Technology Development: New DOD Space Science and Technology
Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future
Versions Need to Be More Robust (28-JAN-05, GAO-05-155).
The Department of Defense (DOD) is depending heavily on new
space-based technologies to support and transform future military
operations. Yet there are concerns that efforts to develop
technologies for space systems are not tied to strategic goals
for space and are not well planned or coordinated. In the
National Defense Authorization Act for 2004, the Congress
required DOD to develop a space science and technology (S&T)
strategy that sets out goals and a process for achieving those
goals. The Congress also required GAO to assess this strategy as
well as the required coordination process.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-155
ACCNO: A16439
TITLE: Technology Development: New DOD Space Science and
Technology Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments,
but Future Versions Need to Be More Robust
DATE: 01/28/2005
SUBJECT: Aerospace research
Congressional oversight
Defense capabilities
Defense procurement
Military research and development
Strategic planning
Program evaluation
Performance measures
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GAO-05-155
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to Congressional Committees
January 2005
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing
Investments, but Future Versions Need to Be More Robust
a
GAO-05-155
[IMG]
January 2005
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing
Investments, but Future Versions Need to Be More Robust
What GAO Found
DOD's new strategy for space S&T met four of the nine requirements set out
by the Congress and plans are in place to meet the remaining requirements.
These included requirements for setting short-and longterm goals and a
process for achieving those goals as well as requirements that focused on
ensuring the strategy was developed with laboratories, research
components, and other organizations involved in space S&T and ensuring the
strategy would be reviewed by appropriate entities and revised
periodically. In addition to meeting these requirements, GAO found that
development of the strategy itself helped spur collaboration within the
DOD space S&T community since it required diverse organizations to come
together, share knowledge, and establish agreement on basic goals.
Since the strategy has only recently been issued, it is too early to
assess whether the direction and processes outlined in the strategy will
be effective in supporting and guiding future space S&T efforts. Moreover,
DOD officials are still working out the details of some implementation
mechanisms. However, in order to better position DOD for successful
implementation, GAO believes that the plan should contain stronger
linkages to DOD's requirements setting process, identify additional
measures for assessing progress in achieving strategic goals, and
explicitly cover all efforts related to space S&T.
Moreover, there are formidable barriers that stand in the way of
optimizing DOD's investment in space S&T. For example:
o DOD does not have complete visibility over all spending related to
space S&T, including spending occurring within some S&T organizations and
acquisition programs. Without a means to see where funding is being
targeted, DOD may not be able to assure all spending on technology
development is focused on achieving its goals.
o The S&T community itself may not have resources critical to achieving
DOD's goals. In recent years, funding and opportunities for testing for
the space S&T community have decreased. And, concerns have grown about the
adequacy of the space S&T workforce.
o DOD acquisition programs continue to undertake technology development
that should be occurring within an S&T environment, which is more
forgiving and less costly than a delivery-oriented acquisition program
environment. Until this is done, cost increases resulting from technology
problems within acquisitions may keep resources away from the S&T
community.
By using the strategy as a tool for assessing and addressing these
challenges, DOD can better position itself for achieving its goals and
also strengthen the S&T base supporting space.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
DOD's Space S&T Strategy Addresses the Act's Requirements
Additional Criteria Are Not Included in the Act That May Enhance
the Strategy Barriers May Hamper Strategy Implementation Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments 1
3 4 6
9 12 19 20 20
Appendix I Budget Activity Descriptions
Appendix II Funding on Technology Development within Science and
Technology and Acquisition Communities
Appendix III Technology Readiness Levels and Their Definitions
Appendix IV Organizations That Participated in Developing the Space
Science and Technology Strategy
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense
Tables
Table 1: Requirements Met or Planned 7 Table 2: Description of Department
of Defense's Budget Activities 22 Table 3: Funding by S&T Community 24
Table 4: Advanced Component Development and Prototypes
Funding for Space Acquisition Programs 24
Figures
Figure 1: DOD S&T Activities within the RDT&E Appropriations 4 Figure 2:
Funding for Space Test Program 14 Figure 3: Number of Experiments Carried
Out by Space Test
Program 15
Abbreviations
BA budget activity
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering
DOD Department of Defense
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
MDA Missile Defense Agency
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
RDT&E research, development, test and evaluation
S&T science and technology
TRL technology readiness level
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
January 28, 2005
The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Department of Defense (DOD) is looking to its space systems to play
an increasingly pivotal role in future military operations. As such, it is
developing several families of new, expensive, and technically challenging
space systems, eventually including constellations of satellites that will
employ laser optics to transport information over long distances in much
larger quantities than radio waves; a new generation of global positioning
technology; and advanced infrared sensors, radar sensors, and
environmental monitoring sensors. At the same time, DOD is seeking to
improve technologies and materials that are critical to enhancing
satellite
performance, such as propulsion systems, cooling systems, onboard and
ground processing systems, and materials used to protect technologies
and spacecraft in the harsh space environment.
A broad array of entities is charged with responsibility for developing
the
science and technology (S&T) supporting space systems, including
research laboratories and test facilities belonging to the military
departments and DOD as well as industry and academic organizations that
perform research and development for these organizations or for specific
DOD space acquisition programs. From fiscal years 2004 through 2009,
DOD plans to spend about $3.8 billion on S&T efforts exclusive to space
applications within its military laboratories and contracts through its
laboratories. Considerably more money will be spent on projects that have
space and terrestrial applications (for example, propulsion technologies
and advanced materials) as well as on technology development that occur
within acquisition programs. In addition, outside agencies, such as the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), also invest in
S&T efforts that can support DOD space systems and may benefit from S&T
efforts being carried out by DOD.
Though there are many diverse organizations carrying out S&T efforts
related to space and a considerable amount being invested, DOD has not had
an overarching strategy for space S&T in recent years that sets goals for
these efforts, helps direct how investments should be spent, and tracks
the overall progress of DOD's investment in space S&T. Moreover, there
have been concerns that the level of collaboration and coordination among
all DOD S&T organizations involved in space has not been adequate, leading
to redundant or unnecessary investments in some areas or even too little
investment in areas where it is critical for the United States to maintain
a lead over other nations. There has also been concern that technologies
have difficulty transitioning from the laboratories to DOD's acquisition
programs. In addition, our previous reports have shown that weapon system
acquisition programs have taken on technology development that should
occur in an S&T environment. In doing so, acquisition programs have not
been able to align customer expectations with resources, and therefore
minimize problems that could hurt the program in its design and production
phases. In fact, many of the space programs we have reviewed over the past
several decades have incurred unanticipated cost and schedule increases
because they began without knowing whether technologies could work as
intended and invariably found themselves addressing technical problems in
a more costly environment.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (the act)
required DOD's Executive Agent for Space and its Director of Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to develop and implement a space S&T
strategy. The act required us to review and assess the S&T strategy and
the effectiveness of the coordination process among DOD S&T elements and
to report our findings by September 1, 2004. As discussed with committee
staff, our objectives were to (1) assess whether the strategy meets the
act's requirements, (2) identify additional criteria above and beyond the
act that could enhance the usefulness of the strategy, and (3) identify
barriers that may hamper DOD's ability to successfully enhance S&T efforts
for space. We provided a briefing on our review to your committees on our
findings on September 1, 2004. This report details our findings.
In conducting our work, we reviewed DOD and military department policy
documents on S&T activities, as well as pertinent S&T reports and related
material, to determine DOD's progress in achieving program mission
Results in Brief
objectives. We assessed the DOD space S&T strategy for compliance with the
2004 Defense Authorization Act. We developed additional criteria with
which to assess the space S&T strategy and identified barriers that may
influence DOD's ability to successfully implement S&T efforts for space.
In doing so, we consulted with subject matter experts and reviewed our
previous best practice reports. We reviewed documents from and conducted
interviews with officials in DOD, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA), NASA, and military department research laboratories. We also
analyzed the fiscal year 2004 virtual Major Force Program for Space and
unclassified DOD budget documents to identify the amount of space
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) funding for fiscal
years 2003 to 2009 and confirmed with DOD officials responsible for
maintaining this information that our analysis was correct. Our review was
conducted from November 2003 to November 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to develop a
strategy for space S&T that identified short-and long-term space S&T
goals; a process for achieving the goals, including an implementation
plan; and a process for assessing progress made toward achieving the
goals. The act also required DOD to coordinate its efforts with various
organizations and agencies involved in space. The strategy met four of
nine specific requirements in the act, and plans are in place to meet the
remaining five requirements. We found that the strategy provides a
foundation for enhancing coordination among space S&T efforts since it
does specify overall goals and it establishes several mechanisms to help
senior leaders gauge whether investments are focusing on those goals.
Moreover, the development of the strategy itself helped spur collaboration
within the DOD space S&T community since it required diverse organizations
to come together, share knowledge, and establish agreement on basic goals.
However, the strategy lacks details in key areas needed to achieve its
goals. For example, measures for gauging success have not been fully
defined. In addition, the strategy does not specifically address how S&T
efforts within space acquisition programs will be covered, even though
considerable money is being spent by acquisition programs on technology
development. Also, the strategy does not address how long-standing
barriers to optimizing DOD's investment in space S&T will be addressed,
including incomplete visibility over funding for space-related S&T as well
as testing and workforce deficiencies. Concentrating on these issues would
help ensure that DOD has the right tools and measures in place to
meet its goals for space. As such, we are making recommendations focused
on addressing these issues in future versions of the strategy. In
addition, there are barriers outside of the space community that may
hamper effective implementation of the space strategy, including a lack of
a DOD-wide investment strategy. Such a strategy could be useful in guiding
and directing S&T investments, funding, and organizational incentives,
which have been encouraging technology development in acquisition programs
rather than the S&T community. DOD has initiated actions to address these
issues, but it is too early to assess their effectiveness.
Background Generally, DOD's S&T community (which includes DOD
laboratories and testing facilities as well as contractors and academic
institutions that support these facilities) conducts research and develops
technologies to support military applications, such as satellites or
weapon systems. Like the acquisition community in DOD, the S&T community
uses RDT&E funds, but the S&T community's work precedes the acquisition
cycle. Weapon system program managers, who receive most of DOD's RDT&E
budget, apply generic technologies to specific systems. Figure 1
highlights activities the S&T community is involved in along with the
RDT&E budget categories, or "activities," which are used to fund these
efforts. More details on both are provided in appendixes I and II.
Figure 1: DOD S&T Activities within the RDT&E Appropriations
Source: Department of Defense.
The S&T community carries out its work within the first three categories
of research and development listed above. DOD has specified that the work
within the fourth category-testing and evaluation of prototypes of systems
or subsystems in a high fidelity or realistic environment-involves efforts
before an acquisition program starts product development. However,
according to DOD officials, it is assumed that either the S&T community or
an acquisition program may carry out this work, and traditionally, weapon
system acquisition programs have taken on technology development within
this stage. After this point, any additional development is to be
completed as part of a formal acquisition or product development phase
under the authority of the weapon system manager and apart from the S&T
community.
The DOD DDR&E is responsible for the overall direction, quality, and
content of the agency's S&T efforts. Each of the military departments-
Army, Air Force, and Navy-has its own S&T programs, as do DOD
organizations such as DARPA, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, MDA, and the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The DOD Executive Agent for
Space-who is also the space milestone decision authority for all space
major defense acquisition programs, the Under Secretary of the Air Force,
and the Director of the NRO-also influences S&T efforts for space since he
decides whether significant investments in space systems are to move
forward in the development process.
There are mechanisms within the space community and DOD designed to ensure
S&T efforts are coordinated and are focused on achieving broader goals and
that redundancy is minimized. Within the space community, a forum called
the Space Technology Alliance was established in 1997 to coordinate the
development of space technologies with an eye toward achieving the
greatest return on investment. Its membership includes the Air Force, the
Army, the Navy, MDA, DARPA, and NRO. At the DOD-wide level, there is a
Defense Science and Technology Strategy, which lays out goals for DOD-wide
S&T efforts based on goals set by higher-level documents, such as the
Quadrennial Defense Review. This strategy is used, in turn, to develop a
DOD-wide basic research plan, which reflects DOD's objectives and planned
investments for basic research conducted by universities, industry, and
laboratories and a DOD-wide technology area plan, which does the same for
applied research and advanced technology development. There is also a
Joint Warfighting S&T Plan, which ties S&T projects to priority future
joint warfighting capabilities identified by higher-level documents. These
overall plans, in turn, are used by DOD laboratories to direct investments
in S&T. They are also used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
provide guidance to the military
departments and the defense agencies as they develop and vet their
proposed budgets. In addition, DOD puts together teams of outside experts
in 12 technology areas to assess whether particular investments across
DOD's S&T community are redundant or unnecessary. These are known as
Technology Area Reviews and Assessments. The teams make recommendations to
a board comprised of senior DOD S&T officials and chaired by the DDR&E for
action to terminate, adjust, and/or enhance investments to better align
the S&T program to comply with the planning document guidance. The DDR&E,
which reports to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics), has oversight of the RDT&E budget activities used to
research and develop new technologies, specifically, RDT&E budget
activities 1 (basic research), 2 (applied research), and 3 (advanced
technology development). Recently, the DDR&E was given oversight of RDT&E
budget activity 4 (advanced component development and prototypes) in an
effort to ensure this development had sufficient oversight from the S&T
community.
The act required DOD to develop a strategy for its space S&T efforts that
identified short-and long-term space S&T goals; a process for achieving
the goals, including an implementation plan; and a process for assessing
progress made toward achieving the goals. The act also required DOD to
coordinate its strategy development efforts.1 The strategy, yet to be
delivered to the Congress at the time of our review, met four of nine
requirements, and plans are in place to meet the remaining five. We found
that the strategy provides a foundation for enhancing coordination among
space S&T efforts since it does specify overall goals and that it
establishes several mechanisms to help senior leaders gauge whether
investments are focusing on those goals. However, since the strategy has
only recently been issued, it is too early to assess whether the direction
and processes outlined in the strategy will be effective in supporting and
guiding future space S&T efforts.
DOD's Space S&T Strategy Addresses the Act's Requirements
1 The act's requirements for the strategy have been codified at 10 U.S.C.
S: 2272 (2004).
Table 1: Requirements Met or Planned
Requirement Requirement met?
Identify short- and long-term goals. Yes
Address a process for achieving the goals, including an Yes implementation
plan.
Address a process for assessing progress made toward achieving the Yes
goals.
Strategy developed in consultation with DOD laboratories, research Yes
components, and other organizations.
Strategy to be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised annually. Planned
Strategy to be made available for review by the congressional defense
Planned committees.
Strategy to be included as part of the annual National Security Space
Planned Plan.
Strategy to be provided to DOD components and DOD S&T entities to Planned
support DOD's planning, programming, and budgeting processes.
In carrying out the space S&T strategy, DOD laboratories, research Planned
components, and other organizations shall each (1) identify research
projects that contribute directly and uniquely to the development of
space technology and (2) inform the DDR&E and the DOD Executive
Agent for Space of the planned budget and schedule for those
projects.
Source: GAO.
The strategy identified goals for space S&T along six main areas-assured
access to space, responsive space capability, assured space operations,
spacecraft technology, information superiority, and S&T workforce. Except
for the goal of enhancing the workforce, the strategy laid out shortterm
goals (within 5 years) and long-term goals (in the year 2020 or beyond).
Under spacecraft technology, for example, the strategy identified a
short-term goal of on-orbit assessment of satellite servicing and repair
and long-term goals of on-orbit assembly, deployment, repair, and
upgrades. Under assured space operations, the strategy identified a
shortterm goal of detecting, identifying, and characterizing natural and
manmade objects in space and a long-term goal of complete space
situational awareness. According to S&T community officials we spoke with,
the mere identification of goals should be useful in helping DOD
laboratories and other S&T facilities to direct their investment as this
type of guidance had not been provided for space previously.
The strategy also establishes several mechanisms for implementation.
Primarily, it calls for semiannual space S&T summit meetings to
coordinate user expectations, highlight technologies, provide guidance,
and establish priorities.2 DDR&E officials, agency S&T executives as well
as Service Program Executive Officers for Space who will ultimately
transition new capabilities, and major command leadership will attend
these meetings. The strategy also implements an Industry Independent
Research and Development coordination conference, where industry and
government officials can come together to collaborate in their S&T
planning activities. Details on both of these mechanisms are still being
worked out, according to the developers of the strategy.
The strategy also identifies some tools and measures that will be used to
track progress in meeting goals. These tools and measures include
"technology roadmaps," which identify timelines, milestones, and
transition dates for specific projects as well as interdependencies with
other projects and "technology readiness level" (TRL), an analytical tool
that assesses the maturity level of technology. Our prior work has found
TRLs to be a valuable decision-making tool since it can presage the likely
consequences of incorporating a technology at a given level of maturity
into a product development. 3 Appendix III details criteria for each TRL.
In addition, DOD has plans in place to ensure that the strategy is
reviewed and revised, as necessary, annually and that it be made publicly
available for review by congressional defense committees. Other DOD S&T
entities will be provided the strategy to support the planning,
programming, and budgeting processes. DOD also plans to include the
strategy as an annex to the National Security Space Plan, even though the
plan is thought to be a lower-level tactical document and not a strategic
document.
The developers of the strategy worked with a wide range of organizations
in establishing goals, measures, and implementation plans. These include
military department laboratories, DARPA, intelligence agencies, MDA, the
Air Force Space Command, NASA, the Space and Missile Systems Center, the
U.S. Strategic Command, the National Security Space Office, and others.4
Officials within the space community we spoke with commented
2 The DDR&E and the DOD Executive Agent for Space signed a Memorandum of
Understanding to conduct organized reviews of the S&T enterprise as
outlined in the space S&T strategy.
3 See Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can
Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July
30, 1999).
4 Appendix IV lists the organizations that participated in developing the
space S&T strategy.
Additional Criteria Are Not Included in the Act That May Enhance the Strategy
that it has historically been difficult to gain agreement from these
organizations. Even though they all have ties to space, these
organizations have different views as to what overall goals the space
community should strive for and how they should be achieved. According to
officials within the space community we spoke with, just getting these
organizations to work together and to gain agreement was a significant
benefit to the community at large since it helped foster more
collaborative working relationships and greater knowledge sharing.
In addition to the requirements specified by the act, we found that
optimizing space S&T efforts also depends on whether (1) the strategy is
clearly linked to other strategies and plans; (2) all DOD space S&T
efforts are covered by the strategy; and (3) the strategy identifies
metrics beyond TRLs that focus on success. Linkage to other strategies and
plans is important to providing clear guidance to S&T laboratories and
other organizations making investments since there are a number of
DOD-wide "strategies" for S&T as well as a number of space-related higher
level strategic plans as well as tactical plans relating to S&T. Coverage
of all space S&T efforts is important since S&T is carried out not only by
DOD laboratories but also by large acquisition programs and other agencies
that have a large stake or investment in space S&T. For example, NRO
develops new satellites for the intelligence community and could
potentially leverage its S&T efforts with DOD's. Lastly, having additional
measures beyond TRLs is important to gauging the success of the
implementation of the strategy as well as the relevancy and feasibility of
specific progress toward achieving DOD's overall goals for space. We found
that the strategy clearly identified linkages to some, but not all, key
plans and strategies, and it did not provide coverage over all S&T efforts
or establish additional measures.
Links to Other Strategies and Plans
The space S&T strategy identifies links to higher-level documents, such as
the National Security Space Strategy, which sets overall strategic goals
for DOD space and identifies capabilities to be pursued, and the Defense
S&T Strategy, which provides overall goals for DOD S&T based on
higher-level strategic documents. The strategy also references lower-level
plans including the National Security Space Plan discussed earlier and
DODwide S&T plans, such as the Basic Research Plan, the Defense Technology
Area Plan, and the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan. However, the strategy did
not provide links to other documents and assessments that impact the space
S&T community. For example, it is unclear how the document will link to
DOD's Space Technology Guide, which describes the current state
of space and space-related technology activities underway, including key
enabling technologies, that is, those that "must be done right" since they
play a pivotal role in making revolutionary advancements in space
applications. The guide is being revised and could serve as a useful
implementation tool for the new space S&T strategy. It is also unclear how
the strategy links to architectures in areas such as responsive space
operations, protection for space mission assurance, and integrated
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance being developed by the
National Security Space Office. These architectures are to define the
future desired state for DOD's space assets. It is important that DOD
reflect these other documents in the new space S&T strategy so that the
space community clearly understands where the strategy fits in relation to
other plans and guides and can ensure decision making is consistent.
Moreover, by establishing closer links with the Space Technology Guide and
architectures under development, DOD may have more avenues to implement
its short- and long-term goals.
In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate in the
development of the strategy, including offices responsible for DOD's new
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). JCIDS is
replacing DOD's requirements generation process for major acquisitions in
an effort to shift the focus to a more capabilities-based approach for
determining joint warfighting needs rather than a threat-based approach
focused on individual systems and platforms. Under JCIDS, boards comprised
of high-level DOD civilians and military officials are to identify future
capabilities needed around key functional concepts and areas, such as
command and control, force application, and battlespace awareness, and to
make trade-offs among air, space, land, and sea platforms in doing so.
Although the JCIDS officials were not required to participate in
developing the strategy, it is important that they do so in the future
since their work could have a significant impact on the direction of
investments for space S&T projects.
Coverage of All S&T Efforts
The space S&T strategy does not explicitly address technology development
efforts within DOD acquisition programs. According to DOD officials, space
acquisition programs are typically using RDT&E funds from budget activity
4 to mature technology and build the first two satellites. Our analysis
showed that space acquisition programs plan to spend as much as $16
billion from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 on budget activity 4. Our
annual assessments of space systems have shown that the portion of the $16
billion that is to be spent on maturing technology (which we could not
readily separate from the portion spent
building the first two satellites) is often being used to carry out
activities that should be carried out in an S&T environment. For example,
the Transformational Satellite program, which is focused on building
advanced communication satellites, entered system development in early
2004 with only one of seven critical technologies matured to a point of
being tested in a relevant environment. Most of the technologies were at a
TRL 3, meaning analytical studies and some laboratory tests had been
conducted, but components had not yet been demonstrated to work together.
If DOD does not explicitly include acquisition programs in the space S&T
strategy, it will not be able to ensure the S&T community has oversight
over a considerable amount of ongoing technology development.
We were not provided access to NRO to discuss how it collaborated with the
DDR&E and the Executive Agent for Space in developing the space S&T
strategy and how they intended to work with the DDR&E and the Executive
Agent for Space in implementing the strategy. However, DOD officials
stated that NRO had participated in the development of the strategy and
would participate in all S&T coordination activities identified by the
space S&T strategy. Moreover, according to DOD officials, NRO and other
intelligence agencies already participate in some DOD space S&T
coordination and review efforts, such as the Space Technology Alliance. In
addition, the DDR&E and the DOD Executive Agent for Space are continuing
to work on increasing coordination between DOD and the intelligence
community. DOD officials also noted that the current Executive Agent for
Space also serves as the Director of NRO, which has helped to increase
coordination between the intelligence community and DOD. While these
efforts may be helping to increase coordination between DOD and the
intelligence S&T communities, it is still important to specifically
include the DOD intelligence agencies in the strategy itself and to
identify protocols that can help foster greater knowledge sharing between
both communities.
Success Measures
While the strategy identifies TRLs as a measure for tracking progress, it
does not prescribe metrics that focus on the value of S&T projects
relative to specific goals or knowledge being gained from projects. Such
metrics would help provide a foundation for assessing progress in
achieving strategic goals. Strategy developers stated that technology
development organizations are better suited to develop and use their own
specific metrics to measure success because different technologies may
require different types of metrics. The developers stated that by design,
the strategy sets the direction but leaves it up to the laboratories and
other S&T entities to establish their own metrics. However, they
acknowledged
that some of the organizations they worked with did not have adequate
metrics. It is important that DOD attempt to identify and use metrics that
help assess progress, since these will enable DOD to evaluate investments
against its short-and long-term goals and make informed investment
decisions.
Barriers May Hamper Strategy Implementation
Though the new space S&T strategy takes important first steps toward
optimizing investments, there are significant barriers that will make it
difficult to make advancements in the way S&T efforts are planned,
managed, and transitioned into acquisition programs. Some barriers relate
specifically to the space community-principally, incomplete RDT&E funding
visibility, inadequate testing resources, and workforce deficiencies.
These can potentially be addressed through further study, resource shifts,
increased management attention, and/or changes to how funding is captured.
Other barriers are more systemic and require more difficult management and
cultural changes to be made throughout DOD. Nevertheless, until barriers
are largely removed, the impact of a new strategy for space S&T may be
limited. The developers of the strategy agreed that the barriers we
identified were important and needed to be addressed through efforts
beyond the development of the strategy.
Visibility over S&T Spending on Space Is Incomplete
The current budget process does not readily capture all RDT&E funding for
space S&T efforts. In 2001, DOD established a "virtual" Major Force
Program for space to increase the visibility of resources allocated for
space activities. This is a programming mechanism that aggregates most
space-unique5 funding by military department and function. However, the
mechanism does not align funding with RDT&E budget activities, making it
more difficult for DOD to assess the balance of funding among basic
research, applied research, and advanced technology development.6 In
working with DOD officials to categorize the virtual Major Force Program
by RDT&E budget activity, we identified about $3.8 billion from fiscal
years 2004 through 2009 for budget activities 2 (applied research) and 3
5 Space unique means the virtual Major Force Program that was designed to
include program elements that represent space activities only. In other
words, land, sea, and air platforms with space components, and work on
sensors or propulsion, are not included in the virtual Major Force Program
for space.
6 Instead, funding is categorized by program element, the smallest
aggregation of resources controlled by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
(advanced technology development). However, funding for budget activity 1
(basic research) cannot be specifically associated to either space or
terrestrial platforms, and therefore does not appear in the virtual Major
Force Program, which is focused on space-unique funding. Funding in RDT&E
budget activities 2 and 3 that is not space unique is also not captured.
In addition, some DOD agencies develop space assets but have primary
missions that are not associated with space and are therefore, not
included in the virtual Major Force Program. For example, MDA's space
efforts are not included in the virtual Major Force Program for space even
though MDA is developing a new generation of missile tracking satellite
systems using advanced infrared sensors. MDA plans to spend about $4.12
billion on this system from fiscal years 2004-2009, and a considerable
portion of this funding is expected to be used to mature technologies for
future satellites. Moreover, DARPA reports its space funding by project so
space S&T efforts cannot be readily identified without additional
knowledge of whether these projects are space related. Currently, DARPA
has funded about $200 million annually on projects that are space unique
and considerably more on projects that have both space and terrestrial
applications. Until the virtual Major Force Program or some other tool can
capture and categorize the total amount of RDT&E dollars supporting
space-unique S&T projects at a minimum, DOD will be limited in guiding and
directing all space investments.
Testing Resources Declining
Testing resources for space technologies are on the decline. In
particular, funding for testing has decreased, costs to launch experiments
have increased, and opportunities have been reduced with the loss of the
space shuttle, which had been partially used for DOD-related technology
experiments. DOD's Space Test Program, which is designed to help the S&T
community find opportunities to test in space relatively costeffectively,
was funded at $62.3 million in fiscal year 1990 but only $38.6 million in
fiscal year 2004 (see fig. 2). And because the cost to launch experiments
has increased, the program has only been able to launch an average of
seven experiments annually in the past 4 years (see fig. 3). According to
Space Test Program officials, demand for testing has not diminished. S&T
officials cited dwindling testing resources as a barrier to their efforts.
While the strategy states that appropriate resources need to be allocated
for on-orbit testing, it does not address how this can or will be done.
Figure 2: Funding for Space Test Program
Dollars in millions
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Fiscal year
Budget trend line Budget
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Figure 3: Number of Experiments Carried Out by Space Test Program
Number of experiments 30
The workforce needed to carry out S&T for space is facing shortages. DOD
officials cited staff shortages with science and engineering backgrounds
and had more concerns about the future since their workforces were
reaching retirement age. These concerns were echoed by DOD and industry
studies. A 2002 study on the space research and development industrial
base conducted by Booz Allen Hamilton, for example, found that over half
of the current space R&D workforce is over 45 years old and that departure
of key talent could be especially worrisome in 10 years, as scientists and
engineers now in the 45-to 49-year-old group begin to retire from the
workforce and are replaced by a smaller pool of less experienced
25
20
15
10 5
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Fiscal year
Piggyback Freeflyer Shuttle Source: U.S. Air Force.
Note: This does not include funding for testing that occurs within
acquisition programs. Chart is in FY 04 constant dollars.
Space S&T Workforce Facing Shortages
personnel.7 In its report, the Space Commission noted that both industry
and the U.S. government face substantial shortages of scientists and
engineers and that recruitment of new personnel is difficult since the
space industry is one of many sectors competing for the limited number of
trained scientists and engineers.8 Booz Allen noted that areas in which
either recruitment efforts are difficult or a critical mass is lacking
include systems engineering and software engineering. The 2004 National
Defense Authorization Act9 directed the Secretary of Defense to promote
the development of space personnel career fields within each of the
military departments. However, we recently reported that the military
services vary in the extent to which they have identified and implemented
initiatives to develop and manage their space cadres.10 Moreover, the
space S&T strategy itself merely lays out goals for workforce without
identifying actions or resources needed to achieve those goals.
In recognizing that more needs to be done to develop, attract, and retain
staff with critical skills, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005 Conference Report11 directed DOD to develop detailed implementation
plans for enhancing the space cadre and to study the ability of academia,
industry, and government to educate and train a community of space
professionals and to address the definition and development of key
competencies and skill levels in the areas of systems engineering, program
management, financial management, operations, and tactics. We believe that
S&T skill areas should also be included in the strategy given the
importance of advancing space technologies and potential future workforce
shortages.
7 Booz, Allen, Hamilton, Space Research and Development Industrial Base
Study Phase One Final Report, McLean, Va., February 2002, and Phase Two
Final Report in August 2002.
8 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization, Washington, D.C., January 11, 2001.
9 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Public Law
108-136.
10 See Defense Space Activities: Additional Actions Needed to Implement
Human Capital Strategy and Develop Space Personnel GAO-04-697 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 11, 2004).
11 H.R. Conference Report Number 108-354, at 281 (2004).
Investment Strategy Needed to Support S&T Planning
DOD does not yet have a departmentwide investment strategy that could
provide a good foundation for space S&T planning. While desired
capabilities are regularly identified by military commanders and are
vetted through strategic reviews, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review,
DOD has limited ability to make trades among space, air, land, and sea
platforms in deciding how best to meet those capabilities, document those
decisions, and follow through on those decisions. For example, DOD would
like to achieve persistent surveillance to enhance military operations.
But it has not been decided how much of the earth needs to be covered and
the extent to which air-based assets, such as unmanned reconnaissance
aircraft, can achieve this capability versus space-based assets, such as
the planned space-based radar system. If DOD conducted thorough and
independent analyses of alternatives weighing the pros and cons of using
different combinations of both assets and made trade-off decisions that
could be enforced across the military services, the S&T community could
have a better basis for deciding how much S&T dollars should go toward
space-based radar technologies versus technologies supporting air
platforms.
The need for an investment strategy DOD-wide or for particular functional
areas has been cited in a variety of recent studies, including a 1999
Defense Science Board study on tactical battlefield communications and a
2004 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The
recently established JCIDS process is designed to identify future
capabilities by functional areas and to make trades between space and
other platforms. However, it is unknown as to how this work will translate
into an investment strategy that could be used to enhance S&T planning.
And it is unknown how effectively decisions made through JCIDS will be
enforced. DOD has also made changes to its Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution12 process to provide higher-level guidance to the
budgeting process. However, it is also unclear as to how effectively these
changes will be implemented over time and whether they can serve as a
foundation for directing science and technology investments.
12The process was established in 2003 and evolved from the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System. DOD uses the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution process to determine priorities, allocate
resources, and evaluate actual output against planned performance and
adjust resources as necessary.
Funding Process Encourages Technology Development to Occur within
Acquisition Programs
We have previously reported that an S&T environment is more forgiving and
less costly than a delivery-oriented acquisition program environment.
Events such as test "failures," new discoveries, and time spent in
attaining knowledge are considered normal in this environment, while they
are seen as a negative event in an acquisition program. Moreover,
separating technology development and product development enables
organizations to align customer expectations with resources, and therefore
minimize problems that could hurt a program in its design and production
phases. Budget realities within DOD, however, make it more advantageous to
fund technology development in an acquisition program. Historically, S&T
organizations receive about 20 percent of DOD's research and development
budget, while weapon system programs receive about 80 percent. The money
going toward S&T is spread over several thousand projects, while the money
going toward weapons systems is spread out over considerably fewer
projects. This "distribution of wealth" makes it easier to finance
technology development within an acquisition program. In addition, even
though more money is distributed to weapon systems, there is still
considerable competition for funding. Such competition makes it
advantageous for programs to include in their design immature technologies
that offer significant performance gains. Within the space community,
there is also a perception that the length of time it takes to develop
space systems (which have only "one shot" at incorporating technologies)
demands that DOD push for continual advancement of technologies, even
after starting an acquisition program.
The impact of acquisition programs taking on technology development that
should be done in an S&T environment is considerable. Our work over the
past several decades has shown that this practice invariably leads to
unanticipated cost and schedule increases for space and other weapon
system programs since technical problems occurring within acquisition
require more time and money to fix. For some large programs for space,
cost increases have amounted to billions of dollars and delayed schedules
by years. Aside from removing technology development from a more
protective environment and from S&T oversight processes, problematic
acquisitions may also rob the S&T community and other acquisition programs
of investment dollars.
Some actions have been taken recently to address this dilemma. In
particular, DOD issued a revised directive in November 2003 expanding the
DDR&E's oversight authority to include efforts to develop advanced
Conclusions
components and prototypes-RDT&E budget activity 4.13 According to DDR&E
officials, this authority was intended to keep technology development out
of the acquisition programs and within the S&T community, but it will take
at least 2 years to determine its success. In addition, DOD's revised
acquisition policy for weapon systems encourages programs not to commit to
undertaking product development until technologies are matured, that is,
at a minimum tested in a relevant environment (TRL 6) and preferably in an
operational environment (TRL 7). However, in October 2003, DOD also issued
a separate acquisition policy for space, which allows technology
development to continue into product development up until a decision is
made to build the first product. At the time of our review, DOD was
revising the space acquisition policy and reexamining how long technology
development should continue within an acquisition program.
DOD has taken an initial positive step in optimizing investments in space
S&T projects by establishing short-and long-term goals, which can be used
to direct spending by S&T organizations, and by establishing a forum by
which senior leaders can assess whether spending is going in the right
direction. However, there will be significant challenges ahead for DOD in
implementing the strategy. Namely, DOD must maintain momentum toward
greater collaboration, which began under this effort. This will not be an
easy task, given the varied and competing interests of organizations with
a stake in DOD's space S&T investment and the fact that the strategy does
not explicitly cover organizations that fall outside the realm of
traditional DOD S&T oversight. Moreover, there are formidable barriers
that stand in the way of achieving and measuring progress, including
inadequate funding visibility, decreased testing resources, workforce
deficiencies, and long-standing incentives that encourage technology
development to take place within acquisition programs rather than the S&T
community. By using the strategy as a tool for assessing and addressing
these challenges, DOD can better position itself for achieving its goals
and also strengthen the S&T base supporting space.
13 Department of Defense Directive, Number 5134.3, "Director of Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E)," November 3, 2003.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the (1) Executive Agent
for Space and (2) the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics) (to whom the DDR&E reports) to make the following
improvements to space S&T strategic planning.
o Establish protocols and mechanisms for enhancing coordination and
knowledge sharing between the DOD S&T community, acquisition programs
involved in space, and DOD intelligence agencies.
o Ensure that the space S&T strategy fully reflects warfighter needs by
establishing links between space S&T strategic planning and DOD's new
JCIDS. In addition, establish links to architectural development processes
to assure that S&T projects align with future technology requirements
identified in space-related architectures.
o Continue to ensure that DOD has the right tools for measuring progress
in achieving its goals for space by identifying metrics that could be used
for assessing the value of S&T projects relative to strategic goals and
knowledge being gained relative to goals.
o Develop plans for addressing barriers to achieving strategic goals for
S&T, including deficiencies in RDT&E funding visibility, testing
resources, and workforce. A first step would be to include skills critical
to S&T in the workforce study identified in the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense
Authorization Act Conference Report.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations and identified actions being taken to address them. (See
app. V for DOD's comments.)
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the
Air Force and interested congressional committees. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (937) 258-7915. Key contributors to this report were
Cristina
Chaplain, Maricela Cherveny, Jean Harker, and Rich Horiuchi.
Michael Sullivan
Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Budget Activity Descriptions
Table 2: Description of Department of Defense's Budget Activities
Budget Name activity Description
Basic research 1 Basic research is systematic study directed toward
greater knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena
and of observable facts without specific applications towards processes or
products in mind. It includes all scientific study and experimentation
directed towards increasing fundamental knowledge and understanding in
those fields of the physical, engineering, environmental, and life
sciences related to long-term national security needs. It is farsighted
high-payoff research that provides the basis for technological progress.
Applied research 2 Applied research is systematic study to understand the
means to meet a recognized and specific need. It is a systematic expansion
and application of knowledge to develop useful materials, devices, and
systems or methods. Applied research may translate promising basic
research into solutions for broadly defined military needs, short of
system development. Applied research precedes systemspecific technology
investigations or development.
Advanced technology development 3
Advanced technology development includes development of subsystems and
components and efforts to integrate them into system prototypes for field
experiments and/or tests in a simulated environment. The results of this
type of effort are proof of technological feasibility and assessment of
subsystem and component operability and producibility rather than the
development of hardware for service use. Projects in this category have a
direct relevance to identified military needs. Program elements in this
category involve pre-acquisition efforts, such as system concept
demonstration, joint and service-specific experiments, or technology
demonstrations, and generally have technology readiness levels (TRLs) of
4, 5, or 6. Projects in this category do not necessarily lead to
subsequent development or procurement phases, but should have the goal of
moving out of space science and technology (S&T) and into the acquisition
process within the future years defense program.
Advanced component 4 Advanced component development and prototypes
development and consists of
efforts necessary to evaluate integrated technologies
prototypes or prototype
systems in a high fidelity and realistic operating
environment.
These activities include system-specific efforts that
help expedite
technology transition from the laboratory to
operational use.
Emphasis is on proving component and subsystem
maturity prior to
integration in major and complex systems and may
involve risk
reduction initiatives. Advanced component development
and
prototypes efforts are to occur before an acquisition
program starts
product development.
System development and demonstration 5 System development and
demonstration consists of newly initiated acquisition programs and
includes engineering and manufacturing development tasks aimed at meeting
validated requirements prior to full-rate production. Characteristics of
this activity involve mature system development, integration, and
demonstration to support a production decision.
Appendix I: Budget Activity Descriptions
Budget Name activity Description
Research, development, test and 6 RDT&E management support includes
evaluation efforts to sustain and/or
(RDT&E) management support modernize the installations or
operations required for general
RDT&E. Such efforts may relate to test
ranges, military
construction, maintenance support of
laboratories, operation and
maintenance of test aircraft and ships,
and studies and analyses in
support of the RDT&E program.
Operational system development 7 Operational system development includes
development efforts to upgrade systems that have been fielded or have
received approval for full-rate production and anticipate production
funding in the current or subsequent fiscal year.
Source: DOD Financial Management Regulation (DOD 7000.14-R, Volume 2B,
Chapter 5, June 2004).
Appendix II: Funding on Technology Development within Science and Technology and
Acquisition Communities
Table 3: Funding by S&T Community
Dollars in millions
Title BA Category Component FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Multi-Disciplinary
a
Space Technology 2 6.2 Air Force $95.8 $101.4 $84.6 $81.1 $101.4 $123.2
$122.1
Space Technology 2 6.2 Air 74.9 101.5 88.9 89.6 97.6 119.0 126.7
1a Force
Advance Spacecraft
Technology 3 6.3 Air 52.4 96.9 60.1 65.9 72.1 88.2 91.0
Force
Maui Space
Surveillance 3 6.3 Air 47.1 51.6 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.5
System Force
Multi-Disciplinary
Adv
Dev Space Tech 3 6.3 Air 51.7 62.1 51.1 59.6 76.3 81.8 73.1
Force
Command, Control,
Communications 3 6.3 Army 8.7 11.3 10.0 14.4 14.9 11.2
Advance Aerospace
Systems 3 6.3 DARPA 111.6 201.6 249.2 233.6 261.8 296.9 327.0
Integrated
Broadcast
System 3 6.3 Air 0.0 8.5 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Force
Total Space S&T
funding $442.2 $634.9 $552.5 $550.5 $630.5 $726.8 $753.0
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: The above R&D categories include (6.2) Exploratory Development and
(6.3) Advanced Development. R&D category (6.1) Basic Research is not
included because these efforts are general in nature and not specific to
space.
aFunding going toward a variety of projects and sources.
Table 4: Advanced Component Development and Prototypes Funding for Space
Acquisition Programs
Title BA Category FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Component
Army Missile Defense
Systems Integration 4 6.3 Army $57.0 $35.5 $4.9 $8.3 $11.9 $11.7 $15.8
Navstar Global
Positioning System 4 6.3 Air 46.6 0.0 40.6 180.0 291.0 779.5 794.0
III Force
Advanced Extremely
High Frequency
4 6.3 Air 802.7 802.3 612.1 410.0 316.8 189.5 131.1
satellite system Force
Polar Milsatcom 4 6.3 Air Force 22.4 5.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
National Polar-Orbiting
Operational
Environmental Satellite
System 4 6.3 Air Force 232.1 264.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Appendix II: Funding on Technology Development within Science and
Technology and Acquisition Communities
BA
Title Category FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Component
Space Control
Technology 4 6.3 Air 12.8 14.6 15.1 14.1 23.0 30.5 40.3
Force
International
Space
Cooperative R&D 4 6.3 Air .6 .5 .6 .6 .6 .6
Force
Transformational
Satcom 4 6.3 Air 111.5 335.4 774.8 1,192.4 1,346.7 1,830.1 1,038.6
Force
Integrated
Broadcast
System 4 6.3 Air 38.4 16.2 23.9 20.2 20.8 21.3 21.6
Force
Wideband
Gapfiller
System 4 6.3 Air 13.8 36.3 73.5 16.0 9.3 5.7
Force
Scamp Block II 4 6.3 14.1 27.7 10.2 92.5 0.0 0.0
Army
Air Force/Nat
Prog
Coop 4 6.3 Air 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Force
Space-Based 4 6.3 Air 45.4 172.6 327.7 466.2 502.7 1177.7 1550.0
Radar Force
Total Space 6.3
funding in BA4 1,399.7 1,711.3 1,884.4 2,400.3 2,522.8 4,046.6 3,598.4
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: The above R&D category is Advanced Development (6.3).
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels and Their Definitions
Technology readiness level Description
1. Basic principles observed and reported Lowest level of technology
readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into applied
research and development. Examples might include paper studies of a
technology's basic properties.
2. Technology concept and/or application formulated Invention begins. Once
basic principles are observed, practical applications can be invented.
3. Analytical and experimental critical function and/or Active research
and development is initiated. This includes analytical
characteristic proof of concept studies and laboratory studies to
physically validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the
technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative.
4. Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory Basic
technological components are integrated to establish that the
environment pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad hoc"
hardware in a laboratory.
5. Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant Fidelity of
breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic
environment technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
integration of components.
6. System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant
environment
Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond the
breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment.
Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated readiness.
Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity laboratory
environment or in simulated operational environment.
7. System prototype demonstration in an operational
Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a major
environment step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of an actual
system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an aircraft,
vehicle, or space. 8. Actual system completed and "flight qualified"
through test and demonstration Technology has been proven to work in its
final form and under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL
represents the end of true system development. Examples include
developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon
system to determine if it meets design specifications.
9. Actual system "flight proven" through successful
Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission mission
operations
conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and evaluation.
Examples include using the system under operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO analysis based on NASA and DOD guidance.
Appendix IV: Organizations That Participated in Developing the Space Science and
Technology Strategy
Air Force Research Laboratory
Air Force Space Command
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology
Central Intelligence Agency
Community Management Staff
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Research and Engineering
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology
Missile Defense Agency
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
National Security Agency
National Security Space Office
Naval Operations Staff
Naval Research Laboratory
Office of Naval Research
Space and Missile Defense Command
Space and Missile Systems Center
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
U.S. Marine Corps
U.S. Strategic Command
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
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