Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate
Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process (13-JUL-04,
GAO-04-899T).
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing
foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal
means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or
bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in
the United States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa
revocation process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism
tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and
Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that
appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on
terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether
weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in our June
2003 report were addressed.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-899T
ACCNO: A10931
TITLE: Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate
Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process
DATE: 07/13/2004
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism
Government information dissemination
Immigration information systems
Immigration or emigration
Interagency relations
National preparedness
Passports
Performance measures
Policies and procedures
Visas
******************************************************************
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GAO-04-899T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT BORDER SECURITY
Tuesday, July 13, 2004
Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process
Statement of Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade
GAO-04-899T
Highlights of GAO-04-899T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing foreign
terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means to
identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or
other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported
in June 2003 that the visa revocation process needed to be strengthened as
an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and
Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that
appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on terrorism
grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether weaknesses in the
visa revocation process identified in our June 2003 report were addressed.
To improve the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we
recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State jointly (1)
develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines agencies'
roles and responsibilities and sets performance standards and (2) address
outstanding legal and policy issues in this area or provide Congress with
specific actions it could take to resolve them. DHS generally concurred
with these recommendations. State agreed to consult with DHS regarding our
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-899T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4128 or [email protected].
July 13, 2004
BORDER SECURITY
Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process
GAO's analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security
took some actions in summer 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa
revocation process that we identified in June 2003. However, GAO's review
of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a detailed
review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses remained.
o Delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of
visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to consular officials
at State. In at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or longer
to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so.
o In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas
to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not
know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country.
o In 10 cases, DHS either failed or took several months to notify
immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in
the country. It then took more than 2 months for immigration investigators
to initiate field investigations of these individuals.
After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004,
additional actions were taken to improve the process. DHS and State
believe these actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past.
In April and May, State revised its procedures and formalized its tracking
system for visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new written
procedures and acted to ensure that immigration investigators were aware
of all individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. State and
DHS also took some steps to address legal and policy issues related to
visa revocations. Further, in April, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC),
an interagency group organized under the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
identified the visa revocation process as a potential homeland security
vulnerability and developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa
revocation cases. However, weaknesses remain. For example, State's and
DHS's procedures are not fully coordinated and lack performance standards,
such as specific time frames for completing each step of the process.
Moreover, outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding
removing individuals based solely on their visa revocation.
Points of Delay Observed in the Visa Revocation Process
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss the report1 we are issuing today on the
visa revocation process and the steps that the Departments of State
(State) and Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies have taken
to improve the use of this process as an antiterrorism tool. In June 2003
we reported2 that agencies lacked written procedures to ensure that
appropriate personnel are notified and take specific actions when the
Department of State revokes visas3 on terrorism grounds.4 As a result,
lookouts were not always posted, other agencies were not always notified
of visa revocations, and there were potential investigative gaps on
individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns who were in the
United States. We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, develop
specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa revocation
process to ensure that information is transmitted to the appropriate
immigration and law enforcement agencies in a timely manner. We also
recommended that they develop a specific policy on actions that
immigration and law enforcement agencies should take to investigate and
locate individuals who remain in the United States after their visas are
revoked.
1U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Additional Actions
Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-04-795
(Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2004).
2U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and
Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process,
GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003).
3In this testimony, we use the term "visa" to refer to nonimmigrant visas
only. The United States also grants visas to people who intend to
immigrate to the United States. A visa is a travel document that allows a
foreign visitor to present himself or herself at a port of entry for
admission to the United States.
4The Department of State revokes a person's visa as a precautionary
measure after it learns that person may be a suspected terrorist. The
purpose of this revocation is to obtain additional information from the
person to determine if the individual is the same person who is suspected
of being a terrorist by requiring him or her to return to the consulate
that issued the visa. According to State officials, this authority is an
important and useful tool for more closely scrutinizing the individual as
he or she reapplies for a new visa. State also revokes visas for reasons
other than terrorism, such as alien smuggling, drug trafficking, and
misrepresentation. State officials told us that visas revoked on terrorism
grounds account for the vast majority of all visas revoked on national
security grounds.
At your request, we examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation
process identified in our June 2003 report were addressed. To accomplish
our objective, we obtained information on policies and procedures put in
place to improve the visa revocation process; interviewed key State and
DHS officials responsible for visa revocations; determined the steps taken
to resolve legal and policy issues raised in our June 2003 report; and
analyzed data on all visas revoked on terrorism grounds over a 3-month
period,5 including detailed information on a random sample of 35 cases
selected from data provided by State in February 2004. We did not review
activities by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate
suspected terrorists. This testimony is based on a published report that
was done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
The Departments of State and Homeland Security took some actions in the
summer of 2003 to address the weaknesses identified in our June 2003
report. State and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of
DHS, developed procedures outlining their respective processes for
handling visa revocations. However, our analysis of visas revoked based on
terrorism concerns from October through December 2003 revealed that
weaknesses remained in the implementation of the visa revocation process,
especially relating to the timely transmission of information among
federal agencies. For instance, we found that backlogs or long delays
sometimes occurred in:
Summary
o screening names of terrorists against State's database of current visa
holders,
o transmitting recommendations to revoke individual visas,
o revoking individual visas after receiving a recommendation to do so,
5Our review covered only nonimmigrant visas that State revoked on
terrorism grounds from October 1, 2003, through December 31, 2003. In this
testimony, when we refer to individuals whose visas have been revoked, we
are referring to those individuals for whom the Department of State has
issued a visa revocation certificate. According to the terms of the
certificate, the revocation is effective immediately on the date the
certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the United States, in
which case the revocation becomes effective immediately upon the alien's
departure from the United States.
o posting appropriate lookouts used to alert border inspectors of the
revocation,
o notifying DHS of visa revocations, and
o requesting that field offices investigate individuals with visas
revoked on terrorism grounds who may be in the country.
We also found that agencies involved in the visa revocation process had
conflicting records of how many visas were revoked for terrorism concerns
and whether individuals who held these visas may be in the country. In
addition, officials from DHS's Customs and Border Protection could not
document that they consistently notified immigration officials of
individuals with revoked visas who were present in the United States. Our
review of visa revocations shows that DHS has located individuals in the
country whose visas were revoked because they may be suspected or actual
terrorists. DHS officials told us that some are still being investigated,
three have been arrested on immigration charges, and others have been
cleared. With respect to an alien already present in the United States,
the Department of State's current visa revocation certificate makes the
revocation effective only upon the alien's departure. Therefore, according
to DHS officials, if U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
special agents locate an alien for whom State has issued a revocation
certificate that states the revocation is effective upon his or her
departure, ICE would be unable to place the alien in removal proceedings
based solely on a visa revocation that had not yet taken place.6
After we initiated our inquiry for this report in January 2004, State and
DHS took additional actions to address the weaknesses we identified
through our analysis. State and DHS believe these actions will avoid
delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State made significant
revisions to its procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa
revocation cases. Between January and May, DHS took steps to develop
additional written procedures, improve the sharing of information on visa
revocation cases, and ensure that immigration investigators are aware of
individuals whose visas were revoked and who may be in the country.
Finally, State and DHS began discussing how to address the legal and
policy issues regarding the removal of individuals with revoked visas. In
addition, the
6DHS could also attempt to remove these aliens based on the derogatory
information that led State to revoke the individual's visa.
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency organization established
under the FBI in December 2003, recently took some steps to improve the
visa revocation process, including developing written standard operating
procedures related to the screening of intelligence information and
training additional staff to perform this function. We did not fully
assess the effectiveness of these actions because they were taken after
the October to December 2003 time period that we reviewed. Nonetheless,
additional measures are needed to further improve the process. The written
policies and procedures often neither contain performance standards such
as time frames for completing individual steps of the visa revocation
process, nor do they reflect a fully coordinated approach to implementing
the process. Further, State and DHS have not concluded their discussion of
legal and policy issues related to removing individuals with revoked visas
from the country.
In light of our past work and the weaknesses we identified through our
review, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and
State work jointly and with other appropriate agencies to develop a
written, governmentwide policy that clearly defines roles and
responsibilities and sets performance standards for the agencies involved
in the visa revocation process. We also recommend that DHS and State
address outstanding legal and policy issues related to removing
individuals with revoked visas from the country or, by October 1, 2004,
provide Congress with a list of specific actions that could help resolve
them.
Our nation's border security process involves multiple tools for
addressing potential terrorist threats to the United States. These tools
generally include (1) preventing potential terrorists from entering the
country and (2) identifying, locating, and investigating potential
terrorists already in the United States. One such tool is the visa
revocation process, which involves multiple federal agencies including the
Terrorist Screening Center and the Departments of State and Homeland
Security. The visa revocation process typically begins with the
development of derogatory information about individuals by various federal
agencies. This information is then forwarded to TSC, which, along with
State, identifies visa holders who may be suspected or actual terrorists.
State then posts lookouts regarding the revocation for these individuals;
revokes their visas; and notifies the overseas post that issued the visa,
DHS, and other agencies. Based on the notification from State, DHS then
determines if any of these individuals may be in the country. If so, DHS
attempts to locate, investigate, and, as appropriate, remove them from the
country.
Background
Initial Actions Taken Mr. Chairman, following our June 2003 report, State
and DHS's U.S.
Customs and Border Protection developed written policies outlining their
to Address respective processes for handling visa revocations. However,
our analysis Weaknesses Were of subsequent visa revocations shows that
weaknesses remained in the
implementation of the visa revocation process.
Inadequate
Delays Occurred at Many Steps in the Visa Revocation Process
State's July 7, 2003, standard operating procedures outlined its internal
process for handling visa revocations, including posting lookouts and
notifying other agencies of the visa revocation. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's procedures developed following our June 2003 report explained
the process for determining whether an individual with a revoked visa may
be in the country and, if so, taking appropriate steps to notify
investigators. Despite these initial efforts, our review of visas revoked
on terrorism grounds from October through December 2003 showed that
weaknesses remained in the visa revocation process, especially regarding
timely transmission of information among federal agencies. As shown in
figure 1, we found delays in agency efforts to:
o Identify individuals whose visas should be revoked. In August and
September 2003, there was a backlog of approximately 5,000 names of
suspected terrorists that had not been screened to identify any visa
holders.
o Transmit recommendations to consular officials to revoke certain
individuals' visas. Instead of sending the typical average of 2 to 6
recommendations to revoke per day, intelligence screeners waited until
they had large batches of nearly 100 recommendations or more before
sending them to consular officials at State.
o Post lookouts to alert border inspectors of visa revocations. Although
State's standard operating procedures directed Consular Affairs officials
to post lookouts regarding the revocation before finalizing it, we found
that in 6 of the 35 cases we examined in detail, Consular Affairs did not
do so until after the revocation was finalized.
o Revoke individual visas. State officials told us it should take no
more than a week to revoke an individual's visa after receiving a
recommendation to do so. In 6 cases, we had sufficient information to
determine how long it took State to revoke a visa after receiving a
recommendation to do so. In 3 of these cases, it took State at least 6
months and, in one case, as long as 17 months to revoke the individual's
visa.
o Notify DHS of visa revocations. Of the 35 cases we reviewed in detail,
DHS received notification from State the same day a revocation was
finalized in 9 cases; in 1 to 6 days in 23 cases; and in 7 days or longer
in 3 cases. It is particularly important that these notifications are
timely when the alien may already be in the country so that DHS can locate
and investigate him or her.
o Investigate individuals with visas revoked on terrorism grounds who
may be in the country. After receiving notification from State, DHS's U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that field offices
should investigate 8 of the 35 cases we examined in detail. In all 8 of
these cases, ICE waited more than 2 months to initiate field
investigations.
Figure 1: Points of Delay in the Visa Revocation Process
We also found that for the October to December 2003 time period, State,
CBP, and ICE reported different numbers of revocations based on terrorism
concerns. As shown in figure 2, State listed 338; ICE, 347; and CBP, 336.
We found that only 320 names were on all three lists and that some lists
contained names that were not on either of the other lists. Instances
where a name did not appear on all three lists show a potential breakdown
in the visa revocation process and raise concern because DHS may not have
been able to take timely action to determine if these individuals were in
the country and, if so, to locate and investigate them.
Conflicting Data among Agencies
Figure 2: Inconsistencies among Agencies on Number of Visas Revoked from
October through December 2003
Our detailed review of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds also
showed that CBP's7 and ICE's records conflicted on whether certain
individuals may have been in the country. In 3 of the 35 cases, CBP and
ICE disagreed about whether an individual might have been in the country
at the time of visa revocation and whether he or she might still be in the
country. In 2 of the cases, CBP did not believe the individual was in the
country and, therefore, did not refer the cases to ICE for investigation.
However, ICE special agents determined that both of these individuals were
and still are in the country-one is awaiting adjudication of a political
asylum claim, and the other has a pending application to become
7CBP's data come from the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), which
does not have complete arrival and departure records for all non-U.S.
citizens. NIIS records arrivals and departures of foreign citizens through
the collection of I-94 forms. Some aliens are required to fill out and
turn in these forms to inspectors at air and sea ports of entry as well as
at land borders. (Canadians and U.S. permanent residents are not required
to fill out I-94 forms when they enter the United States.) NIIS does not
have departure data for aliens if they fail to turn in the bottom portion
of their I-94 when they depart.
a lawful permanent resident of the United States.8 In another instance,
CBP believed an individual was in the country when his visa was revoked
and subsequently notified ICE of the need to locate and investigate him.
However, ICE performed its own search of immigration records based on
State's notification and concluded that the individual was not in the
country. Therefore, it did not investigate him. According to CBP data,
this individual has been in the country for more than a year.
Lapses in Notification, Provision of Derogatory Information
We further found that although Customs and Border Protection officials are
supposed to immediately notify Immigration and Customs Enforcement of
individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country, CBP could not
document that it had notified ICE promptly or, in several cases, that it
notified ICE at all. According to CBP data on the 35 cases in our sample,
10 aliens might have been in the United States at the time of their
revocation. In 3 of these cases, CBP records indicate that ICE was never
notified; in the other 7 cases, CBP notified ICE but could not document
that the notification occurred until at least 3 months after the
revocation.
In addition, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials stated that
they often received no derogatory information showing that individuals
whose visas State had revoked on terrorism concerns may pose a national
security threat. Without this information, ICE may expend resources
conducting investigations on individuals who they believe may pose little
or no threat to national security. According to ICE officials, the growing
number of visa revocation cases based on terrorism concerns places a
significant strain on their investigative resources, forcing ICE to pull
agents off active investigations of known national security threats to
investigate visa revocation cases.
State officials told us that the vast majority of visa revocations on
terrorism grounds are based on derogatory information in the TIPOFF
database. However, in May 2004, ICE officials told us that they were not
aware that most of State's visa revocations on terrorism grounds are based
on information in TIPOFF. According to TSC, of the 35 cases we examined in
detail, 32 of the individuals appeared in TIPOFF. In June 2004, ICE
8On June 8, 2004, ICE investigators told us that they have no specific
derogatory information that would indicate that any of the individuals
remaining in the United States currently represent a threat to national
security.
informed us that its records check located only 6 of the 35 individuals
from our sample in TIPOFF. Also in June, State officials told us they
recently began providing the TIPOFF record number to DHS for each
individual whose revocation was based on derogatory information in TIPOFF.
Majority of ICE Investigations Concluded, but Legal and Policy Issues
Regarding Removing Aliens Remain
Separate from our detailed review of 35 visa revocation cases, we obtained
information on the more than 330 visa revocations on terrorism grounds
from October through December 2003. According to ICE records, ICE
identified 64 individuals whose visas were revoked on national security
grounds between October and December 2003 and may be in the country,
initiated investigations of all these individuals, and concluded a
majority of these investigations. Data provided by ICE show that these
investigations resulted in confirming departure of some aliens, clearing
others, and arresting 3 on administrative immigration charges.9 On June 8,
2004, ICE investigators told us that they have no specific derogatory
information that would indicate that any of the individuals remaining in
the United States currently represent a threat to national security. We
also noted several cases where the visa revocation process prevented
individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from entering
the United States or helped remove them from the United States.
While ICE has investigated individuals with visas revoked on terrorism
grounds, if ICE special agents told us that if they locate an alien in the
United States for whom State has issued a revocation certificate using its
current wording, ICE would be unable to remove the individual based solely
on the visa revocation. State's current visa revocation certificate states
that the revocation shall become effective immediately on the date the
certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the United States, in
which case the revocation will become effective immediately upon the
alien's departure.
9ICE provided us a breakdown of results of the 64 investigations, but we
have not included these data because DHS classified them as law
enforcement sensitive.
Actions Have Been Taken Recently to Address Identified Weaknesses
Since we initiated our inquiry in January 2004, State and DHS have taken
additional steps to address identified weaknesses in the visa revocation
process. These include revising procedures, reviewing past visa revocation
cases, and taking steps to address legal and policy issues. In addition,
in mid-April, TSC identified visa revocations as a potential homeland
security vulnerability and developed an informal process for coordinating
actions and sharing information on visa revocations. However, we
identified some weaknesses that still need to be addressed.
State Revised Standard Operation Procedures and Formalized Its Revocation
Tracking System
In the course of responding to our inquiries, State's Visa Office
discovered that its standard operating procedures had not always been
followed correctly. As a result, in April and May, State made significant
revisions to its procedures to provide more explicit instructions for each
step in the process.10 Also in April, a State official told us that the
Visa Office planned to formalize its previously informal system for
tracking visa revocations to make it a definitive reference point for
information about all visa revocations.
DHS Acted to Improve Policies and Information Sharing, Review Visa
Revocations, and Resolve Legal and Policy Issues
DHS also took several actions following the initiation of our inquiry. In
January, ICE assigned a special agent to CBP to assist with information
exchange and coordination of visa revocation issues and in March issued
written standard operating procedures for visa revocation investigations.
In May, CBP reviewed all visa revocations in its lookout database to
ensure that all appropriate notifications had been sent to ICE and sent
additional notifications. This review identified 656 individuals with
revoked visas who may be in the country. We reviewed these data and
determined that 34 of these individuals' visas were revoked on terrorism
grounds during the period of our review.
In February 2004, DHS officials also told us that they were considering a
regulation relating to visa revocations that could allow the removal of
individuals from the United States because their visas have been revoked
by State. In June 2004, DHS officials told us that they were still
considering this regulation and were coordinating with State and the
Department of Justice. Also in June 2004, DHS officials told us that they
had reached an informal understanding with State that, on a case-by-case
basis, DHS may
10State officials told us that, in light of the evolving relationships
among the agencies involved in the visa revocation process, they revise
their procedures as necessary.
ask that State change its revocation certificate related to an admitted
alien to make the revocation effective retroactively to the date of
issuance of the visa, and State will consider such a request in
consultation with DHS and the Department of Justice. State and DHS further
agreed that should the wording of the revocation certificate be changed,
it would not be changed in all instances, but only on a case-by-case
basis. According to DHS officials, if State changed the wording of the
certificate to make the revocation effective retroactively to the date of
issuance of the visa, the government would no longer be effectively barred
from litigating the issue. Nonetheless, revocation of a visa is not
explicitly a stated grounds for removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act.11 Moreover, the issue of whether, under current statute
and regulations, DHS would have the authority to initiate removal
proceedings solely on the basis of a visa revocation has not been
litigated and remains unresolved legally. As of June 2004, DHS did not
have any specific time frame for completing discussions with State and
other agencies regarding legal and policy issues relating to visa
revocations.
TSC Developed Procedures, Trained Additional Staff, and Assessed the Visa
Revocation Process
Since its formation in December 2003, TSC has taken actions to clarify its
role, increase its capacity to handle visa revocation cases, and analyze
the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. Specifically, in
March 2004, TSC developed written standard operating procedures outlining
the process for screening intelligence information to identify visa
holders who may be terrorists. TSC also recently began training additional
staff to screen terrorism intelligence for matches with visa holders.12
TSC officials told us that, in mid-April 2004, TSC identified the visa
revocation process as a potential vulnerability to homeland security. As a
result, it developed a process to enable the Center to coordinate the
sharing of information on visa revocation cases without relying on formal
notifications transmitted among the agencies.
Additional Actions Still While steps have been taken to improve the visa
revocation process,
Needed which State and DHS believe will help avoid delays experienced in
the past, additional actions are needed to further improve it. There is no
governmentwide policy outlining roles and responsibilities for the visa
118 U.S.C. S: 1101 et seq.
12Previously, the center had one full-time staff member dedicated to
performing this function.
revocation process. Although CBP and ICE have written internal procedures
related to their respective roles and responsibilities in the visa
revocation process, DHS has still not developed an agencywide policy
governing the process. The written procedures also often lack specific
time frames for completing individual steps in the process. For instance,
State's procedures lack guidance on how quickly Consular Affairs officials
should act on recommendations from TSC to revoke individuals' visas, and
ICE's written procedures do not specify a time frame for referring cases
to field offices. In addition, State and DHS have not concluded their
discussions on legal and policy issues related to removing individuals
with revoked visas from the United States.
Mr. Chairman, in light of the weaknesses we identified in our most recent
review of the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly with the
Secretary of State and other appropriate agencies to take the following
two actions:
o Develop a written, governmentwide policy that clearly defines the
roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the visa revocation
process, including the Terrorist Screening Center. This policy should
include directions for sharing information and tracking visa revocation
cases throughout the interagency visa revocation process. It should
incorporate performance standards (e.g., time frames for completing each
step in the process) and periodic interagency assessments to determine
whether information is being shared among the agencies involved,
appropriate follow-up action is being taken, and data differences, if they
occur, are being reconciled; and
o Address outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the status of
aliens with visas revoked on national security grounds who are in the
United States at the time of the revocation. If these issues cannot be
addressed, the executive branch should, by October 1, 2004, provide
Congress with a list of specific actions (including any potential
legislative changes) that could help resolve them.
In commenting on a draft of our report, the Department of Homeland
Security said it generally concurred with the report and its
recommendations. It added that our identification of areas where
improvements are needed will contribute to ongoing efforts to strengthen
the visa revocation process. The Department of State indicated that it
believes that its handling of the revocation process overall has been
excellent and has improved over time. State indicated that it would
consult with DHS regarding implementation of our recommendations.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
(320286)
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
For further information on this testimony, please call Jess Ford or John
Brummet at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Jason Bair, Elizabeth Singer, Mary Moutsos, Janey Cohen,
and Etana Finkler.
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