Nuclear Security: Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of	 
DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to Meet the May  
2003 Design Basis Threat (22-JUN-04, GAO-04-894T).		 
                                                                 
A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites
containing the material used in nuclear weapons, called special  
nuclear material, could have devastating consequences for the	 
site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE
needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key	 
component of an effective program is the design basis threat	 
(DBT), a classified document that identifies, among other things,
the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The	 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the		 
then-current DBT obsolete resulting in DOE issuing a new version 
in May 2003. GAO examined the issues that could impede the	 
ability of DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to	 
fully meet the threat contained in the May 2003 DBT by the	 
department's fiscal year 2006 deadline. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-894T					        
    ACCNO:   A10577						        
  TITLE:     Nuclear Security: Several Issues Could Impede the Ability
of DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to Meet the	 
May 2003 Design Basis Threat					 
     DATE:   06/22/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Physical security					 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Nuclear facility security				 
	     Strategic planning 				 

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GAO-04-894T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT NUCLEAR SECURITY

Tuesday, June 22, 2004

 Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of DOE's Office of Energy, Science and
              Environment to Meet the May 2003 Design Basis Threat

Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director Natural Resources and Environment Team

GAO-04-894T

Highlights of GAO-04-894T, a testimony to Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives

A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites
containing the material used in nuclear weapons, called special nuclear
material, could have devastating consequences for the site and its
surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective
safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program
is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies,
among other things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist
forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the
then-current DBT obsolete resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May
2003.

GAO examined the issues that could impede the ability of DOE's Office of
Energy, Science and Environment to fully meet the threat contained in the
May 2003 DBT by the department's fiscal year 2006 deadline.

June 22, 2004

NUCLEAR SECURITY

Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of DOE's Office of Energy, Science and
Environment to Meet the May 2003 Design Basis Threat

Five Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites contain substantial
quantities of Category I special nuclear material, which consists of
specified quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. These sites
have all developed plans for implementing the May 2003 DBT. However, there
are several issues that could make it difficult to implement these plans
by DOE's deadline of the end of fiscal year 2006. Specifically:

o  	Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites approved their DBT
implementations plans in February 2004 before the Deputy Secretary of
Energy issued his April 2004 guidance on which sites had improvised
nuclear device vulnerabilities. As a result, some sites may be required to
shift to enhanced protection strategies, which could be very costly.
Consequently, the assumptions in the Office of Energy, Science and
Environment DBT implementation plans may no longer be valid, and the plans
may need to be revised.

o  	Office of Energy, Science and Environment site plans are based on the
May 2003 DBT; however, DOE is now reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may
revise it. Consequently, if the DBT is changed in a way that increases
security requirements, some Office of Energy, Science and Environment
sites may have to revise their implementation plans to reflect the need to
provide for a more stringent defense.

o  	The plan for one Office of Energy, Science and Environment site was
under funded. Specifically, officials in the Office of Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology, which is part of the Office of Energy, Science and
Environment, told GAO that, for one site, no DBT implementation funding
had been requested for fiscal year 2005.

o  	Finally, full implementation of these plans will require the
successful resolution of complex organizational arrangements between
various program and security offices.

Consequently, GAO continues to believe, as it recommended in April 2004,
that DOE needs to develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully
resourced implementation plan for meeting the new DBT requirements that
includes important programmatic activities such as the closure of
facilities and the transportation of special nuclear materials.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-894T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro at (202)
512-3841 or [email protected].

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on physical security at
the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Energy, Science and Environment
(ESE). DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment comprises nine
offices, including the Offices of Environmental Management (EM); Nuclear
Energy, Science and Technology (NE); and Science (SC) and is headed by the
Under Secretary for ESE.

DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site
containing the material used in nuclear weapons-called special nuclear
material-could have devastating consequences for the site and its
surrounding communities. This is particularly true at sites that contain
Category I special nuclear material, which consists of specified
quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the form of
assembled nuclear weapons and test devices, major nuclear components, and
other high-grade materials such as solutions and oxides.

Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences, DOE's
effective management of its safeguards and security program, which
includes developing safeguards and security policies, is essential to
preventing an unacceptable, adverse impact on national security.1 For many
years, DOE has employed risk-based security practices. To manage potential
risks, DOE has developed a design basis threat (DBT), a classified
document that identifies the potential size and capabilities of terrorist
forces. DOE's DBT is based on an intelligence community assessment known
as the Postulated Threat. DOE requires the contractors operating its sites
to provide sufficient protective forces and equipment to defend against
the threat contained in the DBT. The DBT in effect on September 11, 2001,
had been DOE policy since June 1999. DOE replaced the 1999 DBT in May 2003
to better reflect the current and projected terrorist threats that
resulted from the September 11 attacks.

On April 27, 2004, we testified before this Subcommittee on several key
aspects surrounding DOE's development and implementation of its May 2003
DBT.2 Specifically, we reported on our examination of (1) the reasons

1See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to
Better Manage Its Safeguards and Security Program, GAO-04-471 (Washington,
D.C.: May 30, 2003).

2See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: DOE Must Address
Significant Issues to Meet the Requirements of the New Design Basis
Threat, GAO-04-701T (Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2004).

DOE needed almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, (2) the higher threat
contained in the new DBT, and (3) the remaining issues that needed to be
resolved for DOE to fully defend against the threat contained in the new
DBT. With regard to the issues needing resolution for DOE to fully defend
against the threat contained in the new DBT, we found that DOE had been
slow to resolve a number of significant issues including developing DBT
implementation plans and budgets to support these plans. The need to fully
resolve these issues may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the
threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, we
stated that DOE's deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the
end of fiscal year 2006 was probably not realistic for some sites.

Subsequently, you asked us to examine in more detail the issues that could
impede ESE's ability to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT by
DOE's fiscal year 2006 deadline. To carry out our objective, we
interviewed DOE and ESE officials, including EM, NE, and SC headquarters
security officials, as well as field security officials. We also reviewed
relevant documents these officials provided to us. In addition, we
reviewed recent reports from DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance for the ESE sites that contain Category I special
nuclear material. We also relied on our previous work on DOE physical
security conducted for this Subcommittee over the last 2 years. We
performed our work from May 2004 to June 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

In summary, ESE sites containing Category I special nuclear material have
developed plans for implementing the May 2003 DBT. However, we believe
there are several issues that could make it difficult to implement these
plans by DOE's deadline of the end of fiscal year 2006. These specific
issues are as follows:

o  	ESE sites approved their implementation plans during February 2004
before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his April 2004 guidance on
which sites had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. As a result,
some sites may be required to shift to enhanced protection strategies,
which could be very costly. Consequently, the assumptions in the ESE site
plans may no longer be valid, and the plans may need to be revised.

o  	ESE site plans are based on the May 2003 DBT; however, DOE is now
reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may revise it. Consequently, if the DBT
is changed to increase security requirements, some ESE offices may have to
revise their implementation plans to reflect the need for a more stringent
defense.

o  	While ESE sites have developed implementation plans, even under the
old assumptions, the plan for one site was under funded. Specifically, NE
security officials told us that for one site no DBT implementation funding
had been requested for fiscal year 2005.

o  	Finally, full implementation of these plans will require the
successful resolution of complex organizational arrangements between
various program and security offices.

We continue to believe, as we recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs to
develop and implement a department wide multiyear, fully resourced
implementation plan for meeting the new DBT requirements that includes
important programmatic activities such as the closure of facilities and
the transportation of special nuclear materials.3

Background 	Five ESE sites collectively contain substantial quantities of
Category I special nuclear material. These include the following:

o  	the Savannah River Site in Savannah River, South Carolina, and the
Hanford Site in Richland, Washington, which are managed by EM;

o  	the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and the
Argonne National Laboratory-West which are located in Idaho Falls, Idaho,
and are managed by NE; and

o  	the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is
managed by SC.

Contractors operate each site for ESE. The ESE program offices that
oversee these sites-EM, NE, and SC-have requested about $397 million in
fiscal year 2005 for security.

Two other organizations are important contributors to DOE's security
program. The Office of Security in DOE's Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance develops and promulgates orders and policies, such
as the DBT, to guide the department's safeguards and security programs.
The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance

3See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to
Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis
Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2004).

Assurance in DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
supports the department by, among other things, independently evaluating
the effectiveness of contractors' performance in safeguards and security.
It also performs follow-up reviews to ensure that contractors have taken
effective corrective actions and appropriately addressed weaknesses in
safeguards and security.

The risks associated with Category I special nuclear materials vary but
include the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a
nuclear yield, theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon, and the
potential for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal. Because of
these risks, DOE has long employed risk-based security practices. The key
component of DOE's well-established, risk-based security practices is the
DBT, a classified document that identifies the characteristics of the
potential threats to DOE assets. The DBT traditionally has been based on a
classified, multiagency intelligence community assessment of potential
terrorist threats, known as the Postulated Threat. The DBT considers a
variety of threats in addition to the terrorist threat. Other adversaries
considered in the DBT include criminals, psychotics, disgruntled
employees, violent activists, and spies. The DBT also considers the threat
posed by insiders, those individuals who have authorized, unescorted
access to any part of DOE facilities and programs. Insiders may operate
alone or may assist an adversary group. Insiders are routinely considered
to provide assistance to the terrorist groups found in the DBT. The threat
from terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat contained in
the DBT.

DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted
protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all
protective systems at DOE's most sensitive sites employ a defense-indepth
concept that includes sensors, physical barriers, hardened facilities and
vaults, and heavily armed paramilitary protective forces equipped with
such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and
chemical protective gear.

The effectiveness of the protective system is formally and regularly
examined through vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is
a systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative
techniques are applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective
protection of specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To
conduct such assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter
experts, such as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate
attacks; and

force-on-force performance testing, in which the site's protective forces
undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists.

The results of these assessments are documented at each site in a
classified document known as the Site Safeguards and Security Plan. In
addition to identifying known vulnerabilities, risks, and protection
strategies for the site, the Site Safeguards and Security Plan formally
acknowledges how much risk the contractor and DOE are willing to accept.
Specifically, for more than a decade, DOE has employed a risk management
approach that seeks to direct resources to its most critical assets-in
this case Category I special nuclear material-and mitigate the risks to
these assets to an acceptable level. Levels of risk-high, medium, and
low-are assigned classified numerical values and are derived from a
mathematical equation that compares a terrorist group's capabilities with
the overall effectiveness of the crucial elements of the site's protective
forces and systems.

Historically, DOE has striven to keep its most critical assets at a low
risk level and may insist on immediate compensatory measures should a
significant vulnerability develop that increases risk above the low risk
level. Compensatory measures could include deploying additional protective
forces or curtailing operations until the asset can be better protected.
In response to a September 2000 DOE Inspector General's report
recommending that DOE establish a policy on what actions are required once
a high or moderate risk is identified, in September 2003, DOE's Office of
Security issued a policy clarification stating that identified high risks
at facilities must be formally reported to the Secretary of Energy or
Deputy Secretary within 24 hours. In addition, under this policy
clarification, identified high and moderate risks require corrective
actions and regular reporting.

Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its
safeguards and security policies are being complied with and are
performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-assessments and
are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. DOE Orders also require
field offices to comprehensively survey contractors' operations for
safeguards and security every year. The Office of Independent Oversight
and Performance Assurance in DOE's Office of Security and Safety Assurance
provides yet another check through its comprehensive inspection program.
All deficiencies identified during surveys and inspections require the
contractors to take corrective action.

Reflecting the post-September 11 environment, the May 2003 DBT, among
other things, identified a larger terrorist threat than did the 1999 DBT.
It also expanded the range of terrorist objectives to include
radiological, biological, and chemical sabotage. Key features of the 2003
DBT included the following:

o  	Expanded terrorist characteristics and goals. The 2003 DBT assumes
that terrorist groups are the following: well armed and equipped; trained
in paramilitary and guerrilla warfare skills and small unit tactics;
highly motivated; willing to kill, risk death, or commit suicide; and
capable of attacking without warning. Furthermore, according to the 2003
DBT, terrorists might attack a DOE facility for a variety of goals,
including the theft of a nuclear weapon, nuclear test device, or special
nuclear material; radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage; and the
on-site detonation of a nuclear weapon, nuclear test device, or special
nuclear material that results in a significant nuclear yield. DOE refers
to such a detonation as an improvised nuclear device.

o  	Increased the size of the terrorist group threat. The 2003 DBT
increases the terrorist threat levels for the theft of the department's
highest value assets-Category I special nuclear materials-although not in
a uniform way. Previously, under the 1999 DBT, all DOE sites that
possessed any type of Category I special nuclear material were required to
defend against a uniform terrorist group composed of a relatively small
number of individuals. Under the 2003 DBT, however, the department judged
the theft of a nuclear weapon or test device to be more attractive to
terrorists, and sites that have these assets are required to defend
against a substantially higher number of terrorists than are other sites.
For example, a DOE site that, among other things, assembles and
disassembles nuclear weapons, is required to defend against a larger
terrorist group. Other DOE sites, such as an EM site that stores excess
plutonium, only have to defend against a smaller group of terrorists.
However, the number of terrorists in the 2003 DBT is larger than the 1999
DBT number. DOE calls this a graded threat approach.

o  	Mandated specific protection strategies. In line with the graded
threat approach and depending on the type of materials they possess and
the likely mission of the terrorist group, sites must now implement
specific protection strategies for Category I special nuclear material. In
addition, sites will have to develop, for the first time, specific
protection strategies for facilities, such as radioactive waste storage
areas, wastewater treatment, and science laboratories, against the threat
of radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage.

o

  A Number of Issues May Affect the Ability of ESE Sites to Fully Meet the
  Threat Contained in the New DBT in a Timely Fashion

Addressed the potential for improvised nuclear device concerns. The May
2003 DBT established a special team to report to the Secretary of Energy
on each site's potential for improvised nuclear devices. Based on the
team's advice, in April 2004 the Deputy Secretary of Energy designated
whether a site had such a concern. This official designation was intended
to help address the general dissatisfaction with previous DOE policies for
improvised nuclear devices, knowledge of which was carefully controlled
and not shared widely with security officials. For example, some EM sites
had no information at all on their potential for this risk.

When we testified before this Subcommittee in April 2004, we stated that
while DOE had issued the final DBT in May 2003, it had only recently begun
to resolve a number of significant issues that could affect the ability of
its sites to fully meet the threat in the new DBT in a timely fashion.
These issues involved issuing additional DBT implementation guidance,
developing DBT implementation plans, and developing budgets to support
these plans. We noted that fully resolving all of these issues might take
several years, and the total cost of meeting the new threats was currently
unknown. Consequently, we stated, full DBT implementation could occur
anywhere from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2008, well beyond the
department's goal of the end of fiscal year 2006. Because some sites would
be unable to effectively counter the higher threat contained in the new
DBT for up to several years, we stated that these sites should be
considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than they were under the
old DBT.

After reviewing ESE's efforts to implement the May 2003 DBT at sites
containing Category I special nuclear material, we continue to be
concerned about whether DOE can meet its fiscal year 2006 deadline for
full DBT implementation. Specifically, while ESE sites that contain
Category I special nuclear material have developed plans for implementing
the May 2003 DBT, as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Energy, we
believe there are four issues that will make it difficult to implement
these plans in a timely fashion.

First, ESE sites approved their implementation plans in February 2004
before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his guidance on which sites
had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. As noted previously, the
May 2003 DBT created a special team, composed of weapons designers and
security specialists to report on each site's improvised nuclear device
vulnerabilities. The results of this report were briefed to senior DOE
officials in March 2004 and the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued

guidance, based on this report, to DOE sites in early April 2004. As a
result, some sites may be required under the 2003 DBT to shift to enhanced
protection strategies, which could be very costly. This special team's
report may most affect ESE sites, because, in some cases, their improvised
nuclear device potential had not previously been explored. In addition,
ESE security officials told us that confusion exists about how or if this
guidance applies to their sites, and they stated that they are working
with officials from DOE's Office of Security to resolve this confusion.
The Director of DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
agreed that additional guidance will be necessary to resolve this
confusion. Consequently, because ESE sites developed their plans well
before this guidance was issued, the assumptions in their plans may no
longer be valid and the plans may need to be revised.

Second, the ESE site implementation plans are based on the May 2003 DBT;
however, DOE is now reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may revise it. In our
April 2004 report, we expressed several concerns about the May 2003 DBT.
In particular, we noted that some DOE sites may have improvised nuclear
device concerns that, if successfully exploited by terrorists could result
in a nuclear detonation. However, under the May 2003 DBT, DOE only
required these sites to defend against a relatively small group of
terrorists. Because we believed that DOE had not made a persuasive case
for defending against a lower number of terrorists, we recommended that
DOE reexamine how it applies the DBT to sites with improvised nuclear
device concerns. Subsequently, in May 2004, the Secretary of Energy
announced that the department would reexamine the DBT. Originally, this
reexamination was to be completed by June 30, 2004. However, according to
the Director of DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
this effort will not be completed until August 6, 2004. In addition, the
Director stated that the end result of this effort may only be a plan on
how to revise the DBT. Consequently, if the DBT is changed in a way that
increases security requirements, some ESE offices may have to revise their
implementation plans to reflect the need to provide for a more stringent
defense.

Third, in one case ESE does not have adequate resources. Specifically,
while ESE sites have developed implementation plans, even under the old
assumptions, the plan for one site was under funded. NE security officials
told us that for one site no DBT implementation funding had been requested
for fiscal year 2005, even though the site recognized that it needed to
substantially increase its protective forces to meet the new DBT.

Finally, ESE faces a number of complex organizational issues that could
make DBT implementation more difficult. Specifically:

o  	EM's Security Director told us that for EM to fully comply with the
DBT requirements in fiscal year 2006 at one of its sites, it will have to
close and de-inventory two facilities, consolidate excess materials into
remaining special nuclear materials facilities, and move consolidated
Category I special nuclear material, which the National Nuclear Security
Administration's Office of Secure Transportation will transport, to
another site. Likewise, the EM Security Director told us that to meet the
DBT requirements at another site, EM will have to accelerate the closure
of one facility and transfer special nuclear material to another facility
on the site. Because the costs to close these facilities and to move
materials within a site are borne by the EM program budget and not by the
EM safeguards and security budget, obtaining adequate funding could be
difficult.

o  	At an Office of Science site, a building that contains Category I
special nuclear material is managed and protected by the Office of
Science, while the material itself belongs to NE. NE is currently planning
to remove the material and process it. After processing, the material will
no longer have to meet the protection requirements for Category I special
nuclear material. Accomplishing this task will require additional security
measures, the planning and funding for which will have to be carefully
coordinated between the Office of Science and NE.

o  	NE sites face similar issues. For example, the NE Security Director
told us that EM currently owns all of the Category I special nuclear
material stored at an NE site. EM is currently planning to have the
National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Secure Transportation
transport this material to several other locations by the end of January
2005. According to the NE site Security Director, NE is counting on the
successful removal of this special nuclear material to meet the
department's fiscal year 2006 deadline for implementing the May 2003 DBT.
To implement the May 2003 DBT, NE also needs to consolidate two of its
sites into a single national laboratory, which will, among other things,
ensure that it has an adequate number of protective forces. If the EM
special nuclear materials are not moved and this consolidation is not
achieved, the number of protective forces at this site may not be
adequate.

Because of the importance of successfully integrating multiple program
activities with security requirements, we continue to believe, as we
recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs to develop and implement a
departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced implementation plan for meeting
the May 2003 DBT requirements that includes important

programmatic activities such as the closure of facilities and the
transportation of special nuclear materials.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

  GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

(360468)

For further information on this testimony, please contact Robin M. Nazzaro
at (202) 512-3841. James Noel and Jonathan Gill made key contributions to
this testimony. Don Cowan and Preston Heard also made contributions to
this testimony.

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