Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are	 
Being Addressed, but State's Planning and Budgeting Process Can  
Be Improved (29-JUL-04, GAO-04-918).				 
                                                                 
The Department of State supports foreign governments' efforts to 
eradicate illicit drug crops. In recent years, State's Office of 
Aviation has maintained aircraft and provided support for the	 
aerial eradication program of the Colombian National Police.	 
However, eradication aircraft are often shot at from the ground  
requiring helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter 
to accompany each mission. In 2003, the Office of Aviation	 
fumigated more than 132,000 hectares of coca, a record amount.	 
GAO examined (1) how the threat to the spray planes has changed  
since 2001, (2) what actions State has taken to address any	 
operational safety concerns, and (3) what resources State	 
provided for the expanding program during fiscal years 2001-04	 
and how it planned and budgeted for the program's growth.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-918 					        
    ACCNO:   A11122						        
  TITLE:     Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in	      
Colombia Are Being Addressed, but State's Planning and Budgeting 
Process Can Be Improved 					 
     DATE:   07/29/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft						 
	     Controlled substances				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Drug trafficking					 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Helicopters					 
	     International cooperation				 
	     Narcotics						 
	     Occupational safety				 
	     Planning programming budgeting			 
	     Reprogramming of appropriated funds		 
	     Crop eradication					 
	     AT-802 Aircraft					 
	     Colombia						 
	     OV-10 Aircraft					 
	     T-65 Spray Plane					 
	     UH-1N Helicopter					 

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GAO-04-918

                 United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 	Report to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Caucus on

                  International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate

July 2004

DRUG CONTROL

 Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being Addressed, but State's
                 Planning and Budgeting Process Can Be Improved

                                       a

GAO-04-918 

Highlights of GAO-04-918, a report to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley,
Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate

The Department of State supports foreign governments' efforts to eradicate
illicit drug crops. In recent years, State's Office of Aviation has
maintained aircraft and provided support for the aerial eradication
program of the Colombian National Police. However, eradication aircraft
are often shot at from the ground requiring helicopter gunships and a
search and rescue helicopter to accompany each mission. In 2003, the
Office of Aviation fumigated more than 132,000 hectares of coca, a record
amount. GAO examined (1) how the threat to the spray planes has changed
since 2001, (2) what actions State has taken to address any operational
safety concerns, and (3) what resources State provided for the expanding
program during fiscal years 2001-04 and how it planned and budgeted for
the program's growth.

To help ensure that the aerial eradication program in Colombia and other
State aviation programs have the resources needed, GAO is recommending
that the Secretary of State develop a strategic planning and budgeting
process that accounts for all of the Office of Aviation's program
requirements. In commenting on a draft of this report, State agreed that a
more comprehensive long-term planning and budgeting process is needed and
has taken some initial steps to this end.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-918.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-4268
or [email protected].

July 2004

DRUG CONTROL

Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being Addressed, but State's
Planning and Budgeting Process Can Be Improved

In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft
averaged fewer than 10 per month. But in late 2002 and during 2003, the
number of hits increased-peaking at 73 in January 2003 and averaging more
than 26 per month-and, in 2003, two spray aircraft crashed and two were
forced to land because of ground fire. Moreover, the number of flying
hours for spray aircraft more than doubled-from about 5,450 hours in 2001
to over 11,300 hours in 2003. In general, this meant the aircraft were
exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire, although other
factors came into play.

In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits, the Colombian
National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each
eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation
gunships that already accompanied every mission. Also, since January 2003,
State has taken several actions to help reduce exposure to the threat of
ground fire by making greater use of information about armed insurgents'
proximity to spray targets.

Since fiscal year 2001, State has significantly increased resources for
the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Funding for the program
doubled from about $49 million in fiscal year 2001 to $100 million for
fiscal year 2003. In addition, from fiscal year 2001 to May 2004,
personnel in Colombia who were directly involved with the program
increased from 179 to 298, and the number of aerial eradication aircraft
increased from 22 to 35. However, State does not prepare budgets that
address all of the Office of Aviation's program requirements.
Consequently, State often moves funds from one program to another, which
may adversely affect those programs. In addition, State does not plan for
the long-term costs of the aerial eradication program, such as aircraft
replacement. As a result, State has postponed requesting funds for new
aircraft.

Number of Ground-Fire Hits Incurred by Spray Aircraft per Month, January
2001 through May 2004

Contents

     Letter                                                                 1 
                                          Results in Brief                  3 
                                             Background                     5 
                            Ground-Fire Hits on Spray Aircraft Increased    8 
                                        Significantly in 2003              
                             State Has Taken Several Actions to Address    
                                         Operational Safety                
                                              Concerns                     11 
                           Resources for Aerial Eradication Increased, but 
                                        State's Planning and               
                             Budgeting Process Does Not Provide for All    14 
                                                Needs                      
                                             Conclusions                   20 
                                 Recommendation for Executive Action       21 
                                 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation        21 
Appendixes                                                              
               Appendix I:              Scope and Methodology              24 
              Appendix II:      Comments from the Department of State      26 
                                Table 1: U.S. Support for the Aerial       
     Tables                            Eradication Program in              
                                   Colombia, Fiscal Years 2001-05          15 
                               Table 2: Office of Aviation Staffing by     
                                       Location, Fiscal Years              
                                               2001-04                     16 
                             Table 3: DynCorp Personnel in Colombia Who    
                                         Support the Aerial                
                              Eradication Program, Fiscal Years 2001-04    17 
                            Table 4: Total Aircraft Supporting Office of   
                                           Aviation Aerial                 
                              Eradication Program, Fiscal Years 2001-04    18 
                             Figure 1: Coca- and Poppy-Growing Areas in       
    Figures                Colombia, 2003 Figure 2: Number of Ground-Fire   6
                                   Hits Incurred by Spray Aircraft         
                              per Month, January 2001 through May 2004      9 
                              Figure 3: Number of Flying Hours by Spray    
                                         Aircraft Per Month,               
                                    January 2001 through May 2004          10 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

July 29, 2004

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman, Caucus on International
Narcotics Control United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since the early 1970s, the United States has supported Colombia's efforts
to reduce drug trafficking activities and stem the flow of illegal drugs,
principally cocaine and heroin, entering the United States. Recognizing
the severity of illicit drug activities and the links between drug
trafficking, the cultivation of coca and opium poppy,1 and the violence
affecting Colombia, the Colombian government announced a $7.5 billion plan
in October 1999, known as Plan Colombia. This plan proposed, among other
things, to reduce the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal
narcotics by 50 percent over 6 years.2 To assist Colombia's efforts, the
United States has substantially increased funding and material support to
Colombia since 2000, providing more than $3.3 billion through fiscal year
2004.3

The Department of State supports foreign governments' efforts to locate
and eradicate illicit drug crops through its Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL); its Narcotics Affairs
Sections (NAS) in particular countries; and the Office of Aviation, which
oversees a contract with DynCorp Aerospace Technology. In recent years,
the Office of Aviation, with DynCorp's assistance, has maintained and

1The leaves of the coca plant are the raw ingredient of cocaine, and opium
poppy is used to produce heroin.

2Although the government of Colombia announced Plan Colombia in 1999, U.S.
funding for counternarcotics purposes was not approved until July 2000,
leading to some uncertainty about when the 6-year goal was to be achieved.
The current Colombian government has announced that it intends to
eliminate coca cultivation by August 2006.

3For a more complete explanation of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, see
our reports titled Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take
Years to Produce Results, GAO01-26 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2000); Drug
Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for U.S.
Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed, GAO-03-783 (Washington,
D.C.: June 16, 2003); and Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to
Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended Results but Programs Are Not
Readily Sustainable, GAO-04-726 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004).

operated aircraft and provided logistical and training support for the
aerial eradication program of the Colombian National Police.4

In 2003, the Office of Aviation fumigated more than 132,000 hectares of
coca, a record amount, and 2,987 hectares of opium poppy. Largely as the
result of these efforts, the estimated number of hectares under coca or
opium poppy cultivation in Colombia has declined by about one-third over
the past 2 years. However, the program operates in a hostile environment-
eradication aircraft are often shot at from the ground-that requires
helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to accompany each
eradication mission. In August 2003, the Director of the Office of
Aviation expressed his concern that the increased operational tempo had
strained the resources and staffing available and he could not continue to
ensure the operational safety of the aerial eradication program.5

You requested that we determine (1) how the threat to the aerial
eradication spray planes has changed since 2001, (2) what actions State
has taken to address any operational safety concerns, and (3) what
resources State provided for the expanding program during fiscal years
2001-04 (through May 2004) and how it planned and budgeted for the
program's growth. To address these objectives, we reviewed overall program
and budgeting documents and interviewed cognizant officials at State/INL
in Washington, D.C. We also interviewed Office of Aviation and DynCorp
officials about operational procedures and reviewed relevant documents,
including site inspections and accident reports, at the Office of
Aviation's main operating base, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; the U.S.
Embassy in Bogota, Colombia; and the Office of Aviation and DynCorp office
at El Dorado Airport in Bogota. We also discussed operational procedures
with NAS, Office of Aviation, and DynCorp personnel in Bogota and met with
managers, pilots, and mechanics and observed eradication operations at
three sites in Colombia. We also reviewed how the data provided to us by
State and DynCorp were compiled and determined that they were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our review from
November 2003 through June 2004 in accordance with generally accepted
government accounting standards. (See app. I for a more complete
discussion of our scope and methodology.)

4The aerial eradication program involves spraying the coca and poppy
plants from low-flying airplanes with an herbicide that attacks the root
system and kills the plant.

5The Director has since retired from government service.

Results in Brief	In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits
on spray aircraft averaged fewer than 10 per month.6 But in late 2002 and
during 2003, the number of ground-fire hits reported increased
significantly-averaging more than 26 per month-and in 2003, for the first
time, two spray aircraft crashed and two were forced to land because of
ground fire. Moreover, the operational tempo more than doubled-from about
5,450 flying hours for spray aircraft in 2001 to over 11,300 hours in
2003. In general, this meant the spray aircraft and accompanying
helicopters were exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire;
although other factors also came into play, such as the proximity of
eradication target areas to insurgent locations. According to U.S.
Embassy/Bogota officials, the increased number of ground-fire hits
occurred, at least in part, because the illicit drug producers were
responding more vigorously to the success of the increased aerial
eradication program.

In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits, the Colombian
National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each
eradication mission, which were in addition to the two Office of Aviation
gunships that already accompanied every mission. In addition, since
January 2003, State/INL and NAS have taken several actions to help reduce
eradication aircraft exposure to the threat of ground fire by making
greater use of information regarding insurgent locations and their
proximity to spray targets. These actions have included the following:

o 	In January 2003, State/INL approved two additional personnel positions
for NAS to collect and share intelligence information with NAS, Office of
Aviation, DynCorp, and appropriate Colombian military and police officials
to plan aerial eradication operations. They began work in August 2003.

o 	In early 2003, the U.S. Embassy began reviewing its protocol for
sharing intelligence information to help ensure that aerial eradication
mission planners have the best available. The revised protocol was
approved in June 2003.

6The number of ground-fire hits is the total number of bullet holes in an
aircraft. For example, if an aircraft receives two or more bullet holes on
a mission, the Office of Aviation reports that the aircraft received two
or more ground-fire hits.

o 	In September 2003, in accordance with the revised intelligence
protocol, the NAS Director began requiring that all eradication missions
have her prior approval.

In addition, the eradication aircraft have always had armor to help
protect the pilots and vulnerable fuel and oil lines from ground fire.
Some of the newer spray planes are undergoing additional modifications to
further protect the pilot.

During fiscal years 2001-03, State/INL significantly increased resources
for the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Funding more than doubled
from $49.1 million in fiscal year 2001 to $100.4 million for fiscal year
2003; funding estimated and proposed for fiscal years 2004 and 2005,
respectively, continue this upward trend. In addition, from the end of
fiscal year 2001 through May 2004, Office of Aviation and DynCorp
personnel in Colombia who were directly involved with aerial eradication
increased from 179 to 298, and the number of aerial eradication aircraft
increased from 22 to 35. However, State/INL and the Office of Aviation do
not plan for or prepare budgets that address all of the Office of
Aviation's program requirements. Consequently, State/INL often moves funds
from one program to another to support the aerial eradication program,
which may adversely affect those programs. In fiscal year 2003, for
example, State/INL reprogrammed more than $5 million from counternarcotics
programs in Bolivia, Peru, and Pakistan for Office of Aviation activities
in Colombia. In addition, State/INL does not plan for the long-term costs
of maintaining the aerial eradication program, such as preparing an
aircraft replacement and acquisition plan. As a result, State/INL has
delayed requesting funding for additional spray aircraft until it develops
the supporting documentation. State/INL acknowledges the weaknesses in its
planning and budgeting process and recently initiated an internal study to
address the problems.

To help ensure that the Office of Aviation has the resources needed to
carry out its programs, including the aerial eradication program in
Colombia, we are recommending that the Secretary of State direct the
Assistant Secretary for State/INL to develop a strategic planning and
budgeting process that accounts for all of the Office of Aviation's
program requirements. In commenting on a draft of this report, State noted
that a more comprehensive long-term planning and budgeting process for the
Office of Aviation is needed and has taken some initial steps to this end.

Background 	Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine and 40
percent of the heroin entering the United States. To assist the Colombian
government in its efforts to implement Plan Colombia and reduce the
cultivation and trafficking of illegal drugs, the United States has
pursued a strategy emphasizing interdiction, aerial eradication, and
alternative development. The strategy has resulted in a 33 percent
reduction in the amount of coca cultivated in Colombia over the last 2
years-from 169,800 hectares in 2001 to 113,850 hectares in 2003;
similarly, opium poppy cultivated also declined by 33 percent-from 6,540
hectares in 2001 to 4,400 hectares in 2003.7 Nevertheless, according to
the Drug Enforcement Administration, cocaine prices nationwide have
remained relatively stable-indicating that cocaine is still readily
available-and Colombia dominates the market for heroin in the northeastern
United States.

Despite improvements in Colombia's security situation in 2003-for example,
according to statistics compiled by the Colombian government, the murder
rate declined 20 percent that year-insurgent and paramilitary groups still
control large parts of the countryside. According to State, the insurgents
exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia's territory
east and south of the Andes. As illustrated in figure 1, this area
includes the primary coca-growing regions of Colombia. These groups- the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation Army, and
paramilitary forces such as the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia-are
involved in every facet of narcotics trafficking and are on State's list
of terrorist organizations.

7In 2003, the Office of Aviation sprayed over 132,000 hectares of coca-a
record number.

Figure 1: Coca-and Poppy-Growing Areas in Colombia, 2003

Source: Created by GAO from information provided by the U.S. Director of
Central Intelligence, Crime and Narcotics Center.

State has supported foreign governments throughout the world to locate and
eradicate illicit drug crops. In recent years, State's efforts have
focused on the aerial eradication program of the Colombian National
Police, although it provides logistical support to Bolivia and Peru and
may be called upon to support drug eradication efforts in Afghanistan.

NAS at the U.S. Embassy/Bogota oversees and manages the Colombian program.
The Office of Aviation, which has a main operating base at Patrick Air
Force Base, Florida, implements the program with contractor assistance
from DynCorp. DynCorp personnel at Patrick provide administrative support,
perform major maintenance on aircraft, and give initial pilot training. In
Colombia, the Office of Aviation and DynCorp maintain a headquarters
office at El Dorado International Airport in Bogota and up to three
operational sites at various Colombian police or military bases around the
country. From these sites, three types of spray aircraft- the OV-10, the
T-65, and the AT-802-fly missions to fumigate the coca and poppy fields in
Colombia. DynCorp provides pilots, mechanics, and other operations and
maintenance personnel.

The aerial eradication program operates in an often-hostile environment
that requires helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to
accompany each aerial eradication mission. Eradication spray planes and
the supporting helicopters are often shot at from the ground. Missions
have been canceled or redirected because NAS, Office of Aviation, or
government of Colombia officials considered the targeted locations too
dangerous.

U.S. officials have had long-standing concerns about the threat posed to
aerial eradication activities and, in particular, the safety of operations
in Colombia. In August 2000, the Office of Aviation requested an
independent evaluation of its aviation operations and safety by the
Inter-Agency Committee for Aviation Policy.8 Based on its review of
operations at two forward operating locations in Colombia and the offices
in Bogota and at Patrick Air Force Base, the committee concluded that the
Office of Aviation program was safe but made numerous suggestions and
recommendations to enhance safety and security. In September 2001, we

8This committee is under the aegis of the General Services Administration.
The committee formulates aviation policies for the various civilian
federal departments and agencies that maintain aircraft. The committee
also helps to ensure that agency aircraft fleets are maintained properly
and are operationally safe through on-site reviews. The committee appoints
a team of aviation experts from various federal agencies to perform these
reviews.

reported that the Office of Aviation had taken action on or implemented
most of the committee's suggestions and recommendations.9 We also made
recommendations for improvement, which State acted on.

Nevertheless, in March 2002, the U.S. Embassy/Bogota reported that in
spite of all of the embassy's precautions, a contractor, possibly an
American, will inevitably be hurt or killed.10 In June 2003, the Director
of the Office of Aviation noted that the Office of Aviation was performing
a very difficult mission in an increasingly hostile environment. In
September 2003, a spray aircraft crashed because of ground fire and, for
the first time, the pilot was killed. In total during 2003, one helicopter
and four spray aircraft either crashed or were severely damaged because of
ground fire. In an October 2003 report, DynCorp noted that the threat to
the program's aircraft and pilots was causing increasing concern about
pilot safety and personnel morale.

Another key component of the Colombian-U.S. counternarcotics strategy was
forming a Colombian Army Counternarcotics Brigade. Although the brigade's
primary mission is to plan and conduct interdiction operations against
cocaine producers and traffickers, the brigade also is supposed to provide
security for the eradication program in some of the insurgentcontrolled
areas of the country. As part of its contract, DynCorp trains pilots and
mechanics and helps maintain and operate the U.S.-provided helicopters for
the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, which supplies the airlift capability
for the counternarcotics brigade.

Ground-Fire Hits on Although the Office of Aviation has reported ground
fire on its aerial

eradication aircraft for years, the number of ground-fire hits began
toSpray Aircraft increase in late 2002. In 2001 and most of 2002, the
number of ground-fire Increased Significantly hits on spray aircraft
averaged fewer than 10 per month. But the number of in 2003 ground-fire
hits reported from October 2002 through 2003 increased

significantly to an average of more than 26 per month. The number of hits

9U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: State Department Provides
Required Aviation Program Oversight, but Safety and Security Should Be
Enhanced, GAO-01-1021 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2001).

10Furthermore, in August of 2002, a DynCorp contract employee was killed
in an accident on the tarmac of an operational site. At the time, based on
on-site inspections by his staff, the Director of the Office of Aviation
reported that he had full confidence in the contractor's ability to meet
State/INL-mandated safety commitments.

peaked at 73 in January 2003, and 46 hits were reported in March 2003.
Although the number of monthly ground-fire hits generally declined after
March 2003, the total number for 2003 was more than the previous 2 years
combined-313 versus 288 in 2001 and 2002. During the first 5 months of
2004, the total number of hits declined considerably to 48 compared with
168 during the same period in 2003. Figure 2 shows the number of
groundfire hits on spray aircraft from January 2001 through May 2004.

Figure 2: Number of Ground-Fire Hits Incurred by Spray Aircraft per Month,
January 2001 through May 2004 Ground-fire hits

2001 2002 2003 2004 Year

Sources: NAS and Office of Aviation (data), GAO (analysis).

In addition, during the period 2001-03, the operational tempo of the
aerial eradication program more than doubled in terms of flying hours for
the spray aircraft. In general, this meant the spray aircraft and
accompanying helicopters were exposed more frequently to the threat of
ground fire; although other factors also came into play, such as the
proximity of eradication areas to insurgent locations. According to the
Office of Aviation, spray aircraft flew about 5,450 hours in 2001, nearly
9,400 hours in 2002, and more than 11,300 in 2003. The increase in flying
hours in 2002 and 2003 largely occurred as the Colombian government,
headed by President Uribe, took a more aggressive approach to aerial
eradication. In the

19 months prior to President Uribe's inauguration in August 2002, spray
aircraft flew about 9,700 hours or 510 hours per month. From August 2002
through May 2004, the eradication program's spray aircraft flew more than
18,450 hours, or about 839 hours a month-during 2003 alone, the program
averaged more than 940 flying hours a month. During the first 5 months of
2004, the pace slowed-spray aircraft flew about 2,000 hours compared with
about 4,900 hours during the same period in 2003. Nevertheless, Office of
Aviation officials report that the number of hectares of coca sprayed in
2004 remains high-62,000 through mid-June-because the spray aircraft are
based close to large coca fields and the AT-802 spray planes, which are
capable of carrying more herbicide than the OV-10,11 have flown more
frequently than during the first 5 months of 2003. Figure 3 illustrates
the spray aircraft's monthly flying hours for January 2001 through May
2004.

Figure 3: Number of Flying Hours by Spray Aircraft Per Month, January 2001
through May 2004 Flying hours

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200 0Jan.

                                      Feb.

.gAu

                                       .

eJu

                                    ly Sept.

.Feb.Mar

.gAu

                              . Sept.Oct.No. Jan.

.MarApr

                                 ly Oct.No Dec.

.g

                                      Feb.

.AprMa

eJu

                               Sept. Dec.Jan.Feb.

.MarApr

                                       .

.yAprMa

                                    Oct.No.

.Mar

                                 lyJuAuDec.Jan.

en

ynJu

ynMaJu

                            yMaJu2001 2002 2003 2004

Year

          Sources: NAS and Office of Aviation (data), GAO (analysis).

11The AT-802 standard load is 300 to 400 gallons of herbicide versus a
maximum of 300 gallons for the OV-10.

According to U.S. Embassy/Bogota and Colombian officials, the primary
reason for the increase in ground-fire hits in late 2002 was the aerial
eradication program's success in reducing the illicit drug producers'
ability to cultivate coca and opium poppy. To combat this success, U.S.
Embassy/Bogota officials reported that the insurgents began

o 	organizing and massing ground fire in front of the spray aircraft's
flight path to force the planes to fly though a barrage of bullets and

o 	using a greater variety of weapons against aerial eradication aircraft,
including some larger caliber weapons capable of penetrating armor and
hitting the aircraft at higher altitudes.12

  State Has Taken Several Actions to Address Operational Safety Concerns

State/INL and NAS have taken several actions to reduce the risk to the
aircraft on aerial eradication missions. Since January 2003, these actions
have primarily focused on improving the processes and procedures for
collecting and analyzing intelligence information that the U.S. Embassy
collects on insurgent locations and capabilities. Other actions include
coordinating spray operations more closely with the Colombian Army and the
Colombian National Police and ensuring that eradication aircraft are
protected to the extent possible from ground fire.

In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits on aerial
eradication aircraft in late 2002 and early 2003, the Colombian National
Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each
eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation
gunships that already accompanied every mission,13 and the NAS Director
directed spray operations away from areas where the hits were occurring.
In addition, throughout 2003 and early 2004, State/INL and NAS took
several actions to make greater use of intelligence information regarding
the ground threats to the eradication aircraft.

o 	In January 2003, State/INL approved a NAS request to hire two personnel
as intelligence/security advisors. Their duties include

12According to the U.S. Embassy/Bogota, insurgents were using 7.62
automatic weapons and, for the first time, .50 caliber machine guns,
rocket propelled grenades, and aerial mines to fire on eradication
aircraft.

13Colombian National Police personnel man and control the guns.

collecting and sharing threat information with U.S. Embassy, DynCorp, and
appropriate Colombian National Police and military officials to plan
aerial eradication operations. These two individuals began work in August
2003. However, they did not have all the necessary security clearances to
handle certain U.S. Embassy intelligence information. Nevertheless, they
collected information from a variety of Colombian military and police
sources that was used in planning operations. To address their lack of
security clearances, in September 2003, the NAS Director tasked another
NAS employee to coordinate intelligence within the U.S. Embassy until the
two individuals receive their security clearances.

o 	In early 2003, the U.S. Embassy/Bogota began reviewing its protocol for
gathering, utilizing, and sharing intelligence information to help ensure
that aerial eradication mission planners have the best available threat
assessment information. A revised protocol was approved in June 2003. It
defines intelligence requirements and sources, frequency of intelligence
updates, intelligence dissemination, and the use of intelligence in
planning missions at forward operating locations. According to NAS and
other U.S. Embassy personnel, the revised protocol improved information
sharing within the embassy and among the embassy, DynCorp, and the
Colombian military and police.

o 	In September 2003, in accordance with the revised intelligence
protocol, the NAS Director began approving the areas where eradication
missions are planned. She reviews the intelligence information available
and will not allow missions in areas where insurgents are thought to be or
where large caliber weapons have been reported. Missions are not flown in
those areas until intelligence information reports that the areas are
relatively safe.

o 	In October 2003, the Office of Aviation authorized DynCorp to hire six
personnel to gather and analyze intelligence for use in planning
eradication missions. According to DynCorp officials, they experienced
delays in filling these positions because of uncertainties regarding its
contract with State/INL.14 The first position was filled in March 2004,
and, as of June 2004, all six positions had been filled.

14State/INL is in the process of awarding a new contract and does not
expect to make a decision until later this year.

o 	In November 2003, Colombian military and police at one operational site
instituted daily threat briefings before the next day's aerial eradication
missions. According to U.S. Embassy and DynCorp officials, DynCorp
obtained the briefings primarily because the eradication unit was
collocated with the Colombian military. At the time of our visit in
January 2004, the DynCorp site manager said that eradication aircraft
flying missions from this site had not incurred any ground-fire hits for 2
months.

In addition, in late 2003, the NAS Director also approved an annual
eradication program plan showing when and where eradication missions will
occur throughout 2004 and what aircraft will be used on each of the
missions. For each target area, the plan details when intelligence on the
threat posed by insurgents and others should be collected, and when the
Colombian Army Counternarcotics Brigade may be needed to conduct ground
operations in support of eradication missions. According to NAS and other
U.S. Embassy officials, the plan was coordinated with the Colombian
military to complement its planned military actions for 2004 and, as a
result, has strengthened the Colombian Army's commitment to support the
aerial eradication program.15

Moreover, to enhance the spray airplanes' ability to withstand ground
fire, the Office of Aviation has ensured that the aircraft are protected
to the extent possible. All the spray aircraft have always had protective
armor around the cockpit and covering vulnerable fuel and oil lines. In
addition, State activated the ejection seats in the OV-10 when it acquired
the aircraft from the Department of Defense.16 The AT-802 spray planes are
undergoing additional modifications to further protect the pilot. Finally,
the helicopters also have added armaments to better protect them from
ground fire.

To further reduce risks, NAS, Office of Aviation, and DynCorp officials
told us that eradication mission planners, site managers, or individual
pilots can cancel flights at any time without fear of reprisal if they
feel the particular

15According to the current NAS Director and the most recent former
Director, the Colombian Army has never turned down a request to assist
with the eradication program. The assistance usually consists of
establishing a presence in a targeted eradication area to keep the
insurgents from operating freely and possibly targeting eradication
aircraft.

16The T-65 and AT-802 do not have ejection seats. Rather, the cockpit is
designed to protect the pilot in the event of a crash.

mission may not be safe because of possible ground fire, maintenance
problems, or other safety concerns. During our visits to three operational
sites, we attended meetings with DynCorp pilots and mechanics where NAS
and Office of Aviation officials emphasized this point. Further, in
separate discussions with some of the pilots and mechanics, they confirmed
to us that they could opt out of a flight at any time without fear of
reprisal.17

  Resources for Aerial Eradication Increased, but State's Planning and Budgeting
  Process Does Not Provide for All Needs

As the aerial eradication program in Colombia grew, State/INL
substantially increased the resources it provided. Funding for the aerial
eradication program in Colombia increased from about $49 million in fiscal
year 2001 to over $100 million in fiscal year 2003. Estimated funding for
fiscal year 2004 and proposed funding for fiscal year 2005 continue this
upward trend. In addition, the number of personnel directly associated
with the program, particularly in Colombia, increased; and the number of
available spray aircraft and helicopters also increased. However,
State/INL does not plan for the long-term costs of maintaining the aerial
eradication program and does not prepare a specific budget for the Office
of Aviation that accounts for all of its program needs. Nevertheless,
Office of Aviation and DynCorp managers said that the resources for
day-to-day operations provided during the period were sufficient, and that
safety was never compromised.

Program Funding Increased	Funding provided through the Office of Aviation
and NAS for the aerial eradication program in Colombia has risen every
year since 2001. As shown in table 1, funding provided through the Office
of Aviation increased 10 percent from 2001 to 2003, from $38 million to
$41.8 million, and is planned to increase an additional 20 percent for
fiscal year 2005. Overall, the Office of Aviation funds are used for the
direct costs of DynCorp, which provides aircraft maintenance and
logistical support and many of the pilots for the eradication program. NAS
funds for the aerial eradication program increased more than fivefold,
from about $11 million in fiscal year 2001 to more than $58 million in
fiscal year 2003. NAS provides funds to support DynCorp operations and for
aircraft fuel, herbicide, and related support. Most of this increase
occurred to support the increased flying hours, additional eradication
aircraft, and multiple operating sites. Such increases

17In connection with our prior report regarding the Office of Aviation
(GAO-01-1021), pilots and mechanics told us the same thing in April 2001.

are planned to continue in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, as funding proposed
for fiscal year 2005 rises to more than $70 million.

Table 1: U.S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program in Colombia,
Fiscal Years 2001-05

                              Dollars in millions

                                  Fiscal year

         Department of                               2004        2005 
          State office  2001   2002     2003 (estimated)   (proposed)   Total 
             Office of                                                
              Aviation $38.0  $38.2    $41.8        $48.0    $50.4     $216.4 
                  NASa   11.1  17.6     58.6         67.4        70.7   225.4 
                 Total $49.1  $55.8  $100.4        $115.4   $121.1     $441.8 

Source: State/INL.

aIn 2003, NAS began paying a contractor $38.8 million a year to support
the Colombian National Police Aviation Service. NAS could not readily
identify the proportion of this contract that is related to aerial
eradication. NAS officials stated they expect this expenditure to continue
through fiscal year 2004 and possibly through fiscal year 2006.

Program Staffing Increased	Office of Aviation and DynCorp staff in
Colombia directly associated with the aerial eradication program increased
from 179 at the end of fiscal year 2001 to 298 at the end of fiscal year
2003. The former NAS Director told us that he supported increasing the
number of Office of Aviation staff in Colombia because doing so allowed
more direct oversight of the program as operations significantly expanded.
The Office of Aviation Director also stated that increasing the staff in
Colombia allowed the office to better ensure the safety and security of
program operations and enhanced its ability to oversee contractor
operations. Table 2 illustrates the number of staff assigned to the Office
of Aviation by location.

Table 2: Office of Aviation Staffing by Location, Fiscal Years 2001-04

                  Staffing by fiscal year (as of September 30)

                                                               Staffing as of 
                      Location   2001      2002       2003       May 31, 2004 
             Patrick Air Force                             
                         Basea    15        21          14 
                      Colombia     3        5           10 
                         Total    18        26          24 

Source: Office of Aviation.

aIncludes staff at Patrick Air Force Base and two or three staff in
Washington, D.C., who provide administrative support. These staff support
aerial eradication and other programs in Colombia, as well as other Office
of Aviation programs in Bolivia, Peru, and Pakistan.

During fiscal years 2001-03, the number of DynCorp personnel supporting
the Office of Aviation at Patrick Air Force Base increased from 159 to
about 190. DynCorp officials were unable to provide exact numbers of staff
who were part of the eradication program versus those who supported other
Office of Aviation programs because many personnel are involved in more
than one program.

As illustrated in table 3, the number of DynCorp staff in Colombia
directly supporting the aerial eradication program increased from 176 in
2001 to 281 staff in 2003 and has further increased to 287 staff as of May
31, 2004. These numbers include pilots and mechanics who rotate in and out
of Colombia. These personnel work 15 days in Colombia and then are
relieved for 13 days by another group of pilots18 and mechanics who work
15 days. This rotation overlap allows time for departing pilots and
mechanics to brief the newly arrived personnel.

18Fixed-wing aircraft pilots are provided by a subcontractor to DynCorp.

Table 3: DynCorp Personnel in Colombia Who Support the Aerial Eradication
Program, Fiscal Years 2001-04

                 Personnel by fiscal year (as of September 30)

         Personnel Personnel as of assigned 2001 2002 2003 May 31, 2004

Permanent 58 69 116

Rotational 118 150 165

Total 176 219 281

                                Source: DynCorp.

    Number of Aircraft Increased

From the end of fiscal year 2001 through May 2004, the number of spray
aircraft and helicopters supporting aerial eradication in Colombia
increased from 22 to 35, with 12 additional spray aircraft and 1
additional helicopter assigned. The Office of Aviation uses three types of
aircraft to spray coca and poppy fields in Colombia-the OV-10, the T-65,
and the AT802. The OV-10 is a Vietnam-era observation plane that was
retrofitted to carry herbicide and fly eradication missions.19 The T-65
and AT-802 are newer aircraft designed for crop dusting and are widely
used in the United States. Although the Office of Aviation has 24 spray
aircraft for use in Colombia-11 OV-10s, 5 T-65s, and 8 AT-802s, some are
usually at Patrick Air Force Base for scheduled maintenance or training
and at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, for mountain-flying training.
The exact number of aircraft in Colombia varies throughout the year
depending on maintenance and training requirements.

The Office of Aviation also uses helicopters to support eradication
missions. On any given mission, spray aircraft are accompanied by at least
5 helicopters. Two Office of Aviation helicopter gunships and 2 or 3
Colombian National Police gunships provide protection from insurgent fire,
and 1 search and rescue helicopter is available to rescue crewmembers in
the event of an emergency. Table 4 illustrates the number of Office of
Aviation aircraft available for the aerial eradication program.

19The OV-10 has two engines while the other spray aircraft have one.
Office of Aviation officials stated that the two engines give an extra
measure of safety. However, the OV-10 is old and increasingly expensive to
operate and maintain.

Table 4: Total Aircraft Supporting Office of Aviation Aerial Eradication
Program, Fiscal Years 2001-04

                  Aircraft by fiscal year (as of September 30)

                                                               Aircraft as of 
              Aircraft type   2001      2002         2003        May 31, 2004 
               Spray planes    12        17            20 
                Helicopters    10        11            12 
                      Total    22        28            32 

Source: Office of Aviation.

Note: In addition, the Office of Aviation operates three other fixed-wing
aircraft. Two are used for transportation support throughout the Andean
region, and the third is used to locate illicit drug crops.

    State/INL's Planning and Budgeting Process Does Not Provide for All of the
    Office of Aviation's Needs

State/INL does not develop a specific budget for the Office of Aviation
addressing all of its programs and does not plan for the long-term costs
of the Office of Aviation's programs, such as providing for replacement
aircraft. As a result, State/INL sometimes uses funds from other programs
to pay for the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Although Office of
Aviation and DynCorp managers said that the resources provided in fiscal
years 2001-04 (through May) were sufficient to carry out the increased
eradication activities safely, they noted that they did not always know
how much funding would be available or when, and that this has led to
lastminute decisions and informal workarounds to avoid suspending or
curtailing eradication operations.

This situation is not new. In 1998, we reported that State and the U.S.
Embassy/Bogota were not adequately prepared to manage increases in aerial
eradication.20 Specifically, when U.S. support for aerial eradication
increased in 1997, the unanticipated costs associated with the increase
led to the reallocation of funds from other NAS programs. At the time,
NAS/Bogota reported that it reallocated $11 million from other activities,
including interdiction, demand reduction, and efforts designed to
strengthen law enforcement institutions in Colombia.

The situation continues. DynCorp officials told us that it nearly
suspended the eradication program because of a shortage of funds in 2002.
But

20U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics
Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges, GAO/NSIAD-98-60
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 1998).

because of delays in training Colombian Army helicopter mechanics and
pilots, DynCorp used funds allocated for that program to continue the
aerial eradication program. Further, DynCorp officials told us they also
have had to delay ordering needed parts because of the lack of funds. Some
of these parts-especially those for the older aircraft, such as the OV-10
spray planes and UH-1N helicopters that accompany the spray planes-are in
short supply and could be difficult to acquire. If the parts are not
available when needed, the aircraft cannot operate.

Office of Aviation's funding comes from several State/INL sources,
including the Andean Counterdrug Initiative account, the International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, and supplemental
appropriations. However, although some of the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative funds are designated for the Office of Aviation, the funds are
divided among multiple country budgets and managed by each country's NAS.
As a result, the Office of Aviation has to request those funds from the
respective NAS Director, which may adversely affect those programs. In
fiscal year 2003, State/INL reprogrammed more than $5 million from
programs in Bolivia, Peru, and Pakistan to fund the Office of Aviation
program in Colombia. In addition, the NAS Director in Colombia told us
that sometimes other funding priorities-such as the narcotics interdiction
program-conflicted with Office of Aviation program needs and delayed
funding for the aerial eradication program.

Furthermore, State/INL often does not receive funds for its programs,
including the aerial eradication program, until months after the start of
the fiscal year. For instance, fiscal year 2004 funds were not available
until mid-June 2004 because of the time needed to address congressional
inquiries about how State/INL proposed to use the funding. State/INL
officials said they have used prior year funds or moved funds from one
project to another to satisfy the most critical needs until all funds are
available. These officials stated that the safety of their operations has
not been compromised but added that the uncertainty over funding
availability has caused an administrative burden.

In June 2004, our report on federal aircraft fleet management also noted
weaknesses in State/INL's planning process.21 We reported that State/INL

21U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Aircraft: Inaccurate Cost Data
and Weaknesses in Fleet Management Planning Hamper Cost Effective
Operations, GAO-04-645 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004).

had not developed a long-term fleet acquisition plan or performed a
costbenefit analysis that considered long-range aircraft replacement,
mission support, and other related costs. In addition, INL had not
performed a lifecycle cost analysis of its aircraft, estimated future
long-term mission requirements, or identified the aircraft best-suited to
meet those requirements. As a result, according to State/INL officials,
State has delayed requesting funding for additional aircraft.

Finally, in October 2003, a State/INL internal review team began examining
the Office of Aviation's programs.22 The review team has noted that the
Office of Aviation has operated effectively in five countries with high
safety and operational success rates. Given its aged aircraft, complex
logistics requirements, and aggressive flight schedule, the team commended
Office of Aviation staff for their professionalism and continued success
under trying circumstances. However, the team also has identified many of
the same concerns that we have raised-from generally poor strategic
planning to inadequate management and financial tools. The team has noted
that State/INL focuses on short-term planning to meet new missions and
changing requirements, with little input from the Office of Aviation.

State/INL officials have begun to address the shortcomings. For example,
State/INL and the Office of Aviation are preparing a strategic plan to
identify long-term mission costs for all of the Office of Aviation
programs. As part of this strategy, State/INL and the Office of Aviation
have developed a critical flight safety plan that includes projected costs
to maintain the Office of Aviation's current aircraft and acquire
additional aircraft to sustain the program. State/INL also intends to
enhance the Office of Aviation's contract oversight capability through
training and the hiring of additional contract administrators and budget
specialists.

Conclusions	The aerial eradication program in Colombia is a difficult
mission in a hostile environment. Since 2001, the demands on the program
have increased significantly and the Office of Aviation's resources for
the program have more than doubled. However, State/INL's planning and
budgeting process for the Office of Aviation did not keep pace with the
growth of the Office of Aviation and the increasing complexity of its

22This review is the first of a series of planned reviews of State/INL
programs. The reviews are intended to assess INL's strengths and
weaknesses to better prepare for future operations.

mission. The current process does not fully serve State/INL's or the
Office of Aviation's present-day needs. As a result, the Office of
Aviation's shortand long-term funding requirements have often been
addressed through ad hoc decisions. In particular, not having a strategic
plan that identifies longrange needs, mission support, and other costs has
prevented State/INL from assessing future requirements and planning and
budgeting for them.

The Office of Aviation will likely continue its operations in Colombia for
the foreseeable future. Further, it may be called on to extend its
operations to other parts of the world as illicit drugs continue to
provide income to insurgents and terrorists who pose a security threat to
the United States and its allies. However, without a planning and
budgeting process that systematically addresses the short-and long-term
requirements of the Office of Aviation's programs, State/INL cannot ensure
that the Office of Aviation's requirements are appropriately prioritized,
long-term resource needs are addressed, and funding is sufficient.

  Recommendation for Executive Action

To improve State/INL's process for providing resources to the Office of
Aviation, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
to develop and implement a strategic planning and budgeting process that
addresses all of the program requirements for the Office of Aviation,
including the aerial eradication program in Colombia. The strategic plan
and budget should address the day-to-day operational needs of the Office
of Aviation's programs, aircraft fleet refurbishment and eventual
replacement, and the resources needed to meet these requirements. The plan
should also be systematically updated as part of State's annual budget
cycle.

  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II).
It stated that the report provides a useful summary of the technical,
planning, and budgeting issues that may affect the Office of Aviation's
programs in Colombia. State also expressed concern that the report
suggests that State/INL does not manage and plan for its aviation program
requirements. However, it agreed that a more comprehensive long-term
planning and budgeting process is needed and has taken some initial steps
to this end.

We did not say that State/INL does not manage and plan for the Office of
Aviation's programs. Rather, we stated that State/INL does not prepare a
specific budget for the Office of Aviation that accounts for all of its

program needs. In fact, State notes that State/INL is beginning to
institutionalize a more formal planning and budgeting process for the
Office of Aviation to address this shortcoming. According to State,
State/INL completed an "initial cut" of an Office of Aviation Strategic
Plan in April 2004, and also recently prepared a Critical Flight Safety
Program to extend the life of its aircraft fleet and an Office of Aviation
Reorganization Plan to hire more staff for strategic planning, budgeting,
and financial analysis. State adds that it has incorporated the safety
program and reorganization plan in State/INL's fiscal year 2006
performance plan and budget request.

These are critical components of a more systematic planning and budgeting
process. We believe that if State/INL follows through with its approach
that it will allow the Office of Aviation to prioritize its programs and,
when funding is limited or not readily available, make systematic
decisions about how to proceed.

In addition, State/INL and Office of Aviation officials provided technical
comments that we have incorporated into this report, as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees and the Secretary of State. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4128 or [email protected], or contact Al Huntington, Assistant
Director, at (202) 512-4140 or [email protected]. Other key contributors
to this report were Ron Hughes, Reid Lowe, and Jim Strus.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

To determine how the threat to the aerial eradication program changed
since 2001, we reviewed cables, memorandums, and reports prepared by the
Department of State/Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (State/INL), the Office of Aviation, and the U.S. Embassy/Bogota,
Colombia. We also discussed the threat issue with officials responsible
for program oversight and implementation from State/INL; State's Narcotics
Affairs Sections (NAS), the Office of Aviation, and other offices at the
U.S. Embassy; and DynCorp Aerospace Technology.

To determine what actions State had taken to address any operational
safety concerns, we examined cables; memorandums; and related documents,
including site inspections and accident reports, prepared by State/INL,
the Office of Aviation, and the U.S. Embassy/Bogota. We also interviewed
officials from State/INL, the Office of Aviation, DynCorp, and the U.S.
Embassy/Bogota (including the current NAS Director and her predecessor) to
obtain their views on the actions taken.

Similarly, to determine the resources provided by State/INL to support the
aerial eradication program in Colombia during fiscal years 2001-04
(through May 2004), we reviewed and analyzed various cables, memorandums,
and other relevant documents related to budget, staffing, and aircraft
prepared by State/INL in Washington, D.C.; the Office of Aviation and
DynCorp at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy/Bogota.
We interviewed cognizant U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and Colombia
and at Patrick Air Force Base about the adequacy of the resources provided
to meet aerial eradication missions. We also discussed resource
availability with the DynCorp project manager at Patrick Air Force Base.

We traveled to Colombia in January 2004. In Colombia, we met with NAS and
other cognizant U.S. Embassy officials and with Office of Aviation and
DynCorp managers at their offices at El Dorado International Airport,
Bogota. We also visited three operational sites-Popayan, San Jose del
Guaviare, and Tumaco-where spray operations were occurring. We interviewed
DynCorp site managers, pilots, and mechanics at each location. At Tumaco,
we also interviewed Colombian Marine Corps officers who coordinated
eradication activities with U.S., DynCorp, and Colombian police officials.

To determine the reliability of the data provided, we interviewed
officials at State/INL, the Office of Aviation, the U.S. Embassy/Bogota,
and DynCorp to determine how they collected and verified the data. To
check the reliability

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

of data on the number of ground-fire hits and flying hours, we compared
information from two different sources at the U.S. Embassy and found it
similar. Further, to determine the reliability of the funding data used in
this report, we examined State financial management activity reports and
compared some of these data with similar information from our prior
reports addressing Office of Aviation activities. However, we did not
audit the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on them. Finally,
to satisfy ourselves that the numbers of personnel and aircraft were
reliable, we examined monthly reports prepared by the Office of Aviation
and DynCorp. We discussed how the reports were compiled and resolved a few
discrepancies concerning the numbers of personnel with cognizant officials
at Patrick Air Force Base and in Bogota. Based on our examination of the
documents we received and our discussions with State and DynCorp
officials, we concluded that these data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report.

                                  Appendix II

                     Comments from the Department of State

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

                               Now on pp. 18-20.

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

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