Elimination	Assists in destroying submarine
missiles from the Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets. The destruction
process includes shipping, defueling, neutralization, and cutting into
pieces all proliferable components of submarine missiles.

Personnel Reliability and Safety	Provides training and equipment to assist
Russia in determining the reliability of its guard forces.

Site Security Enhancements 	Enhances the safety and security of Russian
nuclear weapons storage sites through the use of vulnerability assessments
to determine specific requirements for upgrades. The Department of Defense
(DOD) will then develop security designs to address those vulnerabilities
and install the equipment necessary to bring security standards consistent
with those at U.S. nuclear weapons storage facilities.

Nuclear Weapons Transportation Assists Russia in shipping nuclear warheads
to more secure sites or dismantlement locations.

Railcar Maintenance and Procurement 	Assists Russia in maintaining nuclear
weapons cargo railcars. Funds maintenance of railcars until no longer
feasible, then purchases replacement railcars to maintain 100 cars in
service. DOD will procure 15 guard railcars to replace those retired from
service. Guard railcars will be capable of monitoring security systems in
the cargo railcars and transporting security force personnel.

Weapons Transportation Safety Will provide emergency response vehicles
containing hydraulic cutting tools, pneumatic jacks,

Enhancements	and safety gear to enhance Russia's ability to respond to
possible accidents in transporting nuclear weapons. Meteorological,
radiation detection and monitoring, and communications equipment is also
included.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility	Is constructing a destruction
facility for Russian nerve agent-filled munitions near the town of
Shchuch'ye. The United States will fund the design, construction,
equipment acquisition and installation, systems integration, training, and
start-up of the destruction facility. The Russians will construct one of
the two buildings in which the nerve agent will be removed from munitions
and neutralized, and the drained munitions will be decontaminated.

 Appendix I DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Projects, Fiscal
                                   Year 2004

                         (Continued From Previous Page)

                              Project Description

Chemical Weapons Production Facility Will demilitarize former nerve agent
weapons production facilities by decontaminating,

Demilitarization 	dismantling, and destroying specialized equipment and
special features related to the production, transfer, and storage of
chemical agent/weapons in accordance with treaty requirements.

SS-24 Missile Motor Elimination	Is contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a
means of missile motor disposal other than the original "water washout
method." According to DOD, this method was fiscally and technologically
risky. If an alternate means is agreed upon, the project would also fund
continued storage of the motors until eliminated.

Biological Weapons (BW) Infrastructure Assesses all known former BW
facilities and institutes in the former Soviet Union where access

Elimination 	is provided. These assessments provide detailed vulnerability
and threat analyses for each institute and facility, which will then be
used to develop implementation plans for reducing BW proliferation threats
and prioritizing facility dismantlement efforts.

Biosecurity and Biosafety	Provides security and safety upgrades at
institutes engaged only in legitimate dangerous pathogen research. Tasks
include identification and implementation of necessary structural
improvements and consolidation of dangerous pathogen collections to reduce
the number of sites in a given country storing pathogens.

Cooperative Biological Research 	Engages former BW scientists in peaceful
pursuits in order to prevent the proliferation of BW expertise to
terrorist groups and rogue states. The United States works with institutes
and scientists employed in legitimate research to develop collaborative
projects involving dangerous pathogens for prophylactic, preventive, or
other peaceful purposes.

BW Threat Agent Detection and Will promote biosecurity and biosafety at
biological facilities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan by

Response	strengthening dangerous pathogen detection and response networks,
enabling discovery of the diversion or accidental release of biological
materials, and removing pathogens from existing field stations by safely
and securely transporting and consolidating them in central labs.

Caspian Sea Maritime Interdiction 	Seeks to provide Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan with a comprehensive capability for WMD detection and
interdiction of illicit trafficking in WMD-related materials and
components along the maritime borders of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and the
Caspian Sea.

Uzbekistan Portal Monitors	Provides a comprehensive nuclear detection and
interdiction capability of illicit trafficking in WMD-related materials at
key ports of entry.

Ukraine Land Border Proliferation Provides Ukraine, in conjunction with
DOE's Second Line of Defense, with a comprehensive

Prevention	capability for nuclear detection and interdiction of illicit
trafficking in WMD-related materials along the Ukraine/Moldova border.

Defense and Military Contacts	Expands contacts between defense
establishments in the former Soviet Union in order to stem the
proliferation of WMD, support the implementation of new strategic
frameworks, and increase U.S. access by strengthening defense
partnerships. Events will include, among other things, exchange visits of
senior and midlevel officers, combined military exercises, conferences,
and seminars.

             Source: GAO summary of DOD threat reduction projects.

 Appendix I DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Projects, Fiscal
                                   Year 2004

 Table 4: Department of Energy Nonproliferation Projects within Defense Nuclear
                      Nonproliferation Project Description

Global Radiological Threat Reduction	Secures radiological sources no
longer needed in the United States and locate, identify, recover,
consolidate, and enhance the security of radioactive materials outside the
United States.

Global Nuclear Material Threat Eliminates the use of highly enriched
uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear facilities around the

Reduction	world by converting research reactors to the use of low enriched
uranium (LEU) fuel, returns U.S.-origin HEU and LEU spent fuel to the
United States from U.S.-supplied research reactors around the world,
returns Russian-origin fresh and spent HEU fuel to Russia from
Russiansupplied research reactors around the world, secures
plutonium-bearing spent nuclear fuel from the BN-350 fast breeder reactor
in Kazakhstan, and recovers nuclear materials at vulnerable locations
throughout the world.

Proliferation Detection Project	Develops advanced remote sensing and
ground-based technologies, in support of other agencies, to address
problems related to detection, location, and analysis of foreign weapons
programs.

Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Project Develops satellite and ground-based
technologies to detect nuclear test explosions.

HEU Transparency Implementation Monitors Russian uranium processing
facilities to provide assurance that LEU sold to the United

Project	States for civilian nuclear power plants under the 1993 HEU
Purchase Agreement is derived from weapons-usable HEU removed from
dismantled Russian nuclear weapons.

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Project Provides
replacement fossil-fuel energy that will allow Russia to shutdown its
three remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors. International
Emergency Management Project Assists foreign governments and international
organizations in the development of emergency policy and preparedness
infrastructure, emergency operations facilities, emergency procedures,
exercise programs, and technical and training assistance.

Nonproliferation Policy Project	Works to develop U.S. policy options and
technical measures for use with foreign governments to promote safe,
secure nuclear reductions and transparent monitoring of nuclear warheads,
fissile material, and associated facilities; to strengthen regional
security in order to reduce states' incentives to obtain WMD; and to
strengthen global nonproliferation regimes. Works with DOE/NNSA and
National Laboratories to ensure compliance with applicable
nonproliferation treaties and agreements.

Export Control Policy and Cooperation Project

Regulates the use and supply of technologies that could contribute to the
spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as missile
systems for the delivery of such weapons.

International Safeguards Project	Develops and delivers technology
applications to strengthen capabilities to detect and verify undeclared
nuclear programs; enhances the physical protection and proper accounting
of nuclear material; and assists foreign national partners to meet
safeguards commitments.

Russian Transition Initiatives Project Redirects WMD scientists to
peaceful, civilian employment.

Nuclear Warhead Protection Project 	Provides material protection, control,
and accounting upgrades to enhance the security of Navy HEU fuel and
nuclear material.

Weapons Material Protection Project	Provides material protection, control,
and accounting upgrades to nuclear weapons, uranium enrichment, and
material processing and storage sites.

Material Consolidation and Civilian Enhances the security of
proliferation-attractive nuclear material in Russia by supporting

Sites Project	material protection, control, and accounting upgrade
projects at Russian civilian nuclear facilities.

 Appendix I DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Projects, Fiscal
                                   Year 2004

                         (Continued From Previous Page)

                              Project Description

National Infrastructure and Develops national and regional resources in
the Russian Federation to help establish and

Sustainability Project	sustain effective operation of upgraded nuclear
material protection, control, and accounting systems.

Second Line of Defense and Negotiates cooperative efforts with the Russian
Federation and other key countries to

Megaports Initiative Project	strengthen the capability of enforcement
officials to detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radiological material across international borders. This is accomplished
through the detection, location, and identification of nuclear and
nuclear-related materials, the development of response procedures and
capabilities, and the establishment of required infrastructure elements to
support the control of these materials.

Surplus U.S. HEU Disposition Project Disposes of surplus domestic HEU by
down-blending it.

Surplus U.S. Plutonium Disposition Project

Disposes of surplus domestic plutonium by fabricating it into mixed oxide
fuel for irradiation in existing, commercial nuclear reactors.

Surplus Russian Plutonium Disposition Project

Supports Russia's efforts to dispose of its weapons-grade plutonium by
working with the international community to help pay for Russia's program.

             Source: GAO summary of DOE nonproliferation projects.

Appendix II

DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the Performance of Threat Reduction and
Nonproliferation Programs

DOD and DOE assess the performance of their threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs. They establish goals and assess progress toward
meeting these goals using performance metrics. Table 5 lists these DOD and
DOE goals and metrics.

              Table 5: DOD and DOE Performance Metrics Goal Metric

DOD

Eliminate Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched 1.
Number of missiles eliminated. Ballistic Missiles, and nuclear-capable Air
to Surface Missiles.

Eliminate silos, rail/road-mobile launchers, 2. Numbers of launchers       
ballistic missile                               eliminated.                
submarine launch tubes, and bombers.         3. Percentage of design       
                                                   completed.                 
                                                4. Percentage of construction 
                                                                   completed. 
                                                5. Projected total program    
                                                   cost.                      

Eliminate Former Soviet Union (FSU) nuclear, chemical weapon, 6. Number of
sites. and biological weapon infrastructure at "n" sites.

Conduct vulnerability assessments to consolidate and secure FSU 7. Number
of sites. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities and
materials.

Develop site designs to consolidate and secure FSU nuclear and 8. Number
of sites. biological weapons facilities and materials.

Complete site upgrades to consolidate and secure FSU nuclear, 9. Number of
sites. chemical, and biological weapons facilities and materials.

Construct a Fissile Missile Storage Facility (FMSF) to provide safe 10.
Percentage of FMSF completed without transparency. and secure storage for
fissile material from dismantled warheads. 11. FMSF transparency system.

12. Projected total program cost.

DOE

Develop new technologies to improve U.S. capabilities to detect and 1.
Number of advanced radiation and remote sensing monitor nuclear weapons
production and testing. technologies developed and evaluated.

2. Number of advanced technologies and operational systems (e.g.,
satellite payloads and seismic station calibration data sets) delivered to
U.S. national security users.

3. Number of professional papers/exchanges presented, each representing
Science and Technology knowledge and U.S. leadership in program area.

4.	Annual percentage of all active research and development projects for
which an independent research and development merit assessment has been
completed within the last 3 years.

      Detect, prevent, and reverse the    5.   Annual number of safeguards or 
      proliferation of weapons of mass            physical protection courses 
        destruction (WMD) materials,                    conducted.            
     technology, and expertise, and to       
      strengthen the nonproliferation               Annual percentage of U.S. 
                  regime.                 6.             exports reviewed for 
                                                                proliferation 
                                                         concern.             
                                          7. Cumulative number of cooperative 
                                                    agreement actions         
                                                        completed.            
                                          8.   Cumulative kilograms of HEU    
                                                 purchased and delivered.     

    Appendix II DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the Performance of Threat
                    Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs

                         (Continued From Previous Page)

                                  Goal Metric

Prevent nuclear terrorism by working in Russia and other regions of 9.
Percentage of 39 Russian Navy warhead sites secured.
concern to (1) secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons 10.
Percentage of 25 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites
and weapons-usable material; (2) locate, consolidate, and secure secured.
radiological materials that can be used in a dirty bomb; and (3) 11.
Percentage of 600 metric tons (MT) of weapons-usable nuclear
install detection equipment at border crossings and Mega-Seaports material
secured.
to prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear material. 12.
Percentage of 27 MTs of HEU converted to LEU.

13. Cumulative number of Second Line of Defense sites with nuclear
detection equipment installed.

14. Annual percentage of buildings scheduled for completion of security
upgrades in a year that are done on time.

Prevent adverse migration of WMD expertise by engaging weapons 15. Annual
number of former Soviet weapons scientists, experts in peaceful efforts
and by helping to downsize the Russian engineers, and technicians engaged.
nuclear weapons complex. 16. Cumulative number of technologies
commercialized or

businesses created.

17. Cumulative percentage of nuclear complex reduction targets completed
at six weapons facilities.

18. Annual percentage of non-U.S. government funding contributions
obtained.

Assurance that the LEU being purchased under the 1993 19. Number of
Blend-Down Monitoring Systems operational and
U.S./Russian HEU Purchase Agreement is derived from HEU the annual
percentage of operation during the HEU blend
extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, by developing down
process.
and implementing mutually agreeable transparency measures to 20.
Percentage completed of the 24 annually allowed Special
ensure that the 500 MT of HEU covered by the agreement is Monitoring
Visits to the four Russian HEU-to-LEU processing
permanently down blended and eliminated from Russian inventory.
facilities.

21. Percentage of the year that the on-site Transparency Monitoring Office
is staffed at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant.

Reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by facilitating shutdown of 22.
Percentage of progress toward constructing a fossil plant in
the three remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors Seversk.
in Russia through (1) construction of a new fossil-fuel plant, (2) 23.
Percentage of progress toward constructing a fossil plant in
refurbish an existing fossil-fuel power plant, and (3) execution of a
Zheleznogorsk facilitating shutdown of one weapons-grade
nuclear safety upgrades project to improve reactor safety pending
plutonium production reactor.
shutdown of the reactors. 24. Percentage of progress toward completing
interim safety

upgrades to the three operating Russian plutonium production reactors.

25. Amount of Russian Federation weapons-grade plutonium production
eliminated annually, and cumulatively, from the 1.2 MT per year baseline.

Eliminate surplus Russian plutonium and surplus U.S. plutonium 26.
Percentage of the design and construction of the Pit and HEU. Disassembly
and Conversion Facility completed.

27. Percentage of the design and construction of the mixed oxide (MOX)
Fuel Fabrication Facility completed.

28. Amount of HEU shipped to the United States Enrichment Corporation for
down blending.

29. Amount of off-specification HEU down blended.

30. Russianize the design and construct the MOX Fuel Facility in Russia.

    Appendix II DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the Performance of Threat
                    Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs

                         (Continued From Previous Page)

                                  Goal Metric

Identify, secure, remove, and/or facilitate the disposition of 31.
Cumulative number of vulnerable radiological sites secured
vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment
internationally.
around the world. 32. Cumulative number of U.S. excess and unwanted sealed

sources recovered.

33. Cumulative number of targeted research/test reactors converted from
HEU to LEU fuel.

34. Cumulative kilograms of HEU fresh fuel and spent fuel from
Soviet-supplied research reactors repatriated to Russia.

35. Cumulative number of fuel assemblies containing U.S.-origin spent fuel
returned from foreign research reactors.

                   Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DOE data.

Appendix III

DOD, DOE, and State Department Projects Addressing Similar Missions

DOD and DOE and State have projects in three areas that address similar
missions in the FSU. These areas are the employment of former biological
weapons scientists to prevent the proliferation of their expertise,
improvement of security at sites where Russian nuclear warheads are
stored, and the enhancement of countries' ability to secure their borders
against the smuggling of WMD materials. Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the
different projects, funding and countries served for all three agencies
and areas.

                 Table 6: DOD and DOE Warhead Security Projects

Dollars in millions

2004 Project Lead agency Description funding Location

Site Security DOD This project is designed to enhance the     $47.9 Russia 
                     safety and                                        
Enhancements      security of Russian nuclear weapons storage       
                     sites                                             
                     by conducting vulnerability assessments and       
                     providing equipment such as fences and            
                     sensor                                            
                                      systems.                         

Warhead Security DOE   DOE is enhancing the security around   107.0 Russia 
                                          some                         
       Program          strategic rocket forces sites and some         
                        Navy sites.                                    
                        Threat assessments are conducted at the        
                        sites                                          
                          and security equipment is provided.          

                   Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DOE data.

 Table 7: DOD, DOE, and State Biological Weapons Scientist Employment Projects

Dollars in millions

2004 Project Lead agency Description funding Location

Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) Program's Cooperative
Biological Research (CBR) Project

DOD	The CBR project engages former biological weapons (BW) scientists in
peaceful pursuits in order to prevent the proliferation of BW expertise to
terrorist groups and rogue states.

$6.1	Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and soon-to-be Georgia Russian
Transition Initiative (RTI) Program's Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention (IPP) Project

DOE	The IPP project engage scientists in the FSU in peaceful commercial
activities.

                            23.3 Russia and the FSU

Appendix III DOD, DOE, and State Department Projects Addressing Similar
Missions

                         (Continued From Previous Page)

Dollars in millions

2004 Project Lead agency Description funding Location

        Office of        State       The Bio-Chem Redirect    19.9 Russia and 
      Proliferation                Program funds efforts to           the FSU 
    Threat Reduction   Department redirect former biological       
                                     and chemical weapons          
Program's Bio-Chem               scientists via civilian        
                                     research projects in          
    Redirect Program              collaboration with the U.S.      
                                     Department of Health          
                                      and Human Services,          
                                  Department of Agriculture,       
                                       and Environmental           
                                      Protection Agency.           

BioIndustry   State      The initiative seeks to engage and    2.0 The FSU 
Initiative                          strategically                  
               Department   transform former Soviet biological        
                                        production                    
                             facilities, their technology and         
                                       expertise for                  
                           sustainable, commercial, and peaceful      
                                       enterprises.                   

               Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.

                 Table 8: Overview of Border Security Projects

Dollars in millions

     Project   Lead           Description         2004 funding    Location    
               agency                                          
Second Line  DOE   The Second Line of Defense         $52.0 FSU states and 
       of                    Program seeks                              other 
     Defense             to provide detection                    countries    
     Program              equipment to combat                  
                      nuclear material smuggling.              

WMD Proliferation DOD   Bolsters states' ability to   29.0 Non-Russian FSU 
                              prevent proliferation           
      Prevention          of WMD across their borders,            states      
                                    DOD will                  
      Initiative         provide equipment and logistics      
                                    support,                  
                         training, and other support to       
                                 those agencies               
                         of recipient governments vested      
                                    with the                  
                          authority to monitor borders        
                                   for illegal                
                           transport of WMD or related        
                                   materials.                 

International DOD   Provides a series of training    10.0 The FSU, Baltic  
                                courses and                  
     Counter-         equipment to counter and respond            states, and 
                                  to WMD-                             Eastern 
proliferation      related incidents in-country and            Europe      
                                at borders,                  
      Program         this is a DOD coordinated effort       
                                  with the                   
                      Federal Bureau of Investigation        
                                  and U.S.                   
                     Customs designed to detect, deter,      
                                    and                      
                        prevent smuggling of WMD and         
                                  related                    
                                 materials.                  

    Export Control    State         Provides technical       35.8  The FSU,   
         and                       assistance, develops             Baltic    
Border Security  Department    training materials, and         states, and 
                                    provides support to               Eastern 
                                 enhance countries' export          Europe    
                                    control and related           
                               border security capabilities.      

               Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.

                                  Appendix IV

                     Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix IV
Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix IV
Comments from the Department of Energy

                                   Appendix V

                    Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix V
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix VI

                     GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts	Dave Maurer (202) 512-9627 F. James Shafer (202) 512-6002

Staff 	In addition, Hynek Kalkus, Wyatt R. Hundrup, Nanette J. Ryen,
William Lanouette, Dorian L. Herring, Stacy Edwards, Lynn Cothern, Etana
Finkler,

Acknowledgments	Judy Pagano, and Ernie Jackson made significant
contributions to this report.

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Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification. GAO-04-924.
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13, 1999.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet
Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1995.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet
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