    Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide
    Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational
    Crewing (10-NOV-04, GAO-05-10).

    The Navy has traditionally maintained overseas presence by
    deploying ships for 6 months. Rotating crews aboard ships that
    remain deployed for longer periods is an alternative the Navy
    could pursue to increase the utilization of ships. Senior Navy
    officials have also cited crew rotations as a way to reduce part
    of the Navy's plans for a larger force structure and reportedly
    free billions of dollars for other priorities. On its own
    initiative, GAO examined the Navy's efforts to evaluate and
    implement several rotational crewing options and the impacts of
    ship maintenance on extended rotational crewing deployments.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-10
        ACCNO:   A13373
      TITLE:     Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and
    Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship
    Rotational Crewing
         DATE:   11/10/2004
      SUBJECT:   Cost effectiveness analysis
    	     Data collection
    	     Data integrity
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Equipment maintenance
    	     Internal controls
    	     Maintenance (upkeep)
    	     Military cost control
    	     Military vessels
    	     Naval personnel
    	     Personnel management
    	     Ships
    	     Deployment at sea

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    GAO-05-10

                     United States Government Accountability Office

                         GAO Report to Congressional Committees

    November 2004

    FORCE STRUCTURE

         Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for
                      Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing

                                           a

    GAO-05-10

    [IMG]

    November 2004

    FORCE STRUCTURE

    Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for
    Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing

      What GAO Found

    The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews aboard
    surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible alternative to
    traditional 6-month ship deployments. To effectively institutionalize and
    implement change, best practices show that a comprehensive analytical
    framework provides useful information to decision makers. However, the
    Navy has not established such an analytical framework-consisting of formal
    measurable goals, objectives, and metrics-that could be used to assess the
    feasibility of various rotational crewing options and determine their
    impact on operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale.
    Further, the Navy has not systematically collected or developed accurate
    cost data to perform complete cost-effective analyses. Absent such
    information, the Navy may not know the full impact of rotating crews on
    surface ships, the extent to which the various options should be
    implemented, or whether it is getting maximum return on investment.

    Because rotating crews on surface ships is evolving as an alternative, the
    Navy has not provided effective guidance when implementing the practice
    and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned. Effective guidance
    and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to institutionalize
    change and facilitate efficient operations. While the Navy has
    well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for ballistic
    missile submarines that include appropriately documenting a ship's
    condition and turnover procedures for accountability, it has not provided
    comparable guidance to surface ships. As a result, the Navy unnecessarily
    risks repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and
    crew morale.

    Furthermore, the impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of
    rotational crewing has not been fully assessed. Effective maintenance
    strategies help ensure ships can perform their missions without adverse
    impacts on crew morale. It is a challenge to ensure the mission capability
    of ships that are deployed for longer periods because most maintenance and
    repair is usually completed between 6-month deployments. While rotating
    crews has enabled the Navy to keep ships deployed for up to 24 months, the
    service has not fully examined all issues related to the best maintenance
    strategies that could affect a ship's condition and crew's morale. Absent
    effective strategies, the Navy risks degrading long-term ship condition
    and discouraging crew support for rotational crewing.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

    Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    The Navy Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Feasibility and

    Cost-Effectiveness of Rotational Crewing for Surface Ships
    Navy Has Not Provided Effective Guidance or Capitalized on
    Lessons Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences
    Maintenance Strategies for Alternative Crewing and Potential

    Impacts Have Not Been Fully Assessed
    Conclusions
    Recommendations for Executive Action
    Agency Comments

                                           1

                                          3 6

    11

    21

    33 42 43 43

    Appendix I Ships Included in Our Evaluation

    Appendix II Scope and Methodology

    Appendix III	Summary List of Department of the Navy Guidance
    Implementing 10 U.S.C. 7310

    Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Tables

    Table 1: Comparison of Crewing Options during Deployments to the Persian
    Gulf 12

    Table 2: Selected Preliminary Lessons Learned Regarding the Material
    Condition of U.S.S. Fletcher during the Sea Swap Destroyer Initiative 31

    Table 3: Examples of Maintenance Problems on Patrol Coastal Ships 40 Table
    4: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform 59

    Figures

    Figure 1: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine 46
    Figure 2: The U.S.S. Fletcher, a Spruance-Class Destroyer 48 Figure 3: The
    U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-Class Guided

    Missile Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat

    Passing in the Foreground 49 Figure 4: The U.S.S. Firebolt, a
    Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal 50 Figure 5: The High Speed Vessel
    Experimental Craft, HSV-2 Swift 52 Figure 6: Design Depiction of the
    Navy's Next Generation

    Destroyer, DD(X) 53 Figure 7: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat
    Ship 55

    Abbreviations

    DD destroyer
    DD(X) next generation guided missile destroyer
    DDG guided missile destroyer
    DOD Department of Defense
    HSV high speed vessel

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

    November 10, 2004

    Congressional Committees

    The Navy's fleet of surface ships represents a significant capital
    investment to provide the forward presence desired. The Navy is also
    facing an affordability challenge as it invests in new ships, supports a
    high pace of operations, and manages rising personnel costs. The Navy has
    traditionally maintained overseas presence by using standard deployments
    whereby individual ships and their permanently assigned crews are deployed
    for approximately 6 months out of a 27-month cycle that includes time for
    training and ship maintenance. Rotating crews aboard ships so that the
    ships can remain deployed for a longer period is one of many alternatives
    the Navy could pursue to increase the utilization or the operational
    on-station days,1 or both, of Navy ships. Recently, senior Navy officials
    have also cited crew rotations as one of the ways to partially mitigate
    the need for a larger force structure and free billions of dollars for
    higher priority areas, such as the capabilities needed to operate from the
    sea when the United States is denied access to bases and ports abroad. As
    such, it is prudent for the Navy to employ its ships in a manner that
    maximizes its return on investment.

    The Navy has rotated crews on ships in several ways, although its use of
    this practice is not widespread and is still evolving. On its Ohio-class
    Trident ballistic missile submarines, the Navy has used a "Blue-Gold" crew
    concept since the 1960s, whereby two complete crews are assigned to a
    single hull and rotate deployments. In the 1990s, the Navy's Mine Warfare
    Command2 used a concept whereby four crews rotated among three ships
    throughout the deployment cycle. More recently, the U.S. Pacific Fleet3
    has

    1 Operational on-station days are defined as those days a ship spends
    forwardly deployed in the designated theater of operations.

    2 The Navy's Mine Warfare Command is responsible for developing and
    evaluating mine warfare doctrine, tactics, and equipment. The Command also
    ensures readiness of mine warfare forces to conduct offensive and
    defensive mine warfare operations through training and operational
    experience.

    3 The U.S. Pacific Fleet provides trained and combat-ready naval forces to
    combatant commanders. Pacific Fleet ships are at sea in the Pacific,
    Indian, and Arctic Oceans, from the west coast of the United States to the
    Arabian Gulf. The Pacific Fleet encompasses approximately 200 ships, 2,000
    aircraft, and over 239,000 sailors, Marines, and civilians.

    been demonstrating the ability to rotate crews on some of its destroyers
    as part of a "Sea Swap" demonstration project. Under this concept, there
    are the same numbers of crews as ships, but the crews rotate for 6 months
    to those ships that are forward deployed for extended periods of 18 months
    or more. The Navy is also using this concept on its patrol coastal ships
    operating in the Persian Gulf and the Blue-Gold concept to support the
    high speed vessel experimental ship, the HSV-2 Swift.

    We prepared this report under our oversight authority and are providing it
    to you because of your oversight on defense issues. Recognizing the Navy's
    need to explore ways for improving the use of its surface ships and its
    plan for employing rotational crews on several types of surface ships in
    the current and planned force (appendix I provides a description of all
    ships included in our evaluation), this report addresses the following
    questions: (1) Has the Navy systematically evaluated the feasibility,
    including the cost-effectiveness, of rotational crewing concepts for
    existing and future classes of surface ships? (2) Have the Navy's
    experiences with rotational crewing been effectively implemented? (3) How
    does ship maintenance affect implementation of rotational crewing?

    To assess whether the Navy has systematically evaluated the feasibility
    and cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing concepts for existing and
    future classes of surface ships, we reviewed rotational crewing studies
    performed by and for the Navy, including a recent study by the Center for
    Naval Analyses;4 compiled and analyzed sailor reenlistment data;
    interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy Headquarters and fleet
    officials; met with cost analysis experts in the government and the
    private sector; and reviewed key acquisition documents and crew employment
    plans. To assess whether the Navy has effectively implemented rotational
    crewing on surface ships and leveraged lessons learned, we conducted over
    40 focus group meetings with rotational crews; interviewed Pacific and
    Atlantic Fleet5 officials responsible for

    4 The Center for Naval Analyses is the Department of the Navy's Federally
    Funded Research and Development Center. The Center's analysts provide
    direct support to operating forces and senior staffs across the spectrum
    of Navy and Marine Corps activities.

    5 The mission of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet is to provide combat-ready naval
    forces and to ensure that those forces are supplied the leadership,
    manpower, equipment, maintenance, training, and material needed to perform
    their assigned missions. The Fleet commander determines readiness and
    training requirements for assigned forces and ensures that deploying units
    meet prescribed readiness standards.

    personnel, operations, maintenance, and training; and reviewed Navy
    Lessons Learned System instructions and queried the system to determine
    relevant lessons recorded. We used the strategic ballistic submarine
    community as a best practice based on its long-standing successful use of
    rotational crewing. To assess how maintenance on ships homeported in the
    United States might be affected by extended deployments, we reviewed ship
    maintenance directives and instructions, reviewed ship maintenance
    reports, and conducted focus group meetings with the three crews on the
    Arleigh Burke-class destroyers involved with the Sea Swap destroyer
    demonstration project and several crews that had rotated on patrol coastal
    ships.

    While we did not validate the maintenance reports and sailor reenlistment
    data used in this report, we discussed the data with DOD officials to
    determine that the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We
    did validate the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the data
    were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted our review from
    July 2003 through July 2004 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards. The scope and methodology used in our
    review are described in further detail in appendix II.

                                    Results in Brief

    The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews aboard
    surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible alternative to
    traditional 6-month ship deployments. However, the service has not
    institutionalized this change by employing a comprehensive analytical
    framework that will systematically evaluate all rotational crewing options
    for current and future classes of surface ships. Best practices show that
    an analytic framework that includes measurable goals and objectives,
    performance metrics, and evaluation plans helps decision makers
    effectively implement change. The Navy has developed some data to
    demonstrate that rotational crewing aboard surface ships is feasible for
    increasing the forward presence. But, the Navy has not established formal
    measurable goals, objectives, and metrics that would be used to assess
    each of the rotational crewing options to determine their impact on
    operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale. For example,
    one measure of crew morale is the reenlistment rate. While the Navy did
    not assess the rates for participants in rotational crewing, we found that
    reenlistments were generally lower on the Sea Swap guided missile
    destroyers compared to comparable Pacific Fleet ships. Further, the Navy
    has not systematically collected or developed accurate cost data in order
    to perform complete cost-effectiveness analyses. For example, cost
    assessments have been limited to identifying fuel savings resulting from

    fewer ship transits to and from homeports, costs for crew transportation
    and berthing, and some additional maintenance and training costs. A
    systematic cost-effectiveness assessment, according to cost analysis
    experts, should include all costs for each of the crewing alternatives,
    such as housing, training, maintenance, and ship acquisition costs. This
    capability and cost information is critical for comparing the different
    crewing options and evaluating which one most effectively meets specific
    operational requirements. In the absence of a systematic evaluation of the
    potential feasibility and cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing
    options for its current and future classes of surface ships, the Navy may
    make decisions without knowing the full impact of the practice on surface
    ships or the extent to which this practice should be implemented to meet
    operational requirements. Consequently, the Navy does not know that it is
    getting a maximum return on investment or the extent to which using
    rotational crewing can economically offset future ship total ownership
    costs.6

    The Navy's experiences with rotational crewing as an alternative to
    standard deployments are still evolving, and thus the Navy has not
    provided effective guidance for implementing the concept on surface ships
    and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned to support consistent
    management of the practice. Effective guidance and sharing of lessons
    learned are key tools used to institutionalize change and facilitate
    efficient operations. While the Navy has conducted some planning in
    support of rotational crewing on Sea Swap destroyers and has
    well-established crew rotation guidance for fleet ballistic missile
    submarines, it has not provided comparable guidance, including standard
    policies and procedures, to conduct rotational crewing on other surface
    ships. Consequently, management of rotational crewing on these ships has
    been left to ship commanders, resulting in inconsistent implementation and
    accountability. Further, the surface ship community has not capitalized on
    lessons learned from past and current crew rotation experiences. By not
    systematically recording and sharing lessons learned from its rotational
    crewing experiences aboard surface ships, the Navy unnecessarily risks
    repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew
    morale. For example, experiences have shown the need to properly account
    for inventories of equipment and supplies during crew turnover

    6 Total ownership costs include the costs to research, develop, acquire,
    own, operate, maintain, and dispose of weapon and support systems; the
    costs of other equipment and real property; the costs to recruit, retrain,
    separate, and otherwise support military and civilian personnel; and all
    other costs of DOD's business operations.

    that affect operations and general support of the crew, yet this inventory
    control problem during crew turnovers persists.

    The Navy has not fully assessed the impact of ship maintenance on the
    implementation of rotational crewing because it has been focused on
    demonstrating the feasibility of the practice and allowed different
    approaches to conducting maintenance without examining all related issues
    that could affect success. Effective maintenance strategies help to ensure
    that ships can perform their missions without adverse impacts on crew
    morale or incurring unintended consequences. It is a challenge to ensure
    the mission capability of ships that are deployed for longer periods (up
    to 24 months) because they must maintain mission capability while deployed
    and forego standard maintenance periods that generally occur every 6
    months. According to the Center for Naval Analyses, a more comprehensive
    Navy maintenance effort-including predeployment inspections and more
    overseas mission-essential repairs-was required to sustain the readiness
    of the two destroyers deployed in the Sea Swap demonstration project than
    is typical. Even with these extra efforts, the resulting impact on the
    condition of the ships was uncertain. Although the Center concluded that
    maintenance was adequate to sustain the ships at high readiness levels and
    that, upon return, the material condition of one of the demonstration
    ships was comparable to another recently deployed ship, Navy inspection
    data suggest otherwise. For example, we found that the Sea Swap ship had
    significantly more numerous deficiencies and lower inspection scores than
    the recently deployed ship. Because of the importance of maintenance, the
    Center concluded that if the demonstration project becomes a more standard
    practice, the Navy should review the maintenance process and assess
    maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs. We found the need
    for such an analysis was further supported by the experiences of other
    deployed ships using rotational crews, such as the patrol coastal ships.
    These ships did not receive such focused maintenance, and Navy officials
    identified several maintenance problems that were not corrected while
    deployed that could have affected the ships' mission capability. Moreover,
    the Center and our focus groups reported concerns about the extra workload
    to maintain ships at a high level of readiness. In the absence of
    effective strategies, the Navy runs the risk that it will degrade the
    long-term condition of ships as well as discourage crew support for
    rotational crewing.

    To ensure the Navy increases ship utilization in an effective and
    efficient manner, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct
    the Secretary of the Navy to systematically evaluate the feasibility and
    cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing alternatives; develop a

    rotational crewing program with effective management oversight, standard
    procedures, and lessons learned; and fully assess the maintenance
    strategies. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
    the recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the
    recommendations.

                                       Background

        The Importance of Having a Forward Military Presence Overseas

    Maintaining an overseas military presence that is prepared to deter
    threats and engage enemies remains an enduring tenet of U.S. national
    military strategy and priorities. For example, the National Military
    Strategy7 notes that an overseas presence supports the ability of the
    United States to project power against threats and support the
    establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions that foster
    extremist ideologies. The strategy also notes that keeping an overseas
    presence serves to assure U.S. allies; improves the ability to prosecute
    the global war on terrorism; deters, dissuades, and defeats other threats;
    and supports transformation. The Chief of Naval Operations earlier this
    year underscored the continuing importance of forward-deployed forces,
    noting "Our forward rotations remain critically important to our security,
    to strengthening alliances and coalitions, and to the global war on
    terrorism. But it is clear we must make these rotations with purpose, not
    just to fill the calendar."8

        Current Operational and Budgetary Pressures on Ship Procurement and
        Operational Accounts

    In early 2001, the Chief of Naval Operations recognized the challenge of
    accomplishing the Navy's missions within its budget. In February 2001, the
    Vice Chief of Naval Operations established a task force to explore force
    structure options facing the naval service, noting that in order for
    organizations to remain vital and competitive "they maintain their options
    and seek innovative developments that may provide simpler, more
    convenient, or less costly alternative solutions to their needs." One of
    the task force's primary assumptions was that the Navy leadership
    understands that there may be insufficient procurement funds available to
    maintain current fleet size. Another assumption was that the demand for

    7 "National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004 -A
    Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow," The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    8 Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
    before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, March 10, 2004.

    naval forward presence would remain greater than the supply, regardless of
    fleet size. Within a year, an operational studies group within the Office
    of the Chief of Naval Operations noted that the need for alternative
    crewing approaches might be necessary to sustain the pace of global
    operations, especially in the global war on terrorism.

    More recently, senior Navy officials have warned that budgets will remain
    tight. In June 2004, the Secretary of the Navy stated that DOD will have
    less money for recapitalization because the defense budget will not
    continue growing at the rates it has in recent years. The Navy's
    acquisition executive has also noted that the Navy is employing multiple
    strategies that eventually may reduce the number of ships, submarines, and
    aircraft it purchases, saving taxpayer dollars as it seeks more effective
    ways of employing its forces so that fewer of them can provide the
    capabilities needed to accomplish assigned missions.

        Rotating Crews Is a Part of Force Structure Assessment

    Traditional Ship Employment Cycle Provides Limited Time in Theater

    One such effort that may enable the Navy to sustain a high pace of
    operations within expected budgets involves the rotation of crews on and
    off forward-deployed Navy surface ships. While the Chief of Naval
    Operations stated earlier this year that the ideal fleet size would be
    about 375 ships, he also said that he is no longer willing to commit to
    any specific number of ships until the Navy completes a new assessment of
    ship requirements. The assessment, which started this year, will evaluate
    the potential impact on force structure requirements from keeping ships at
    sea for longer than standard 6-month deployments by rotating the crews on
    and off. He noted the Navy's recent experience with keeping two destroyers
    on extended deployments, whereby these two ships provided the presence
    overseas that is the equivalent of 8 to 10 ships on normal deployment
    schedules.

    The amount of time a ship ultimately spends forward deployed in a theater
    of operations is affected by several factors in its employment cycle.
    These factors include length of a deployment, transit speeds and port
    calls, crew training and certification, ship maintenance requirements, and
    maintaining sufficient readiness for surging forces during nondeployed
    periods. The result is that a ship homeported in the United States and
    deploying to the Persian Gulf area for 6 months will normally spend less
    than 20 percent of its time in theater and that the Navy would need about
    6 ships to maintain a continuous presence in the region over a 2-year
    period.

    As part of the transformation efforts to increase the fleet's operational
    readiness and responsiveness, the Navy recently implemented a new

                                  Ship Crewing Options

    operational strategy-called the Fleet Response Plan-that changes the
    manner in which it maintains, trains, mans, and deploys its ships. The
    overall objective of the plan is to create a more responsive force by
    sustaining a more level balance of training between deployments, instead
    of dropping to minimum rates of readiness upon return from deployment and
    then gradually rebuilding its state of readiness throughout a 12-month
    training cycle that follows major maintenance of the vessel. The plan also
    modifies long-standing forward presence policy of predictable, 6-month
    deployments to predetermined regions. This flexible deployment concept
    allows units that have attained high readiness to embark on deployments of
    varied duration-but still generally no longer than 6 months-in support of
    specific national priorities, such as homeland defense, multinational
    exercises, security cooperation events, deterrent operations, or
    prosecution of the global war on terrorism. These deployments provide what
    the Chief of Naval Operations calls "presence with a purpose," and are
    intended to occur in less predictable patterns to keep potential
    adversaries off guard.

    In addition to the standard ship and crew employment cycle, the range of
    Navy crewing options falls into four major categories: (1) Sea Swap, (2)
    Horizon, (3) Blue-Gold, and (4) partial or graduated crew swapping.9 Each
    of these options can be implemented in varying ways and may have different
    advantages and disadvantages, but the Navy's actual experience with
    nonstandard crewing concepts on surface ships is limited.

    Standard Crew Deployments

    Standard crew deployments use one crew per ship. Most of the crewmembers
    are assigned to the ship for 4 years, and it is common for crewmembers to
    deploy overseas on the same ship more than once. Standard ship deployments
    occur once every 27 months for a period of 6 months of which the ship and
    the crew are on-station for 3 to 4 months, depending upon whether the ship
    deploys from the east or west coast of

    9 For the purposes of this report, we are not including Navy ships
    operated by the Military Sealift Command and crewed by civilian mariners.
    The Command provides sea transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies and
    ammunition to sustain U.S. forces worldwide during peacetime and in war.

    the United States.10 Most Navy ships and their crews employ the standard
    crew deployment option.

    Sea Swap

    The Sea Swap option uses the same number of crews as ships. Notionally
    under this option, one of the ships deploys two, three, or four times
    longer than the standard time by rotating crews every 6 months at an
    overseas location. Ideally, all of the Sea Swap ships share an identical
    configuration, so crew performance and capability are not degraded because
    of ship differences.11 Because crews do not return to the ships on which
    they trained, under a four-ship Sea Swap option, some crews could serve on
    three different ships in just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate
    combat proficiency on each one. A limited number of destroyers and patrol
    coastal ships have employed the Sea Swap option in recent years.

    Horizon

    The Horizon option involves one or two more crews than hulls, such as four
    crews for three ships or five crews for three ships. Crews serve for no
    more than 6 months on ships that are deployed for 18 months or more. Under
    a three-ship Horizon option, crews could serve on at least two ships in
    just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat proficiency on
    each one. In addition, each crew would be without a ship for a period of
    time and stay ashore at a readiness, or training, center. This crewing
    option was employed on mine countermeasure ships during the 1990s.

    Blue-Gold

    The Blue-Gold option assigns two complete crews, designated "Blue" and
    "Gold," to a single ship. Most of the crewmembers are assigned to a ship
    for several years, and it is common for them to deploy overseas on the

    10 A ship based in San Diego, California, would spend a greater portion of
    its deployment intransit to the Persian Gulf-operating area than a ship
    based in Norfolk, Virginia, because of the distance. As a result, a ship
    based in San Diego may spend about 14 percent of its time in the Persian
    Gulf area whereas a ship based in Norfolk would spend closer to 20 percent
    of its time in the Persian Gulf area.

    11 Surface ships are continuously having their combat and other systems
    upgraded or replaced so maintaining "identical" configurations is a
    challenge. Also, despite surface ships with the same "design" being built
    within years of each other, no two ships are exactly alike and even more
    differences are likely when these ships are built in different shipyards.

    Rotational Crewing Believed to Provide Forward Presence Benefits

    same ship more than once. Crew deployments would not exceed 6 months and
    are often of much shorter duration. An advantage with this option includes
    the crews' familiarity with the ship. However, a disadvantage is that the
    proficiency can degrade since crews sometimes do not have a ship on which
    to train and must rely on mock-ups and simulators. The Blue-Gold option
    has been employed by the strategic submarine force and the

    12

    HSV-2 Swift.

    Partial or Graduated Crew Swapping

    Partial crew swapping has been employed on a limited basis. The most
    notable use of this option involved the exchange of crewmembers between a
    ship based in Japan with a ship based in the United States in 1999. A
    variation on this theme is when portions of a ship's crew are swapped out
    at regular intervals, for example, one-quarter of the crew every 2 or 3
    months.

    The most significant advantage attributed to rotational crewing options is
    the more efficient use of a ship in an overseas operating area. This is
    accomplished by keeping the ship on extended deployments, ranging from 12
    to 36 months or longer, while at the same time not increasing the crew's
    time away from home. Top Navy officials, including the Chief of Naval
    Operations, believe that increased efficiencies from rotating crews enable
    the Navy to perform the same number of missions with fewer ships or to
    increase the number of missions with the same force size. For example, the
    Navy's acquisition executive stated that if the Sea Swap option is
    employed on its next generation guided missile destroyer, the DD(X),13 the
    Navy might be able to reduce requirements from 24 to 16 ships and apply
    the savings toward the next generation cruiser.

    Disadvantages often associated with rotational crewing include increased
    infrastructure costs; deteriorating ship material condition and lack of
    ready access to maintenance support while on extended deployment;
    decreased readiness due to differences between ships; and decreased
    quality of life and other sociological issues for crew members, including
    the sense of less "ship ownership," fewer port calls, and cultural
    changes.

    12 The HSV-2 Swift is a high-speed aluminum-hulled catamaran acquired as
    an interim mine warfare command and control ship. For a picture and
    details on the ship, see appendix I.

    13 The DD(X) is the Navy's next generation, multimission destroyer,
    tailored for land attack missions.

    Recent Sea Swap Destroyer Demonstration Project Assesses Feasibility

    Key Commands Responsible for Implementing Rotational Crewing on Surface
    Ships

      The Navy Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Feasibility and
      Cost-Effectiveness of Rotational Crewing for Surface Ships

    The Navy recently conducted a 2-year demonstration to determine if two
    destroyers could (1) provide more deployment time on-station and (2)
    maintain sailor quality of life while rotating crews. The Navy declared
    the demonstration a success, stating that the ships operated well while
    increasing their operational capability. In its report on the Sea Swap
    demonstration project, the Center concluded that the feasibility of the
    concept clearly was a success.14 However, the Center noted that there were
    problems and limitations. While none of the problems was considered a
    showstopper, the Center stated that the Sea Swap demonstration afforded
    the opportunity to learn lessons in order to enhance the use of the
    practice in the future. Many of these, such as the need for improved
    accountability, oversight, and understanding of maintenance strategies,
    are discussed in this report.

    The Chief of Naval Operations has charged the Commander, Naval Surface
    Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, with being the primary proponent for
    demonstrating the feasibility of rotating crews on surface ships as well
    as assessing the cost of the various options and providing oversight and
    accountability. To date the Command's emphasis has been on using the Sea
    Swap demonstration as a "proof-of-concept" for rotational crewing. It
    provided the guidance implementing the concept, approved the assessment
    plan, and used Center support to collect and analyze some data. However,
    other commands are involved in implementing other rotational crewing
    options on surface ships; they include the Mine Warfare Command and the
    Amphibious Group Two Command. See appendix II for a more complete list of
    organizations involved.

    Although the Navy's senior leadership has initiated a change in how the
    Navy can operate in the future by demonstrating that rotational crewing is
    a feasible alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments, the Navy
    has not systematically evaluated the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of
    all rotational crewing options for its current and future classes of
    surface ships. The Navy has documented that rotational crewing helps to
    increase the forward presence of its ships beyond the traditional 6-month
    deployment periods, and officials have indicated that they want to make
    greater use of rotational crew options. While the Navy has conducted some
    limited assessments of the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration project, it
    has not developed a comprehensive common analytical framework to assess
    the potential impact of all rotational crewing options

    14 Center for Naval Analyses, Sea Swap Assessment (Alexandria, Virginia:
    September 2004).

    on the material condition of all of the ships, operational requirements,
    and the quality of life for crews.

    In addition, the Navy has not collected complete and consistent
    information that is critical for comparing different crewing alternatives
    for such factors as evaluating which alternative most cost-effectively
    meets specific requirements and warfighting effectiveness. In the absence
    of a common analytical framework, Navy officials assigned to ships that
    have used or experimented with crew rotations have been left to develop
    their own goals, objectives, and metrics and the results have to date been
    uneven. As a result, the Navy does not have complete and accurate data,
    including cost data that reflect total ownership and operating and support
    costs, readiness, and crew quality of life, making success or failure of
    the individual options involving different types of ships difficult to
    determine. In the absence of a systematic evaluation, the Navy also does
    not know the extent to which rotational crewing options can provide
    maximum return on investment and economically offset future ship total
    ownership costs.

    Navy Has Some Evidence The Navy has developed some data to demonstrate
    that rotational crewing to Show That Rotational helps to increase the
    forward presence of its ships beyond the traditional Crewing Increases
    6-month deployment periods. Table 1 shows the percentage of time a ship
    Forward Presence and Is would be notionally forward deployed during the
    employment cycle for

    each type of crew deployment option and the number of ships that
    wouldConsidering Greater Use be required to keep one vessel continuously
    operating in the Persian Gulf.

     Table 1: Comparison of Crewing Options during Deployments to the Persian Gulf

                                Percent of ship's     Number of ships required to
                                 employment cycle                    continuously
    Crewing option            forward deployed       keep one forward deployed
          Standard                             17
          Sea Swap                             24
          Horizon                              32
         Blue-Gold                             71                             1.5

                          Source: GAO's analysis of Navy data.

    Given such promise for improving deployment efficiencies, Surface Force
    Pacific Command15 officials have considered using rotational crewing
    options on other ships. For example, in July 2004, the Commander, Naval
    Surface Force, indicated plans to use the Sea Swap option on an
    Arleigh Burke-class destroyer based in the Atlantic Fleet and an
    expeditionary strike group based in the Pacific Fleet, during the spring
    and
    summer of 2005, respectively. In addition, Mine Warfare Command
    officials informed us in July 2004 that it intends to rotate crews on mine
    warfare ships based in the Persian Gulf later in the year, but it had not
    yet
    determined which option it will use.

    The Navy is also considering rotational crewing for operating future ships
    and, as a result, it could change the number of new ships that might be
    purchased. For example, the Navy is designing and procuring the littoral
    combat ship16 and the DD(X), which will cost billions of dollars. The Navy
    has suggested that if crew rotations with an expeditionary strike group
    are
    as successful as with the Sea Swap destroyers' demonstration,
    procurement plans for the number of the DD(X) destroyers can be
    reduced and the savings applied to other high priority ships.

        No Established Framework and Limited Information for Comparing Crew Rotation
        Options

    While the Center and the Surface Force Pacific Command have conducted some
    assessments of the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Navy did not have
    an analytical framework or collect the information that would be needed to
    assess and compare all crewing options. Lacking such a framework, the Navy
    has not systematically assessed the effect that rotational crewing has on
    such factors as the ships' material condition and readiness or crew
    quality of life and training. Additionally, the Navy has not
    systematically evaluated the cost-effectiveness of the various crewing
    options.

    15 Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, located in San
    Diego, California, ensures surface ships of the Pacific Fleet are properly
    trained, maintained, and crewed to support military operations. The
    Command is responsible for the readiness of 81 ships, including cruisers,
    destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships, logistics, and fleet
    support ships.

    16 The littoral combat ship will be a new class of Navy surface
    combatants. It is intended to be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable, and
    tailored for specific missions such as antisubmarine, antisurface, or mine
    warfare in heavily contested coastal area waters, and will use
    interchangeable mission modules tailored for specific missions.

    Analytic Framework Would Improve Ability to Evaluate Crewing Options

    Best practices show that an analytic framework that includes measurable
    goals and objectives, performance metrics, and evaluation plans17 would
    allow decision makers and others to receive consistent information needed
    to compare and assess different policy options, measure implementation
    progress, and determine whether the desired results were being achieved.
    Without such information for the various crewing options, Navy managers do
    not have a clear picture of the status of the crew rotation efforts,
    whether potential benefits from different crew rotations are being
    achieved, which option might be best in certain situations, and whether
    major issues need to be resolved.

    The Navy has not established formal criteria for evaluating the
    implementation of the various rotational crewing options because its focus
    has been on demonstrating the feasibility of the concept rather than on
    assessing and formalizing the options. For example, the Navy did not
    establish evaluation criteria prior to implementing Sea Swap, and none was
    identified in the Center's Sea Swap assessment plan. As a result, the
    Center lacked criteria for judging ship condition and crew quality of
    life. According to the Center's September 2004 report, the Navy had no
    intent to control the operational activities in the sense of a scientific
    experiment, where one notionally scores a probability of success or other
    such measure of effectiveness. It said the intent was that general
    conclusions about the feasibility and difficulties of pursuing the Sea
    Swap concept for future force employment planning would be drawn from the
    experiment. Moreover, the Navy did not have comparable assessments for the
    options employed on other ships such as the patrol coastal ships and the
    HSV-2 Swift.

    More common data and analyses are not available for comparison because, in
    the absence of a common analytical framework, individual commands using
    crew rotations have been able to decide on their own what (1) goals,
    objectives, and metrics to establish; (2) data to collect; and (3)
    evaluations to do, if any. Such goals, objectives, and metrics on ship
    condition and quality of life, which could affect crew retention, were not
    established prior to deployment, and complete information on these factors
    was not systematically collected during and after deployments. As a
    result, while the Navy has reported that the Sea Swap demonstration

    17 The Government Performance and Results Act offers a model for
    developing an
    effective management framework to improve the likelihood of implementing
    initiatives and
    assessing results.

    Material Condition of Ships Not Systematically Assessed

    project was a success for the destroyers involved, the Navy lacks clear
    criteria to objectively evaluate how well the project did and the
    project's potential against other rotational crewing options in two key
    areas we assessed-the condition of the ship and the crew's quality of
    life.

    The Sea Swap demonstration project collected data on ship condition that
    could be valuable. However, complete data were not systematically
    collected on the ships before deployment and there were no clear criteria
    for comparing the ships' condition upon return. For example, the Navy
    conducted a total ship readiness assessment of the U.S.S. Higgins, one of
    the two demonstration destroyers, in April 2004, shortly after the ship
    returned from its 18-month deployment. This post-deployment assessment of
    the combat, hull, mechanical, and electrical systems was used to compare
    the U.S.S. Higgins's material condition to the U.S.S. Decatur's. The
    U.S.S. Decatur, a guided missile destroyer, had recently completed a
    standard 6-month deployment. According to Surface Force officials, there
    was no significant difference between the two ships' material condition
    upon return. However, there is some disagreement about the criteria and
    interpretation of the data used in reaching this conclusion. This is
    discussed in more detail on pages 37-39. In its report, the Center
    cautioned that further analyses of ship material condition are needed.
    Comparable assessments of ship condition are not being performed on the
    U.S.S. Fletcher, the other Sea Swap destroyer on extended deployment.

    The Navy is missing an opportunity to collect data and more objectively
    assess the impact of extended deployments on ship condition. A more
    stringent independent inspection18 for the U.S.S. Higgins is scheduled in
    January 2005, about 8 months after its return from deployment and likely
    after having received significant shipyard maintenance and modernization.
    Furthermore, Surface Force officials also told us that a comparable
    preinactivation inspection, which is normally performed, would not be done

    18 Known as a trials and material inspection, this more stringent
    inspection is conducted by an independent Navy organization whose
    responsibilities include conducting material inspections of all naval
    ships at least once every 3 years, if practicable, for the purpose of
    determining and reporting upon a ship's fitness for further service and
    material conditions that limit her capability to carry out assigned
    missions and periodically ascertaining and reporting on the material
    condition and performance capabilities or limitations of Navy ships.

    Quality-of-Life Issues Not Fully Assessed

    on the U.S.S. Fletcher because it is being decommissioned and they do not
    want to spend the money.19

    An objective of Sea Swap was to maintain the crews' quality of life. The
    Center's study plan stated the Center would examine how the project
    improved or degraded the quality of life and quality of work for Navy
    personnel through surveys and interviews with crewmembers. However, the
    Navy did not establish goals for determining the quality-of-life success
    of the Sea Swap program. As a result, even though the Center had collected
    data on morale, it could not conclude whether Sea Swap had succeeded or
    failed in this regard. Also, the Navy has no plans to monitor crews'
    quality of life for the patrol coastal ships and the HSV-2 Swift. The need
    for such an analysis is borne out by the impact of crew morale on
    reenlistment rates.

    Quality of Life Is an Important Factor in Sailors' Career Choice

    Sailors' views of their quality of life is an important factor in
    determining whether they will choose to continue their military career.
    The Chief of Naval Operations has recognized the importance of people in
    making the Navy successful in performing its mission and has consistently
    made manpower and quality of service top priorities. According to the
    Chief, "Quality of work includes everything that makes your workplace a
    great place to be-from getting the spare parts you need in a timely manner
    to working spaces that are up to current standards."

    Sea Swap's Implementation May Have Been Key to Quality-of-Life Concerns

    Information collected by the Center, and by us during our review,
    indicated that implementation of the Sea Swap demonstration project had a
    negative effect on crewmember quality of life. While noting that Sea Swap
    had been successful technically, the Center's pre- and postsurveys of the
    crew showed that Sea Swap adversely affected morale because of the
    increased workload, fewer opportunities for liberty port calls, and
    crewmembers' general impression that the Sea Swap deployment was worse
    than their previous deployment. For example, the Center asked crews about
    their expectations for Sea Swap compared to

    19 Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4770.5F, May 29, 1991, "General
    Instructions for Inactive Ships and Craft," states that a Board of
    Inspection and Survey will inspect a ship to determine and document the
    material condition of the ship prior to inactivation.

    previous deployments. The survey results showed that 65 percent of the
    arriving crews expected that Sea Swap would be a worse experience than
    their last deployment and of departing crews; 84 percent said
    participating in Sea Swap was worse.

    Our focus groups with crews on the U.S.S. Higgins and the patrol coastal
    ships also revealed a negative quality of life. The Center and we both
    identified several factors that contributed to sailors' feelings,
    including workload, training and professional development opportunities,
    quantity and quality of port visits, and several sociological issues
    (e.g., culture, ship "ownership," sense of pride and recognition,
    predictability, or Navy tradition). The Center also noted that Navy
    leadership would need to understand which features of Sea Swap cause
    negative perceptions.

    We addressed quality-of-life issues in each of our 43 focus group
    meetings. All 26 of our focus group meetings with Sea Swap destroyer crews
    that served on the U.S.S. Higgins and with crews on patrol coastal ships
    attested to a highly negative quality of life, a decreased morale, and a
    strong desire to not participate on any more crew rotations implemented
    like their most recent experience. Many crewmembers indicated that
    rotational crewing might have had a more positive effect if the following
    conditions were met:

    o  	crew swapping had been better managed to ensure work accountability to
    reduce the workload,

    o  there had been time for individual training and professional
    development,

    o  promises had been kept on designated port calls,

    o  	port calls had been phased throughout the deployment instead of at the
    end when sailors just wanted to return home,

    o  return flight schedules had been better coordinated, and

    o  proper recognition had been given to each crew.

    A small number of crewmembers indicated that their Sea Swap experience was
    positive in that they liked knowing they would be on a finite deployment
    period of 6 months.

    In contrast, the 17 focus groups we conducted with Blue-Gold crewmembers
    from the HSV-2 Swift and the strategic submarine force found that these
    crewmembers had a generally positive crew rotation experience. They
    attributed their positive experiences to a level workload, management
    accountability, predictable schedules, individual training and
    professional development opportunities, and sufficient amounts of

    personal time during the interdeployment cycle, despite the ships' high
    operational tempo.

    Negative Morale Impacted Reenlistment Rates

    Lower reenlistment rates for sailors with less than 6 years of service20
    that served on Sea Swap guided missile destroyers and patrol coastal ships
    reinforced the Center's survey results and our focus group findings. Both
    Pacific Fleet and Surface Force Command officials identified reenlistment
    data as a key indicator of whether crews are satisfied with rotations. The
    Center's survey and our analysis showed that negative morale associated
    with participating in Sea Swap had an adverse impact on reenlistment
    rates. The Center's conclusion was based on a series of crew surveys.
    According to the Center,

    o  	55 percent of the crew said after the deployment that they thought
    that Sea Swap would make them less likely to stay in the Navy, versus 39
    percent before the deployment, and

    o  	73 percent stated that if all deployments were like Sea Swap, they
    would be less likely to stay in the Navy.

    Our analysis of overall reenlistment data for sailors with less than 6
    years
    of active service indicated that the crews on all three Arleigh
    Burke-class
    destroyers involved in the Sea Swap demonstration experienced
    50 percent reenlistment rates. These rates were below the Navy-wide
    reenlistment goal of 56 percent for this group and the actual 64 percent
    reenlistment rate for non-Sea Swap Arleigh Burke-class destroyers based
    in the Pacific Fleet.21 Because the first-term reenlistment rates for the
    three
    Sea Swap destroyer crews were as low as 23 to 37 percent during their
    Sea Swap cycle, these ships were among the few that did not meet the

    20 These sailors are commonly called first termers. These enlisted
    personnel eligible for reenlistment are from what DOD calls "Zone A" and
    cover reenlistments falling between 17 months and 6 years of active
    service. This group was selected as a proxy for crew morale because the
    personnel are less likely to reenlist if their experience is not good
    since they have little investment in a career at this point. Sailors with
    more than 6 years of experience are more likely to remain in the Navy.

    21 Based on our request, the Navy provided reenlistment data for all
    DDG-51 class ships by 6-month increments from 11/1/01 through 4/30/04. We
    excluded from our analysis two ships that experienced low reenlistment
    rates, the U.S.S. Milius, a ship experimenting with reduced manning, and
    the U.S.S. Paul Hamilton, a ship that was on an extended 10-month
    deployment, because we wanted to compare destroyers on normal deployments
    with destroyers in the Sea Swap initiative.

    Cost-Effectiveness of Crew Rotation Options Not Systematically Evaluated

    Navy-wide reenlistment goal. If the Navy expands rotational crewing with
    out understanding its full impact on crews, the results could affect
    retention and crew support.

    The Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and Navy commands using crew
    rotations have not systematically collected cost data for assessing the
    return on investment or cost-effectiveness of all surface ship rotational
    crewing options for current and future ships. The Navy testified to the
    Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 2002 that it would determine
    the true cost and potential savings of one rotational crewing option, Sea
    Swap, to provide a firm analytical basis in order to decide whether to
    expand use of that option or look for other alternatives.22 Recently, the
    Commander, Naval Surface Force, initiated a limited effort to collect and
    model costs. However, to date, data collection and analyses comparing the
    cost of all the crew rotation options have not been completed.
    Cost-effectiveness is a method used by organizations seeking to gain the
    best value for their money and to achieve operational requirements while
    balancing costs, schedules, performance, and risks. The best value is
    often not readily apparent and requires an analysis to maximize value. A
    cost-effectiveness analysis is used where benefits cannot be expressed in
    monetary terms but, rather, in "units of benefit," for example, days of
    forward presence. Such an analysis would be of particular importance when
    making return on investment decisions about how many ships to buy and how
    to operate them.

    Moreover, officials in DOD's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
    told us that they have not conducted a basic cost-effectiveness analysis
    of rotational crewing alternatives. Nonetheless, they believe that
    rotational crewing is a good concept, that the Navy needs to perform these
    analyses, and that they were not aware of any such analyses having been
    conducted in the Navy. The Naval Cost Analysis Division cited DOD cost
    analysis guidance and procedures that would be applicable to a
    cost-effectiveness study of rotational crewing alternatives.23 According
    to Division officials, this guidance is to be used as the basis for
    preparing program life-cycle cost estimates, and provides information on
    the scope of the cost analysis,

    22 "Navy On-Station Enhancement Options," Statement of Rear Admiral (Lower
    Half) Miles B. Wachendorf, U.S. Navy, Director, Strategy & Policy
    Division, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sea Power
    Subcommittee (March 19, 2002).

    23 Department of Defense Manual 5000.4-M, "Cost Analysis Guidance and
    Procedures," December 1992.

    the procedures, and the presentation of the estimates. Division officials
    also told us they have not participated in any rotational crewing
    cost-effectiveness studies nor are they aware of any. Officials in both
    DOD and Navy offices indicated that the cost analyses for crew rotation
    alternatives should include the development of a cost structure for
    identifying all the relevant cost elements in the program, including depot
    level maintenance, fuel, training, infrastructure costs, and other costs
    unique to the program.

    While Surface Force Pacific officials had developed limited information on
    costs and savings unique to the Sea Swap destroyers, it was not complete,
    and they have not developed comparable data for the patrol coastal ships
    and the HSV-2 Swift. Examples of information collected included the
    estimated fuel savings from ship transits that were not needed;
    transportation, room and board for flying the crews to turnover cities;
    and special training. These officials told us that they plan to collect
    additional data to help evaluate Sea Swap costs, but that they are still
    determining what cost data should be collected and how to establish a
    baseline for control group comparison purposes. Furthermore, they told us
    that collection of the data will be challenging because there is no
    central database or automated system for coding rotational crewing-related
    expenses that could be used for documenting the unique costs associated
    with rotational crewing. The officials were also concerned that Navy
    management and accounting data systems are not integrated, making it
    difficult to collect complete and actual cost information that could be
    helpful in identifying the costs of the Sea Swap initiative.

    Surface Force Pacific officials have also determined that they have
    responsibility for assessing the costs of crew rotation in the patrol
    coastal ships as well, but they had not been doing so. Amphibious Group
    Two24 officials told us in October 2003 that they have not systematically
    evaluated costs and are not aware of any cost-effectiveness analyses of
    rotational crewing being conducted. Surface Force officials said that more
    complete costs for patrol coastal ships have to be collected and analyzed
    to allow for cost-effective comparisons.

    24 Amphibious Group Two provides squadrons, ships, and supporting elements
    that are manned, trained, and materially and operationally ready to
    deploy. The Group, part of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, is located in Norfolk,
    Virginia. The Group has responsibility for the patrol coastal ships.

    Notwithstanding the limitations in the available cost data, Naval Surface
    Force Pacific officials told us they recently developed and are refining a
    model that presents information that is more comprehensive. For example,
    in a July 14, 2004, briefing, the Force's commanding officer presented
    costs of the Sea Swap demonstration, including a cost comparison for both
    the U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins to other ships in their
    respective classes, including the average costs per deployed day. Surface
    Force Pacific officials said that this model is also used to present
    similar data for the future littoral combat ship. However, we were
    informed that much of the data used in the model is based on estimates
    rather than actual costs and that some costs integral to evaluating
    rotational crewing options, such as maintenance and training
    infrastructure, were not included. Furthermore, the model has not been
    tested or validated by the Navy.

      Navy Has Not Provided Effective Guidance or Capitalized on Lessons Learned
      from Rotational Crewing Experiences

    The Navy has done some planning in support of rotational crewing on
    surface ships, such as for the Sea Swap demonstration project, but because
    the concept is evolving as an alternative, the service has not provided
    effective guidance during implementation on all ships to ensure proper
    oversight and accountability. Furthermore, the Navy has not systematically
    leveraged lessons learned to effectively support rotational crewing.
    Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key management tools
    to overcome challenges associated with institutionalizing change and
    facilitating efficient operations. The Navy has well-established crew
    rotation policies and procedures for ballistic missile submarines for use
    as best practices that include appropriately documenting the ship's
    condition and using advanced teams to help prepare for crew turnover and
    help ensure accountability. However, the Navy has not provided comparable
    guidance with policies and procedures to ensure proper crew turnover and
    accountability to all surface ships using rotational crewing.
    Consequently, the management of surface ship crew rotations has been
    informally delegated to each ship's incoming and outgoing commanding
    officers. This has resulted in inconsistent management of and
    accountability for operational factors, such as the ship's condition and
    ship inventories, when one crew replaces another. In addition, the surface
    ship community has not systematically collected, recorded, or disseminated
    lessons learned from all rotational crewing experiences. Although the Navy
    has a formal system to record lessons learned from fleet operations,
    experiences from crew rotations are not being recorded in the system so
    that they could be routinely shared among the surface ships and commands
    using rotational crewing. As a result, the

    Navy unnecessarily risks repeating past mistakes that could decrease
    warfighting effectiveness and crew morale.

        Navy Conducted Some Planning in Support of Rotational Crewing

    Submarine Community Has Established Planning Elements

    Because rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments
    differs from the traditional 6-month ship deployment, it is important that
    planning be effective to increase institutional knowledge and gain
    acceptance for implementing the change. The Navy has performed extensive
    planning in support of rotational crewing on ballistic missile submarines.
    However, crew rotation planning for the surface ship community has been
    limited and less formal.

    The submarine community has a well-established concept for conducting
    Blue-Gold crew rotations, based on 40 years of experience on fleet
    ballistic missile submarines. As a result, we analyzed the community's
    concepts, procedures, and processes to identify "best practices." We found
    that three key elements of this concept are

    o  formalized turnover policies and procedures;

    o  a training plan that maintains proficiency of crews that are in port;
    and

    o  a maintenance plan that includes crew and incremental maintenance.

    Formalized Crew Rotation Turnover Policies and Procedures Help Ensure
    Accountability

    The Navy's Submarine Forces Command developed formal policies and
    procedures for crew turnover in order to develop a comprehensive status of
    a ship's material condition and accountability of controlled material and
    documents, scheduled maintenance, and supply. The turnover process takes
    place over 2 to 3 days, during which the on-coming crewmembers from each
    department and division meet with their off-going counterparts to review
    detailed turnover checklists that cover issues such as personnel,
    training, administration, maintenance logs, classified material, ship
    operational funds, parts, and food supplies. For example, both crews
    review the status of preventative and corrective maintenance repairs that
    are recorded in equipment status logs, which help document the material
    condition of the ship. This information is passed from one crew to another
    during turnover to maintain continuity of maintenance. Both crews also
    review an inventory of provisions, medicines, hazardous material, and
    information technology equipment. Crewmembers from both crews are required
    to sign the checklists, and the two ship commanders are ultimately
    responsible for ensuring accountability of the material

    condition of the ship. By taking these steps, the on-coming ship command
    has the opportunity to note unsatisfactory conditions-including
    significant personnel, training, operational readiness, habitability, and
    material deficiency issues-on an exchange-of-command report. Turnovers can
    be delayed if both crews do not agree on the ship's material status.
    Members from one crew we met mentioned that they take pride in conducting
    the turnover because they want to set the standard for their partner crew.

    Training Programs Maintain Proficiency of the Crew While Ashore

    Maintaining the operational proficiency of the crew that is in port
    without a submarine is the main challenge to the strategic submarine's
    Blue-Gold system. In response, the strategic submarine force has developed
    a training program to maintain crew proficiency in core competencies while
    ashore. This program is designed to update crews on recent procedural
    changes, allow crews to perform maintenance operations, and refresh
    personnel who have been away from their duties for several months. Crews
    receive classroom instruction and maintain their skills in simulators at
    the Trident Training Facility.25 Crews are monitored and evaluated through
    graded individual and group exercises. Officers and crewmembers stated
    that they generally received adequate and sufficient training at the
    training facility to perform their mission. Nevertheless, they stated that
    simulated training is not the same as training on a ship and that crew
    readiness is lower during the first week of deployment as they try to
    refamiliarize themselves with the ship and their mission.

    Crew and Incremental Maintenance Plan Designed for Rotational Crewing

    The ballistic missile submarine maintenance concept was specifically
    designed to accomplish incremental maintenance over a 42-year life cycle.
    The concept consists of crews working together to conduct maintenance
    repairs and incremental maintenance that is planned or unplanned
    corrective maintenance during an in-port maintenance period.

    The submarine community has formal guidance for the in-port maintenance
    period during which both crews jointly conduct maintenance

    25 The Trident Training Facility provides basic, advanced, functional,
    refresher, and team training to ballistic missile submarine officers and
    crews in order to build competence and proficiency in operating and
    maintaining these submarines.

    Limited Planning for Surface Ship Crew Rotations

    repairs.26 One main purpose is to enhance the efficiency and productivity
    of the maintenance period. During this time, both crews operate under one
    chain of command; the off-going crew reports directly to the on-coming
    ship commander. Once the submarine is at sea, the off-crew works with the
    maintenance facility and the on-crew to develop a work package of needed
    preventive and corrective maintenance repairs. As a result, during the
    next in-port maintenance period the crew that has just taken command knows
    what to expect. Officers and crewmembers in our focus groups stated that
    this approach was key to completing required maintenance repairs in a
    short period. It also helps ensure that items that may not have been
    captured during turnover are identified according to officers on one
    submarine. In addition, crews stated that this concept decreases the
    incentives for pushing off work to the other crew because both crews
    conduct the needed maintenance repairs.

    The incremental maintenance plan involves routine maintenance based on a
    set schedule common to all submarines and corrective repairs, which
    include those items that break or are in a degraded condition as a result
    of operations. The Trident Planned Equipment Replacement Program, another
    aspect of incremental maintenance, provides for repairs on hull,
    mechanical, electrical, or combat control system equipment that require
    maintenance beyond the ability of the ship's crew. The incremental
    overhaul relies on an extensive shore-based maintenance infrastructure,
    including dedicated full-time maintenance personnel, maintenance
    facilities that provide a full range of repair and maintenance services,
    and dry docks that provide the support necessary to conduct required
    equipment repairs and replacements.

    Despite the challenges of implementing this change in crewing practice,
    the surface ship community's planning in support of crew rotations has
    been less formal and limited to several areas, including crew training on
    different systems used on participating ships, use of advanced crew
    turnover teams, and location and timing of port calls. Crews in our focus
    groups also identified some limitations to these planning efforts.

    26 This concept is generally referred to as an "integrated crew refit."

    Planned Training for Different Equipment and Systems between Ships Had
    Limitations

    A Naval Warfare College study of several crew rotation options identified
    the crew's unfamiliarity with equipment and systems between different
    ships as a potential challenge for conducting the program. As part of the
    Sea Swap demonstration project, the Commander, Naval Surface Force, sought
    to address differences in ship design, construction, and modernization
    between forward-deployed and nondeployed ships by providing crews with
    predeployment training specific to the forwarddeployed ship they would
    join.27 The Command planned for the training to account for many of the
    differences between the destroyers, with emphasis on training systems and
    equipment on the forward-deployed ship, and set-up training classes in the
    United States and Sea Swap cities.28 For example, one on-coming crew
    received training to ensure its proficiency in areas such as critical
    weapons systems and engineering prior to the ship's turnover. Amphibious
    Group Two also provided training to patrol coastal ship crews to help them
    bridge the engineering differences they would face on the deployed ship.

    However, in our focus group discussions, ship crews participating in Sea
    Swap and on the patrol coastal ships cited concerns about the adequacy of
    this training. The crewmembers indicated that proficiency improved with
    practice drills, but sufficient proficiency was not achieved prior to
    deploying, even though they had received their certifications. The delay
    in achieving proficiency was accentuated for the crew that swapped in the
    Persian Gulf because the crewmembers did not have the opportunity during a
    transit to become familiar with their new ship. For example, crewmembers
    for one ship stated that they only received partial training for operating
    a new radio that is necessary for conducting strike operations. This
    partial training degraded the crew's ability to shoot Tomahawk land attack
    missiles. Crewmembers also stated that they did not receive training to
    operate damage control radios, which meant the crew would have been unable
    to use the radios in an emergency.

    Patrol coastal ship crewmembers also indicated that they faced challenges
    in training to operate the deployed ship's different equipment. For
    example, crewmembers stated they did not receive weapons training for

    27 This type of training is commonly called difference training. 28 Sea
    Swap cities are the cities where destroyer crew rotations took place.

    Stinger missiles prior to overseas deployment because these weapons
    systems are not typically used while on deployment in the United States.
    Patrol coastal ship focus group comments revealed that the crews
    compensated for training deficiencies with self-initiated training during
    deployment. These crews also received some training from the Coast Guard
    while in theater. They felt the deficiencies in training on different
    systems compromised their ability to perform their respective mission.

    Value of Some Advanced Turnover Teams Was Limited

    The Surface Force Pacific Command established advance turnover teams to
    assist ships participating in the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration
    project, but their assistance was sometimes constrained. These teams were
    comprised of approximately 15 to 20 members of the on-coming crew who were
    sent to the forward-deployed ship 2 weeks in advance of the turnover to
    conduct inventories and observe ship operations. The use of an advanced
    turnover team was an effort to expedite the turnover process from one crew
    to another. A Command official cited the work performed by these teams as
    instrumental in reducing the amount of time required for the turnover as
    well as for increasing their familiarity with the new ship. However,
    crewmembers in our focus groups stated that advance teams were not as
    effective as they could have been in some turnovers because they were
    denied access to areas and equipment in the ship at the time of turnovers.
    For example, a regional support office assumed control of a Sea Swap
    destroyer in the United States, locked up the workspaces, and did not
    grant the advance team access. In another instance, the advance team
    arriving on the ship overseas was not given access until the new crew
    assumed responsibility for the ship, which limited the team's time and
    ability to expedite an effective turnover.

        Navy Crew Rotation Efforts Have Lacked Standard Guidance to Ensure Oversight
        and Accountability

    The Navy's implementation of surface ship crew rotation efforts lacked
    effective guidance to ensure oversight and accountability. Because the
    practice differs from the traditional crewing approach, such guidance is a
    key to ensuring successful implementation. In the absence of such
    guidance, including standard policies and procedures similar to those used
    in the ballistic missile submarine community, officers and crews on Sea
    Swap destroyers, patrol coastal ships, and the HSV-2 Swift developed their
    own turnover procedures. This caused inconsistency between crews
    conducting the turnovers, which in turn, led to problems in documenting
    ship condition and accounting for ship inventories. As a result, surface
    ship crews cited the need to develop and implement standard turnover
    procedures, including checklists.

    Crewmembers said there was no document to sign during the turnover to hold
    crews accountable for recording necessary maintenance repairs. For
    example, crews reported that Navy systems for tracking maintenance
    requirements and accomplishments were not systematically used to record
    maintenance repairs. Officers and enlisted crews on Sea Swap destroyers
    and patrol coastal ships indicated that, as a result, the ship maintenance
    logs did not accurately reflect the material status of the ships. One Sea
    Swap crew reported that the prior crew did not document that the
    forward-fueling station had a hole, which took the entire deployment to

    fix. In another instance, one crew stated that although three portable
    fire pumps were required to be on board the vessel, the crew only found
    two pumps, of which only one worked. Additionally, a patrol coastal ship
    crew indicated that the previous crew reported only a few needed
    maintenance repairs in the maintenance log. However, after turnover, the
    on-coming crew said that it noted about 50 repair items, including all 6
    main engines that could not operate simultaneously. In another case, the
    electronic preventive maintenance log was not working during turnover,
    which the on-coming crew reportedly spent 3 weeks in repairs to make it
    function.

    A ship commander mentioned that there is a challenge associated with
    properly tracking maintenance logs, which are not valued by all crews.
    Those logs can be valuable tools when used, but he stated that the
    maintenance logs did not reflect the material status of the ship. Some
    patrol coastal ship officers stated that every crew emphasizes different
    maintenance priorities, which can contribute to perceptions of inadequate
    material condition of the ship during and after turnover. Notwithstanding
    different perceptions of the material condition of the ship, Sea Swap and
    patrol coastal ship crewmembers raised concerns about the lack of
    accountability, in particular oversight of documenting the material
    condition of the ship. Crewmembers from the Sea Swap destroyers and patrol
    coastal ships cited the need to establish turnover standards and
    checklists and to conduct an independent inspection to monitor the
    turnover and review the material condition of the ship.

    Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship crews also mentioned that accountability
    for ship inventories was inadequate. Naval supply guidance cites the need
    to conduct physical inventories of equipment and materials to the extent
    necessary to ensure effective control of those materials normally required
    for performing the mission or which require special management

    attention.29 Crewmembers told us that guidance on conducting inventories
    was not always followed in preparation for and during turnovers. Some
    crews mentioned that the time to review supply inventories, a
    time-consuming activity during turnover, was a problem. There were several
    instances on Sea Swap destroyers of missing equipment- maintenance
    assistance modules estimated at $90,000-and tools. One Sea Swap destroyer
    crew also reported that the crew discovered during an inventory a pair of
    missing night vision goggles. In another case, the oncoming crew lacked
    basic supplies, such as cleaning materials, light bulbs, and toilet paper.
    Crewmembers also reported items missing on their assigned ships upon
    return that were not identified during turnover. In another example,
    crewmembers of a patrol coastal ship crew stated that, upon return to the
    United States, they found that 10,000 rounds of ammunition were missing on
    their assigned ship. Sea Swap destroyer and patrol coastal ship crews
    cited the need for an independent authority to hold crews accountable for
    ship inventories.

        Surface Ship Community Did Not Capitalize on Past and Current Lessons
        Learned

    Navy Lessons Learned System Created as a Central Repository to Preclude
    the Loss of Knowledge

    The surface ship community also has not capitalized on existing and
    evolving lessons learned to more effectively plan and conduct crew
    rotations. Capturing and sharing such lessons serve to further
    institutionalize change by improving its implementation. While the Navy
    has a formal system to record lessons learned, experiences from current
    rotational crewing efforts are not being systematically collected and
    recorded in that system. As a result, the Navy is missing an opportunity
    to record lessons learned that could be leveraged by crews involved in
    current and future crew rotation experiences. Further, surface ships and
    commands have not capitalized on the lessons learned in the system to plan
    and conduct crew rotations. Consequently, crews experienced similar
    difficulties to those that the previously recorded lessons learned sought
    to correct.

    The Navy created a lessons learned database in 1991 to provide a system
    for units to benefit from collective Navy experiences, identify
    deficiencies, and take corrective measures in all aspects of fleet
    operations. A lesson learned is defined as information that increases the
    efficiency of Navy processes and improves the execution of future
    operations. According to

    29 Examples include classified and hazardous items, security type medical
    supplies such as narcotics, laptop computers, depot level repairables, and
    maintenance assistance modules.

    Surface Ship Commands Have Not Made Systematic Efforts to Collect and
    Record Lessons Learned for the Navy's Central System

    the Navy, it should provide value to existing Navy policy, doctrine,
    tactics, techniques, procedures, organization, training, systems, or
    equipment.30

    The Navy Warfare Development Command is responsible for administering the
    system, and its officials indicated that information for current
    rotational crewing efforts should be submitted to the system, as it is the
    best way for lessons to be shared across the Navy community. Anyone in the
    Navy can submit a lessons learned report through the immediate chain of
    command. Fleet commands process and validate the proposed report, which is
    then forwarded to be officially entered into the system. Navy personnel
    ashore and at sea can access lessons learned contained in the system
    through a classified Internet site.31 Use of this central repository would
    preclude the loss of lessons, such as those lost by the Mine Warfare
    Command in the late 1990s due to a computer failure.

    The Naval Surface Force Command recognized the need for a comprehensive
    list of lessons learned in order to examine the Sea Swap initiative, but
    the Command has not made a systematic effort to collect or record lessons
    learned, nor did it task Sea Swap crews to identify and submit them. Aside
    from 78 lessons learned pertaining to crew rotations that took place in
    1999 on Forward Deployed Naval Forces32 in the Seventh Fleet area of
    operations, no lessons learned directly related to crew rotations had been
    posted regarding the Sea Swap destroyers, patrol coastal ships, and HSV
    Swift experiences as of July 30, 2004. Absent guidance, Sea Swap crews'
    efforts to record lessons learned have been inconsistent. Some crews
    developed lists of lessons learned that were distributed to other
    rotational crews and the Command, including some that related to manning,
    personnel, supply, predeployment maintenance, training, turnover
    preparations and execution, turnover time, and advance

    30 Criteria for submitting a lesson learned include one or more of the
    following: (1) identify problem areas, issues, or requirements, and if
    known, recommend solutions; (2) contribute new information on existing or
    experimental tactics, techniques, procedures, policy, or doctrine; (3)
    provide an innovative technique or a procedure that successfully
    accomplishes the task; and/or (4) provide information of interest in
    planning, execution, application, or employment of an organization,
    system, process, or procedure.

    31 The site can be accessed from the Command Web page at
    www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil.

    32 Ships homeported overseas are considered part of the Forward Deployed
    Naval Forces. This force structure is negotiated with each respective host
    nation, with each host nation having ultimate decision authority regarding
    U.S. vessels assigned to their port. Therefore, if ships on extended
    deployment were considered homeported overseas, negotiations with the
    pertinent host nation would be required prior to starting each deployment.

    parties. In one case, a Sea Swap ship undertook a concerted effort to
    document lessons learned prior to deployment, but a majority of those
    documents were later discarded because the crew wanted to create
    additional workspace. By not systematically recording and providing
    valuable experiences from crew rotations to the Navy Lessons Learned
    System, the Navy is missing an opportunity to more effectively plan and
    conduct current and future crew rotations.

    In response to a Senate Armed Services Committee request on the status of
    one of the Sea Swap ships,33 the Command identified a preliminary set of
    lessons learned as shown in table 2.

    33 S. Rept. No. 108-46, at 309 (2003).

    Table 2: Selected Preliminary Lessons Learned Regarding the Material
    Condition of U.S.S. Fletcher during the Sea Swap Destroyer Initiative

    Topic Issue

    More efficient forward presence	A standard deployment of a ship from San
    Diego to the Central Command requires a 40-day period (30 days transiting
    and 10 days of quality-of-life port calls) at the start and end of a
    deployment. Given a normal, 180-day deployment, this provides 100 days of
    overseas presence in the Central Command per crew. The lesson learned was
    that by employing Sea Swap and conducting only one transit to the Central
    Command and one return to San Diego, the four crews rotating on the U.S.S.
    Fletcher will provide 518 days of forward presence. To achieve this number
    with standard deployments, five-plus ships would have had to deploy.

    Crew training certifications	Sea Swap crews conducted their predeployment
    training and achieved their certifications on their own hulls, prior to
    turnover. These certifications remained with the crew. The lesson learned
    was that Sea Swap crews met all operational taskings; therefore, the
    certifications should remain with the crews, not tied to the hull.

    Naval cultural issues 	There is a sense of ownership that a crew feels for
    their ship. Sea Swap has personnel leaving their ship for another of the
    same class. The lesson learned was the need to fully educate the crew on
    the overall benefits of participating in an experiment such as Sea Swap
    and ensure a positive attitude of the crew.

    Maintenance of the forward-deployed ship	Casualty reports are tracking on
    both classes of ships involved in Sea Swap and are compared to previous
    ships of both classes. The numbers of those reports have spiked each time
    a new crew embarks but have settled following a short period. The lesson
    learned was that the spikes that occur when a crew assumes the ship are
    somewhat expected due to new eyes reviewing the equipment.

    Follow-on orders for Sea Swap crews 	As Sea Swap crews would assume the
    hull of the crew who had just relieved them, it was necessary to change
    their code. Detailed coordination was required with the Bureau of Naval
    Personnel to ensure personnel with incoming orders went to the proper crew
    as they rotated ships. The lesson learned was that early and detailed
    coordination is mandatory.

    Source: Naval Surface Force Pacific Command.

    A final report will be provided to the Committee once the initiative is
    completed. None of these lessons learned from the Sea Swap initiative have
    been reported to the Navy Lessons Learned System.

    Efforts to gather lessons learned in the patrol coastal community have
    been inconsistent. Amphibious Group Two similarly did not provide
    direction to collect and record lessons learned and stated that crews
    involved in rotations passed on lessons learned to one another. A patrol
    coastal ship commander stated that crew efforts to gather lessons learned
    were informal. We identified one lessons learned report sent by a ship
    commander to the ship's command, Amphibious Group Two, that contained
    lessons related to maintenance funding, ownership, and maintaining good
    ship inventories. However, none of these lessons learned had been recorded
    in the Navy Lessons Learned System as of July 30, 2004.

    Many Past Lessons Learned Available in Formal System Are Not Being
    Systematically Leveraged

    The Mine Warfare Command directed the HSV-2 Swift commanding officers to
    develop lessons learned reports on five issues. Only two of those lessons
    learned reports had been posted to the Navy Lessons Learned System as of
    July 30, 2004, and neither addressed ship crewing issues.

    The surface ship community has not capitalized on the Navy lessons learned
    database to plan and conduct crew rotations. A Naval Surface Force Pacific
    Command official told us that the Command did not systematically solicit
    available lessons learned from the Navy Lessons Learned System to help
    plan for crew rotations. We found that participants in our focus groups
    reported experiencing similar problems that several of the formal lessons
    learned reported by the Forward Deployed Naval Forces in 1999 had
    addressed. For example, two important lessons not leveraged were

    o  	reviewing the automated process for the transfer of crew
    identification codes when assigned to a new ship and

    o  	establishing and abiding by a written agreement between both ship
    commanders that clearly defines transfer and accountability procedures for
    equipment turnover.

    When crews for Forward Deployed Naval Forces were rotated in 1999, the
    Navy recognized that the ships were not timely in properly updating
    crewmembers' records to show the ship to which crewmembers were assigned.
    This resulted in incorrect enlisted master files and the inability to
    process pay transactions. The lesson learned report stated that the Navy
    should instantly transfer personnel from one code to another automatically
    in a timely manner, which is crucial to avoid incorrect master files and
    the potential loss of certain pay and entitlements. Numerous Sea Swap
    destroyer, patrol coastal ship, and HSV-2 Swift officers and crews we met
    experienced similar difficulties. They reported that because their
    respective code was not changed to reflect they had changed ships, some
    crewmembers experienced problems receiving pay and others were ordered to
    the wrong ship. Officers and crew from a Sea Swap ship stated that
    creating codes for each crew would help alleviate similar problems.
    Assigning crews codes is a standard practice in the ballistic missile
    submarine community. This practice was also used by the mine warfare
    community during their crew rotations in the mid-1990s. The systematic use
    of an effective lessons learned system could have alerted the Navy to the
    need for a mechanism to ensure the effective transfer of crews and ships
    from one code to another in a timely and an accurate manner.

    Establishing and abiding by written agreements between both ship
    commanders involved in a crew rotation enable both crews early in the
    planning phase to determine what equipment stays with the ship or the crew
    and improves accountability for tool equipment transfer. The Navy's
    lessons learned database identified the need for such agreements. However,
    despite both ship commanders agreeing during the planning phases of one of
    the turnovers that each ship's tools, parts, and material would remain
    with the respective ship and that both crews would review an inventory
    checklist during turnover, both crews did not follow the agreement. One
    crew removed many of the tools and other equipment before leaving the
    ship. As a result, the on-coming crew did not have the needed tools and
    other equipment to perform maintenance and repairs and had to spend
    $150,000 to buy the needed tools. Officers and crews from two patrol
    coastal ships also indicated that absent an agreed-upon written inventory
    identifying which items stay with the ship and what items stay with the
    crew, one of the crews took needed ship items back to the United States,
    in part, to ensure the crew had necessary items on the new ship. Officers
    from one patrol coastal ship stated that there is a need for a standard
    set of inventory items that should stay on a ship. Sea Swap and patrol
    coastal ship officers and crewmembers stated that an independent authority
    is needed to monitor the turnover process, including an inventory of
    tools, to hold both crews accountable.

    The impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational crewing
    has not been fully assessed. This is because the Navy has been focused on
    demonstrating the feasibility of the practice and allowed ships to use
    different approaches to conducting maintenance without capturing all
    needed information and examining all related issues that could impact
    success. A full assessment of maintenance issues on all ships employing
    this practice would be important in identifying and addressing possible
    impediments to effectively implementing rotational crewing. Navy
    destroyers and patrol coastal ships using rotational crews on extended
    deployments have faced maintenance challenges to ensure the mission
    capability of ships while overseas. To help minimize the adverse effects
    on the material condition of forward-deployed Sea Swap destroyers, the
    Navy expanded the scope of predeployment maintenance and sent maintenance
    support representatives in theater to provide additional technical support
    to crews. Despite concluding that the condition of the returning ship,
    U.S.S. Higgins, was comparable to that of another ship that had recently
    returned from a deployment, the results of such efforts on maintaining
    ship material condition are uncertain. The Center recommended that a
    review of maintenance support might be necessary prior to expanding

      Maintenance Strategies for Alternative Crewing and Potential Impacts Have Not
      Been Fully Assessed

    Sea Swap to other ships. We found the need for such an analysis was
    further supported by the experience of patrol coastal ships, which did not
    receive such focused maintenance and identified several maintenance
    problems that were not corrected while deployed that could have affected
    their mission capability. Moreover, both the Center and our focus groups
    with rotational crews found that increased maintenance tasks contributed
    to diminished crew morale. Therefore, while the Navy used rotational crews
    to keep ships on station for up to 24 months, in the absence of a careful
    analysis of alternative maintenance strategies, the Navy runs the risk
    that some maintenance approaches will degrade the long-term condition of
    ships, diminish crew morale, and discourage crew support for using the
    practice.

        Maintaining Ships on Extended Deployment Is a Challenge

    Navy vessels using rotational crews on extended deployments have faced
    maintenance challenges to ensure the vessels' mission capability while
    overseas. Normally, most ship maintenance and repair is completed between
    6-month deployments. For instance, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers normally
    receive continuous maintenance34 annually and 2-month Selected Restricted
    Availabilities35 every 22 months. However, ships employing rotational
    crews on extended deployments do not return to the United States for
    periods of 12 or more months, so crews must maintain ship capability while
    deployed in compliance with law36 and Navy guidance on overseas
    maintenance (see appendix III for details on Navy guidance).

    According to the Center, each Sea Swap destroyer received more maintenance
    support and more intensive support than typically received by ships on
    routine deployments. This support included numerous

    34 Continuous maintenance is surface ship depot level work performed while
    in port to keep ship systems fully operational between scheduled shipyard
    maintenance periods.

    35 Selected Restricted Availability is defined as a short, labor-intensive
    industrial period for the accomplishment of maintenance and selected
    modernization.

    36 Title 10, United States Code, section 7310(a) restricts repairs of
    naval vessels outside the United States based on where the ship is
    homeported and the nature of the repairs to be performed. Specifically,
    any naval vessel or any other vessel under the jurisdiction of the
    Secretary of the Navy with its homeport in the United States may not be
    overhauled, repaired, or maintained in a shipyard outside the United
    States or Guam, other than in the case of voyage repairs. Under Navy
    guidance, voyage repairs generally consist of emergency work that is
    necessary to enable a ship to continue its mission and that can be
    accomplished without a change to the ship's deployment schedule.

    predeployment inspections and maintenance on their power, electrical,
    steering, combat, and other systems to eliminate many potential required
    maintenance activities during deployment. For example, the predeployment
    maintenance on one of the Sea Swap ships, the U.S.S. Fletcher, began with
    the identification of all time-driven maintenance requirements that were
    scheduled during the extended deployment. Examples included calibration,
    assessments, and inspections of equipment to renew time-driven
    certifications. (Such actions are comparable to checking a car's timing
    belt or inspecting brakes and tires before taking a long trip.) Numerous
    other inspections were also conducted prior to deployment on selected ship
    systems and equipment to identify and repair problems and ensure the good
    working order of the ship. The U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins each
    received inspections for hull, mechanical, and electrical systems, as well
    as combat systems. The U.S.S. Higgins also received inspections of its
    Aegis radar system.

    Sea Swap destroyers also received overseas maintenance support beyond that
    available to ships on a typical deployment. The Surface Force Pacific
    Command sent U.S.-based ship engineering material assessment teams,
    ranging from 3 to 11 members, to perform maintenance on the Sea Swap
    destroyers while the ships transited from their operational area of
    responsibility to overseas locations where crew turnovers occurred. The
    teams also assisted the crews while the destroyers were in port at the
    crew turnover city and were comprised of senior-level maintainers capable
    of performing a variety of maintenance jobs at the ship's organizational37
    and intermediate levels.38 According to Navy maintenance officials, the
    team's presence during transit from the theater of operations to the Sea
    Swap city and in port facilitated the completion of preventative
    maintenance, particularly repairs associated with ship habitability.
    Surface Force Pacific Command also assigned a Sea Swap destroyer port
    engineer to help ship officials develop maintenance plans during port
    visits, which is not typical for ships on normal deployments.

    37 Organizational (shipboard) maintenance consists of corrective and
    preventive maintenance, which is performed by the ship's crew on its
    assigned equipment. Repairs normally consist of inspecting, servicing,
    lubricating, adjusting, and replacing parts, minor assemblies, and
    subassemblies.

    38 Intermediate maintenance consists of preventive and corrective
    maintenance, which is the responsibility of and performed by qualified
    personnel with specialized facilities such as fleet support activities.
    Repairs normally consist of calibration, repair or replacement of damaged
    or unserviceable parts or assemblies, and emergency manufacture of
    nonavailable parts.

    U.S. Naval Forces Central Command39 officials also noted that Sea Swap
    destroyers experienced material degradation over time. As a result, both
    destroyers required maintenance that was not readily supportable during
    operations. Navy officials said that Sea Swap destroyers were given
    preference for port visits in support of crew turnovers and maintenance as
    compared to other ships. They also said that maintaining ships deployed to
    the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for long periods would
    continue to be a challenge.

    During our review, we found that patrol coastal ship rotational crews also
    faced challenges in maintaining ship material condition. Like the Sea Swap
    destroyers, the patrol coastal ships received system inspections prior to
    deployment. Patrol coastal port engineers and maintenance support teams
    checked key systems-such as engines, weapons packages, and the bridge-to
    hedge against wear and tear the ship would experience on an extended
    deployment. However, unlike the Sea Swap destroyers, U.S. Naval Forces
    Central Command officials indicated that patrol coastal ships were not
    given preferential treatment to support maintenance. The patrol coastal
    ship community deployed a maintenance support team with the crews in an
    effort to address overseas maintenance needs, however, these teams are not
    unique to rotational crewing and typically support any patrol coastal ship
    deployment. The team consisted of five members located in theater who
    performed limited maintenance, ordered and stored parts, and provided
    administrative support. The scope of the maintenance performed by the
    teams was limited to organizational, intermediate, and select depot-level
    maintenance.40

    According to focus groups with patrol coastal ship crews, the maintenance
    support teams were usually the only personnel in theater capable of
    rectifying frequently occurring maintenance problems. If a maintenance
    support team was not available, the crew had to contact a technical

    39 U.S. Naval Forces Central Command supports all naval operations in the
    U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. This area includes the
    Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean.

    40 Depot-level maintenance consists of maintenance performed by designated
    maintenance activities to support organizational-and intermediate-level
    maintenance activities by the use of more extensive ship facilities,
    equipment, and personnel of higher technical skill. Repairs may consist of
    inspection, test, repair, modification, alteration, modernization,
    conversion, overhaul, and rebuild of parts, assemblies, subassemblies,
    equipment end items, and weapon systems. Depot-level maintenance is
    normally accomplished in fixed shops, shipyards, and other shore-based
    facilities, or by depot field teams.

    support representative in the United States for assistance or try to
    conduct the maintenance itself. Some patrol coastal ship crewmembers
    indicated that the size of the maintenance support teams was insufficient
    to support both patrol coastal ships on extended deployments and suggested
    expanding the maintenance support teams to be comparable to the system
    used by the Coast Guard. According to patrol coastal ship crews, the Coast
    Guard had four ships similar to the patrol coastal ships in theater and
    provided approximately 50 maintenance personnel to perform the same
    function as the patrol coastal maintenance support team. The increased
    size of the Coast Guard's maintenance support allowed its crews to stand
    down and live in barracks during maintenance periods. By contrast, a
    patrol coastal officer noted that, during maintenance availabilities,
    maintenance support teams only assisted the crew and did not take over the
    work effort and the crews remained on board throughout the repair process
    and performed maintenance.

        Full Impact of Navy Maintenance Strategy for Destroyers and Other Ships
        Using Crew Rotations Is Not Clear

    The results of the different maintenance strategies used to sustain the
    two destroyers that were apart of the Sea Swap demonstration project and
    other ships using rotational crewing are uncertain. While the Center
    judged that the condition of the U.S.S. Higgins was comparable to another
    ship that had recently returned from a routine 6-month deployment, others
    in the Navy disagreed based on inspection results. We did not identify any
    similar effort to determine the impact on the patrol coastal or other
    ships that would provide the Navy with additional insights into the impact
    of the extended deployment on their condition.

    The Center's judgment was based in part on a total ship readiness
    assessment conducted by Pacific Fleet maintenance personnel, in which
    Surface Force Pacific officials judged the U.S.S. Higgins' ship material
    condition after a 17-month deployment to be comparable to the U.S.S.
    Decatur's. However, officials from the Fleet Technical Support Center
    Pacific that performed the assessment thought there were some significant
    differences in the condition between the two ships. These officials found
    that the U.S.S. Higgins had 697 noted deficiencies out of 3,370 items
    tested (21 percent), whereas the U.S.S. Decatur had 465 out of 3,231 items
    tested (14 percent). While the number of deficiencies alone does not
    necessarily indicate the significant material differences between the
    ships, some of the items deficient on the U.S.S. Higgins included data
    links for controlling operations between a ship and an aircraft and
    another

    was the nonoperational extra high frequency communication system41 on the
    U.S.S. Higgins that was operational on the U.S.S. Decatur.

    Fleet Technical Support Center Pacific officials also assessed the
    operational functionality of each ship's equipment and found that the
    U.S.S. Higgins was not as capable. This assessment measured the equipment
    operational capability42 of each ship in order to quantitatively determine
    whether the ship's systems were performing in accordance with Navy
    requirements. The assessment results showed that the U.S.S. Higgins
    received an overall score of .70, while the U.S.S. Decatur received a
    score of .85. According to the Navy handbook, an equipment operational
    capability score of 1.0 indicates the equipment is fully capable of
    performing its function as designed, while a score of 0 indicates the
    equipment is totally unable to perform its function as designed. The
    handbook provides that any score between .70 and .80 indicates ship
    equipment is unable to obtain optimum operational standards, while scores
    above .80 indicate ship equipment passes all operational tests.

    A further breakdown of the scores indicates the U.S.S. Higgins may have
    had problems that were more serious. The .70 score for the U.S.S. Higgins
    was arrived at by assessing two categories of equipment: the combat
    system-related equipment43 and the hull, mechanical, and electrical
    systems-related equipment.44 The combat system-related equipment score for
    the U.S.S. Higgins was .77, while the U.S.S. Decatur received a score of
    .83. Since the combat system portion of the score was higher than the
    total for the U.S.S. Higgins, the hull, mechanical, and electrical
    equipment

    41 This communications system connects ships, submarines, and shore
    facilities. The system enables survivable, worldwide command and control
    communications to strategic and tactical naval forces through all levels
    of conflict.

    42 The readiness of ship equipment is quantified with a value called an
    Equipment Operational Capability score. The score is a number between 0
    and 1, which is assigned to the lowest level of equipment being tested and
    reflects its ability to pass selected planned maintenance system tests and
    provide functional capability, as perceived by the assessing technician.

    43 Combat system-related equipment consists of command, control,
    communications, computers, and intelligence systems, detection systems,
    electromagnetic compatibility systems, guns, launchers, and other fire
    control systems as well as supporting equipment.

    44 Hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment examples include items
    related to a ship's engine and propulsion systems, safety equipment, and
    habitability systems such as air conditioners.

    score was at a minimum below .70.45 According to the handbook, scores
    above .50 and below .70 indicate that equipment has significantly reduced
    output or restricted operability. By contrast, we found that the hull
    mechanical and electrical equipment score for the U.S.S. Decatur was at
    least .85, given an overall score of .85 and a combat system score of .83,
    which indicated that equipment was fully operable.

    Even though it concluded that the U.S.S. Higgins' condition was
    comparable, the Center recognized the importance of maintenance to the
    success of rotational crewing and proposed the Navy further assess
    maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs. Specifically, the
    Center suggested that if Sea Swap becomes a more standard practice, "it
    will be necessary to conduct a holistic review of the overall maintenance
    process, including technical services and training." This review would
    assess the responsibilities and interrelationships among the many players,
    such as the ship's force, ship repair units, port engineers, and ship
    engineering maintenance teams. In addition, the Center added that the Navy
    should conduct a careful assessment to determine which maintenance support
    aspects are essential costs and which are dispensable. As of July 2004,
    the Navy had not started such an assessment.

    We found that the experience of other ships on extended deployments, such
    as patrol coastal ships, bore out the need for such an analysis. Patrol
    coastal ships did not receive focused maintenance comparable to Sea Swap
    destroyers, and ship officials identified several maintenance problems
    aboard one or more ships (see table 3) that were not corrected while
    deployed that could have affected their mission capability.

    45 We were able to obtain the combat system-related equipment scores for
    both ships, however, the Navy did not report a total hull, mechanical, and
    electrical system score.

           Table 3: Examples of Maintenance Problems on Patrol Coastal Ships

    Repair needed Action needed and effect of not receiving repair

    Severe hull cracks identified on ships 	Hull needed reinforcement. This
    class of ships is prone to hull cracking in heavy seas. If cracks are
    repaired quickly, the damage can be mitigated; if not, more severe
    cracking can cause the ship to break into pieces and sink. Installation of
    hull strengthening alteration eliminates the cracking problem but requires
    drydocking.

    Ship service diesel generator fuel system clogged

    The fuel system, including fuel lines, pumps, and filters, needed
    industrial cleaning. Excessive biological growth in the fuel tanks due to
    the environment in which the ships are operating causes the system to
    clog. The potential impact is the loss of ship service diesel generator
    control and electrical power.

                           Rotating crane leaked and operated

    erratically The rotating crane needed repairs. A rotating crane is
    required to launch and recover a ship's rubber hull inflatable boat.
    Continued loss of the crane's operational capabilities will result in a
    major degradation to the primary mission area.

    Source: U.S. Navy.

    Patrol coastal ships on extended deployments did not have extra in-theater
    maintenance support comparable to Sea Swap destroyers. For instance,
    patrol coastal ships did not have ship engineering maintenance teams to
    aid the crew in achieving maintenance. As a result, according to the
    maintenance support team coordinator for patrol coastal ships, routine
    continuous maintenance often could not be accomplished and, subsequently,
    the overall material condition of patrol coastal ships deployed overseas
    slowly degraded. The official explained that repairs authorized overseas
    are very narrow in scope and only cover maintenance absolutely necessary
    for the ship to conduct its mission. As a result, the official commented
    that organizational-and intermediate-level planned maintenance and
    preservation work are left to the crew and deployed maintenance support
    teams to take on over short periods in port, typically 5 days or less. In
    addition, according to a patrol coastal ship port engineer, each
    forward-deployed patrol coastal ship had received about 4 weeks of
    maintenance in port over the last 18 months and added that this level of
    maintenance does not equal what a traditionally deployed patrol coastal
    would receive. Port engineers and other maintenance staff noted challenges
    in keeping the patrol coastal ships operationally ready. For instance, in
    our focus group discussions with patrol coastal ship crews, they explained
    that the ship's rotating crane that launches and retrieves the ship's
    rigid inflatable boats broke down during a patrol and the ship had to rely
    upon the Coast Guard to help with its repair. A Navy official also
    explained that the extendedly deployed patrol coastal ships have a very
    high operational tempo, which also impacts the ability of the ship's force
    to conduct organizational maintenance and increases the overall
    degradation of the ship over time. The official stated that onboard
    maintenance efforts have been able to keep the patrol coastal ships

    running, but that the Navy will pay a heavy price once the ships return to
    homeport for extensive overhauls, since repairs that are more serious will
    be necessary.

        The Challenge of Maintaining Ships on Extended Deployment Contributed to
        Crew Morale and Quality-of-Life Problems

    The Center and we found that crews expressed concern about the extra
    workload they endured to maintain high ship readiness. Specifically, the
    Center concluded that while the Sea Swap demonstration showed a benefit
    for the Navy-saving dollars and increasing forward presence- many sailors
    spoke of the burdens and loss of traditions. According to the Center, Sea
    Swap crews performed more work and experienced fewer benefits and
    traditions than what may have originally drawn them to the Navy. For
    instance, the Center's report noted that some Sea Swap crewmembers found
    that the maintenance workload was high throughout the entire deployment.
    Other complaints were that whenever the Sea Swap ships pulled into an
    Arabian Gulf port, other ships' sailors left on liberty while the Sea Swap
    crews remained on board doing maintenance. This intense maintenance
    schedule was a morale problem and a frequent topic that arose during the
    Center's crew interviews.

    Our focus groups with Sea Swap destroyer crews identified similar
    concerns. For instance, extra maintenance work related to painting and
    preserving the ship was left to the ship's crew to accomplish. In
    addition, Sea Swap officers in our focus groups indicated that unreported
    work and high workloads disrupted sailor quality of life and that there
    was no increase in time or resources to get maintenance done. They also
    told us that more equipment inspections by in-theater support teams were
    needed while in port. The officers explained that the ship's crew had to
    inspect and fix different equipment throughout the ship because in-theater
    support teams were not available. According to the Sea Swap officers and
    crew, this affected their quality of life since liberty time was reduced
    to accommodate ship maintenance needs.

    Our focus groups with patrol coastal ship rotational crews also indicated
    that increased maintenance tasks and workloads adversely affected crew
    morale and quality of life. Patrol coastal ship senior chiefs told us that
    rotational crews had difficulty meeting ship preservation requirements,
    loading supplies, and documenting ship maintenance logs for non-working
    items during port visits of 5 days or less. In addition, crewmembers on
    each rotational patrol coastal ship complained that they received no
    liberty ports; that all port visits became working ports due to the ship's
    maintenance needs; and that, given the small size of the ships, they
    needed time away from other crewmembers to decompress. Furthermore, a
    patrol

    Conclusions

    coastal ship commanding officer said that his deployed patrol coastal ship
    required too many maintenance demands and noted that the ship was
    maintenance-intensive from the day his crew took over.

    Rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments appears to be
    a feasible alternative to the traditional way the Navy operates that could
    enhance its effectiveness. Successfully overcoming issues that could
    impede using this alternative and to gain support for implementing this
    change require knowledge of the various rotational options and their
    impact on operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale.
    However, the Navy has not taken several key steps that could help it
    better plan, manage, and monitor the implementation of this crewing
    approach and therefore may not realize its full potential. For example,
    the Navy has not established the analytical framework to evaluate all
    rotational crewing options and related costs. In the absence of formal
    measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for assessing feasibility, cost,
    and other factors, including crew quality of life, the Navy does not have
    clear criteria for deciding when to use rotational crewing and which
    option best fits the situation. Furthermore, until the Navy more
    systematically collects data on current and potential surface ship
    rotational crewing options, including complete and accurate cost data for
    cost-effectiveness analyses, it will lack valuable information for making
    informed decisions about the potential for applying rotational crewing to
    current and future ships as well as whether it can get maximum return on
    investment and offset billions of dollars in future total ownership costs.

    The Navy's implementation of crew rotations also lacks effective guidance
    to ensure oversight and accountability. For example, the Navy does not
    provide guidance that specifies standard policies and procedures for
    rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and accountability for
    ship operations during crew rotations. Until it does, crews may continue
    to have problems consistently documenting ship condition and accounting
    for ship inventories during ship turnover, which could lead to additional
    work burdens on the on-coming crew and potentially affect readiness.
    Furthermore, without more formal guidance built on systematically
    collected, recorded, and disseminated lessons learned from all rotational
    experiences that specify standard policies and procedures, the Navy may
    repeat mistakes.

    Finally, the Navy does not know enough about the implications of
    maintenance on ships using rotational crews as a means to extend their
    deployments. The Center for Naval Analyses noted in its report on the

    Sea Swap demonstration that if that option is to become a more standard
    practice, the Navy needs to further review the overall maintenance
    process. However, until the Navy fully assesses the additional maintenance
    demands and related crew quality-of-life issues experienced by all ships
    implementing this crewing approach, and evaluates alternative maintenance
    strategies, it runs the risk that it will degrade the long-term condition
    of ships and discourage crew support for rotational crewing.

    To ensure that the nation's multibillion-dollar investment in Navy ships
    yields the greatest possible benefits at the lowest possible total cost,
    we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
    Navy to take the following four actions:

                                  Recommendations for

      Executive Action

    o  	Systematically evaluate the feasibility and cost-effectiveness for
    current and potential application of several rotational crewing
    alternatives for its surface forces by

    o  	establishing formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for
    assessing feasibility, costs, and other factors, including crew quality of
    life, and

    o  	systematically collecting and developing complete and accurate cost
    data, including ship total ownership costs, in order to perform accurate
    cost-effectiveness analyses.

    o  	Provide guidance that specifies standard policies and procedures for
    rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and accountability for
    ship operations during the rotation.

    o  	Systematically collect, record, and disseminate lessons learned
    pertaining to rotational crewing in the Navy Lessons Learned System to
    enhance knowledge sharing.

    o  	Conduct a study of the maintenance processes used for all ships
    involved in rotating crews and examine, as part of the study,
    opportunities to mitigate the crews' concerns about maintenance workload
    to improve their quality of life.

    Agency Comments 	In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed
    with the recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the
    recommendations.

    DOD's comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV.

    We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
    committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the
    Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available
    to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
    charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me
    at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Key staff members
    that contributed to this report are listed in appendix V.

    Janet St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

    List of Committees

    The Honorable James L. Talent
    Chairman
    The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Seapower
    Committee on Armed Services
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Joel Hefley
    Chairman
    The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Readiness
    Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable John M. McHugh
    Chairman
    The Honorable Vic Snyder
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Total Force
    Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett
    Chairman
    The Honorable Gene Taylor
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Projection Forces
    Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives

    Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

    Ohio-Class Ballistic 	Nuclear-powered Ohio-class ballistic missile
    submarines, also known as Trident submarines, provide the sea-based leg of
    the triad of U.S. strategic

    Missile Submarine 	deterrent forces and the most survivable nuclear strike
    capability. There are 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines in the
    fleet, homeported in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. Each
    submarine has about 15 officers and 140 enlisted personnel. The average
    procurement unit cost for each Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine is
    $2 billion (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

    To maintain a constant at-sea presence, a Blue-Gold rotational crewing
    concept is employed on these submarines. Each ship has a "Blue" Crew and a
    "Gold" Crew, each with its own respective ship command. The ship deploys
    with one of these crews for 77 days, followed by a 2-to 3-day crew
    turnover and a 35-day maintenance period. For example, after a Blue Crew
    deployment, the Gold Crew takes command of the boat after a 3-day turnover
    process. The Blue Crew assists the Gold Crew in conducting maintenance
    repairs. During the Gold Crew's patrol, the Blue Crew stands down and
    enters a training cycle in its homeport.

    Figure 1: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine

                                   Source: U.S. Navy.

                      Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

    Spruance-Class Destroyer

    The DD-963 Spruance-class destroyer has multimission offensive and
    defensive capabilities, and it can operate independently or as part of
    other naval formations. These ships were developed for the primary mission
    of antisubmarine warfare. Many of these ships were subsequently modernized
    with a vertical launch system1 and a Tomahawk cruise missile capability
    that greatly expanded the role of the destroyer in strike warfare.2 The
    crew consists of 30 officers and 352 enlisted personnel. The average
    procurement unit cost is $489.6 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

    The Pacific Fleet conducted Sea Swap rotational crewing with four ships of
    this class, with the U.S.S. Fletcher being the forward-deployed unit. The
    three other destroyers were decommissioned coincident with the crew
    exchange. That is, each on-coming crew decommissioned its ship prior to
    swapping with the off-going crew of the U.S.S. Fletcher. As a result,
    after their 6-month deployment, the off-going crewmembers dispersed to a
    variety of new assignments, just as if their own ship were being
    decommissioned. Further, the Spruance-class destroyer swap rotation was
    initially planned on three ships but was extended by adding a fourth
    destroyer. As a result, the U.S.S. Fletcher remained deployed for over 22
    months. All of the Spruance-class destroyers will be decommissioned by the
    end of fiscal year 2006.

    1 A vertical launch system is a missile storage and firing system aboard a
    ship that enables the vessel to perform multiple warfighting capabilities,
    including antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, ship self-defense,
    strike warfare, and antisurface warfare.

    2 Strike warfare is the use of tactical aircraft and/or cruise missile
    strikes against land targets in an offensive power projection role.

    Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

               Figure 2: The U.S.S. Fletcher, a Spruance-Class Destroyer

    Source: U.S. Navy.

                      Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

      Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile Destroyer

    The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers-first
    commissioned in July 1991, with primary homeports in San Diego and
    Norfolk-provide multimission offensive and defensive capabilities,
    operating independently or as part of other naval formations. The DDG-51
    is equipped with the Aegis combat system, a vertical launching system for
    launching antiaircraft and Tomahawk missiles, and an advanced
    antisubmarine warfare system. Each destroyer crews 23 officers and 300
    enlisted personnel, and has a procurement average unit cost of $976
    million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

    Navy plans call for a force of 62 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile
    destroyers. At the end of fiscal year 2004, this force will total 43
    ships. The Navy is conducting a Sea Swap rotational crewing system to
    rotate entire crews from one hull to another on selected ships in the
    Naval Surface Force Pacific Command's fleet of Arleigh Burke-class
    destroyers.

    Figure 3: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile
    Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground

    Source: U.S. Navy.

                      Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

      Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal

    The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships are small Navy vessels used to
    conduct surveillance and shallow-water interdiction operations in support
    of maritime homeland security operations and coastal patrol of foreign
    shores. The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ship first entered into service
    in 1993. The patrol coastal force consists of 13 ships-4 stationed in San
    Diego, California, and 9 in Little Creek, Virginia. The crew consists of 4
    officers and 24 enlisted personnel. The procurement average unit cost is
    $19.4 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

    The Navy is using a crew swap model in which the entire crew of 28
    crewmembers rotates from one hull to another. The rotations are occurring
    between patrol coastal ships in the United States and those deployed in
    the Arabian Gulf to increase operation days and reduce transit times.
    Operational requirements have delayed the decommissioning of 8 ships and
    the transfer of 5 ships equipped with loading ramps to the Coast Guard.

    Figure 4: The U.S.S. Firebolt, a Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal

                                   Source: U.S. Navy.

                      Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

                                   High Speed Vessel
                                   Two (HSV-2) Swift

    The HSV-2 Swift is a high speed (almost 50 knots), wave-piercing
    aluminum-hulled catamaran that was acquired as an interim mine warfare
    command and support ship and a platform for conducting joint
    experimentation, including Marine Corps sea basing.3 The Navy leased and
    accepted delivery of the catamaran from the builder, Incat Australia, in
    Australia, in August 2003. The Swift was leased for 1 year at a cost of
    $27 million, with a 4-year option ($58 million).

    The Swift employs two crews of 41 members each and uses the Blue-Gold
    crewing option. The Gold Crew is based out of the Naval Amphibious Base
    Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia. It operates the ship as a joint
    experimental platform with Marine Corps troops embarked, testing
    experimental and near-shore combat ship concepts. It also conducts special
    operations warfare.4 The Blue Crew is based out of Naval Station,
    Ingleside, Texas. This crew operates the ship as a mine warfare command
    and control ship. The Mine Warfare Command is in charge of coordinating
    overall mission scheduling for the ship and crews. The crews are
    responsible for the ship, but not its mission equipment. Each command that
    brings modules aboard ship must supply personnel to operate the modules.
    The Swift operates on a nominal 117-day cycle (plus or minus 10 days),
    including a 3-to-4 day turnover between crews, with a 4-month on/4-month
    off cycle. Crew exchanges take place in the crews' respective homeports or
    at overseas locations.

    3 Sea basing is the concept of placing capabilities critical to joint and
    coalition operational success, such as offensive and defensive firepower,
    maneuver forces, command and control, and logistics, at sea.

    4 The five principal mission areas of special operations are
    unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign
    internal defense, and combating terrorism.

                      Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

    Figure 5: The High Speed Vessel Experimental Craft, HSV-2 Swift

    The DD(X) is a next generation, multimission surface combatant ship
    tailored for land attack that has not been built. The Navy intends to
    operate the DD(X) independently or as part of other naval formations. The
    DD(X) is expected to provide precision firepower at long ranges in support
    of forces ashore using two 155-mm advanced gun systems and 80
    vertical-launch system tubes for the Tomahawk cruise missiles and other
    weapons.

    For fiscal year 2005, the Navy is requesting $221 million to begin
    building the first DD(X) and $1.2 billion for research and development for
    the program. The first ship is planned for delivery to the Navy in 2012.
    The Navy estimates that the first DD(X) will cost about $2.8 billion,
    including about $1.0 billion in detailed design and nonrecurring
    engineering costs for the class. The Navy earlier indicated it was
    planning to procure 24 DD(X) vessels through fiscal year 2017, before
    shifting to procurement of the next generation cruiser in fiscal year
    2018. Recently, however, the Navy indicated it might accelerate the start
    of the cruiser procurement to sometime between fiscal year 2011 and 2014
    and reduce the number of DD(X) destroyers it intends to buy to between 10
    to 16.

                                   Source: U.S. Navy.

      Next Generation Guided Missile Destroyer, the DD(X)

    Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

    Current DD(X) design planning anticipates a crew size of 125 to 175
    persons. The procurement contract establishes the requirement to consider
    deploying ships up to 3 years and requires the design agent to conduct and
    complete an analysis of crewing options that would support extended
    forward deployments, including standard, Sea Swap, Horizon, and Blue-Gold
    crewing options. The contract also requires the design agent to ensure
    that the DD(X) system can be effectively operated with an optimized crew
    and provide the crew with the highest quality of life, while minimizing
    total ownership cost.

    Figure 6: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation Destroyer, DD(X)

    Source: U.S. Navy.

                      Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

                                  Littoral Combat Ship

    The littoral combat ship-a new class of Navy surface combatants and the
    smallest member in the DD(X) family of next generation surface combatant
    ships-is intended to be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable, and tailored
    for specific missions, such as antisubmarine, antisurface, or mine warfare
    in heavily contested littoral, or near-shore, waters, and it will use
    interchangeable mission modules5 tailored for specific missions. The
    Navy's goal is to develop a platform that can be fielded in relatively
    large numbers to support a wide range of joint missions, with
    reconfigurable mission modules to assure access to the littorals for the
    Navy forces in the face of threats from surface craft, submarines, and
    mines. It is also expected to have the capability to deploy independently
    to overseas littoral regions and remain on station for extended periods
    either with a battle group or through at-sea replenishment. Baseline ship
    planning is for a single crew; rotational crewing concepts are being
    explored as a secondary option. Crew size is expected to range between 15
    to 50 core crewmembers, which do not include the crew for the mission
    package.

    The Navy has plans to build 56 ships, with the first to be delivered in
    fiscal year 2007 for an estimated cost of $20 billion. Each sea frame hull
    has an average unit cost of $147.5 million to $216.4 million (in fiscal
    year 2004 dollars). The mission modules' average procurement cost is $177
    million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars) per ship set. The resulting average
    cost for a littoral combat ship platform is $324.6 million to $393.4
    million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).

    5 Mission packages would provide the main warfighting capability and
    functionality for specific missions and would consist of a combination of
    manned and unmanned off-board vehicles, deployable sensors, and mission
    manning detachments. A mission module would be used in multiple mission
    packages and, conversely, several mission modules would constitute a
    mission package. Mission modules are typically used to transport, support
    and house mission components (sensors or weapons), which would, in turn,
    be deployable or stationary aboard the ship.

    Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation

                Figure 7: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship

    Source: U.S. Navy.

                           Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    To assess whether the Navy has systematically evaluated the feasibility
    and cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing concepts for existing and
    future classes of surface ships, we interviewed Department of Defense
    (DOD) and Navy Headquarters and fleet officials, met with cost analysis
    experts in the government and the private sector, reviewed key acquisition
    documents and crew employment plans, and reviewed rotational crewing
    studies performed for and by the Navy. Studies we reviewed included

    o  	"Future Force Operational Plan," Executive Summary of the Horizon
    Concept Generation Team, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group
    XVI (June 1997);

    o  	"Crew Rotation: The MCM-1 Experience," Center for Naval Analyses (May
    1998);

    o  	"Alternative Naval Crew Rotation Operations," Center for Naval
    Analyses (October 2001)

    o  	"Task Force Sierra Force Structure For The Future Phase One," Naval
    War College (undated);

    o  	"Alternative Approaches to Meet New Operational Commitments," Briefing
    by the Deep Blue Team, Chief of Naval Operations (undated);

    o  	"Sea Swap," Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Naval War College
    (June 2003); and

    o  "Sea Swap Assessment," Center for Naval Analyses (September 2004).

    We also conducted meetings with several of the commanding and executive
    officers of the Sea Swap destroyers, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected patrol
    coastal ships and strategic ballistic missile submarines.

    To assess whether the Navy has effectively managed rotational crewing on
    surface ships and leveraged lessons learned, we visited Naval Surface
    Force Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California; Submarine Group
    Nine Command, Bangor, Washington; Mine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi,
    Texas; and Amphibious Group Two Command, Norfolk, Virginia. We also met
    with officials from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Warfare
    (Plans, Policies, and Operations; Surface Warfare; and Submarine Warfare)
    to review Navy guidance and plans for conducting crew rotations. We also
    conducted over 40 focus group meetings with Navy officers and crews
    involved in crew rotations on the guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Higgins,
    selected ballistic missile submarines, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected
    patrol coastal ships (see page 58 for more information on the objective,
    scope, and methodology of the focus groups). Further, we reviewed Navy
    Lessons Learned System instructions and visited the Navy Warfare
    Development Command,

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    Newport, Rhode Island, to query the Navy Lessons Learned System to
    determine recorded lessons learned pertaining to crew rotations.

    To assess how ship maintenance may impact implementation of rotational
    crewing, we reviewed relevant laws and Navy regulations pertaining to
    maintenance of U.S. Navy ships. We discussed ship material condition and
    associated sailor workload in over 25 focus groups with crews from the Sea
    Swap guided missile destroyers and from selected patrol coastal ships that
    had participated in crew rotations. We also obtained ship material
    condition assessments, called Total Ship Readiness Assessments, for the
    U.S.S. Higgins and the U.S.S. Decatur. We discussed the methodology and
    results of the assessments with officials from the Fleet Technical Support
    Center, San Diego, California; the Southwest Regional Maintenance Center,
    Commander Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California; the Naval Surface Warfare
    Center, Corona Division, Corona, California; and the Naval Surface Force
    Pacific, San Diego, California. We met with and obtained maintenance
    guidance and reports from Navy officials at Combined Fleet Forces Command,
    Norfolk, Virginia; Surface Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; Surface
    Force Pacific, San Diego, California; Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet,
    Honolulu, Hawaii; Amphibious Group Two Command, Little Creek, Virginia;
    and maintenance experts in the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of the
    Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and the Chief of Naval
    Operations, Washington, D.C. We also obtained written responses to our
    questions from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. In addition, we reviewed
    the Center for Naval Analyses's Sea Swap Assessment report and discussed
    the report's findings with officials from the Center.

    To compare reenlistment rates for crews on Sea Swap guided missile
    destroyers and non-Sea Swap guided missile destroyers in the U.S. Pacific
    Fleet, we obtained Unit Honor Roll reports, derived from the Enlisted
    Master File, from the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu, Hawaii. We
    did not analyze Spruance-class destroyer data for two reasons: (1) we did
    not conduct focus groups with these crews and (2) the rotational crewing
    experience was not as complete or complicated as that experienced by crews
    on Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. Based upon discussions
    with Pacific Fleet officials we also excluded selected ship crews from our
    non-Sea Swap guided missile ship analysis because we wanted the ships we
    analyzed to reflect the standard ship and crew option as closely as
    possible. The ships and crews we excluded were: (1) precommissioning crews
    because of their small sample sizes and nondeployed status, (2) the U.S.
    Milius and its crew because it was an optimal manning experiment ship, and
    (3) the U.S. Paul Hamilton

                           Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    because this crew was on an extended, 10-month deployment. We compiled
    reenlistment averages for the ships we analyzed in 6-month blocks that
    roughly corresponded with Sea Swap guided missile destroyer program and
    crew deployments, beginning November 1, 2001, and ending on April 30,
    2004, and that included pre-deployment, deployment and postdeployment data
    for these crews.

    While we did not validate the casualty report and sailor reenlistment data
    used in this report, we discussed the data with DOD officials to determine
    that the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We did validate
    the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the data were
    sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted our review from July
    2003 through July 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards.

      Focus Groups with Crews on Rotational Crewing Ships

    We conducted focus group meetings with Navy submarine and ship officers
    and enlisted personnel who were involved in crew rotations. Focus groups
    involve structured small group discussions designed to gain more in-depth
    information about specific issues that cannot easily be obtained from
    single or serial interviews. As with typical focus group methodologies,
    our design included multiple groups with varying group characteristics but
    some homogeneity-such as rank and responsibility- within groups. Each
    group involved 7 to 10 participants. Discussions were held in a structured
    manner, guided by a moderator who used a standardized list of questions to
    encourage participants to share their thoughts and experiences. Our
    overall objective in using a focus group approach was to obtain views,
    insights, and feelings of Navy submarine and ship officers and enlisted
    personnel involved in crew rotations.

        Scope of Our Focus Groups

    To gain broad perspectives, we conducted over 40 separate focus group
    sessions with multiple groups of Navy ship officers and enlisted personnel
    involved in crew rotations on the guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Higgins,
    selected ballistic missile submarines, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected
    patrol coastal ships. Table 4 identifies the composition of the focus
    groups on each of the vessels. Across focus groups, participants were
    selected to ensure a wide distribution of officers, enlisted personnel,
    seniority, and ship departments. GAO analysts traveled to each naval
    station to conduct the majority of the focus groups. Six of the focus
    groups were conducted on board the U.S.S. Higgins while it transited to
    its homeport after its extended deployment.

                           Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

            Table 4: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform

                          Strategic             Arleigh    Patrol    HSV-2  Total
                                            Burke-class   coastal
        Personnel groups  submarines         destroyers        ships Swift groups
        Junior enlisted            3                  6            3     2
           personnel
           Lead petty              4                  3            -     1
            officers
          Chief petty              1                  3            -     1
            officers
        Senior enlisted            1                  -            2     1
           personnel
            Officers               2                  3            3     1
         Advanced party            -                  3            -     -
             Total                11                 18            8     6

                                      Source: GAO.

        Methodology for Our Focus Groups

    A guide was developed to assist the moderator in leading the discussions.
    The guide helped the moderator address several topics related to crew
    rotations: training, maintenance, infrastructure and operations,
    management and oversight, readiness, crew characteristics, quality of
    life, lessons learned, and overall satisfaction with the rotational
    crewing experience. Each focus group discussion began with the moderator
    describing the purpose of our study and explaining how focus groups work.
    Participants were assured anonymity of their responses, in that names
    would not be directly linked to their responses in write-ups of the
    sessions and that all of the responses for the session would be
    summarized. The participants were then asked open-ended questions about
    the impact of crew rotations on each of the topics. All focus group
    questions were moderated by a GAO analyst who was assisted by a GAO
    subject matter expert, while two assistants took notes.

                                    Content Analysis

    We performed a systematic content analysis of the open-ended responses in
    order to categorize and summarize participants' experiences with crew
    rotations. Based on the primary topics developed in the focus group guide,
    individual GAO analysts reviewed the responses from one of the crews and
    created their own respective lists of subcategories within each of the
    primary focus group topics. The analysts then met collectively to generate
    a proposed list of topic primary categories and subcategories.

    To ensure inter-rater reliability, one of our analysts reviewed the
    responses from each vessel type and assigned each comment to a
    corresponding category. Another analyst also reviewed each response and
    independently assigned the same comment to a corresponding category.

                           Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    Any comments that were not assigned to the same category were then
    reconciled and adjudicated by the two analysts, which led to the comments
    being placed into one or more of the resulting categories. Agreement
    regarding each placement was reached between at least two analysts. All
    initial disagreements regarding placement into categories were discussed
    and reconciled. The responses in each category were then used in our
    evaluation of how the Navy's experiences with rotational crewing have been
    effectively managed and the effect of maintenance overseas on ships
    homeported in the United States during extended deployments.

        Limitations of Focus Groups

    Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the
    extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population, (2)
    develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make decisions
    about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically representative
    samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead, they are intended to
    generate in-depth information about the focus group participants' reasons
    for the attitudes held toward specific topics and to offer insights into
    the range of concerns and support for an issue.

    The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is
    limited for several reasons. First, they represent the responses of Navy
    ship officers and enlisted personnel from more than 40 selected groups.
    Second, while the composition of the groups was designed to assure a
    distribution of Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship
    departments, the groups were not randomly sampled. Third, participants
    were asked questions about their specific experiences with crew rotations.
    The experiences of other Navy ship officers and personnel involved in crew
    rotations, who did not participate in our focus group, may have varied.

    Because of these limitations, we did not rely entirely on focus groups,
    but rather used several different methodologies to corroborate and support
    our conclusions to objectives two and three.

    Appendix III: Summary List of Department of the Navy Guidance Implementing 10
    U.S.C. 7310

    Chief of Naval Operations

    Naval Sea Systems Command

    Department of the Navy guidance related to the implementation of Title 10,
    United States Code, section 7310(a) restrictions on overseas maintenance,
    or that define terms used in the law, is noted below.

    Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4700.7K (July 2003), "Maintenance
    Policy for U.S. Navy Ships," defines voyage repairs as "corrective
    maintenance of mission-or safety-essential items necessary for a ship to
    deploy or to continue on its deployment."

    Naval Sea Systems Command Fleet Modernization Program Management and
    Operations Manual (June 2002, Rev. 2), SL720-AA-MAN-010, Glossary, defines
    voyage repairs as "emergency work necessary to repair damage sustained by
    a ship to enable the ship to continue on its mission and which can be
    accomplished without requiring a change in the ship's operating schedule
    or the general streaming notice in effect."

      Military Sealift Command

    Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 4700.15A (February 2,
    2000), "Accomplishing Ship Repair in Foreign Shipyards," states that
    voyage repairs include

    o  	corrective maintenance on mission or safety essential items necessary
    for a ship to deploy, to continue on its deployment, or comply with
    regulatory requirements;

    o  	scheduled maintenance, only to the extent that said maintenance is
    absolutely necessary to ensure machinery and equipment operational
    reliability or comply with regulatory requirements; and

    o  	voyage repairs do not include corrective maintenance actions that may
    be deferred until the next scheduled regular overhaul and drydocking
    availability in the United States or Guam without degrading operational
    readiness, habitability standards, or personnel safety, or adversely
    impacting regulatory compliance.

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
    report.

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

                                     See comment 1.

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

                                     See comment 2.

                                     See comment 3.

                                     See comment 4.

                                     See comment 5.

                                     See comment 6.

                                     See comment 7.

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

                                     See comment 8.

                                     See comment 9.

                                    See comment 10.

                                    See comment 11.

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

      GAO's Comments

    The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter
    dated October 25, 2004.

    1. 	We have added a discussion of the methodology we used in our Sea Swap
    destroyer reenlistment analysis. See appendix II.

    2. No change needed in report.

    3. No change needed in report.

    4. 	We agree that expanded scope predeployment inspections and maintenance
    for ships scheduled for extended deployments are prudent. We also agree
    that ships scheduled for extended deployments would benefit from a clearly
    defined process to delineate those increased requirements.

    5. 	Our report noted that increased maintenance tasks contributed to
    diminished crew morale. We agree with DOD's comment that many other
    factors also contributed to the diminished morale for sailors crewing on
    rotational crewing ships.

    6. Our report did not recommend revising Title 10 requirements.

    7. No change needed in report.

    8. No change needed in report.

    9. No change needed in report.

    10. No change needed in report.

    11. No change needed in report.

    Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

      GAO Contact Acknowledgments

    (350383)

    Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402

    Jim Bancroft, Kelly Baumgartner, Larry Bridges, Lee Cooper, Corrie
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    Payne, Charles Perdue, Terry Richardson, Roderick Rodgers, Bill Russell,
    Rebecca Shea, Jennifer Thomas, Julie Tremper, John Van Schaik, and R.K.
    Wild made key contributions to this report.

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