Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles Is  
Well Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by	 
C-130 Aircraft Need to
 					 
Be Clarified (12-AUG-04, GAO-04-925).				 
                                                                 
In its transformation to a more responsive and mobile force, the 
Army plans to form 6 Stryker Brigade Combat teams equipped with a
new family of armored vehicles known as Strykers. The		 
Stryker--which provides transport for troops, weapons, and	 
command and control--was required by the Army to weigh no more	 
than 38,000 pounds and be transportable in theater by C-130 cargo
aircraft arriving ready for immediate combat operations. The Army
plans to equip its future force with a new generation of	 
vehicles--Future Combat Systems--to also be transportable by	 
C-130s. GAO was asked to assess (1) the current status of Stryker
vehicle acquisition, including the most current Stryker vehicle  
program and operating cost estimates; (2) the status and results 
of Stryker vehicle tests; and (3) the ability of C-130 aircraft  
to transport Stryker vehicles within a theater of operations.	 
This report also addresses the transportability of the Army's	 
Future Combat Systems on C-130 aircraft.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-925 					        
    ACCNO:   A11692						        
  TITLE:     Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker      
Vehicles Is Well Under Way, but Expectations for Their		 
Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to
			 
Be Clarified							 
     DATE:   08/12/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Operational testing				 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Transportation research				 
	     Army personnel					 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Developmental testing				 
	     Air transportation operations			 
	     Aircraft						 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Fighter aircraft					 
	     Testing						 
	     Military forces					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Army Armored Gun System				 
	     C-130 Aircraft					 
	     C-130H Aircraft					 
	     Hercules Aircraft					 
	     M113 Armored Personnel Carrier			 
	     Stryker Armored Vehicle				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-04-925

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                     GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

August 2004

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

  Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles Is Well Under Way, but Expectations for
         Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to Be Clarified

                                       a

GAO-04-925

Highlights of GAO-04-925, a report to congressional requesters

In its transformation to a more responsive and mobile force, the Army
plans to form 6 Stryker Brigade Combat teams equipped with a new family of
armored vehicles known as Strykers. The Stryker-which provides transport
for troops, weapons, and command and control-was required by the Army to
weigh no more than 38,000 pounds and be transportable in theater by C-130
cargo aircraft arriving ready for immediate combat operations. The Army
plans to equip its future force with a new generation of vehicles-Future
Combat Systems-to also be transportable by C-130s.

GAO was asked to assess (1) the current status of Stryker vehicle
acquisition, including the most current Stryker vehicle program and
operating cost estimates; (2) the status and results of Stryker vehicle
tests; and (3) the ability of C-130 aircraft to transport Stryker vehicles
within a theater of operations. This report also addresses the
transportability of the Army's Future Combat Systems on C-130 aircraft.

GAO recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) provide to Congress
clarification of expected capabilities and limitations of C-130 transport
for Stryker vehicles and Future Combat System vehicles; and options for
alternative transport. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-925.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
512-8365 or [email protected].

August 2004

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles Is Well Under Way, but Expectations for
Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to Be Clarified

The acquisition of the Stryker vehicles is about two-thirds complete; with
about 1,200 of 8 production vehicle configurations ordered and 800
delivered to units. In addition, limited quantities of two developmental
vehicles-the Mobile Gun System and the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Reconnaissance vehicle prototypes-have also been ordered for testing.
Stryker program costs have increased about 22 percent from the November
2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December 2003 estimate of $8.7
billion. Total program costs include acquisition costs-procurement,
research, development, and test and evaluation-as well as military
construction costs related to Strykers. The Army does not yet have
reliable estimates of the Stryker's operating costs because of limited
peacetime use to develop data.

As of June 2004, testing of the eight production Strykers was mostly
complete, with the vehicles meeting Army operational requirements with
limitations. However, development and testing schedules of the two
developmental Strykers have been delayed, resulting in an over 1-year
delay in meeting the vehicles' production milestones and fielding dates.

While the Army has demonstrated the required transportability of Strykers
by C-130 aircraft in training exercises, in an operational environment,
the Stryker's average weight of 38,000 pounds-along with other factors
such as added equipment weight and less than ideal flight
conditions-significantly limits the C-130's flight range and reduces the
size force that could be deployed. These factors also limit the ability of
Strykers to conduct combat operations immediately upon arrival as
required. With the similar maximum weight envisioned for Future Combat
System vehicles intended for the Army's future force, the planned C-130
transport of those vehicles would present similar challenges.

Cargo Payload and Range of an Armored C-130H Aircraft in Nearly Ideal
Flight Conditions

Source: GAO analysis of Air Mobility Command data.

Contents

Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Acquisition of Stryker Production Vehicles Is about Two-thirds

Complete, Though Overall Program Costs Have Increased, and Operational
Cost Estimates Are Not Yet Reliable

Tested Production Vehicles Generally Met Requirements, but Testing and
Acquisition Schedules for Developmental Vehicles Have Been Delayed

Army Demonstrated Required Stryker C-130 Transportability, but Contrary to
Congressional Expectations, Operational Limits Significantly Challenge
Routine C-130 Transport

Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Scope and Methodology

                                       1

                                      3 5

11

16

20 28 28 29 30

Appendix Comments from the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products

Tables

Table 1: Stryker Vehicle Descriptions 7 Table 2: Stryker Vehicle
Acquisition Status As of April 2004 12 Table 3: Increases in Stryker
Vehicle Program's Costs 13 Table 4: Operating Cost Estimates per Vehicle
15 Table 5: Selected Performance Capabilities and Limitations from

Stryker Evaluation Report 17 Table 6: Stryker Production Vehicle and Total
Load Weights at the National Training Center in April 2003 22

Table 7: Analysis of C-130 Range from Selected Airfields in the Middle
East and Afghanistan When Carrying Cargo Weighing 38,000 Pounds 25

Figures

Figure 1: The Infantry Carrier Vehicle Is One of Eight Production
Configurations 8 Figure 2: The Mobile Gun System Is One of Two
Developmental Configurations 9 Figure 3: The Nuclear Biological Chemical
Reconnaissance Vehicle Is One of Two Developmental Configurations 10
Figure 4: Stryker Vehicle Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National
Training Center 21 Figure 5: Cargo Payload and Range of an Armored C-130H
Aircraft in Nearly Ideal Flight Conditions 23 Figure 6: Stryker Vehicle
with Slat Armor in Iraq 24

Abbreviations EUR

DOD Department of Defense
NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
RTD&E Research, Development, Test, And Evaluation
SAR Selected Acquisition Report
DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

August 12, 2004

The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman, Committee On Armed Services House of
Representatives

The Honorable Jim Saxton

Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and
Capabilities Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

The U.S. Army is transforming its force to one expected to be more
strategically responsive, rapidly deployable, and able to effectively
operate in all types of military operations. The first step in the Army's
transformation was to form six Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams
equipped with a new family of 10 armored vehicle configurations known as
Strykers. Congressional appropriations for the Stryker vehicle program, in
then-year dollars1 totaled $4.5 billion from fiscal years 2000 through
2004. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2005 included $1.3
billion for the program, leaving $2.9 billion based on current estimates
needed to complete funding of the $8.7 billion estimated total cost of the
program.2 These program costs include acquisition costs--procurement,
research, development, and test and evaluation-as well as related military
construction costs.

According to the Army's operational requirements,3 Stryker vehicles are to
be transportable by C-130 aircraft within a theater of operation, arriving
ready for combat operations. The capability of C-130 transport is a key
performance requirement for the vehicles and is central to the Army's
rationale for creating Stryker brigades. The C-130 is a four-engine, high

1 Then-year dollar amounts for a particular year reflect the cost
prevailing during that year.

2 Appropriations included operations and support costs of $121 million
through fiscal year 2005 for contractor support and maintenance of the
vehicles. After 2005 and through the life cycle of the vehicles,
operations and support costs are to be included in the Army's Operations
and Maintenance budget account.

3 Department of Army, Operational Requirements Document For A Family of
Stryker Vehicles, Prepared for Milestone III Decision (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 19, 2004).

wing cargo aircraft that the U.S. Air Force primarily uses as a
short-range transporter. The first Stryker brigade became operational in
October 2003, at which time it was deployed to Iraq. Beginning in 2010,
the Army plans to begin the transition to its future force-the Objective
Force-and to equip this force with a new generation of vehicles known as
Future Combat Systems,4 which are also, according to operational
requirements,5 to be transportable in theater by C-130 air transport.

In your initial request, you asked us to review the Stryker vehicle's
capabilities, performance, costs, and ability to meet operational and
mission requirements. You later asked us to assess the transportability of
Stryker vehicles on C-130 aircraft. We provided your offices our
preliminary observations on these issues in October and November 2003 and
April 2004, and this report summarizes and updates the information
provided in those meetings. Our objectives were to determine (1) the
current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition, including the most current
Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates; (2) the status and
results of Stryker vehicle tests; and (3) the ability of C-130 aircraft to
transport Stryker vehicles within a theater of operations. We also address
transportability of the Army's Future Combat Systems on C-130 aircraft.

To conduct our review of Stryker vehicle acquisition status, costs, and
testing results, we interviewed officials and analyzed documents from the
Army's Stryker Program Management Office and Test and Evaluation Command
and reviewed Army and Department of Defense developmental, operational,
and survivability test reports. In our assessment of the ability of C-130
airlift to transport Stryker vehicles, we reviewed a study of the C130
aircraft's range and payload capabilities, and interviewed U.S. Army, Air
Force, and Transportation Command officials. We determined that the data
and documents we reviewed were sufficiently reliable to answer our
objectives. We performed our review from July 2003 through June 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more
detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented later

4 According to the Army, the Objective Force is the force that achieves
the objectives of the Army's transformation. The Army further states that
this future force will capitalize on advances in science and technology
enabling the Army to equip its forces with Future Combat Systems to
include manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, and munitions.
These vehicles and systems are expected to be a fraction of the weight of
existing heavy fighting vehicles to improve transportability.

5 Department of Army, Operational Requirements Document for the Future
Combat Systems (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2003).

  Results in Brief

in the report. A list of related GAO products appears at the end of this
report.

Acquisition of the Stryker production vehicles6 is about two-thirds
complete, but overall program costs are higher than earlier estimates and
vehicle operating cost estimates are not yet reliable. The Army has
ordered more than 1,200-or 68 percent-of the 8 Stryker production vehicle
configurations it plans to buy, along with limited quantities of the two
developmental vehicle prototypes for testing. Of the production vehicles,
800 have been delivered to Stryker brigades. Estimated total costs for the
Stryker vehicle program increased about 22 percent, from the original
November 2000 estimate, in then-year dollars, of $7.1 billion to the
December 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion. The average acquisition cost per
vehicle increased from $3.34 million to $4.13 million during the same time
period. The largest increase in the Stryker program's cost estimate
resulted from the cost of military construction, such as the cost of
upgrading vehicle maintenance facilities for Strykers. However with the
deployment of the first Stryker Brigade to Iraq, the Army did not have
reliable estimates of Stryker vehicle operating costs because it does not
yet have sufficient operational experience with the vehicles in peacetime.

As of June 2004, the testing of the eight Stryker production vehicles is
mostly complete with the vehicles meeting operational requirements with
certain limitations, but the testing and acquisition schedules of the two
developmental Strykers-the Mobile Gun System and Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance vehicles-have been delayed. The Stryker
vehicle system evaluations by the Army and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) determined that the production vehicles met operational
requirements with some limitations and, overall, support the key
operational capabilities and effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat
Team. Delays in development and testing of the Mobile Gun System and NBC
Reconnaissance vehicles will result in about a 1- to 2year delay in
meeting originally planned production decision milestones and fielding
dates.

6 Eight of 10 Stryker vehicle configurations are considered production
ready because these vehicles have already undergone system development and
engineering. Two of the 10 vehicle configurations are developmental
because design, development, and testing are needed before they can go
into production.

Although the Army has demonstrated the required transportability of
Strykers by C-130s during training events, the C-130 has a limited
capability to transport the Stryker vehicle in an operational environment
except under favorable conditions. Because of the Strykers' average
38,000-pound weight, using C-130 aircraft to transport Strykers in an
operational environment would limit flight range, the size force that
could be deployed, and the ability to conduct operations immediately upon
arrival-a key operational requirement for Stryker vehicles. Additional
weight, such as from mission equipment or armor and less than ideal
environmental conditions, poses significant challenges. For example,
according to a study of C-130 transport of Army vehicles by the Military
Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering Agency, an armored
C-130H7 aircraft taking off in ideal conditions such as moderate air
temperature could transport 38,000 pounds for a maximum range of 860
miles. Adding just 2,000 pounds onboard the aircraft for associated cargo
such as mission equipment or ammunition reduces the C-130 aircraft's
takeoff-to-landing range to only 500 miles. Furthermore, a C-130 with a
38,000-pound Stryker vehicle on board would not be able to take off at all
from locations in higher elevations, such as Afghanistan, during daytime
in the summer. Because of these constraints, equipment and supplies for
the Strykers might need to be moved on separate aircraft, increasing the
numbers of aircraft or sorties8 needed to deploy a Stryker force,
deployment time, and the time it would take after arrival to begin
operations. In addition, if fitted with additional armor for increased
protection against weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades, a Stryker
vehicle would be unable to fit inside a C-130, and with added weight of
the armor, the aircraft would be too heavy to take off. At the envisioned
38,000-pound maximum weight of the Future Combat System vehicles, the
planned C-130 transport of those vehicles for the Army's Future Objective
Force would present the same challenges.

Given the challenges of C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles, the Army's
operational requirements and congressional expectations for such
transport, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, clarify
for

7 The current C-130 inventory is mostly comprised of various
configurations of the E and H models. C-130 armor protects the aircraft in
hostile areas from weapons such as small arms and rocket-propelled
grenades. The armor adds about 1,600 pounds to the weight of the aircraft.

8 In air operations, a sortie is defined as an operational flight by one
aircraft.

Background

Congress (1) the expected deployment capabilities of Stryker brigades and
Stryker vehicles via C-130 aircraft within a theater of operations and the
types of operational missions using C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles
that would be achievable; (2) potential operational capability limitations
of Stryker brigades given the limits of C-130 transport; and (3) options
for, and availability of, alternative modes of transportation for
transporting Stryker brigades within an operational theater. We are also
recommending that the department include similar clarification for C-130
transport of Future Combat System vehicles.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD)
partially concurred with our recommendations. DOD's comments are in the
appendix and our evaluation of its comments is on page 29.

The Stryker family of vehicles consists of 10 eight-wheeled armored
vehicles mounted on a common chassis that provide transport for troops,
weapons, and command and control. Stryker vehicles weigh on average about
19 tons-or 38,000 pounds, substantially less than the M1A1 Abrams tanks
(68 tons) and the Bradley Fighting vehicle (33 tons), the primary combat
platforms of the Army's heavier armored units. The C-130 cargo aircraft is
capable of tactical, or in-theater, transport of one Stryker vehicle; the
Army's Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting vehicle exceed the C-130
aircraft's size and weight limits.

The Army's original operational requirements for Stryker vehicles9
included (1) the capability of entering, being transportable in, and
exiting a C-130 aircraft; (2) the vehicle's combat capable deployment
weight10 must not exceed 38,000 pounds to allow C-130 transport of 1,000
miles; and (3) the Stryker vehicles must be capable of immediate combat
operations after unloading.11 The Army's most current operational
requirements for

9 Department of Army, Operational Requirements Document For A Family of
Interim Armored Vehicles, Prepared for Milestone II Decision (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 22, 2000).

10 According to Army contracting officials, combat capable deployment
weight is the weight of Stryker vehicles along with any equipment for the
vehicles, such as communications systems or weapons that allow the
capability to conduct combat operations immediately after unloading from
an aircraft.

11 The Army's Test and Evaluation Command defined "immediate" to mean
between 15 and 40 minutes upon off-loading from the aircraft, depending on
the vehicle variant.

Stryker vehicles required the same vehicle weight and C-130 transport
capabilities without reference to C-130 transport of 1,000 miles. The Army
has similar operational requirements for its Future Combat Systems'
vehicles. The Army's April 2003 Operational Requirements document for the
Future Combat Systems requires the vehicles' essential combat
configuration to be no greater than 38,000 pounds and have a size suitable
for C-130 aircraft transport. A memorandum of agreement between the Air
Force and the Army issued in 2003,12 set procedures allowing C-130
transport of 38,000-pound Stryker vehicles aboard Air Force aircraft, but
required that the combined weight of the vehicles, other cargo, and
passengers shall not exceed C-130 operational capabilities, which vary
based on mission requirements, weather, airfield conditions, among other
factors.

Eight of the 10 vehicle configurations are being acquired production
ready-meaning they require little engineering design and development work
prior to production. Two of the 10 vehicle configurations, the Mobile Gun
System and the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle, are developmental vehicle
variants-meaning that a substantial amount of design, development, and
testing is needed before they can go into production. Table 1 provides
descriptions of the ten Stryker vehicles. Three of the vehicles are shown
in figures 1 to 3.

12 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Air Force and United
States Army for Air-Transport of the Stryker, signed by General Eric K.
Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and General John P. Jumper, Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 2003).

Table 1: Stryker Vehicle Descriptions

             Vehicle configuration Description Production vehicles

Provides the brigade's primary tank-killing system. It reinforces the
brigade reconnaissance squadron and

Anti-Tank Guided Missile vehicle provides long-range direct fires.

Provides the brigade with the means to receive information and data,
analyze, prepare and transmit data; and control the forces/ functions
carrying out

Commander's vehicle combat missions.

Provides maneuver/mobility support capabilities, which include obstacle
clearing, in-stride breaching of surface mines, proofing of subsurface
mines, and

Engineer Squad vehicle smoke generation for local protection.

Provides automated enhanced surveillance, target acquisition, target
identification, target tracking, target designation, position location,
and communications

Fire Support vehicle functionality.

Provides protected transport and supporting fires for the infantry squad
during dismounted assault. It

Infantry Carrier vehicle carries an infantry squad with individual
equipment.

The battalion aid station for brigade units, providing treatment for
serious injury and advanced trauma

Medical Evaluation vehicle cases.

Provides infantry units with screening obscurants, suppressive forces and
on-call supporting fires. 120mm and 81mm variants provide responsive,
accurate and lethal indirect fire support to the

Mortar Carrier dismounted infantry assault.

Provides force situational awareness, gathering and transmitting real time
intelligence while moving throughout the battlefield in close, complex,
and

Reconnaissance vehicle urban terrain.

                             Developmental vehicles

Supports dismounted infantry and engages the enemy in close combat to
clear opposition and permit rapid movement, allowing the force to maintain
the initiative, occupy and/ or secure key objectives, and

Mobile Gun System defeat strong points.

Provides on-the-move and remote near-real-time Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical nuclear, biological, and chemical detection and (NBC)
Reconnaissance vehicle surveillance.

Source: U.S. Army.

Figure 1: The Infantry Carrier Vehicle Is One of Eight Production Configurations

                               Source: U.S. Army.

Figure 2: The Mobile Gun System Is One of Two Developmental Configurations

                               Source: U.S. Army.

Figure 3: The Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle Is One of
Two Developmental Configurations

Source: U.S. Army.

The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one mechanized infantry
brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first two of six planned
Stryker brigades. The first of these brigades, the 3rd Brigade, Second
Infantry Division, became operational in October 2003, at which time the
Brigade was deployed to Iraq. The second of the two Fort Lewis brigades
became operational in May 2004, and plans are for it to deploy to Iraq in
late 2004. The Army plans to form four more Stryker brigades from 2005
through 2008. The planned locations of the next four brigades are Fort
Wainwright/Fort Richardson, Alaska; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii; and a brigade of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard.

Acquisition of Stryker Acquisition of the eight Stryker production vehicle
configurations is about

two-thirds complete with about 68 percent of the over
1,800-plannedProduction Vehicles Is production vehicles ordered, and a low
rate of production for the two about Two-thirds developmental Strykers is
scheduled for September 2004. Estimated

program costs have increased because of, among other reasons,
increasesComplete, Though in the Army's estimate for related military
construction, such as for the Overall Program cost of building new Stryker
vehicle maintenance facilities. However, the

Army does not yet have reliable estimates for the Stryker's operating
costs,Costs Have Increased, such as for vehicle maintenance, because of
limited peacetime operational and Operational Cost experience with the
vehicles.

  Estimates Are Not Yet Reliable

About Two-thirds of The Army is pursuing three acquisition schedules for
the Stryker Stryker Production Vehicle production and developmental
vehicles. Since the November 2000 Stryker Acquisition Completed vehicle
contract award,13 the Army has ordered 1,231 production

vehicles-about 68 percent-of the 1,814 production vehicles the Army plans
to buy for the six Stryker brigades. Of the 1,231 vehicles ordered, 800
have been delivered to the brigades, including all of the production
vehicles for the first two Stryker brigades. The Army is currently
fielding Stryker production vehicles for the third of the six planned
brigades. The third brigade is to be fielded in Alaska.

Thus far, the Army has bought limited quantities of the developmental
vehicle variants-8 Mobile Gun System and 4 NBC Reconnaissance vehicles-as
prototypes and for use in testing at various test sites around the
country. Of 238 Mobile Gun Systems the Army plans to buy overall, current
plans are to buy 72 initially upon approval for low-rate initial
production scheduled for September 2004. The Army plans low-rate initial
production of 17 NBC Reconnaissance vehicles also in September 2004. The
Mobile Gun System is not scheduled to reach a full production decision
until September 2006 at the earliest, while the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle
is not scheduled to reach its full production decision until 2007. Table 2
below shows the status of Stryker vehicle acquisition as of April 2004.

13 On November 16, 2000, the Army awarded a contract for Interim Armored
vehicles, now called Stryker Vehicles, to General Motors General Dynamics
Defense Group L.L.C; a joint venture of General Motors Defense-Canada and
General Dynamics Land Systems. In 2003 General Dynamics Land Systems
bought General Motors Defense-Canada.

Table 2: Stryker Vehicle Acquisition Status As of April 2004 Vehicle
configuration/ Total planned

                             Quantities Quantities

variant

                      quantities ordered Percent delivered

Percent of planned quantities Production vehicles

          Infantry carrier            699         445        64        328    
           Reconnaissance             393         290        74        140    
           Mortar carrier             224         127        57        85     
         Medical evacuation           114              79    69        47     
            Commander's               112              80    71        41     
            Fire-Support              108              80    74        39     
      Antitank guided missile         88               88    100       88     
           Engineer squad             76               42    55        32     
      Production vehicle total       1,814       1,231       68        800    

                             Developmental vehicles

          NBC Reconnaissance             44                4    9       4     
           Mobile Gun System             238               8    3       8     
      Developmental vehicle total        282         12         4       12    
                 Total                  2,096       1,243      59      812    

Stryker Vehicle Program's The Stryker vehicle program's total costs
increased, in then-year dollars, Costs Have Increased from from the
original November 2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December Earlier
Estimates 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion-or about 22 percent.14 The
increases

occurred primarily due to revised estimates for the associated cost of

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

Note: Percentages are rounded.

military construction, such as that needed to upgrade maintenance and
training facilities for a Stryker brigade, but were also due to lesser
increases in procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) costs for the vehicles-which together grew by about 8 percent from
the original November 2000 estimate.

In then-year dollars, the estimated cost of military construction
accounted for the largest increase in the Stryker program's cost estimate.
In

14 This information was included in DOD's Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR) submitted to the Congress for the period ending December 31, 2003.
The SAR summarizes the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and technical
status of major defense acquisition programs.

December 2003, the Army increased its estimate for military construction
by about $1.01 billion over the original November 2000 estimate, from $322
million to $1.3 billion. (See table 3.) As in all major Department of
Defense acquisition programs, military construction costs are included in
the program's total costs. According to the Army, the military
construction cost estimate increased because the December 2003 estimate
reflects (1) the identification of all five sites scheduled to receive
Stryker brigades and (2) the total cost of upgrading or building
maintenance and training facilities at these installations to accommodate
a Stryker brigade. When the original estimate was made, only one site had
been identified to receive a Stryker brigade and that estimate identified
just the cost of maintenance facility upgrades.

             Table 3: Increases in Stryker Vehicle Program's Costs

                         Then-year dollars in millions

                                November 2000               
           Cost element             (original December 2003 Increase/decrease 
                                    estimate)               
      Military construction            $322.2      $1,333.3          $1,011.1 
           Procurement               $6,290.0      $6,679.8            $389.8 
Research, development, test,        $508.0        $645.6            $137.6 
           & evaluation                                     
            Total cost               $7,120.2      $8,658.7          $1,538.5 
    aTotal number of vehicles            2131          2096            (35.0) 
    bAverage acquisition cost           $3.34         $4.13             $0.79 
           per vehicle                                      

Source: U.S. Army.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are negative.

aPlanned vehicle quantities are subject to change because of modifications
to the Stryker Brigade's design.

bTotal acquisition cost/number of vehicles.

The Stryker vehicle's procurement costs increased by about $390 million.
The largest factor in the increase of procurement costs was the higher
than originally estimated costs of procuring add-on reactive armor,15
including the additional costs to equip six Stryker brigades with add-on
armor, instead of four brigades as originally planned. Also, the cost of

15 Stryker vehicles are built from ballistic steel and covered with
ceramic armor that can withstand 14.5mm ammunition. For added protection
against rocket-propelled grenades, the vehicles are designed to carry
removable add-on reactive armor. The add-on armor is currently in
development and will not be available until 2005. Strykers currently
deployed to Iraq are fitted with slat armor to protect against
rocket-propelled grenades.

Limited Peacetime The Army does not have reliable estimates of Stryker
vehicle operating Operational Experience costs because, with the first
Stryker brigade's deployment to Iraq, it lacks Makes Operating Cost
sufficient peacetime operational experience with the vehicles. The Army
Estimates Unreliable considers 3 years of actual peacetime operational
cost data to be sufficient

for reliable estimates.16 Since none of the production vehicles have 3
years

RDT&E increased about $138 million, from $508 million to $645.6 million.
Most of the RDT&E cost increase is attributable to revised estimates for
the cost of test and evaluation, development, and system engineering for
the developmental vehicles. The average acquisition cost per vehicle
increased by about $0.79 million, from $3.34 million to $4.13 million. The
program costs and average acquisition cost per vehicle estimates reflect a
reduction in the number of Strykers planned from 2,131 to 2,096. (See
table 3 above.)

of peacetime operating experience, reliable operating cost estimates will
not be available until 2005 at the earliest. With the Mobile Gun System
and NBC Reconnaissance vehicles still in development, it will be several
years before these vehicles are fully fielded and sufficient data are
available for reliable estimates of their operating costs.

According to the Army, current Stryker vehicle operating cost estimates,
shown in table 4 below, are engineering estimates based in part on
operating costs for another vehicle in the Army's inventory-the M-113
armored personnel carrier.17 The estimates assume peacetime operations.

16 The Army uses peacetime operational cost data, rather than data
collected during operations such as in Iraq, because peacetime data is
more representative of actual long-term operating costs.

17 The Army used operating costs of the M113 for its Stryker vehicle
operating cost estimates because the M113 is a medium-weight armored
personnel carrier that has been in the Army's inventory for a number of
years. Therefore, the Army had historical peacetime operating costs for
the vehicle.

                 Table 4: Operating Cost Estimates per Vehicle

Fiscal year 2004 constant dollars

                  Vehicle configuration Cost per-mile estimate

                       Medical Evaluation vehicle $12.27

                         Reconnaissance vehicle $16.48

                        Infantry Carrier vehicle $17.19

                          Fire Support vehicle $18.78

                           Commander's vehicle $21.33

                    Anti-Tank Guided Missile vehicle $22.05

                         Engineer Squad vehicle $25.66

                             Mortar Carrier $28.96

        Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle $35.62

                            Mobile Gun System $69.76

Source: U.S. Army Stryker Program Office.

Note: Estimates are based, in part, on costs of Army's M-113 armored
personnel carrier.

Vehicle operating costs include the cost for maintenance, repair, and the
cost of consumable and repairable parts. The Army calculates vehicle cost
per mile by tracking vehicle mileage and the actual costs of consumable or
replaceable parts used.18 However, the short time frame from fielding the
first Stryker brigade's production vehicles-May 2002 through January
2003-and the brigades' deployment to Iraq in October 2003, limited the
amount of time and miles the vehicles were in peacetime service.
Similarly, fielding of Stryker vehicles for the second brigade was
completed in January 2004. While the Army collected operational cost and
mileage data for both brigades, there were insufficient actual operating
costs and miles on the vehicles to make reliable estimates. Consequently,
until the Army can collect more actual peacetime operating cost data for
the production vehicles, it will not be able to determine actual vehicle
operating costs and make reliable operating cost estimates for these
vehicles. Similarly, reliable operating cost estimates for the Mobile Gun
System and NBC Reconnaissance vehicle will not be available until after
2006 when they are scheduled to begin full production and fielding.

18 Operating costs do not include petroleum, oil, and lubricant costs.

Tested Production According to Army and OSD test reports19, the tested
Stryker production

vehicles met operational requirements with certain limitations
and,Vehicles Generally overall, support the key operational capabilities
and force effectiveness of Met Requirements, the Stryker Brigade Combat
Team. The separate developmental testing

schedules of the Mobile Gun System and NBC Reconnaissance vehiclesbut
Testing and have been delayed, resulting in delays in meeting planned
production Acquisition Schedules milestone dates. Delay in the Mobile Gun
System's development was due

in part to shortfalls in meeting performance requirements of the
vehicle'sfor Developmental ammunition autoloader system. The NBC
Reconnaissance vehicle's Vehicles Have Been development schedule was
delayed pending OSD approval of an updated

technology readiness assessment20 for the vehicle and its nuclear,Delayed
biological, and chemical sensor systems.

Following Testing, Army Following the Army's completion of live-fire tests
and evaluation for seven and OSD Indicate Stryker production vehicles in
February 2004 and its ongoing test evaluation of the Production Vehicles
Met eighth, the Army stated that the Stryker production vehicles met

operational requirements, with limitations; and OSD approved
fullOperational Requirements, production.21

    with Limitations

The Army's System Evaluation Report for the Stryker production decision
concluded that overall, the Stryker family of vehicles is effective,
suitable, and survivable, and supports the key operational capabilities
and force effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The report
concluded that the Stryker production vehicle configurations met
operational requirements with limitations. For example, in the area of
lethality, the report noted that four Stryker vehicle configurations have
a remote weapons station that provides effective protective and supporting
fires for

19 Army Test and Evaluation Command, U.S. Army Evaluation Center, System
Evaluation Report for the Stryker Family of Vehicles, for Milestone III
Decision, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2004) and OSD Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, Operational Test & Evaluation and Live
Fire Test & Evaluation Report on the Stryker Family of Vehicles,
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2004).

20 A technology readiness assessment provides information to DOD
acquisition officials on the maturity of technologies used in or proposed
for a system at the time of acquisition milestones such as low-rate
initial production.

21 In its March 2004 Stryker Acquisition Decision Memorandum, OSD
delegated to the Army Acquisition Executive a decision on Mortar Carrier
production pending successful assessment of live-fire test results of the
Mortar Carrier (B) mounted vehicle variant. The Mortar Carrier vehicle has
two configurations: the Mortar Carrier (A), which carries mortars for
dismounted use, and the Mortar Carrier (B), which has an integrated
mounted mortar system.

dismounted maneuver. However, limitations of the remote weapons station's
capability to provide accurate and continuous fires at night and while
moving reduce its effectiveness and lethality. Similarly, while the
Stryker vehicles contribute to force protection and meet survivability
requirements, there are inherent and expected survivability limitations as
in any armored vehicle system. Table 5 lists some of the operational
requirements of the vehicles and excerpts of selected performance
capabilities and limitations from the Army's Stryker system evaluation
report.

    Table 5: Selected Performance Capabilities and Limitations from Stryker
                               Evaluation Report

Operational requirement Overall assessment Examples of limitations

Lethality 	The Stryker family of While the remote weapons station provides
effective protective and vehicles provides significant support fires, its
capability to provide accurate and continuous fires is firepower
capabilities giving limited at night and while moving. the Striker Combat
Brigade Team commander the ability to shape the battle. Four variants have
a remote weapons station that provides effective protective and supporting
fires for dismounted maneuver.

Logistics supportability 	Stryker vehicles are An augmentation of
personnel is needed to sustain a brigade's Stryker logistically
supportable and vehicle maintenance workload. require significantly less
petroleum supplies than an equivalent heavy brigade.

Mobility 	Stryker has good on and off-Fully loaded in temperatures above
100 degrees Fahrenheit, power train road mobility. Its off-road cooling is
insufficient, limiting the Stryker's ability to operate for extended
mobility is comparable to periods in soft soil or sand or to climb
prolonged grades. other Army wheeled vehicles but less than tracked
vehicles.

Reliability and maintainability 	Except Engineer Squad All vehicle
configurations experienced a significant number of vehicles, Stryker
family of unscheduled maintenance actions. vehicles meets operational
reliability requirements.

Survivability 	Stryker vehicles contribute to There are inherent and
expected survivability limitations. Specific force protection and meet
ballistic survivability results are classified. survivability
requirements.

Source: U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command.

The OSD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, found that six Stryker
production vehicles are operationally effective for employment in
smallscale contingency operations and operationally suitable with certain

Mobile Gun System Although developmental testing is ongoing, the
development and testing Development and Testing schedule of the Mobile Gun
System has been delayed, resulting in more Schedule Ongoing but than a
1-year delay in meeting planned production decision milestone

dates, with initial limited production to start in September 2004. The
delayDelayed in the Mobile Gun System's development was due in part to
shortfalls in limitations.22 OSD found that the Engineer Squad vehicle is
not operationally suitable because of poor reliability. However, in its
March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD determined that the
operational capabilities provided by the Engineer Squad vehicle supported
its continued production in light of planned fixes, operational
work-arounds, and planned follow-on testing. It also determined that
corrective actions are needed to address survivability and ballistic
vulnerability limitations of the vehicles, such as ensuring basic armor
performance and reducing exposure of Stryker personnel.

meeting performance requirements of the vehicle's ammunition autoloader
system. At the time of our review, the Mobile Gun System was undergoing
additional testing to find a fix for the autoloader, in preparation for a
low-rate production decision. The Mobile Gun System is scheduled for
production qualification testing through July 2004, production
verification testing starting in October 2005, and live-fire test and
evaluation starting in November 2005 through September 2006. The Army's
earlier Mobile Gun System acquisition schedule was to complete
developmental testing and have a low-rate initial production decision in
2003 and begin full production in 2005. Current Army plans are to buy
limited quantities of Mobile Gun System vehicles upon OSD approval of
low-rate initial production planned for September 2004. A full-rate
production decision for the Mobile Gun System is currently scheduled for
late in 2006.

The Mobile Gun System has a 105mm cannon with an autoloader for rapidly
loading cannon rounds without outside exposure of its threeperson crew.
The principal function of the Mobile Gun System is to provide rapid and
lethal direct fires to protect assaulting infantry. The Mobile Gun System
cannon is designed to defeat bunkers and create openings in reinforced
concrete walls through which infantry can pass to accomplish their
missions. According to the Army's Stryker Program

22 The Mortar Carrier vehicle was not evaluated by the OSD Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), because its live-fire tests were
not completed at the time DOT&E conducted its evaluation.

NBC Reconnaissance Although its developmental testing is also ongoing, the
development Vehicle Development schedule of the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle
has also been delayed, and Schedule Delayed its production is now
scheduled to occur about two years later than

planned. The delay was primarily due to additional time needed to develop
Management Office, the autoloader system was responsible for 80 percent of
the system aborts during initial Mobile Gun System reliability testing
because of cannon rounds jamming in the system. As of February 2004, the
Army was planning additional testing and working with the autoloader's
manufacturer to determine a solution. A functioning autoloader is needed
if the Mobile Gun System is to meet its operational requirements because
manual loading of cannon rounds both reduces the desired rate of fire and
requires brief outside exposure of crew. In its March 2004 Stryker
acquisition decision, OSD required the Army to provide changes to the
Mobile Gun System developmental exit criteria within 90 days, including
the ability to meet cost and system reliability criteria.

and test the vehicle's nuclear, biological, and chemical sensor systems.
As a result, low-rate initial production, previously scheduled for
December 2003, will not occur until September 2004. A full-rate production
decision, which had previously been scheduled for June 2005, will not
occur until July 2007. In its March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD
required the Army to provide within 90 days an updated technology
readiness assessment for the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle and its nuclear,
biological, and chemical sensor systems. At that time, OSD will make a
determination as to whether the vehicle is ready for production.

Army Demonstrated Although the Army demonstrated during training events
that Stryker

vehicles can be transported short distances on C-130 aircraft and
unloadedRequired Stryker C-for immediate combat, the average 38,000 pound
weight of Stryker 130 Transportability, vehicles, other cargo weight
concerns, and less than ideal environmental

conditions present significant challenges in using C-130s for routinebut
Contrary to Stryker transport. Similar operational limits would exist for
C-130 Congressional transport of the Army's Future Combat Systems because
they are also Expectations, being designed to weigh about 38,000 pounds.

Operational Limits In addition, much of the mission equipment, ammunition,
fuel, personnel,

and armor a Stryker brigade would need to conduct a combat
operationSignificantly might need to be moved on separate aircraft,
increasing the numbers of Challenge Routine C-aircraft or sorties needed
to deploy a Stryker force, adding to deployment

time and the time it would take after arrival to begin operations. Yet,
the

130 Transport 	Army's weight requirement and C-130 transport requirements
for the vehicles, and information the Army provided to Congress in budget
documents and testimony, created expectations that Stryker vehicles could
be routinely transported by C-130 aircraft within an operational theater.

Stryker's C-130 Short-In a December 2003 report on the first Stryker
Brigade's design Distance Deployability evaluation,23 we reported that the
Stryker Brigade demonstrated the ability Was Demonstrated in to conduct
tactical deployments by C-130 aircraft. At the National Training

Center in April 2003, we observed the brigade conduct a
tacticalOperational Evaluations movement by moving a Stryker infantry
company with its personnel, supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via seven
C-130 aircraft flying 35 sorties from Southern California Logistics
Airfield to a desert airfield on Fort Irwin about 70 miles away.24 Figure
4 shows a Stryker vehicle being offloaded from a C-130 at the National
Training Center.

23 GAO, Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative
Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues
Remain for Future Brigades, GAO-04-188 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2003).

24 In a later event in May 2003 during the Stryker Brigade operational
evaluation, we also observed a Stryker infantry company-consisting of 21
Stryker vehicles and 5 other trucks and trailers; 188 soldiers; and 3 days
of food, water, ammunition, and fuel to support the company-travel from
the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, to a nearby
airfield using seven C-130s flying 25 sorties over a distance of about 100
miles. Upon landing at the airfield, the company moved to a tactical
assembly area and onward to conduct a combat operation.

  Figure 4: Stryker Vehicle Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training
                                     Center

Source: U.S. Army.

A team from the Department of Defense's (DOD) Office of the Director for
Operational Test and Evaluation and the Army's Test and Evaluation Command
also observed the Stryker vehicle's deployment and recorded the weight of
the vehicles and the total load weight onboard the aircraft. The average
weight for the eight production vehicle configurations was just less than
38,000 pounds, while the total load weight-including a 3-days' supply of
fuel, food, water, and ammunition-averaged more than 39,100 pounds. Table
6 shows the weight of eight-production vehicles and their total load
weight recorded at the time of the April 2003 National Training Center
deployment. We noted in our December 2003 report,25

however, that while the tactical deployment of Stryker vehicles by C-130
aircraft was demonstrated, the Army had yet to demonstrate under various
environmental conditions, such as high temperature and airfield altitude,
just how far Stryker vehicles can be tactically deployed by C-130
aircraft.

25 GAO-04-188.

Table 6: Stryker Production Vehicle and Total Load Weights at the National
Training Center in April 2003

              Vehicle configurationa    Vehicle weightb    Total load weightc 
                         Commander's       36,660                      38,130 
                      Reconnaissance       37,090                      38,350 
                        Fire-Support       37,220                      37,850 
                    Infantry Carrier       37,630                      39,940 
                  Medical Evacuation       37,930                      38,570 
                      Engineer Squad       38,450                      39,500 
                      Mortar Carrier       38,940                      39,990 
             Antitank Guided Missile       39,980                      40,820 
                      Average weight       37,988                      39,144 

Weight Presents The weight of Stryker vehicles presents significant
challenges for C-130 Significant Challenges for aircraft transport
because, as a general rule U.S. Air Force air mobility C-130 Transport of
Stryker planning factors specify an allowable C-130 cargo weight of about
34,000

pounds for routine flight. With most Stryker vehicles weighing close
toVehicles, Making 38,000 pounds on board, the distance-or range-that a
C-130 aircraftRequirements and could fly is significantly reduced when
taking-off in high air temperaturesExpectations Difficult to or from
airfields located in higher elevations. In standard, or nearly ideal,Meet
flight conditions-such as day-time, low head-wind, moderate air

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

aThe NBC Reconnaissance vehicle and the Mobile Gun System were in
developmental testing and did not participate in this exercise.

bVehicle weight is the weight of each vehicle during a Stryker C-130
deployment that was conducted as part of the Stryker Brigade Operational
Evaluation at the National Training Center in April 2003. The vehicle
weights are not final and may change slightly as the make-up of their
associated equipment packages is finalized.

cTotal load weight is the weight of each vehicle during the April 2003
deployment with a 3-days' supply of fuel, food, water, ammunition, and
crew. The Anti-Tank Guided Missile's total load weight included a four-man
crew.

temperature, and low elevation-an armored C-130H with a cargo payload of
38,000 pounds can generally expect to fly 860 miles from takeoff to
landing. Furthermore, according to a Military Traffic Management Command's
Transportation Engineering Agency study of C-130 aircraft

transportability of Army vehicles,26 a C-130's range is significantly
reduced with only minimal additional weight, and ideal conditions rarely
exist in combat scenarios. The C-130 aircraft's range may be further
reduced if operational conditions such as high-speed takeoffs and
threat-based route deviations exist because more fuel would be consumed
under these conditions. Even in ideal flight conditions, adding just 2,000
pounds onboard the aircraft for associated cargo such as mission
equipment, personnel, or ammunition reduces the C-130 aircraft's
takeoff-to-landing range to 500 miles. In addition, the more than
41,000-pound weight of the Mobile Gun System would limit the C-130
aircraft's range to a maximum distance of less than 500 miles. Figure 5
shows the affects of cargo weight on an armored C-130H aircraft's flight
range in nearly ideal flight conditions.

Figure 5: Cargo Payload and Range of an Armored C-130H Aircraft in Nearly
Ideal Flight Conditions

               Source: GAO analysis of Air Mobility Command data.

26 Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering Agency,
C130E/H/J/J-30 Transportability of Army Vehicles (Sept. 11, 2002). The
Military Traffic Management Command is a component command of the U.S.
Transportation Command, which manages the Department of Defense's
transportation system. The Military Traffic Management Command was renamed
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command in January 2004.

The addition of armor to the Strykers would pose additional challenges.
With removable armor added to Strykers, the vehicles will not fit inside a
C-130. To provide interim protection against rocket-propelled grenades,
the Stryker vehicles of the brigade that deployed to Iraq in October 2003,
were fitted with Slat armor weighing about 5,000 pounds for each vehicle
(see fig. 6). By 2005, the Army expects to complete the development of
add-on reactive armor-weighing about 9,000 pounds per vehicle-for
protection against rocket-propelled grenades. With either type of armor
installed, a Stryker vehicle will not fit inside a C-130 aircraft cargo
bay. Regardless, with the added weight of the armor even in ideal flight
conditions, the aircraft would be too heavy to take off.

               Figure 6: Stryker Vehicle with Slat Armor in Iraq

Source: U.S. Army.

Furthermore, according to the Army Test and Evaluation Command's Stryker
System Evaluation, in less than favorable flight conditions, the Air Force
considers routine transport of the 38,000-pound cargo weight of a Stryker
vehicle on C-130 aircraft risky, and such flight may not be permitted
under the Air Force's flight operations risk management requirements if
other transport means are available. In two theaters where U.S. forces are
currently operating-the Middle East and Afghanistan, high temperatures and
elevation can reduce C-130 aircraft range if carrying a 38,000-pound
Stryker vehicle. Table 7 shows the reduced C-130 aircraft transport range
due to daytime average summer temperatures of more than 100 degrees
Fahrenheit in Iraq and high temperatures and elevations in Afghanistan.
From two locations in Afghanistan (Bagram at 4,895 feet elevation and
Kabul at 5,871 feet elevation) during daytime in the summer, a C-130 with
a Stryker vehicle on board would not be able to take off at all. In winter
from these same locations, its flight range would be reduced to 610 miles
departing from Bagram and to 310 miles departing from Kabul. These same
weight concerns would also apply to the Army's Future Combat Systems
vehicles, which according to the Army's operational requirements should be
no larger than 38,000 pounds and be transportable by a C-130.

Table 7: Analysis of C-130 Range from Selected Airfields in the Middle
East and Afghanistan When Carrying Cargo Weighing 38,000 Pounds

                        Flight ranges in nautical miles

Flight range Flight range Airfield (summer) (winter)

                                        Day      Night      Day         Night 
                 Kuwait City, Kuwait    710       860       710           860 
               Tallil Air Base, Iraq    760       860       860           860 
                Baghdad, Int'l, Iraq    760       860       760           860 
                Balad Air Base, Iraq    760       860       760           860 
                Mosul Air Base, Iraq    660       860       860           860 
                         Doha, Qatar    760       760       860           860 
                aBagram, Afghanistan         0    510       610           860 
                 Kabul, Afghanistana         0    110       310           610 
               Kandahar, Afghanistan    360       760       760           860 

Source: U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Army Evaluation Center.

aElevation, temperature, and terrain prevent takeoff with cargo weighing
38,000 pounds.

C-130 Airlift for Stryker Because a C-130's range is limited by weight and
a Stryker's weight Brigades Could Increase exceeds limits for routine
C-130 loading, a tactical movement of significant Force Deployment Time
distance of a Stryker brigade via C-130 aircraft in less than ideal
conditions and Time Needed to Start could necessitate moving much of the
mission equipment, ammunition,

fuel, personnel, and armor on separate aircraft. Such use of
separateOperations upon Arrival- aircraft for moving Stryker vehicles and
associated equipment, personnel,a Key Operational and supplies increases
the force closure,27 or deployment, time and mightRequirement and limit
the deployed forces' ability to be capable of immediate combat Expectation
operations upon arrival-one of the Army's key operational requirements

for the Stryker vehicles-because aircraft would arrive at different times
Additionally, the Mobile Gun System, expected to weigh over 41,000 pounds,
is probably too heavy to transport a significant distance via C-130
aircraft. Furthermore, the C-130 aircraft cannot transport many of a
Stryker brigade's vehicles at all. Stryker vehicles make up a little more
than 300 of the over 1,000 vehicles of a Stryker brigade, and many of the
brigade's support vehicles, such as fuel trucks, are too large or heavy
for C-130 transport.

and potentially different locations. In combination, a 38,000-pound
Stryker vehicle, and the associated equipment, personnel, or armor that
would have to be transported on separate aircraft are likely to increase
the number of aircraft or sorties that would be needed to deploy a Stryker
force. For example, if a decision were made to use a Stryker's add-on
armor for a tactical mission, at about 9,000 pounds for each vehicle's
armor, it would take at least one additional C-130 aircraft sortie to
transport the armor for about four vehicles. Or, because of potential
limits of the availability of C-130 lift assets, the size of a Stryker
force and number of Stryker vehicles that could be tactically deployed
would have to be reduced.

At the National Training Center in April 2003, we observed, upon landing,
an infantry company unload the vehicles from the C-130 aircraft,
reconfigure them for combat missions, and move onward to a staging area.
All Stryker variants except one reconfigured into combat capable modes
within their designated time standard. Once reconfigured, units of the
Stryker brigade also demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate combat
operations. However, this was a short-range movement with only

27 Force closure is the process of a unit arriving at a specified
location. It begins when the first element arrives at a designated
location, and ends when the last element arrives.

seven aircraft and did not require fitting armor on the vehicles. In an
operational mission, depending on the size of the Stryker force deployed,
using separate C-130 aircraft for transporting vehicles and associated
people and equipment could significantly increase force deployment time
because of the increased numbers of aircraft sorties needed. Upon arrival,
it would also increase the time needed to reconfigure and begin operations
because the vehicles, equipment, and personnel on different aircraft might
arrive at different times or at different airfield locations. In addition,
if a decision were made to use add-on armor for a mission, the armor would
need to be installed after arrival, adding an average of about 10 hours
per vehicle in reconfiguration time to install the armor.

The capability of transporting Stryker vehicles on C-130 aircraft, despite
its challenges and limitations, is a major objective of the Army's
transformation to a lighter more responsive force. As such, the Army's
weight and C-130 transport requirements for the vehicles, as well as
information the Army provided to Congress, created expectations that
Stryker vehicles could be routinely transported within an operational
theater by C-130 aircraft. For example, in several congressional hearings
since 2001, senior Army leadership testified that Stryker vehicles would
be capable of transport by C-130 aircraft.28 In addition, annual budget
justifications, which the Army submits to Congress for Stryker vehicle
acquisition, highlight the C-130 transport capability of
Stryker-vehicleequipped Brigade Combat Teams.

During our review, Army officials acknowledged the significant challenges
and limitations of meeting expectations for transporting Stryker vehicles-
and beyond 2010, the Future Combat Systems-on C-130 aircraft in terms of
limited flight range, the size force that could be deployed, and the
challenges of arriving ready for combat. The officials, however, believe
that the capability to transport Stryker vehicles or the Future Combat
Systems' vehicles on C-130 aircraft, even over short distances, offers the
theater combatant commanders an additional option among other modes of
intratheater transportation-such as C-17 aircraft, sealift, or driving
over land-for transporting Stryker brigades and vehicles in tactical
missions. In addition, the officials believe that the ability to transport

28 See, for example, Army Modernization and Transformation In Review of
the Defense Authorization Request for fiscal year 2003: Hearings on S.
2225 Before the Airland Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, 107th Cong. 15 (2002) (statement of General John M. Keane, Vice
Chief of Staff, United States Army).

Conclusions

Recommendations for Executive Action

elements of a Stryker brigade as small as a platoon29 with four Stryker
vehicles- as a part of an operational mission of forces moving by other
means, greatly enhances the combatant commander's war-fighting
capabilities.

In less than 4 years from the November 2000 Stryker vehicle contract
award, the Army is well under way in fielding the eight production vehicle
configurations, and Stryker vehicles are already in use in military
operations in Iraq. However, program costs have increased, largely because
of the cost of military construction related to Stryker vehicle needs, and
delays in developing and testing the two remaining variants will delay
their fielding and use.

Furthermore, although the Army has successfully demonstrated that Stryker
vehicles can be transported on C-130 aircraft during training events,
routine use of the C-130 for airlifting Stryker vehicles, for other than
short-range missions with limited numbers of vehicles, would be difficult
in theaters where U.S. forces are currently operating. Therefore, the
intended capability of Stryker brigades to be transportable by C-130
aircraft would be markedly reduced. The Army's operational requirements
and information the Army provided to Congress created expectations that a
Stryker vehicle weight of 38,000 pounds-and a similar weight for Future
Combat System vehicles-would allow routine C-130 transport in tactical
operations. Consequently, congressional decision makers do not have an
accurate sense or realistic expectations of the operational capabilities
of Stryker vehicles and Future Combat Systems.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, take the
following two actions:

1. Provide to Congress information that

o  	clarifies the expected C-130 tactical intratheater deployment
capabilities of Stryker brigades and Stryker vehicles and describes
probable operational missions and scenarios using C-130 transport

29 A Stryker brigade platoon could consist of about 16 to 44 people,
depending on its organizational mission.

        of Stryker vehicles that are achievable, including the size of a

combat capable C-130 deployable Stryker force;  o  describes operational
capability limitations of Stryker brigades given the limits of C-130
transport; and

o  	identifies options for, and the feasibility of, alternative modes of
transportation-such as C-17 aircraft- for transporting Stryker brigades
within an operational theater.

2. 	Provide the Congress similar clarification concerning the operational
requirements and expected C-130 tactical airlift capabilities of Future
Combat System vehicles, considering the limits of C-130 aircraft
transportability.

                                Agency Comments
                               and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
partially concurred with our recommendations. The department also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated in the report where appropriate.

DOD concurred that operational requirements for airlift capability for
brigade transport need clarification and stated that the ongoing Mobility
Capabilities Study, scheduled for completion in the spring of 2005, will
include an assessment of the intratheater transport of Army Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams and address the recommendations of this report. In
responding to our recommendation to provide information to Congress
concerning C-130 transport of Stryker-equipped brigades, the department
partially concurred and stated that the Army has studied C-130
transportability in depth. While we agree that the Army has studied C-130
transportability of Stryker vehicles-including the limitations that we
point out in this report-their comments provide no assurance that this
information will be provided to Congress, and we believe Congress needs
this type of information to have an accurate sense of the operational
capabilities of Stryker brigades. The department also partially concurred
with our recommendation to provide to Congress similar clarification
concerning the operational requirements and expected C-130 tactical
airlift capabilities of Future Combat System vehicles, considering the
limits of C-130 aircraft transportability. The department noted in its
response that the Army is currently considering many factors, including
C-130 tactical airlift capability limits, as it reviews Future Combat
Systems Unit of Action capability requirements. The department also stated
that the Mobility Capabilities Study would include intratheater transport
of Army units of action-the Army's Future Combat Systems-equipped future
force.

  Scope and Methodology

Given the ongoing congressional interest in the implications of the Army's
requirements for C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles and Future Combat
System ground vehicles, we agree that the information the Congress would
need, if addressed in the Mobility Capabilities Study and provided to
Congress, would meet the intent of our recommendations. With the Mobility
Capabilities Study not scheduled for completion until the spring of 2005,
we will assess at that time the adequacy of the study's assessment of
intratheater transport of Army Stryker-and Future Combat Systemequipped
units. The Senate Armed Services Committee has directed GAO to monitor
DOD's processes used to conduct the Mobility Capabilities Study, and to
report on the adequacy and completeness of the study to the congressional
defense committees no later than 30 days after the completion of the
study.30

The appendix contains the full text of the department's comments.

To determine the current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition and the
latest Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates, we analyzed
documents on Stryker vehicle acquisition plans, contract performance
requirements, and costs and interviewed officials from the Army Program
Executive Office/Stryker Program Management Office, Warren, Michigan. To
determine Stryker program costs, we reviewed the DOD approved December
2003 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and interviewed Stryker Program
Management Office officials. For our analysis of Stryker vehicle-operating
costs, we reviewed the Army's mileage cost estimates and the Army's
methodology for calculating costs per mile. We did not verify source
information the Army used in its calculations.

To determine the status and results of Stryker vehicle tests, we reviewed
the results of Stryker vehicle developmental and survivability testing
from the Army Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria, Virginia, and the
Army Developmental Test Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We
also reviewed the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Army Evaluation
Center's Stryker System Evaluation Report and OSD Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation's Operational Test and Evaluation and Live Fire Test
and Evaluation Report for the Stryker family of vehicles.

30 S. Rep No. 108-260 at 126 (2004).

To determine the ability of C-130 aircraft to transport Stryker vehicles
within a theater of operations, we reviewed a Military Traffic Management
Command's, Transportation Engineering Agency study of the C-130 aircraft's
range and payload capabilities and interviewed U.S. Army, Air Force and
Transportation Command officials. We notified U.S. Central Command of our
objective to review plans for C-130 aircraft transport of Stryker vehicles
within the command's area of operations, but Central Command officials
determined that this was an Army issue, rather than a combatant command's
issue.

Our review was conducted from July 2003 through June 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and
subcommittees that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for
DOD. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available
at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-8365, or Assistant Director, George Poindexter, at (202)
512-7213. Major contributors to this report were Kevin Handley, Frank
Smith, and M. Jane Hunt.

William M. Solis, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles

Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense

                    Page 33 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles

Related GAO Products

Defense Acquisitions: The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features, Risks,
and Alternatives. GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004.

Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for
First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future
Brigades. GAO-04-188. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.

Issues Facing the Army's Future Combat Systems Program. GAO-031010R.
Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003.

Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army
Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry
Carrier vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated
Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.

Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should Be
Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's
Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2003.

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2002.

Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its
Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. Washington, D.C.:
November 16, 2001.

Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges.
GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.

GAO's Mission 	The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation
and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
costObtaining Copies of is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each
weekday, GAO postsGAO Reports and newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon,
goTestimony to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone 	The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: 	Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

  To Report Fraud, Contact:

Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: [email protected] Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected](202)
512-4400Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street
NW, Room 7125 Relations Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs 	Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548

           Presorted Standard Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00

United States
Government Accountability Office
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business
Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Service Requested
*** End of document. ***