Force Structure: Department of the Navy's Tactical Aviation	 
Integration Plan Is Reasonable, but Some Factors Could Affect	 
Implementation (13-AUG-04, GAO-04-900). 			 
                                                                 
The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act and the Senate	 
Report for the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act mandated  
that GAO examine the Navy and Marine Corps' Tactical Aviation	 
Integration Plan. In response to these mandates, this report	 
addresses (1) how Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts,	 
force structure, and procurement costs change; (2) the		 
methodology and assumptions the services used to analyze the	 
potential for integrating the forces; (3) the analytical process 
the services used to decide which reserve squadrons to		 
decommission; and (4) other factors that might affect		 
implementation of the Plan.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-900 					        
    ACCNO:   A11661						        
  TITLE:     Force Structure: Department of the Navy's Tactical       
Aviation Integration Plan Is Reasonable, but Some Factors Could  
Affect Implementation						 
     DATE:   08/13/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Military aviation					 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military procurement				 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Tactical air forces				 
	     AV-8 Aircraft					 
	     B-1B Aircraft					 
	     F-14 Aircraft					 
	     F/A-18C/D Aircraft 				 
	     F/A-18E/F Aircraft 				 
	     Harrier Aircraft					 
	     Hornet Aircraft					 
	     Joint Strike Fighter				 
	     Navy/Marine Corps Tactical Aviation		 
	     Integration Plan					 
                                                                 
	     Tomcat Aircraft					 

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GAO-04-900

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Committees

August 2004

FORCE STRUCTURE

 Department of the Navy's Tactical Aviation Integration Plan Is Reasonable, but
                    Some Factors Could Affect Implementation

GAO-04-900

Highlights of GAO-04-900, a report to the Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations and the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services

The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act and the Senate Report for
the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO examine the
Navy and Marine Corps' Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. In response to
these mandates, this report addresses (1) how Navy and Marine Corps
operational concepts, force structure, and procurement costs change; (2)
the methodology and assumptions the services used to analyze the potential
for integrating the forces; (3) the analytical process the services used
to decide which reserve squadrons to decommission; and (4) other factors
that might affect implementation of the Plan.

To enhance the potential that the future tactical aviation force will meet
the services' mission needs and ensure more transparency in future
decommissioning decisions, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense

o  	direct that the number of needed backup aircraft be assessed,

o  	develop guidance and methodology for analyzing future decommissioning
decisions, and

o  	direct that future readiness funding for the future tactical aviation
force be analyzed.

In written comments, the Department of Defense generally agreed with the
recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-900.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact George Morse at (757)
552-8108 or [email protected].

August 2004

FORCE STRUCTURE

Department of the Navy's Tactical Aviation Integration Plan Is Reasonable, but
Some Factors Could Affect Implementation

Concerns about the affordability of their prior tactical aviation
procurement plan prompted the Navy and Marine Corps to agree to a new
Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. Under this Plan, the two services will
perform their missions using fewer units of more capable aircraft and
reducing total program aircraft procurement costs by $28 billion over the
next 18 years. Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps will increase the
extent to which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force
to accomplish both services' missions. The Plan also reduces the services'
tactical aviation force structure by decommissioning five squadrons, thus
decreasing the number of Navy and Marine Corps squadrons to 59, and
reduces the total number of aircraft they plan to buy from 1,637 to 1,140.

The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet the
Navy and Marine Corps' operational requirements with a smaller force
primarily on the findings of a contractor study that evaluated the
relative capability of different tactical aviation force structures. GAO's
review of the contractor's methodology and assumptions about force
structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies suggests that
much of the analysis appears reasonable. However, GAO noted some
limitations-including the lack of analytical support for reducing the
number of backup aircraft-increase the risk that the smaller force will be
less effective than expected.

The Navy and Marine Corps each followed a different process in selecting a
reserve squadron to decommission. The Marine Corps made a clear and
well-documented analysis of the operational, fiscal, logistical, and
personnel impacts of different options that appears to provide decision
makers with a reasonable basis for selecting the Reserve unit to
decommission. By contrast, the Navy selected its reserve squadron without
clear criteria or a documented, comprehensive analysis, and thus with less
transparency in its process.

Two other factors that might affect successful implementation of the Plan
are the potential unavailability of readiness funding and delays in
fielding the new force. Although the contractor recommended that the Navy
identify future readiness-funding requirements, to date, the Navy has not
conducted this analysis. In addition, the Department of the Navy is
experiencing engineering and weight problems in developing the Joint
Strike Fighter that will cause it to be delayed until 2013, at least 1
year later than had been projected, and other high risks to the program
remain. Because these delays will cause the Navy to operate legacy
aircraft longer than expected, they might also increase operations and
maintenance costs, making an analysis of future readiness funding
requirements even more important.

Contents �

Letter

Results in Brief�Background�Plan Changes the Navy and Marine
Corps' Operational Concepts �

and Reduces Force Structure to Achieve Procurement Savings Navy's Analysis
Generally Appears Reasonable, but Some Limitations Could Understate Risks

In the Absence of DOD Criteria, the Marine Corps and Navy Used Different
Methods and Documentation Standards to Determine Which Reserve Units to
Decommission

Two Other Factors Could Affect the Plan's Implementation and

Add Risk Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation Scope and Methodology

                                       1

                                      2 5

                                       6

                                       9

16

18 19 20 21 22

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Tables

Table 1: Force Structure Summary for the Previous Program and the Navy and
Marine Corps' Integration Plan 8 Table 2: Previous Program and the Navy
and Marine Corps' Integration Plan Aircraft Procurement Summary 9 Table 3:
Marine Corps Criteria for Selecting a Reserve Unit to Decommission 17

Figures

Figure 1: Navy's Projected Tactical Aviation Procurement Budget Compared
with Original Procurement Plan, Fiscal Years 2002-26 5

Figure 2: Capability Scores Determined by Contractor's Panel of Experts 11

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense �GAO Government Accountability Office
�

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

August 13, 2004

Congressional Committees:

The Department of the Navy formerly planned to spend almost $92 billion by
fiscal year 2021 to replace legacy F/A-18C/D, F-14, and AV-8 aircraft with
newer F/A-18E/Fs and the future Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Concerned
that it could not afford to purchase as many of these aircraft as
originally planned, however, in fiscal year 2002 the Department of the
Navy announced a new Tactical Aviation Integration Plan, whereby the Navy
and Marine Corps concluded that they would be able to achieve their
missions with fewer aircraft and units by operating as a combined force.

Out of concern about how the Navy and Marine Corps' future plans for their
tactical aviation forces would affect mission capability, Congress
mandated that GAO examine the Navy and Marine Corps' Tactical Aviation
Integration Plan.1 In the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act,
Congress directed GAO to assess Navy and Marine Corps requirements for
tactical aviation and the role of Navy and Marine Corps Reserve assets in
meeting such requirements.2 In addition, the Senate Report for the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 directed GAO to
analyze the Navy and Marine Corps' Plan to determine the validity of the
assumptions made in formulating the Plan, the expected impact of the Plan
on Navy and Marine Corps force structure, and the ability of the smaller
force structure to meet operational requirements.3 After meeting with your
offices, we agreed on a strategy for completing work in response to both
mandates and agreed to provide an interim briefing and a final report. We
briefed your offices on our results from late February through April 2004.

1 Hereinafter referred to as the Plan. 2 Pub. L. No. 108-87, S:8141
(2003). 3 S. Rep. No. 108-46, at 123 (2003).

Based on our work in response to these mandates, this final report
addresses the following questions:

1. How would Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, force structure,
and procurement costs change under the Plan?

2. What methodology and assumptions did the Navy and Marine Corps use to
analyze the potential for integrating tactical aviation assets, and what,
if any, limitations affect the services' analysis?

3. To what extent did the Navy and Marine Corps use a thorough and
well-documented process to assess which reserve squadrons should be
decommissioned in fiscal year 2004 to implement the Plan?

4. What other factors might affect the implementation of the Plan?

To accomplish these objectives, we analyzed the contractor study that
supports the Plan by reviewing its methodology, major assumptions, and
modeling input and approach. We also obtained information from officials
at Navy and Marine Corps Headquarters, Navy and Marine Corps Reserve
Headquarters, Joint Forces Command, Atlantic and Pacific Naval Air Forces
Headquarters, and Marine Forces Atlantic Headquarters in order to verify
and assess both the information contained in the study and the resulting
decisions about force structure, procurement plans, and operational
impacts. We assessed the reliability of the services' data by reviewing
the methodology and pertinent contractor and service information used for
the study and the Plan. In addition, as part of our analysis, we visited
selected Navy and Marine Corps Reserve tactical aviation units in order to
get their perspective on the possible decommissioning of reserve squadrons
as well as future roles and missions.

Concerns about the affordability of their future tactical aviation
procurement plan prompted the Navy and Marine Corps to agree to a Plan
whereby the two services will be performing their missions using fewer
units of more capable aircraft and reducing total program aircraft
procurement costs from $92 billion to about $64 billion over the next 18
years. Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps will increase the extent
to which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force for
both services. The Plan will also reduce the services' tactical aviation
force structure by decommissioning three active and two reserve squadrons,
thus decreasing the number of Navy and Marine Corps

Results in Brief

squadrons to 59. By decreasing the number of squadrons, the number of
aircraft in some squadrons, and the number of backup aircraft, the
Department of the Navy would decrease the total tactical aviation aircraft
procurement from the original program's 1,637 to 1,140 aircraft, a
reduction of 497 aircraft.

The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet the
Navy and Marine Corps' operational requirements with a smaller force
primarily on the findings of a contractor study that evaluated the
relative capability of different tactical aviation force structures.
Although our review of the contractor's methodology and assumptions about
force structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies suggests
that much of the contractor's analysis appears to be reasonable, we also
noted some limitations in the study that add risk. Specifically, we found
the following:

o  The contractor modeled the Joint Strike Fighters aboard Navy carriers
as if all would have the same performance characteristics despite knowing
that the Marine Corps' Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing version has
significantly less range and payload capability than the Navy's carrier
version.

o  Following the contractor's recommendation, the Navy decided to reduce
the number of backup aircraft it would buy predicated on expected lower
attrition rates and improvements in maintenance management without fully
analyzing the feasibility of achieving these efficiencies.

o  The contractor's force structure analysis showed that the new force had
significantly more capability than the current force but relied on
aircraft performance scores assigned by a panel of experts. However, a
sensitivity analysis performed by the contractor also showed that
variations in these scores significantly affected the forces' relative
capability and therefore the increased effectiveness might not be as high
as reported.

Each of these factors increases the risk that the future smaller force
will not be as effective at accomplishing the Navy and Marine Corps'
tactical missions as the Department of Navy expects.

The Navy and Marine Corps each followed a different process in selecting a
reserve squadron to decommission. The process developed by the Marine
Corps Reserve produced a well-documented analysis of the

operational, fiscal, logistical, and personnel impacts of different
options that appears to provide decision makers with a sound basis for
selecting the reserve unit to decommission. By contrast, the Navy selected
the reserve squadron to decommission without clear criteria or a
documented comprehensive analysis supporting its decision. In the absence
of standard Department of Defense guidance for analyzing and documenting
decommissioning alternatives, a lack of transparency could occur in
conjunction with future service force structure decisions.

Two other factors might affect successful implementation of the Plan,
including the potential uncertainty about future requirements for
readiness funding and delays in fielding the new force. Although the
contractor recommended that the Navy identify future readiness-funding
requirements and ensure that a mechanism be in place for fully funding
these accounts, to date, the Navy has not conducted this analysis. Without
an examination of future funding requirements, the Navy cannot know
whether sufficient funds will be available to maintain readiness levels
that are adequate for the smaller tactical aviation force to meet the
mission needs of both the Navy and Marine Corps. In addition, the
Department of the Navy is also experiencing engineering and weight
problems in developing the Joint Strike Fighter that will cause it to be
delayed until 2013-at least 1 year beyond when it had been projected to
begin receiving the aircraft-and other risks to the program remain.
Because these delays will cause the Navy to operate legacy aircraft longer
than expected, they might also increase operation and maintenance costs,
making an analysis of future readiness funding requirements even more
important.

To mitigate the risks associated with implementing the Navy and Marine
Corps' Plan and enhance future decommissioning decisions, we are
recommending that (1) the Secretary of the Navy conduct additional
analyses of the expected efficiencies essential to reducing the number of
backup aircraft and the necessary readiness funding and (2) the Secretary
of Defense require comprehensive and well-documented analyses when
services make decisions about which units to decommission. In written
comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense generally
agreed with our recommendations and cited actions it plans to take to
implement them. Although some of the department's proposed actions appear
consistent with our recommendations, we believe it needs to take further
steps. The department should develop clear criteria for the services to
use in making future unit decommissioning decisions and require them to
retain documentation of their analyses to facilitate oversight and
transparency. The department's comments and our evaluation are on page 21
of this report.

Background

The Department of Defense's 2001 Defense Planning Guidance tasked the
Department of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive review to assess the
feasibility of fully integrating Navy and Marine Corps aviation force
structure to achieve both effectiveness and efficiency. The Department of
the Navy narrowed the study to include only fixed-wing tactical aviation
assets because of affordability concerns. Specifically, Navy officials
were concerned that the projected procurement budget would not be
sufficient to buy as many F/A-18E/Fs and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft as
originally planned. The difference between the funding needed to support
the Navy's original plan for procuring tactical aircraft and the Navy's
projected procurement budget is shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Navy's Projected Tactical Aviation Procurement Budget Compared
with Original Procurement Plan, Fiscal Years 2002-26

                      Fiscal year 2002 dollars in millions

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000 3,000

2,000

1,000

0 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026

Fiscal years

JSF

F/A-18E/F

Source: U.S. Navy.

Note: The profile shown for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for fiscal
years 2005-11 reflects funding for both the F/A-18E/F and the Joint Strike
Fighter.

Figure 1 shows that, starting in fiscal year 2005, the Navy's typical
aviation allocation of $3,200 million per year would not be sufficient to
support the previous procurement plan for F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike
Fighter aircraft.

In December 2001, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps jointly commissioned a contractor to study the feasibility of
integrating Naval tactical aviation. The study prompted a memorandum of
agreement between the Navy and Marine Corps in August 2002 to integrate
their tactical aviation assets and buy fewer aircraft than originally
planned.

The Plan proposes that the Navy and Marine Corps (1) merge operational
concepts; (2) reduce the number of squadrons, aircraft per squadron, and
backup aircraft; and (3) reduce the total number of aircraft to be
procured in the future. The Department of the Navy anticipates that these
changes will save approximately $28 billion in procurement costs over the
next 18 years through fiscal year 2021.

Plan Changes the Navy and Marine Corps' Operational Concepts and Reduces
Force Structure to Achieve Procurement Savings

Navy and Marine Corps Merge Concepts of Operation

Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps would increase the extent to
which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force for both
services. Under the Plan, the Navy and Marine Corps would increase cross
deployment of squadrons between the services and would further consolidate
missions and operations through changes in aircrew training and the
initiation of command-level officer exchanges.

Under the Plan, the Marine Corps would increase the number of squadrons
dedicated to carrier air wings, and the Navy would begin to dedicate
squadrons to Marine Aircraft Wings. In 2003 the Marine Corps began to
provide the Navy with the first of six additional dedicated squadrons to
augment four squadrons already integrated into carrier air wings during
the 1990s. As a result, each of the Navy's 10 active carrier air wings
would ultimately include one Marine Corps squadron by 2012. Concurrently,
the Navy would integrate three dedicated squadrons into Marine Aircraft
Wings by 2008, primarily to support the Marine Corps Unit Deployment

Program4 rotations to Japan. The first Navy squadron to deploy in support
of Marine Corps operations would occur in late fiscal year 2004, with
other squadrons to follow in fiscal years 2007 and 2008.

As part of the new operating concept, the Department of the Navy would
satisfy both Navy and Marine Corps missions using either Navy or Marine
Corps squadrons. Traditionally, the primary mission of Navy tactical
aviation has been to provide long-range striking power from a carrier,
while Marine Corps tactical aviation provided air support for ground
forces. Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation squadrons will retain
their primary mission responsibilities, but units that integrate would
additionally be responsible to train as well as perform required mission
responsibilities of the other service. For example, if a Navy squadron
were assigned to the Marine Corps Unit Deployment Program, its pilots
would receive more emphasis on training for close air support missions,
and, similarly, Marine Corps pilots would place more emphasis on
long-range strike missions before deploying with a carrier air wing.
Moreover, Navy and Marine Corps officers would exchange Command positions
to further develop a more unified culture. For instance, a Marine Corps
colonel would command a carrier air wing, while a Navy captain would
command a Marine Corps Aircraft Group.

Plan Expected to Reduce Total Number of Squadrons, Aircraft per Squadron,
and Backup Aircraft

As indicated in table 1, the Department of the Navy would create a smaller
tactical aviation force structure consisting of fewer squadrons, reduced
numbers of aircraft per squadron, and fewer backup aircraft. The number of
tactical aviation squadrons would decrease from 68 under the previous plan
to 59 by 2012. To achieve this reduction of nine squadrons, the department
would

o  cancel plans to reestablish four active Navy squadrons as anticipated
under its prior procurement plan,

o  decommission one Marine Corps Reserve squadron as well as one Navy
Reserve squadron in 2004, and

o  decommission three active Navy squadrons. The first active squadron is
scheduled to be decommissioned in fiscal year 2006; two other squadrons
are to be decommissioned from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2012.

4 Marine Corps Unit Deployment program maintains three tactical aviation
squadrons at Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan, to meet contingency
operations throughout the Western Pacific Theater.

Table 1: Force Structure Summary for the Previous Program and the Navy and
Marine Corps' Integration Plan

                            Force structure   Force structure      Reductions 
      Service/Component     under previous  under integration        in force 
                               program                   plan       structure 
         Navy-Active       40 squadrons/500  33 squadrons/370 7 squadrons/130 
                              aircrafta              aircraft        aircraft 
        Navy-Reserves        3 squadrons/36    2 squadrons/22   1 squadron/14 
                                   aircraft          aircraft        aircraft 
     Marine Corps-Active   21 squadrons/308  21 squadrons/210  0 squadrons/98 
                               aircraft              aircraft        aircraft 
    Marine Corps-Reserves    4 squadrons/48    3 squadrons/30   1 squadron/18 
                                   aircraft          aircraft        aircraft 
      Total operational    68 squadrons/892 59 squadrons/632  9 squadrons/260 
          aircraft             aircraft     aircraft                 aircraft 
       Backup aircraft                  745               508 
       Total aircraft                 1,637             1,140 

Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis).

aThe Navy currently has 36 active squadrons instead of 40 as listed in the
table. The difference in numbers is due to four Marine Corps squadrons
that are currently integrated aboard Navy carriers. The Navy's previous
plan was to buy enough aircraft to reestablish those four squadrons as
Navy units.

Under the Plan, the number of aircraft assigned to some tactical aviation
squadrons would be reduced. All Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18C squadrons
that transition to the future Joint Strike Fighter aircraft would be
reduced from 12 to 10 aircraft. In addition, Navy F/A-18F squadrons will
be reduced from 14 to 12 aircraft. Furthermore, by 2006, aircraft assigned
to the remaining two Navy and three Marine Corps Reserve squadrons would
be reduced from 12 to 10. By reducing the aircraft assigned to squadrons,
the size of Navy air wings will transition from 46 to 44 aircraft in 2004,
as the Navy procures new aircraft. A notional air wing in the Navy's
current force is made up of 46 aircraft comprising a combination of
F/A-18C and F-14 squadrons. However, by 2016, carrier air wings would
contain 44 aircraft made up of two squadrons of 10 Joint Strike Fighters,
one squadron of 12 F/A-18E fighters, and one squadron of 12 F/A-18F
fighters.

The Department of the Navy's Plan would also reduce the number of backup
aircraft to be procured from 745 (under the previous program) to 508, for
a total reduction of 237 aircraft. Backup aircraft consist of those
aircraft that are not primarily assigned to active or reserve squadrons.
Specifically, backup aircraft are necessary to meet a variety of needs
such as

o  training new pilots;

o  replacing aircraft that are either awaiting or undergoing depot-level
repair;

o  meeting research, development, and test and evaluation needs;

o  attrition during peacetime or wartime operations; and

o  meeting miscellaneous requirements, such as adversary training and the
Blue Angels demonstration team.

Plan Expected to Reduce Procurement of Tactical Fighters and Save
Procurement Costs

In implementing the Plan, the Department of the Navy expects to reduce the
number of tactical aviation aircraft it will purchase by 497-from 1,637 to
1,140. As indicated in table 2, it plans to procure, respectively, 88 and
409 fewer F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Almost half (237,
or 48 percent) of the expected reduction in aircraft procurement is
attributable to the plan to have fewer backup aircraft. By reducing the
total number of new tactical aviation aircraft to be procured, the
Department of the Navy now expects that its new procurement program will
cost about $64 billion, as compared with nearly $92 billion for the
previously planned force, resulting in a savings of approximately $28
billion.

Table 2: Previous Program and the Navy and Marine Corps' Integration Plan
Aircraft Procurement Summary

                                                                Reductions in 
                              Previous program Integration plan      aircraft 
                Aircraft type      procurement   procurement      procurement 
                    F/A-18E/F              548              460 
         Joint Strike Fighter            1,089              680 
                        Total            1,637            1,140 

Navy's Analysis Generally Appears Reasonable, but Some Limitations Could
Understate Risks

Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis).

The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet its
operational requirements with a smaller force primarily on the results of
a contractor study. The contractor's analysis generally appeared
reasonable because it assessed the relative capability of different
tactical aviation force structures and included important assumptions
about force structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies.
However, from our review of the contractor's methodology and assumptions,
we identified some limitations in its analysis that may understate the
risk associated with implementing some aspects of the Plan. These
limitations include (1) the contractor's decision to model only the
carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter despite the Marine Corps'
plans to operate Short Take Off and Vertical Landing aircraft on carriers,
(2) the contractor's limited studies supporting recommended reductions in
backup aircraft,

and (3) the contractor's method for determining aircraft capabilities used
in the force analyses.

Methodology Compared Relative Force Structure Capabilities

The contractor modeled the effectiveness of the current force, the larger
force that the Navy had previously planned to buy, and the study's
recommended smaller force at three stages of a notional warfight. The
warfight was based on a generic composite scenario that was developed with
input from the Air Force and Army. It has been previously used by the
Joint Strike Fighter Program Office to assess the effectiveness of a joint
strike force in terms of phases of a warfight; geographical location of
combat forces; the characteristics of targets, such as type and hardness;
and whether targets are mobile. During the forward presence phase of the
contractor's modeling scenario, one carrier battle group and one
amphibious readiness group were deployed, and aircraft operated at a
maximum distance of 400 nautical miles from the carrier. In the buildup
phase, three carrier battle groups and three amphibious groups were
deployed in one theater, and aircraft operated at a maximum distance of
150 nautical miles. During the mature phase, eight carrier battle groups,
eight amphibious readiness groups, and 75 percent of all other assets were
deployed to land-based sites, and aircraft operated at a maximum distance
of 150 nautical miles from the carrier.

To measure combat effectiveness levels, the contractor methodically
compared the estimated capabilities of the current force, the previously
planned force, and the recommended force to hit targets and perform close
air support. To determine the relative capabilities of each aircraft
comprising these forces, the contractor convened a panel of experts who
were familiar with planned capability and used official aircraft
performance data to score the offensive and defensive capabilities of
different aircraft across a range of missions performed during the three
stages of the warfight. As indicated in figure 2, the experts determined
that the Joint Strike Fighter, which is still in development, will be the
most capable aircraft and assigned it a baseline score of 1 compared with
the other aircraft.

Figure 2: Capability Scores Determined by Contractor's Panel of Experts

Capacity scores

                                       1

AV-8B

    F-14D F/A-18A+/C/DF/A-18E/F Block 1F/A-18E/F Block 2Joint Strike Fighter

                   Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis).

Figure 2 also shows that based on the capability scores assigned other
aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter is expected to be approximately nine
times more capable than the AV-8B Harrier aircraft, about five times more
capable than the F-14D and F/A-18 A+/C/D aircraft, three times more
capable than the first version of the F/A-18 E/F aircraft, and 50 percent
more capable than the second version of the F/A-18E/F. In addition, the
contractor measured the percentage of units deployed in order to ensure
that Navy and Marine Corps personnel tempo and operational tempo5
guidelines for peacetime were not exceeded.

The study concluded that, because of the expected increase in the
capabilities of F/A-18 E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, both the
previously planned force and the recommended new smaller force were more
effective than today's force. Furthermore, the new smaller force was

5 Personnel tempo measures the frequency of deployments and time away from
home. Operational tempo measures the intensity of actions for military
units by tracking the number of days per quarter that the unit is
deployed.

just as effective in most instances as the previously planned force
because the smaller force had enough aircraft to fully populate aircraft
carrier flight decks and therefore did not cause a reduction in the number
of targets that could be hit. However, the analysis showed that beginning
in 2015, there would be a 10 percent reduction in effectiveness in close
air support during the mature phase of a warfight because fewer squadrons
and aircraft would be available to deploy to land bases. The analysis also
showed that the smaller force stayed within personnel and operational
tempo guidelines during peacetime.

Analysis Included Reasonable Assumptions

The contractor's analysis was based on three key assumptions that
generally appeared to be reasonable and consistent with DOD plans. First,
it assumed that the future naval force structure would include 12 carrier
battle groups, supported by 1 reserve and 10 active carrier air wings, and
12 amphibious readiness groups. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
validated this naval force structure and judged that this force structure
presented moderate operational risk in implementing the defense strategy.
Second, it assumed that the Navy and Marine Corps' tactical aviation
procurement budget would continue to be about $3.2 billion in fiscal year
2002 dollars annually through 2020. This was based on the Department of
the Navy's determination that the tactical aviation procurement budget
would continue to represent about 50 percent of the services' total
aircraft procurement budget as it had in fiscal years 1995 to 2002. Third,
it assumed that the Department of the Navy could reduce the number of
backup aircraft it buys based on expected efficiencies in managing its
backup aircraft inventory.

Some Limitations in the Navy's Analysis Understate Risks in Implementing
the Plan

Our analysis also showed, however, that certain limitations derived from
the contractor's study could add risk to the expected effectiveness of the
future smaller force. These limitations are

o  the study's modeling assumption that the effectiveness of the Marine
Corps' Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing version of the Joint Strike
Fighter would be the same as the Navy's carrier version despite projected
differences in their capability;

o  the study's assumption that certain efficiencies in the management of
backup aircraft could be realized, without documenting and providing
supporting analyses substantiating how they would be achieved; and

o  the study's process for assigning capability measures to aircraft
which, because of its subjectivity, could result in an overestimation of
the smaller force's effectiveness.

Projected Capability Differences of Joint Strike Fighter Versions Could
Affect Expected Effectiveness of Smaller Tactical Aviation Force

Projected Efficiencies in Managing Backup Aircraft Were Based on Limited
Analysis

The contractor's study assumed that all Joint Strike Fighters aboard Navy
carriers, including those belonging to the Marine Corps, would have the
performance characteristics of the carrier version of that aircraft.
However, the Marine Corps plans to operate only the Short Takeoff and
Vertical Landing version of the aircraft, which is projected to be
significantly less capable than the carrier version in terms of range and
payload (number of weapons it can carry). The Marine Corps believes this
version is needed to satisfy its requirement to operate from austere land
bases or amphibious ships in order to quickly support ground forces when
needed. But the carrier version's unrefueled range and internal payload
are expected to exceed those of the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing
version by approximately 50 and 100 percent, respectively.

The contractor mitigated the differences in the two versions' capabilities
by modeling a scenario whereby the aircraft would operate from carriers
located 150 miles from the targets during the mature phase of the
warfight-well within the range of the Marine Corps' version. By contrast,
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the targets struck from carriers
would have been outside the range of the Short Takeoff and Vertical
Landing version of the aircraft unless in-flight refueling was performed,
thereby reducing its effectiveness. The study noted that because of the
differences in performance, substitution of the Short Takeoff and Vertical
Landing version for the carrier version would result in decreased
effectiveness when the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing version's
performance parameters are exceeded. However, the study did not conduct
additional analyses to quantify the impact of using Short Takeoff and
Vertical Landing aircraft aboard carriers. Therefore, if the Plan is
implemented whereby the Marine Corps operates the Short Takeoff and
Vertical Landing version of the aircraft exclusively as one of four
tactical aviation squadrons aboard each carrier, under a different
scenario featuring a greater range to targets, the overall effectiveness
of the tactical fighter group could be less than what the contractor's
study predicted. Navy officials acknowledged that operating the Short
Takeoff and Vertical Landing Joint Strike Fighter aircraft from carriers
presents a number of challenges that the Navy expects to address as the
aircraft progresses through development.

The contractor's study recommended cutting 351 backup aircraft based on
expected improvements and efficiencies in the Navy's management of such
aircraft. The study identified three main factors prompting its conclusion
that fewer backup aircraft would be needed.

o  Actual historical attrition rates for F/A-18 aircraft, according to the
Navy, suggest that the attrition rate for the F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike
Fighter could be lower than expected. The Navy determined that attrition
might be only 1 percent of total aircraft inventory, rather than the
expected 1.5 and 1.3 percent included in the Navy's original procurement
plan for the aircraft respectively6; thus, fewer attrition aircraft would
suffice.

o  Business practices for managing aircraft in the maintenance pipeline
could be improved. According to the contractor, if Navy depots performed
as much maintenance per day as Air Force depots, it appears that the Navy
could reduce the number of aircraft in the maintenance pipeline; thus,
fewer aircraft could suffice.

o  Testing, evaluating, and aircrew training could become more efficient.
According to the contractor's study, fewer aircraft would be needed to
test and evaluate future technology improvements because of the Navy and
Marine Corps' two Joint Strike Fighter variants (the carrier and Short
Takeoff and Vertical Landing versions would have many common parts). In
addition, advances in trainer technology and the greater sortie generation
capability of the newer aircraft could enable them to achieve more
training objectives in a single flight; thus, fewer aircraft could
suffice.

Although the contractor recognized the potential of these efficiencies
when recommending the reduction to the number of backup aircraft, it did
not fully analyze the likelihood of achieving them. According to the
contractor, it recommended the reduction based on limited analysis of the
potential to reduce the number of attrition and maintenance pipeline
aircraft. As a result, the contractor also recommended that the Department
of the Navy study whether it could achieve expected maintenance
efficiencies by improving its depot operations. However, the department
has not conducted such an assessment.

The Department of the Navy considered the risk of cutting 351 aircraft too
high and instead decided to cut only 237 backup aircraft-the number
reflected in the Navy's plan. Historically, the Navy's backup inventory
has equaled approximately 95 percent of the number of combat aircraft. The
contractor recommended that the Navy reduce its backup aircraft

6 We did not assess the reliability of the Navy's data generating the
attrition rates for the F/A-18 aircraft.

Subjectivity in Aircraft Capabilities Scoring Could Reduce Expected Force
Effectiveness

requirement to 62 percent of its planned inventory of combat aircraft.
Concerned that this might be too drastic a cut, the Navy decided to use 80
percent when determining the number of backup aircraft in its Plan.
Although the Plan's higher ratio of backup aircraft to combat aircraft
will reduce operational risk by having more aircraft available for
attrition and other purposes, the Navy's 80 percent factor was not based
on a documented analysis. Navy officials noted that because of budget
limitations, it would be difficult to purchase additional aircraft to
support the smaller tactical aviation force in case some of the projected
efficiencies are not realized.

The contractor relied on aircraft capability scores assigned by a panel of
experts as a basis for comparing the relative effectiveness of the
aircraft and alternative force structures examined. The results showed
that by 2020, the previously planned and new smaller force would be four
times more effective at hitting targets than the current force. However,
the panelists subjectively determined the capability scores from official
aircraft performance parameters provided by the Navy. The contractor
reportedly conducted a "sensitivity analysis" of the aircraft capability
scores and found that changing the scores affected the forces' relative
effectiveness. Since the contractor did not retain documentation of the
analysis, we could not verify the quality of the scoring, nor attest that
the relative effectiveness of the new force will be four times greater
than the current force as the study reported. Nevertheless, the
contractor's acknowledgement that score variations could affect relative
force effectiveness raises the possibility that the estimated increases in
effectiveness, both for the previously planned force and for the
recommended smaller force, might not be as high as the study concluded.
Navy and Marine Corps officials agreed that gaining a significant increase
in total capability was key to accepting a smaller, more capable tactical
aviation force. However, if the capability of the recommended smaller
force is significantly less than that indicated by the study, the smaller
force's ability to meet both Navy and Marine Corps' mission requirements
could be adversely affected.

In the Absence of DOD Criteria, the Marine Corps and Navy Used Different
Methods and Documentation Standards to Determine Which Reserve Units to
Decommission

The Navy and Marine Corps took significantly different approaches toward
the task of assessing and documenting their decisions on which reserve
units to decommission. The Marine Corps used a well-documented process
that clearly showed what criteria were applied to arrive at its decision,
whereas the Navy's approach lacked clarity and supporting documentation
about how different options were evaluated. DOD has not developed criteria
to guide such decommissioning decisions. In a previous report, we reviewed
the Air Force's decision to reduce and consolidate the B-1B bomber fleet
and found that Air Force officials did not complete a formal comprehensive
analysis of potential basing options in order to determine whether they
were choosing the most cost-effective units to keep.7 We also stated that
in the absence of standard guidance for analyzing basing alternatives,
similar problems could occur in the future. In this instance, the absence
of standard DOD guidance for analyzing and documenting decommissioning
alternatives allowed the Navy to use a very informal and less transparent
process to determine which reserve squadron to decommission in fiscal year
2004. The lack of a formal process could also hinder transparency in
making such decisions in the future, which adversely affects Congress's
ability to provide appropriate oversight.

The Marine Corps Conducted a Comprehensive Analysis to Support
Decommissioning Decision

The Marine Corps established a team that conducted and documented a
comprehensive review to support its decision about which Marine Corps
Reserve squadron to decommission.8 In conducting its analysis, the Marine
Corps assumed that (1) reserve assets that had not been decommissioned
must be optimized for integration in future combat roles, (2) mission
readiness and productivity are crucial, and (3) the political and legal
ramifications of deactivating reserve units must be considered. The study
team established a set of criteria consisting of personnel, operational,
fiscal, logistical, and strategic factors and applied these criteria when
evaluating each of the Marine Corps' four reserve squadrons. Table 3
identifies the selection criteria applied to each squadron.

7 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Review of B-1 Process
Identifies Opportunity to Improve Future Analysis, GAO-02-846 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2002).

8 The study team submitted the report to the Commander, 4th Marine
(Reserve) Air Wing, on December 7, 2002.

Table 3: Marine Corps Criteria for Selecting a Reserve Unit to
Decommission

Personnel 	Detailed demographics analysis was conducted to determine the
number and status of personnel for each location. The implications of
relocating and retraining squadron personnel were examined.

Operational Unit, pilot, and aircraft readiness, productivity, and
efficiency were

a

assessed. Sortie analysis was conducted, and aircraft utilization rates
were examined. Support provided for training exercises and other events
was analyzed.

Fiscal 	Operational and training costs were examined. Cost per flight
hour, cost to support combined arms training at Marine Corps Air/Ground
Task Force Training Center Twenty-nine Palms, Calif., and
operations/maintenance and personnel costs were assessed.

Logistical 	Basing impacts and divestiture expenses were examined.
Suitability of facilities (billeting, work areas, messing, etc.) and
operations, training, and maintenance supportability were assessed.

Strategic Doctrinal, organizational, and regional issues were examined.

Source: U.S. Marine Corps.

aA single mission or flight of an aircraft.

The study results were presented to the Marine Requirements Oversight
Council for review and recommendation and to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps.9 The Commandant decided in May 2004 to decommission reserve
squadron VMFA-321 located at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, by
September 2004.

The Navy Did Not Conduct a Formal Analysis or Provide Documentation to
Support Its Decommissioning Decision

In December 2003, the Navy decided to decommission one of three Navy
Reserve tactical aviation squadrons, VFA-203, located in Atlanta, Georgia.
The Chief of Naval Reserve stated that the Navy used a variety of criteria
in deciding which unit to decommission. These criteria included the
squadrons' deployment history, the location of squadrons in relation to
operating ranges, and the location of a reserve intermediate maintenance
facility. Navy officials, however, could not provide documentation of the
criteria or the analysis used to support its decision. Without such
documentation to provide transparency to the Navy's process, we could not
determine whether these criteria were systematically applied to each
reserve squadron. Furthermore, we could not assess whether the Navy had

9 The Marine Requirements Oversight Council advises the Commandant of the
Marine Corps on policy matters related to concepts, force structure, and
requirements validation.

Two Other Factors Could Affect the Plan's Implementation and Add Risk

systematically evaluated and compared other factors such as operational,
personnel, and financial impacts for all Navy Reserve squadrons.

Two other factors could adversely affect the successful implementation of
the Plan and increase the risk level assumed at the time the contractor
completed the study and the Navy and Marine Corps accepted the Plan. These
factors are (1) uncertainty about requirements for readiness funding to
support the tactical aviation force and (2) projected delays in fielding
the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft that might cause the Department of the
Navy not to implement the Plan as early as expected and might increase
operations and maintenance costs. If these factors are not appropriately
addressed, the Department of the Navy may not have sufficient funding to
support the readiness levels required for the smaller force to meet the
Navy and Marine Corps' missions, and the transition to the Plan's force
might be more costly than anticipated.

The contractor's study stated that because the Navy and the Marine Corps
would have a combined smaller tactical aviation force under the Plan, the
services' readiness accounts must be fully funded to ensure that the
aircraft readiness levels are adequate to meet the mission needs of both
services. Furthermore, the contractor recommended that the Navy conduct an
analysis to determine the future readiness funding requirements and ensure
that the Navy has a mechanism in place to fully fund the readiness
accounts. So far, the Navy has not conducted this analysis, nor has it
addressed how it will ensure that the readiness accounts will be fully
funded because Navy officials noted that they consider future budget
estimates to be adequate. However, a recent Congressional Research Service
evaluation of the Plan noted that operations and maintenance costs have
been growing in recent years for old aircraft and that new aircraft have
sometimes, if not often, proved more expensive to maintain than planned.10
Furthermore, our analysis of budget data for fiscal years 2001-3 indicates
that the Department of the Navy's operations and maintenance costs
averaged about $388 million more than what was requested for tactical
aviation and other flight operations. Without a review of future readiness
funding requirements, the Navy cannot be certain that sufficient funding
will be available to maintain

10 Congressional Research Service, Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air
Integration Plan: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.,
Sept. 2003).

the readiness levels that will enable the smaller tactical aviation force
to meet the mission needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps.

Delays in fielding the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, both known and
potential, could also affect the successful implementation of the Plan. As
a result of engineering and weight problems in the development of the
Joint Strike Fighter, there will be at least a 1-year delay in when the
Navy and Marine Corps had expected to begin receiving the Joint Strike
Fighter aircraft. As noted in the Department of the Navy's most recent
acquisition reports to Congress, the Navy has delayed the Short Takeoff
and Vertical Landing version from 2010 to 2012 and the Navy's carrier
version from 2012 to 2013. Furthermore, in March 2004 we reported that
numerous program risks and possible schedule variances could cause
additional delays.11

Recent Joint Strike Fighter program cost increases could also delay the
fielding of the aircraft. In DOD's December 31, 2003, procurement plan,
the average unit cost of the aircraft increased from $69 million to $82
million. Assuming that the Department of the Navy procures the 680 Joint
Strike Fighter aircraft as proposed under the Plan, the total procurement
cost will be approximately $9 billion higher. This increase in cost, when
considered within the limits of the expected $3.2 billion annual
procurement budget, will likely prevent the Department of the Navy from
fielding the smaller but more effective tactical aviation force as early
as expected. Additionally, these delays will oblige the Department of the
Navy to operate legacy aircraft longer than expected, which could result
in increased operations and maintenance costs. A potential increase in
operations and maintenance costs makes it even more important for the
Department of the Navy to conduct an analysis to determine its future
readiness funding requirements.

Conclusions The contractor's study results provided the Department of the
Navy with a reasonable basis for concluding that it could afford to buy a
smaller but more capable force that would meet its future operating
requirements by using fewer Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation
squadrons of more capable aircraft as a combined force and achieving
efficiencies that allow it to reduce the number of backup aircraft needed.
However, there are

11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of
Major Weapon Programs. GAO-04-248 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).

known management and funding risks to realizing the new smaller forces'
affordability and effectiveness. Until Navy management assesses the
likelihood of future lower attrition rates and aircraft maintenance, test
and evaluation, and training requirements, the Navy runs the risk that the
number of backup aircraft it plans to procure will not be adequate to
support the smaller tactical aviation force and add concern to the Plan's
affordability. Furthermore, in the absence of clear DOD guidance citing
consistent criteria and documentation requirements for supporting
decisions that affect units, such as which Navy and Marine Corps Reserve
squadrons to decommission, we remain concerned about the transparency of
the process for reducing the force to those with oversight responsibility.
The inconsistency in the Marine Corps' and Navy's approaches and
supporting documentation confirms the value of such guidance to ensure
clear consideration of the best alternative. Finally, until the Department
of the Navy knows the readiness funding requirements for operating the new
smaller force, it cannot be certain that it can maintain the readiness
levels required to meet operational demands. Such an assessment of these
requirements would provide a sound basis for seeking proper funding.

To enhance the potential that the future Navy and Marine Corps integrated
tactical aviation force will meet the mission needs of both services and
ensure more transparency when making future decommissioning decisions, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:

o  direct the Secretary of the Navy to thoroughly assess all of the
factors that provide the basis for the number of backup aircraft needed to
support a smaller tactical aviation force under the plan to integrate Navy
and Marine Corps tactical aviation forces,

o  develop guidance that (1) identifies the criteria and methodology for
analyzing future decisions about which units to decommission and (2)
establishes requirements for documenting the process used and analysis
conducted, and

o  direct the Secretary of the Navy to analyze future readiness funding
requirements to support the tactical aviation integration plan and include
required funding in future budget requests.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Comments �and Our Evaluation �

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Director, Defense
Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, stated that the
department generally agreed with our recommendations and cited actions
that it is taking. The department's comments are reprinted in their
entirety in appendix I.

In partially concurring with our first recommendation to thoroughly assess
all of the factors that provide the basis for the number of backup
aircraft, DOD stated that the Department of the Navy's Naval Air Systems
Command would complete an effort to review all aircraft inventories to
determine the optimum quantity required by July 2004. However, we were not
able to evaluate the Navy's study because Navy officials have since told
us that it will not be completed until late September or early October
2004.

With regard to our second recommendation to develop guidance that would
identify criteria and a methodology for analyzing future decommissioning
decisions and require documenting the process, DOD stated that it would
change Directive 5410.10, which covers the notification of inactivation or
decommission of forces, and require it to contain the criteria and
methodology used to make the force structure decision. While we agree that
the new guidance, if followed, would disclose these aspects of the
decision-making process, it does not appear sufficient to meet the need we
identified for consistency and documentation to support force structure
decisions. Therefore, we believe that DOD should take additional steps to
meet the intent of our recommendation by developing consistent criteria
and requiring documentation to ensure transparency for those providing
oversight of such decisions in the future.

In partially concurring with our third recommendation related to future
readiness funding requirements, the Department of Defense stated that the
Department of the Navy is currently developing analytical metrics that
would provide a better understanding of how to fund readiness accounts to
achieve a target readiness level. We support the development of validated
metrics that would link the amount of funding to readiness levels because
they would provide decision makers with assurance that sufficient funding
would be provided.

Scope and Methodology

To determine how Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, force
structure, and procurement costs would change under the Plan, we obtained
information about the Navy and Marine Corps' current roles and mission,
force structure, and projected tactical aviation procurement programs and
conducted a comparative analysis. We also met with Navy and Marine Corps
officials at the headquarters and major command levels as well as
Congressional Research Service officials to further understand and
document the operational, force structure, and procurement cost changes
expected if the Plan is implemented.

To determine what methodology and assumptions the Navy and Marine Corps
used to analyze the potential for integrating tactical aviation assets and
any limitations that could affect the services' analysis, we analyzed
numerous aspects of the contractor's study that provided the impetus for
the Plan. Specifically, we met with the contractor officials of Whitney,
Bradley & Brown, Inc., to gain first-hand knowledge of the model used to
assess aircraft performance capability and the overall reasonableness of
the study's methodology. We also reviewed the scenario and assessed the
key analytical assumptions used in order to evaluate their possible impact
on the implementation of the Plan. We examined operational and aircraft
performance factors to determine the potential limitations that could
affect the services' analysis. Additionally, we held discussions with
officials at Navy and Marine Corps headquarters, Joint Forces Command,
Naval Air Forces Pacific and Atlantic Commands, Marine Forces Atlantic
Command, and the Air Combat Command to validate and clarify how the Plan
would or would not affect the ability of tactical aviation forces to meet
mission needs.

To determine the process the Navy and Marine Corps used to assess which
reserve squadrons should be decommissioned in fiscal year 2004, we
obtained information from the Marine Corps Reserve Headquarters and the
4th Marine Air Wing showing a comparative analysis of Marine Corps Reserve
squadrons. In the absence of comparable information from the Navy, we held
discussions with the Chief of Naval Reserve and the Director, Navy Air
Warfare, and visited the Naval Air Force Reserve Command to obtain
information about the decision-making process for selecting the Navy
reserve unit to be decommissioned. We also visited the Commander of the
Navy Reserve Carrier Air Wing-20, along with four reserve squadrons, two
each from the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves, to clarify and better
understand their roles, missions, and overall value to the total force
concept.

To determine what other factors might affect the implementation of the
Plan, we analyzed the contractor's study, Congressional Research Service
reports, and prior GAO reports for potential effects that were not
considered in the final results of the analysis. We discussed these
factors with officials from Navy and Marine Corps headquarters as well as
Naval Air Forces Pacific and Atlantic Commands and Marine Forces Atlantic
Command to assess the impact of the Plan on day-to-day operations.

We assessed the reliability of pertinent data about aircraft capability,
force structure, and military operations contained in the contractor's
study that supports the Plan by (1) reviewing with contractor officials
the methodology used for the analysis; (2) reviewing the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review, prior GAO reports, and service procurement and aircraft
performance documents; and (3) conducting discussions with Navy and Marine
Corps officials. We concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purpose of this report.

We performed our review from July 2003 through May 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
�Secretary of the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the
Director, �Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
congressional�committees and parties. We will also make copies
available to others upon �request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO �Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
�

Please contact me on (202) 512-4402 if you or your staff have any
�questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this
report are �included in appendix I. �

Janet St. Laurent, Director�Defense Capabilities and
Management�

List of Committees

The Honorable Ted Stevens �Chairman �The Honorable Robert C.
Byrd �Ranking Minority Member�Committee on Appropriations
�United States Senate �

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young �Chairman �The Honorable
David R. Obey �Ranking Minority Member�Committee on
Appropriations �House of Representatives �

The Honorable John W. Warner�Chairman �The Honorable Carl
Levin �Ranking Minority Member�Committee on Armed Services
�United States Senate �

The Honorable Duncan Hunter �Chairman �The Honorable Ike
Skelton �Ranking Minority Member�Committee on Armed Services
�House of Representatives �

                       Page 25 GAO-04-900 Force Structure

Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.

                       Page 26 GAO-04-900 Force Structure

                       Page 27 GAO-04-900 Force Structure

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

(350414)

Richard G. Payne (757) 552-8119 George O. Morse (757) 552-8108

In addition to those named above, Willie J. Cheely, Jr.; Kelly
Baumgartner; W. William Russell, IV; Michael T. Dice; Cheryl A. Weissman;
Katherine S. Lenane; and Monica L. Wolford also made significant
contributions to this report.

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