Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide
Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational	 
Crewing (10-NOV-04, GAO-05-10). 				 
                                                                 
The Navy has traditionally maintained overseas presence by	 
deploying ships for 6 months. Rotating crews aboard ships that	 
remain deployed for longer periods is an alternative the Navy	 
could pursue to increase the utilization of ships. Senior Navy	 
officials have also cited crew rotations as a way to reduce part 
of the Navy's plans for a larger force structure and reportedly  
free billions of dollars for other priorities. On its own	 
initiative, GAO examined the Navy's efforts to evaluate and	 
implement several rotational crewing options and the impacts of  
ship maintenance on extended rotational crewing deployments.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-10						        
    ACCNO:   A13373						        
  TITLE:     Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and
Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship 	 
Rotational Crewing						 
     DATE:   11/10/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Equipment maintenance				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Maintenance (upkeep)				 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Military vessels					 
	     Naval personnel					 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Ships						 
	     Deployment at sea					 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-10

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                     GAO Report to Congressional Committees

November 2004

FORCE STRUCTURE

     Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for
                  Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing

                                       a

GAO-05-10

[IMG]

November 2004

FORCE STRUCTURE

Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for
Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing

  What GAO Found

The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews aboard
surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible alternative to
traditional 6-month ship deployments. To effectively institutionalize and
implement change, best practices show that a comprehensive analytical
framework provides useful information to decision makers. However, the
Navy has not established such an analytical framework-consisting of formal
measurable goals, objectives, and metrics-that could be used to assess the
feasibility of various rotational crewing options and determine their
impact on operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale.
Further, the Navy has not systematically collected or developed accurate
cost data to perform complete cost-effective analyses. Absent such
information, the Navy may not know the full impact of rotating crews on
surface ships, the extent to which the various options should be
implemented, or whether it is getting maximum return on investment.

Because rotating crews on surface ships is evolving as an alternative, the
Navy has not provided effective guidance when implementing the practice
and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned. Effective guidance
and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to institutionalize
change and facilitate efficient operations. While the Navy has
well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for ballistic
missile submarines that include appropriately documenting a ship's
condition and turnover procedures for accountability, it has not provided
comparable guidance to surface ships. As a result, the Navy unnecessarily
risks repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and
crew morale.

Furthermore, the impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of
rotational crewing has not been fully assessed. Effective maintenance
strategies help ensure ships can perform their missions without adverse
impacts on crew morale. It is a challenge to ensure the mission capability
of ships that are deployed for longer periods because most maintenance and
repair is usually completed between 6-month deployments. While rotating
crews has enabled the Navy to keep ships deployed for up to 24 months, the
service has not fully examined all issues related to the best maintenance
strategies that could affect a ship's condition and crew's morale. Absent
effective strategies, the Navy risks degrading long-term ship condition
and discouraging crew support for rotational crewing.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

Letter

Results in Brief
Background
The Navy Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Feasibility and

Cost-Effectiveness of Rotational Crewing for Surface Ships
Navy Has Not Provided Effective Guidance or Capitalized on
Lessons Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences
Maintenance Strategies for Alternative Crewing and Potential

Impacts Have Not Been Fully Assessed
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments

                                       1

                                      3 6

11

21

33 42 43 43

Appendix I Ships Included in Our Evaluation

Appendix II Scope and Methodology

Appendix III	Summary List of Department of the Navy Guidance
Implementing 10 U.S.C. 7310

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Tables

Table 1: Comparison of Crewing Options during Deployments to the Persian
Gulf 12

Table 2: Selected Preliminary Lessons Learned Regarding the Material
Condition of U.S.S. Fletcher during the Sea Swap Destroyer Initiative 31

Table 3: Examples of Maintenance Problems on Patrol Coastal Ships 40 Table
4: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform 59

Figures

Figure 1: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine 46
Figure 2: The U.S.S. Fletcher, a Spruance-Class Destroyer 48 Figure 3: The
U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-Class Guided

Missile Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat

Passing in the Foreground 49 Figure 4: The U.S.S. Firebolt, a
Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal 50 Figure 5: The High Speed Vessel
Experimental Craft, HSV-2 Swift 52 Figure 6: Design Depiction of the
Navy's Next Generation

Destroyer, DD(X) 53 Figure 7: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat
Ship 55

Abbreviations

DD destroyer
DD(X) next generation guided missile destroyer
DDG guided missile destroyer
DOD Department of Defense
HSV high speed vessel

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

November 10, 2004

Congressional Committees

The Navy's fleet of surface ships represents a significant capital
investment to provide the forward presence desired. The Navy is also
facing an affordability challenge as it invests in new ships, supports a
high pace of operations, and manages rising personnel costs. The Navy has
traditionally maintained overseas presence by using standard deployments
whereby individual ships and their permanently assigned crews are deployed
for approximately 6 months out of a 27-month cycle that includes time for
training and ship maintenance. Rotating crews aboard ships so that the
ships can remain deployed for a longer period is one of many alternatives
the Navy could pursue to increase the utilization or the operational
on-station days,1 or both, of Navy ships. Recently, senior Navy officials
have also cited crew rotations as one of the ways to partially mitigate
the need for a larger force structure and free billions of dollars for
higher priority areas, such as the capabilities needed to operate from the
sea when the United States is denied access to bases and ports abroad. As
such, it is prudent for the Navy to employ its ships in a manner that
maximizes its return on investment.

The Navy has rotated crews on ships in several ways, although its use of
this practice is not widespread and is still evolving. On its Ohio-class
Trident ballistic missile submarines, the Navy has used a "Blue-Gold" crew
concept since the 1960s, whereby two complete crews are assigned to a
single hull and rotate deployments. In the 1990s, the Navy's Mine Warfare
Command2 used a concept whereby four crews rotated among three ships
throughout the deployment cycle. More recently, the U.S. Pacific Fleet3
has

1 Operational on-station days are defined as those days a ship spends
forwardly deployed in the designated theater of operations.

2 The Navy's Mine Warfare Command is responsible for developing and
evaluating mine warfare doctrine, tactics, and equipment. The Command also
ensures readiness of mine warfare forces to conduct offensive and
defensive mine warfare operations through training and operational
experience.

3 The U.S. Pacific Fleet provides trained and combat-ready naval forces to
combatant commanders. Pacific Fleet ships are at sea in the Pacific,
Indian, and Arctic Oceans, from the west coast of the United States to the
Arabian Gulf. The Pacific Fleet encompasses approximately 200 ships, 2,000
aircraft, and over 239,000 sailors, Marines, and civilians.

been demonstrating the ability to rotate crews on some of its destroyers
as part of a "Sea Swap" demonstration project. Under this concept, there
are the same numbers of crews as ships, but the crews rotate for 6 months
to those ships that are forward deployed for extended periods of 18 months
or more. The Navy is also using this concept on its patrol coastal ships
operating in the Persian Gulf and the Blue-Gold concept to support the
high speed vessel experimental ship, the HSV-2 Swift.

We prepared this report under our oversight authority and are providing it
to you because of your oversight on defense issues. Recognizing the Navy's
need to explore ways for improving the use of its surface ships and its
plan for employing rotational crews on several types of surface ships in
the current and planned force (appendix I provides a description of all
ships included in our evaluation), this report addresses the following
questions: (1) Has the Navy systematically evaluated the feasibility,
including the cost-effectiveness, of rotational crewing concepts for
existing and future classes of surface ships? (2) Have the Navy's
experiences with rotational crewing been effectively implemented? (3) How
does ship maintenance affect implementation of rotational crewing?

To assess whether the Navy has systematically evaluated the feasibility
and cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing concepts for existing and
future classes of surface ships, we reviewed rotational crewing studies
performed by and for the Navy, including a recent study by the Center for
Naval Analyses;4 compiled and analyzed sailor reenlistment data;
interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy Headquarters and fleet
officials; met with cost analysis experts in the government and the
private sector; and reviewed key acquisition documents and crew employment
plans. To assess whether the Navy has effectively implemented rotational
crewing on surface ships and leveraged lessons learned, we conducted over
40 focus group meetings with rotational crews; interviewed Pacific and
Atlantic Fleet5 officials responsible for

4 The Center for Naval Analyses is the Department of the Navy's Federally
Funded Research and Development Center. The Center's analysts provide
direct support to operating forces and senior staffs across the spectrum
of Navy and Marine Corps activities.

5 The mission of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet is to provide combat-ready naval
forces and to ensure that those forces are supplied the leadership,
manpower, equipment, maintenance, training, and material needed to perform
their assigned missions. The Fleet commander determines readiness and
training requirements for assigned forces and ensures that deploying units
meet prescribed readiness standards.

personnel, operations, maintenance, and training; and reviewed Navy
Lessons Learned System instructions and queried the system to determine
relevant lessons recorded. We used the strategic ballistic submarine
community as a best practice based on its long-standing successful use of
rotational crewing. To assess how maintenance on ships homeported in the
United States might be affected by extended deployments, we reviewed ship
maintenance directives and instructions, reviewed ship maintenance
reports, and conducted focus group meetings with the three crews on the
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers involved with the Sea Swap destroyer
demonstration project and several crews that had rotated on patrol coastal
ships.

While we did not validate the maintenance reports and sailor reenlistment
data used in this report, we discussed the data with DOD officials to
determine that the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We
did validate the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the data
were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted our review from
July 2003 through July 2004 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. The scope and methodology used in our
review are described in further detail in appendix II.

                                Results in Brief

The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews aboard
surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible alternative to
traditional 6-month ship deployments. However, the service has not
institutionalized this change by employing a comprehensive analytical
framework that will systematically evaluate all rotational crewing options
for current and future classes of surface ships. Best practices show that
an analytic framework that includes measurable goals and objectives,
performance metrics, and evaluation plans helps decision makers
effectively implement change. The Navy has developed some data to
demonstrate that rotational crewing aboard surface ships is feasible for
increasing the forward presence. But, the Navy has not established formal
measurable goals, objectives, and metrics that would be used to assess
each of the rotational crewing options to determine their impact on
operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale. For example,
one measure of crew morale is the reenlistment rate. While the Navy did
not assess the rates for participants in rotational crewing, we found that
reenlistments were generally lower on the Sea Swap guided missile
destroyers compared to comparable Pacific Fleet ships. Further, the Navy
has not systematically collected or developed accurate cost data in order
to perform complete cost-effectiveness analyses. For example, cost
assessments have been limited to identifying fuel savings resulting from

fewer ship transits to and from homeports, costs for crew transportation
and berthing, and some additional maintenance and training costs. A
systematic cost-effectiveness assessment, according to cost analysis
experts, should include all costs for each of the crewing alternatives,
such as housing, training, maintenance, and ship acquisition costs. This
capability and cost information is critical for comparing the different
crewing options and evaluating which one most effectively meets specific
operational requirements. In the absence of a systematic evaluation of the
potential feasibility and cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing
options for its current and future classes of surface ships, the Navy may
make decisions without knowing the full impact of the practice on surface
ships or the extent to which this practice should be implemented to meet
operational requirements. Consequently, the Navy does not know that it is
getting a maximum return on investment or the extent to which using
rotational crewing can economically offset future ship total ownership
costs.6

The Navy's experiences with rotational crewing as an alternative to
standard deployments are still evolving, and thus the Navy has not
provided effective guidance for implementing the concept on surface ships
and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned to support consistent
management of the practice. Effective guidance and sharing of lessons
learned are key tools used to institutionalize change and facilitate
efficient operations. While the Navy has conducted some planning in
support of rotational crewing on Sea Swap destroyers and has
well-established crew rotation guidance for fleet ballistic missile
submarines, it has not provided comparable guidance, including standard
policies and procedures, to conduct rotational crewing on other surface
ships. Consequently, management of rotational crewing on these ships has
been left to ship commanders, resulting in inconsistent implementation and
accountability. Further, the surface ship community has not capitalized on
lessons learned from past and current crew rotation experiences. By not
systematically recording and sharing lessons learned from its rotational
crewing experiences aboard surface ships, the Navy unnecessarily risks
repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew
morale. For example, experiences have shown the need to properly account
for inventories of equipment and supplies during crew turnover

6 Total ownership costs include the costs to research, develop, acquire,
own, operate, maintain, and dispose of weapon and support systems; the
costs of other equipment and real property; the costs to recruit, retrain,
separate, and otherwise support military and civilian personnel; and all
other costs of DOD's business operations.

that affect operations and general support of the crew, yet this inventory
control problem during crew turnovers persists.

The Navy has not fully assessed the impact of ship maintenance on the
implementation of rotational crewing because it has been focused on
demonstrating the feasibility of the practice and allowed different
approaches to conducting maintenance without examining all related issues
that could affect success. Effective maintenance strategies help to ensure
that ships can perform their missions without adverse impacts on crew
morale or incurring unintended consequences. It is a challenge to ensure
the mission capability of ships that are deployed for longer periods (up
to 24 months) because they must maintain mission capability while deployed
and forego standard maintenance periods that generally occur every 6
months. According to the Center for Naval Analyses, a more comprehensive
Navy maintenance effort-including predeployment inspections and more
overseas mission-essential repairs-was required to sustain the readiness
of the two destroyers deployed in the Sea Swap demonstration project than
is typical. Even with these extra efforts, the resulting impact on the
condition of the ships was uncertain. Although the Center concluded that
maintenance was adequate to sustain the ships at high readiness levels and
that, upon return, the material condition of one of the demonstration
ships was comparable to another recently deployed ship, Navy inspection
data suggest otherwise. For example, we found that the Sea Swap ship had
significantly more numerous deficiencies and lower inspection scores than
the recently deployed ship. Because of the importance of maintenance, the
Center concluded that if the demonstration project becomes a more standard
practice, the Navy should review the maintenance process and assess
maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs. We found the need
for such an analysis was further supported by the experiences of other
deployed ships using rotational crews, such as the patrol coastal ships.
These ships did not receive such focused maintenance, and Navy officials
identified several maintenance problems that were not corrected while
deployed that could have affected the ships' mission capability. Moreover,
the Center and our focus groups reported concerns about the extra workload
to maintain ships at a high level of readiness. In the absence of
effective strategies, the Navy runs the risk that it will degrade the
long-term condition of ships as well as discourage crew support for
rotational crewing.

To ensure the Navy increases ship utilization in an effective and
efficient manner, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Navy to systematically evaluate the feasibility and
cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing alternatives; develop a

rotational crewing program with effective management oversight, standard
procedures, and lessons learned; and fully assess the maintenance
strategies. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
the recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the
recommendations.

                                   Background

    The Importance of Having a Forward Military Presence Overseas

Maintaining an overseas military presence that is prepared to deter
threats and engage enemies remains an enduring tenet of U.S. national
military strategy and priorities. For example, the National Military
Strategy7 notes that an overseas presence supports the ability of the
United States to project power against threats and support the
establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions that foster
extremist ideologies. The strategy also notes that keeping an overseas
presence serves to assure U.S. allies; improves the ability to prosecute
the global war on terrorism; deters, dissuades, and defeats other threats;
and supports transformation. The Chief of Naval Operations earlier this
year underscored the continuing importance of forward-deployed forces,
noting "Our forward rotations remain critically important to our security,
to strengthening alliances and coalitions, and to the global war on
terrorism. But it is clear we must make these rotations with purpose, not
just to fill the calendar."8

    Current Operational and Budgetary Pressures on Ship Procurement and
    Operational Accounts

In early 2001, the Chief of Naval Operations recognized the challenge of
accomplishing the Navy's missions within its budget. In February 2001, the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations established a task force to explore force
structure options facing the naval service, noting that in order for
organizations to remain vital and competitive "they maintain their options
and seek innovative developments that may provide simpler, more
convenient, or less costly alternative solutions to their needs." One of
the task force's primary assumptions was that the Navy leadership
understands that there may be insufficient procurement funds available to
maintain current fleet size. Another assumption was that the demand for

7 "National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004 -A
Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow," The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8 Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, March 10, 2004.

naval forward presence would remain greater than the supply, regardless of
fleet size. Within a year, an operational studies group within the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations noted that the need for alternative
crewing approaches might be necessary to sustain the pace of global
operations, especially in the global war on terrorism.

More recently, senior Navy officials have warned that budgets will remain
tight. In June 2004, the Secretary of the Navy stated that DOD will have
less money for recapitalization because the defense budget will not
continue growing at the rates it has in recent years. The Navy's
acquisition executive has also noted that the Navy is employing multiple
strategies that eventually may reduce the number of ships, submarines, and
aircraft it purchases, saving taxpayer dollars as it seeks more effective
ways of employing its forces so that fewer of them can provide the
capabilities needed to accomplish assigned missions.

    Rotating Crews Is a Part of Force Structure Assessment

Traditional Ship Employment Cycle Provides Limited Time in Theater

One such effort that may enable the Navy to sustain a high pace of
operations within expected budgets involves the rotation of crews on and
off forward-deployed Navy surface ships. While the Chief of Naval
Operations stated earlier this year that the ideal fleet size would be
about 375 ships, he also said that he is no longer willing to commit to
any specific number of ships until the Navy completes a new assessment of
ship requirements. The assessment, which started this year, will evaluate
the potential impact on force structure requirements from keeping ships at
sea for longer than standard 6-month deployments by rotating the crews on
and off. He noted the Navy's recent experience with keeping two destroyers
on extended deployments, whereby these two ships provided the presence
overseas that is the equivalent of 8 to 10 ships on normal deployment
schedules.

The amount of time a ship ultimately spends forward deployed in a theater
of operations is affected by several factors in its employment cycle.
These factors include length of a deployment, transit speeds and port
calls, crew training and certification, ship maintenance requirements, and
maintaining sufficient readiness for surging forces during nondeployed
periods. The result is that a ship homeported in the United States and
deploying to the Persian Gulf area for 6 months will normally spend less
than 20 percent of its time in theater and that the Navy would need about
6 ships to maintain a continuous presence in the region over a 2-year
period.

As part of the transformation efforts to increase the fleet's operational
readiness and responsiveness, the Navy recently implemented a new

                              Ship Crewing Options

operational strategy-called the Fleet Response Plan-that changes the
manner in which it maintains, trains, mans, and deploys its ships. The
overall objective of the plan is to create a more responsive force by
sustaining a more level balance of training between deployments, instead
of dropping to minimum rates of readiness upon return from deployment and
then gradually rebuilding its state of readiness throughout a 12-month
training cycle that follows major maintenance of the vessel. The plan also
modifies long-standing forward presence policy of predictable, 6-month
deployments to predetermined regions. This flexible deployment concept
allows units that have attained high readiness to embark on deployments of
varied duration-but still generally no longer than 6 months-in support of
specific national priorities, such as homeland defense, multinational
exercises, security cooperation events, deterrent operations, or
prosecution of the global war on terrorism. These deployments provide what
the Chief of Naval Operations calls "presence with a purpose," and are
intended to occur in less predictable patterns to keep potential
adversaries off guard.

In addition to the standard ship and crew employment cycle, the range of
Navy crewing options falls into four major categories: (1) Sea Swap, (2)
Horizon, (3) Blue-Gold, and (4) partial or graduated crew swapping.9 Each
of these options can be implemented in varying ways and may have different
advantages and disadvantages, but the Navy's actual experience with
nonstandard crewing concepts on surface ships is limited.

Standard Crew Deployments

Standard crew deployments use one crew per ship. Most of the crewmembers
are assigned to the ship for 4 years, and it is common for crewmembers to
deploy overseas on the same ship more than once. Standard ship deployments
occur once every 27 months for a period of 6 months of which the ship and
the crew are on-station for 3 to 4 months, depending upon whether the ship
deploys from the east or west coast of

9 For the purposes of this report, we are not including Navy ships
operated by the Military Sealift Command and crewed by civilian mariners.
The Command provides sea transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies and
ammunition to sustain U.S. forces worldwide during peacetime and in war.

the United States.10 Most Navy ships and their crews employ the standard
crew deployment option.

Sea Swap

The Sea Swap option uses the same number of crews as ships. Notionally
under this option, one of the ships deploys two, three, or four times
longer than the standard time by rotating crews every 6 months at an
overseas location. Ideally, all of the Sea Swap ships share an identical
configuration, so crew performance and capability are not degraded because
of ship differences.11 Because crews do not return to the ships on which
they trained, under a four-ship Sea Swap option, some crews could serve on
three different ships in just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate
combat proficiency on each one. A limited number of destroyers and patrol
coastal ships have employed the Sea Swap option in recent years.

Horizon

The Horizon option involves one or two more crews than hulls, such as four
crews for three ships or five crews for three ships. Crews serve for no
more than 6 months on ships that are deployed for 18 months or more. Under
a three-ship Horizon option, crews could serve on at least two ships in
just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat proficiency on
each one. In addition, each crew would be without a ship for a period of
time and stay ashore at a readiness, or training, center. This crewing
option was employed on mine countermeasure ships during the 1990s.

Blue-Gold

The Blue-Gold option assigns two complete crews, designated "Blue" and
"Gold," to a single ship. Most of the crewmembers are assigned to a ship
for several years, and it is common for them to deploy overseas on the

10 A ship based in San Diego, California, would spend a greater portion of
its deployment intransit to the Persian Gulf-operating area than a ship
based in Norfolk, Virginia, because of the distance. As a result, a ship
based in San Diego may spend about 14 percent of its time in the Persian
Gulf area whereas a ship based in Norfolk would spend closer to 20 percent
of its time in the Persian Gulf area.

11 Surface ships are continuously having their combat and other systems
upgraded or replaced so maintaining "identical" configurations is a
challenge. Also, despite surface ships with the same "design" being built
within years of each other, no two ships are exactly alike and even more
differences are likely when these ships are built in different shipyards.

Rotational Crewing Believed to Provide Forward Presence Benefits

same ship more than once. Crew deployments would not exceed 6 months and
are often of much shorter duration. An advantage with this option includes
the crews' familiarity with the ship. However, a disadvantage is that the
proficiency can degrade since crews sometimes do not have a ship on which
to train and must rely on mock-ups and simulators. The Blue-Gold option
has been employed by the strategic submarine force and the

12

HSV-2 Swift.

Partial or Graduated Crew Swapping

Partial crew swapping has been employed on a limited basis. The most
notable use of this option involved the exchange of crewmembers between a
ship based in Japan with a ship based in the United States in 1999. A
variation on this theme is when portions of a ship's crew are swapped out
at regular intervals, for example, one-quarter of the crew every 2 or 3
months.

The most significant advantage attributed to rotational crewing options is
the more efficient use of a ship in an overseas operating area. This is
accomplished by keeping the ship on extended deployments, ranging from 12
to 36 months or longer, while at the same time not increasing the crew's
time away from home. Top Navy officials, including the Chief of Naval
Operations, believe that increased efficiencies from rotating crews enable
the Navy to perform the same number of missions with fewer ships or to
increase the number of missions with the same force size. For example, the
Navy's acquisition executive stated that if the Sea Swap option is
employed on its next generation guided missile destroyer, the DD(X),13 the
Navy might be able to reduce requirements from 24 to 16 ships and apply
the savings toward the next generation cruiser.

Disadvantages often associated with rotational crewing include increased
infrastructure costs; deteriorating ship material condition and lack of
ready access to maintenance support while on extended deployment;
decreased readiness due to differences between ships; and decreased
quality of life and other sociological issues for crew members, including
the sense of less "ship ownership," fewer port calls, and cultural
changes.

12 The HSV-2 Swift is a high-speed aluminum-hulled catamaran acquired as
an interim mine warfare command and control ship. For a picture and
details on the ship, see appendix I.

13 The DD(X) is the Navy's next generation, multimission destroyer,
tailored for land attack missions.

Recent Sea Swap Destroyer Demonstration Project Assesses Feasibility

Key Commands Responsible for Implementing Rotational Crewing on Surface
Ships

  The Navy Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Feasibility and
  Cost-Effectiveness of Rotational Crewing for Surface Ships

The Navy recently conducted a 2-year demonstration to determine if two
destroyers could (1) provide more deployment time on-station and (2)
maintain sailor quality of life while rotating crews. The Navy declared
the demonstration a success, stating that the ships operated well while
increasing their operational capability. In its report on the Sea Swap
demonstration project, the Center concluded that the feasibility of the
concept clearly was a success.14 However, the Center noted that there were
problems and limitations. While none of the problems was considered a
showstopper, the Center stated that the Sea Swap demonstration afforded
the opportunity to learn lessons in order to enhance the use of the
practice in the future. Many of these, such as the need for improved
accountability, oversight, and understanding of maintenance strategies,
are discussed in this report.

The Chief of Naval Operations has charged the Commander, Naval Surface
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, with being the primary proponent for
demonstrating the feasibility of rotating crews on surface ships as well
as assessing the cost of the various options and providing oversight and
accountability. To date the Command's emphasis has been on using the Sea
Swap demonstration as a "proof-of-concept" for rotational crewing. It
provided the guidance implementing the concept, approved the assessment
plan, and used Center support to collect and analyze some data. However,
other commands are involved in implementing other rotational crewing
options on surface ships; they include the Mine Warfare Command and the
Amphibious Group Two Command. See appendix II for a more complete list of
organizations involved.

Although the Navy's senior leadership has initiated a change in how the
Navy can operate in the future by demonstrating that rotational crewing is
a feasible alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments, the Navy
has not systematically evaluated the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of
all rotational crewing options for its current and future classes of
surface ships. The Navy has documented that rotational crewing helps to
increase the forward presence of its ships beyond the traditional 6-month
deployment periods, and officials have indicated that they want to make
greater use of rotational crew options. While the Navy has conducted some
limited assessments of the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration project, it
has not developed a comprehensive common analytical framework to assess
the potential impact of all rotational crewing options

14 Center for Naval Analyses, Sea Swap Assessment (Alexandria, Virginia:
September 2004).

on the material condition of all of the ships, operational requirements,
and the quality of life for crews.

In addition, the Navy has not collected complete and consistent
information that is critical for comparing different crewing alternatives
for such factors as evaluating which alternative most cost-effectively
meets specific requirements and warfighting effectiveness. In the absence
of a common analytical framework, Navy officials assigned to ships that
have used or experimented with crew rotations have been left to develop
their own goals, objectives, and metrics and the results have to date been
uneven. As a result, the Navy does not have complete and accurate data,
including cost data that reflect total ownership and operating and support
costs, readiness, and crew quality of life, making success or failure of
the individual options involving different types of ships difficult to
determine. In the absence of a systematic evaluation, the Navy also does
not know the extent to which rotational crewing options can provide
maximum return on investment and economically offset future ship total
ownership costs.

Navy Has Some Evidence The Navy has developed some data to demonstrate
that rotational crewing to Show That Rotational helps to increase the
forward presence of its ships beyond the traditional Crewing Increases
6-month deployment periods. Table 1 shows the percentage of time a ship
Forward Presence and Is would be notionally forward deployed during the
employment cycle for

each type of crew deployment option and the number of ships that
wouldConsidering Greater Use be required to keep one vessel continuously
operating in the Persian Gulf.

 Table 1: Comparison of Crewing Options during Deployments to the Persian Gulf

                            Percent of ship's     Number of ships required to 
                             employment cycle                    continuously 
Crewing option            forward deployed       keep one forward deployed 
      Standard                             17 
      Sea Swap                             24 
      Horizon                              32 
     Blue-Gold                             71                             1.5 

                      Source: GAO's analysis of Navy data.

Given such promise for improving deployment efficiencies, Surface Force
Pacific Command15 officials have considered using rotational crewing
options on other ships. For example, in July 2004, the Commander, Naval
Surface Force, indicated plans to use the Sea Swap option on an
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer based in the Atlantic Fleet and an
expeditionary strike group based in the Pacific Fleet, during the spring
and
summer of 2005, respectively. In addition, Mine Warfare Command
officials informed us in July 2004 that it intends to rotate crews on mine
warfare ships based in the Persian Gulf later in the year, but it had not
yet
determined which option it will use.

The Navy is also considering rotational crewing for operating future ships
and, as a result, it could change the number of new ships that might be
purchased. For example, the Navy is designing and procuring the littoral
combat ship16 and the DD(X), which will cost billions of dollars. The Navy
has suggested that if crew rotations with an expeditionary strike group
are
as successful as with the Sea Swap destroyers' demonstration,
procurement plans for the number of the DD(X) destroyers can be
reduced and the savings applied to other high priority ships.

    No Established Framework and Limited Information for Comparing Crew Rotation
    Options

While the Center and the Surface Force Pacific Command have conducted some
assessments of the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Navy did not have
an analytical framework or collect the information that would be needed to
assess and compare all crewing options. Lacking such a framework, the Navy
has not systematically assessed the effect that rotational crewing has on
such factors as the ships' material condition and readiness or crew
quality of life and training. Additionally, the Navy has not
systematically evaluated the cost-effectiveness of the various crewing
options.

15 Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, located in San
Diego, California, ensures surface ships of the Pacific Fleet are properly
trained, maintained, and crewed to support military operations. The
Command is responsible for the readiness of 81 ships, including cruisers,
destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships, logistics, and fleet
support ships.

16 The littoral combat ship will be a new class of Navy surface
combatants. It is intended to be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable, and
tailored for specific missions such as antisubmarine, antisurface, or mine
warfare in heavily contested coastal area waters, and will use
interchangeable mission modules tailored for specific missions.

Analytic Framework Would Improve Ability to Evaluate Crewing Options

Best practices show that an analytic framework that includes measurable
goals and objectives, performance metrics, and evaluation plans17 would
allow decision makers and others to receive consistent information needed
to compare and assess different policy options, measure implementation
progress, and determine whether the desired results were being achieved.
Without such information for the various crewing options, Navy managers do
not have a clear picture of the status of the crew rotation efforts,
whether potential benefits from different crew rotations are being
achieved, which option might be best in certain situations, and whether
major issues need to be resolved.

The Navy has not established formal criteria for evaluating the
implementation of the various rotational crewing options because its focus
has been on demonstrating the feasibility of the concept rather than on
assessing and formalizing the options. For example, the Navy did not
establish evaluation criteria prior to implementing Sea Swap, and none was
identified in the Center's Sea Swap assessment plan. As a result, the
Center lacked criteria for judging ship condition and crew quality of
life. According to the Center's September 2004 report, the Navy had no
intent to control the operational activities in the sense of a scientific
experiment, where one notionally scores a probability of success or other
such measure of effectiveness. It said the intent was that general
conclusions about the feasibility and difficulties of pursuing the Sea
Swap concept for future force employment planning would be drawn from the
experiment. Moreover, the Navy did not have comparable assessments for the
options employed on other ships such as the patrol coastal ships and the
HSV-2 Swift.

More common data and analyses are not available for comparison because, in
the absence of a common analytical framework, individual commands using
crew rotations have been able to decide on their own what (1) goals,
objectives, and metrics to establish; (2) data to collect; and (3)
evaluations to do, if any. Such goals, objectives, and metrics on ship
condition and quality of life, which could affect crew retention, were not
established prior to deployment, and complete information on these factors
was not systematically collected during and after deployments. As a
result, while the Navy has reported that the Sea Swap demonstration

17 The Government Performance and Results Act offers a model for
developing an
effective management framework to improve the likelihood of implementing
initiatives and
assessing results.

Material Condition of Ships Not Systematically Assessed

project was a success for the destroyers involved, the Navy lacks clear
criteria to objectively evaluate how well the project did and the
project's potential against other rotational crewing options in two key
areas we assessed-the condition of the ship and the crew's quality of
life.

The Sea Swap demonstration project collected data on ship condition that
could be valuable. However, complete data were not systematically
collected on the ships before deployment and there were no clear criteria
for comparing the ships' condition upon return. For example, the Navy
conducted a total ship readiness assessment of the U.S.S. Higgins, one of
the two demonstration destroyers, in April 2004, shortly after the ship
returned from its 18-month deployment. This post-deployment assessment of
the combat, hull, mechanical, and electrical systems was used to compare
the U.S.S. Higgins's material condition to the U.S.S. Decatur's. The
U.S.S. Decatur, a guided missile destroyer, had recently completed a
standard 6-month deployment. According to Surface Force officials, there
was no significant difference between the two ships' material condition
upon return. However, there is some disagreement about the criteria and
interpretation of the data used in reaching this conclusion. This is
discussed in more detail on pages 37-39. In its report, the Center
cautioned that further analyses of ship material condition are needed.
Comparable assessments of ship condition are not being performed on the
U.S.S. Fletcher, the other Sea Swap destroyer on extended deployment.

The Navy is missing an opportunity to collect data and more objectively
assess the impact of extended deployments on ship condition. A more
stringent independent inspection18 for the U.S.S. Higgins is scheduled in
January 2005, about 8 months after its return from deployment and likely
after having received significant shipyard maintenance and modernization.
Furthermore, Surface Force officials also told us that a comparable
preinactivation inspection, which is normally performed, would not be done

18 Known as a trials and material inspection, this more stringent
inspection is conducted by an independent Navy organization whose
responsibilities include conducting material inspections of all naval
ships at least once every 3 years, if practicable, for the purpose of
determining and reporting upon a ship's fitness for further service and
material conditions that limit her capability to carry out assigned
missions and periodically ascertaining and reporting on the material
condition and performance capabilities or limitations of Navy ships.

Quality-of-Life Issues Not Fully Assessed

on the U.S.S. Fletcher because it is being decommissioned and they do not
want to spend the money.19

An objective of Sea Swap was to maintain the crews' quality of life. The
Center's study plan stated the Center would examine how the project
improved or degraded the quality of life and quality of work for Navy
personnel through surveys and interviews with crewmembers. However, the
Navy did not establish goals for determining the quality-of-life success
of the Sea Swap program. As a result, even though the Center had collected
data on morale, it could not conclude whether Sea Swap had succeeded or
failed in this regard. Also, the Navy has no plans to monitor crews'
quality of life for the patrol coastal ships and the HSV-2 Swift. The need
for such an analysis is borne out by the impact of crew morale on
reenlistment rates.

Quality of Life Is an Important Factor in Sailors' Career Choice

Sailors' views of their quality of life is an important factor in
determining whether they will choose to continue their military career.
The Chief of Naval Operations has recognized the importance of people in
making the Navy successful in performing its mission and has consistently
made manpower and quality of service top priorities. According to the
Chief, "Quality of work includes everything that makes your workplace a
great place to be-from getting the spare parts you need in a timely manner
to working spaces that are up to current standards."

Sea Swap's Implementation May Have Been Key to Quality-of-Life Concerns

Information collected by the Center, and by us during our review,
indicated that implementation of the Sea Swap demonstration project had a
negative effect on crewmember quality of life. While noting that Sea Swap
had been successful technically, the Center's pre- and postsurveys of the
crew showed that Sea Swap adversely affected morale because of the
increased workload, fewer opportunities for liberty port calls, and
crewmembers' general impression that the Sea Swap deployment was worse
than their previous deployment. For example, the Center asked crews about
their expectations for Sea Swap compared to

19 Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4770.5F, May 29, 1991, "General
Instructions for Inactive Ships and Craft," states that a Board of
Inspection and Survey will inspect a ship to determine and document the
material condition of the ship prior to inactivation.

previous deployments. The survey results showed that 65 percent of the
arriving crews expected that Sea Swap would be a worse experience than
their last deployment and of departing crews; 84 percent said
participating in Sea Swap was worse.

Our focus groups with crews on the U.S.S. Higgins and the patrol coastal
ships also revealed a negative quality of life. The Center and we both
identified several factors that contributed to sailors' feelings,
including workload, training and professional development opportunities,
quantity and quality of port visits, and several sociological issues
(e.g., culture, ship "ownership," sense of pride and recognition,
predictability, or Navy tradition). The Center also noted that Navy
leadership would need to understand which features of Sea Swap cause
negative perceptions.

We addressed quality-of-life issues in each of our 43 focus group
meetings. All 26 of our focus group meetings with Sea Swap destroyer crews
that served on the U.S.S. Higgins and with crews on patrol coastal ships
attested to a highly negative quality of life, a decreased morale, and a
strong desire to not participate on any more crew rotations implemented
like their most recent experience. Many crewmembers indicated that
rotational crewing might have had a more positive effect if the following
conditions were met:

o  	crew swapping had been better managed to ensure work accountability to
reduce the workload,

o  there had been time for individual training and professional
development,

o  promises had been kept on designated port calls,

o  	port calls had been phased throughout the deployment instead of at the
end when sailors just wanted to return home,

o  return flight schedules had been better coordinated, and

o  proper recognition had been given to each crew.

A small number of crewmembers indicated that their Sea Swap experience was
positive in that they liked knowing they would be on a finite deployment
period of 6 months.

In contrast, the 17 focus groups we conducted with Blue-Gold crewmembers
from the HSV-2 Swift and the strategic submarine force found that these
crewmembers had a generally positive crew rotation experience. They
attributed their positive experiences to a level workload, management
accountability, predictable schedules, individual training and
professional development opportunities, and sufficient amounts of

personal time during the interdeployment cycle, despite the ships' high
operational tempo.

Negative Morale Impacted Reenlistment Rates

Lower reenlistment rates for sailors with less than 6 years of service20
that served on Sea Swap guided missile destroyers and patrol coastal ships
reinforced the Center's survey results and our focus group findings. Both
Pacific Fleet and Surface Force Command officials identified reenlistment
data as a key indicator of whether crews are satisfied with rotations. The
Center's survey and our analysis showed that negative morale associated
with participating in Sea Swap had an adverse impact on reenlistment
rates. The Center's conclusion was based on a series of crew surveys.
According to the Center,

o  	55 percent of the crew said after the deployment that they thought
that Sea Swap would make them less likely to stay in the Navy, versus 39
percent before the deployment, and

o  	73 percent stated that if all deployments were like Sea Swap, they
would be less likely to stay in the Navy.

Our analysis of overall reenlistment data for sailors with less than 6
years
of active service indicated that the crews on all three Arleigh
Burke-class
destroyers involved in the Sea Swap demonstration experienced
50 percent reenlistment rates. These rates were below the Navy-wide
reenlistment goal of 56 percent for this group and the actual 64 percent
reenlistment rate for non-Sea Swap Arleigh Burke-class destroyers based
in the Pacific Fleet.21 Because the first-term reenlistment rates for the
three
Sea Swap destroyer crews were as low as 23 to 37 percent during their
Sea Swap cycle, these ships were among the few that did not meet the

20 These sailors are commonly called first termers. These enlisted
personnel eligible for reenlistment are from what DOD calls "Zone A" and
cover reenlistments falling between 17 months and 6 years of active
service. This group was selected as a proxy for crew morale because the
personnel are less likely to reenlist if their experience is not good
since they have little investment in a career at this point. Sailors with
more than 6 years of experience are more likely to remain in the Navy.

21 Based on our request, the Navy provided reenlistment data for all
DDG-51 class ships by 6-month increments from 11/1/01 through 4/30/04. We
excluded from our analysis two ships that experienced low reenlistment
rates, the U.S.S. Milius, a ship experimenting with reduced manning, and
the U.S.S. Paul Hamilton, a ship that was on an extended 10-month
deployment, because we wanted to compare destroyers on normal deployments
with destroyers in the Sea Swap initiative.

Cost-Effectiveness of Crew Rotation Options Not Systematically Evaluated

Navy-wide reenlistment goal. If the Navy expands rotational crewing with
out understanding its full impact on crews, the results could affect
retention and crew support.

The Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and Navy commands using crew
rotations have not systematically collected cost data for assessing the
return on investment or cost-effectiveness of all surface ship rotational
crewing options for current and future ships. The Navy testified to the
Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 2002 that it would determine
the true cost and potential savings of one rotational crewing option, Sea
Swap, to provide a firm analytical basis in order to decide whether to
expand use of that option or look for other alternatives.22 Recently, the
Commander, Naval Surface Force, initiated a limited effort to collect and
model costs. However, to date, data collection and analyses comparing the
cost of all the crew rotation options have not been completed.
Cost-effectiveness is a method used by organizations seeking to gain the
best value for their money and to achieve operational requirements while
balancing costs, schedules, performance, and risks. The best value is
often not readily apparent and requires an analysis to maximize value. A
cost-effectiveness analysis is used where benefits cannot be expressed in
monetary terms but, rather, in "units of benefit," for example, days of
forward presence. Such an analysis would be of particular importance when
making return on investment decisions about how many ships to buy and how
to operate them.

Moreover, officials in DOD's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
told us that they have not conducted a basic cost-effectiveness analysis
of rotational crewing alternatives. Nonetheless, they believe that
rotational crewing is a good concept, that the Navy needs to perform these
analyses, and that they were not aware of any such analyses having been
conducted in the Navy. The Naval Cost Analysis Division cited DOD cost
analysis guidance and procedures that would be applicable to a
cost-effectiveness study of rotational crewing alternatives.23 According
to Division officials, this guidance is to be used as the basis for
preparing program life-cycle cost estimates, and provides information on
the scope of the cost analysis,

22 "Navy On-Station Enhancement Options," Statement of Rear Admiral (Lower
Half) Miles B. Wachendorf, U.S. Navy, Director, Strategy & Policy
Division, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sea Power
Subcommittee (March 19, 2002).

23 Department of Defense Manual 5000.4-M, "Cost Analysis Guidance and
Procedures," December 1992.

the procedures, and the presentation of the estimates. Division officials
also told us they have not participated in any rotational crewing
cost-effectiveness studies nor are they aware of any. Officials in both
DOD and Navy offices indicated that the cost analyses for crew rotation
alternatives should include the development of a cost structure for
identifying all the relevant cost elements in the program, including depot
level maintenance, fuel, training, infrastructure costs, and other costs
unique to the program.

While Surface Force Pacific officials had developed limited information on
costs and savings unique to the Sea Swap destroyers, it was not complete,
and they have not developed comparable data for the patrol coastal ships
and the HSV-2 Swift. Examples of information collected included the
estimated fuel savings from ship transits that were not needed;
transportation, room and board for flying the crews to turnover cities;
and special training. These officials told us that they plan to collect
additional data to help evaluate Sea Swap costs, but that they are still
determining what cost data should be collected and how to establish a
baseline for control group comparison purposes. Furthermore, they told us
that collection of the data will be challenging because there is no
central database or automated system for coding rotational crewing-related
expenses that could be used for documenting the unique costs associated
with rotational crewing. The officials were also concerned that Navy
management and accounting data systems are not integrated, making it
difficult to collect complete and actual cost information that could be
helpful in identifying the costs of the Sea Swap initiative.

Surface Force Pacific officials have also determined that they have
responsibility for assessing the costs of crew rotation in the patrol
coastal ships as well, but they had not been doing so. Amphibious Group
Two24 officials told us in October 2003 that they have not systematically
evaluated costs and are not aware of any cost-effectiveness analyses of
rotational crewing being conducted. Surface Force officials said that more
complete costs for patrol coastal ships have to be collected and analyzed
to allow for cost-effective comparisons.

24 Amphibious Group Two provides squadrons, ships, and supporting elements
that are manned, trained, and materially and operationally ready to
deploy. The Group, part of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, is located in Norfolk,
Virginia. The Group has responsibility for the patrol coastal ships.

Notwithstanding the limitations in the available cost data, Naval Surface
Force Pacific officials told us they recently developed and are refining a
model that presents information that is more comprehensive. For example,
in a July 14, 2004, briefing, the Force's commanding officer presented
costs of the Sea Swap demonstration, including a cost comparison for both
the U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins to other ships in their
respective classes, including the average costs per deployed day. Surface
Force Pacific officials said that this model is also used to present
similar data for the future littoral combat ship. However, we were
informed that much of the data used in the model is based on estimates
rather than actual costs and that some costs integral to evaluating
rotational crewing options, such as maintenance and training
infrastructure, were not included. Furthermore, the model has not been
tested or validated by the Navy.

  Navy Has Not Provided Effective Guidance or Capitalized on Lessons Learned
  from Rotational Crewing Experiences

The Navy has done some planning in support of rotational crewing on
surface ships, such as for the Sea Swap demonstration project, but because
the concept is evolving as an alternative, the service has not provided
effective guidance during implementation on all ships to ensure proper
oversight and accountability. Furthermore, the Navy has not systematically
leveraged lessons learned to effectively support rotational crewing.
Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key management tools
to overcome challenges associated with institutionalizing change and
facilitating efficient operations. The Navy has well-established crew
rotation policies and procedures for ballistic missile submarines for use
as best practices that include appropriately documenting the ship's
condition and using advanced teams to help prepare for crew turnover and
help ensure accountability. However, the Navy has not provided comparable
guidance with policies and procedures to ensure proper crew turnover and
accountability to all surface ships using rotational crewing.
Consequently, the management of surface ship crew rotations has been
informally delegated to each ship's incoming and outgoing commanding
officers. This has resulted in inconsistent management of and
accountability for operational factors, such as the ship's condition and
ship inventories, when one crew replaces another. In addition, the surface
ship community has not systematically collected, recorded, or disseminated
lessons learned from all rotational crewing experiences. Although the Navy
has a formal system to record lessons learned from fleet operations,
experiences from crew rotations are not being recorded in the system so
that they could be routinely shared among the surface ships and commands
using rotational crewing. As a result, the

Navy unnecessarily risks repeating past mistakes that could decrease
warfighting effectiveness and crew morale.

    Navy Conducted Some Planning in Support of Rotational Crewing

Submarine Community Has Established Planning Elements

Because rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments
differs from the traditional 6-month ship deployment, it is important that
planning be effective to increase institutional knowledge and gain
acceptance for implementing the change. The Navy has performed extensive
planning in support of rotational crewing on ballistic missile submarines.
However, crew rotation planning for the surface ship community has been
limited and less formal.

The submarine community has a well-established concept for conducting
Blue-Gold crew rotations, based on 40 years of experience on fleet
ballistic missile submarines. As a result, we analyzed the community's
concepts, procedures, and processes to identify "best practices." We found
that three key elements of this concept are

o  formalized turnover policies and procedures;

o  a training plan that maintains proficiency of crews that are in port;
and

o  a maintenance plan that includes crew and incremental maintenance.

Formalized Crew Rotation Turnover Policies and Procedures Help Ensure
Accountability

The Navy's Submarine Forces Command developed formal policies and
procedures for crew turnover in order to develop a comprehensive status of
a ship's material condition and accountability of controlled material and
documents, scheduled maintenance, and supply. The turnover process takes
place over 2 to 3 days, during which the on-coming crewmembers from each
department and division meet with their off-going counterparts to review
detailed turnover checklists that cover issues such as personnel,
training, administration, maintenance logs, classified material, ship
operational funds, parts, and food supplies. For example, both crews
review the status of preventative and corrective maintenance repairs that
are recorded in equipment status logs, which help document the material
condition of the ship. This information is passed from one crew to another
during turnover to maintain continuity of maintenance. Both crews also
review an inventory of provisions, medicines, hazardous material, and
information technology equipment. Crewmembers from both crews are required
to sign the checklists, and the two ship commanders are ultimately
responsible for ensuring accountability of the material

condition of the ship. By taking these steps, the on-coming ship command
has the opportunity to note unsatisfactory conditions-including
significant personnel, training, operational readiness, habitability, and
material deficiency issues-on an exchange-of-command report. Turnovers can
be delayed if both crews do not agree on the ship's material status.
Members from one crew we met mentioned that they take pride in conducting
the turnover because they want to set the standard for their partner crew.

Training Programs Maintain Proficiency of the Crew While Ashore

Maintaining the operational proficiency of the crew that is in port
without a submarine is the main challenge to the strategic submarine's
Blue-Gold system. In response, the strategic submarine force has developed
a training program to maintain crew proficiency in core competencies while
ashore. This program is designed to update crews on recent procedural
changes, allow crews to perform maintenance operations, and refresh
personnel who have been away from their duties for several months. Crews
receive classroom instruction and maintain their skills in simulators at
the Trident Training Facility.25 Crews are monitored and evaluated through
graded individual and group exercises. Officers and crewmembers stated
that they generally received adequate and sufficient training at the
training facility to perform their mission. Nevertheless, they stated that
simulated training is not the same as training on a ship and that crew
readiness is lower during the first week of deployment as they try to
refamiliarize themselves with the ship and their mission.

Crew and Incremental Maintenance Plan Designed for Rotational Crewing

The ballistic missile submarine maintenance concept was specifically
designed to accomplish incremental maintenance over a 42-year life cycle.
The concept consists of crews working together to conduct maintenance
repairs and incremental maintenance that is planned or unplanned
corrective maintenance during an in-port maintenance period.

The submarine community has formal guidance for the in-port maintenance
period during which both crews jointly conduct maintenance

25 The Trident Training Facility provides basic, advanced, functional,
refresher, and team training to ballistic missile submarine officers and
crews in order to build competence and proficiency in operating and
maintaining these submarines.

Limited Planning for Surface Ship Crew Rotations

repairs.26 One main purpose is to enhance the efficiency and productivity
of the maintenance period. During this time, both crews operate under one
chain of command; the off-going crew reports directly to the on-coming
ship commander. Once the submarine is at sea, the off-crew works with the
maintenance facility and the on-crew to develop a work package of needed
preventive and corrective maintenance repairs. As a result, during the
next in-port maintenance period the crew that has just taken command knows
what to expect. Officers and crewmembers in our focus groups stated that
this approach was key to completing required maintenance repairs in a
short period. It also helps ensure that items that may not have been
captured during turnover are identified according to officers on one
submarine. In addition, crews stated that this concept decreases the
incentives for pushing off work to the other crew because both crews
conduct the needed maintenance repairs.

The incremental maintenance plan involves routine maintenance based on a
set schedule common to all submarines and corrective repairs, which
include those items that break or are in a degraded condition as a result
of operations. The Trident Planned Equipment Replacement Program, another
aspect of incremental maintenance, provides for repairs on hull,
mechanical, electrical, or combat control system equipment that require
maintenance beyond the ability of the ship's crew. The incremental
overhaul relies on an extensive shore-based maintenance infrastructure,
including dedicated full-time maintenance personnel, maintenance
facilities that provide a full range of repair and maintenance services,
and dry docks that provide the support necessary to conduct required
equipment repairs and replacements.

Despite the challenges of implementing this change in crewing practice,
the surface ship community's planning in support of crew rotations has
been less formal and limited to several areas, including crew training on
different systems used on participating ships, use of advanced crew
turnover teams, and location and timing of port calls. Crews in our focus
groups also identified some limitations to these planning efforts.

26 This concept is generally referred to as an "integrated crew refit."

Planned Training for Different Equipment and Systems between Ships Had
Limitations

A Naval Warfare College study of several crew rotation options identified
the crew's unfamiliarity with equipment and systems between different
ships as a potential challenge for conducting the program. As part of the
Sea Swap demonstration project, the Commander, Naval Surface Force, sought
to address differences in ship design, construction, and modernization
between forward-deployed and nondeployed ships by providing crews with
predeployment training specific to the forwarddeployed ship they would
join.27 The Command planned for the training to account for many of the
differences between the destroyers, with emphasis on training systems and
equipment on the forward-deployed ship, and set-up training classes in the
United States and Sea Swap cities.28 For example, one on-coming crew
received training to ensure its proficiency in areas such as critical
weapons systems and engineering prior to the ship's turnover. Amphibious
Group Two also provided training to patrol coastal ship crews to help them
bridge the engineering differences they would face on the deployed ship.

However, in our focus group discussions, ship crews participating in Sea
Swap and on the patrol coastal ships cited concerns about the adequacy of
this training. The crewmembers indicated that proficiency improved with
practice drills, but sufficient proficiency was not achieved prior to
deploying, even though they had received their certifications. The delay
in achieving proficiency was accentuated for the crew that swapped in the
Persian Gulf because the crewmembers did not have the opportunity during a
transit to become familiar with their new ship. For example, crewmembers
for one ship stated that they only received partial training for operating
a new radio that is necessary for conducting strike operations. This
partial training degraded the crew's ability to shoot Tomahawk land attack
missiles. Crewmembers also stated that they did not receive training to
operate damage control radios, which meant the crew would have been unable
to use the radios in an emergency.

Patrol coastal ship crewmembers also indicated that they faced challenges
in training to operate the deployed ship's different equipment. For
example, crewmembers stated they did not receive weapons training for

27 This type of training is commonly called difference training. 28 Sea
Swap cities are the cities where destroyer crew rotations took place.

Stinger missiles prior to overseas deployment because these weapons
systems are not typically used while on deployment in the United States.
Patrol coastal ship focus group comments revealed that the crews
compensated for training deficiencies with self-initiated training during
deployment. These crews also received some training from the Coast Guard
while in theater. They felt the deficiencies in training on different
systems compromised their ability to perform their respective mission.

Value of Some Advanced Turnover Teams Was Limited

The Surface Force Pacific Command established advance turnover teams to
assist ships participating in the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration
project, but their assistance was sometimes constrained. These teams were
comprised of approximately 15 to 20 members of the on-coming crew who were
sent to the forward-deployed ship 2 weeks in advance of the turnover to
conduct inventories and observe ship operations. The use of an advanced
turnover team was an effort to expedite the turnover process from one crew
to another. A Command official cited the work performed by these teams as
instrumental in reducing the amount of time required for the turnover as
well as for increasing their familiarity with the new ship. However,
crewmembers in our focus groups stated that advance teams were not as
effective as they could have been in some turnovers because they were
denied access to areas and equipment in the ship at the time of turnovers.
For example, a regional support office assumed control of a Sea Swap
destroyer in the United States, locked up the workspaces, and did not
grant the advance team access. In another instance, the advance team
arriving on the ship overseas was not given access until the new crew
assumed responsibility for the ship, which limited the team's time and
ability to expedite an effective turnover.

    Navy Crew Rotation Efforts Have Lacked Standard Guidance to Ensure Oversight
    and Accountability

The Navy's implementation of surface ship crew rotation efforts lacked
effective guidance to ensure oversight and accountability. Because the
practice differs from the traditional crewing approach, such guidance is a
key to ensuring successful implementation. In the absence of such
guidance, including standard policies and procedures similar to those used
in the ballistic missile submarine community, officers and crews on Sea
Swap destroyers, patrol coastal ships, and the HSV-2 Swift developed their
own turnover procedures. This caused inconsistency between crews
conducting the turnovers, which in turn, led to problems in documenting
ship condition and accounting for ship inventories. As a result, surface
ship crews cited the need to develop and implement standard turnover
procedures, including checklists.

Crewmembers said there was no document to sign during the turnover to hold
crews accountable for recording necessary maintenance repairs. For
example, crews reported that Navy systems for tracking maintenance
requirements and accomplishments were not systematically used to record
maintenance repairs. Officers and enlisted crews on Sea Swap destroyers
and patrol coastal ships indicated that, as a result, the ship maintenance
logs did not accurately reflect the material status of the ships. One Sea
Swap crew reported that the prior crew did not document that the
forward-fueling station had a hole, which took the entire deployment to

fix. In another instance, one crew stated that although three portable
fire pumps were required to be on board the vessel, the crew only found
two pumps, of which only one worked. Additionally, a patrol coastal ship
crew indicated that the previous crew reported only a few needed
maintenance repairs in the maintenance log. However, after turnover, the
on-coming crew said that it noted about 50 repair items, including all 6
main engines that could not operate simultaneously. In another case, the
electronic preventive maintenance log was not working during turnover,
which the on-coming crew reportedly spent 3 weeks in repairs to make it
function.

A ship commander mentioned that there is a challenge associated with
properly tracking maintenance logs, which are not valued by all crews.
Those logs can be valuable tools when used, but he stated that the
maintenance logs did not reflect the material status of the ship. Some
patrol coastal ship officers stated that every crew emphasizes different
maintenance priorities, which can contribute to perceptions of inadequate
material condition of the ship during and after turnover. Notwithstanding
different perceptions of the material condition of the ship, Sea Swap and
patrol coastal ship crewmembers raised concerns about the lack of
accountability, in particular oversight of documenting the material
condition of the ship. Crewmembers from the Sea Swap destroyers and patrol
coastal ships cited the need to establish turnover standards and
checklists and to conduct an independent inspection to monitor the
turnover and review the material condition of the ship.

Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship crews also mentioned that accountability
for ship inventories was inadequate. Naval supply guidance cites the need
to conduct physical inventories of equipment and materials to the extent
necessary to ensure effective control of those materials normally required
for performing the mission or which require special management

attention.29 Crewmembers told us that guidance on conducting inventories
was not always followed in preparation for and during turnovers. Some
crews mentioned that the time to review supply inventories, a
time-consuming activity during turnover, was a problem. There were several
instances on Sea Swap destroyers of missing equipment- maintenance
assistance modules estimated at $90,000-and tools. One Sea Swap destroyer
crew also reported that the crew discovered during an inventory a pair of
missing night vision goggles. In another case, the oncoming crew lacked
basic supplies, such as cleaning materials, light bulbs, and toilet paper.
Crewmembers also reported items missing on their assigned ships upon
return that were not identified during turnover. In another example,
crewmembers of a patrol coastal ship crew stated that, upon return to the
United States, they found that 10,000 rounds of ammunition were missing on
their assigned ship. Sea Swap destroyer and patrol coastal ship crews
cited the need for an independent authority to hold crews accountable for
ship inventories.

    Surface Ship Community Did Not Capitalize on Past and Current Lessons
    Learned

Navy Lessons Learned System Created as a Central Repository to Preclude
the Loss of Knowledge

The surface ship community also has not capitalized on existing and
evolving lessons learned to more effectively plan and conduct crew
rotations. Capturing and sharing such lessons serve to further
institutionalize change by improving its implementation. While the Navy
has a formal system to record lessons learned, experiences from current
rotational crewing efforts are not being systematically collected and
recorded in that system. As a result, the Navy is missing an opportunity
to record lessons learned that could be leveraged by crews involved in
current and future crew rotation experiences. Further, surface ships and
commands have not capitalized on the lessons learned in the system to plan
and conduct crew rotations. Consequently, crews experienced similar
difficulties to those that the previously recorded lessons learned sought
to correct.

The Navy created a lessons learned database in 1991 to provide a system
for units to benefit from collective Navy experiences, identify
deficiencies, and take corrective measures in all aspects of fleet
operations. A lesson learned is defined as information that increases the
efficiency of Navy processes and improves the execution of future
operations. According to

29 Examples include classified and hazardous items, security type medical
supplies such as narcotics, laptop computers, depot level repairables, and
maintenance assistance modules.

Surface Ship Commands Have Not Made Systematic Efforts to Collect and
Record Lessons Learned for the Navy's Central System

the Navy, it should provide value to existing Navy policy, doctrine,
tactics, techniques, procedures, organization, training, systems, or
equipment.30

The Navy Warfare Development Command is responsible for administering the
system, and its officials indicated that information for current
rotational crewing efforts should be submitted to the system, as it is the
best way for lessons to be shared across the Navy community. Anyone in the
Navy can submit a lessons learned report through the immediate chain of
command. Fleet commands process and validate the proposed report, which is
then forwarded to be officially entered into the system. Navy personnel
ashore and at sea can access lessons learned contained in the system
through a classified Internet site.31 Use of this central repository would
preclude the loss of lessons, such as those lost by the Mine Warfare
Command in the late 1990s due to a computer failure.

The Naval Surface Force Command recognized the need for a comprehensive
list of lessons learned in order to examine the Sea Swap initiative, but
the Command has not made a systematic effort to collect or record lessons
learned, nor did it task Sea Swap crews to identify and submit them. Aside
from 78 lessons learned pertaining to crew rotations that took place in
1999 on Forward Deployed Naval Forces32 in the Seventh Fleet area of
operations, no lessons learned directly related to crew rotations had been
posted regarding the Sea Swap destroyers, patrol coastal ships, and HSV
Swift experiences as of July 30, 2004. Absent guidance, Sea Swap crews'
efforts to record lessons learned have been inconsistent. Some crews
developed lists of lessons learned that were distributed to other
rotational crews and the Command, including some that related to manning,
personnel, supply, predeployment maintenance, training, turnover
preparations and execution, turnover time, and advance

30 Criteria for submitting a lesson learned include one or more of the
following: (1) identify problem areas, issues, or requirements, and if
known, recommend solutions; (2) contribute new information on existing or
experimental tactics, techniques, procedures, policy, or doctrine; (3)
provide an innovative technique or a procedure that successfully
accomplishes the task; and/or (4) provide information of interest in
planning, execution, application, or employment of an organization,
system, process, or procedure.

31 The site can be accessed from the Command Web page at
www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil.

32 Ships homeported overseas are considered part of the Forward Deployed
Naval Forces. This force structure is negotiated with each respective host
nation, with each host nation having ultimate decision authority regarding
U.S. vessels assigned to their port. Therefore, if ships on extended
deployment were considered homeported overseas, negotiations with the
pertinent host nation would be required prior to starting each deployment.

parties. In one case, a Sea Swap ship undertook a concerted effort to
document lessons learned prior to deployment, but a majority of those
documents were later discarded because the crew wanted to create
additional workspace. By not systematically recording and providing
valuable experiences from crew rotations to the Navy Lessons Learned
System, the Navy is missing an opportunity to more effectively plan and
conduct current and future crew rotations.

In response to a Senate Armed Services Committee request on the status of
one of the Sea Swap ships,33 the Command identified a preliminary set of
lessons learned as shown in table 2.

33 S. Rept. No. 108-46, at 309 (2003).

Table 2: Selected Preliminary Lessons Learned Regarding the Material
Condition of U.S.S. Fletcher during the Sea Swap Destroyer Initiative

Topic Issue

More efficient forward presence	A standard deployment of a ship from San
Diego to the Central Command requires a 40-day period (30 days transiting
and 10 days of quality-of-life port calls) at the start and end of a
deployment. Given a normal, 180-day deployment, this provides 100 days of
overseas presence in the Central Command per crew. The lesson learned was
that by employing Sea Swap and conducting only one transit to the Central
Command and one return to San Diego, the four crews rotating on the U.S.S.
Fletcher will provide 518 days of forward presence. To achieve this number
with standard deployments, five-plus ships would have had to deploy.

Crew training certifications	Sea Swap crews conducted their predeployment
training and achieved their certifications on their own hulls, prior to
turnover. These certifications remained with the crew. The lesson learned
was that Sea Swap crews met all operational taskings; therefore, the
certifications should remain with the crews, not tied to the hull.

Naval cultural issues 	There is a sense of ownership that a crew feels for
their ship. Sea Swap has personnel leaving their ship for another of the
same class. The lesson learned was the need to fully educate the crew on
the overall benefits of participating in an experiment such as Sea Swap
and ensure a positive attitude of the crew.

Maintenance of the forward-deployed ship	Casualty reports are tracking on
both classes of ships involved in Sea Swap and are compared to previous
ships of both classes. The numbers of those reports have spiked each time
a new crew embarks but have settled following a short period. The lesson
learned was that the spikes that occur when a crew assumes the ship are
somewhat expected due to new eyes reviewing the equipment.

Follow-on orders for Sea Swap crews 	As Sea Swap crews would assume the
hull of the crew who had just relieved them, it was necessary to change
their code. Detailed coordination was required with the Bureau of Naval
Personnel to ensure personnel with incoming orders went to the proper crew
as they rotated ships. The lesson learned was that early and detailed
coordination is mandatory.

Source: Naval Surface Force Pacific Command.

A final report will be provided to the Committee once the initiative is
completed. None of these lessons learned from the Sea Swap initiative have
been reported to the Navy Lessons Learned System.

Efforts to gather lessons learned in the patrol coastal community have
been inconsistent. Amphibious Group Two similarly did not provide
direction to collect and record lessons learned and stated that crews
involved in rotations passed on lessons learned to one another. A patrol
coastal ship commander stated that crew efforts to gather lessons learned
were informal. We identified one lessons learned report sent by a ship
commander to the ship's command, Amphibious Group Two, that contained
lessons related to maintenance funding, ownership, and maintaining good
ship inventories. However, none of these lessons learned had been recorded
in the Navy Lessons Learned System as of July 30, 2004.

Many Past Lessons Learned Available in Formal System Are Not Being
Systematically Leveraged

The Mine Warfare Command directed the HSV-2 Swift commanding officers to
develop lessons learned reports on five issues. Only two of those lessons
learned reports had been posted to the Navy Lessons Learned System as of
July 30, 2004, and neither addressed ship crewing issues.

The surface ship community has not capitalized on the Navy lessons learned
database to plan and conduct crew rotations. A Naval Surface Force Pacific
Command official told us that the Command did not systematically solicit
available lessons learned from the Navy Lessons Learned System to help
plan for crew rotations. We found that participants in our focus groups
reported experiencing similar problems that several of the formal lessons
learned reported by the Forward Deployed Naval Forces in 1999 had
addressed. For example, two important lessons not leveraged were

o  	reviewing the automated process for the transfer of crew
identification codes when assigned to a new ship and

o  	establishing and abiding by a written agreement between both ship
commanders that clearly defines transfer and accountability procedures for
equipment turnover.

When crews for Forward Deployed Naval Forces were rotated in 1999, the
Navy recognized that the ships were not timely in properly updating
crewmembers' records to show the ship to which crewmembers were assigned.
This resulted in incorrect enlisted master files and the inability to
process pay transactions. The lesson learned report stated that the Navy
should instantly transfer personnel from one code to another automatically
in a timely manner, which is crucial to avoid incorrect master files and
the potential loss of certain pay and entitlements. Numerous Sea Swap
destroyer, patrol coastal ship, and HSV-2 Swift officers and crews we met
experienced similar difficulties. They reported that because their
respective code was not changed to reflect they had changed ships, some
crewmembers experienced problems receiving pay and others were ordered to
the wrong ship. Officers and crew from a Sea Swap ship stated that
creating codes for each crew would help alleviate similar problems.
Assigning crews codes is a standard practice in the ballistic missile
submarine community. This practice was also used by the mine warfare
community during their crew rotations in the mid-1990s. The systematic use
of an effective lessons learned system could have alerted the Navy to the
need for a mechanism to ensure the effective transfer of crews and ships
from one code to another in a timely and an accurate manner.

Establishing and abiding by written agreements between both ship
commanders involved in a crew rotation enable both crews early in the
planning phase to determine what equipment stays with the ship or the crew
and improves accountability for tool equipment transfer. The Navy's
lessons learned database identified the need for such agreements. However,
despite both ship commanders agreeing during the planning phases of one of
the turnovers that each ship's tools, parts, and material would remain
with the respective ship and that both crews would review an inventory
checklist during turnover, both crews did not follow the agreement. One
crew removed many of the tools and other equipment before leaving the
ship. As a result, the on-coming crew did not have the needed tools and
other equipment to perform maintenance and repairs and had to spend
$150,000 to buy the needed tools. Officers and crews from two patrol
coastal ships also indicated that absent an agreed-upon written inventory
identifying which items stay with the ship and what items stay with the
crew, one of the crews took needed ship items back to the United States,
in part, to ensure the crew had necessary items on the new ship. Officers
from one patrol coastal ship stated that there is a need for a standard
set of inventory items that should stay on a ship. Sea Swap and patrol
coastal ship officers and crewmembers stated that an independent authority
is needed to monitor the turnover process, including an inventory of
tools, to hold both crews accountable.

The impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational crewing
has not been fully assessed. This is because the Navy has been focused on
demonstrating the feasibility of the practice and allowed ships to use
different approaches to conducting maintenance without capturing all
needed information and examining all related issues that could impact
success. A full assessment of maintenance issues on all ships employing
this practice would be important in identifying and addressing possible
impediments to effectively implementing rotational crewing. Navy
destroyers and patrol coastal ships using rotational crews on extended
deployments have faced maintenance challenges to ensure the mission
capability of ships while overseas. To help minimize the adverse effects
on the material condition of forward-deployed Sea Swap destroyers, the
Navy expanded the scope of predeployment maintenance and sent maintenance
support representatives in theater to provide additional technical support
to crews. Despite concluding that the condition of the returning ship,
U.S.S. Higgins, was comparable to that of another ship that had recently
returned from a deployment, the results of such efforts on maintaining
ship material condition are uncertain. The Center recommended that a
review of maintenance support might be necessary prior to expanding

  Maintenance Strategies for Alternative Crewing and Potential Impacts Have Not
  Been Fully Assessed

Sea Swap to other ships. We found the need for such an analysis was
further supported by the experience of patrol coastal ships, which did not
receive such focused maintenance and identified several maintenance
problems that were not corrected while deployed that could have affected
their mission capability. Moreover, both the Center and our focus groups
with rotational crews found that increased maintenance tasks contributed
to diminished crew morale. Therefore, while the Navy used rotational crews
to keep ships on station for up to 24 months, in the absence of a careful
analysis of alternative maintenance strategies, the Navy runs the risk
that some maintenance approaches will degrade the long-term condition of
ships, diminish crew morale, and discourage crew support for using the
practice.

    Maintaining Ships on Extended Deployment Is a Challenge

Navy vessels using rotational crews on extended deployments have faced
maintenance challenges to ensure the vessels' mission capability while
overseas. Normally, most ship maintenance and repair is completed between
6-month deployments. For instance, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers normally
receive continuous maintenance34 annually and 2-month Selected Restricted
Availabilities35 every 22 months. However, ships employing rotational
crews on extended deployments do not return to the United States for
periods of 12 or more months, so crews must maintain ship capability while
deployed in compliance with law36 and Navy guidance on overseas
maintenance (see appendix III for details on Navy guidance).

According to the Center, each Sea Swap destroyer received more maintenance
support and more intensive support than typically received by ships on
routine deployments. This support included numerous

34 Continuous maintenance is surface ship depot level work performed while
in port to keep ship systems fully operational between scheduled shipyard
maintenance periods.

35 Selected Restricted Availability is defined as a short, labor-intensive
industrial period for the accomplishment of maintenance and selected
modernization.

36 Title 10, United States Code, section 7310(a) restricts repairs of
naval vessels outside the United States based on where the ship is
homeported and the nature of the repairs to be performed. Specifically,
any naval vessel or any other vessel under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of the Navy with its homeport in the United States may not be
overhauled, repaired, or maintained in a shipyard outside the United
States or Guam, other than in the case of voyage repairs. Under Navy
guidance, voyage repairs generally consist of emergency work that is
necessary to enable a ship to continue its mission and that can be
accomplished without a change to the ship's deployment schedule.

predeployment inspections and maintenance on their power, electrical,
steering, combat, and other systems to eliminate many potential required
maintenance activities during deployment. For example, the predeployment
maintenance on one of the Sea Swap ships, the U.S.S. Fletcher, began with
the identification of all time-driven maintenance requirements that were
scheduled during the extended deployment. Examples included calibration,
assessments, and inspections of equipment to renew time-driven
certifications. (Such actions are comparable to checking a car's timing
belt or inspecting brakes and tires before taking a long trip.) Numerous
other inspections were also conducted prior to deployment on selected ship
systems and equipment to identify and repair problems and ensure the good
working order of the ship. The U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins each
received inspections for hull, mechanical, and electrical systems, as well
as combat systems. The U.S.S. Higgins also received inspections of its
Aegis radar system.

Sea Swap destroyers also received overseas maintenance support beyond that
available to ships on a typical deployment. The Surface Force Pacific
Command sent U.S.-based ship engineering material assessment teams,
ranging from 3 to 11 members, to perform maintenance on the Sea Swap
destroyers while the ships transited from their operational area of
responsibility to overseas locations where crew turnovers occurred. The
teams also assisted the crews while the destroyers were in port at the
crew turnover city and were comprised of senior-level maintainers capable
of performing a variety of maintenance jobs at the ship's organizational37
and intermediate levels.38 According to Navy maintenance officials, the
team's presence during transit from the theater of operations to the Sea
Swap city and in port facilitated the completion of preventative
maintenance, particularly repairs associated with ship habitability.
Surface Force Pacific Command also assigned a Sea Swap destroyer port
engineer to help ship officials develop maintenance plans during port
visits, which is not typical for ships on normal deployments.

37 Organizational (shipboard) maintenance consists of corrective and
preventive maintenance, which is performed by the ship's crew on its
assigned equipment. Repairs normally consist of inspecting, servicing,
lubricating, adjusting, and replacing parts, minor assemblies, and
subassemblies.

38 Intermediate maintenance consists of preventive and corrective
maintenance, which is the responsibility of and performed by qualified
personnel with specialized facilities such as fleet support activities.
Repairs normally consist of calibration, repair or replacement of damaged
or unserviceable parts or assemblies, and emergency manufacture of
nonavailable parts.

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command39 officials also noted that Sea Swap
destroyers experienced material degradation over time. As a result, both
destroyers required maintenance that was not readily supportable during
operations. Navy officials said that Sea Swap destroyers were given
preference for port visits in support of crew turnovers and maintenance as
compared to other ships. They also said that maintaining ships deployed to
the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for long periods would
continue to be a challenge.

During our review, we found that patrol coastal ship rotational crews also
faced challenges in maintaining ship material condition. Like the Sea Swap
destroyers, the patrol coastal ships received system inspections prior to
deployment. Patrol coastal port engineers and maintenance support teams
checked key systems-such as engines, weapons packages, and the bridge-to
hedge against wear and tear the ship would experience on an extended
deployment. However, unlike the Sea Swap destroyers, U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command officials indicated that patrol coastal ships were not
given preferential treatment to support maintenance. The patrol coastal
ship community deployed a maintenance support team with the crews in an
effort to address overseas maintenance needs, however, these teams are not
unique to rotational crewing and typically support any patrol coastal ship
deployment. The team consisted of five members located in theater who
performed limited maintenance, ordered and stored parts, and provided
administrative support. The scope of the maintenance performed by the
teams was limited to organizational, intermediate, and select depot-level
maintenance.40

According to focus groups with patrol coastal ship crews, the maintenance
support teams were usually the only personnel in theater capable of
rectifying frequently occurring maintenance problems. If a maintenance
support team was not available, the crew had to contact a technical

39 U.S. Naval Forces Central Command supports all naval operations in the
U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. This area includes the
Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean.

40 Depot-level maintenance consists of maintenance performed by designated
maintenance activities to support organizational-and intermediate-level
maintenance activities by the use of more extensive ship facilities,
equipment, and personnel of higher technical skill. Repairs may consist of
inspection, test, repair, modification, alteration, modernization,
conversion, overhaul, and rebuild of parts, assemblies, subassemblies,
equipment end items, and weapon systems. Depot-level maintenance is
normally accomplished in fixed shops, shipyards, and other shore-based
facilities, or by depot field teams.

support representative in the United States for assistance or try to
conduct the maintenance itself. Some patrol coastal ship crewmembers
indicated that the size of the maintenance support teams was insufficient
to support both patrol coastal ships on extended deployments and suggested
expanding the maintenance support teams to be comparable to the system
used by the Coast Guard. According to patrol coastal ship crews, the Coast
Guard had four ships similar to the patrol coastal ships in theater and
provided approximately 50 maintenance personnel to perform the same
function as the patrol coastal maintenance support team. The increased
size of the Coast Guard's maintenance support allowed its crews to stand
down and live in barracks during maintenance periods. By contrast, a
patrol coastal officer noted that, during maintenance availabilities,
maintenance support teams only assisted the crew and did not take over the
work effort and the crews remained on board throughout the repair process
and performed maintenance.

    Full Impact of Navy Maintenance Strategy for Destroyers and Other Ships
    Using Crew Rotations Is Not Clear

The results of the different maintenance strategies used to sustain the
two destroyers that were apart of the Sea Swap demonstration project and
other ships using rotational crewing are uncertain. While the Center
judged that the condition of the U.S.S. Higgins was comparable to another
ship that had recently returned from a routine 6-month deployment, others
in the Navy disagreed based on inspection results. We did not identify any
similar effort to determine the impact on the patrol coastal or other
ships that would provide the Navy with additional insights into the impact
of the extended deployment on their condition.

The Center's judgment was based in part on a total ship readiness
assessment conducted by Pacific Fleet maintenance personnel, in which
Surface Force Pacific officials judged the U.S.S. Higgins' ship material
condition after a 17-month deployment to be comparable to the U.S.S.
Decatur's. However, officials from the Fleet Technical Support Center
Pacific that performed the assessment thought there were some significant
differences in the condition between the two ships. These officials found
that the U.S.S. Higgins had 697 noted deficiencies out of 3,370 items
tested (21 percent), whereas the U.S.S. Decatur had 465 out of 3,231 items
tested (14 percent). While the number of deficiencies alone does not
necessarily indicate the significant material differences between the
ships, some of the items deficient on the U.S.S. Higgins included data
links for controlling operations between a ship and an aircraft and
another

was the nonoperational extra high frequency communication system41 on the
U.S.S. Higgins that was operational on the U.S.S. Decatur.

Fleet Technical Support Center Pacific officials also assessed the
operational functionality of each ship's equipment and found that the
U.S.S. Higgins was not as capable. This assessment measured the equipment
operational capability42 of each ship in order to quantitatively determine
whether the ship's systems were performing in accordance with Navy
requirements. The assessment results showed that the U.S.S. Higgins
received an overall score of .70, while the U.S.S. Decatur received a
score of .85. According to the Navy handbook, an equipment operational
capability score of 1.0 indicates the equipment is fully capable of
performing its function as designed, while a score of 0 indicates the
equipment is totally unable to perform its function as designed. The
handbook provides that any score between .70 and .80 indicates ship
equipment is unable to obtain optimum operational standards, while scores
above .80 indicate ship equipment passes all operational tests.

A further breakdown of the scores indicates the U.S.S. Higgins may have
had problems that were more serious. The .70 score for the U.S.S. Higgins
was arrived at by assessing two categories of equipment: the combat
system-related equipment43 and the hull, mechanical, and electrical
systems-related equipment.44 The combat system-related equipment score for
the U.S.S. Higgins was .77, while the U.S.S. Decatur received a score of
.83. Since the combat system portion of the score was higher than the
total for the U.S.S. Higgins, the hull, mechanical, and electrical
equipment

41 This communications system connects ships, submarines, and shore
facilities. The system enables survivable, worldwide command and control
communications to strategic and tactical naval forces through all levels
of conflict.

42 The readiness of ship equipment is quantified with a value called an
Equipment Operational Capability score. The score is a number between 0
and 1, which is assigned to the lowest level of equipment being tested and
reflects its ability to pass selected planned maintenance system tests and
provide functional capability, as perceived by the assessing technician.

43 Combat system-related equipment consists of command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence systems, detection systems,
electromagnetic compatibility systems, guns, launchers, and other fire
control systems as well as supporting equipment.

44 Hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment examples include items
related to a ship's engine and propulsion systems, safety equipment, and
habitability systems such as air conditioners.

score was at a minimum below .70.45 According to the handbook, scores
above .50 and below .70 indicate that equipment has significantly reduced
output or restricted operability. By contrast, we found that the hull
mechanical and electrical equipment score for the U.S.S. Decatur was at
least .85, given an overall score of .85 and a combat system score of .83,
which indicated that equipment was fully operable.

Even though it concluded that the U.S.S. Higgins' condition was
comparable, the Center recognized the importance of maintenance to the
success of rotational crewing and proposed the Navy further assess
maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs. Specifically, the
Center suggested that if Sea Swap becomes a more standard practice, "it
will be necessary to conduct a holistic review of the overall maintenance
process, including technical services and training." This review would
assess the responsibilities and interrelationships among the many players,
such as the ship's force, ship repair units, port engineers, and ship
engineering maintenance teams. In addition, the Center added that the Navy
should conduct a careful assessment to determine which maintenance support
aspects are essential costs and which are dispensable. As of July 2004,
the Navy had not started such an assessment.

We found that the experience of other ships on extended deployments, such
as patrol coastal ships, bore out the need for such an analysis. Patrol
coastal ships did not receive focused maintenance comparable to Sea Swap
destroyers, and ship officials identified several maintenance problems
aboard one or more ships (see table 3) that were not corrected while
deployed that could have affected their mission capability.

45 We were able to obtain the combat system-related equipment scores for
both ships, however, the Navy did not report a total hull, mechanical, and
electrical system score.

       Table 3: Examples of Maintenance Problems on Patrol Coastal Ships

Repair needed Action needed and effect of not receiving repair

Severe hull cracks identified on ships 	Hull needed reinforcement. This
class of ships is prone to hull cracking in heavy seas. If cracks are
repaired quickly, the damage can be mitigated; if not, more severe
cracking can cause the ship to break into pieces and sink. Installation of
hull strengthening alteration eliminates the cracking problem but requires
drydocking.

Ship service diesel generator fuel system clogged

The fuel system, including fuel lines, pumps, and filters, needed
industrial cleaning. Excessive biological growth in the fuel tanks due to
the environment in which the ships are operating causes the system to
clog. The potential impact is the loss of ship service diesel generator
control and electrical power.

                       Rotating crane leaked and operated

erratically The rotating crane needed repairs. A rotating crane is
required to launch and recover a ship's rubber hull inflatable boat.
Continued loss of the crane's operational capabilities will result in a
major degradation to the primary mission area.

Source: U.S. Navy.

Patrol coastal ships on extended deployments did not have extra in-theater
maintenance support comparable to Sea Swap destroyers. For instance,
patrol coastal ships did not have ship engineering maintenance teams to
aid the crew in achieving maintenance. As a result, according to the
maintenance support team coordinator for patrol coastal ships, routine
continuous maintenance often could not be accomplished and, subsequently,
the overall material condition of patrol coastal ships deployed overseas
slowly degraded. The official explained that repairs authorized overseas
are very narrow in scope and only cover maintenance absolutely necessary
for the ship to conduct its mission. As a result, the official commented
that organizational-and intermediate-level planned maintenance and
preservation work are left to the crew and deployed maintenance support
teams to take on over short periods in port, typically 5 days or less. In
addition, according to a patrol coastal ship port engineer, each
forward-deployed patrol coastal ship had received about 4 weeks of
maintenance in port over the last 18 months and added that this level of
maintenance does not equal what a traditionally deployed patrol coastal
would receive. Port engineers and other maintenance staff noted challenges
in keeping the patrol coastal ships operationally ready. For instance, in
our focus group discussions with patrol coastal ship crews, they explained
that the ship's rotating crane that launches and retrieves the ship's
rigid inflatable boats broke down during a patrol and the ship had to rely
upon the Coast Guard to help with its repair. A Navy official also
explained that the extendedly deployed patrol coastal ships have a very
high operational tempo, which also impacts the ability of the ship's force
to conduct organizational maintenance and increases the overall
degradation of the ship over time. The official stated that onboard
maintenance efforts have been able to keep the patrol coastal ships

running, but that the Navy will pay a heavy price once the ships return to
homeport for extensive overhauls, since repairs that are more serious will
be necessary.

    The Challenge of Maintaining Ships on Extended Deployment Contributed to
    Crew Morale and Quality-of-Life Problems

The Center and we found that crews expressed concern about the extra
workload they endured to maintain high ship readiness. Specifically, the
Center concluded that while the Sea Swap demonstration showed a benefit
for the Navy-saving dollars and increasing forward presence- many sailors
spoke of the burdens and loss of traditions. According to the Center, Sea
Swap crews performed more work and experienced fewer benefits and
traditions than what may have originally drawn them to the Navy. For
instance, the Center's report noted that some Sea Swap crewmembers found
that the maintenance workload was high throughout the entire deployment.
Other complaints were that whenever the Sea Swap ships pulled into an
Arabian Gulf port, other ships' sailors left on liberty while the Sea Swap
crews remained on board doing maintenance. This intense maintenance
schedule was a morale problem and a frequent topic that arose during the
Center's crew interviews.

Our focus groups with Sea Swap destroyer crews identified similar
concerns. For instance, extra maintenance work related to painting and
preserving the ship was left to the ship's crew to accomplish. In
addition, Sea Swap officers in our focus groups indicated that unreported
work and high workloads disrupted sailor quality of life and that there
was no increase in time or resources to get maintenance done. They also
told us that more equipment inspections by in-theater support teams were
needed while in port. The officers explained that the ship's crew had to
inspect and fix different equipment throughout the ship because in-theater
support teams were not available. According to the Sea Swap officers and
crew, this affected their quality of life since liberty time was reduced
to accommodate ship maintenance needs.

Our focus groups with patrol coastal ship rotational crews also indicated
that increased maintenance tasks and workloads adversely affected crew
morale and quality of life. Patrol coastal ship senior chiefs told us that
rotational crews had difficulty meeting ship preservation requirements,
loading supplies, and documenting ship maintenance logs for non-working
items during port visits of 5 days or less. In addition, crewmembers on
each rotational patrol coastal ship complained that they received no
liberty ports; that all port visits became working ports due to the ship's
maintenance needs; and that, given the small size of the ships, they
needed time away from other crewmembers to decompress. Furthermore, a
patrol

Conclusions

coastal ship commanding officer said that his deployed patrol coastal ship
required too many maintenance demands and noted that the ship was
maintenance-intensive from the day his crew took over.

Rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments appears to be
a feasible alternative to the traditional way the Navy operates that could
enhance its effectiveness. Successfully overcoming issues that could
impede using this alternative and to gain support for implementing this
change require knowledge of the various rotational options and their
impact on operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale.
However, the Navy has not taken several key steps that could help it
better plan, manage, and monitor the implementation of this crewing
approach and therefore may not realize its full potential. For example,
the Navy has not established the analytical framework to evaluate all
rotational crewing options and related costs. In the absence of formal
measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for assessing feasibility, cost,
and other factors, including crew quality of life, the Navy does not have
clear criteria for deciding when to use rotational crewing and which
option best fits the situation. Furthermore, until the Navy more
systematically collects data on current and potential surface ship
rotational crewing options, including complete and accurate cost data for
cost-effectiveness analyses, it will lack valuable information for making
informed decisions about the potential for applying rotational crewing to
current and future ships as well as whether it can get maximum return on
investment and offset billions of dollars in future total ownership costs.

The Navy's implementation of crew rotations also lacks effective guidance
to ensure oversight and accountability. For example, the Navy does not
provide guidance that specifies standard policies and procedures for
rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and accountability for
ship operations during crew rotations. Until it does, crews may continue
to have problems consistently documenting ship condition and accounting
for ship inventories during ship turnover, which could lead to additional
work burdens on the on-coming crew and potentially affect readiness.
Furthermore, without more formal guidance built on systematically
collected, recorded, and disseminated lessons learned from all rotational
experiences that specify standard policies and procedures, the Navy may
repeat mistakes.

Finally, the Navy does not know enough about the implications of
maintenance on ships using rotational crews as a means to extend their
deployments. The Center for Naval Analyses noted in its report on the

Sea Swap demonstration that if that option is to become a more standard
practice, the Navy needs to further review the overall maintenance
process. However, until the Navy fully assesses the additional maintenance
demands and related crew quality-of-life issues experienced by all ships
implementing this crewing approach, and evaluates alternative maintenance
strategies, it runs the risk that it will degrade the long-term condition
of ships and discourage crew support for rotational crewing.

To ensure that the nation's multibillion-dollar investment in Navy ships
yields the greatest possible benefits at the lowest possible total cost,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Navy to take the following four actions:

                              Recommendations for

  Executive Action

o  	Systematically evaluate the feasibility and cost-effectiveness for
current and potential application of several rotational crewing
alternatives for its surface forces by

o  	establishing formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for
assessing feasibility, costs, and other factors, including crew quality of
life, and

o  	systematically collecting and developing complete and accurate cost
data, including ship total ownership costs, in order to perform accurate
cost-effectiveness analyses.

o  	Provide guidance that specifies standard policies and procedures for
rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and accountability for
ship operations during the rotation.

o  	Systematically collect, record, and disseminate lessons learned
pertaining to rotational crewing in the Navy Lessons Learned System to
enhance knowledge sharing.

o  	Conduct a study of the maintenance processes used for all ships
involved in rotating crews and examine, as part of the study,
opportunities to mitigate the crews' concerns about maintenance workload
to improve their quality of life.

Agency Comments 	In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed
with the recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the
recommendations.

DOD's comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me
at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at [email protected]. Key staff members
that contributed to this report are listed in appendix V.

Janet St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

List of Committees

The Honorable James L. Talent
Chairman
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Seapower
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Joel Hefley
Chairman
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable John M. McHugh
Chairman
The Honorable Vic Snyder
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Total Force
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett
Chairman
The Honorable Gene Taylor
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Projection Forces
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

Ohio-Class Ballistic 	Nuclear-powered Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarines, also known as Trident submarines, provide the sea-based leg of
the triad of U.S. strategic

Missile Submarine 	deterrent forces and the most survivable nuclear strike
capability. There are 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines in the
fleet, homeported in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. Each
submarine has about 15 officers and 140 enlisted personnel. The average
procurement unit cost for each Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine is
$2 billion (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

To maintain a constant at-sea presence, a Blue-Gold rotational crewing
concept is employed on these submarines. Each ship has a "Blue" Crew and a
"Gold" Crew, each with its own respective ship command. The ship deploys
with one of these crews for 77 days, followed by a 2-to 3-day crew
turnover and a 35-day maintenance period. For example, after a Blue Crew
deployment, the Gold Crew takes command of the boat after a 3-day turnover
process. The Blue Crew assists the Gold Crew in conducting maintenance
repairs. During the Gold Crew's patrol, the Blue Crew stands down and
enters a training cycle in its homeport.

Figure 1: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine

                               Source: U.S. Navy.

                  Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

Spruance-Class Destroyer

The DD-963 Spruance-class destroyer has multimission offensive and
defensive capabilities, and it can operate independently or as part of
other naval formations. These ships were developed for the primary mission
of antisubmarine warfare. Many of these ships were subsequently modernized
with a vertical launch system1 and a Tomahawk cruise missile capability
that greatly expanded the role of the destroyer in strike warfare.2 The
crew consists of 30 officers and 352 enlisted personnel. The average
procurement unit cost is $489.6 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

The Pacific Fleet conducted Sea Swap rotational crewing with four ships of
this class, with the U.S.S. Fletcher being the forward-deployed unit. The
three other destroyers were decommissioned coincident with the crew
exchange. That is, each on-coming crew decommissioned its ship prior to
swapping with the off-going crew of the U.S.S. Fletcher. As a result,
after their 6-month deployment, the off-going crewmembers dispersed to a
variety of new assignments, just as if their own ship were being
decommissioned. Further, the Spruance-class destroyer swap rotation was
initially planned on three ships but was extended by adding a fourth
destroyer. As a result, the U.S.S. Fletcher remained deployed for over 22
months. All of the Spruance-class destroyers will be decommissioned by the
end of fiscal year 2006.

1 A vertical launch system is a missile storage and firing system aboard a
ship that enables the vessel to perform multiple warfighting capabilities,
including antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, ship self-defense,
strike warfare, and antisurface warfare.

2 Strike warfare is the use of tactical aircraft and/or cruise missile
strikes against land targets in an offensive power projection role.

Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

           Figure 2: The U.S.S. Fletcher, a Spruance-Class Destroyer

Source: U.S. Navy.

                  Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

  Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile Destroyer

The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers-first
commissioned in July 1991, with primary homeports in San Diego and
Norfolk-provide multimission offensive and defensive capabilities,
operating independently or as part of other naval formations. The DDG-51
is equipped with the Aegis combat system, a vertical launching system for
launching antiaircraft and Tomahawk missiles, and an advanced
antisubmarine warfare system. Each destroyer crews 23 officers and 300
enlisted personnel, and has a procurement average unit cost of $976
million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

Navy plans call for a force of 62 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile
destroyers. At the end of fiscal year 2004, this force will total 43
ships. The Navy is conducting a Sea Swap rotational crewing system to
rotate entire crews from one hull to another on selected ships in the
Naval Surface Force Pacific Command's fleet of Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers.

Figure 3: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile
Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground

Source: U.S. Navy.

                  Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

  Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal

The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships are small Navy vessels used to
conduct surveillance and shallow-water interdiction operations in support
of maritime homeland security operations and coastal patrol of foreign
shores. The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ship first entered into service
in 1993. The patrol coastal force consists of 13 ships-4 stationed in San
Diego, California, and 9 in Little Creek, Virginia. The crew consists of 4
officers and 24 enlisted personnel. The procurement average unit cost is
$19.4 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

The Navy is using a crew swap model in which the entire crew of 28
crewmembers rotates from one hull to another. The rotations are occurring
between patrol coastal ships in the United States and those deployed in
the Arabian Gulf to increase operation days and reduce transit times.
Operational requirements have delayed the decommissioning of 8 ships and
the transfer of 5 ships equipped with loading ramps to the Coast Guard.

Figure 4: The U.S.S. Firebolt, a Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal

                               Source: U.S. Navy.

                  Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

                               High Speed Vessel
                               Two (HSV-2) Swift

The HSV-2 Swift is a high speed (almost 50 knots), wave-piercing
aluminum-hulled catamaran that was acquired as an interim mine warfare
command and support ship and a platform for conducting joint
experimentation, including Marine Corps sea basing.3 The Navy leased and
accepted delivery of the catamaran from the builder, Incat Australia, in
Australia, in August 2003. The Swift was leased for 1 year at a cost of
$27 million, with a 4-year option ($58 million).

The Swift employs two crews of 41 members each and uses the Blue-Gold
crewing option. The Gold Crew is based out of the Naval Amphibious Base
Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia. It operates the ship as a joint
experimental platform with Marine Corps troops embarked, testing
experimental and near-shore combat ship concepts. It also conducts special
operations warfare.4 The Blue Crew is based out of Naval Station,
Ingleside, Texas. This crew operates the ship as a mine warfare command
and control ship. The Mine Warfare Command is in charge of coordinating
overall mission scheduling for the ship and crews. The crews are
responsible for the ship, but not its mission equipment. Each command that
brings modules aboard ship must supply personnel to operate the modules.
The Swift operates on a nominal 117-day cycle (plus or minus 10 days),
including a 3-to-4 day turnover between crews, with a 4-month on/4-month
off cycle. Crew exchanges take place in the crews' respective homeports or
at overseas locations.

3 Sea basing is the concept of placing capabilities critical to joint and
coalition operational success, such as offensive and defensive firepower,
maneuver forces, command and control, and logistics, at sea.

4 The five principal mission areas of special operations are
unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign
internal defense, and combating terrorism.

                  Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

Figure 5: The High Speed Vessel Experimental Craft, HSV-2 Swift

The DD(X) is a next generation, multimission surface combatant ship
tailored for land attack that has not been built. The Navy intends to
operate the DD(X) independently or as part of other naval formations. The
DD(X) is expected to provide precision firepower at long ranges in support
of forces ashore using two 155-mm advanced gun systems and 80
vertical-launch system tubes for the Tomahawk cruise missiles and other
weapons.

For fiscal year 2005, the Navy is requesting $221 million to begin
building the first DD(X) and $1.2 billion for research and development for
the program. The first ship is planned for delivery to the Navy in 2012.
The Navy estimates that the first DD(X) will cost about $2.8 billion,
including about $1.0 billion in detailed design and nonrecurring
engineering costs for the class. The Navy earlier indicated it was
planning to procure 24 DD(X) vessels through fiscal year 2017, before
shifting to procurement of the next generation cruiser in fiscal year
2018. Recently, however, the Navy indicated it might accelerate the start
of the cruiser procurement to sometime between fiscal year 2011 and 2014
and reduce the number of DD(X) destroyers it intends to buy to between 10
to 16.

                               Source: U.S. Navy.

  Next Generation Guided Missile Destroyer, the DD(X)

Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

Current DD(X) design planning anticipates a crew size of 125 to 175
persons. The procurement contract establishes the requirement to consider
deploying ships up to 3 years and requires the design agent to conduct and
complete an analysis of crewing options that would support extended
forward deployments, including standard, Sea Swap, Horizon, and Blue-Gold
crewing options. The contract also requires the design agent to ensure
that the DD(X) system can be effectively operated with an optimized crew
and provide the crew with the highest quality of life, while minimizing
total ownership cost.

Figure 6: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation Destroyer, DD(X)

Source: U.S. Navy.

                  Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

                              Littoral Combat Ship

The littoral combat ship-a new class of Navy surface combatants and the
smallest member in the DD(X) family of next generation surface combatant
ships-is intended to be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable, and tailored
for specific missions, such as antisubmarine, antisurface, or mine warfare
in heavily contested littoral, or near-shore, waters, and it will use
interchangeable mission modules5 tailored for specific missions. The
Navy's goal is to develop a platform that can be fielded in relatively
large numbers to support a wide range of joint missions, with
reconfigurable mission modules to assure access to the littorals for the
Navy forces in the face of threats from surface craft, submarines, and
mines. It is also expected to have the capability to deploy independently
to overseas littoral regions and remain on station for extended periods
either with a battle group or through at-sea replenishment. Baseline ship
planning is for a single crew; rotational crewing concepts are being
explored as a secondary option. Crew size is expected to range between 15
to 50 core crewmembers, which do not include the crew for the mission
package.

The Navy has plans to build 56 ships, with the first to be delivered in
fiscal year 2007 for an estimated cost of $20 billion. Each sea frame hull
has an average unit cost of $147.5 million to $216.4 million (in fiscal
year 2004 dollars). The mission modules' average procurement cost is $177
million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars) per ship set. The resulting average
cost for a littoral combat ship platform is $324.6 million to $393.4
million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

5 Mission packages would provide the main warfighting capability and
functionality for specific missions and would consist of a combination of
manned and unmanned off-board vehicles, deployable sensors, and mission
manning detachments. A mission module would be used in multiple mission
packages and, conversely, several mission modules would constitute a
mission package. Mission modules are typically used to transport, support
and house mission components (sensors or weapons), which would, in turn,
be deployable or stationary aboard the ship.

Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

            Figure 7: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship

Source: U.S. Navy.

                       Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

To assess whether the Navy has systematically evaluated the feasibility
and cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing concepts for existing and
future classes of surface ships, we interviewed Department of Defense
(DOD) and Navy Headquarters and fleet officials, met with cost analysis
experts in the government and the private sector, reviewed key acquisition
documents and crew employment plans, and reviewed rotational crewing
studies performed for and by the Navy. Studies we reviewed included

o  	"Future Force Operational Plan," Executive Summary of the Horizon
Concept Generation Team, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group
XVI (June 1997);

o  	"Crew Rotation: The MCM-1 Experience," Center for Naval Analyses (May
1998);

o  	"Alternative Naval Crew Rotation Operations," Center for Naval
Analyses (October 2001)

o  	"Task Force Sierra Force Structure For The Future Phase One," Naval
War College (undated);

o  	"Alternative Approaches to Meet New Operational Commitments," Briefing
by the Deep Blue Team, Chief of Naval Operations (undated);

o  	"Sea Swap," Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Naval War College
(June 2003); and

o  "Sea Swap Assessment," Center for Naval Analyses (September 2004).

We also conducted meetings with several of the commanding and executive
officers of the Sea Swap destroyers, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected patrol
coastal ships and strategic ballistic missile submarines.

To assess whether the Navy has effectively managed rotational crewing on
surface ships and leveraged lessons learned, we visited Naval Surface
Force Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California; Submarine Group
Nine Command, Bangor, Washington; Mine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi,
Texas; and Amphibious Group Two Command, Norfolk, Virginia. We also met
with officials from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Warfare
(Plans, Policies, and Operations; Surface Warfare; and Submarine Warfare)
to review Navy guidance and plans for conducting crew rotations. We also
conducted over 40 focus group meetings with Navy officers and crews
involved in crew rotations on the guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Higgins,
selected ballistic missile submarines, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected
patrol coastal ships (see page 58 for more information on the objective,
scope, and methodology of the focus groups). Further, we reviewed Navy
Lessons Learned System instructions and visited the Navy Warfare
Development Command,

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Newport, Rhode Island, to query the Navy Lessons Learned System to
determine recorded lessons learned pertaining to crew rotations.

To assess how ship maintenance may impact implementation of rotational
crewing, we reviewed relevant laws and Navy regulations pertaining to
maintenance of U.S. Navy ships. We discussed ship material condition and
associated sailor workload in over 25 focus groups with crews from the Sea
Swap guided missile destroyers and from selected patrol coastal ships that
had participated in crew rotations. We also obtained ship material
condition assessments, called Total Ship Readiness Assessments, for the
U.S.S. Higgins and the U.S.S. Decatur. We discussed the methodology and
results of the assessments with officials from the Fleet Technical Support
Center, San Diego, California; the Southwest Regional Maintenance Center,
Commander Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California; the Naval Surface Warfare
Center, Corona Division, Corona, California; and the Naval Surface Force
Pacific, San Diego, California. We met with and obtained maintenance
guidance and reports from Navy officials at Combined Fleet Forces Command,
Norfolk, Virginia; Surface Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; Surface
Force Pacific, San Diego, California; Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet,
Honolulu, Hawaii; Amphibious Group Two Command, Little Creek, Virginia;
and maintenance experts in the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and the Chief of Naval
Operations, Washington, D.C. We also obtained written responses to our
questions from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. In addition, we reviewed
the Center for Naval Analyses's Sea Swap Assessment report and discussed
the report's findings with officials from the Center.

To compare reenlistment rates for crews on Sea Swap guided missile
destroyers and non-Sea Swap guided missile destroyers in the U.S. Pacific
Fleet, we obtained Unit Honor Roll reports, derived from the Enlisted
Master File, from the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu, Hawaii. We
did not analyze Spruance-class destroyer data for two reasons: (1) we did
not conduct focus groups with these crews and (2) the rotational crewing
experience was not as complete or complicated as that experienced by crews
on Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. Based upon discussions
with Pacific Fleet officials we also excluded selected ship crews from our
non-Sea Swap guided missile ship analysis because we wanted the ships we
analyzed to reflect the standard ship and crew option as closely as
possible. The ships and crews we excluded were: (1) precommissioning crews
because of their small sample sizes and nondeployed status, (2) the U.S.
Milius and its crew because it was an optimal manning experiment ship, and
(3) the U.S. Paul Hamilton

                       Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

because this crew was on an extended, 10-month deployment. We compiled
reenlistment averages for the ships we analyzed in 6-month blocks that
roughly corresponded with Sea Swap guided missile destroyer program and
crew deployments, beginning November 1, 2001, and ending on April 30,
2004, and that included pre-deployment, deployment and postdeployment data
for these crews.

While we did not validate the casualty report and sailor reenlistment data
used in this report, we discussed the data with DOD officials to determine
that the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We did validate
the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the data were
sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted our review from July
2003 through July 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

  Focus Groups with Crews on Rotational Crewing Ships

We conducted focus group meetings with Navy submarine and ship officers
and enlisted personnel who were involved in crew rotations. Focus groups
involve structured small group discussions designed to gain more in-depth
information about specific issues that cannot easily be obtained from
single or serial interviews. As with typical focus group methodologies,
our design included multiple groups with varying group characteristics but
some homogeneity-such as rank and responsibility- within groups. Each
group involved 7 to 10 participants. Discussions were held in a structured
manner, guided by a moderator who used a standardized list of questions to
encourage participants to share their thoughts and experiences. Our
overall objective in using a focus group approach was to obtain views,
insights, and feelings of Navy submarine and ship officers and enlisted
personnel involved in crew rotations.

    Scope of Our Focus Groups

To gain broad perspectives, we conducted over 40 separate focus group
sessions with multiple groups of Navy ship officers and enlisted personnel
involved in crew rotations on the guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Higgins,
selected ballistic missile submarines, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected
patrol coastal ships. Table 4 identifies the composition of the focus
groups on each of the vessels. Across focus groups, participants were
selected to ensure a wide distribution of officers, enlisted personnel,
seniority, and ship departments. GAO analysts traveled to each naval
station to conduct the majority of the focus groups. Six of the focus
groups were conducted on board the U.S.S. Higgins while it transited to
its homeport after its extended deployment.

                       Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

        Table 4: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform

                      Strategic             Arleigh    Patrol    HSV-2  Total 
                                        Burke-class   coastal          
    Personnel groups  submarines         destroyers        ships Swift groups 
    Junior enlisted            3                  6            3     2 
       personnel                                                       
       Lead petty              4                  3            -     1 
        officers                                                       
      Chief petty              1                  3            -     1 
        officers                                                       
    Senior enlisted            1                  -            2     1 
       personnel                                                       
        Officers               2                  3            3     1 
     Advanced party            -                  3            -     - 
         Total                11                 18            8     6 

                                  Source: GAO.

    Methodology for Our Focus Groups

A guide was developed to assist the moderator in leading the discussions.
The guide helped the moderator address several topics related to crew
rotations: training, maintenance, infrastructure and operations,
management and oversight, readiness, crew characteristics, quality of
life, lessons learned, and overall satisfaction with the rotational
crewing experience. Each focus group discussion began with the moderator
describing the purpose of our study and explaining how focus groups work.
Participants were assured anonymity of their responses, in that names
would not be directly linked to their responses in write-ups of the
sessions and that all of the responses for the session would be
summarized. The participants were then asked open-ended questions about
the impact of crew rotations on each of the topics. All focus group
questions were moderated by a GAO analyst who was assisted by a GAO
subject matter expert, while two assistants took notes.

                                Content Analysis

We performed a systematic content analysis of the open-ended responses in
order to categorize and summarize participants' experiences with crew
rotations. Based on the primary topics developed in the focus group guide,
individual GAO analysts reviewed the responses from one of the crews and
created their own respective lists of subcategories within each of the
primary focus group topics. The analysts then met collectively to generate
a proposed list of topic primary categories and subcategories.

To ensure inter-rater reliability, one of our analysts reviewed the
responses from each vessel type and assigned each comment to a
corresponding category. Another analyst also reviewed each response and
independently assigned the same comment to a corresponding category.

                       Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Any comments that were not assigned to the same category were then
reconciled and adjudicated by the two analysts, which led to the comments
being placed into one or more of the resulting categories. Agreement
regarding each placement was reached between at least two analysts. All
initial disagreements regarding placement into categories were discussed
and reconciled. The responses in each category were then used in our
evaluation of how the Navy's experiences with rotational crewing have been
effectively managed and the effect of maintenance overseas on ships
homeported in the United States during extended deployments.

    Limitations of Focus Groups

Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the
extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population, (2)
develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make decisions
about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically representative
samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead, they are intended to
generate in-depth information about the focus group participants' reasons
for the attitudes held toward specific topics and to offer insights into
the range of concerns and support for an issue.

The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is
limited for several reasons. First, they represent the responses of Navy
ship officers and enlisted personnel from more than 40 selected groups.
Second, while the composition of the groups was designed to assure a
distribution of Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship
departments, the groups were not randomly sampled. Third, participants
were asked questions about their specific experiences with crew rotations.
The experiences of other Navy ship officers and personnel involved in crew
rotations, who did not participate in our focus group, may have varied.

Because of these limitations, we did not rely entirely on focus groups,
but rather used several different methodologies to corroborate and support
our conclusions to objectives two and three.

Appendix III: Summary List of Department of the Navy Guidance Implementing 10
U.S.C. 7310

Chief of Naval Operations

Naval Sea Systems Command

Department of the Navy guidance related to the implementation of Title 10,
United States Code, section 7310(a) restrictions on overseas maintenance,
or that define terms used in the law, is noted below.

Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4700.7K (July 2003), "Maintenance
Policy for U.S. Navy Ships," defines voyage repairs as "corrective
maintenance of mission-or safety-essential items necessary for a ship to
deploy or to continue on its deployment."

Naval Sea Systems Command Fleet Modernization Program Management and
Operations Manual (June 2002, Rev. 2), SL720-AA-MAN-010, Glossary, defines
voyage repairs as "emergency work necessary to repair damage sustained by
a ship to enable the ship to continue on its mission and which can be
accomplished without requiring a change in the ship's operating schedule
or the general streaming notice in effect."

  Military Sealift Command

Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 4700.15A (February 2,
2000), "Accomplishing Ship Repair in Foreign Shipyards," states that
voyage repairs include

o  	corrective maintenance on mission or safety essential items necessary
for a ship to deploy, to continue on its deployment, or comply with
regulatory requirements;

o  	scheduled maintenance, only to the extent that said maintenance is
absolutely necessary to ensure machinery and equipment operational
reliability or comply with regulatory requirements; and

o  	voyage repairs do not include corrective maintenance actions that may
be deferred until the next scheduled regular overhaul and drydocking
availability in the United States or Guam without degrading operational
readiness, habitability standards, or personnel safety, or adversely
impacting regulatory compliance.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

                                 See comment 1.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

                                 See comment 2.

                                 See comment 3.

                                 See comment 4.

                                 See comment 5.

                                 See comment 6.

                                 See comment 7.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

                                 See comment 8.

                                 See comment 9.

                                See comment 10.

                                See comment 11.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

  GAO's Comments

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter
dated October 25, 2004.

1. 	We have added a discussion of the methodology we used in our Sea Swap
destroyer reenlistment analysis. See appendix II.

2. No change needed in report.

3. No change needed in report.

4. 	We agree that expanded scope predeployment inspections and maintenance
for ships scheduled for extended deployments are prudent. We also agree
that ships scheduled for extended deployments would benefit from a clearly
defined process to delineate those increased requirements.

5. 	Our report noted that increased maintenance tasks contributed to
diminished crew morale. We agree with DOD's comment that many other
factors also contributed to the diminished morale for sailors crewing on
rotational crewing ships.

6. Our report did not recommend revising Title 10 requirements.

7. No change needed in report.

8. No change needed in report.

9. No change needed in report.

10. No change needed in report.

11. No change needed in report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

  GAO Contact Acknowledgments

(350383)

Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402

Jim Bancroft, Kelly Baumgartner, Larry Bridges, Lee Cooper, Corrie
Dodd-Burtch, Joseph Kirschbaum, Kate Lenane, Elizabeth Morris, Richard
Payne, Charles Perdue, Terry Richardson, Roderick Rodgers, Bill Russell,
Rebecca Shea, Jennifer Thomas, Julie Tremper, John Van Schaik, and R.K.
Wild made key contributions to this report.

GAO's Mission	The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation
and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO
documents at no cost

is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO postsGAO
Reports and newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its
Web site. To Testimony have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products
every afternoon, go to

www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone	The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548

To order by Phone:	Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

    To Report Fraud, Contact:
    Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: [email protected] Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional	Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125

Relations Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs	Susan Becker, Acting Manager, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548

           Presorted Standard Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00

United States
Government Accountability Office
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business
Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Service Requested
*** End of document. ***