Capitol Visitor Center: Schedule Delays Continue; Reassessment	 
Underway (15-SEP-05, GAO-05-1037T).				 
                                                                 
This testimony discusses progress on the Capitol Visitor Center  
(CVC) project. Our remarks will focus on (1) the Architect of the
Capitol's (AOC) progress in managing the project's schedule since
the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Senate Committee on  
Appropriations' July 14 hearing on the project; (2) our estimate 
of a general time frame for completing the base project's	 
construction and the preliminary results of our assessment of the
risks associated with AOC's July 2005 schedule for the base	 
project; and (3) the project's costs and funding, including the  
potential impact of scheduling issues on cost. However, we will  
not, as originally planned, provide specific estimated completion
dates because AOC's contractors revised the schedule in August to
reflect recent delays, but AOC has not yet evaluated the revised 
schedule. AOC believes that the time added to the schedule by its
contractors is unreasonable. Until AOC completes its evaluation  
and we assess it, any estimates of specific completion dates are,
in our view, tentative and preliminary. Similarly, we will wait  
until the schedule is stabilized to update our November 2004	 
estimate of the cost to complete the project. Currently, AOC and 
its consultant, McDonough Bolyard Peck (MBP), are still 	 
developing their cost-to-complete estimates.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-1037T					        
    ACCNO:   A36937						        
  TITLE:     Capitol Visitor Center: Schedule Delays Continue;	      
Reassessment Underway						 
     DATE:   09/15/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Schedule slippages 				 
	     Construction contracts				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Facility construction				 
	     Contract administration				 
	     Construction (process)				 
	     Construction costs 				 
	     Contract oversight 				 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Facility management				 
	     Financial management				 
	     Government facility construction			 
	     Capitol Visitor Center Project			 

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GAO-05-1037T

                 United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT CAPITOL VISITOR

Thursday, September 15, 2005

CENTER

                Schedule Delays Continue; Reassessment Underway

Statement of Bernard L. Ungar, Director Terrell Dorn, Assistant Director
Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO-05-1037T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to assist the Subcommittee in monitoring
progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will
focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) progress in managing the
project's schedule since the Subcommittee's July 14 hearing on the
project; (2) our estimate of a general time frame for completing the base
project's construction and the preliminary results of our assessment of
the risks associated with AOC's July 2005 schedule for the base project;
and (3) the project's costs and funding, including the potential impact of
scheduling issues on cost.1 However, we will not, as originally planned,
provide specific estimated completion dates because AOC's contractors
revised the schedule in August to reflect recent delays, but AOC has not
yet evaluated the revised schedule. AOC believes that the time added to
the schedule by its contractors is unreasonable. Until AOC completes its
evaluation and we assess it, any estimates of specific completion dates
are, in our view, tentative and preliminary. Similarly, we will wait until
the schedule is stabilized to update our November 2004 estimate of the
cost to complete the project. Currently, AOC and its consultant, McDonough
Bolyard Peck (MBP), are still developing their cost-to-complete estimates.

Our remarks today are based on our review of schedules and financial
reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its
construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; our
observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and our
discussions with CVC project staff (including AOC, its major CVC
contractors, and representatives of MBP), AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, and
officials responsible for managing the Capitol Power Plant. We also
reviewed applicable appropriations legislation. Appendix I provides more
detailed information on our assessment of the project's schedule. We did
not perform an audit; rather, we performed our work to assist Congress in
conducting its oversight activities.

In summary, although AOC and its construction contractors have continued
to make progress since the Subcommittee's July 14 CVC hearing, several
delays have occurred and more are expected. These delays could postpone
the base project's completion significantly beyond

1See GAO, Capitol Visitor Center: Update on Status of Project's Schedule
and Costs, GAO-05-910T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005).

September 15, 2006, the date targeted in AOC's July 2005 schedule.2
Although not yet fully reviewed and accepted by AOC, the schedule that
AOC's contractors revised in August 2005 shows February 26, 2007, as the
base project's completion date. The contractors reported this revised date
largely because some key activities associated with the heating,
ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) and fire protection systems had
not been included in previous schedules and because delays were occurring,
both in constructing the utility tunnel and in completing interior
stonework.

According to our preliminary analysis of the project's July 2005 schedule,
the base project is more likely to be completed sometime in the spring or
summer of 2007 than by September 15, 2006. Unless the project's scope is
changed or extraordinary actions are taken, the base project is likely to
be completed later than September 15, 2006, for the reasons cited by the
contractors and for other reasons, such as the optimistic durations
estimated for a number of activities and the risks and uncertainties
facing the project. AOC believes that the contractors added too much time
to the schedule in August for activities not included in the schedule and
that it can expedite the project by working concurrently rather than
sequentially and by taking other actions. While AOC may not need all of
the time added for the missing activities, CVC project personnel believe
that more time will be needed than is currently scheduled for other
activities, such as the utility tunnel, interior finishes and stonework,
and the East Front. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the base
project's construction schedule, we cannot estimate a specific completion
date at this time. Additionally, we are concerned about actions that have
been, or could be, proposed to accelerate work to meet the September 15,
2006, target date. While such actions could expedite the project and save
some costs, they could also increase other costs or adversely affect the
CVC facility's quality, functionality, or life safety provisions. The
project's schedule also raises a number of management concerns, including
the potential for delays

2AOC set September 15, 2006, as the contractual date for completing the
base project's construction and for opening the CVC facility to the
public. The House and Senate expansion spaces were scheduled to be
completed after that date. AOC set the September contract completion date
in November 2004, when it reached agreement with the contractor on a new
date for starting sequence 2 that reflected the delays experienced on
sequence 1. On September 6, 2005, AOC informed Capitol Preservation
Commission representatives that it still expected the base project's
construction to be substantially complete on September 15, 2006, but was
postponing the date for opening the facility to the public to December 15,
2006, so that it could complete system tests, minor punch-list work, and
preparations for operations.

caused by not allowing enough time to address potential problems or to
complete critical activities. Since the Subcommittee's July 14 hearing, we
have discussed several actions with AOC that we believe are needed to
address the CVC project's schedule problems and our concerns. These
actions include

o  	evaluating the project's revised schedule, including the activity
durations, to ensure that adequate time is provided;

o  	analyzing the impact of various factors on the schedule and the
adequacy of the resources scheduled to be applied to meet completion
dates;

o  	carefully considering the costs, benefits, and risks associated with
proposals to accelerate work or reduce its scope and ensuring that
appropriate management controls are in place to prevent or minimize the
possible adverse consequences of such actions, if taken;

o  	proposing a CVC opening date that allows reasonable time between the
completion of construction and the facility's opening to address problems
that may arise;

o  	ensuring that delays and their causes are adequately determined and
documented on an ongoing basis; and

o  	advising Congress of any plans for accelerating work or reducing its
scope so that Congress can be involved in such decisions.

AOC agreed with our suggestions.

Fiscal year 2006 appropriations have provided sufficient funds to cover
AOC's request for CVC construction funding as well as additional funds for
some risks and uncertainties that may arise, such as costs associated with
additional sequence 2 delays or unexpected conditions. Although sequence 2
delays have been occurring, the extent to which the government is
responsible for their related costs is not clear at this time. Additional
funding may be necessary if the government is responsible for significant
delay-related costs or if significant changes are made to the project's
design or scope or to address unexpected conditions. In addition, we and
AOC identified some CVC construction activities that received duplicate
funding. AOC has discussed this issue with the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees.

Work on the Project Is Progressing, but Delays Continue

Project's Schedule, Including Possible Actions to Accelerate Work, Raises
Management Concerns

AOC and its contractors have continued to make progress on the project
since the Subcommittee's July 14 hearing. However, mostly because some key
activities associated with the HVAC and fire protection systems were not
included in earlier schedules and because delays occurred in installing
stonework and excavating the utility tunnel, the sequence 2 contractor's
August schedule shows the expected completion date for the base project as
February 26, 2007. As discussed at the Subcommittee's July 14 hearing, AOC
recognized some delays in its June 2005 schedule, which showed the base
project's expected completion date as October 19, 2006. Although AOC has
not evaluated the contractor's August schedule, it does not believe that
so much additional time will be needed. Furthermore, as discussed in the
next section, AOC maintains that work could be accelerated to meet the
September 15, 2006, target date.

According to our analysis of the CVC project's schedule, the base project
is unlikely to be completed by the September 15, 2006, target date for
several reasons. AOC believes that it could take actions to complete the
project by then, but these actions could have negative as well as positive
consequences. These and other schedule-related issues raise a number of
management concerns. We have discussed actions with AOC officials that we
believe are necessary to address problems with the schedule and our
concerns. AOC generally agreed with our suggestions.

Base Project's Construction Is Likely to Be Completed Later Than Scheduled for
Several Reasons

For several reasons, we believe that the base project is more likely to be
completed sometime in the spring or summer of 2007 than by September 15,
2006:

o  	As we have previously testified, AOC's sequence 2 contractor,
Manhattan Construction Company, has continued to miss its planned dates
for completing activities that we and AOC are tracking to assist the
Subcommittee in measuring the project's progress. For example, as of
September 8, the contractor had completed 7 of the 16 selected activities
scheduled for completion before today's hearing (see app. II); however,
none of the 7 activities was completed on time. Unforeseen site
conditions, an equipment breakdown, delays in stone deliveries, and a
shortage of stone masons for the interior stonework were among the reasons
given for why the work was not completed on time.3 Our analysis

3Also see, for example, GAO, Capitol Visitor Center: Effective Schedule
Management and Updated Cost Information Needed, GAO-05-811T (Washington,
D.C.: June 14, 2005).

of the sequence 2 contractor's production pace between November 2004 and
July 2005 indicates that the base project's construction is unlikely to be
finished by September 15, 2006, if the contractor continues at the same
pace or even accelerates the work somewhat. In fact, at the current or
even a slightly accelerated pace, the base project would be completed
several months after September 15, 2006. To finish the base project's
construction by that date, our analysis shows that the sequence 2
contractor would have to recover 1 day for every 8 remaining days between
July 2005 and September 2006 and could incur no further delays.4

o  	We continue to believe that the durations scheduled for a number of
sequence 2 activities are unrealistic. According to CVC project team
managers and staff, several activities, such as constructing the utility
tunnel; testing the fire protection system; testing, balancing, and
commissioning the HVAC system; installing interior stonework; and
finishing work in some areas are not likely to be completed as indicated
in the July 2005 schedule. Some of these are among the activities whose
durations we identified as optimistic in early 2004 and that we and AOC's
construction management contractor identified as contributing most to the
project's schedule slippage in August 2005; these activities also served
as the basis for our March 2004 recommendation to AOC that it reassess its
activity durations to see that they are realistic and achievable at the
budgeted cost. Because AOC had not yet implemented this recommendation and
these activities were important to the project's completion, we suggested
in our May 17 testimony before the Subcommittee that AOC give priority
attention to this recommendation.5 AOC's construction management
contractor initiated such a review after the May 17 hearing. Including
more time in the schedule to complete these activities could add many more
weeks to the project's schedule.

o  	AOC's more aggressive schedule management is identifying significant
omissions of activities and time from the sequence 2 schedule. AOC's
approach, though very positive, is coming relatively late in the project.
For example, several detailed activities associated with testing,
balancing, and commissioning the CVC project's HVAC and fire protection
system were added to the schedule in July and August, extending the
schedule by several months. AOC believes, and we agree, that some of this
work may be done concurrently, rather than sequentially as shown in the
August

4This analysis assumes the 60-day delay shown in the project's July
schedule.

5GAO, Capitol Visitor Center: Priority Attention Needed to Manage
Schedules and Contracts, GAO-05-714T (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005).

schedule, thereby saving some of the added time. However, until more work
is done to further develop this part of the schedule, it is unclear how
much time could be saved. Furthermore, the July schedule does not appear
to include time to address significant problems with the HVAC or fire
alarm systems should they occur during testing.

o  	In August 2005, CVC project personnel identified several risks and
uncertainties facing the project that they believed could adversely affect
its schedule. Examples include additional unforeseen conditions in
constructing the utility and House Connector tunnels; additional delays in
stonework due to slippages in stone deliveries, shortages of stone masons,
or stop-work orders responding to complaints about noise from work in the
East Front; and problems in getting the HVAC and fire protection systems
to function properly, including a sophisticated air filtration system that
has not been used before on such a large scale. Providing for these risks
and uncertainties in the schedule could add another 60 to 90 days to the
completion date, on top of the additional time needed to perform
activities that were not included in the schedule or whose durations were
overly optimistic.

o  	Over the last 2 months, AOC's construction management contractor has
identified 8 critical activity paths that will extend the base project's
completion date beyond September 15, 2006, if lost time cannot be
recovered or further delays cannot be prevented. These 8 activity paths
are in addition to 3 that were previously identified by AOC's construction
management contractor. In addition, the amount of time that has to be
recovered to meet the September 15 target has increased significantly. The
activity paths include work on the utility tunnel and testing and
balancing the HVAC system; procuring and installing the control wiring for
the air handling units; testing the fire alarm system; millwork and
casework in the orientation theaters and atrium; and stonework in the East
Front, orientation theaters, and exhibit gallery. Having so many critical
activity paths complicates project management and makes on-time completion
more difficult.

Possible Actions to Accelerate Work Raise Concerns

AOC believes it can recover much of the lost time and mitigate remaining
risks and uncertainties through such actions as using temporary equipment,
adding workers, working longer hours, resequencing work, or performing
some work after the CVC facility opens. AOC said that it is also
developing a risk mitigation plan that should contain additional steps it
can take to address the risks and uncertainties facing the project.
Various AOC actions could expedite the project and save costs, but they
could also have less positive effects. For example, accelerating work on
the utility

tunnel could save costs by preventing or reducing delays in several other
important activities whose progress depends on the tunnel's completion.
Conversely, using temporary equipment or adding workers to overcome delays
could increase the project's costs if the government is responsible for
the delays. Furthermore, (1) actions to accelerate the project may not
save time; (2) the time savings may be offset by other problems; or (3)
working additional hours, days, or shifts may adversely affect the quality
of the work or worker safety. In our opinion, decisions to accelerate work
must be carefully made, and if the work is accelerated, it must be tightly
managed.

Possible proposals from contractors to accelerate the project by changing
the scope of work or its quality could compromise the CVC facility's life
safety system, the effective functioning of the facility's HVAC system,
the functionality of the facility to meet its intended purposes, or the
life-cycle costs of materials. In August, project personnel raised such
possibilities as lessening the rigor of systems' planned testing, opening
the facility before all planned testing is done, or opening the facility
before completing all the work identified by Capitol Preservation
Commission representatives as having to be completed for the facility to
open. While such measures could save time, we believe that the risks
associated with these types of actions need to be carefully considered
before adoption and that management controls need to be in place to
preclude or minimize any adverse consequences of such actions, if taken.

Project's Schedule Presents Other Management Concerns

AOC's schedule presents other management issues, including some that we
have discussed in earlier testimonies.

o  	AOC tied the date for opening the CVC facility to the public to
September 15, 2006, the date in the sequence 2 contract for completing the
base project's construction. Joining these two milestones does not allow
any time for addressing unexpected problems in completing the construction
work or in preparing for operations. AOC has since proposed opening the
facility to the public on December 15, 2006, but the schedule does not yet
reflect this proposed revision. Specifically, on September 6, 2005, AOC
told Capitol Preservation Commission representatives that it was still
expecting the CVC base project to be substantially completed by September
15, 2006, but it proposed to postpone the facility's opening for 3 months
to provide time to finish testing CVC systems, complete punch-list work,
and prepare for operating the facility. In our view, allowing some time to
address unexpected problems is prudent.

o  	AOC's and its contractors' reassessment of activity durations in the
August schedule may not be sufficiently rigorous to identify all those
that are unrealistic. In reassessing the project's schedule, the
construction management contractor found some durations to be reasonable
that we considered likely to be too optimistic. Recently, AOC's sequence 2
and construction management contractors reported that, according to their
reassessment, the durations for interior stonework were reasonable. We
previously found that these durations were optimistic, and CVC project
staff we interviewed in August likewise believed they were unrealistic.

o  	We have previously expressed concerns about a lack of sufficient or
timely analysis and documentation of delays and their causes and
determination of responsibility for the delays, and we recommended that
AOC perform these functions more rigorously. We have not reassessed this
area recently. However, given the project's uncertain schedule, we believe
that timely and rigorous analysis and documentation of delays and their
causes and determination of responsibility for them are critical. We plan
to reexamine this area again in the next few weeks.

o  	The uncertainty associated with the project's construction schedule
increases the importance of having a summary schedule that integrates the
completion of construction with preparations for opening the facility to
the public, as the Subcommittee has requested and we have recommended.6
Without such a schedule, it is difficult to determine whether all
necessary activities have been identified and linked to provide for a
smooth opening or whether CVC operations staff will be hired at an
appropriate time. In early September, AOC gave a draft operations schedule
to its construction management contractor to integrate into the
construction schedule.

o  	As we noted in our July 14 testimony, AOC could incur additional costs
for temporary work if it opens the CVC facility to the public before the
construction of the House and Senate expansion spaces is substantially
complete. As of last week, AOC's contractors were still evaluating the
construction schedule for the expansion spaces, and it was not clear what
needs AOC would have for temporary work. The schedule, which we received
in early September, shows December 2006 as the date for completing the
construction of the expansion spaces. We have not yet assessed the
likelihood of the contractor's meeting this date.

6See, for example, GAO-05-714T.

o  	Finally, we are concerned about the capacity of the Capitol Power
Plant (CPP) to provide adequately for cooling, dehumidifying, and heating
the CVC facility during construction and when it opens to the public.
Delays in completing CPP's ongoing West Refrigeration Plant Expansion
Project, the removal from service of two chillers because of refrigerant
gas leaks, fire damage to a steam boiler, management issues, and the
absence of a CPP director could potentially affect CPP's ability to
provide sufficient chilled water and steam for the CVC facility and other
congressional buildings. These issues are discussed in greater detail in
appendix III.

Actions Are Needed and Being Taken to Move the Project Forward and Address
Concerns

Since the Subcommittee's July 14 CVC hearing, we have discussed a number
of actions with AOC officials that we believe are necessary to address
problems with the project's schedule and our concerns. AOC generally
agreed with our suggestions, and a discussion of them and AOC's responses
follows.

o  	By October 31, 2005, work with all relevant stakeholders to reassess
the entire project's construction schedule, including the schedule for the
House and Senate expansion spaces, to ensure that all key activities are
included, their durations are realistic, their sequence and
interrelationships are appropriate, and sufficient resources are shown to
accomplish the work as scheduled. Specific activities that should be
reassessed include testing, balancing, and commissioning the HVAC and
filtration systems; testing the fire protection system; constructing the
utility tunnel; installing the East Front mechanical (HVAC) system;
installing interior stonework and completing finishing work (especially
plaster work); fabricating and delivering interior bronze doors; and
fitting out the gift shops. AOC agreed and has already asked its
construction management and sequence 2 contractors to reassess the August
schedule. AOC has also asked the sequence 2 contractor to show how it will
recover time lost through delays.

o  	Carefully consider the costs, benefits, and risks associated with
proposals to change the project's scope, modify the quality of materials,
or accelerate work, and ensure that appropriate management controls are in
place to prevent or minimize any adverse effects of such actions. AOC
agreed. It noted that the sequence 2 contractor had already begun to work
additional hours to recover lost time on the utility tunnel. AOC also
noted that its construction management contractor has an inspection
process in place to identify problems with quality and has recently
enhanced its efforts to oversee worker safety.

o  	Propose a CVC opening date to Congress that allows a reasonable amount
of time between the completion of the base project's construction and the
CVC facility's opening to address any likely problems that are not
provided for in the construction schedule. The December 15, 2006, opening
date that AOC proposed earlier this month would provide about 90 days
between these milestones if AOC meets its September 15, 2006, target for
substantial completion. However, we continue to believe that AOC will have
difficulty meeting the September 15 target, and although the 90-day period
is a significant step in the right direction, an even longer period is
likely to be needed.

o  Give priority attention to effectively implementing our previous

Project Costs and Funding Provided as of September 2005

recommendations that AOC (1) analyze and document delays and the reasons
and responsibility for them on an ongoing basis and analyze the impact of
scope changes and delays on the project's schedule at least monthly and
(2) advise Congress of any additional costs it expects to incur to
accelerate work or perform temporary work to advance the CVC facility's
opening so Congress can weigh the advantages and disadvantages of such
actions. AOC agreed.

AOC is still updating its estimate of the cost to complete the CVC
project, including the base project and the House and Senate expansion
spaces. As a result, we have not yet had an opportunity to comprehensively
update our November 2004 estimate that the project's estimated cost at
completion will likely be between $515.3 million without provision for
risks and uncertainties and $559 million with provision for risks and
uncertainties. Since November 2004, we have added about $10.3 million to
our $515.3 million estimate to account for additional CVC design and
construction work. (App. IV provides information on the project's cost
estimates since the original 1999 estimate.) However, our current $525.6
million estimate does not include costs that AOC may incur for delays
beyond those delay costs included in our November 2004 estimate.
Estimating the government's costs for delays that occurred after November
2004 is difficult because it is unclear who ultimately will bear
responsibility for various delays. Furthermore, AOC's new estimates may
cause us to make further revisions to our cost estimates.

To date, about $528 million has been provided for CVC construction. (See
app.V.) This amount does not include about $7.8 million that was made

available for either CVC construction or operations.7 In late August, we
and AOC found that duplicate funding had been provided for certain CVC
construction work. Specifically, about $800,000 was provided in two
separate funding sources for the same work. The House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations were notified of this situation and AOC's
plan to address it. The funding that has been provided and that is
potentially available for CVC construction covers the current estimated
cost of the facility at completion and provides some funds for risks and
uncertainties. However, if AOC encounters significant additional costs for
delays or other changes, more funding may be needed.

Because of the potential for coordination problems with a project as large
and complex as CVC, we had recommended in July that AOC promptly designate
responsibility for integrating the planning and budgeting for CVC
construction and operations. In late August, AOC designated a CVC staff
member to oversee both CVC construction and operations funding. AOC had
also arranged for its operations planning consultant to develop an
operations preparation schedule and for its CVC project executive and CVC
construction management contractor to prepare an integrated construction
and operations schedule. AOC has received a draft operations schedule and
has given it to its construction management contractor to integrate into
the construction schedule. Pending the hiring of an executive director for
CVC, which AOC would like to occur by the end of January 2006, the
Architect of the Capitol said he expects his Chief Administrative Officer,
who is currently overseeing CVC operations planning, to work closely with
the CVC project executive to integrate CVC construction and operations
preparations.

Work and costs could also be duplicated in areas where the
responsibilities of AOC's contractors overlap. For example, the contracts
or planned modification for both AOC's CVC construction design contractor
and CVC operations contractor include work related to the gift shop's
design and wayfinding signage. We discussed the potential for duplication
with AOC, and it agreed to work with its operations planning contractor to
clarify the contractor's scope of work, eliminate any duplication, and
adjust the operations contract's funding accordingly.

7Public Law 108-447, enacted in December 2004, provided that up to $10.6
million could be so transferred upon the approval of the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations for the use of the CVC project. In June 2005,
AOC received approval to use about $2.8 million of this $10.6 million,
leaving a balance of about $7.8 million that can be used in the future.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Contacts and	For further information about this testimony, please contact
Bernard Ungar at (202) 512-4232 or Terrell Dorn at (202) 512-6923. Other
key

Acknowledgments 	contributors to this testimony include Shirley Abel,
Michael Armes, John Craig, George Depaoli, Jr., Maria Edelstein, Elizabeth
Eisenstadt, Brett Fallavollita, Jeanette Franzel, Jackie Hamilton, Bradley
James, Scott Riback, and Kris Trueblood.

                    Appendix I: Risk Assessment Methodology

With the assistance of a contractor, Hulett & Associates, we assessed the
risks associated with the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) July 2005
schedule for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project and used the results
of our assessment to estimate a time frame for completing the base CVC
project with and without identified risks and uncertainties.1 In August
2005, we and the contractor interviewed project managers and team members
from AOC and its major CVC contractors, a representative from the Army
Corps of Engineers, and AOC's Chief Fire Marshal to determine the risks
they saw in completing the remaining work and the time they considered
necessary to finish the CVC project and open it to the public. Using the
project's July 2005 summary schedule (the most recent schedule available
when we did our work), we asked the team members to estimate how many
workdays would be needed to complete the remaining work. More
specifically, for each summary-level activity that the members had a role
or expertise in, we asked them to develop three estimates of the
activity's duration-the least, most likely, and longest time needed to
complete the activity. We planned to estimate the base project's most
likely completion date without factoring in risks and uncertainties using
the most likely activity durations estimated by the team members. In
addition, using these three-point estimates and a simulation analysis to
calculate different combinations of the team's estimates that factored in
identified risks and uncertainties, we planned to estimate completion
dates for the base project at various confidence levels.

In August 2005, AOC's construction management and sequence 2 contractors
were updating the July project schedule to integrate the construction
schedule for the House and Senate expansion spaces, reflect recent
progress and problems, and incorporate the results to date of their
reassessment of the time needed for testing, balancing, and commissioning
the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning, (HVAC) system and for fire
alarm testing.2 This reassessment was being done partly to implement a
recommendation we had made to AOC after assessing the project's schedule
in early 2004 and finding that the scheduled durations for these and other
activities were optimistic. AOC's construction management and

1We did not include the schedule for work on the House and Senate
expansion spaces in our assessment because the schedule was not completed
in time for analysis before the Subcommittee's September hearing.

2AOC's sequence 2 contractor was unable to integrate the detailed schedule
for the expansion spaces into the overall project schedule because of a
number of problems, but plans to do so in the September schedule.

sequence 2 contractors found that key detailed activities associated with
the HVAC system had not been included in the schedule and that the
durations for a number of activities were not realistic. Taking all of
these factors into account, AOC's contractors revised the project's
schedule in August. AOC believes that the revised schedule, which shows
the base project's completion date slipping by several months, allows too
much time for the identified problems. As a result of this problem and
others we brought to AOC's attention, AOC has asked its contractors to
reassess the schedule. AOC's construction management contractor believes
that such a reassessment could take up to 2 months. In our opinion, there
are too many uncertainties associated with the base project's schedule to
develop reliable estimates of specific completion dates, with or without
provisions for risks and uncertainties.

Appendix II: Capitol Visitor Center Critical Construction Milestones,
July-September 2005

                Activity                   Location     Scheduled      Actual 
                                                        completion completion 
        Wall Stone Area 8 Layout          Great Hall       6/20/05    7/25/05 
        Wall Stone Area 9 Layout          Great Hall       6/24/05    7/28/05 
           Wall Stone Area 3a             Great Hall       7/06/05    7/22/05 
           Wall Stone Area 2a             Great Hall       7/06/05    7/25/05 
      Drill/Set Soldier Piles Sta.      Utility Tunnel     6/08/05 
                0:00-1:00                                          
       Wall Stone Area 9 Pedestals        Great Hall       7/05/05 
            Wall Stone Area 1          Cong. Auditorium    8/08/05 
            Wall Stone Area 2          Cong. Auditorium    8/22/05 
        Bridge Over First Street        Utility Tunnel     8/02/05    8/12/05 
            Wall Stone Area 3          Cong. Auditorium    9/06/05 
Excavate and Lag Stations 1:00-2:00  Utility Tunnel     8/02/05    8/24/05 
           Wall Stone Area 4a             Great Hall       7/15/05    8/30/05 
    Excavate and Shore Sta. 0:00-1:00   Utility Tunnel     7/21/05 
Concrete Working Slab First Street   Utility Tunnel     7/26/05 
      Waterproof Working Slab Sta.      Utility Tunnel     7/29/05 
                0:00-1:00                                          
         Wall Stone Area 9 Base           Great Hall       7/15/05 

Source: AOC's April 2005 CVC sequence 2 construction schedule for the
scheduled completion dates and AOC and its construction management
contractor for the actual completion dates.

Note: Actual completion information was obtained on September 8, 2005.

aThese activities are not critical. All other activities were critical in
the April schedule or became critical in subsequent schedules.

Appendix III: Issues Affecting the Capitol Power Plant's Cooling and Heating
Capacity

Several issues could affect the capacity of the Capitol Power Plant (CPP)
to provide sufficient chilled water and steam for the CVC facility and
other congressional buildings. CPP produces chilled water for cooling and
dehumidification and steam for heating Capitol Hill buildings. 1 To
accommodate the CVC facility and meet other needs, CPP has been increasing
its production capacity through the West Refrigeration Plant Expansion
Project. This project, which was scheduled for completion in time to
provide chilled water for the CVC facility during construction and when it
opened, has been delayed. In addition, problems with aging equipment, fire
damage, management weaknesses, and a leadership vacancy could affect CPP's
ability to provide chilled water and steam. More specifically:

o  	In July, two chillers in CPP's East Refrigeration Plant were taken out
of service because of a significant refrigerant gas leak. The refrigerant,
whose use is being phased out nationally, escaped into the surrounding
environment. Because of the chillers' age and use of an outdated
refrigerant, AOC has determined that it would not be cost-effective to
repair the chillers. CPP's chilled water production capacity will be
further reduced between December 1, 2005, and March 15, 2006, when the
West Refrigeration Plant is to be shut down to enable newly installed
equipment to be connected to the existing chilled water system. However,
the remainder of CPP's East Refrigeration Plant is to remain operational
during this time, and AOC expects that the East Refrigeration Plant will
have sufficient capacity to meet the lower wintertime cooling demands.
Additionally, CPP representatives indicated that they could bring the West
Refrigeration Plant back online to provide additional cooling capacity in
an emergency. CPP is developing a cost estimate for this option.

o  	In June, one of two CPP boilers that burn coal to generate steam was
damaged by fire. According to a CPP incident report, CPP operator errors
contributed to the incident and subsequent damage. Both boilers were taken
off-line for scheduled maintenance between July 1 and September 15, and
CPP expects both boilers to be back online by September 30, thereby
enabling CPP to provide steam to CVC when it is needed.

o  	Several management issues at CPP could further affect the expansion
plant's and CPP's operational readiness:

1The Capitol Power Plant is no longer used to generate electric power, but
it does generate steam and chilled water to serve the heating and cooling
needs of the U.S. Capitol and 23 surrounding facilities. These facilities
include about 16 million square feet.

o  	CPP has not yet developed a plan for staffing and operating the entire
plant after the West Refrigeration Plant becomes operational or contracted
for its current staff to receive adequate training to operate the West
Refrigeration Plant's new, much more modern equipment.

o  	CPP has not yet received a comprehensive commissioning plan from its
contractor.

o  	A number of procurement issues associated with the plant expansion
project have arisen. We are reviewing these issues.

o  	CPP has been without a director since May 2005, when the former
director resigned. CPP is important to the functioning of Congress, and
strong leadership is needed to oversee the completion of the expansion
project and the integration, commissioning, and operation of the new
equipment, as well as address the operational and management problems at
the plant. Filling the director position with an experienced manager who
is also an expert in the production of steam and chilled water is
essential. AOC recently initiated the recruitment process.

Appendix IV: Cost Growth for the CVC Project

                              Dollars in millions

                      Factors Cost increase Subtotal Total

 Project budget, original (1999) $265.0 Factors beyond or largely beyond AOC's
                                    control

a

                         5 additional scope items $29.7

                     House and Senate expansion spaces 70.0

          Air filtration system funded by Dep't. of Defense (DOD) 33.3

                 Enhanced fire safety and security 13.7 $146.7

Bid prices exceeding estimates, preconstruction costs exceeding budgeted
costs,
unforeseen field conditions, 46.0

           46.0 Additional cost-to-complete items (as of August 2005)

          Other factors (costs associated with delays and         57.6  250.3 
                     design-to-budget overruns)                        
        Project budget after increases (as of November 2004)           $515.3 
    GAO-projected costs to complete after proposed scope changes       
                    (as of June 2005, excluding                        
                     risks and uncertainties)b                     7.2 $522.5 

Design of the Library of Congress tunnel (Funds from Capitol Preservation
Fund) 0.7

Wayfinding fabrication and installation 1.0

Gift shop design 0.1

              Gift shop construction and fit-out              1.3      
     GAO-projected costs to complete (as of August 2005,           3.1 $525.6 
             excluding risks and uncertainties)c                       
     Potential additional costs associated with risks and              
             uncertainties (as of November 2004)d           43.5       
    Less: Risks and uncertainties GAO believes the project             
                           faced in                                    
    November 2004 [Congressional seals, orientation film,              
             and backpack storage space ($4.2) +                       
         US Capitol Police securitymonitoring ($3.0)]       (7.2)      
    Less: Additional cost-to-complete items (as of August   (3.1)      
                            2005)                                      
        Potential remaining costs related to risks and            33.2 
                        uncertainties                                  
            GAO estimate of total cost to complete                     $558.8 

Sources: AOC and its contractors.

aThe five additional scope items are the House connector tunnel, the East
Front elevator extension, the Library of Congress tunnel, temporary
operations, and enhanced perimeter security.

bThe proposed scope changes totaling $7.2 million include $4.2 million for
congressional seals, an orientation film, and backpack storage space and
$3 million for U.S. Capitol Police security monitoring.

cBecause of rounding dollars in tenths of millions, this estimate excludes
$2,892 for CVC ceremonial groundbreaking activities.

dRisks and uncertainties can include shortages in skilled stone masons and
stone, security and life safety changes, unknown operator requirements,
unforeseen conditions, and contractor coordination issues.

Appendix V: Current Funding Provided to the CVC Project

                              Dollars in millions

                         Project Funding Subtotal Total

                            Funding as of June 2005

                   Base project (as of November 2004) $351.1

                          Expansion spaces House $35.0

                    Senate 35.0 $70.0 Filtration system 33.3

                 US Capitol Police security monitoring 3.0 36.3

Transfer of emergency response funds 26.3

              Current funding provided (as of June 2005) a $483.7

Funding provided for FY 2006 b c 41.9

Design of Library of Congress tunnel (funds from the Capitol Preservation
Fund) b 0.7

      Construction-related funding provided in operations obligation plan:

b

Gift shop 0.7

bc

Wayfinding 0.3

Commissioning systems 0.2                                            
b cMiscellaneous design and construction 0.4                         
Construction-related funding provided in operations 1.6              
Other funding provided 2.3                                           
Additional funding                                                   

b c

Current funding provided (as of August 2005) d $527.9

Sources: Legislation, Conference Reports, and AOC.

aBecause of rounding dollars in tenths of millions, the $483.7 million
does not include $2,892 made available by the Capitol Preservation
Commission from the Capitol Preservation Fund in October 2000 for the
groundbreaking ceremony.

bFiscal year 2006 CVC construction funding does not include some
construction-related items funded from other sources. Funds for these
items include $700,000 for the Library of Congress tunnel provided by the
Capitol Preservation Fund and $1.6 million provided in CVC's June 2005
operations obligation plan. The $1.6 million is part of the $10.6 million
made available in December 2004 by Public Law 108-447 for both CVC
construction and operations.

cFunds were provided for certain items that duplicated funding already
provided in fiscal year 2006 CVC construction funding. The $41.9 million
represents fiscal year 2006 funding made available for CVC
construction-related activity. Included in this $41.9 million fiscal year
2006 funding are some construction-related items (i.e., $150,000 for
wayfinding design, $232,000 for commissioning systems, and $423,000 for
miscellaneous design and construction) totaling $805,000 for which AOC
received the duplicative funding. These items had also been included in
the $2.8 million operations obligation plan approved in June 2005. AOC has
stated that it will not use fiscal year 2006 funding for these items.
Thus, $805,000 of the $41.9 million fiscal year 2006 funding will be
available for other uses.

dTwo construction-related items have not yet been fully funded. These are
the gift shop construction (approximately $771,000) and wayfinding
fabrication and installation (approximately $800,000).

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