    Elections: Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents
    Challenges (20-JUL-04, GAO-04-975T).

    The technology used to cast and count votes is one aspect of the
    multifaceted U.S. election process. GAO examined voting
    technology, among other things, in a series of reports that it
    issued in 2001 following the problems encountered in the 2000
    election. In October 2002, the Congress enacted the Help America
    Vote Act, which, among other things, established the Election
    Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration of
    federal elections. The act also established a program to provide
    funds to states to replace older punch card and lever machine
    voting equipment. As this older voting equipment has been
    replaced with newer electronic voting systems over the last 2
    years, concerns have been raised about the vulnerabilities
    associated with certain electronic voting systems. Among other
    things, GAO's testimony focuses on attributes on which electronic
    voting systems can be assessed, as well as design and
    implementation factors affecting their performance. GAO also
    describes the immediate and longer-term challenges confronting
    local jurisdictions in using any type of voting equipment,
    particularly electronic voting systems.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-975T
        ACCNO:   A11053
      TITLE:     Elections: Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and
    Presents Challenges
         DATE:   07/20/2004
      SUBJECT:   Elections
    	     Electronic forms
    	     Federal law
    	     Performance measures
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Systems analysis
    	     Systems evaluation
    	     Information systems
    	     Federal aid to localities
    	     Federal aid to states

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    GAO-04-975T

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO Testimony

    Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy,
    Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee on Government
    Reform, House of Representatives

    For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT Tuesday, July 20, 2004

    ELECTIONS

             Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges

    Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and
    Systems

    GAO-04-975T

    Highlights of GAO-04-975T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
    Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the
    Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

    The technology used to cast and count votes is one aspect of the
    multifaceted U.S. election process. GAO examined voting technology, among
    other things, in a series of reports that it issued in 2001 following the
    problems encountered in the 2000 election. In October 2002, the Congress
    enacted the Help America Vote Act, which, among other things, established
    the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration
    of federal elections. The act also established a program to provide funds
    to states to replace older punch card and lever machine voting equipment.
    As this older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic
    voting systems over the last 2 years, concerns have been raised about the
    vulnerabilities associated with certain electronic voting systems.

    Among other things, GAO's testimony focuses on attributes on which
    electronic voting systems can be assessed, as well as design and
    implementation factors affecting their performance. GAO also describes the
    immediate and longer term challenges confronting local jurisdictions in
    using any type of voting equipment, particularly electronic voting
    systems.

    July 20, 2004

    ELECTIONS

    Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges

    An electronic voting system, like other automated information systems, can
    be judged on several bases, including how well its design provides for
    security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as its cost. For
    example, direct recording electronic systems offer advantages in ease of
    use because they can have features that accommodate voters with various
    disabilities, and they protect against common voter errors, such as
    overvoting (voting for more candidates than is permissible); a
    disadvantage of such systems is their capital cost and frequent lack of an
    independent paper audit trail. Advantages of optical scan voting equipment
    (another type of electronic voting system) include capital cost and the
    enhanced security associated with having a paper audit trail;
    disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as limited ability to
    accommodate voters with disabilities.

    One important determinant of voting system performance is how it is
    designed and developed, including the testing that determines whether the
    developed system performs as designed. In the design and development
    process, a critical factor is the quality of the specified system
    requirements as embodied in applicable standards or guidance. For voting
    technology, these voluntary standards have historically been problematic;
    the EAC has now been given responsibility for voting system guidelines,
    and it intends to update them. The EAC also intends to strengthen the
    process for testing voting system hardware and software. A second
    determinant of performance is how the system is implemented. In
    implementing a system, it is critical to have people with the requisite
    knowledge and skills to operate it according to well-defined and
    understood processes. The EAC also intends to focus on these people and
    process factors in its role of assisting in the administration of
    elections.

    In the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the challenges
    confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting systems are
    similar to those facing any technology user. These challenges include both
    immediate and more long term challenges, as shown in the table.

    Challenges in Using Electronic Voting Systems

                                  Time frame Challenge

    Near term  o  	Performing those security, testing, and maintenance
    activities needed to adequately ensure that the system operates as
    intended.

    o  	Managing the system, the people who interact with the system, and the
    processes that govern this interaction as interrelated and interdependent
    parts.

    Long term  o  	Having reliable measures and objective data to know whether
    the system is meeting the needs of the user community (both voters and
    those who administer the elections).

                                                          o  Making choices about
                                                            future system changes
                                                            in light of whether a
        www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-975T.                 given system will
                                                            provide benefits over
                                                             its useful life that
                                                            are commensurate with
                                                                             life
                                                             cycle costs, and
        To view the full product, including the             ensuring that these
                         scope                             costs are affordable.
    and methodology, click on the link above.  Source:
                                                   GAO.
    For more information, contact Randolph C.
        Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

    I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on
    electronic voting systems.1 In light of concerns associated with the
    voting systems used in the 2000 election, we produced a series of reports,
    issued in 2001,2 in which we examined virtually every aspect of the
    election process, including types of voting technology. As we reported in
    2001, the particular technology used to cast and count votes is a critical
    part of this process, but it is only one facet of a multifaceted election
    process. Other facets include the people who implement and use the
    technology and the processes that govern its implementation, among which
    are the standards used to define the characteristics and performance of
    the technology. Accordingly, we recognized that no voting technology,
    however well designed, can be a magic bullet that will solve all the
    problems that can arise in the election process. At the same time, we also
    recognized that if not properly managed, this one facet of the election
    process can significantly undermine the integrity of the whole.

    As requested, my testimony today will focus on electronic voting systems,
    and in doing so I will address (1) the role of these systems within the
    larger election process, (2) attributes that can be used to examine these
    systems' capabilities, (3) the importance of both system design and
    implementation to the performance of these systems, and (4) the challenges
    confronting local jurisdictions in using any type of voting equipment,
    particularly electronic voting systems.

    In preparing for this testimony, we drew extensively from our published
    work on the election process. We augmented this work

    1 In this testimony, the term electronic voting system is used
    generically, to refer both to optical scan systems and direct recording
    electronic systems, both of which depend on electronic technology. Each
    type of system is described more fully in the Background section of this
    testimony.

    2 For example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Perspectives on
    Activities and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.:
    Oct. 15, 2001); Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment
    Standards, GAO-02-52 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001); and Elections: A
    Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals, GAO-02-90 (Washington, D.C.:
    Oct. 15, 2001).

    with reviews of more recent studies of electronic voting systems and other
    relevant documents. In addition, we interviewed commissioners of the newly
    appointed Election Assistance Commission (EAC) regarding its efforts to
    date and its plans, and we attended EAC and other commission hearings on
    electronic voting systems. Our follow-up work was performed from February
    to July 2004 in Washington, D.C. All the work on which this testimony is
    based was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards.

      Results in Brief

    Electronic voting systems play a vital role in elections, but they are
    only one component in a multidimensional process. The people, processes,
    and technology that make up these various dimensions all contribute to the
    success of the overall election process. From a national perspective, this
    overall process involves many levels of government, including over 10,000
    jurisdictions with widely varying characteristics and requirements. For
    example, the size of a jurisdiction and the languages spoken by voters are
    significant variables in local election processes, as is the performance
    of the particular voting system used.

    The performance of an electronic voting system, like any type of automated
    information system, can be judged on several bases, including how well its
    design provides for security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as
    well as cost. For example, direct recording electronic systems have
    advantages in ease of use because they can have features that accommodate
    persons with various disabilities, and they provide features that protect
    against common voter errors; disadvantages of such systems are their cost
    and their frequent lack of an independent paper audit trail. Advantages of
    optical scan voting equipment, which is another type of electronic voting
    system, include cost and the enhanced security associated with having a
    paper audit trail; disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as their
    limited ability to accommodate voters with disabilities.

    Voting system performance is a function of two very important activities:
    system design and development-including the testing

    that determines whether the developed system performs as designed-and
    system implementation. One critical input to the design and development
    process is the quality of the specified system requirements as embodied in
    applicable standards. For voting technology, these standards have
    historically been problematic, and they are now a focus of the EAC.
    Critical inputs to the system implementation process are having people
    with the requisite knowledge and skills to operate and use the system, and
    having well-defined and understood processes governing this operation and
    use. Both are also areas of focus by the commission.

    Looking toward to the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the
    challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting
    systems are not unlike those facing any technology user. These challenges
    include (1) performing those security, testing, and maintenance activities
    needed to minimize risk and adequately ensure that the system operates as
    intended; (2) managing the system, the people who interact with the
    system, and the processes that govern this interaction as interrelated and
    interdependent parts; (3) having reliable measures and objective data to
    know whether the system is meeting the needs of the jurisdiction's user
    community (both the voters and the persons who administer the elections);
    and (4) making choices about future system changes in light of whether a
    given system will provide benefits over its useful life commensurate with
    life-cycle costs, and ensuring that these costs are affordable.

    Background

    Following the 2000 national elections, we performed a comprehensive series
    of reviews covering our nation's election process, in which we identified
    a number of challenges. These reviews culminated in a capping report that
    summarized this work and provided the Congress with a framework for
    considering options for election administration reform.3 Our reports and

    3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: A Framework for Evaluating
    Reform Proposals, GAO-02-90 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

    framework were among the resources that the Congress drew on in enacting
    the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002,4 which provided guidance for
    fundamental election administration reform. Among other things, the act
    authorizes $3.86 billion in funding over several fiscal years for programs
    to replace punch card and mechanical lever voting equipment, improve
    election administration, improve accessibility, train poll workers, and
    perform research and pilot studies. It also created the EAC to oversee the
    election administration reform process. Since the act's passage, a number
    of voting jurisdictions have replaced their older voting equipment with
    direct recording electronic systems. At the same time, concerns have been
    raised about the use of these systems; some have reported that these
    systems have serious security vulnerabilities and that the embedded
    controls are not sufficient to ensure the integrity of the election
    process. The EAC, which began operations in January 2004, held a public
    hearing in May 2004 at which a major topic was the security and
    reliability of electronic voting devices.

    GAO Work Following the 2000 Elections Provided a Framework for Election

    Administration Reform

    At the request of congressional leaders, committees, and members, we
    conducted an extensive body of work in the wake of the 2000 elections,
    which culminated in seven reports addressing a range of election-related
    topics.

    First, we reviewed the constitutional framework for the administration of
    elections, as well as major federal statutes enacted in this area. 5 We
    reported that the constitutional framework for elections includes both
    state and federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of
    both their own elections and federal elections, but the Congress has
    enacted laws in several major areas of the voting process, including the
    timing of federal

    4 Pub. L. No. 107-252.

    5 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: The Scope of Congressional
    Authority in Election Administration, GAO-01-470 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
    13, 2001).

    elections, voter registration, and absentee voting requirements.
    Congressional authority to legislate in this area derives from various
    constitutional sources, depending upon the type of election. For federal
    elections, the Congress has constitutional authority over both
    congressional and presidential elections.

    Second, we examined voting assistance for military and overseas voters.6
    We reported that although tools are available for such voters, many
    potential voters were unaware of them, and many military and overseas
    voters believed it was challenging to understand and comply with state
    requirements and local procedures for absentee voting. In addition,
    although information was not readily available on the precise number of
    military and overseas absentee votes that were disqualified in the 2000
    general election and the reasons for disqualification, we found through a
    national telephone survey that almost two-thirds of the disqualified
    absentee ballots were rejected because of lateness or errors in completion
    of the envelope or form accompanying the ballot. We recommended that the
    Secretaries of Defense and State improve (1) the clarity and completeness
    of service guidance, (2) voter education and outreach programs, (3)
    oversight and evaluation of voting assistance efforts, and (4) sharing of
    best practices. The Departments of Defense and State agreed with our
    overall findings and recommendations, and as of May 2004, the
    recommendations had largely been implemented.

    Third, we investigated whether minorities and disadvantaged voters were
    more likely to have their votes not counted because the voting method they
    used was less reliable than that of affluent white voters.7 According to
    our results, the state in which counties were located had more effect on
    the number of uncounted presidential votes than did counties' demographic
    characteristics or voting method. State differences accounted for 26
    percent of the total

    6 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Voting Assistance to Military
    and Overseas Citizens Should Be Improved, GAO-01-1026 (Washington, D.C.:
    Sept. 28, 2001).

    7 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Statistical Analysis of
    Factors That Affected Uncounted Votes in the 2000 Presidential Election,
    GAO-02-122 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

    variation in uncounted presidential votes across counties.8 County
    demographic characteristics accounted for 16 percent of the variation
    (counties with higher percentages of minority residents tended to have
    higher percentages of uncounted presidential votes, while counties with
    higher percentages of younger and more educated residents tended to have
    lower percentages of uncounted presidential votes), and voting equipment
    accounted for 2 percent of the variation.

    Fourth, in a review of voting accessibility for voters with disabilities,9
    we found that all states had provisions addressing voting by people with
    disabilities, but these provisions varied greatly. Federal law requires
    that voters with disabilities have access to polling places for federal
    elections, with some exceptions.10 All states provided for one or more
    alternative voting methods or accommodations intended to facilitate voting
    by people with disabilities. In addition, states and localities had made
    several efforts to improve voting accessibility for voters with
    disabilities, such as modifying polling places, acquiring new voting
    equipment, and expanding voting options, but state and county election
    officials surveyed cited various challenges to improving access. We
    concluded that given the limited availability of accessible polling
    places, other options that could allow more voters with disabilities to
    vote at a polling place on election day include reassigning them to other,
    more accessible polling places or creating accessible superprecincts in
    which voters from more than one precinct could all vote in the same
    building.

    Fifth, we reported on the status and use of voting equipment standards
    developed by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).11

    8 State differences may have included such factors as statewide voter
    education efforts, state standards for determining what is a valid vote,
    the use of straight party ballots, the number of candidates on the ballot,
    the use of provisional ballots, and the extent to which absentee or early
    voting occurred.

    9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Voters with Disabilities: Access to
    Polling Places and Alternative Voting Methods, GAO-02-107 (Washington,
    D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

    10 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973ee-1.

    11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Status and Use of Federal
    Voting Equipment Standards, GAO-02-52 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

    These standards define minimum functional and performance requirements, as
    well as minimum life-cycle management processes for voting equipment
    developers to follow, such as quality assurance. At the time of our
    review, no federal agency had explicit statutory responsibility for
    developing the standards; however, the FEC developed voluntary standards
    for computer-based systems in 1990,12 and the Congress provided funding
    for this effort. Similarly, no federal agency was responsible for testing
    voting systems against the federal standards. Instead, the National
    Association of State Election Directors accredited independent test
    authorities to test voting systems against the standards. We noted,
    however, that the FEC standards had not been updated since 1990 and were
    consequently out of date. We suggested that the Congress consider
    assigning explicit federal authority, responsibility, and accountability
    for the standards, including their proactive and continuous update and
    maintenance; we also suggested that the Congress consider what, if any,
    federal role is appropriate regarding implementation of the standards,
    including the accreditation of independent test authorities and the
    qualification of voting systems. Both of these matters were addressed in
    the Help America Vote Act, which, among other things, set up the EAC to
    take responsibility for voluntary voting system guidelines. We also made
    recommendations to the FEC aimed at improving the guidelines. Before the
    EAC became operational, the FEC continued to update and maintain the
    guidelines, issuing a new version in 2002.

    Sixth, we issued a report on election activities and challenges across the
    nation.13 In this report, we described the operations and challenges
    associated with each stage of the election process, including voter
    registration; absentee and early voting; 14 election day administration;
    and vote counts, certification, and recounts. The report also provided
    analyses on issues associated with voting

    12 Performance and Test Standards for Punchcard, Marksense, and Direct
    Recording Electronic Voting Systems (January 1990).

    13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Perspectives on Activities
    and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15,
    2001);

    14 Absentee and early voting allows eligible persons to vote in person or
    by mail before election day.

    systems that were used in the November 2000 elections and the potential
    use of the Internet for voting. Among other things, we pointed out that
    each of the major stages of an election depends on the effective
    interaction of people (the election officials and voters), processes (or
    internal controls), and technology (registration systems, election
    management systems, and voting systems). We also enumerated the challenges
    facing election officials at all stages of the election process.

    Finally, we issued a capping report that included a framework for
    evaluating election administration reform proposals.15 Among other things,
    we observed that the constitutional and operational division of federal
    and state authority to conduct elections had resulted in great variability
    in the ways that elections are administered in the United States. We
    concluded that given the diversity and decentralized nature of election
    administration, careful consideration needed to be given to the degree of
    flexibility and the planned time frames for implementing new initiatives.
    We also concluded that in order for election administration reform to be
    effective, reform proposals must address all major parts of our election
    system-its people, processes, and technology-which are interconnected and
    significantly affect the election process. And finally, we provided an
    analytical framework for the Congress to consider in deciding on changes
    to the overall election process.

    The Help America Vote Act Was Enacted to Strengthen the Overall Election
    Process

    Enacted by the Congress in October 2002, the Help America Vote Act of 2002
    addressed a range of election issues, including the lack of explicit
    federal (statutory) responsibility for developing and maintaining
    standards for electronic voting systems and for testing voting systems
    against standards.

    With the far-reaching goal of improving the election process in every
    state, the act affects nearly every aspect of the voting process, from
    voting technology to provisional ballots, and from voter registration to
    poll worker training. In particular, the act established a program

    15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: A Framework for Evaluating
    Reform Proposals, GAO-02-90 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

    to provide funds to states to replace punch card and lever machine voting
    equipment,16 established the EAC to assist in the administration of
    federal elections and provide assistance with the administration of
    certain federal election laws and programs, and established minimum
    election administration standards for the states and units of local
    government that are responsible for the administration of federal
    elections. In January 2004, the Congressional Research Service reported
    that disbursements to states for the replacement of older equipment and
    election administration improvements totaled $649.5 million.17

    The act specifically tasked the EAC to serve as a national clearinghouse
    and resource for compiling election information and reviewing election
    procedures; for example, it is to conduct periodic studies of election
    administration issues to promote methods of voting and administration that
    are most convenient, accessible, and easy to use for all voters. Other
    examples of EAC responsibilities include

    0M	developing and adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and
    maintaining information on the experiences of states in implementing the
    guidelines and operating voting systems;

    0M	testing, certifying, decertifying, and recertifying voting system
    hardware and software through accredited laboratories;

    0M	making payments to states to help them improve elections in the areas
    of voting systems standards, provisional voting and voting information
    requirements, and computerized statewide voter registration lists; and

    0M making grants for research on voting technology improvements.

    According to the act, reporting to the EAC will be the Technical
    Guidelines Development Committee, which will make

    16 The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for
    administering grants to the states to replace punch card systems and lever
    machines in qualifying states, including providing payments for general
    election administration improvements to states that apply for funds to
    replace voting equipment.

    17 Kevin J. Coleman and Eric A. Fischer, Elections Reform: Overview and
    Issues, Congressional Research Service RS20898 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 21,
    2004).

    recommendations on voluntary voting system guidelines. The National
    Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will provide technical
    support to the development committee, and the NIST Director will serve as
    its chairman.

    In December 2003, the EAC commissioners were appointed, and the EAC began
    operations in January 2004. According to the commission chairman, the
    EAC's fiscal year 2004 budget is $1.2 million, and its near-term plans
    focus on complying with requirements established in HAVA. In that regard,
    the EAC issued its first annual report to the Congress in April of this
    year on the status of election administration reform. The EAC also plans
    to issue best practices guidelines in July 2004 to increase the
    reliability of voting equipment and systems for the November 2004
    elections. The guidelines also include guidance on recruiting and training
    poll workers. The commission's longer term plans include updating the
    voluntary voting system guidelines and improving the process for
    independent testing of voting systems. Toward this end, the EAC's
    Technical Guidelines Development Committee recently held its first meeting
    to develop a plan to update voluntary voting system guidelines. According
    to some commissioners, current operations are constrained by a lack of
    persons in key staff positions, including the Executive Director, General
    Counsel, and Inspector General.

    Electronic Voting Systems Fall into Two Primary Categories

    In the United States today, most votes are cast and counted by one of two
    types of electronic voting systems: optical scan and direct recording
    electronic (DRE). Two older voting technologies were also used in the 2000
    elections: punch card equipment (used by about 31 percent of registered
    voters in 2000 and expected to be used by 19 percent in 2004) and
    mechanical lever voting machines (used by about 17 percent of registered
    voters in 2000 and expected to be 13 percent in 2004). 18 These equipment
    types are being

    18 Figures for the 2000 and 2004 elections are according to Election Data
    Services, Inc. Election Data Services, Inc., is a political consulting
    firm specializing in redistricting, election administration, and the
    analysis and presentation of census and political data.

    replaced as required by provisions established in HAVA.19 In addition, for
    a small minority of registered voters, votes are cast and counted manually
    on paper ballots.20

    Optical Scan Systems

    Optical scan voting systems use electronic technology to tabulate paper
    ballots. Although optical scan technology has been in use for decades for
    such tasks as scoring standardized tests, it was not applied to voting
    until the 1980s. In 2000, about 31 percent of registered voters voted on
    optical scan systems. In the 2004 election, according to Election Data
    Services, Inc., about 32 percent of registered voters will use optical
    scan voting equipment.

    For voting, an optical scan system is made up of computer-readable
    ballots, appropriate marking devices, privacy booths, and a computerized
    tabulation device. The ballot, which can be of various sizes, lists the
    names of the candidates and the issues. Voters record their choices using
    an appropriate writing instrument to fill in boxes or ovals, or to
    complete an arrow next to the candidate's name or the issue. The ballot
    includes a space for write-ins to be placed directly on the ballot.

    Optical scan ballots are tabulated by optical-mark-recognition equipment
    (see fig. 1), which counts the ballots by sensing or reading the marks on
    the ballot. Ballots can be counted at the polling place-this is referred
    to as precinct-count optical scan21-or

    19 Pub. L. 107-252, Sec. 102, provides federal funds to states for the
    systematic removal and replacement of punch card voting systems and lever
    voting systems in time for the regularly scheduled general election for
    federal offices to be held in November 2004; states that receive a
    certified waiver may extend their replacement time frame until the first
    election for federal office after January 1, 2006.

    20 We reported that about 1 percent of registered voters used manually
    counted paper ballots in the 2000 elections. Election Data Services, Inc.,
    reports that about 0.6 percent will use this method in the 2004 elections.

    21 Precinct-count optical scan equipment sits on a ballot box with two
    compartments for scanned ballots-one for accepted ballots (i.e., those
    that are properly filled out) and one for rejected ballots (i.e., blank
    ballots, ballots with write-ins, or those accepted because of a forced
    override). In addition, an auxiliary compartment in the ballot box is used
    for storing ballots if an emergency arises (e.g., loss of power or machine
    failure) that prevents the ballots from being scanned.

    at a central location. If ballots are counted at the polling place, voters
    or election officials put the ballots into the tabulation equipment, which
    tallies the votes; these tallies can be captured in removable storage
    media that are transported to a central tally location, or they can be
    electronically transmitted from the polling place to the central tally
    location. If ballots are centrally counted, voters drop ballots into
    sealed boxes, and election officials transfer the sealed boxes to the
    central location after the polls close, where election officials run the
    ballots through the tabulation equipment.

    Figure 1: Precinct-Count Optical Scan Tabulator and Central-Count Optical
    Scan Tabulator

    Software instructs the tabulation equipment to assign each vote (i.e., to
    assign valid marks on the ballot to the proper candidate or issue). In
    addition to identifying the particular contests and candidates, the
    software can be configured to capture, for example, straight party voting
    and vote-for-no-more-than-N contests. Precinct-based optical scanners can
    also be programmed to detect overvotes (where the voter votes for two
    candidates for one office, for example,

    invalidating the vote) and undervotes (where the voter does not vote for
    all contests or issues on the ballot) and to take some action in response
    (rejecting the ballot, for instance). In addition, optical scan systems
    often use vote-tally software to tally the vote totals from one or more
    vote tabulation devices.

    If election officials program precinct-based optical scan systems to
    detect and reject overvotes and undervotes, voters can fix their mistakes
    before leaving the polling place. However, if voters are unwilling or
    unable to correct their ballots, a poll worker can manually override the
    program and accept the ballot, even though it has been overvoted or
    undervoted. If ballots are tabulated centrally, voters do not have the
    opportunity to correct mistakes that may have been made.

    Direct Recording Electronic Systems

    First introduced in the 1970s, DREs capture votes electronically, without
    the use of paper ballots. In the 2000 election, about 12 percent of voters
    used this type of technology. In the 2004 election, according to Election
    Data Services, Inc., about 29 percent of registered voters will use this
    voting technology.

    DREs come in two basic types, pushbutton or touchscreen, the pushbutton
    being the older technology; during the 2000 elections, pushbutton DREs
    were the most prevalent of the two types. The two types vary considerably
    in appearance (see fig. 2). Pushbutton DREs are larger and heavier than
    touchscreens.

    Figure 2: DRE Pushbutton and DRE Touchscreen

    Pushbutton and touchscreen units also differ significantly in the way they
    present ballots to the voter. With the pushbutton, all ballot information
    is presented on a single "full-face" ballot. For example,

    a ballot may have 50 buttons on a 3 by 3 foot ballot, with a candidate or
    issue next to each button. In contrast, touchscreen DREs display the
    ballot information on an electronic display screen. For both pushbutton
    and touchscreen types, the ballot information is programmed onto an
    electronic storage medium, which is then uploaded to the machine. For
    touchscreens, ballot information can be displayed in color and can
    incorporate pictures of the candidates. Because the ballot space on a
    touchscreen is much smaller than on a pushbutton machine, voters who use
    touchscreens must page through the ballot information. Both touchscreen
    and pushbutton DREs can accommodate multilingual ballots.

    Despite the differences, the two types have some similarities, such as how
    the voter interacts with the voting equipment. For pushbuttons, voters
    press a button next to the candidate or issue, which then lights up to
    indicate the selection. Similarly, voters using touchscreens make their
    selections by touching the screen next to the candidate or issue, which is
    then highlighted. When voters are finished making their selections on a
    touchscreen or a pushbutton DRE, they cast their votes by pressing a final
    "vote" button or screen. Until they hit this final button or screen,
    voters can change their selections. Both types allow voters to write in
    candidates. While most DREs allow voters to type write-ins on a keyboard,
    some pushbutton types require voters to write the name on paper tape that
    is part of the device.

    Although DREs do not use paper ballots, they do retain permanent
    electronic images of all the ballots, which can be stored on various
    media, including internal hard disk drives, flash cards, or memory
    cartridges. According to vendors, these ballot images, which can be
    printed, can be used for auditing and recounts.

    Some of the newer DREs use smart card technology as a security feature.
    Smart cards are plastic devices-about the size of a credit card-that use
    integrated circuit chips to store and process data, much like a computer.
    Smart cards are generally used as a means to open polls and to authorize
    voter access to ballots. For instance, smart cards on some DREs store
    program data on the election and are used to help set up the equipment;
    during setup, election workers verify that the card received is for the
    proper election. Other DREs are programmed to automatically activate when
    the

    voter inserts a smart card; the card brings up the correct ballot onto the
    screen. In general, the interface with the voter is very similar to that
    of an automatic teller machine.

    Like optical scan devices, DREs require the use of software to program the
    various ballot styles and tally the votes, which is generally done through
    the use of memory cartridges or other media. The software is used to
    generate ballots for each precinct within the voting jurisdiction, which
    includes defining the ballot layout, identifying the contests in each
    precinct, and assigning candidates to contests. The software is also used
    to configure any special options, such as straight party voting and
    vote-for-no-morethan-N contests. In addition, for pushbutton types, the
    software assigns the buttons to particular candidates and, for
    touchscreens, the software defines the size and location on the screen
    where the voter makes the selection. Vote-tally software is often used to
    tally the vote totals from one or more units.

    DREs offer various configurations for tallying the votes. Some contain
    removable storage media that can be taken from the voting device and
    transported to a central location to be tallied. Others can be configured
    to electronically transmit the vote totals from the polling place to a
    central tally location.

    DREs are designed not to allow overvotes; for example, if a voter selects
    a second choice in a two-way race, the first choice is deselected. In
    addition to this standard feature, different types offer a variety of
    options, including many aimed at voters with disabilities, that
    jurisdictions may choose to purchase. In our 2001 work, we cited the
    following features as being offered in some models of DRE:

    0M	A "no-vote" option. This option helps avoid unintentional undervotes.
    This provides the voter with the option to select "no vote (or abstain)"
    on the display screen if the voter does not want to vote on a particular
    contest or issue.

    0M	A "review" feature. This feature requires voters to review each page of
    the ballot before pressing the button to cast the vote.

    0M	Visual enhancements. Visual enhancements include color highlighting of
    ballot choices, candidate pictures, etc.

    0M	Accommodations for voters with disabilities. Examples of options for
    voters who are blind include Braille keyboards and audio interfaces.22 At
    least one vendor reported that its DRE accommodates voters with
    neurological disabilities by offering head movement switches and "sip and
    puff" plug-ins.23 Another option is voice recognition capability, which
    allows voters to make selections orally.

    0M	An option to recover spoiled ballots. This feature allows voters to
    recast their votes after their original ballots are cast. For this option,
    every DRE at the poll site would be connected to a local area network. A
    poll official would void the original "spoiled" ballot through the
    administrative workstation that is also connected to the local area
    network. The voter could then cast another ballot.

    0M	An option to provide printed receipts. In this case, the voter would
    receive a paper printout or ballot when the vote is cast. This feature is
    intended to provide voters and/or election officials with an opportunity
    to check what is printed against what is recorded and displayed. It is
    envisioned that procedures would be in place to retrieve the paper
    receipts from the voters so that they could not be used for vote selling.
    Some DREs also have an infrared "presence sensor" that is used to control
    the receipt printer in the event the voter is allowed to keep the paper
    receipt; if the voter leaves without taking the receipt, the receipt is
    pulled back into the printer.

    Expanded Use of Electronic Voting Systems Has Raised Concerns

    As older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic voting
    systems over the last 2 years, the debate has shifted from hanging chads
    and butterfly ballots to vulnerabilities associated with DREs. Problems
    with these devices in recent elections have arisen in various states. For
    example:

    22 According to spokespersons for national advocacy groups for people with
    disabilities, only a small percentage of blind people have the Braille
    proficiency needed to vote using a Braille ballot.

    23 Using a mouth-held straw, the voter issues switch commands-hard puff,
    hard sip, soft puff, and soft sip-to provide signals or instructions to
    the voting machine.

    0M	Six DRE units used in two North Carolina counties lost 436 ballots cast
    in early voting for the 2002 general election because of a software
    problem, according to a February 9, 2004, report in Wired News. The
    manufacturer said that problems with the firmware of its touchscreen
    machines led to the lost ballots. The state was trying out the machines in
    early voting to determine if it wanted to switch from the optical scan
    machines it already owned to the new touchscreen systems.

    0M	According to a January 2004 report in Wired News, blank ballots were
    recorded for 134 voters who signed in and cast ballots in Broward County,
    Florida. These votes represented about 1.3 percent of the more than 10,000
    people who voted in the race for a state house representative.

    0M	USA Today reported that four California counties suffered from problems
    with DREs in a March 2004 election, including miscounted ballots, delayed
    polling place openings, and incorrect ballots. In San Diego County, about
    one-third of the county's polling places did not open on time because of
    battery problems caused by a faulty power switch.

    Additionally, serious questions are being raised about the security of
    DREs. Some state that their use could compromise the integrity of the
    election process and that these devices need auditing mechanisms, such as
    receipt printers that would provide a paper audit trail and allow voters
    to confirm their choices.24 Among these critics are computer scientists,
    citizens groups, and legislators.

    For example, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities
    released a security analysis of software from a DRE of a major vendor,
    concluding that the code had serious security flaws that could permit
    tampering.25 Other computer scientists, while

    24 Stanford University computer science professor David Dill was reported
    as saying "All of this just underscores the need for voting machines to
    have a paper trail." Dill runs Verified Voting, a group that is urging
    election officials and legislators to mandate voter-verified paper ballots
    as audit tools.

    25 Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach,
    Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, Johns Hopkins University
    Information Security Institute, TR2003-19 (July 2003).

    agreeing that the code contained security flaws, criticized the study for
    not recognizing how standard election procedures can mitigate these
    weaknesses. Following the Johns Hopkins and Rice study, the State of
    Maryland contracted with both SAIC and RABA Technologies to study the same
    DRE equipment. The SAIC study found that the equipment, as implemented in
    Maryland, poses a security risk.26 Similarly, RABA identified
    vulnerabilities associated with the equipment.27 An earlier Caltech/MIT
    study28 noted that despite security strengths of the election process in
    the United States,29 current trends in electronic voting are weakening
    those strengths and introducing risks; according to this study, properly
    designed and implemented electronic voting systems could actually improve,
    rather than diminish, security.

    Citizen advocacy groups are also taking action. For example, according to
    an April 21, 2004, press release from the Campaign for Verifiable Voting
    in Maryland, the group filed a lawsuit against the Maryland State Board of
    Elections to force election officials to decertify the DRE machines used
    in Maryland until the manufacturer remedies security vulnerabilities and
    institutes a paper audit trail.

    Legislators and other officials are also responding to the issues. In at
    least 20 states, according to the Associated Press, legislation has been
    introduced requiring a paper record of every vote cast.30 Following the
    problems in California described above, the California

    26 Science Applications International Corporation, Risk Assessment Report,
    SAIC-60992003-261 (Sept. 2, 2003).

    27 RABA Technologies, LLC, Trusted Agent Report (Jan. 20, 2004).

    28 Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be
    (July 2001). (http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/2001report.html)

    29 These strengths include the openness of the election process, which
    permits observation of counting and other aspects of election procedure;
    the decentralization of elections and the division among different levels
    of government and groups of people; equipment that produces "redundant
    trusted recordings" of votes; and the public nature and control of the
    election process.

    30 Rachel Konrad, Legislators Wary of Electronic Voting, The Associated
    Press (Apr. 24, 2004).

    Secretary of State banned the use of one model of touchscreen DREs and
    conditionally decertified other similar models. According to the New York
    Times, these models represented 14,000 and 28,000 units, respectively.31
    The Secretary recommended that the state Attorney General consider taking
    civil and criminal action against the manufacturer for "fraudulent
    actions." The decision followed the recommendations of the state's Voting
    Systems and Procedures Panel, which urged the Secretary of State to
    prohibit the four counties that experienced difficulties from using their
    touchscreen units in the November 2004 election. The panel reported that
    the manufacturer did not obtain federal approval of the model used in the
    four affected counties and installed software that had not been approved
    by the Secretary of State. It also noted that problems with the systems
    prevented an unspecified number of voters from casting ballots. In
    addition, two California state senators drafted a bill to prohibit the use
    of any DRE voting system without a paper trail in the 2004 general
    election; they planned to introduce the bill if the Secretary of State did
    not act.32 In June 2004, the Secretary of State proposed standards for the
    creation and testing of paper trails for electronic voting systems.

    At the federal level, several bills have been introduced in response to
    concerns about electronic voting technology. One of the bills,33 the Voter
    Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 (H.R. 2239), if
    enacted, would require that voting machines used in elections for federal
    office produce paper audit trails so that voters and election officials
    can check accuracy.34 Among other provisions,

    31 John Schwartz, "High-Tech Voting Is Banned in California," New York
    Times (May 1, 2004).

    32 Tim Reiterman, Stuart Pfeifer, and Jean O. Pasco, "State Is Urged to
    Ban Vote Machine," Los Angeles Times (Apr. 24, 2004).

    33 Other related measures include S 1986, Protecting American Democracy
    Act of 2003; S 2045, Secure and Verifiable Electronic Voting Act of 2004;
    S2313, Restore Elector Confidence in Our Representative Democracy Act of
    2004; and S 2437, Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2004.

    34 A companion to this bill in the Senate is S 1980.

    the bill would also ban the use of undisclosed software35 and wireless
    communications devices in voting systems.

    Some of the concerns regarding DREs were raised at a public hearing held
    by the EAC on May 5, 2004. The purpose of the hearing was to permit the
    EAC to receive information on the use, security, and reliability of
    electronic voting devices. It included panels of technology and standards
    experts, vendors of voting systems, state election administrators, and
    citizen advocacy groups. One expert testified that electronic voting
    systems are flawed because they do not permit voters to verify that their
    votes were recorded correctly and they do not permit a public vote count.
    Others stated that the systems can be made secure only by the addition of
    a voterverifiable paper ballot. On the other hand, the election
    administrators on the panel described positive experiences with DREs, and
    representatives of voters with disabilities supported the use of DREs
    because of their accessibility features.36

      Despite Their Vital Role, Voting Systems Are Only One Aspect of the

    Larger Election Process Electronic voting systems represent one of many
    important components in the overall election process. This process is made
    up of several stages, with each stage consisting of key people, process,
    and technology variables. Many levels of government are involved,
    including over 10,000 jurisdictions with widely varying characteristics.

    35 The bill states that any voting system containing or using software
    shall disclose the source code of that software to the EAC, and the EAC
    shall make that source code available for inspection, upon request, to any
    citizen.

    36 Following this hearing, which focused on DRE voting systems, the EAC
    held a second hearing on June 3, 2004, to focus on three other voting
    technologies: punch card and lever machines and optical scan voting
    equipment. The hearing addressed best practices, problems, and
    transitional issues associated with these systems. A major emphasis of the
    hearing was to identify practices that could be published and used by
    local election officials in preparation for the election of November 2,
    2004.

    In the U.S. election process, all levels of government share
    responsibility. At the federal level, the Congress has authority under the
    Constitution to regulate presidential and congressional elections and to
    enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory practices in all
    elections-federal, state, and local.37 It has passed legislation affecting
    the administration of state elections that addresses voter registration,38
    absentee voting,39 accessibility provisions for the elderly and
    handicapped,40 and prohibitions against discriminatory practices.41 The
    Congress does not have general constitutional authority over the
    administration of state and local elections.

    At the state level, the states are responsible for the administration of
    both their own elections and federal elections. States regulate the
    election process, including, for example, adoption of voluntary voting
    system guidelines, testing of voting systems, ballot access, registration
    procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of voting places,
    provision of election day workers, and counting and certification of the
    vote. In fact, the U.S. election process can be seen as an assemblage of
    51 somewhat distinct election systems-those of the 50 states and the
    District of Columbia.

    Further, although election policy and procedures are legislated primarily
    at the state level, states typically have decentralized this process so
    that the details of administering elections are carried out at the city or
    county levels, and voting is done at the local level. As we reported in
    2001, local election jurisdictions number more than 10,000, and their size
    varies enormously-from a rural county with

    37 For more information on the role of the federal government in the
    administration of elections, see U.S. General Accounting Office,
    Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election
    Administration, GAO-01-470 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2001).

    38 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, commonly known as the "Motor
    Voter" Act; 42 U.S.C. 1973gg to 1973gg-10.

    39 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (1986); 42 U.S.C.
    1973ff to 1973ff

    6.

    40 Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (1984); 42
    U.S.C. 1973ee to 1973ee-6.

    41 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973 to 1973bb-1.

    about 200 voters to a large urban county such as Los Angeles County, where
    the total number of registered voters for the 2000 elections exceeded the
    registered voter totals in 41 states.

    The size of a voting jurisdiction significantly affects the complexity of
    planning and conducting the election, as well as the method used to cast
    and count votes. In our 2001 work, we quoted the chief election official
    in a very large voting jurisdiction: "the logistics of preparing and
    delivering voting supplies and equipment to the county's 4,963 voting
    precincts, recruiting and training 25,000 election day poll workers,
    preparing and mailing tens of thousands of absentee ballot packets daily
    and later signature verifying, opening and sorting 521,180 absentee
    ballots, and finally, counting 2.7 million ballots is extremely
    challenging."

    The specific nature of these challenges is affected by the voting
    technology that the jurisdiction uses. For example, jurisdictions using
    DRE systems may need to manage the electronic transmission of votes or
    vote counts; jurisdictions using optical scan technology need to manage
    the paper ballots that this technology reads and tabulates. Jurisdictions
    using optical scan technology may also need to manage electronic
    transmissions if votes are counted at various locations and totals are
    electronically transmitted to a central tally point.

    Another variable is the diversity of languages within a jurisdiction. In
    November 2000, Los Angeles County, for instance, provided ballots in
    Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, and Tagalog, as well as
    English. No matter what technology is used, jurisdictions may need to
    provide ballot translations; however, the logistics of printing paper
    materials in a range of languages, as would be required for optical scan
    technology, is different from the logistics of programming translations
    into DRE units.

    Some states do have statewide election systems so that every voting
    jurisdiction uses similar processes and equipment, but others do not. For
    instance, we reported in 2001 that in Pennsylvania, local election
    officials told us that there were 67 counties and

    consequently 67 different ways of handling elections.42 In some states,
    state law prescribes the use of common voting technology throughout the
    state, while in other states local election officials generally choose the
    voting technology to be used in their precincts, often from a list of
    state-certified options.

    Whatever the jurisdiction and its specific characteristics, administering
    an election is a year-round activity, involving varying sets of people to
    carry out processes at different stages. These stages generally consist of
    the following:

    0M	Voter registration. Among other things, local election officials
    register eligible voters and maintain voter registration lists, including
    updates to registrants' information and deletions of the names of
    registrants who are no longer eligible to vote.

    0M	Absentee and early voting. This type of voting allows eligible persons
    to vote in person or by mail before election day. Election officials must
    design ballots and other systems to permit this type of voting, as well as
    educating voters on how to vote by these methods.

    0M	The conduct of an election. Election administration includes
    preparation before election day, such as local election officials
    arranging for polling places, recruiting and training poll workers,
    designing ballots, and preparing and testing voting equipment for use in
    casting and tabulating votes, as well as election day activities, such as
    opening and closing polling places and assisting voters to cast votes.

    0M	Vote counting. At this stage, election officials tabulate the cast
    ballots; determine whether and how to count ballots that cannot be read by
    the vote counting equipment; certify the final vote counts; and perform
    recounts, if required.

    As shown in figure 3, each stage of an election involves people,
    processes, and technology.

    42 GAO-02-3.

    Figure 3: Stages of Election Process

    Electronic voting systems are primarily involved in the last two stages,
    during which votes are cast and counted. However, the type of system that
    a jurisdiction uses may affect earlier stages. For example, in a
    jurisdiction that uses optical scan systems, paper ballots like those used
    on election day may be mailed in the absentee voting stage. On the other
    hand, a jurisdiction that uses DRE technology would have to make a
    different provision for absentee voting.

      Electronic Voting Systems' Performance Can Be Judged on Several

    Attributes Although the current debate concerning electronic voting
    systems primarily relates to security, other factors affecting election
    administration are also relevant in evaluating these systems. Ensuring the
    security of elections is essential to public confidence and election
    integrity, but officials choosing a voting system must also consider other
    performance factors, such as accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as
    well as cost. Accuracy refers to how frequently the equipment completely
    and correctly records and counts votes; ease of use refers to how
    understandable and

    accessible the equipment is to a diverse group of voters and to election
    workers; and efficiency refers to how quickly a given vote can be cast and
    counted. Finally, equipment's life-cycle cost versus benefits is an
    overriding practical consideration.

    Security

    In conducting elections, officials must be able to assure the public that
    the confidentiality of the ballot is maintained and fraud prevented. In
    providing this assurance, the people, processes, and technology involved
    in the election system all play a role: the security procedures and
    practices that jurisdictions implement, the security awareness and
    training of the election workers who execute them, and the security
    features provided by the systems.

    Election officials are responsible for establishing and managing privacy
    and security procedures to protect against threats to the integrity of
    elections.43 These security threats include potential modification or loss
    of electronic voting data; loss, theft, or modification of physical
    ballots; and unauthorized access to software and electronic equipment.
    Physical access controls are required for securing voting equipment, vote
    tabulation equipment, and ballots; software access controls (such as
    passwords and firewalls44) are required to limit the number of people who
    can access and operate voting devices, election management software, and
    vote tabulation software. In addition, election processes are designed to
    ensure privacy by protecting the confidentiality of the vote: physical
    screens are used around voting stations, and poll workers are present to
    prevent voters from being watched or coerced while voting.

    43 We have described an effective security program as including, at a
    minimum, (1) assigning responsibility for security, (2) assessing security
    risks and vulnerabilities and implementing both manual and
    technology-based security measures to prevent or counter these risks, and
    (3) periodically reviewing the controls to ensure their appropriateness.
    For more information, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide:
    Information Security Management, GAO/AIMD-98-68 (Washington, D.C.: May
    1998).

    44 A firewall is a hardware or software component that protects computers
    or networks from attacks by outside network users by blocking and checking
    all incoming traffic.

    Examples of security controls that are embedded in the technology include
    the following:

    0M	Access controls. Election workers may have to enter user names and
    passwords to access voting systems and software, so that only authorized
    users can make modifications. On election day, voters may need to provide
    a smart card or token45 to DRE units.

    0M	Encryption. To protect the confidentiality of the vote, DREs use
    encryption technology to scramble the votes cast so that the votes are not
    stored in the same order in which they were cast. In addition, if vote
    totals are electronically transmitted, encryption is used to protect the
    vote count from compromise by scrambling it before it is transmitted over
    telephone wires and unscrambling it once it is received.

    0M	Physical controls. Hardware locks and seals protect against
    unauthorized access to the voting device once it has been prepared for the
    election (e.g., once the vote counter is reset, the unit is tested, and
    ballots are prepared).

    0M	Audit trails. Audit trails provide documentary evidence to recreate
    election day activity, such as the number of ballots cast (by each ballot
    configuration or type) and candidate vote totals for each contest. Audit
    trails are used for verification purposes, particularly in the event that
    a recount is demanded. With optical scan systems, the paper ballots
    provide an audit trail. Since not all DREs provide a paper record of the
    votes, election officials may rely on the information that is collected by
    the DRE's electronic memory. Part of the debate over the assurance of
    integrity that DREs provide revolves around the reliability of this
    information.

    0M	Redundant storage. Redundant storage media in DREs provide backup
    storage of votes cast or vote counts to facilitate recovery of voter data
    in the event of power or system failure.

    The particular features offered by DRE and optical scan equipment differ
    by vendor make and model as well as the nature of the technology. DREs
    generally offer most of the features, but there is

    45 In security systems, a token is small device that displays a constantly
    changing identification code; smart cards may perform a similar function.

    debate about the implementation of these features and the adequacy of the
    access controls and audit trails that this technology provides. If DREs
    use tokens or smart cards to authenticate voters, these tokens must also
    be physically protected and may require software security protection. For
    optical scan systems, redundant storage media may not be required, but
    software and physical access controls may be associated with tabulation
    equipment and software, and if vote tallies are transmitted
    electronically, encryption may also be used. In addition, since these
    systems use paper ballots, the audit trail is clearer, but physical access
    to ballots after they are cast must be controlled. The physical and
    process controls used to protect paper ballots include ballot boxes as
    well as the procedures implemented to protect the boxes if they need to be
    transported, to tabulate ballots, and to store counted ballots for later
    auditing and possible recounts.

    Accuracy

    Ensuring that votes are accurately recorded and tallied is an essential
    attribute of any voting equipment. Without such assurance, both voter
    confidence in the election and the integrity and legitimacy of the outcome
    of the election are at risk. The importance of an accurate vote count
    increases with the closeness of the election. Both optical scan and DRE
    systems are claimed to be highly accurate. In 2001, our vendor survey
    showed virtually no differences in vendor representations of the accuracy
    of DRE and optical scan voting equipment, measured in terms of how
    accurately the equipment counted recorded votes.46 Vendors of optical scan
    equipment reported accuracy rates of between 99 and 100 percent, with
    vendors of DREs reporting 100 percent accuracy.

    As we reported in 2001, although 96 percent of local election
    jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their voting
    equipment during the 2000 election, according to our mail survey, only
    about 48 percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on

    46 GAO-02-3.

    the accuracy of their voting equipment for the election.47 Further, it was
    unclear whether jurisdictions actually had meaningful performance data. Of
    those local election jurisdictions that we visited that stated that their
    voting equipment was 100 percent accurate, none was able to provide actual
    data to substantiate these statements. Similarly, according to our mail
    survey, only about 51 percent of jurisdictions collected data on
    undervotes, and about 47 percent collected data on overvotes for the
    November 2000 election.48

    Although voting equipment may be designed to count votes as recorded with
    100 percent accuracy, how frequently the equipment counts votes as
    intended by voters is a function not only of equipment design, but also of
    the interaction of people and processes. These people and process factors
    include whether, for example,

    0M technicians have followed proper procedures in testing and maintaining
    the system,

    0M voters followed proper procedures when using the system,

    0M election officials have provided voters with understandable procedures
    to follow, and

    0M poll workers properly instructed and guided voters.

    As indicated earlier, various kinds of errors can lead to voter intentions
    not being captured when ballots are counted. Avoiding or compensating for
    these errors may involve solutions based on technology, processes, or
    both. For example, DREs are designed to prevent overvoting; however,
    overvoting can also be prevented by a procedure to check optical scan
    ballots for overvotes before the voter leaves the polls, which can be
    accomplished by a precinctbased tabulator or by other means.

    47 GAO-02-3. Confidence intervals were calculated at the 95 percent
    confidence level. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates from GAO's mail
    survey have a confidence interval of plus or minus 4 percentage points or
    less; all estimates from GAO's telephone survey have a confidence interval
    of plus or minus 11 percentage points or less.

    48 DREs do not allow overvotes, so the figure for overvotes does not
    include jurisdictions that used DREs.

    Ease of Use

    Like accuracy, ease of use (or user friendliness) largely depends on how
    voters interact with the voting system, physically and intellectually.
    This interaction, commonly referred to as the human/machine interface, is
    a function of the system design, the processes established for its use,
    and user education and training. Among other things, how well
    jurisdictions design ballots and educate voters on the use of voting
    equipment affects how easy voters find the system to use. In the 2000
    elections, for example, ballots for some optical scan systems were printed
    on both sides, so that some voters failed to vote one of the sides. This
    risk could be mitigated by clear ballot design and by explicit
    instructions, whether provided by poll workers or voter education
    materials. Thus, ease of use affects accuracy (i.e., whether the voter's
    intent is captured), and it can also affect the efficiency of the voting
    process (confused voters take longer to vote).

    Accessibility to diverse types of voters, including those with
    disabilities, is a further aspect of ease of use. As described earlier,
    DREs offer more options for voters with disabilities, as they can be
    equipped with a number of aids to voters with disabilities. However, these
    options increase the expense of the units, and not all jurisdictions are
    likely to opt for them. Instead of technological solutions, jurisdictions
    may establish special processes for voters with disabilities, such as
    allowing them to be assisted to cast their votes; this workaround can,
    however, affect the confidentiality of the vote.

    Efficiency

    Efficiency-the speed of casting and tallying votes-is an important
    consideration for jurisdictions not only because it influences voter
    waiting time and thus potentially voter turnout, but also because it
    affects the number of voting systems that a jurisdiction needs to acquire
    and maintain, and thus the cost.

    Efficiency can be measured in terms of the number of people that the
    equipment can accommodate within a given time, how quickly the equipment
    can count votes, and the length of time that voters need to wait. With
    DREs, the vote casting and counting functions are virtually inseparable,
    because the ballot is embedded in the

    voting equipment. Accordingly, for DREs efficiency is generally measured
    in terms of the number of voters that each machine accommodates on
    election day. In 2001, vendors reported that the number of voters
    accommodated per DRE ranges from 200 to 1,000 voters per system per
    election day.

    With optical scan systems, in contrast, vote casting and counting are
    separate activities, since the ballot is a separate medium-a sheet of
    paper or a computer card-which once completed is put into the vote
    tabulator. As a result, the efficiency of optical scan equipment is
    generally measured in terms of the speed of count (i.e., how quickly the
    equipment counts the votes on completed ballots). Complicating this
    measurement is the fact that efficiency differs depending on whether
    central-count or precinct-based tabulators are used. Central-count
    equipment generally counts more ballots per hour because it is used to
    count the ballots for an entire jurisdiction, rather than an individual
    polling site. For central-count optical scan equipment, 10 vendors
    reported speed of count ranges from 9,000 to 24,000 ballots per hour. For
    precinct-count optical scan equipment, vendors generally did not provide
    specific speed of count data, but they stated that one machine is
    generally used per polling site.

    Generalizations about the effect of technology on wait times are
    difficult. In 2001, our mail survey found that 84 percent of jurisdictions
    nationwide were satisfied with the amount of voter wait time at the
    polling place during the November 2000 election, but that 13 percent of
    jurisdictions considered long lines at the polling places to be a major
    problem.49 However, we estimated that only 10 percent of jurisdictions
    nationwide collected information on the average amount of time that it
    took voters to vote. We were told by some jurisdictions that the length of
    time voters must wait is affected by ballots that include many races and
    issues. Some jurisdictions reported that their ballots were so long that
    it took voters a long time in the voting booth to read them and vote. As a
    result, lines backed up, and some voters had to wait for over an hour to
    cast their votes. Officials in one jurisdiction said that their voters
    experienced long wait times in part because redistricting caused

    49 GAO-02-3.

    confusion among voters, who often turned up at the wrong polling places.
    As these examples show, the voting system used is not always a major
    factor in voter wait times. However, processes that do depend on the
    system may affect the time that a voter must spend voting. For example, in
    precincts that use precinct-level counting technology for optical scan
    ballots, voters may place their ballots in the automatic feed slot of the
    tabulator. This process can add to voting time if the tabulator is
    designed to reject ballots that are undervoted, overvoted, or damaged, and
    the voter is given the opportunity to correct the ballot.

    Cost

    Generally, buying DRE units is more expensive than buying optical scan
    systems. For a broad picture, consider the comparison that we made in 2001
    of the costs of purchasing new voting equipment for local election
    jurisdictions based on three types of equipment: central-count optical
    scan equipment, precinct-count optical scan equipment, and touchscreen DRE
    units.50 Based on equipment cost information available in August 2001, we
    estimated that purchasing optical scan equipment that counted ballots at a
    central location would cost about $191 million.51 Purchasing an optical
    scan counter for each precinct that could notify voters of errors on their
    ballots would cost about $1.3 billion. Purchasing touchscreen DRE units
    for each precinct, including at least one unit per precinct that could
    accommodate blind, deaf, and paraplegic voters, would cost about $3
    billion.

    For a given jurisdiction, the particular cost involved will depend on the
    requirements of the jurisdiction, as well as the particular equipment
    chosen. Voting equipment costs vary among types of voting equipment and
    among different manufacturers and models of the same type of equipment.
    For example, in 2001, DRE touchscreen unit costs ranged from $575 to
    $4,500. Similarly, unit costs for precinct-count optical scan equipment
    ranged from $4,500 to $7,500. Among other things, these differences can be
    attributed to

    50 GAO-02-3. 51 Cost estimates include capital costs only.

    differences in what is included in the unit cost as well as differences in
    the characteristics of the equipment.

    In addition to the equipment unit cost, an additional cost for
    jurisdictions is the software that operates the equipment, prepares the
    ballots, and tallies the votes (and in some cases, prepares the election
    results reports). Our vendor survey showed that although some vendors
    included the software cost in the unit cost of the voting equipment, most
    priced the software separately. Software costs for DRE and optical scan
    equipment could run as high as $300,000 per jurisdiction. The higher costs
    were generally for the more sophisticated software associated with
    election management systems. Because the software generally supported
    numerous equipment units, the software unit cost varied depending on the
    number of units purchased or the size of the jurisdiction.

    Other factors affecting the acquisition cost of voting equipment are the
    number and types of peripherals required. In general, DREs require more
    peripherals than do optical scan systems, which adds to their expense. For
    example, some DREs require smart cards, smart card readers, memory
    cartridges and cartridge readers, administrative workstations, and plug-in
    devices (for increasing accessibility for voters with disabilities).
    Touchscreen DREs may also offer options that affect the cost of the
    equipment, such as color versus black and white screens. In addition, most
    DREs and all optical scan units require voting booths, and most DREs and
    some precinct-based optical scan tabulators offer options for modems.
    Precinct-based optical scan tabulators also require ballot boxes to
    capture the ballots after they are scanned.

    Once jurisdictions acquire the voting equipment, they must also incur the
    cost to operate and maintain it, which can vary considerably. For example,
    in 2001, jurisdictions that used DREs reported a range of costs from about
    $2,000 to $27,000. Similarly, most jurisdictions that used optical scan
    equipment reported that operations and maintenance costs ranged from about
    $1,300 to $90,000. The higher ends of these cost ranges generally related
    to the larger jurisdictions. In fact, one large jurisdiction that used
    optical scan equipment reported that its operating costs were $545,000. In
    addition, the jurisdictions reported that these costs generally included
    software licensing and upgrades, maintenance

    contracts with vendors, equipment replacement parts, and supply costs.

    For decisions on whether to invest in new voting equipment, both initial
    capital costs (i.e., cost to acquire the equipment) and longterm support
    costs (i.e., operation and maintenance costs) are relevant. Moreover,
    these collective costs (i.e., life-cycle costs) need to be viewed in the
    context of the benefits the equipment will provide over its useful life.
    It is advisable to link these benefits directly to the performance
    characteristics of the equipment and the needs of the jurisdiction.

      Electronic Voting System Performance Depends on System Design

    and Implementation The performance of any information technology system,
    including electronic voting systems, is heavily influenced by a number of
    factors, not the least of which is the quality of the system's design and
    the effectiveness with which the system is implemented in an operational
    setting. System design and implementation, in turn, are a function of such
    things as how well the system's requirements are defined, how well the
    system is tested, and how well the people that operate and use the system
    understand and follow the procedures that govern their interaction with
    it. Our work in 2001 raised concerns about the FEC's voting system
    standards, and showed that practices relative to testing and
    implementation of voting systems varied across states and local
    jurisdictions.

    Voting Systems Should Be Designed, Built, and Tested against Well-Defined
    Standards

    Like that of any information technology product, the design of a voting
    system starts with the explicit definition of what the system is to do and
    how well it is to do it. These requirements are then translated into
    design specifications that are used to develop the system. Organizations
    such as the Department of Defense and the Institute of Electrical and
    Electronics Engineers have developed guidelines for various types of
    systems requirements and for the processes that are important to managing
    the development of any system throughout its life cycle. These guidelines
    address types of

    product requirements (e.g., functional and performance), as well as
    documentation and process requirements governing the production of the
    system.

    In the case of voting systems, the FEC had assumed responsibility for
    issuing standards that embodied these requirements, a responsibility that
    HAVA has since assigned to the EAC. The FEC standards are nevertheless
    still the operative standards until the EAC updates them. These FEC-issued
    standards apply to system hardware, software, firmware, and
    documentation,52 and they span prevoting, 53 voting,54 and postvoting
    activities.55 They also address, for example, requirements relating to
    system security; system accuracy and integrity; system auditability;
    system storage and maintenance; and data retention and transportation. In
    addition to these standards, some states and local jurisdictions have
    specified their own voting system requirements.

    In 2001, we cited a number of problems with the FEC-issued voting system
    standards, including missing elements of the standards. Accordingly, we
    made recommendations to improve the standards. Subsequently, the FEC
    approved the revised voting system standards on April 30, 2002. According
    to EAC commissioners with whom we spoke, the commission has inherited the
    FEC standards, but it plans to work with NIST to revise and strengthen
    them.

    To ensure that systems are designed and built in conformance with
    applicable standards, our work in 2001 found that three levels of

    52 Systems are all those intended for preparing the voting system for use
    in an election; producing the appropriate ballot formats; testing that the
    voting system and ballot materials have been properly prepared and are
    ready for use; recording and counting votes; consolidating and reporting
    results; displaying results on site or remotely; and maintaining and
    producing audit trail information.

    53 Prevoting operations include ballot preparation; the preparation of
    election-specific software or firmware; the production of ballots or
    ballot pages; the installation of ballots and ballot counting software or
    firmware; and system and equipment tests.

    54 Voting operations include all operations conducted at the polling place
    by voters and officials, including the generation of status messages.

    55 Postvoting operations include closing the polling place; obtaining
    reports by voting machine, polling place, and precinct (for central-count
    systems); obtaining consolidated reports; and obtaining reports of audit
    trails.

    tests are generally performed: qualification tests, certification tests,
    and acceptance tests. For voting systems, the FEC-issued standards called
    for qualification testing to be performed by independent testing
    authorities. According to the standards, this testing is to ensure that
    voting systems comply with both the FEC standards and the systems' own
    design specifications. State standards define certification tests, which
    the states generally perform to determine how well the systems conform to
    individual state laws, requirements, and practice.56 Finally, state and
    local standards define acceptance testing, performed by the local
    jurisdictions procuring the voting systems. This testing is to determine
    whether the equipment, as delivered and installed, satisfies all the
    jurisdiction's functional and performance requirements. Beyond these
    levels of testing, jurisdictions also perform routine maintenance and
    diagnostic activities to further ensure proper system performance on
    election day.

    Our 2001 work found that the majority of states (38) had adopted the FEC
    standards then in place,57 and thus these states required that the voting
    systems used in their jurisdictions passed qualification testing.58 In
    addition, we reported that qualified voting equipment had been used in
    about 49 percent (+-7 percentage points) of jurisdictions nationwide that
    used DREs and about 46 percent (+-7 percentage points) of jurisdictions
    nationwide that used optical scan technology. However, about 46 percent
    (+-5 percentage points) reported that they did not know whether their
    equipment had been qualified.

    56 States and local jurisdictions may use the standards to baseline the
    minimum functional and performance requirements but may also impose other
    requirements to meet their needs (such as the type and number of languages
    that equipment should support, how a ballot needs to appear on a DRE
    screen, or options that allow persons with various types of disabilities
    to vote).

    57 As of April 2004, the District of Columbia and 42 out of 50 states have
    regulations that require voting systems to meet federal standards,
    according to the Election Reform Information Project of the University of
    Richmond.

    58 However, because the standards were not published until 1990 and the
    qualification testing program was not established until 1994, we judged in
    2001 that many jurisdictions were probably using voting equipment that did
    not undergo qualification testing.

    As we reported in 2001, 45 states and the District of Columbia told us
    that they had certification testing programs, and we estimate from our
    mail survey that about 90 percent of jurisdictions used state-certified
    voting equipment in the 2000 national election.59 In addition, we reported
    that most of the jurisdictions that had recently bought new voting
    equipment had conducted some form of acceptance testing. However, the
    processes and steps performed and the people who performed them varied.
    For example, in one jurisdiction that purchased DREs, election officials
    stated that testing consisted of a visual inspection, power-up, opening of
    polls, activation and verification of ballots, and closing of polls. In
    contrast, officials in another jurisdiction stated that they relied
    entirely on the vendor to test their DREs. In jurisdictions that used
    optical scan equipment, acceptance testing generally consisted of running
    decks of test cards. For example, officials from one jurisdiction stated
    that they tested each unit with the assistance of the vendor using a
    vendor-supplied test deck.

    Our 2001 work found that the processes and people involved in routine
    system maintenance, diagnostic, and pre-election day checkout activities
    varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, about 90 percent of
    jurisdictions nationwide using DRE and optical scan technology had
    performed routine or manufacturer-suggested maintenance and checkout
    before the 2000 national election. However, our visits to 27 local
    election jurisdictions revealed variations in the frequency with which
    jurisdictions performed such routine maintenance. For example, some
    performed maintenance right before an election, while others performed
    maintenance regularly throughout the year. For example, officials in one
    jurisdiction that used DREs stated that they tested the batteries monthly.

    Voting Systems Should Be Properly Implemented

    Proper implementation of voting systems is a matter of people knowing how
    to carry out appropriately designed processes to ensure that the
    technology performs as intended in an operational

    59 GAO-02-3.

    setting. According to the EAC commissioners, one of their areas of focus
    will be election administration processes and the people who carry out
    these processes. Examples include ballot preparation, voter education,
    recruiting and training poll workers, setting up the polls, running the
    election, and counting the votes.

    Ballot preparation. Whether ballots are electronic or paper, they need to
    be designed in a way that promotes voter understanding when they are
    actually used. Designing both optical scan and DRE ballots requires
    consideration of the different types of human interaction entailed and the
    application of some human factors expertise. For DREs, programming skills
    need to be applied to create the ballot and enter the ballot information
    onto an electronic storage medium, which is then uploaded to the unit. For
    optical scan systems, paper ballots need to be designed and printed in
    specified numbers for distribution to polling places; they may also be
    used for absentee balloting, usually in combination with printed mailing
    envelopes. Electronic "ballots" in DRE units do not require distribution
    separate from the distribution of the voting equipment itself; however,
    the use of DREs means that a separate technique is necessary for absentee
    ballots-generally paper ballots. Thus, the use of these units generally
    requires a mixed election system.

    Voter education. Implementation of any voting method requires that voters
    understand how to vote-that is, what conventions are followed. For optical
    scan systems, voters need to understand how to mark the ballots, they need
    to know what kinds of marker (type of pen or pencil) can be used, they
    need to be informed if a ballot must be marked on both sides, and so on.
    For DRE systems, voters need to understand how to select candidates or
    issues and understand that their votes are not cast until the cast vote
    button is pressed; for touchscreens, they need to know how to navigate the
    various screens presented to them.

    Voters also need to understand the procedure for write-in votes. In 2001,
    one jurisdiction had an almost 5 percent overvote rate because voters did
    not understand the purpose of the ballot section permitting write-in
    votes. Voters selected a candidate on the ballot and then wrote the
    candidate's name in the write-in section of the ballot, thus overvoting
    and spoiling the ballot. In addition to voter education, how the system is
    programmed to operate can also

    address this issue. For example, precinct-count optical scan equipment can
    be programmed to return a voter's ballot if the ballot is overvoted or
    undervoted and allow the voter to make changes.

    Poll worker recruitment and training. Poll workers need implementation
    training. They need to be trained not only in how to assist voters to use
    the voting system, but also in how to use the technology for the tasks
    poll workers need to perform. These tasks can vary greatly from
    jurisdiction to jurisdiction. When more sophisticated voting systems are
    used at polling sites, jurisdictions may find it challenging to find poll
    workers with the skills to implement and use newer technologies. In 2001,
    we quoted one election official who said that "it is increasingly
    difficult to find folks to work for $6 an hour. We are relying on older
    retired persons- many who can't/won't keep up with changes in the
    technology or laws. Many of our workers are 70+."

    Setting up the polls. Proper setup of polling places raises a number of
    implementation issues related to the people, processes, and technology
    involved. For DREs, the need for appropriate power outlets and possibly
    network connections limits the sites that can be used as polling places.
    In addition, setting up, initializing, and sometimes networking DRE units
    are technically challenging tasks. Technicians and vendor representatives
    may be needed to perform these tasks or to assist poll workers with them.
    In addition, with DREs, computer security issues come into play that are
    different from those associated with the paper and pencil tools that
    voters use in optical scan systems. Besides the units themselves, many DRE
    systems use cards or tokens that must be physically secured. With optical
    scan equipment, the ballots must be physically secured. Further, if
    precinct-based tabulation is used with an optical scan system, the
    tabulation equipment must be protected from tampering.

    Running the election. Many implementation issues associated with running
    the election are associated with the interaction of voters with the
    technology. Although both DREs and optical scan systems are based on
    technologies that most voters will have encountered before, general
    familiarity is not enough to avoid voter errors. With optical scan, voter
    errors are generally related to improperly marked ballots: the wrong
    marking device, stray marks, too many marks

    (overvotes), and so on. As described already, DRE equipment is designed to
    minimize voter error (by preventing overvotes, for example), but problems
    can also occur with this voting method. For example, many DREs require the
    voter to push a cast vote button to record the vote. However, some voters
    forget to push this button and leave the polling place without doing so.
    Similarly, after pressing the final cast vote button, voters cannot alter
    their votes. In some cases, this button may be pressed by mistake-for
    example, a small child being held by a parent may knock or kick the final
    vote button before the parent has completed the ballot.

    The technology is not the only factor determining the outcome in these
    situations, as different jurisdictions have different rules and processes
    concerning such problems. In 2001, we reported that when voters forgot to
    press the cast vote button, one jurisdiction required that an election
    official reach under the voting booth curtain and push the cast vote
    button without looking at the ballot. However, another jurisdiction
    required that an election official invalidate the ballot and reset the
    machine for a new voter.

    Counting the votes. Finally, implementation of the processes for counting
    votes is affected both by the technology used and by local requirements.
    With DREs, votes are collected within each unit. Some contain removable
    storage media that can be taken from the voting unit and transported to a
    central location to be tallied. Others can be configured to electronically
    transmit the vote totals from the polling place to a central tally
    location. As described earlier, optical scan systems also vary in the way
    votes are counted, depending on whether precinct-based or centralized
    tabulation equipment is used. For optical scan systems, officials follow
    state and local regulations and processes to determine whether and how to
    count ballots that cannot be read by the tabulation equipment. Counting
    such ballots may involve decisions on how to judge voter intent, which are
    also generally governed by state and local regulations and processes.

    In addition, depending on the type of voting technology used, ways to
    perform recounts may differ. For optical scan devices, recounts can be
    both automatic and manual; as in the original vote counting, officials
    make decisions on counting ballots that cannot be read by the tabulation
    equipment and on voter intent. With DREs there is no separate paper ballot
    or record of the voter's intention, and

    therefore election officials rely on the information recorded in the
    machine's memory: that is, permanent (read only) electronic images of each
    of the "marked" ballots. The assurance that these images are an accurate
    record of the vote depends on several things, including the proper
    implementation of the processes involved in designing, maintaining,
    setting up, and using the technology.

      Jurisdictions Face Immediate and Longer Term Challenges in

    Leveraging Voting Technologies In 2001, we identified four key challenges
    confronting local jurisdictions in effectively using and replacing voting
    technologies. These challenges are not dissimilar to those faced by any
    organization seeking to leverage modern technology to support mission
    operations. The first two challenges are particularly relevant in the near
    term, as jurisdictions look to position themselves for this year's
    national elections. The latter two are more relevant to jurisdictions'
    strategic acquisition and use of modern voting systems.

    Ensuring that Necessary Security, Testing, and Maintenance Activities Are
    Performed

    Maximizing the performance of the voting systems that jurisdictions have
    and plan to use in November 2004 means taking proactive steps between now
    and then to best ensure that systems perform as intended. These steps
    include activities aimed at securing, testing, and maintaining these
    systems. We reported in 2001 that although the vast majority of
    jurisdictions performed security, testing, and maintenance activities in
    one form or another, the extent and nature of these activities varied
    among jurisdictions and depended on the availability of resources
    (financial and human capital) committed to them. The challenge facing all
    voting jurisdictions will be to ensure that these activities are fully and
    properly performed, particularly in light of the serious security concerns
    that have been reported with DREs.

    Managing the People, Processes, and Technology as Components of the
    Overall Process

    As previously discussed in this testimony, jurisdictions need to manage
    the triad of people, processes, and technology as interrelated and
    interdependent parts of the total voting process. Given the amount of time
    that remains between now and the November 2004 elections, jurisdictions'
    voting system performance is more likely to be influenced by improvements
    in poll worker system operation training, voter education about system
    use, and vote casting procedures than by changes to the systems
    themselves.60 The challenge for voting jurisdictions is thus to ensure
    that these people and process issues are dealt with effectively.

    Having Reliable System Performance Measures and Objective Data

    Reliable measures and objective data are needed for jurisdictions to know
    whether the technology being used is meeting the needs of the user
    communities (both the voters and the officials who administer the
    elections). In 2001, we reported that the vast majority of jurisdictions
    were satisfied with the performance of their respective technologies in
    the November 2000 elections. However, this satisfaction was mostly based
    not on objective data measuring performance, but rather on the subjective
    impressions of election officials. Although these impressions should not
    be discounted, informed decisionmaking on voting technology investment
    requires more objective data. The challenge for jurisdictions is to define
    measures and begin collecting data so that they can definitely know how
    their systems are performing.

    Ensuring That Technology Cost Is Commensurate with Benefits

    Jurisdictions must be able to ensure that the technology will provide
    benefits over its useful life that are commensurate with life-cycle costs
    (acquisition as well as operations and maintenance) and that these
    collective costs are affordable and sustainable. In 2001, we reported that
    the technology type and configuration that jurisdictions employed varied
    depending on each jurisdiction's unique circumstances, such as size and
    resource constraints, and

    60 Some system changes may be feasible, such as connecting DREs to
    printers.

    that reliable data on life-cycle costs and benefits were not available.
    The challenge for jurisdictions is to view and treat voting systems as
    capital investments and to manage them as such, including basing decisions
    on technology investments on clearly defined requirements and reliable
    analyses of quantitative and qualitative return on investment.

    In closing, I would like to say again that electronic voting systems are
    an undeniably critical link in the overall election chain. While this link
    alone cannot make an election, it can break one. The problems that some
    jurisdictions have experienced and the serious concerns being surfaced by
    security experts and others highlight the potential for difficulties in
    the upcoming 2004 national elections if the challenges that we cited in
    2001 and reiterate in this testimony are not effectively addressed.
    Although the EAC only recently began operations and is not yet at full
    strength, it needs to remain vigilant in its efforts to ensure that
    jurisdictions and voters are educated and well-informed about the proper
    implementation and use of electronic voting systems, and to ensure that
    jurisdictions take the appropriate steps-related to people, process, and
    technology-that are needed regarding security, testing, and maintenance.
    More strategically, the EAC needs to move swiftly to strengthen the
    voluntary voting system guidelines and the testing associated with
    enforcing these guidelines. Critical to the commission's ability to do
    this will be the adequacy of resources at its disposal and the degree of
    cooperation it receives from entities at all levels of government.

    Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
    any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at
    this time.

      Contact and Acknowledgements

    For further information, please contact Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-6256
    or by e-mail at hiter@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony
    were Barbara S. Collier, Deborah A. Davis, Richard B. Hung, John M. Ortiz,
    Jr., Maria J. Santos, and Linda R. Watson.

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