Elections: Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents	 
Challenges (20-JUL-04, GAO-04-975T).				 
                                                                 
The technology used to cast and count votes is one aspect of the 
multifaceted U.S. election process. GAO examined voting 	 
technology, among other things, in a series of reports that it	 
issued in 2001 following the problems encountered in the 2000	 
election. In October 2002, the Congress enacted the Help America 
Vote Act, which, among other things, established the Election	 
Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration of	 
federal elections. The act also established a program to provide 
funds to states to replace older punch card and lever machine	 
voting equipment. As this older voting equipment has been	 
replaced with newer electronic voting systems over the last 2	 
years, concerns have been raised about the vulnerabilities	 
associated with certain electronic voting systems. Among other	 
things, GAO's testimony focuses on attributes on which electronic
voting systems can be assessed, as well as design and		 
implementation factors affecting their performance. GAO also	 
describes the immediate and longer-term challenges confronting	 
local jurisdictions in using any type of voting equipment,	 
particularly electronic voting systems. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-975T					        
    ACCNO:   A11053						        
  TITLE:     Elections: Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and    
Presents Challenges						 
     DATE:   07/20/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Elections						 
	     Electronic forms					 
	     Federal law					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems analysis					 
	     Systems evaluation 				 
	     Information systems				 
	     Federal aid to localities				 
	     Federal aid to states				 

******************************************************************
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**                                                              **
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GAO-04-975T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT Tuesday, July 20, 2004

ELECTIONS

         Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges

Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and
Systems

GAO-04-975T

Highlights of GAO-04-975T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the
Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

The technology used to cast and count votes is one aspect of the
multifaceted U.S. election process. GAO examined voting technology, among
other things, in a series of reports that it issued in 2001 following the
problems encountered in the 2000 election. In October 2002, the Congress
enacted the Help America Vote Act, which, among other things, established
the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration
of federal elections. The act also established a program to provide funds
to states to replace older punch card and lever machine voting equipment.
As this older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic
voting systems over the last 2 years, concerns have been raised about the
vulnerabilities associated with certain electronic voting systems.

Among other things, GAO's testimony focuses on attributes on which
electronic voting systems can be assessed, as well as design and
implementation factors affecting their performance. GAO also describes the
immediate and longer term challenges confronting local jurisdictions in
using any type of voting equipment, particularly electronic voting
systems.

July 20, 2004

ELECTIONS

Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges

An electronic voting system, like other automated information systems, can
be judged on several bases, including how well its design provides for
security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as its cost. For
example, direct recording electronic systems offer advantages in ease of
use because they can have features that accommodate voters with various
disabilities, and they protect against common voter errors, such as
overvoting (voting for more candidates than is permissible); a
disadvantage of such systems is their capital cost and frequent lack of an
independent paper audit trail. Advantages of optical scan voting equipment
(another type of electronic voting system) include capital cost and the
enhanced security associated with having a paper audit trail;
disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as limited ability to
accommodate voters with disabilities.

One important determinant of voting system performance is how it is
designed and developed, including the testing that determines whether the
developed system performs as designed. In the design and development
process, a critical factor is the quality of the specified system
requirements as embodied in applicable standards or guidance. For voting
technology, these voluntary standards have historically been problematic;
the EAC has now been given responsibility for voting system guidelines,
and it intends to update them. The EAC also intends to strengthen the
process for testing voting system hardware and software. A second
determinant of performance is how the system is implemented. In
implementing a system, it is critical to have people with the requisite
knowledge and skills to operate it according to well-defined and
understood processes. The EAC also intends to focus on these people and
process factors in its role of assisting in the administration of
elections.

In the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the challenges
confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting systems are
similar to those facing any technology user. These challenges include both
immediate and more long term challenges, as shown in the table.

Challenges in Using Electronic Voting Systems

                              Time frame Challenge

Near term  o  	Performing those security, testing, and maintenance
activities needed to adequately ensure that the system operates as
intended.

o  	Managing the system, the people who interact with the system, and the
processes that govern this interaction as interrelated and interdependent
parts.

Long term  o  	Having reliable measures and objective data to know whether
the system is meeting the needs of the user community (both voters and
those who administer the elections).

                                                      o  Making choices about 
                                                        future system changes 
                                                        in light of whether a 
    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-975T.                 given system will 
                                                        provide benefits over 
                                                         its useful life that 
                                                        are commensurate with 
                                                                         life 
                                                         cycle costs, and     
    To view the full product, including the             ensuring that these   
                     scope                             costs are affordable.  
and methodology, click on the link above.  Source: 
                                               GAO.   
For more information, contact Randolph C.          
    Hite at (202) 512-3439 or [email protected].          

United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on
electronic voting systems.1 In light of concerns associated with the
voting systems used in the 2000 election, we produced a series of reports,
issued in 2001,2 in which we examined virtually every aspect of the
election process, including types of voting technology. As we reported in
2001, the particular technology used to cast and count votes is a critical
part of this process, but it is only one facet of a multifaceted election
process. Other facets include the people who implement and use the
technology and the processes that govern its implementation, among which
are the standards used to define the characteristics and performance of
the technology. Accordingly, we recognized that no voting technology,
however well designed, can be a magic bullet that will solve all the
problems that can arise in the election process. At the same time, we also
recognized that if not properly managed, this one facet of the election
process can significantly undermine the integrity of the whole.

As requested, my testimony today will focus on electronic voting systems,
and in doing so I will address (1) the role of these systems within the
larger election process, (2) attributes that can be used to examine these
systems' capabilities, (3) the importance of both system design and
implementation to the performance of these systems, and (4) the challenges
confronting local jurisdictions in using any type of voting equipment,
particularly electronic voting systems.

In preparing for this testimony, we drew extensively from our published
work on the election process. We augmented this work

1 In this testimony, the term electronic voting system is used
generically, to refer both to optical scan systems and direct recording
electronic systems, both of which depend on electronic technology. Each
type of system is described more fully in the Background section of this
testimony.

2 For example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Perspectives on
Activities and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 15, 2001); Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment
Standards, GAO-02-52 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001); and Elections: A
Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals, GAO-02-90 (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 15, 2001).

with reviews of more recent studies of electronic voting systems and other
relevant documents. In addition, we interviewed commissioners of the newly
appointed Election Assistance Commission (EAC) regarding its efforts to
date and its plans, and we attended EAC and other commission hearings on
electronic voting systems. Our follow-up work was performed from February
to July 2004 in Washington, D.C. All the work on which this testimony is
based was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

  Results in Brief

Electronic voting systems play a vital role in elections, but they are
only one component in a multidimensional process. The people, processes,
and technology that make up these various dimensions all contribute to the
success of the overall election process. From a national perspective, this
overall process involves many levels of government, including over 10,000
jurisdictions with widely varying characteristics and requirements. For
example, the size of a jurisdiction and the languages spoken by voters are
significant variables in local election processes, as is the performance
of the particular voting system used.

The performance of an electronic voting system, like any type of automated
information system, can be judged on several bases, including how well its
design provides for security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as
well as cost. For example, direct recording electronic systems have
advantages in ease of use because they can have features that accommodate
persons with various disabilities, and they provide features that protect
against common voter errors; disadvantages of such systems are their cost
and their frequent lack of an independent paper audit trail. Advantages of
optical scan voting equipment, which is another type of electronic voting
system, include cost and the enhanced security associated with having a
paper audit trail; disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as their
limited ability to accommodate voters with disabilities.

Voting system performance is a function of two very important activities:
system design and development-including the testing

that determines whether the developed system performs as designed-and
system implementation. One critical input to the design and development
process is the quality of the specified system requirements as embodied in
applicable standards. For voting technology, these standards have
historically been problematic, and they are now a focus of the EAC.
Critical inputs to the system implementation process are having people
with the requisite knowledge and skills to operate and use the system, and
having well-defined and understood processes governing this operation and
use. Both are also areas of focus by the commission.

Looking toward to the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the
challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting
systems are not unlike those facing any technology user. These challenges
include (1) performing those security, testing, and maintenance activities
needed to minimize risk and adequately ensure that the system operates as
intended; (2) managing the system, the people who interact with the
system, and the processes that govern this interaction as interrelated and
interdependent parts; (3) having reliable measures and objective data to
know whether the system is meeting the needs of the jurisdiction's user
community (both the voters and the persons who administer the elections);
and (4) making choices about future system changes in light of whether a
given system will provide benefits over its useful life commensurate with
life-cycle costs, and ensuring that these costs are affordable.

Background

Following the 2000 national elections, we performed a comprehensive series
of reviews covering our nation's election process, in which we identified
a number of challenges. These reviews culminated in a capping report that
summarized this work and provided the Congress with a framework for
considering options for election administration reform.3 Our reports and

3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: A Framework for Evaluating
Reform Proposals, GAO-02-90 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

framework were among the resources that the Congress drew on in enacting
the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002,4 which provided guidance for
fundamental election administration reform. Among other things, the act
authorizes $3.86 billion in funding over several fiscal years for programs
to replace punch card and mechanical lever voting equipment, improve
election administration, improve accessibility, train poll workers, and
perform research and pilot studies. It also created the EAC to oversee the
election administration reform process. Since the act's passage, a number
of voting jurisdictions have replaced their older voting equipment with
direct recording electronic systems. At the same time, concerns have been
raised about the use of these systems; some have reported that these
systems have serious security vulnerabilities and that the embedded
controls are not sufficient to ensure the integrity of the election
process. The EAC, which began operations in January 2004, held a public
hearing in May 2004 at which a major topic was the security and
reliability of electronic voting devices.

GAO Work Following the 2000 Elections Provided a Framework for Election

Administration Reform

At the request of congressional leaders, committees, and members, we
conducted an extensive body of work in the wake of the 2000 elections,
which culminated in seven reports addressing a range of election-related
topics.

First, we reviewed the constitutional framework for the administration of
elections, as well as major federal statutes enacted in this area. 5 We
reported that the constitutional framework for elections includes both
state and federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of
both their own elections and federal elections, but the Congress has
enacted laws in several major areas of the voting process, including the
timing of federal

4 Pub. L. No. 107-252.

5 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: The Scope of Congressional
Authority in Election Administration, GAO-01-470 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
13, 2001).

elections, voter registration, and absentee voting requirements.
Congressional authority to legislate in this area derives from various
constitutional sources, depending upon the type of election. For federal
elections, the Congress has constitutional authority over both
congressional and presidential elections.

Second, we examined voting assistance for military and overseas voters.6
We reported that although tools are available for such voters, many
potential voters were unaware of them, and many military and overseas
voters believed it was challenging to understand and comply with state
requirements and local procedures for absentee voting. In addition,
although information was not readily available on the precise number of
military and overseas absentee votes that were disqualified in the 2000
general election and the reasons for disqualification, we found through a
national telephone survey that almost two-thirds of the disqualified
absentee ballots were rejected because of lateness or errors in completion
of the envelope or form accompanying the ballot. We recommended that the
Secretaries of Defense and State improve (1) the clarity and completeness
of service guidance, (2) voter education and outreach programs, (3)
oversight and evaluation of voting assistance efforts, and (4) sharing of
best practices. The Departments of Defense and State agreed with our
overall findings and recommendations, and as of May 2004, the
recommendations had largely been implemented.

Third, we investigated whether minorities and disadvantaged voters were
more likely to have their votes not counted because the voting method they
used was less reliable than that of affluent white voters.7 According to
our results, the state in which counties were located had more effect on
the number of uncounted presidential votes than did counties' demographic
characteristics or voting method. State differences accounted for 26
percent of the total

6 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Voting Assistance to Military
and Overseas Citizens Should Be Improved, GAO-01-1026 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 28, 2001).

7 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Statistical Analysis of
Factors That Affected Uncounted Votes in the 2000 Presidential Election,
GAO-02-122 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

variation in uncounted presidential votes across counties.8 County
demographic characteristics accounted for 16 percent of the variation
(counties with higher percentages of minority residents tended to have
higher percentages of uncounted presidential votes, while counties with
higher percentages of younger and more educated residents tended to have
lower percentages of uncounted presidential votes), and voting equipment
accounted for 2 percent of the variation.

Fourth, in a review of voting accessibility for voters with disabilities,9
we found that all states had provisions addressing voting by people with
disabilities, but these provisions varied greatly. Federal law requires
that voters with disabilities have access to polling places for federal
elections, with some exceptions.10 All states provided for one or more
alternative voting methods or accommodations intended to facilitate voting
by people with disabilities. In addition, states and localities had made
several efforts to improve voting accessibility for voters with
disabilities, such as modifying polling places, acquiring new voting
equipment, and expanding voting options, but state and county election
officials surveyed cited various challenges to improving access. We
concluded that given the limited availability of accessible polling
places, other options that could allow more voters with disabilities to
vote at a polling place on election day include reassigning them to other,
more accessible polling places or creating accessible superprecincts in
which voters from more than one precinct could all vote in the same
building.

Fifth, we reported on the status and use of voting equipment standards
developed by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).11

8 State differences may have included such factors as statewide voter
education efforts, state standards for determining what is a valid vote,
the use of straight party ballots, the number of candidates on the ballot,
the use of provisional ballots, and the extent to which absentee or early
voting occurred.

9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Voters with Disabilities: Access to
Polling Places and Alternative Voting Methods, GAO-02-107 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

10 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973ee-1.

11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Status and Use of Federal
Voting Equipment Standards, GAO-02-52 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

These standards define minimum functional and performance requirements, as
well as minimum life-cycle management processes for voting equipment
developers to follow, such as quality assurance. At the time of our
review, no federal agency had explicit statutory responsibility for
developing the standards; however, the FEC developed voluntary standards
for computer-based systems in 1990,12 and the Congress provided funding
for this effort. Similarly, no federal agency was responsible for testing
voting systems against the federal standards. Instead, the National
Association of State Election Directors accredited independent test
authorities to test voting systems against the standards. We noted,
however, that the FEC standards had not been updated since 1990 and were
consequently out of date. We suggested that the Congress consider
assigning explicit federal authority, responsibility, and accountability
for the standards, including their proactive and continuous update and
maintenance; we also suggested that the Congress consider what, if any,
federal role is appropriate regarding implementation of the standards,
including the accreditation of independent test authorities and the
qualification of voting systems. Both of these matters were addressed in
the Help America Vote Act, which, among other things, set up the EAC to
take responsibility for voluntary voting system guidelines. We also made
recommendations to the FEC aimed at improving the guidelines. Before the
EAC became operational, the FEC continued to update and maintain the
guidelines, issuing a new version in 2002.

Sixth, we issued a report on election activities and challenges across the
nation.13 In this report, we described the operations and challenges
associated with each stage of the election process, including voter
registration; absentee and early voting; 14 election day administration;
and vote counts, certification, and recounts. The report also provided
analyses on issues associated with voting

12 Performance and Test Standards for Punchcard, Marksense, and Direct
Recording Electronic Voting Systems (January 1990).

13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Perspectives on Activities
and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15,
2001);

14 Absentee and early voting allows eligible persons to vote in person or
by mail before election day.

systems that were used in the November 2000 elections and the potential
use of the Internet for voting. Among other things, we pointed out that
each of the major stages of an election depends on the effective
interaction of people (the election officials and voters), processes (or
internal controls), and technology (registration systems, election
management systems, and voting systems). We also enumerated the challenges
facing election officials at all stages of the election process.

Finally, we issued a capping report that included a framework for
evaluating election administration reform proposals.15 Among other things,
we observed that the constitutional and operational division of federal
and state authority to conduct elections had resulted in great variability
in the ways that elections are administered in the United States. We
concluded that given the diversity and decentralized nature of election
administration, careful consideration needed to be given to the degree of
flexibility and the planned time frames for implementing new initiatives.
We also concluded that in order for election administration reform to be
effective, reform proposals must address all major parts of our election
system-its people, processes, and technology-which are interconnected and
significantly affect the election process. And finally, we provided an
analytical framework for the Congress to consider in deciding on changes
to the overall election process.

The Help America Vote Act Was Enacted to Strengthen the Overall Election
Process

Enacted by the Congress in October 2002, the Help America Vote Act of 2002
addressed a range of election issues, including the lack of explicit
federal (statutory) responsibility for developing and maintaining
standards for electronic voting systems and for testing voting systems
against standards.

With the far-reaching goal of improving the election process in every
state, the act affects nearly every aspect of the voting process, from
voting technology to provisional ballots, and from voter registration to
poll worker training. In particular, the act established a program

15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: A Framework for Evaluating
Reform Proposals, GAO-02-90 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

to provide funds to states to replace punch card and lever machine voting
equipment,16 established the EAC to assist in the administration of
federal elections and provide assistance with the administration of
certain federal election laws and programs, and established minimum
election administration standards for the states and units of local
government that are responsible for the administration of federal
elections. In January 2004, the Congressional Research Service reported
that disbursements to states for the replacement of older equipment and
election administration improvements totaled $649.5 million.17

The act specifically tasked the EAC to serve as a national clearinghouse
and resource for compiling election information and reviewing election
procedures; for example, it is to conduct periodic studies of election
administration issues to promote methods of voting and administration that
are most convenient, accessible, and easy to use for all voters. Other
examples of EAC responsibilities include

0M	developing and adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and
maintaining information on the experiences of states in implementing the
guidelines and operating voting systems;

0M	testing, certifying, decertifying, and recertifying voting system
hardware and software through accredited laboratories;

0M	making payments to states to help them improve elections in the areas
of voting systems standards, provisional voting and voting information
requirements, and computerized statewide voter registration lists; and

0M making grants for research on voting technology improvements.

According to the act, reporting to the EAC will be the Technical
Guidelines Development Committee, which will make

16 The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for
administering grants to the states to replace punch card systems and lever
machines in qualifying states, including providing payments for general
election administration improvements to states that apply for funds to
replace voting equipment.

17 Kevin J. Coleman and Eric A. Fischer, Elections Reform: Overview and
Issues, Congressional Research Service RS20898 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 21,
2004).

recommendations on voluntary voting system guidelines. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will provide technical
support to the development committee, and the NIST Director will serve as
its chairman.

In December 2003, the EAC commissioners were appointed, and the EAC began
operations in January 2004. According to the commission chairman, the
EAC's fiscal year 2004 budget is $1.2 million, and its near-term plans
focus on complying with requirements established in HAVA. In that regard,
the EAC issued its first annual report to the Congress in April of this
year on the status of election administration reform. The EAC also plans
to issue best practices guidelines in July 2004 to increase the
reliability of voting equipment and systems for the November 2004
elections. The guidelines also include guidance on recruiting and training
poll workers. The commission's longer term plans include updating the
voluntary voting system guidelines and improving the process for
independent testing of voting systems. Toward this end, the EAC's
Technical Guidelines Development Committee recently held its first meeting
to develop a plan to update voluntary voting system guidelines. According
to some commissioners, current operations are constrained by a lack of
persons in key staff positions, including the Executive Director, General
Counsel, and Inspector General.

Electronic Voting Systems Fall into Two Primary Categories

In the United States today, most votes are cast and counted by one of two
types of electronic voting systems: optical scan and direct recording
electronic (DRE). Two older voting technologies were also used in the 2000
elections: punch card equipment (used by about 31 percent of registered
voters in 2000 and expected to be used by 19 percent in 2004) and
mechanical lever voting machines (used by about 17 percent of registered
voters in 2000 and expected to be 13 percent in 2004). 18 These equipment
types are being

18 Figures for the 2000 and 2004 elections are according to Election Data
Services, Inc. Election Data Services, Inc., is a political consulting
firm specializing in redistricting, election administration, and the
analysis and presentation of census and political data.

replaced as required by provisions established in HAVA.19 In addition, for
a small minority of registered voters, votes are cast and counted manually
on paper ballots.20

Optical Scan Systems

Optical scan voting systems use electronic technology to tabulate paper
ballots. Although optical scan technology has been in use for decades for
such tasks as scoring standardized tests, it was not applied to voting
until the 1980s. In 2000, about 31 percent of registered voters voted on
optical scan systems. In the 2004 election, according to Election Data
Services, Inc., about 32 percent of registered voters will use optical
scan voting equipment.

For voting, an optical scan system is made up of computer-readable
ballots, appropriate marking devices, privacy booths, and a computerized
tabulation device. The ballot, which can be of various sizes, lists the
names of the candidates and the issues. Voters record their choices using
an appropriate writing instrument to fill in boxes or ovals, or to
complete an arrow next to the candidate's name or the issue. The ballot
includes a space for write-ins to be placed directly on the ballot.

Optical scan ballots are tabulated by optical-mark-recognition equipment
(see fig. 1), which counts the ballots by sensing or reading the marks on
the ballot. Ballots can be counted at the polling place-this is referred
to as precinct-count optical scan21-or

19 Pub. L. 107-252, Sec. 102, provides federal funds to states for the
systematic removal and replacement of punch card voting systems and lever
voting systems in time for the regularly scheduled general election for
federal offices to be held in November 2004; states that receive a
certified waiver may extend their replacement time frame until the first
election for federal office after January 1, 2006.

20 We reported that about 1 percent of registered voters used manually
counted paper ballots in the 2000 elections. Election Data Services, Inc.,
reports that about 0.6 percent will use this method in the 2004 elections.

21 Precinct-count optical scan equipment sits on a ballot box with two
compartments for scanned ballots-one for accepted ballots (i.e., those
that are properly filled out) and one for rejected ballots (i.e., blank
ballots, ballots with write-ins, or those accepted because of a forced
override). In addition, an auxiliary compartment in the ballot box is used
for storing ballots if an emergency arises (e.g., loss of power or machine
failure) that prevents the ballots from being scanned.

at a central location. If ballots are counted at the polling place, voters
or election officials put the ballots into the tabulation equipment, which
tallies the votes; these tallies can be captured in removable storage
media that are transported to a central tally location, or they can be
electronically transmitted from the polling place to the central tally
location. If ballots are centrally counted, voters drop ballots into
sealed boxes, and election officials transfer the sealed boxes to the
central location after the polls close, where election officials run the
ballots through the tabulation equipment.

Figure 1: Precinct-Count Optical Scan Tabulator and Central-Count Optical
Scan Tabulator

Software instructs the tabulation equipment to assign each vote (i.e., to
assign valid marks on the ballot to the proper candidate or issue). In
addition to identifying the particular contests and candidates, the
software can be configured to capture, for example, straight party voting
and vote-for-no-more-than-N contests. Precinct-based optical scanners can
also be programmed to detect overvotes (where the voter votes for two
candidates for one office, for example,

invalidating the vote) and undervotes (where the voter does not vote for
all contests or issues on the ballot) and to take some action in response
(rejecting the ballot, for instance). In addition, optical scan systems
often use vote-tally software to tally the vote totals from one or more
vote tabulation devices.

If election officials program precinct-based optical scan systems to
detect and reject overvotes and undervotes, voters can fix their mistakes
before leaving the polling place. However, if voters are unwilling or
unable to correct their ballots, a poll worker can manually override the
program and accept the ballot, even though it has been overvoted or
undervoted. If ballots are tabulated centrally, voters do not have the
opportunity to correct mistakes that may have been made.

Direct Recording Electronic Systems

First introduced in the 1970s, DREs capture votes electronically, without
the use of paper ballots. In the 2000 election, about 12 percent of voters
used this type of technology. In the 2004 election, according to Election
Data Services, Inc., about 29 percent of registered voters will use this
voting technology.

DREs come in two basic types, pushbutton or touchscreen, the pushbutton
being the older technology; during the 2000 elections, pushbutton DREs
were the most prevalent of the two types. The two types vary considerably
in appearance (see fig. 2). Pushbutton DREs are larger and heavier than
touchscreens.

Figure 2: DRE Pushbutton and DRE Touchscreen

Pushbutton and touchscreen units also differ significantly in the way they
present ballots to the voter. With the pushbutton, all ballot information
is presented on a single "full-face" ballot. For example,

a ballot may have 50 buttons on a 3 by 3 foot ballot, with a candidate or
issue next to each button. In contrast, touchscreen DREs display the
ballot information on an electronic display screen. For both pushbutton
and touchscreen types, the ballot information is programmed onto an
electronic storage medium, which is then uploaded to the machine. For
touchscreens, ballot information can be displayed in color and can
incorporate pictures of the candidates. Because the ballot space on a
touchscreen is much smaller than on a pushbutton machine, voters who use
touchscreens must page through the ballot information. Both touchscreen
and pushbutton DREs can accommodate multilingual ballots.

Despite the differences, the two types have some similarities, such as how
the voter interacts with the voting equipment. For pushbuttons, voters
press a button next to the candidate or issue, which then lights up to
indicate the selection. Similarly, voters using touchscreens make their
selections by touching the screen next to the candidate or issue, which is
then highlighted. When voters are finished making their selections on a
touchscreen or a pushbutton DRE, they cast their votes by pressing a final
"vote" button or screen. Until they hit this final button or screen,
voters can change their selections. Both types allow voters to write in
candidates. While most DREs allow voters to type write-ins on a keyboard,
some pushbutton types require voters to write the name on paper tape that
is part of the device.

Although DREs do not use paper ballots, they do retain permanent
electronic images of all the ballots, which can be stored on various
media, including internal hard disk drives, flash cards, or memory
cartridges. According to vendors, these ballot images, which can be
printed, can be used for auditing and recounts.

Some of the newer DREs use smart card technology as a security feature.
Smart cards are plastic devices-about the size of a credit card-that use
integrated circuit chips to store and process data, much like a computer.
Smart cards are generally used as a means to open polls and to authorize
voter access to ballots. For instance, smart cards on some DREs store
program data on the election and are used to help set up the equipment;
during setup, election workers verify that the card received is for the
proper election. Other DREs are programmed to automatically activate when
the

voter inserts a smart card; the card brings up the correct ballot onto the
screen. In general, the interface with the voter is very similar to that
of an automatic teller machine.

Like optical scan devices, DREs require the use of software to program the
various ballot styles and tally the votes, which is generally done through
the use of memory cartridges or other media. The software is used to
generate ballots for each precinct within the voting jurisdiction, which
includes defining the ballot layout, identifying the contests in each
precinct, and assigning candidates to contests. The software is also used
to configure any special options, such as straight party voting and
vote-for-no-morethan-N contests. In addition, for pushbutton types, the
software assigns the buttons to particular candidates and, for
touchscreens, the software defines the size and location on the screen
where the voter makes the selection. Vote-tally software is often used to
tally the vote totals from one or more units.

DREs offer various configurations for tallying the votes. Some contain
removable storage media that can be taken from the voting device and
transported to a central location to be tallied. Others can be configured
to electronically transmit the vote totals from the polling place to a
central tally location.

DREs are designed not to allow overvotes; for example, if a voter selects
a second choice in a two-way race, the first choice is deselected. In
addition to this standard feature, different types offer a variety of
options, including many aimed at voters with disabilities, that
jurisdictions may choose to purchase. In our 2001 work, we cited the
following features as being offered in some models of DRE:

0M	A "no-vote" option. This option helps avoid unintentional undervotes.
This provides the voter with the option to select "no vote (or abstain)"
on the display screen if the voter does not want to vote on a particular
contest or issue.

0M	A "review" feature. This feature requires voters to review each page of
the ballot before pressing the button to cast the vote.

0M	Visual enhancements. Visual enhancements include color highlighting of
ballot choices, candidate pictures, etc.

0M	Accommodations for voters with disabilities. Examples of options for
voters who are blind include Braille keyboards and audio interfaces.22 At
least one vendor reported that its DRE accommodates voters with
neurological disabilities by offering head movement switches and "sip and
puff" plug-ins.23 Another option is voice recognition capability, which
allows voters to make selections orally.

0M	An option to recover spoiled ballots. This feature allows voters to
recast their votes after their original ballots are cast. For this option,
every DRE at the poll site would be connected to a local area network. A
poll official would void the original "spoiled" ballot through the
administrative workstation that is also connected to the local area
network. The voter could then cast another ballot.

0M	An option to provide printed receipts. In this case, the voter would
receive a paper printout or ballot when the vote is cast. This feature is
intended to provide voters and/or election officials with an opportunity
to check what is printed against what is recorded and displayed. It is
envisioned that procedures would be in place to retrieve the paper
receipts from the voters so that they could not be used for vote selling.
Some DREs also have an infrared "presence sensor" that is used to control
the receipt printer in the event the voter is allowed to keep the paper
receipt; if the voter leaves without taking the receipt, the receipt is
pulled back into the printer.

Expanded Use of Electronic Voting Systems Has Raised Concerns

As older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic voting
systems over the last 2 years, the debate has shifted from hanging chads
and butterfly ballots to vulnerabilities associated with DREs. Problems
with these devices in recent elections have arisen in various states. For
example:

22 According to spokespersons for national advocacy groups for people with
disabilities, only a small percentage of blind people have the Braille
proficiency needed to vote using a Braille ballot.

23 Using a mouth-held straw, the voter issues switch commands-hard puff,
hard sip, soft puff, and soft sip-to provide signals or instructions to
the voting machine.

0M	Six DRE units used in two North Carolina counties lost 436 ballots cast
in early voting for the 2002 general election because of a software
problem, according to a February 9, 2004, report in Wired News. The
manufacturer said that problems with the firmware of its touchscreen
machines led to the lost ballots. The state was trying out the machines in
early voting to determine if it wanted to switch from the optical scan
machines it already owned to the new touchscreen systems.

0M	According to a January 2004 report in Wired News, blank ballots were
recorded for 134 voters who signed in and cast ballots in Broward County,
Florida. These votes represented about 1.3 percent of the more than 10,000
people who voted in the race for a state house representative.

0M	USA Today reported that four California counties suffered from problems
with DREs in a March 2004 election, including miscounted ballots, delayed
polling place openings, and incorrect ballots. In San Diego County, about
one-third of the county's polling places did not open on time because of
battery problems caused by a faulty power switch.

Additionally, serious questions are being raised about the security of
DREs. Some state that their use could compromise the integrity of the
election process and that these devices need auditing mechanisms, such as
receipt printers that would provide a paper audit trail and allow voters
to confirm their choices.24 Among these critics are computer scientists,
citizens groups, and legislators.

For example, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities
released a security analysis of software from a DRE of a major vendor,
concluding that the code had serious security flaws that could permit
tampering.25 Other computer scientists, while

24 Stanford University computer science professor David Dill was reported
as saying "All of this just underscores the need for voting machines to
have a paper trail." Dill runs Verified Voting, a group that is urging
election officials and legislators to mandate voter-verified paper ballots
as audit tools.

25 Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach,
Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, Johns Hopkins University
Information Security Institute, TR2003-19 (July 2003).

agreeing that the code contained security flaws, criticized the study for
not recognizing how standard election procedures can mitigate these
weaknesses. Following the Johns Hopkins and Rice study, the State of
Maryland contracted with both SAIC and RABA Technologies to study the same
DRE equipment. The SAIC study found that the equipment, as implemented in
Maryland, poses a security risk.26 Similarly, RABA identified
vulnerabilities associated with the equipment.27 An earlier Caltech/MIT
study28 noted that despite security strengths of the election process in
the United States,29 current trends in electronic voting are weakening
those strengths and introducing risks; according to this study, properly
designed and implemented electronic voting systems could actually improve,
rather than diminish, security.

Citizen advocacy groups are also taking action. For example, according to
an April 21, 2004, press release from the Campaign for Verifiable Voting
in Maryland, the group filed a lawsuit against the Maryland State Board of
Elections to force election officials to decertify the DRE machines used
in Maryland until the manufacturer remedies security vulnerabilities and
institutes a paper audit trail.

Legislators and other officials are also responding to the issues. In at
least 20 states, according to the Associated Press, legislation has been
introduced requiring a paper record of every vote cast.30 Following the
problems in California described above, the California

26 Science Applications International Corporation, Risk Assessment Report,
SAIC-60992003-261 (Sept. 2, 2003).

27 RABA Technologies, LLC, Trusted Agent Report (Jan. 20, 2004).

28 Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be
(July 2001). (http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/2001report.html)

29 These strengths include the openness of the election process, which
permits observation of counting and other aspects of election procedure;
the decentralization of elections and the division among different levels
of government and groups of people; equipment that produces "redundant
trusted recordings" of votes; and the public nature and control of the
election process.

30 Rachel Konrad, Legislators Wary of Electronic Voting, The Associated
Press (Apr. 24, 2004).

Secretary of State banned the use of one model of touchscreen DREs and
conditionally decertified other similar models. According to the New York
Times, these models represented 14,000 and 28,000 units, respectively.31
The Secretary recommended that the state Attorney General consider taking
civil and criminal action against the manufacturer for "fraudulent
actions." The decision followed the recommendations of the state's Voting
Systems and Procedures Panel, which urged the Secretary of State to
prohibit the four counties that experienced difficulties from using their
touchscreen units in the November 2004 election. The panel reported that
the manufacturer did not obtain federal approval of the model used in the
four affected counties and installed software that had not been approved
by the Secretary of State. It also noted that problems with the systems
prevented an unspecified number of voters from casting ballots. In
addition, two California state senators drafted a bill to prohibit the use
of any DRE voting system without a paper trail in the 2004 general
election; they planned to introduce the bill if the Secretary of State did
not act.32 In June 2004, the Secretary of State proposed standards for the
creation and testing of paper trails for electronic voting systems.

At the federal level, several bills have been introduced in response to
concerns about electronic voting technology. One of the bills,33 the Voter
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 (H.R. 2239), if
enacted, would require that voting machines used in elections for federal
office produce paper audit trails so that voters and election officials
can check accuracy.34 Among other provisions,

31 John Schwartz, "High-Tech Voting Is Banned in California," New York
Times (May 1, 2004).

32 Tim Reiterman, Stuart Pfeifer, and Jean O. Pasco, "State Is Urged to
Ban Vote Machine," Los Angeles Times (Apr. 24, 2004).

33 Other related measures include S 1986, Protecting American Democracy
Act of 2003; S 2045, Secure and Verifiable Electronic Voting Act of 2004;
S2313, Restore Elector Confidence in Our Representative Democracy Act of
2004; and S 2437, Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2004.

34 A companion to this bill in the Senate is S 1980.

the bill would also ban the use of undisclosed software35 and wireless
communications devices in voting systems.

Some of the concerns regarding DREs were raised at a public hearing held
by the EAC on May 5, 2004. The purpose of the hearing was to permit the
EAC to receive information on the use, security, and reliability of
electronic voting devices. It included panels of technology and standards
experts, vendors of voting systems, state election administrators, and
citizen advocacy groups. One expert testified that electronic voting
systems are flawed because they do not permit voters to verify that their
votes were recorded correctly and they do not permit a public vote count.
Others stated that the systems can be made secure only by the addition of
a voterverifiable paper ballot. On the other hand, the election
administrators on the panel described positive experiences with DREs, and
representatives of voters with disabilities supported the use of DREs
because of their accessibility features.36

  Despite Their Vital Role, Voting Systems Are Only One Aspect of the

Larger Election Process Electronic voting systems represent one of many
important components in the overall election process. This process is made
up of several stages, with each stage consisting of key people, process,
and technology variables. Many levels of government are involved,
including over 10,000 jurisdictions with widely varying characteristics.

35 The bill states that any voting system containing or using software
shall disclose the source code of that software to the EAC, and the EAC
shall make that source code available for inspection, upon request, to any
citizen.

36 Following this hearing, which focused on DRE voting systems, the EAC
held a second hearing on June 3, 2004, to focus on three other voting
technologies: punch card and lever machines and optical scan voting
equipment. The hearing addressed best practices, problems, and
transitional issues associated with these systems. A major emphasis of the
hearing was to identify practices that could be published and used by
local election officials in preparation for the election of November 2,
2004.

In the U.S. election process, all levels of government share
responsibility. At the federal level, the Congress has authority under the
Constitution to regulate presidential and congressional elections and to
enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory practices in all
elections-federal, state, and local.37 It has passed legislation affecting
the administration of state elections that addresses voter registration,38
absentee voting,39 accessibility provisions for the elderly and
handicapped,40 and prohibitions against discriminatory practices.41 The
Congress does not have general constitutional authority over the
administration of state and local elections.

At the state level, the states are responsible for the administration of
both their own elections and federal elections. States regulate the
election process, including, for example, adoption of voluntary voting
system guidelines, testing of voting systems, ballot access, registration
procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of voting places,
provision of election day workers, and counting and certification of the
vote. In fact, the U.S. election process can be seen as an assemblage of
51 somewhat distinct election systems-those of the 50 states and the
District of Columbia.

Further, although election policy and procedures are legislated primarily
at the state level, states typically have decentralized this process so
that the details of administering elections are carried out at the city or
county levels, and voting is done at the local level. As we reported in
2001, local election jurisdictions number more than 10,000, and their size
varies enormously-from a rural county with

37 For more information on the role of the federal government in the
administration of elections, see U.S. General Accounting Office,
Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election
Administration, GAO-01-470 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2001).

38 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, commonly known as the "Motor
Voter" Act; 42 U.S.C. 1973gg to 1973gg-10.

39 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (1986); 42 U.S.C.
1973ff to 1973ff

6.

40 Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (1984); 42
U.S.C. 1973ee to 1973ee-6.

41 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973 to 1973bb-1.

about 200 voters to a large urban county such as Los Angeles County, where
the total number of registered voters for the 2000 elections exceeded the
registered voter totals in 41 states.

The size of a voting jurisdiction significantly affects the complexity of
planning and conducting the election, as well as the method used to cast
and count votes. In our 2001 work, we quoted the chief election official
in a very large voting jurisdiction: "the logistics of preparing and
delivering voting supplies and equipment to the county's 4,963 voting
precincts, recruiting and training 25,000 election day poll workers,
preparing and mailing tens of thousands of absentee ballot packets daily
and later signature verifying, opening and sorting 521,180 absentee
ballots, and finally, counting 2.7 million ballots is extremely
challenging."

The specific nature of these challenges is affected by the voting
technology that the jurisdiction uses. For example, jurisdictions using
DRE systems may need to manage the electronic transmission of votes or
vote counts; jurisdictions using optical scan technology need to manage
the paper ballots that this technology reads and tabulates. Jurisdictions
using optical scan technology may also need to manage electronic
transmissions if votes are counted at various locations and totals are
electronically transmitted to a central tally point.

Another variable is the diversity of languages within a jurisdiction. In
November 2000, Los Angeles County, for instance, provided ballots in
Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, and Tagalog, as well as
English. No matter what technology is used, jurisdictions may need to
provide ballot translations; however, the logistics of printing paper
materials in a range of languages, as would be required for optical scan
technology, is different from the logistics of programming translations
into DRE units.

Some states do have statewide election systems so that every voting
jurisdiction uses similar processes and equipment, but others do not. For
instance, we reported in 2001 that in Pennsylvania, local election
officials told us that there were 67 counties and

consequently 67 different ways of handling elections.42 In some states,
state law prescribes the use of common voting technology throughout the
state, while in other states local election officials generally choose the
voting technology to be used in their precincts, often from a list of
state-certified options.

Whatever the jurisdiction and its specific characteristics, administering
an election is a year-round activity, involving varying sets of people to
carry out processes at different stages. These stages generally consist of
the following:

0M	Voter registration. Among other things, local election officials
register eligible voters and maintain voter registration lists, including
updates to registrants' information and deletions of the names of
registrants who are no longer eligible to vote.

0M	Absentee and early voting. This type of voting allows eligible persons
to vote in person or by mail before election day. Election officials must
design ballots and other systems to permit this type of voting, as well as
educating voters on how to vote by these methods.

0M	The conduct of an election. Election administration includes
preparation before election day, such as local election officials
arranging for polling places, recruiting and training poll workers,
designing ballots, and preparing and testing voting equipment for use in
casting and tabulating votes, as well as election day activities, such as
opening and closing polling places and assisting voters to cast votes.

0M	Vote counting. At this stage, election officials tabulate the cast
ballots; determine whether and how to count ballots that cannot be read by
the vote counting equipment; certify the final vote counts; and perform
recounts, if required.

As shown in figure 3, each stage of an election involves people,
processes, and technology.

42 GAO-02-3.

Figure 3: Stages of Election Process

Electronic voting systems are primarily involved in the last two stages,
during which votes are cast and counted. However, the type of system that
a jurisdiction uses may affect earlier stages. For example, in a
jurisdiction that uses optical scan systems, paper ballots like those used
on election day may be mailed in the absentee voting stage. On the other
hand, a jurisdiction that uses DRE technology would have to make a
different provision for absentee voting.

  Electronic Voting Systems' Performance Can Be Judged on Several

Attributes Although the current debate concerning electronic voting
systems primarily relates to security, other factors affecting election
administration are also relevant in evaluating these systems. Ensuring the
security of elections is essential to public confidence and election
integrity, but officials choosing a voting system must also consider other
performance factors, such as accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as
well as cost. Accuracy refers to how frequently the equipment completely
and correctly records and counts votes; ease of use refers to how
understandable and

accessible the equipment is to a diverse group of voters and to election
workers; and efficiency refers to how quickly a given vote can be cast and
counted. Finally, equipment's life-cycle cost versus benefits is an
overriding practical consideration.

Security

In conducting elections, officials must be able to assure the public that
the confidentiality of the ballot is maintained and fraud prevented. In
providing this assurance, the people, processes, and technology involved
in the election system all play a role: the security procedures and
practices that jurisdictions implement, the security awareness and
training of the election workers who execute them, and the security
features provided by the systems.

Election officials are responsible for establishing and managing privacy
and security procedures to protect against threats to the integrity of
elections.43 These security threats include potential modification or loss
of electronic voting data; loss, theft, or modification of physical
ballots; and unauthorized access to software and electronic equipment.
Physical access controls are required for securing voting equipment, vote
tabulation equipment, and ballots; software access controls (such as
passwords and firewalls44) are required to limit the number of people who
can access and operate voting devices, election management software, and
vote tabulation software. In addition, election processes are designed to
ensure privacy by protecting the confidentiality of the vote: physical
screens are used around voting stations, and poll workers are present to
prevent voters from being watched or coerced while voting.

43 We have described an effective security program as including, at a
minimum, (1) assigning responsibility for security, (2) assessing security
risks and vulnerabilities and implementing both manual and
technology-based security measures to prevent or counter these risks, and
(3) periodically reviewing the controls to ensure their appropriateness.
For more information, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide:
Information Security Management, GAO/AIMD-98-68 (Washington, D.C.: May
1998).

44 A firewall is a hardware or software component that protects computers
or networks from attacks by outside network users by blocking and checking
all incoming traffic.

Examples of security controls that are embedded in the technology include
the following:

0M	Access controls. Election workers may have to enter user names and
passwords to access voting systems and software, so that only authorized
users can make modifications. On election day, voters may need to provide
a smart card or token45 to DRE units.

0M	Encryption. To protect the confidentiality of the vote, DREs use
encryption technology to scramble the votes cast so that the votes are not
stored in the same order in which they were cast. In addition, if vote
totals are electronically transmitted, encryption is used to protect the
vote count from compromise by scrambling it before it is transmitted over
telephone wires and unscrambling it once it is received.

0M	Physical controls. Hardware locks and seals protect against
unauthorized access to the voting device once it has been prepared for the
election (e.g., once the vote counter is reset, the unit is tested, and
ballots are prepared).

0M	Audit trails. Audit trails provide documentary evidence to recreate
election day activity, such as the number of ballots cast (by each ballot
configuration or type) and candidate vote totals for each contest. Audit
trails are used for verification purposes, particularly in the event that
a recount is demanded. With optical scan systems, the paper ballots
provide an audit trail. Since not all DREs provide a paper record of the
votes, election officials may rely on the information that is collected by
the DRE's electronic memory. Part of the debate over the assurance of
integrity that DREs provide revolves around the reliability of this
information.

0M	Redundant storage. Redundant storage media in DREs provide backup
storage of votes cast or vote counts to facilitate recovery of voter data
in the event of power or system failure.

The particular features offered by DRE and optical scan equipment differ
by vendor make and model as well as the nature of the technology. DREs
generally offer most of the features, but there is

45 In security systems, a token is small device that displays a constantly
changing identification code; smart cards may perform a similar function.

debate about the implementation of these features and the adequacy of the
access controls and audit trails that this technology provides. If DREs
use tokens or smart cards to authenticate voters, these tokens must also
be physically protected and may require software security protection. For
optical scan systems, redundant storage media may not be required, but
software and physical access controls may be associated with tabulation
equipment and software, and if vote tallies are transmitted
electronically, encryption may also be used. In addition, since these
systems use paper ballots, the audit trail is clearer, but physical access
to ballots after they are cast must be controlled. The physical and
process controls used to protect paper ballots include ballot boxes as
well as the procedures implemented to protect the boxes if they need to be
transported, to tabulate ballots, and to store counted ballots for later
auditing and possible recounts.

Accuracy

Ensuring that votes are accurately recorded and tallied is an essential
attribute of any voting equipment. Without such assurance, both voter
confidence in the election and the integrity and legitimacy of the outcome
of the election are at risk. The importance of an accurate vote count
increases with the closeness of the election. Both optical scan and DRE
systems are claimed to be highly accurate. In 2001, our vendor survey
showed virtually no differences in vendor representations of the accuracy
of DRE and optical scan voting equipment, measured in terms of how
accurately the equipment counted recorded votes.46 Vendors of optical scan
equipment reported accuracy rates of between 99 and 100 percent, with
vendors of DREs reporting 100 percent accuracy.

As we reported in 2001, although 96 percent of local election
jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their voting
equipment during the 2000 election, according to our mail survey, only
about 48 percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on

46 GAO-02-3.

the accuracy of their voting equipment for the election.47 Further, it was
unclear whether jurisdictions actually had meaningful performance data. Of
those local election jurisdictions that we visited that stated that their
voting equipment was 100 percent accurate, none was able to provide actual
data to substantiate these statements. Similarly, according to our mail
survey, only about 51 percent of jurisdictions collected data on
undervotes, and about 47 percent collected data on overvotes for the
November 2000 election.48

Although voting equipment may be designed to count votes as recorded with
100 percent accuracy, how frequently the equipment counts votes as
intended by voters is a function not only of equipment design, but also of
the interaction of people and processes. These people and process factors
include whether, for example,

0M technicians have followed proper procedures in testing and maintaining
the system,

0M voters followed proper procedures when using the system,

0M election officials have provided voters with understandable procedures
to follow, and

0M poll workers properly instructed and guided voters.

As indicated earlier, various kinds of errors can lead to voter intentions
not being captured when ballots are counted. Avoiding or compensating for
these errors may involve solutions based on technology, processes, or
both. For example, DREs are designed to prevent overvoting; however,
overvoting can also be prevented by a procedure to check optical scan
ballots for overvotes before the voter leaves the polls, which can be
accomplished by a precinctbased tabulator or by other means.

47 GAO-02-3. Confidence intervals were calculated at the 95 percent
confidence level. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates from GAO's mail
survey have a confidence interval of plus or minus 4 percentage points or
less; all estimates from GAO's telephone survey have a confidence interval
of plus or minus 11 percentage points or less.

48 DREs do not allow overvotes, so the figure for overvotes does not
include jurisdictions that used DREs.

Ease of Use

Like accuracy, ease of use (or user friendliness) largely depends on how
voters interact with the voting system, physically and intellectually.
This interaction, commonly referred to as the human/machine interface, is
a function of the system design, the processes established for its use,
and user education and training. Among other things, how well
jurisdictions design ballots and educate voters on the use of voting
equipment affects how easy voters find the system to use. In the 2000
elections, for example, ballots for some optical scan systems were printed
on both sides, so that some voters failed to vote one of the sides. This
risk could be mitigated by clear ballot design and by explicit
instructions, whether provided by poll workers or voter education
materials. Thus, ease of use affects accuracy (i.e., whether the voter's
intent is captured), and it can also affect the efficiency of the voting
process (confused voters take longer to vote).

Accessibility to diverse types of voters, including those with
disabilities, is a further aspect of ease of use. As described earlier,
DREs offer more options for voters with disabilities, as they can be
equipped with a number of aids to voters with disabilities. However, these
options increase the expense of the units, and not all jurisdictions are
likely to opt for them. Instead of technological solutions, jurisdictions
may establish special processes for voters with disabilities, such as
allowing them to be assisted to cast their votes; this workaround can,
however, affect the confidentiality of the vote.

Efficiency

Efficiency-the speed of casting and tallying votes-is an important
consideration for jurisdictions not only because it influences voter
waiting time and thus potentially voter turnout, but also because it
affects the number of voting systems that a jurisdiction needs to acquire
and maintain, and thus the cost.

Efficiency can be measured in terms of the number of people that the
equipment can accommodate within a given time, how quickly the equipment
can count votes, and the length of time that voters need to wait. With
DREs, the vote casting and counting functions are virtually inseparable,
because the ballot is embedded in the

voting equipment. Accordingly, for DREs efficiency is generally measured
in terms of the number of voters that each machine accommodates on
election day. In 2001, vendors reported that the number of voters
accommodated per DRE ranges from 200 to 1,000 voters per system per
election day.

With optical scan systems, in contrast, vote casting and counting are
separate activities, since the ballot is a separate medium-a sheet of
paper or a computer card-which once completed is put into the vote
tabulator. As a result, the efficiency of optical scan equipment is
generally measured in terms of the speed of count (i.e., how quickly the
equipment counts the votes on completed ballots). Complicating this
measurement is the fact that efficiency differs depending on whether
central-count or precinct-based tabulators are used. Central-count
equipment generally counts more ballots per hour because it is used to
count the ballots for an entire jurisdiction, rather than an individual
polling site. For central-count optical scan equipment, 10 vendors
reported speed of count ranges from 9,000 to 24,000 ballots per hour. For
precinct-count optical scan equipment, vendors generally did not provide
specific speed of count data, but they stated that one machine is
generally used per polling site.

Generalizations about the effect of technology on wait times are
difficult. In 2001, our mail survey found that 84 percent of jurisdictions
nationwide were satisfied with the amount of voter wait time at the
polling place during the November 2000 election, but that 13 percent of
jurisdictions considered long lines at the polling places to be a major
problem.49 However, we estimated that only 10 percent of jurisdictions
nationwide collected information on the average amount of time that it
took voters to vote. We were told by some jurisdictions that the length of
time voters must wait is affected by ballots that include many races and
issues. Some jurisdictions reported that their ballots were so long that
it took voters a long time in the voting booth to read them and vote. As a
result, lines backed up, and some voters had to wait for over an hour to
cast their votes. Officials in one jurisdiction said that their voters
experienced long wait times in part because redistricting caused

49 GAO-02-3.

confusion among voters, who often turned up at the wrong polling places.
As these examples show, the voting system used is not always a major
factor in voter wait times. However, processes that do depend on the
system may affect the time that a voter must spend voting. For example, in
precincts that use precinct-level counting technology for optical scan
ballots, voters may place their ballots in the automatic feed slot of the
tabulator. This process can add to voting time if the tabulator is
designed to reject ballots that are undervoted, overvoted, or damaged, and
the voter is given the opportunity to correct the ballot.

Cost

Generally, buying DRE units is more expensive than buying optical scan
systems. For a broad picture, consider the comparison that we made in 2001
of the costs of purchasing new voting equipment for local election
jurisdictions based on three types of equipment: central-count optical
scan equipment, precinct-count optical scan equipment, and touchscreen DRE
units.50 Based on equipment cost information available in August 2001, we
estimated that purchasing optical scan equipment that counted ballots at a
central location would cost about $191 million.51 Purchasing an optical
scan counter for each precinct that could notify voters of errors on their
ballots would cost about $1.3 billion. Purchasing touchscreen DRE units
for each precinct, including at least one unit per precinct that could
accommodate blind, deaf, and paraplegic voters, would cost about $3
billion.

For a given jurisdiction, the particular cost involved will depend on the
requirements of the jurisdiction, as well as the particular equipment
chosen. Voting equipment costs vary among types of voting equipment and
among different manufacturers and models of the same type of equipment.
For example, in 2001, DRE touchscreen unit costs ranged from $575 to
$4,500. Similarly, unit costs for precinct-count optical scan equipment
ranged from $4,500 to $7,500. Among other things, these differences can be
attributed to

50 GAO-02-3. 51 Cost estimates include capital costs only.

differences in what is included in the unit cost as well as differences in
the characteristics of the equipment.

In addition to the equipment unit cost, an additional cost for
jurisdictions is the software that operates the equipment, prepares the
ballots, and tallies the votes (and in some cases, prepares the election
results reports). Our vendor survey showed that although some vendors
included the software cost in the unit cost of the voting equipment, most
priced the software separately. Software costs for DRE and optical scan
equipment could run as high as $300,000 per jurisdiction. The higher costs
were generally for the more sophisticated software associated with
election management systems. Because the software generally supported
numerous equipment units, the software unit cost varied depending on the
number of units purchased or the size of the jurisdiction.

Other factors affecting the acquisition cost of voting equipment are the
number and types of peripherals required. In general, DREs require more
peripherals than do optical scan systems, which adds to their expense. For
example, some DREs require smart cards, smart card readers, memory
cartridges and cartridge readers, administrative workstations, and plug-in
devices (for increasing accessibility for voters with disabilities).
Touchscreen DREs may also offer options that affect the cost of the
equipment, such as color versus black and white screens. In addition, most
DREs and all optical scan units require voting booths, and most DREs and
some precinct-based optical scan tabulators offer options for modems.
Precinct-based optical scan tabulators also require ballot boxes to
capture the ballots after they are scanned.

Once jurisdictions acquire the voting equipment, they must also incur the
cost to operate and maintain it, which can vary considerably. For example,
in 2001, jurisdictions that used DREs reported a range of costs from about
$2,000 to $27,000. Similarly, most jurisdictions that used optical scan
equipment reported that operations and maintenance costs ranged from about
$1,300 to $90,000. The higher ends of these cost ranges generally related
to the larger jurisdictions. In fact, one large jurisdiction that used
optical scan equipment reported that its operating costs were $545,000. In
addition, the jurisdictions reported that these costs generally included
software licensing and upgrades, maintenance

contracts with vendors, equipment replacement parts, and supply costs.

For decisions on whether to invest in new voting equipment, both initial
capital costs (i.e., cost to acquire the equipment) and longterm support
costs (i.e., operation and maintenance costs) are relevant. Moreover,
these collective costs (i.e., life-cycle costs) need to be viewed in the
context of the benefits the equipment will provide over its useful life.
It is advisable to link these benefits directly to the performance
characteristics of the equipment and the needs of the jurisdiction.

  Electronic Voting System Performance Depends on System Design

and Implementation The performance of any information technology system,
including electronic voting systems, is heavily influenced by a number of
factors, not the least of which is the quality of the system's design and
the effectiveness with which the system is implemented in an operational
setting. System design and implementation, in turn, are a function of such
things as how well the system's requirements are defined, how well the
system is tested, and how well the people that operate and use the system
understand and follow the procedures that govern their interaction with
it. Our work in 2001 raised concerns about the FEC's voting system
standards, and showed that practices relative to testing and
implementation of voting systems varied across states and local
jurisdictions.

Voting Systems Should Be Designed, Built, and Tested against Well-Defined
Standards

Like that of any information technology product, the design of a voting
system starts with the explicit definition of what the system is to do and
how well it is to do it. These requirements are then translated into
design specifications that are used to develop the system. Organizations
such as the Department of Defense and the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers have developed guidelines for various types of
systems requirements and for the processes that are important to managing
the development of any system throughout its life cycle. These guidelines
address types of

product requirements (e.g., functional and performance), as well as
documentation and process requirements governing the production of the
system.

In the case of voting systems, the FEC had assumed responsibility for
issuing standards that embodied these requirements, a responsibility that
HAVA has since assigned to the EAC. The FEC standards are nevertheless
still the operative standards until the EAC updates them. These FEC-issued
standards apply to system hardware, software, firmware, and
documentation,52 and they span prevoting, 53 voting,54 and postvoting
activities.55 They also address, for example, requirements relating to
system security; system accuracy and integrity; system auditability;
system storage and maintenance; and data retention and transportation. In
addition to these standards, some states and local jurisdictions have
specified their own voting system requirements.

In 2001, we cited a number of problems with the FEC-issued voting system
standards, including missing elements of the standards. Accordingly, we
made recommendations to improve the standards. Subsequently, the FEC
approved the revised voting system standards on April 30, 2002. According
to EAC commissioners with whom we spoke, the commission has inherited the
FEC standards, but it plans to work with NIST to revise and strengthen
them.

To ensure that systems are designed and built in conformance with
applicable standards, our work in 2001 found that three levels of

52 Systems are all those intended for preparing the voting system for use
in an election; producing the appropriate ballot formats; testing that the
voting system and ballot materials have been properly prepared and are
ready for use; recording and counting votes; consolidating and reporting
results; displaying results on site or remotely; and maintaining and
producing audit trail information.

53 Prevoting operations include ballot preparation; the preparation of
election-specific software or firmware; the production of ballots or
ballot pages; the installation of ballots and ballot counting software or
firmware; and system and equipment tests.

54 Voting operations include all operations conducted at the polling place
by voters and officials, including the generation of status messages.

55 Postvoting operations include closing the polling place; obtaining
reports by voting machine, polling place, and precinct (for central-count
systems); obtaining consolidated reports; and obtaining reports of audit
trails.

tests are generally performed: qualification tests, certification tests,
and acceptance tests. For voting systems, the FEC-issued standards called
for qualification testing to be performed by independent testing
authorities. According to the standards, this testing is to ensure that
voting systems comply with both the FEC standards and the systems' own
design specifications. State standards define certification tests, which
the states generally perform to determine how well the systems conform to
individual state laws, requirements, and practice.56 Finally, state and
local standards define acceptance testing, performed by the local
jurisdictions procuring the voting systems. This testing is to determine
whether the equipment, as delivered and installed, satisfies all the
jurisdiction's functional and performance requirements. Beyond these
levels of testing, jurisdictions also perform routine maintenance and
diagnostic activities to further ensure proper system performance on
election day.

Our 2001 work found that the majority of states (38) had adopted the FEC
standards then in place,57 and thus these states required that the voting
systems used in their jurisdictions passed qualification testing.58 In
addition, we reported that qualified voting equipment had been used in
about 49 percent (+-7 percentage points) of jurisdictions nationwide that
used DREs and about 46 percent (+-7 percentage points) of jurisdictions
nationwide that used optical scan technology. However, about 46 percent
(+-5 percentage points) reported that they did not know whether their
equipment had been qualified.

56 States and local jurisdictions may use the standards to baseline the
minimum functional and performance requirements but may also impose other
requirements to meet their needs (such as the type and number of languages
that equipment should support, how a ballot needs to appear on a DRE
screen, or options that allow persons with various types of disabilities
to vote).

57 As of April 2004, the District of Columbia and 42 out of 50 states have
regulations that require voting systems to meet federal standards,
according to the Election Reform Information Project of the University of
Richmond.

58 However, because the standards were not published until 1990 and the
qualification testing program was not established until 1994, we judged in
2001 that many jurisdictions were probably using voting equipment that did
not undergo qualification testing.

As we reported in 2001, 45 states and the District of Columbia told us
that they had certification testing programs, and we estimate from our
mail survey that about 90 percent of jurisdictions used state-certified
voting equipment in the 2000 national election.59 In addition, we reported
that most of the jurisdictions that had recently bought new voting
equipment had conducted some form of acceptance testing. However, the
processes and steps performed and the people who performed them varied.
For example, in one jurisdiction that purchased DREs, election officials
stated that testing consisted of a visual inspection, power-up, opening of
polls, activation and verification of ballots, and closing of polls. In
contrast, officials in another jurisdiction stated that they relied
entirely on the vendor to test their DREs. In jurisdictions that used
optical scan equipment, acceptance testing generally consisted of running
decks of test cards. For example, officials from one jurisdiction stated
that they tested each unit with the assistance of the vendor using a
vendor-supplied test deck.

Our 2001 work found that the processes and people involved in routine
system maintenance, diagnostic, and pre-election day checkout activities
varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, about 90 percent of
jurisdictions nationwide using DRE and optical scan technology had
performed routine or manufacturer-suggested maintenance and checkout
before the 2000 national election. However, our visits to 27 local
election jurisdictions revealed variations in the frequency with which
jurisdictions performed such routine maintenance. For example, some
performed maintenance right before an election, while others performed
maintenance regularly throughout the year. For example, officials in one
jurisdiction that used DREs stated that they tested the batteries monthly.

Voting Systems Should Be Properly Implemented

Proper implementation of voting systems is a matter of people knowing how
to carry out appropriately designed processes to ensure that the
technology performs as intended in an operational

59 GAO-02-3.

setting. According to the EAC commissioners, one of their areas of focus
will be election administration processes and the people who carry out
these processes. Examples include ballot preparation, voter education,
recruiting and training poll workers, setting up the polls, running the
election, and counting the votes.

Ballot preparation. Whether ballots are electronic or paper, they need to
be designed in a way that promotes voter understanding when they are
actually used. Designing both optical scan and DRE ballots requires
consideration of the different types of human interaction entailed and the
application of some human factors expertise. For DREs, programming skills
need to be applied to create the ballot and enter the ballot information
onto an electronic storage medium, which is then uploaded to the unit. For
optical scan systems, paper ballots need to be designed and printed in
specified numbers for distribution to polling places; they may also be
used for absentee balloting, usually in combination with printed mailing
envelopes. Electronic "ballots" in DRE units do not require distribution
separate from the distribution of the voting equipment itself; however,
the use of DREs means that a separate technique is necessary for absentee
ballots-generally paper ballots. Thus, the use of these units generally
requires a mixed election system.

Voter education. Implementation of any voting method requires that voters
understand how to vote-that is, what conventions are followed. For optical
scan systems, voters need to understand how to mark the ballots, they need
to know what kinds of marker (type of pen or pencil) can be used, they
need to be informed if a ballot must be marked on both sides, and so on.
For DRE systems, voters need to understand how to select candidates or
issues and understand that their votes are not cast until the cast vote
button is pressed; for touchscreens, they need to know how to navigate the
various screens presented to them.

Voters also need to understand the procedure for write-in votes. In 2001,
one jurisdiction had an almost 5 percent overvote rate because voters did
not understand the purpose of the ballot section permitting write-in
votes. Voters selected a candidate on the ballot and then wrote the
candidate's name in the write-in section of the ballot, thus overvoting
and spoiling the ballot. In addition to voter education, how the system is
programmed to operate can also

address this issue. For example, precinct-count optical scan equipment can
be programmed to return a voter's ballot if the ballot is overvoted or
undervoted and allow the voter to make changes.

Poll worker recruitment and training. Poll workers need implementation
training. They need to be trained not only in how to assist voters to use
the voting system, but also in how to use the technology for the tasks
poll workers need to perform. These tasks can vary greatly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. When more sophisticated voting systems are
used at polling sites, jurisdictions may find it challenging to find poll
workers with the skills to implement and use newer technologies. In 2001,
we quoted one election official who said that "it is increasingly
difficult to find folks to work for $6 an hour. We are relying on older
retired persons- many who can't/won't keep up with changes in the
technology or laws. Many of our workers are 70+."

Setting up the polls. Proper setup of polling places raises a number of
implementation issues related to the people, processes, and technology
involved. For DREs, the need for appropriate power outlets and possibly
network connections limits the sites that can be used as polling places.
In addition, setting up, initializing, and sometimes networking DRE units
are technically challenging tasks. Technicians and vendor representatives
may be needed to perform these tasks or to assist poll workers with them.
In addition, with DREs, computer security issues come into play that are
different from those associated with the paper and pencil tools that
voters use in optical scan systems. Besides the units themselves, many DRE
systems use cards or tokens that must be physically secured. With optical
scan equipment, the ballots must be physically secured. Further, if
precinct-based tabulation is used with an optical scan system, the
tabulation equipment must be protected from tampering.

Running the election. Many implementation issues associated with running
the election are associated with the interaction of voters with the
technology. Although both DREs and optical scan systems are based on
technologies that most voters will have encountered before, general
familiarity is not enough to avoid voter errors. With optical scan, voter
errors are generally related to improperly marked ballots: the wrong
marking device, stray marks, too many marks

(overvotes), and so on. As described already, DRE equipment is designed to
minimize voter error (by preventing overvotes, for example), but problems
can also occur with this voting method. For example, many DREs require the
voter to push a cast vote button to record the vote. However, some voters
forget to push this button and leave the polling place without doing so.
Similarly, after pressing the final cast vote button, voters cannot alter
their votes. In some cases, this button may be pressed by mistake-for
example, a small child being held by a parent may knock or kick the final
vote button before the parent has completed the ballot.

The technology is not the only factor determining the outcome in these
situations, as different jurisdictions have different rules and processes
concerning such problems. In 2001, we reported that when voters forgot to
press the cast vote button, one jurisdiction required that an election
official reach under the voting booth curtain and push the cast vote
button without looking at the ballot. However, another jurisdiction
required that an election official invalidate the ballot and reset the
machine for a new voter.

Counting the votes. Finally, implementation of the processes for counting
votes is affected both by the technology used and by local requirements.
With DREs, votes are collected within each unit. Some contain removable
storage media that can be taken from the voting unit and transported to a
central location to be tallied. Others can be configured to electronically
transmit the vote totals from the polling place to a central tally
location. As described earlier, optical scan systems also vary in the way
votes are counted, depending on whether precinct-based or centralized
tabulation equipment is used. For optical scan systems, officials follow
state and local regulations and processes to determine whether and how to
count ballots that cannot be read by the tabulation equipment. Counting
such ballots may involve decisions on how to judge voter intent, which are
also generally governed by state and local regulations and processes.

In addition, depending on the type of voting technology used, ways to
perform recounts may differ. For optical scan devices, recounts can be
both automatic and manual; as in the original vote counting, officials
make decisions on counting ballots that cannot be read by the tabulation
equipment and on voter intent. With DREs there is no separate paper ballot
or record of the voter's intention, and

therefore election officials rely on the information recorded in the
machine's memory: that is, permanent (read only) electronic images of each
of the "marked" ballots. The assurance that these images are an accurate
record of the vote depends on several things, including the proper
implementation of the processes involved in designing, maintaining,
setting up, and using the technology.

  Jurisdictions Face Immediate and Longer Term Challenges in

Leveraging Voting Technologies In 2001, we identified four key challenges
confronting local jurisdictions in effectively using and replacing voting
technologies. These challenges are not dissimilar to those faced by any
organization seeking to leverage modern technology to support mission
operations. The first two challenges are particularly relevant in the near
term, as jurisdictions look to position themselves for this year's
national elections. The latter two are more relevant to jurisdictions'
strategic acquisition and use of modern voting systems.

Ensuring that Necessary Security, Testing, and Maintenance Activities Are
Performed

Maximizing the performance of the voting systems that jurisdictions have
and plan to use in November 2004 means taking proactive steps between now
and then to best ensure that systems perform as intended. These steps
include activities aimed at securing, testing, and maintaining these
systems. We reported in 2001 that although the vast majority of
jurisdictions performed security, testing, and maintenance activities in
one form or another, the extent and nature of these activities varied
among jurisdictions and depended on the availability of resources
(financial and human capital) committed to them. The challenge facing all
voting jurisdictions will be to ensure that these activities are fully and
properly performed, particularly in light of the serious security concerns
that have been reported with DREs.

Managing the People, Processes, and Technology as Components of the
Overall Process

As previously discussed in this testimony, jurisdictions need to manage
the triad of people, processes, and technology as interrelated and
interdependent parts of the total voting process. Given the amount of time
that remains between now and the November 2004 elections, jurisdictions'
voting system performance is more likely to be influenced by improvements
in poll worker system operation training, voter education about system
use, and vote casting procedures than by changes to the systems
themselves.60 The challenge for voting jurisdictions is thus to ensure
that these people and process issues are dealt with effectively.

Having Reliable System Performance Measures and Objective Data

Reliable measures and objective data are needed for jurisdictions to know
whether the technology being used is meeting the needs of the user
communities (both the voters and the officials who administer the
elections). In 2001, we reported that the vast majority of jurisdictions
were satisfied with the performance of their respective technologies in
the November 2000 elections. However, this satisfaction was mostly based
not on objective data measuring performance, but rather on the subjective
impressions of election officials. Although these impressions should not
be discounted, informed decisionmaking on voting technology investment
requires more objective data. The challenge for jurisdictions is to define
measures and begin collecting data so that they can definitely know how
their systems are performing.

Ensuring That Technology Cost Is Commensurate with Benefits

Jurisdictions must be able to ensure that the technology will provide
benefits over its useful life that are commensurate with life-cycle costs
(acquisition as well as operations and maintenance) and that these
collective costs are affordable and sustainable. In 2001, we reported that
the technology type and configuration that jurisdictions employed varied
depending on each jurisdiction's unique circumstances, such as size and
resource constraints, and

60 Some system changes may be feasible, such as connecting DREs to
printers.

that reliable data on life-cycle costs and benefits were not available.
The challenge for jurisdictions is to view and treat voting systems as
capital investments and to manage them as such, including basing decisions
on technology investments on clearly defined requirements and reliable
analyses of quantitative and qualitative return on investment.

In closing, I would like to say again that electronic voting systems are
an undeniably critical link in the overall election chain. While this link
alone cannot make an election, it can break one. The problems that some
jurisdictions have experienced and the serious concerns being surfaced by
security experts and others highlight the potential for difficulties in
the upcoming 2004 national elections if the challenges that we cited in
2001 and reiterate in this testimony are not effectively addressed.
Although the EAC only recently began operations and is not yet at full
strength, it needs to remain vigilant in its efforts to ensure that
jurisdictions and voters are educated and well-informed about the proper
implementation and use of electronic voting systems, and to ensure that
jurisdictions take the appropriate steps-related to people, process, and
technology-that are needed regarding security, testing, and maintenance.
More strategically, the EAC needs to move swiftly to strengthen the
voluntary voting system guidelines and the testing associated with
enforcing these guidelines. Critical to the commission's ability to do
this will be the adequacy of resources at its disposal and the degree of
cooperation it receives from entities at all levels of government.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.

  Contact and Acknowledgements

For further information, please contact Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-6256
or by e-mail at [email protected]. Other key contributors to this testimony
were Barbara S. Collier, Deborah A. Davis, Richard B. Hung, John M. Ortiz,
Jr., Maria J. Santos, and Linda R. Watson.

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