Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active  
Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems (13-NOV-03, GAO-04-89).
                                                                 
In light of the recent mobilizations associated with the war on  
terrorism and homeland security, GAO was asked to determine if	 
controls used to pay mobilized Army Guard personnel provided	 
assurance that such pays were accurate and timely. GAO's audit	 
used a case study approach to focus on controls over three key	 
areas: processes, people (human capital), and systems.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-89						        
    ACCNO:   A08855						        
  TITLE:     Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to 
Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems		 
     DATE:   11/13/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Erroneous payments 				 
	     Hazardous military-duty pay			 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Military compensation				 
	     Military pay					 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Mobilization					 
	     Strategic mobility forces				 
	     Timeliness 					 

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GAO-04-89

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 
on National Security, Emerging Threats, 
and International Relations, Committee 
on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives 
November 2003 MILITARY PAY 
Army National Guard 
Personnel Mobilized 
to Active Duty 
Experienced 
Significant Pay 
Problems
Contents
Tables
Figures 
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November 13, 2003 Leter 
The Honorable Christopher Shays 
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations 
Committee on Government Reform 
House of Representatives 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Army National 
Guard (Army Guard) mobilized and deployed soldiers in support of 
Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. When mobilized for up to 
2 years at a time, these Army Guard soldiers performed search and destroy 
missions against Taliban and al Qaeda members throughout Asia and 
Africa; fought on the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq; guarded al Qaeda 
prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; provided security at the 
Pentagon; and are now assisting in peace-keeping operations in Iraq. 
In 1993, we reported1 on millions of dollars of overpayments and other 
problems associated with payroll payments to Army military personnel 
during 1992 as soldiers returned from Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm. A significant factor contributing to the improper payments 
discovered as part of that audit was the large number of Army Guard 
personnel mobilized to active duty and paid from the Armyï¿½s active duty 
payroll system. Because many of the current missions, particularly those 
associated with the global war on terrorism, are expected to persist, Army 
Guard personnel are likely to continue to experience additional 
mobilizations. Given the critical roles these mobilized Army Guard soldiers 
play in carrying out vital military missions both in the United States and 
overseas, effective internal controls are needed not only to provide timely 
and accurate pay to these soldiers, but also to prevent any such problems 
from adversely affecting the Armyï¿½s ability to retain these valuable 
personnel. 
In light of the recent mobilizations and growing importance of the Army 
Guard in fighting the war on terrorism and providing domestic security, you 
asked us to determine if controls used to pay mobilized Army Guard personnel using the Armyï¿½s reserve pay system provided reasonable 
assurance that such payments were accurate and timely. 
Because our preliminary assessment determined that current operations 
used to pay mobilized Army Guard soldiers relied extensively on errorprone 
manual transactions entry into multiple, nonintegrated systems, we 
did not statistically test current processes and controls. Instead, we used a 
case study approach to provide more detailed perspective on the nature of 
pay deficiencies in the three key areas of processes, people (human 
capital), and systems. Specifically, we gathered available data and analyzed 
the pay experiences of Army Guard special forces and military police units 
mobilized to active duty in support of Operations Noble Eagle and 
Enduring Freedom during the period from October 2001 through March 
2003. (See apps. I-VI for detailed summaries of our six case study units.) 
Finally, you asked us to identify any evidence that pay problems were 
continuing with Army Guard personnel in more recently mobilized units 
deployed to support missions in Iraq. We conducted a limited review of the 
initial mobilization and deployment pay records of one unit currently 
participating in that operation. 
We performed our work from November 2002 through September 2003 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Further details on our scope and methodology are included in appendix 
VII. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of 
Defense or his designee. We received written comments from the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), which are reprinted in appendix VIII.
Results in Brief The existing processes and controls used to provide basic and special 
active duty pays to mobilized Army Guard personnel are so cumbersome 
and complex that the Army; the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS); and, most importantly, the mobilized Army Guard soldiers cannot 
be reasonably assured of timely and accurate payroll payments. 
Weaknesses in the current processes and controls resulted in a substantial 
number of over- and underpayments and late active duty payments2 to 
mobilized Army Guard personnel at our case study units. For example, 450 
of the 481 soldiers from our six case study units had at least one pay 
problem associated with their mobilization. These pay problems severely 
constrain the Armyï¿½s and the Department of Defenseï¿½s (DOD) ability to 
provide a most basic service to these personnel, many of whom were 
risking their lives in combat. In addition, resulting inaccurate, late, and, or 
missing pays, and associated erroneous debts also had a profound financial 
impact on individual soldiers and their families. Soldiers and their families 
were required to spend considerable time, sometimes while the soldiers 
were deployed in remote, combat environments overseas, continually 
addressing concerns over their pay and allowances. 
One of the primary causes for these pay problems is rooted in the complex, 
cumbersome processes used to pay soldiers from their initial mobilization 
through active duty deployment to demobilization. While not designed as 
such, these pay operations have evolved over time to the point that few, if 
any, in the department fully understand their breadth, scope, and inherent 
weaknesses. Army Guard pay process requirements, particularly in light of 
the potentially hundreds of organizations and estimated thousands of 
personnel involved, were not well understood or consistently applied with respect to determining (1) the actions required to pay mobilized Army 
Guard soldiers timely and accurately, and (2) the components responsible, 
among Army Guard, active Army, and DFAS, for taking the required 
actions. Further, we found several instances in which existing regulations 
were out of dateï¿½some of which still reflected practices in place in 1991 
during Operation Desert Storm. As a result, we found numerous errors in 
key pay transactions at our case study locations. 
For example, procedures relating to amending active duty orders were 
problematic. For the Colorado Special Forces unit, we found that actions 
taken by the Army Guard military pay officials in an attempt to amend 34 
soldiersï¿½ orders resulted in reversing the active duty pays and allowances 
the soldiers received for 11 of the 12 months they were deployed on active 
duty in Afghanistan. Instead, the system recorded these pays and 
allowances as debts. These 34 soldiers received notice on their Leave and 
Earnings Statements that they owed the government an average of $48,000 
per soldier, for a largely erroneous total debt of $1.6 million. In another 
case, after exhausting all in-theatre processes to initiate pays without 
success, a sergeant with an Army Guard unit stationed in Uzbekistan had to 
make a time-consuming trip to Kuwait and back in order to personally 
deliver pay information from his unit to a finance office that could process 
Army Guard data. The trip proved to be not only a major inconvenience 
but was also life threatening, as the sergeantï¿½s aircraft came under enemy 
fire during the course of his journey. 
With respect to human capital at our case study units, we found 
weaknesses, including (1) insufficient resources allocated to pay 
processing, (2) inadequate training related to existing policies and 
procedures, and (3) poor customer service. A sufficient number of welltrained 
military pay staff is particularly crucial given the extensive, 
cumbersome, and labor-intensive process requirements that have evolved 
to support active duty pay to Army Guard soldiers. During our work at the 
case study locations we audited, we identified instances in which military 
pay technicians with the Army Guard and active Army finance office 
locations made data coding errors when entering pay transactions into the 
pay systems. We were told that these errors occurred because military pay 
personnelï¿½particularly those at the active Army finance office locationsï¿½ 
were unfamiliar with the systemï¿½s pay processing requirements for active 
duty pays to mobilized Army Guard personnel. 
A related human capital issueï¿½customer support for active duty pay 
issuesï¿½was a recurring concern at our six case study locations. None of the DOD, Army, or Army Guard policies and procedures we examined 
addressed the level or quality of customer service that mobilized Army 
Guard soldiers should be provided for questions or problems with their 
active duty pays. For example, one soldier told us that he submitted 
documentation on three separate occasions to support the housing 
allowance he should have received as of the beginning of his October 2001 
mobilization. Each time he was told to resubmit the documentation 
because his previously submitted documents were lost. Subsequently, 
while he was deployed, he made additional repeated inquiries concerning 
when he would receive his housing allowance pay. He was told that it 
would be taken care of when he returned from his deployment. However, 
when he returned from his deployment, he was told that he should have 
taken care of this issue while he was deployed and that it was now too late 
to receive this allowance. 
Several systems issues were also a significant factor impeding accurate and 
timely payroll payments to mobilized Army Guard soldiers. The system 
relied on to pay mobilized Army Guard soldiersï¿½the Defense Joint Military 
Pay System-Reserve Component (DJMS-RC)ï¿½was originally designed to 
process payroll payments to Army Reserve and Army Guard personnel on 
weekend drills, on short periods of annual active duty (periods of less than 
30 days in duration), or for training. With Army Guard personnel now being 
paid from DJMS-RC for extended periods of active duty (as long as 2 years 
at a time), DFAS officials told us that the system is now stretched to the 
limits of its functionality. DFAS has established ï¿½workaroundsï¿½ to 
compensate for the DJMS-RC system constraints. Overall, we found the 
current stove-piped, nonintegrated systems were labor-intensive and 
require extensive error-prone manual data entry and reentry. As a result, it 
was often difficult to ensure that mobilized soldiers received only and all 
the pays and allowances to which they were entitled, as illustrated in 
appendixes I-VI by our six case studies. While DOD has plans to implement 
system improvements in this area, it is likely that the department will be 
required to operate within existing system constraints for at least several 
more years. 
Finally, our limited review of pays to one more recently activated Army 
Guard military police unit deployed to Iraq in April 2003 to provide military 
convoy security and carry out highway patrols indicated that some of the 
same types of pay problems that we found in our six case study units 
continued to occur. Of the 152 soldiers mobilized in this unit, we identified 
54 soldiers who were either overpaid, underpaid, received entitled active 
duty pays and allowances over 30 days late, or for whom erroneous pay-
related debts were created. We found that these pay problems could be 
attributed to control breakdowns similar to those we found at our case 
study units, including input errors related to amended orders, delays and 
errors in coding pay and allowance transactions, and slow or nonexistent 
customer service response. 
We are making a series of recommendations to address the Army Guard 
active duty pay weaknesses we identified in the areas of process, human 
capital, and systems. While DOD should take a number of immediate 
actions to address these problems, we are also recommending that DOD 
ensure that its longer-term reengineering and system improvement efforts 
in this area include complete and lasting solutions to the weaknesses 
identified. In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our 
recommendations and outlined its actions to address the deficiencies noted 
in our report. 
Background The Army Guard is the oldest component of any of the uniformed services. 
It traces its roots to the colonial militia, and claims a ï¿½birthï¿½of 1636. Today, 
the Army Guard exists in 54 locations that include all 50 states, the District 
of Columbia, and three territories: Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto 
Rico. There are about 2,300 Army Guard units within these locations and 
over 350,000 Army Guard members. During peacetime, Army Guard units 
report to the adjutant generals of their states or territories, or in the case of 
the District of Columbia, to the Commanding General. Each adjutant 
general reports to the governor of the state, or in the case of the District of 
Columbia, the mayor. 
At the state level, the governors have the ability, under the Constitution of 
the United States, to call up members of the Army Guard in times of 
domestic emergency or need. The Army Guardï¿½s state mission is perhaps 
the most visible and well known. Army Guard units battle fires or help 
communities deal with floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, snowstorms, or other 
emergency situations. In times of civil unrest, the citizens of a state rely on 
the Army Guard to respond, if needed. During national emergencies, 
however, the President has the authority to mobilize the Army Guard, 
putting them in federal duty status. While federalized, the units answer to 
the Combatant Commander of the theatre in which they are operating and, 
ultimately, to the President. Even when not federalized, the Army Guard 
has a federal mission to maintain properly trained and equipped units, 
available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency, or as 
otherwise needed. Nonfederalized Army Guard membersï¿½ pay and allowances are paid with state funds while federalized Army Guard 
membersï¿½ pay and allowances are paid with federal funds. 
Typically, Army Guard members enlist for 8 years and are entitled to a 
number of benefits while serving in the Army Guard, including those for 
health care, life insurance, and other state-specific benefits. After their 
enlistment periods, former Army Guard members are entitled to veteransï¿½ 
benefits, such as veteransï¿½ health care and burial benefits. 
Army Guard members are required to attend one drill weekend each month 
and one annual training period (usually 2 weeks in the summer) each year. 
Initially, all nonprior service personnel are required to attend initial entry 
training, also known as Basic Training. After Basic Training, soldiers go to 
their Advanced Individual Training, which teaches them the special skills 
they will need for their jobs in the Army Guard. This training can usually be 
scheduled to accommodate civilian job or school constraints. The Army 
Guard has armories and training facilities in more than 2,800 communities. 
The Army Guard is a partner with the active Army and the Army Reserves 
in fulfilling the country's military needs. The National Guard Bureau 
(NGB) assists the Army Guard in this partnership. NGB is a joint bureau of 
the Departments of the Army and the Air Force and is charged with 
overseeing the federal functions of the Army Guard and the Air Guard. In 
this capacity, NGB helps the Army Guard and the Air Guard procure 
funding and administer policies. NGB also acts as a liaison between the 
Departments of the Army and Air Force and the states. 
All Army forces are integrated under DODï¿½s ï¿½total forceï¿½ concept. DODï¿½s 
total force concept is based on the premise that it is not practically feasible 
to maintain active duty forces sufficient to meet all possible war 
contingencies. Under this concept, DODï¿½s active and reserve components 
are to be blended into a cohesive total force to meet a given mission. On September 14, 2001, the President declared a national emergency as a 
result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United 
States. Concurrent with this declaration, the President authorized the 
Secretary of Defense to call troops to active duty pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 
Section 12302. The Secretary of Defense delegated to the Secretary of the 
Army the authority to order Army Guard soldiers to active duty as part of 
the overall mobilization effort. Approximately 93,000 Army Guard soldiers 
were activated as of March 2003. At that time, Army Guard soldiers 
accounted for 34 percent of the total reserve components3 mobilized in 
response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 
The active duty federal missions established in response to the September 
2001 national emergency were categorized into two operations: Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. In general, missions to 
fight terrorism outside the United States were categorized under Operation 
Enduring Freedom, while missions to provide domestic defense were 
categorized as Operation Noble Eagle. For example, Army Guard soldiers 
participated in direct combat in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring 
Freedom. U.S. homeland security missions, such as guarding the Pentagon, 
airports, nuclear power plants, domestic water supplies, bridges, tunnels, 
and other military assets were conducted under Operation Noble Eagle. 
The Army Guard also supported federal peacekeeping operations in 
Southwest Asia with Operation Desert Spring and in Kosovo with 
Operation Joint Guardian under various other military operations.
While on active duty, all Army Guard soldiers earn various statutorily 
authorized pays and allowances. The types of pay and allowances Army 
Guard soldiers are eligible to receive vary depending upon rank and length 
of service, dependency status, skills and certifications acquired, duty 
location, and the difficulty of the assignment. While Army Guard soldiers 
mobilized to active duty may be entitled to receive additional pays and 
allowances, we focused on 14 basic types of pays and allowances 
applicable to the Army Guard units we selected for case studies. As shown 
in table 1, we categorized these 14 pay and allowance types into two 
groups: (1) pays, including basic pay, special duty assignment pay, 
parachute jumping and foreign language proficiency skill-based pays, and 
location-based hostile fire and hardship duty pays and (2) allowances, 
including allowances for housing, subsistence, family separation, and cost 
of living for the continental United States.4 
Table 
1: Basic Pays and Allowances Associated with Case Study Units 
Pays Description Dollar amount 
Basic pay Salary Varies depending on rank and 
years of service 
Hazardous duty pay - 
jump pay 
Pay for parachute jumping $150 per month 
Hazardous duty pay ï¿½ 
jump pay - high altitude 
low opening pay 
Pay for parachute jumping at 
high altitude without use of a 
static line 
$225 per month 
Special duty assignment 
pay 
Pay to enlisted soldiers 
performing duties that are 
particularly difficult or 
requiring an unusual degree 
of responsibility 
Varies from $55 to $375 per 
month
Foreign language 
proficiency pay 
Pay for specialized foreign 
language skills 
Varies depending on 
proficiency but may not 
exceed $300 per month 
Diving duty pay Pay for diving duty or the 
requirement to maintain 
proficiency as a diver 
Varies according to service 
branch and proficiency but 
may not exceed $240 per 
month for officers and $340 
per month for enlisted 
members 
Hardship duty location 
pay for designated areas 
Pay when assigned to duty in 
specified locations 
$50, $100, or $150 per month 
(depending on duty location) 
Hardship duty location 
pay for certain places 
(phase out began on 
January 1, 2002) 
Pay to enlisted soldiers when 
assigned to duty in specified 
locations 
Varies from $8 to $22.50 per 
month depending on rank 
Hostile fire/imminent 
danger pay 
Full pay for any portion of 
month assigned to a location 
subject to or in close proximity 
to hostile fire or assigned to 
duty in a designated imminent 
danger location 
$150 per month through 
September 30, 2002; $225 
per month effective October 
1, 2002 though September 
30, 2003 
Allowances 
Basic allowance for 
housing 
Meant to offset the cost of 
housing when member does 
not receive governmentprovided 
housing 
Varies depending on location, 
rank, and whether member 
has dependents 
Cost of living allowance in 
the continental United 
States 
Meant to provide 
compensation for variations in 
costs (other than housing) in 
the continental United States 
Varies depending on location, 
rank, years of service, and 
whether member has 
dependents 
Basic allowance for 
subsistence 
Meant to offset costs for a 
memberï¿½s meals 
Varies depending on whether 
member is officer or enlisted 
Family separation 
allowance I 
Meant to offset added housing 
expenses resulting from 
forced separation from 
dependents 
Equivalent to monthly basic 
allowance for housing for 
member of same rank without 
dependents 
Family separation 
ï¿½allowance II 
Meant to offset certain 
expenses resulting from 
forced separation from 
dependents 
$100 per month from January 
1, 1998, through September 
30, 2002; $250 per month 
effective October 1, 2002, 
through September 30, 2003 
Source: GAO analysis. 
In addition, Army Guard soldiers may be eligible for tax advantages 
associated with their mobilization to active duty. That is, mobilized Army 
Guard soldiers assigned to or working in a combat zone are entitled to exclude from taxable income certain military pay that would otherwise be 
taxable.5 
As shown in figure 1, there are three key phases associated with starting 
and stopping relevant pays and allowances for mobilized Army Guard 
soldiers: (1) initial mobilization (primarily through the Soldier Readiness 
Processing), (2) deployment, which includes carrying out assigned mission 
operations while on active duty, and (3) demobilization. 
Figure 
1: Three Key Phases for Active Duty Pays to Army Guard Soldiers 
Mobilization Deployed Demobilization 
ï¿½ Pays soldiers 
ï¿½ Issues Leave and Earnings Statements 
and wage garnishments 
Performs 
active duty 
mission 
Leaves 
active army 
duty station 
Return to 
Army Guard 
home station 
Receive Release 
from Active 
Duty Orders 
Arrives at 
active Army 
duty station 
Arrives at 
active Army 
demobilization 
station 
DFAS 
Source: GAO. 
Receive Mobilization 
Orders and review 
pay records as part 
of Soldier Readiness 
Processing (SRP) at 
Army Guard home 
station 
2nd pay record 
review done as part 
of SRP at active 
Army mobilization 
station 
Army Guard units and state-level command support components, as well as 
active Army finance components and DFAS, have key roles in this process. 
In addition, there are five key computer systems involved in authorizing, entering, and processing active duty pays to mobilized Army Guard soldiers 
through the three key phases of their mobilization: 
ï¿½ Armyï¿½s standard order writing system, Automated Fund Control Order 
System (AFCOS); 
ï¿½ Army Guardï¿½s personnel system, Standard Installation Division 
Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS); 
ï¿½ Army Guardï¿½s pay input system, JUMPS Standard Terminal Input System 
(JUSTIS); 
ï¿½ active Armyï¿½s pay input system, Defense Military Pay Office System 
(DMO); and 
ï¿½ DFASï¿½ Army Guard and Reserve pay system, DJMS-RC. 
Initial Mobilization Phase During the initial mobilization, units receive an alert order and begin a 
mobilization preparation program, Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP). 
The financial portion of the SRP is conducted by one of the 54 United 
States Property and Fiscal Offices (USPFO) to verify the accuracy of pay 
records for each soldier and to make changes to pay records based on 
appropriate supporting documentation for the pays and allowances that the 
soldiers will be entitled to receive when initially mobilized. If 
documentation, such as birth certificates for dependents or parachute 
jumping certifications, is missing, soldiers have a few days to obtain the 
necessary documents. The unit commander is responsible for ensuring that 
all personnel data for each soldier under their command are current. 
When the unit receives a mobilization order, USPFO pay technicians are 
responsible for initiating basic pay and allowances by manually entering 
the start and stop dates into DJMS-RC6 for the active duty tour that appears 
on each soldierï¿½s mobilization order. Army Guard pay technicians use 
JUSTIS to access and record data in DJMS-RC. By entering the soldierï¿½s 
Social Security number and mobilization order number into JUSTIS, the 
pay technician can view the pay data in DJMS-RC, ensure that they are complete, and enter any missing data supported by documentation 
provided by the soldier. If done correctly, soldiers will start to receive 
basic pay, basic allowances for housing, basic allowances for subsistence, 
and jump pay automatically based on the start date entered into DJMS-RC. 
After soldiers complete their initial SRP and receive individual mobilization 
orders, they travel as a unit to a mobilization station. At the mobilization 
station, mobilized Army Guard personnel undergo a second SRP review. In 
this second SRP, mobilization station personnel are responsible for 
confirming or correcting the results of the first SRP, including making 
necessary reviews to ensure that each soldierï¿½s records are current. 
Mobilization pay technicians are required to promptly initiate pays that 
were not initiated during the first SRP and enter appropriate pay changes 
into DJMS-RC. The mobilization station commander is required to certify 
that the unit is ready for mobilization, including ensuring that all authorized 
active duty pays are in place for the soldiers in the unit, at the end of this 
process. 
DJMS-RC will generate certain pays and allowances automatically for each 
2-week pay period until the stop date entered in DJMS-RC. If entered 
correctly, the stop date in DJMS-RC will be the end of active duty tour date 
documented on the soldierï¿½s mobilization orders. This automated feature is 
intended to prevent erroneous payments to soldiers beyond their 
authorized active duty status. However, human intervention is required 
when a pay or allowance error is detected or an event occurs that requires 
a change in the soldierï¿½s pay and personnel file. For example, a change in 
dependent status, such as marriage or divorce, a promotion, jump pay 
disqualification, or being demobilized before an active duty tour ends 
would change or eliminate some of the pays and allowances a soldier 
would be entitled to receive. All pays and allowances and subsequent 
changes are documented in the Master Military Pay Account (MMPA)ï¿½the 
central pay record repository in DJMS-RC for each soldier. 
Deployed Phase While deployed on active duty, there are several Army Guard (USPFO), 
active Army, and DFAS components involved in paying mobilized Army 
Guard personnel. The active Army servicing finance office, which may be 
within the United States or in a foreign country, is responsible for initiating 
pays earned while the soldier is deployed, such as hostile fire pay and 
hardship duty pay. Pay technicians start hostile fire pay for each soldier 
listed on a battle roster or flight manifest. Thereafter, hostile fire pay is 
automatically generated each pay period. Other location-based pays, such as hardship duty, require pay transactions each month. The servicing 
finance office for the deployed phase is under the jurisdiction of the active 
Army. Active Army servicing finance offices use DMO to enter pay 
transactions into DJMS-RC. Under certain conditions, either active Army 
pay servicing offices or USPFOs can process applicable pay-altering 
transactions, such as those related to a soldierï¿½s early separation from 
active duty or a soldierï¿½s death. 
Demobilization Phase Upon completion of an active duty tour, soldiers normally return to the 
same Army locations from which they were mobilized for demobilization 
out-processing before returning to their home units. Demobilization 
personnel, employed by the active Army or Army Guard, are required to 
provide each soldier with a Release from Active Duty (REFRAD) order and 
a Form DD 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty. The 
demobilization station pay technicians are to use these documents as a 
basis for deactivating the soldierï¿½s active duty pay and allowances as of the 
date of release from active duty. At this time, the supporting USPFO is 
responsible for discontinuing monthly input of all nonautomated pays and 
allowances. If the demobilization station did not take action to return a 
soldier to a demobilized status, the state USPFO has this responsibility. 
Military Pay Systems 
Environment 
In 1995, the Army decided to process pays to mobilized Army Guard 
soldiers from the DJMS-RC system rather than the active Army payroll 
system used to pay mobilized Army Guard soldiers previously. According 
to the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations), 
this decision was made as an interim measure (pending the conversion to a 
single system to pay both active and reserve component soldiers) based on 
the belief that DJMS-RC provides the best service to the reserve component 
soldiers. DJMS-RC is a large, complex, and sensitive payroll computer 
application used to pay Army and Air National Guard and Army and Air 
Force Reserve personnel. DFAS has primary responsibility for developing 
guidance and managing operations of the system. DFAS Indianapolis is the 
central site for all Army military pay and is responsible for maintaining over 
1 million MMPAs for the Army. Each MMPA contains a soldierï¿½s pay-related 
personnel, entitlement, and performance data. All pay-related transactions 
that are entered into DJMS-RC, through JUSTIS and DMO, update the 
MMPA. Personnel data contained in the MMPA are generated from 
SIDPERSï¿½a personnel database maintained and used by the Army Guard 
at the 54 state-level personnel offices to capture data on personnel-related actions (e.g. discharge, promotion, demotion actions that impact soldiersï¿½ 
pay). 
DFAS Denver is responsible for designing, developing, and maintaining 
customer requirements for the Military and Civilian Pay Services business 
line, and its Technical Support Office designs and maintains the DJMS-RC 
core pay software. DFAS-Indianapolis serves as a ï¿½gatekeeperï¿½ in that it 
monitors the daily status of data uploaded to DJMS-RC to ensure that all 
transactions are received and processed in DJMS-RC. Users can sign on to 
DJMS-RC directly through online interactive software used for file transfer 
transactions, online queries of MMPAs, and downloads of data files and 
various DJMS-RC reports. 
JUSTIS is the pay input subsystem used by the 54 state-level Army Guard 
commands, including the USPFOs, to update DJMS-RC. Database 
management of JUSTIS is decentralized in that each of the 54 sites owns 
and maintains its own JUSTIS database. This subsystem processes 
transactions for submission to DJMS-RC to create payments for Army 
National Guard soldiers. JUSTIS receives certain pay-affecting personnel 
data from SIDPERS. 
JUSTIS receives a limited amount of mobilization order data directly from 
AFCOS. These systems share the same operating system platform and 
certain database tables. However, additional data needed to create pay 
transactions associated with active duty pay and allowances must be 
entered manually into JUSTIS from hard copies of mobilization orders. 
DMO is the pay input subsystem used by active Army finance offices and 
the DOD military pay offices, including those in overseas locations such as 
Europe, Korea, and Iraq, to update DJMS-RC. This pay input subsystem 
can be used by active Army finance offices to create transactions for 
military pay and allowances that are not reported at the time of 
mobilization for upload to DJMS-RC and for active Army finance offices to 
use to enter location-based pays, such as hostile fire and hardship duty 
pays and combat zone tax exclusion transactions. 
Case Studies Illustrate 
Significant Pay 
Problems 
We found significant pay problems at the six Army Guard units we audited. 
These problems related to processes, human capital, and systems. The six 
units we audited, including three special forces and three military police 
units, were as follows: 
Special forces units
ï¿½ Colorado B Company, 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces 
ï¿½ Virginia B Company, 3rd Battalion, 20th Special Forces 
ï¿½ West Virginia C Company, 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces 
Military police units 
ï¿½ Mississippi 114th Military Police Company 
ï¿½ California 49th Military Police Headquarters and Headquarters 
Detachment 
ï¿½ Maryland 200th Military Police Company 
In addition, we conducted a limited review of the pay experiences of a 
seventh unit mobilized more recently and deployed to Iraq in April 2003ï¿½ 
the Colorado Army Guardï¿½s 220th Military Police Companyï¿½to determine 
the extent to which the pay problems we found in our six case study units 
persisted. As shown in figure 2, these units were deployed to various 
locations in the United States and overseas in support of Operations Noble 
Eagle and Enduring Freedom.
Figure 
2: Units and Deployment Location 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6
7 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 
Mississippi, 114th Military Police Company - deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
Deployments 
California, 49th Military Police Detachment - deployed to Fort Lewis, Washington 
Virginia, 20th Special Forces, 3rd Battalion, B Company - deployed to Afghanistan 
Maryland, 200th Military Police Company - deployed to Pentagon, Virginia 
Colorado, 19th Special Forces, 5th Battalion, B Company - deployed to Afghanistan 
West Virginia, 19th Special Forces, 2nd Battalion, C Company - deployed to Afghanistan 
Colorado, 220th Military Police Company - deployed to Iraq 
Source: GAO. 
s 
These units were deployed to help perform a variety of critical mission 
operations, including search and destroy missions in Afghanistan against 
Taliban and al Qaeda forces, guard duty for al Qaeda prisoners in Cuba, 
providing security at the Pentagon shortly after the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks, and military convoy security and highway patrols in Iraq. For the six units we audited, we found significant pay problems involving 
over one million dollars in errors. These problems consisted of 
underpayments, overpayments, and late payments that occurred during all 
three phases of Army Guard mobilization to active duty. Overall, for the 18- 
month period from October 1, 2001, through March 31, 2003, we identified 
overpayments,7 underpayments, and late payments at the six case study 
units estimated at $691,000, $67,000, and $245,000, respectively. In 
addition, for one unit, these pay problems resulted in largely erroneous 
debts totaling $1.6 million. Overall, we found that 450 of the 481 soldiers 
from our case study units had at least one pay problem associated with 
their mobilization to active duty. Table 2 shows the number of soldiers 
with at least one pay problem during each of the three phases of active duty 
mobilization. 
Table 
2: Pay Problems at Six Case Study Units 
Army Guard unit 
Soldiers with pay problems 
Mobilization Deployment Demobilization 
Colorado Special Forces 56 of 62 61 of 62 53 of 62 
Virginia Special Forces 31 of 65 63 of 65 60 of 65 
West Virginia Special Forces 36 of 94 84 of 94 66 of 94 
California Military Police 48 of 51 41 of 51 0 of 51 
Maryland Military Police 75 of 90 64 of 90 3 of 90 
Mississippi Military Police 21 of 119 93 of 119 90 of 119
Due to the lack of supporting documents at the state, unit, and battalion 
levels, we may not have identified all of the pay problems related to the 
active duty mobilizations of these units. We have provided documentation 
for the pay problems we identified to appropriate DOD officials for further 
research to determine whether additional amounts are owed to the 
government or the soldiers. The payment problems we identified at the six 
case study units did not include instances of fraudulent payments, which 
were a major finding resulting from the further investigation of improper 
payments found in our 1993 audit of Army military payroll.8 Nonetheless, 
we found the inaccurate, late, and missing pays and associated erroneous 
debts found during our current audit had a profound financial impact on 
individual soldiers and their families. Some of the pay problems we 
identified included the following. 
ï¿½ DOD erroneously billed 34 soldiers in a Colorado National Guard 
Special Forces unit an average of $48,000 each. Though we first notified 
DOD of these issues in April and sent a follow-up letter in June 2003, the 
largely erroneous total debt for these soldiers of about $1.6 million 
remained unresolved at the end of our audit in September 2003. 
ï¿½ As a result of confusion over responsibility for entering transactions 
associated with a Colorado soldierï¿½s promotion, the soldierï¿½s spouse had 
to obtain a grant from the Colorado National Guard to pay bills while 
her husband was in Afghanistan. 
ï¿½ Some soldiers did not receive payments for up to 6 months after 
mobilization and others still had not received certain payments by the 
conclusion of our audit work. 
ï¿½ Ninety-one of 100 members of a Mississippi National Guard military 
police unit that was deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, did not receive 
the correct amount of Hardship Duty Pay.
ï¿½ One soldier from the Mississippi unit was paid $9,400 in active duty pay 
during the 3 months following an early discharge for drug-related 
charges. 
ï¿½ Forty-eight of 51 soldiers in a California National Guard military police 
unit received late payments because the unit armory did not have a copy 
machine available to make copies of needed pay-related documents. 
ï¿½ Four Virginia Special Forces soldiers who were injured in Afghanistan 
and unable to resume their civilian jobs experienced problems in 
receiving entitled active duty pays and related health care. 
In some cases, the problems we identified may have distracted these 
professional soldiers from mission requirements, as they spent 
considerable time and effort while deployed attempting to address these 
issues. Further, these problems may adversely affect the Armyï¿½s ability to 
retain these valuable personnel. Appendixes Iï¿½VI provide details of the pay 
experiences of the soldiers at the case study units we audited. 
Significant Weaknesses 
in Processes over 
Mobilized Army Guard 
Pay 
Procedural requirements, particularly in light of the potentially hundreds of 
organizations and thousands of personnel involved, were not well 
understood or consistently applied with respect to determining (1) the 
actions required to make timely, accurate active duty pays to mobilized 
Army Guard soldiers and (2) the component responsible, among Army 
Guard, active Army, and DFAS, for taking the required actions. Further, we 
found instances in which existing guidance was out of dateï¿½some of 
which still reflected practices in place in 1991 during Operation Desert 
Storm. These complex, cumbersome processes, which were developed in 
piecemeal fashion over a number of years, provide numerous opportunities 
for control breakdowns. We found that a substantial number of payment 
errors were caused, at least in part, by unclear procedural requirements for 
processing active duty pay and allowance entitlements to mobilized Army 
Guard soldiers. 
Complex, Cumbersome, and 
Evolving Processes 
Overall, as shown in figures 3, 4 and 5, we found that an extensive, 
cumbersome, and labor-intensive process has evolved to pay mobilized 
Army Guard soldiers for their active duty service. Figure 
3: Initial Mobilization Phase Process 
Process for initiating 
active duty pay when 
first mobilized 
Process for stopping 
active duty pay when 
demobilized 
Process for pay changes 
while deployed 
1 2 3 
See 
part 
2
to 
duty 
station 
Personnel clerks update pay 
impacting soldier data in 
SIDPERS for mobilized 
soldiers. 
Payroll clerks review 
supporting documentation, 
pass system edit checks, 
and input payroll start and 
stop date for automated 
active duty pay and 
allowances into JUSTIS. 
2nd SRP pay transactions 
entered into DMO after 
review and edit checks. 
Mobilization 
orders 
Mobilization 
orders 
Mobilization 
orders 
Home unit 
Soldiers under state control 
receive federal active duty 
mobilization orders, and their 
active duty pay support 
documentation is validated as 
part of the Soldier Readiness 
Processing (SRP). 
Mobilization station 
2nd SRP opportunity to 
update/correct active duty 
pay support based on 
mobilization orders. 
Monthly data 
reconciliation 
Start active duty 
pay transactions 
monthly listing 
of soldiers paid 
for active duty 
Monthly Unit 
Commander Pay 
Management 
Report 
Start pay transactions 
updated/corrected into 
DJMS-RC. 
Process pay transactions 
entered into DJMS-RC. Up 
to 8 to 10 active duty payroll 
payments to soldiers each 
month. 
1 
Unit 
Commander 
Monthly personnel 
on-board vs. paid 
reconciliation 
Army Guard - State Personnel 
Office 
Army Guard - State U.S. 
Property and Fiscal Office 
(USPFO) 
DFAS - IN 
Active Army - Mobilization 
Station DMPO or 
Army Finance Office 
Army Order 
Writing System 
AFCOS 
Pay and allowances, wage garnishment 
and LESs to soldiers Source: GAO.
Figure 
4: Deployed Phase Process
Figure 
5: Demobilization Phase Process 
Process for initiating 
active duty pay when 
first mobilized 
Process for stopping 
active duty pay when 
demobilized 
Process for pay changes 
while deployed 
1 2 3 
From 
part 
2 
from 
duty 
station 
Home unit 
Soldiers return to home 
station and state control. 
Demobilization station 
Receive Release from Active 
Duty Order (REFRAD) and 
Certificate of Release or 
Discharge from Active Duty 
(Form DD 214). 
Transactions pass review of 
documentation and system 
edit checks to stop active 
duty pay through JUSTIS. 
Stop pay transactions entered 
into DJMS-RC 
Soldier is removed from 
active duty status in 
SIDPERS. 
Transactions pass review of 
documentation and system 
edit checks to stop active 
duty pay through DMO. 
Monthly 
data 
reconciliation 
Process pay transactions 
entered into DJMS-RC. 
monthly listing 
of soldiers paid 
for active duty 
Stop pay 
transactions 
Debt 
assessed and 
wage 
garnishment 
to soldier for any 
overpayments 
4 
Monthly personnel 
on-board vs. paid 
reconciliation 
Unit 
Commander 
Monthly Unit 
Commander Pay 
Management 
Report 
Active Army - Demobilization 
Station DMPO or 
Army Finance Office 
Army Guard - State Personnel 
Office 
Army Guard - State U.S. 
Property and Fiscal Office 
(USPFO) 
DFAS - IN 
REFRAD, 
revoked, or 
amended order 
Army Order 
Writing System 
AFCOS 
Pay and allowances, wage garnishment 
and LESs to soldiers 
Source: GAO.
While figures 3, 4 and 5 provide an overview of the process, particularly of 
the types of DOD organizations involved, they do not fully capture the 
numbers of different DOD components involved. Specifically, thousands of 
Army Guard (individual units and state-level organizations), active Army, 
and DFAS components may be involved in authorizing, processing, and 
paying mobilized Army Guard soldiers, including 
ï¿½ an estimated 2,300 local Army Guard home units, unit commanders, and 
unit administrators that are involved in maintaining up-to-date soldier 
personnel and related pay records; 
ï¿½ 54 state-level Army Guard commands, including both USPFOs and statelevel 
personnel offices involved in authorizing and starting active duty 
pay transactions; 
ï¿½ active Army finance offices or DOD Military Pay Offices at over 15 
mobilization stations across the United States that are involved in 
processing Army Guard personnel to and from their active duty 
locations; 
ï¿½ 28 active Army area servicing finance offices at over 50 locations 
worldwide that are involved in servicing Army Guard soldiersï¿½ locationbased 
active duty pays; 
ï¿½ DFAS-Indianapolisï¿½the central site for processing Army Guard 
soldiersï¿½ active duty pays; 
ï¿½ DFAS-Denverï¿½the central site for maintaining the pay system used to 
pay Army Guard soldiers; 
ï¿½ DFAS-Clevelandï¿½the central site for handling soldier military pay 
inquiries; and 
ï¿½ The Army National Guard Financial Services Centerï¿½the Army Guard 
organization responsible for providing guidance, training, and oversight 
and coordination for active duty pays to Army Guard personnel. 
Several of these organizations with key roles in payroll payments to 
mobilized Army Guard soldiers, including DOD, DFAS, Army, and the Army 
Guard, have issued their own implementing regulations, policies, and 
procedures. In addition, we found unwritten practices in place at some of 
the case study locations we audited. Existing written policies and procedures are voluminousï¿½the DOD Financial Management Regulations 
(FMR) guidance on pay and allowance entitlements alone covers 65 
chapters. As a result of their size and continually evolving nature as legal, 
procedural, and system requirements change, we found that policies and 
procedures were not well understood or consistently applied across the 
potentially hundreds of organizations and thousands of personnel involved 
in paying mobilized Army Guard personnel. These processes have been 
developed in piecemeal fashion over a number of years to accommodate 
changing legislative requirements, DOD policies, and the unique operating 
practices of different DOD organizations and systems involved in these 
processes. 
As discussed in the following sections, these extensive and evolving 
policies and procedures were confusing both across various organizations 
and personnel involved in their implementation and, more importantly, to 
the Army Guard soldiers who are the intended beneficiaries. In addition, 
these cumbersome policies and procedures contributed to the pay errors 
we identified. 
Procedural Requirements 
Not Clear 
We found instances in which unclear procedural requirements for 
processing active duty pays contributed to erroneous and late pays and 
allowances to mobilized Army Guard soldiers. For example, we found 
existing policies and procedural guidance were unclear with respect to the 
following issues. 
Amending active duty orders. A significant problem we found at the 
case study locations we audited concerned procedures that should be 
followed for amending active duty orders. We found instances at two of 
our case study locations in which military pay technicians at either a 
USPFO or an active Army finance office made errors in amending existing 
orders. These errors resulted in establishing virtually all prior pays made 
under the original orders as debts. A major contributor to the pay errors 
we found in this area was that existing procedures did not clearly state how 
USPFO and active Army finance personnel should modify existing order 
tour start and stop information in the pay system when necessary without 
also unintentionally adversely affecting previous pays and allowances. 
Also, these procedures did not warn USPFO and active Army personnel 
that using alternative methods will automatically result in an erroneous 
debt assessment and garnishment of up to two-thirds of the soldierï¿½s pay.
We identified over $1 million in largely erroneous debt transactions as a 
result of breakdowns in this area. At the Colorado Special Forces unit, we 
found that actions taken by the Colorado USPFO in an attempt to amend 34 
soldiersï¿½ orders resulted in reversing the active pay and allowances the 
soldiers received for 11 of the 12 months they were deployed on active duty 
in Afghanistan and instead establishing these payments as debts. These 34 
soldiers received notice on their Leave and Earnings Statements that they 
owed the government an average of approximately $48,000 per soldier, for 
a total largely erroneous debt of $1.6 million. Although we informed DOD 
of this problem in April 2003, as of the end of our audit fieldwork in 
September 2003, the problems at the Colorado Special Forces unit had not 
been resolved. DOD officials did advise us that, as a result of our work, 
they implemented a software change on September 18, 2003, intended to 
help avoid such problems in the future. Specifically, we were told new 
warning messages have been added to JUSTIS that will appear when a 
transaction is entered to cancel or amend a tour of duty. The new warnings 
will advise that the transaction will or could result in a collection action 
and will ask the pay technician to confirm that is their intent. While we did 
not verify the effectiveness of this change, it has the potential to reduce pay 
problems associated with errors made in amending orders. 
Required time frames for processing pay transactions. Written 
requirements did not exist with respect to the maximum amount of time 
that should elapse between the receipt by the responsible Army Guard or 
Army pay office of proper documentation and processing the related pay 
transaction through the pay system. While some of the locations we 
audited had established informal processing targets, for example, 3 days, 
we also found numerous instances in which available documentation 
indicated lengthy delays in processing pay transactions after pay offices 
received supporting documentation. These lengthy processing delays 
resulted in late payroll payments to deployed soldiers. 
Required monthly reconciliations of pay and personnel data. The 
case study units lacked specific written requirements for conducting and 
documenting monthly reconciliations of pay and personnel mismatch 
reports and unit commandersï¿½ finance reports. Available documentation 
showed that these controls were either not done or were not done 
consistently or timely. Because, as discussed later in this report, the 
processing of Army Guard pay relies on systems that are not integrated or 
effectively interfaced, these after-the-fact detective controls are critical to 
detecting and correcting erroneous or fraudulent pays. To be effective, the 54 state-level Army Guard commands must individually 
reconcile common data elements in all 54 state-operated personnel 
databases for Army Guard personnel with corresponding DJMS-RC pay 
records at least monthly. Because of the lack of clarity in existing 
procedural requirements in this area, we found that several of the locations 
we visited had established standard but undocumented reconciliation 
practices. However, at the six case study locations we audited, we found 
that although all the USPFOs told us they received monthly SIDPERS and 
DJMS-RC mismatch reports, they did not always fully reconcile and make 
all necessary system corrections each month. Lacking specific written 
policies and procedural requirements for such reconciliations, several of 
the case study locations we audited established a standard, but 
undocumented, practice of reconciling roughly a third of the common data 
elements every month, so that all elements were to be reconciled and all 
necessary corrective actions taken over a 3-month period. However, 
documentation was not always retained to determine the extent to which 
these reconciliations were done and if they were done consistently. 
Our findings are similar to those in reports from Army Guard operational 
reviews. For example, the results of the most recent reviews at three of the 
six case study locations we audited showed that state Army Guard 
personnel were not performing effective reconciliations of pay and 
personnel record discrepancies each month. One such report9 concluded, 
ï¿½Failure to reconcile the Personnel/Pay Mismatch listing monthly provides 
a perfect opportunity to establish fraudulent personnel or pay accounts.ï¿½ 
Several of the instances we identified in which soldiers received pay and 
allowances for many months after their release from active duty likely 
would have been identified sooner had USPFO military pay personnel 
investigated the personnel/pay mismatch report discrepancies more 
frequently. For example, at one case study unit, 34 soldiers received pay 
for several months past their official discharge dates. Although records 
were not available to confirm that these overpayments were reported as 
discrepancies on monthly mismatch reports, the USPFO military pay 
supervisor told us that at the time the mismatch reports were not being 
used to identify and correct pay-affecting errors. As discussed later, at another case study unit, a mobilized soldier was 
released from active duty and discharged from the Army in June 2002, 
earlier than his planned release date due to alleged involvement in drugrelated 
activities. But, the soldier continuied to receive active duty pay. The 
soldierï¿½s SIDPERS personnel record on July 2, 2002, to reflect the 
discharge. According to pay records, the soldierï¿½s pay continued until the 
USPFO military pay supervisor identified the discrepancy on the 
September 25, 2002, personnel/pay mismatch report and initiated action 
that stopped the soldierï¿½s pay effective September 30, 2002. However, 
because this discrepancy was not identified until late September, the 
soldier received $9,400 in extra pay following his discharge from the Army. 
In addition, while as discussed previously, we found a number of instances 
in which Army Guard soldiersï¿½ active duty pays continued after their 
demobilization, available documentation showed only one instance in the 
six case study units we visited in which a reconciliation of the unit 
commanderï¿½s finance report resulted in action to stop improper active duty 
pay and allowances. Specifically, available documentation shows that an 
administrative clerkï¿½s review of this report while the unit was mobilized in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, resulted in action to stop active duty pay and 
allowances to a soldier who was previously demobilized. However, it is 
also important to note that while these reconciliations are an important 
after-the-fact detective control, they are limited because they can only 
detect situations in which payroll and personnel records do not agree. A 
number of pay errors we identified resulted from the fact that neither 
personnel nor pay records were updated. 
Soldiers returning from deployments earlier than their units. For 
four of our case study units, we found instances in which Army Guard 
soldiersï¿½ active duty pays were not stopped at the end of their active duty 
tours when they were released from active duty earlier than their units. We 
found procedural guidance did not clearly specify how to carry out 
assigned responsibilities for soldiers who return from active duty earlier 
than their units. DFAS-Indianapolis guidance provides only that ï¿½the 
supporting USPFO will be responsible for validating the status of any 
soldier who does not return to a demobilized status with a unit.ï¿½ The 
guidance did not state how the USPFO should be informed that a soldier 
did not return with his or her unit, or how the USPFO was to take action to 
validate the status of such soldiers. At one of our case study locations, 
officials at the USPFO informed us that they became aware that a soldier 
had returned early from a deployment when the soldier appeared at a 
weekend drill while his unit was still deployed.
Data input and eligibility requirements for housing and family 
separation allowances. Our audit work at two of our case study 
locations indicated that procedural guidance was not clear with respect to 
transaction entry and eligibility requirements for the basic allowance for 
housing and the family separation allowance, respectively. For example, 
during our audit work at one of our case study locations, we determined 
that because of inconsistent interpretations of existing guidance for 
ï¿½dependentsï¿½ in entering transactions to start paying soldiersï¿½ basic 
allowance for housing, a number of Maryland soldiers were not paid the 
correct amount. At another case study location, we found that existing 
guidance on eligibility determination was misinterpreted so that soldiers 
were erroneously refused the ï¿½single parent soldiers family separation 
allowanceï¿½ to which they were entitled. 
Organizational 
Responsibilities Not Clear 
We also found that existing policies and procedures were unclear with 
respect to organizational responsibilities. Confusion centered principally 
around pay processing responsibility for Army Guard soldiers as they move 
from state control to federal control and back again. To be effective, 
current processes rely on close coordination and communication between 
state (Army Guard unit and state-level command organizations) and federal 
(active Army finance locations at mobilization/demobilization stations and 
at area servicing finance offices). However, we found a significant number 
of instances in which critical coordination requirements were not clearly 
defined. 
Individual Case Illustration: Confusion over Responsibility for Entering Pay 
Transactions Results in Family Obtaining a Grant to Pay Bills 
A sergeant incurred pay problems during his mobilization and deployment to Afghanistan 
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom that caused financial hardship for his family 
while he was deployed. In this case, the active Army and his state's USPFO were 
confused as to responsibility for processing pay input transactions associated with a 
promotion. Specifically, pay input transactions were required for his promotion from a 
sergeant first class (E-7) to master sergeant (E-8), his demotion back to an E-7, and a 
second promotion back to an E-8. The end result was the soldier was overpaid during 
the period of his demotion. DFAS garnished his wages and collected approximately 
$1,100 of the soldier's salary. These garnishments reduced the soldier's net pay to less 
than 50 percent of the amount he had been receiving. As a result, the soldier's wife had 
to obtain a grant of $500 from the Colorado National Guard's Family Support Group to 
pay bills.
DFAS Indianapolis mobilization procedures authorize the Army Guardï¿½s 
USPFOs and the active Armyï¿½s mobilization station and in-theater finance 
offices to enter transactions for deployed soldiers. However, we found 
existing guidance did not provide for clear responsibility and 
accountability between USPFOs and active Army mobilization stations and 
in-theater servicing finance offices with respect to responsibility for 
entering transactions while in-theater and terminating payments for 
soldiers who separate early or who are absent without leave or are 
confined. For example, at one of our case study locations, we found that 
this broad authority for entering changes to soldiersï¿½ pay records enabled 
almost simultaneous attempts by two different pay offices to enter pay 
transactions into DJMS-RC for the same soldier. 
As shown in the following illustration, at another case study location we 
found that, in part because of confusion over responsibility for starting 
location-based pays, a soldier was required to carry out a dangerous 
multiday mission to correct these payments.
Individual Case Illustration: Difficulty in Starting In-Theatre Pays 
A sergeant with the West Virginia National Guard Special Forces unit was stationed in 
Uzbekistan with the rest of his unit, which was experiencing numerous pay problems. 
The sergeant told us that the local finance office in Uzbekistan did not have the systems 
up and ready, nor available personnel who were familiar with DJMS-RC. According to the 
sergeant, the active Army finance personnel were only taking care of the active Army 
soldiersï¿½ pay issues. When pay technicians at the West Virginia USPFO attempted to 
help take care of some of the West Virginia National Guard soldiersï¿½ pay problems, they 
were told by personnel at DFAS-Indianapolis not to get involved because the active Army 
finance offices had primary responsibility for correcting the unitï¿½s pay issues. 
Eventually, the sergeant was ordered to travel to the finance office at Camp Doha, 
Kuwait, to get its assistance in fixing the pay problems. As illustrated in the following 
map. This trip, during which a soldier had to set aside his in-theatre duties to attempt to 
resolve Army Guard pay issues, proved to be not only a major inconvenience to the 
sergeant, but was also life-threatening. At Camp Doha (an established finance office), a 
reserve pay finance unit was sent from the United States to deal with the reserve 
component soldiersï¿½ pay issues. The sergeant left Uzbekistan for the 4-day trip to Kuwait. 
He first flew from Uzbekistan to Oman in a C-130 ambulatory aircraft (carrying wounded 
soldiers). From Oman, he flew to Masirah Island. From Masirah Island he flew to Kuwait 
International Airport, and from the airport he had a 45-minute drive to Camp Doha. The 
total travel time was 16 hours. The sergeant delivered a box of supporting documents 
used to input data into the system. He worked with the finance office personnel at Camp 
Doha to enter the pertinent data on each member of his battalion into DJMS-RC. After 2 
days working at Camp Doha, the sergeant returned to the Kuwait International Airport, 
flew to Camp Snoopy in Qatar, and from there to Oman. On his flight between Oman and 
Uzbekistan, the sergeantï¿½s plane took enemy fire and was forced to return to Oman. No 
injuries were reported. The next day, he left Oman and returned safely to Uzbekistan.
While guidance that permits both Army Guard and active Army military pay 
personnel to enter transactions for mobilized Army Guard soldiers 
provides flexibility in serving the soldiers, we found indications that it also 
contributed to soldiers being passed between the active Army and Army 
Guard servicing locations. For example, at another of our case study 
locations, we were told that several mobilized soldiers sought help in 
resolving active duty pay problems from the active Armyï¿½s mobilization 
station finance office at Fort Knox and later the finance office at Fort 
Campbell. However, officials at those active Army locations directed the 
soldiers back to the USPFO because they were Army Guard soldiers. 
We also found procedures were not clear on how to ensure timely 
processing of active duty medical extensions for injured Army Guard 
soldiers. Army Regulation 135-381 provides that Army Guard soldiers who 
are incapacited as a result of injury, illness, or disease that occured while 
on active duty for more than 30 consecutive days are eligible for continued 
health benefits. That is, with medical extension status, soldiers are entitled 
to continue to receive active duty pays, allowances, and medical benefits 
while under a physicianï¿½s care. 
At the Virginia 20th Special Forces, B Company, 3rd Battalion, we found that 
four soldiers were eligible for continued active duty pay and associated 
medical benefits due to injuries incurred as a result of their involvement in 
Operation Enduring Freedom. Although these injuries precluded them 
from resuming their civilian jobs, they experienced significant pay 
problems as well as problems in receiving needed medical care, in part, as a 
result of the lack of clearly defined implementing procedures in this area. 
All four soldiers experienced pay disruptions because existing guidance 
was not clear on actions needed to ensure that these soldiers were retained 
on active duty medical extensions. One of the soldiers told us, ï¿½People did 
not know who was responsible for what. No one knew who to contact or 
what paperwork was neededï¿½.ï¿½ As a result, all four have experienced 
gaps in receiving active duty pay and associated medical benefits while 
they remained under a physicianï¿½s care for injuries received while on their 
original active duty tour. Individual Case Illustration: Unclear Regulations for Active Duty Medical 
Extension 
Four soldiers who were injured while mobilized in Afghanistan for Operation Enduring 
Freedom told us that customer service was poor and no one was really looking after 
their interest or even cared about them. These problems resulted in numerous personal 
and financial difficulties for these soldiers. 
ï¿½ ï¿½Not having this resolved means that my family has had to make greater sacrifices and 
it leaves them in an unstable environment. This has caused great stress on my family 
that may lead to divorce.ï¿½ 
ï¿½ ï¿½My orders ran out while awaiting surgery and the care center tried to deny me care. 
My savings account was reduced to nearly 0 because I was also not getting paid while 
I waited. I called the Inspector General at Walter Reed and my congressman. My 
orders were finally cut. In the end, I was discharged 2 weeks before my care should 
have been completed because the second amendment to my orders never came and I 
couldnï¿½t afford to wait for them before I went back to work. The whole mess was 
blamed on the ï¿½stateï¿½ and nothing was ever done to fix it.ï¿½ 
ï¿½ One sergeant was required to stay at Womack, the medical facility at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina, while on medical extension. His home was in New Jersey. He had not 
been home for about 20 months, since his call to active duty. While he was recovering 
from his injuries, his wife was experiencing a high-risk pregnancy and depended upon 
her husbandï¿½s medical coverage, which was available while he remained in active duty 
status. Even though she lived in New Jersey, she scheduled her medical appointments 
near Fort Bragg to be with her husband. The sergeant submitted multiple requests to 
extend his active duty medical extension status because the paperwork kept getting 
lost. Lapses in obtaining approvals for continued active duty medical extension status 
caused the sergeantï¿½s military medical benefits and his active duty pay to be stopped 
several times. He told us that because of gaps in his medical extension orders, he was 
denied medical coverage, resulting in three delays in scheduling a surgery. He also 
told us he received medical bills associated with his wifeï¿½s hospitalization for the 
delivery of their premature baby as a result of these gaps in coverage. 
Guidance Outdated We found several instances in which existing DOD and Army regulations 
and guidance in the pay and allowance area are outdated and conflict with 
more current legislative and DOD guidance. Some existing guidance 
reflected pay policies and procedures dating back to Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm in 1991. While we were able to associate pay 
problems with only one of these outdated requirements, there is a risk that 
they may also have caused as yet unidentified pay problems. Further, 
having out-of-date requirements in current regulations may contribute to 
confusion and customer service issues. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 
replaced the basic allowance for quarters and the variable housing 
allowance with the basic allowance for housing.10 However, volume 7A, 
chapter 27 of the DOD FMR, dated February 2002, still refers to the basic 
allowance for quarters and the variable housing allowance. The act also 
replaced foreign duty pay with hardship duty pay.11 Yet, chapter 8 of Army 
Regulation 37-104-4 (Military Pay and Allowances Policy and Procedures ï¿½ 
Active Component) still refers to foreign duty pay. 
Further, current DFAS and Army mobilization procedural guidance directs 
active Army finance units to use transaction codes to start soldiersï¿½ 
hardship duty pays that are incorrect. Effective December 2001, DOD 
amended FMR, Volume 7A, chapter 17, to establish a new ï¿½designated areaï¿½ 
hardship duty pay with rates of $50, $100, or $150 per month, depending on 
the area. However, DFAS guidance dated December 19, 2002, directed 
mobilization site finance offices to use transaction codes that resulted in 
soldiers receiving a prior type of hardship duty pay that was eliminated in 
the December 2001 revisions. At one of our case study locations, we found 
that because the active Army finance office followed the outdated DFAS 
guidance for starting hardship duty pays, 91 of 100 Mississippi military 
police unit soldiers deployed to Cuba to guard al Qaeda prisoners were 
paid incorrect amounts of hardship duty pay. 
In addition, Army Regulation 37-104-4, dated September 1994, which was 
still in effect at the end of our audit work, provides that mobilized Army 
Guard soldiers are to be paid through the active Army pay systemï¿½the 
Defense Joint Military Pay System-Active Component (DJMS-AC). This 
procedure, in effect during the mobilizations to support Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, was changed in 1995. Specifically, in 1995, it was 
agreed that Army Guard personnel would no longer be moved to the active 
duty pay system, DJMS-AC, when mobilized to active duty, but would 
remain on the DJMS-RC system. Maintaining such outdated references in 
current policies may have contributed to confusion by USPFO and active 
Army finance personnel regarding required actions, particularly in light of 
the extensive set of policies and procedures now in effect in this area.
Human Capital Issues 
Affect Ability to Pay 
Mobilized Army Guard 
Soldiers Promptly and 
Accurately 
With respect to human capital, we found weaknesses, including 
(1) insufficient resources allocated to pay processing, (2) inadequate 
training related to existing policies and procedures, and (3) poor customer 
service. The lack of sufficient numbers of well-trained, competent military 
pay professionals can undermine the effectiveness of even a world-class 
integrated pay and personnel system. A sufficient number of well-trained 
military pay staff is particularly crucial given the extensive, cumbersome, 
and labor-intensive process requirements that have evolved to support 
active duty pay to Army Guard soldiers. GAOï¿½s Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government states that effective human capital 
practices are critical to establishing and maintaining a strong internal 
control environment. Specifically, management should take steps to 
ensure that its organization has the appropriate number of employees, and 
that appropriate human capital practices, including hiring, training, and 
retention, are in place and effectively operating. 
Insufficient Numbers of 
Military Pay Processing 
Personnel 
Our audit identified concerns with the numbers of knowledgeable 
personnel dedicated to entering and processing active duty pays and 
allowances to mobilized Army Guard soldiers. As discussed previously, 
both active Army and Army Guard military pay personnel play key roles in 
this area. Army Guard operating procedures provide that the primary 
responsibility for administering Army Guard soldiersï¿½ pay as they are 
mobilized to active duty rests with the 54 USPFOs. These USPFOs are 
responsible for processing pay for drilling reservists along with the 
additional surge of processing required for initiating active duty pays for 
mobilized soldiers. 
Our audit work identified concerns with the human capital resources 
allocated to this area, primarily with respect to the Army Guard military 
pay processing at the state-level USPFOs. Specifically, we identified 
concerns with (1) the number of staff on board in the military pay sections 
of the USPFOs, (2) the relatively lower grade structure for nonsupervisory 
personnel in the USPFOsï¿½ military pay sections in comparison with the 
grades for similar positions in other sections of the USPFO which led to 
difficulty in recruiting and retaining military pay processing personnel, and 
(3) as discussed in the following section, few of the military pay 
technicians on board at the six locations we audited had received formal 
training on pay eligibility and pay processing requirements for mobilized 
Army Guard personnel. NGB provides annual authorization for the overall staffing levels for each 
state. Within these overall staffing authorizations, each state allocates 
positions to each of the sections within a USPFO, including the military pay 
section and other sections such as vendor and contract pay. We compared 
the actual number of personnel on board to the NGB-authorized staffing 
level for the military pay sections at the case study locations we audited. 
During our audit period, two of the six case study locations had fewer 
military pay technicians on board than they were authorized. 
Officials at several of the six case study units also stated that restrictions 
on rank/grade at which USPFOs are allowed to hire personnel for their 
military pay sections made it difficult to recruit and retain employees. For 
example, a USPFO official told us that retaining personnel in the military 
pay section of the USPFOs was particularly difficult because similar 
administrative positions in other sections of the USPFO were typically 
higher paying and provided better benefits than the positions in the military 
pay section. The highest pay grade of the nonsupervisory pay technicians 
at the six case study units was a GS-7, and the majority of personnel were 
in the GS-6 pay grade. 
Although the Army and DFAS have established an agreement that in part 
seeks to ensure that resources are available to provide appropriately 
skilled pay personnel at mobilization stations to support surge processing, 
no such contingency staffing plan exists for the USPFOs. Specifically, a 
November 2002 memorandum of understanding between the Army and 
DFAS states that the active Army has primary responsibility to provide 
trained military or civilian resources to execute active duty pay and 
allowance surge processing requirements. However, this memorandum 
does not address the resources needed for surge processing at USPFOs. As 
discussed previously, pay problems at the case study units were caused in 
part by USPFO military pay sections attempting to process large numbers 
of pay transactions without sufficient numbers of knowledgeable 
personnel. 
Lacking sufficient numbers of personnel undermines the ability of the 
USPFO pay functions to carry out established control procedures. For 
example, our audits at several of the six case study units showed that there 
were no independent reviews of proposed pay transactions before they 
were submitted to DJMS-RC for processing. Such independent supervisory 
reviews are required by DJMS-RC operating procedures. However, a 
USPFO official told us that because of the limited number of pay 
technicians available to process pay transactionsï¿½particularly when processing massive numbers of transactions to start active duty pays at the 
same timeï¿½this requirement was often not followed. 
The Chief of Payroll at one of our case study locations told us that because 
they were currently understaffed, staff members worked 12 to 14 hours a 
day and still had backlogs of pay start transactions to be entered into the 
pay system. We were also told that two of our other case study locations 
experienced backlogs and errors in entering pay start transactions when 
they were processing large numbers of Army Guard soldiers during initial 
mobilizations. Military pay personnel told us that they were able to avoid 
backlogs in processing pay start transactions during mobilization 
processing by conscripting personnel from other USPFO sections to help in 
assembling and organizing the extensive paperwork associated with 
activating appropriate basic pays, entitlements, and special incentive pays 
for their mobilized Army Guard soldiers. 
Training on Pay Entitlement 
and Processing 
Requirements Critical 
In addition to concerns about the numbers of personnel onboard at the 
USPFO military pay offices involved in processing pay transactions for our 
case study units, we identified instances in which the personnel at military 
pay offices at both the USPFOs and the active Army finance offices did not 
appear to know the different aspects of the extensive pay eligibility or 
payroll processing requirements used to provide accurate and timely pays 
to Army Guard soldiers. There are no DOD or Army requirements for 
military pay personnel to receive training on pay entitlements and 
processing requirements associated with mobilized Army Guard soldiers or 
for monitoring the extent to which personnel have taken either of the 
recently established training courses in the area. Such training is critical 
given that military pay personnel must be knowledgeable about the 
extensive and complex pay eligibility and processing requirements. We 
also found that such training is particularly important for active Army pay 
personnel who may have extensive experience and knowledge of pay 
processing requirements for regular Army soldiers, but may not be well 
versed in the unique procedures and pay transaction entry requirements for 
Army Guard soldiers. 
During our work at the case study units, we identified numerous instances 
in which military pay technicians at both the USPFOs and active Army 
finance office locations made data coding errors when entering transaction 
codes into the pay systems. We were told that these errors occurred 
because military pay personnelï¿½particularly those at the active Army 
finance office locationsï¿½were unfamiliar with the systemï¿½s pay processing requirements for active duty pays to mobilized Army Guard personnel. 
Correcting these erroneous transactions required additional labor-intensive 
research and data entry by other more skilled pay technicians. As 
discussed previously, we also found that pay technicians did not 
understand how to properly code data on the soldiersï¿½ dependents status, 
which is used to determine housing allowances, into the pay system. As a 
result, we identified cases in which soldiers were underpaid housing 
allowances to which they were entitled. 
Personnel at active Army finance offices told us that while they are readily 
familiar with the pay processing requirements for active Army personnel 
(using DJMS-AC), they had little experience with, or training in, the policies 
and procedures to be followed in entering pay transactions into DJMS-RC. 
An Army finance office official told us that handling two sets of pay 
transaction processing procedures is often confusing because they are 
often required to process a large number of both active Army personnel 
and Army Guard and other reserve personnel using different processes and 
systems at the same time. 
While the Army Guard offers training for their military pay technicians, we 
found that there was no overall monitoring of Army Guard pay personnel 
training. At several of the case study locations we audited, we found that 
Army Guard pay technicians relied primarily on on-the-job-training and 
phone calls to the Army Guard Financial Services Center in Indianapolis or 
to other military pay technicians at other locations to determine how to 
process active duty pays to activated Army Guard personnel. 
Beginning in fiscal year 2002, the Army Guard began offering training on 
mobilization pays and transaction processing to the USPFO military pay 
technicians. However, there is no requirement for USPFO pay technicians 
to attend these training courses. In addition, available documentation 
showed that two of the five scheduled courses for fiscal year 2003 were 
canceledï¿½one because of low registration and one because of schedule 
conflicts. 
Only two of the six case study locations we audited tracked the extent to 
which pay technicians have taken training in this area. We were told that 
few of the military pay technicians at the state Army Guard USPFOs we 
audited had formal training on JUSTIS, DJMS-RC, or mobilization pay 
processing requirements and procedures. Throughout our case studies, we 
found numerous errors that involved some element of human capital. One 
payroll clerk told us that she had not received any formal training on how to operate JUSTIS when she was assigned to the job. Instead, she stated, 
she has learned how to operate the system through on-the-job training and 
many phone calls to system support personnel in Indianapolis. She 
estimated that she was not fully comfortable with all the required 
transaction processing procedures until she had been on the job for about 7 
years. 
In addition, unit commanders have significant responsibilities for 
establishing and maintaining the accuracy of soldersï¿½ pay records. U.S. 
Army Forces Command Regulation 500-3-3, Reserve Component Unit 
Commanderï¿½s Handbook (July 15, 1999) requires unit commanders to (1) 
annually review and update pay records for all soldiers under their 
command as part of an annual soldier readiness review and (2) obtain and 
submit supporting documentation needed to start entitled active duty pay 
and allowances based on mobilization orders. However, we saw little 
evidence the commanders of our case study units carried out these 
requirements. Further, neither Army Guard unit commanders nor active 
Army commanders were required to receive training on the importance of 
the pay to on-board personnel reconciliations, discussed previously, as an 
after-the-fact detective control to proactively identify Army Guard soldiers 
who should no longer receive active duty pays. We were told that this was 
primarily because unit commanders have many such administrative duties, 
and without additional training on the importance of these actions, they 
may not receive sufficient priority attention. 
The lack of unit commander training on the importance of these 
requirements may have contributed to the pay problems we identified at 
our case study units. For example, at our Virginia case study location, we 
found that when the unit was first mobilized, USPFO pay personnel were 
required to spend considerable time and effort to correct hundreds of 
errors in the unitï¿½s pay records dating back to 1996. Such errors could have 
been identified and corrected during the preceding yearsï¿½ readiness 
reviews. Further, we observed many cases in which active duty pays were 
not started until more than 30 days after the entitled start dates because 
soldiers did not submit the paperwork necessary to start these pays. 
Customer Service Concerns Through data collected directly from selected soldiers and work at our six 
case study locations, we identified a recurring soldier concern with the 
level and quality of customer service they received associated with their 
pays and allowances when mobilized to active duty. None of the DOD, 
Army, or Army Guard policies and procedures we examined addressed the level or quality of customer service that mobilized Army Guard soldiers 
should be provided concerning questions or problems with their active 
duty pays. However, we identified several sources that soldiers may go to 
for customer service or information on any such issues. These include 
ï¿½ their home unit, 
ï¿½ the military pay section of the USPFO of their home stateï¿½s Army Guard, 
ï¿½ the designated active Army area servicing finance office, and 
ï¿½ a toll free number, 1-888-729-2769 (Pay Army). 
While soldiers had multiple sources from which they could obtain service, 
we found indications that many Army Guard soldiers were displeased with 
the customer service they received. We found that not all Army Guard 
soldiers and their families were informed at the beginning of their 
mobilization of the pays and allowances they should receive while on 
active duty. This information is critical for enabling soldiers to identify if 
they were not receiving such pays and therefore require customer service. 
In addition, as discussed later in this report, we found that the 
documentation provided to Army Guard soldiersï¿½primarily in the form of 
leave and earnings statementsï¿½concerning the pays and allowances they 
received did not facilitate customer service. Our audit identified customer 
service concerns at all three phases of the active duty tours and involving 
DFAS, active Army, and Army Guard servicing components. 
Consistent with the confusion we found among Army Guard and active 
Army finance components concerning responsibility for processing pay 
transactions for mobilized Army Guard soldiers, we found indications that 
the soldiers themselves were similarly confused. Many of the complaints 
we identified concerned confusion over whether Army Guard personnel 
mobilized to active duty should be served by the USPFO because they were 
Army Guard soldiers or by the active Army because they were mobilized to 
federal service.
Individual Case Illustration: Poor Customer Service 
One soldier told us that he submitted documentation on three separate occasions to 
support the housing allowance he should have received as of the beginning of his 
October 2001 mobilization. Each time he was told to resubmit the documentation 
because his previously submitted documents were lost. Subsequently, while he was 
deployed, he made additional repeated inquiries as to when he would receive his 
housing allowance pay. He was told that it would be taken care of when he returned 
from his deployment. However, when he returned from his deployment, he was told that 
he should have taken care of this issue while he was deployed and that it was now too 
late to receive this allowance. 
Data collected from Army Guard units mobilized to active duty indicated 
that some members of the units had concerns with the pay support 
customer service they received associated with their mobilizationï¿½ 
particularly with respect to pay issues associated with their demobilization. 
Specifically, of the 43 soldiers responding to our question on satisfaction 
with customer support during the mobilization phase, 10 indicated 
satisfaction, while 15 reported dissatisfaction.12 In addition, of the 45 
soldiers responding to our question on customer support following 
demobilization, 5 indicated satisfaction while 29 indicated dissatisfaction.13 
Of the soldiers who provided written comments about customer service, 
none provided any positive comments about the customer service they 
received, and several had negative comments about the customer service 
they received, including such comments as ï¿½nonexistent,ï¿½ ï¿½hostile,ï¿½ or 
ï¿½poor.ï¿½ For example, a company commander for one of our case study units 
told us that he was frustrated with the level of customer support his unit 
received during the initial mobilization process. Only two knowledgeable 
military pay officials were present to support active duty pay transaction 
processing for the 51 soldiers mobilized for his unit. He characterized the 
customer service his unit received at initial mobilization as time consuming 
and frustrating. 
Personnel we talked with at the Colorado special forces unit we audited 
were particularly critical of the customer service they received both while 
deployed in Afghanistan and when they were demobilized from active duty. 
Specifically, unit officials expressed frustration with being routed from one 
office to another in their attempts to resolve problems with their active duty pays and allowances. For example, the unit administrator told us he 
contacted the servicing area active Army finance office for the 101st 
Airborne in West Virginia because his unit was attached to the 101st when 
they were deployed. The finance office instructed him to contact the 
USPFO in West Virginia because, although he was from a Colorado unit, his 
unit was assigned to a West Virginia Army Guard unit. However, when he 
contacted the West Virginia USPFO for service, officials from that office 
instructed him to contact the USPFO in his home state of Colorado to 
provide service for his pay problems. 
Systems Problems 
Hamper Prompt and 
Accurate Army Guard 
Pay 
Several systems issues were significant factors impeding accurate and 
timely payroll payments to mobilized Army Guard soldiers, including 
ï¿½ the lack of an integrated or effectively interfaced pay system with both 
the personnel and order-writing systems, 
ï¿½ limitations in DJMS-RC processing capabilities, and 
ï¿½ ineffective system edits of payments and debts. 
DOD has a significant system enhancement project under way to improve 
military pay. However, given that the effort has been under way for about 5 
years and DOD has encountered challenges fielding the system, it is likely 
that the department will continue to operate with existing system 
constraints for at least several more years. 
Our findings related to weaknesses in the systems environment were 
consistent with issues raised by DOD in its June 2002 report14 to the 
Congress on its efforts to implement an integrated military pay and 
personnel system. Specifically, DODï¿½s report acknowledged that major 
deficiencies in the delivery of military personnel and pay services to ensure 
soldiers receive timely and accurate personnel and pay support must be 
addressed by the envisioned system. Further, the report indicated these 
deficiencies were the direct result of the inability of a myriad of current 
systems with multiple, complex interfaces to fully support current business 
process requirements. Figure 6 provides an overview of the five systems currently involved in 
processing Army Guard pay and personnel information. 
Figure 
6: Overview of Army Guard Pay and Personnel Systems 
Army National Guard 
DFAS 
Army 
SIDPERS 
AFCOS 
JUSTIS 
DJMS-RC 
DMO 
Active duty payments 
to soldiers, LESs, 
and wage garnishments 
Source: GAO. 
Hard copy of 
Mobilization orders
Reconciliation 
Hard copy of 
Mobilization orders 
Hard copy of 
Mobilization orders 
Lack of Integrated Systems The five key DOD systems involved in authorizing, entering, processing, 
and paying mobilized Army Guard soldiers were not integrated. Lacking 
either an integrated or effectively interfaced set of personnel and pay 
systems, DOD must rely on error-prone, manual entry of data from the 
same source documents into multiple systems. With an effectively 
integrated system, changes to personnel records automatically update 
related payroll records from a single source of data input. While not as 
efficient as an integrated system, an automatic personnel-to-payroll system 
interface can also reduce errors caused by independent, manual entry of 
data from the same source documents into both pay and personnel 
systems. Without an effective interface between the personnel and pay systems, we found instances in which pay-affecting information did not get 
entered into both the personnel and pay systems, thus causing various pay 
problemsï¿½particularly late payments. 
We found that an existing interface could be used to help alert military pay 
personnel to take action when mobilization transactions are entered into 
the personnel system. Specifically, Army Guard state personnel offices 
used an existing interface between SIDPERS and JUSTIS to transmit data 
on certain personnel transactions (i.e., transfers, promotions, demotions, 
and address changes) to the 54 USPFOs to update the soldierï¿½s pay records. 
However, this personnel-to-pay interface (1) requires manual review and 
acceptance by USPFO pay personnel of the transactions created in 
SIDPERS and (2) does not create pay and allowance transactions to update 
a soldierï¿½s pay records. For example, when Army Guard soldiers change 
from inactive drilling status to active duty status, state personnel offices 
create personnel-related transactions in SIDPERS, but associated payrelated 
transactions to update the soldierï¿½s pay records are not 
automatically created in JUSTIS. USPFO pay personnel are not aware that 
a pay-related transaction is needed until they receive documentation from 
the soldier, the soldierï¿½s unit commander, or the monthly personnel/pay 
mismatch report. Automated improvements, such as an administrative 
action transmitted through the personnel-to-payroll interface, could be 
used to proactively alert USPFOs of certain pay-impacting transactions that 
are created in SIDPERS as a means to help ensure timely and accurate pay. 
In our case studies, we found instances in which mobilization order data 
that were entered into SIDPERS were either not entered into DJMS-RC for 
several months after the personnel action or were entered inconsistently. 
At the case study locations we audited, we found several instances in 
which Army Guard soldiers received amended or revoked orders that were 
entered into SIDPERS but were not entered into DJMS-RC. We also found 
instances in which personnel pay-affecting changes such as changes in 
family separation allowance, basic allowance for housing, and active duty 
pay increases from promotions, were not entered into the pay system 
promptly. Consequently, these soldiers either received active duty pays 
they were not entitled to receiveï¿½some for several monthsï¿½or did not 
timely receive active duty pays to which they were entitled. Individual Case Illustration: Overpayment due to Lack of Integrated Pay and 
Personnel Systems 
A soldier with the Mississippi Army National Guard was mobilized in January 2002 with 
his unit and traveled to the mobilization station at Fort Campbell. The unit stayed at Fort 
Campbell to perform post security duties until June 2002. On June 14, 2002, the E-4 
specialist received a "general" discharge order from the personnel office at Fort 
Campbell for a drug-related offense. However, he continued to receive active duty pay, 
totaling approximately $9,400, until September 2002. Although the discharge 
information was promptly entered into the soldier's personnel records, it was not entered 
into the pay system for almost 4 months. This problem was caused by weaknesses in 
the processes designed to work around the lack of integrated pay and personnel 
systems. Further, the problem was not detected because reconciliations of pay and 
personnel data were not performed timely. Specifically, it was not until over 3 months 
after the soldier's discharge, through its September 2002 end-of-month reconciliation, 
that the Mississippi Army National Guard USPFO identified the overpayment and took 
action on October 2, 2002, to stop the individual's pay. However, collection efforts on the 
$9,400 overpayment did not begin until July 2003, when we pointed out this situation to 
USPFO officials. 
The lack of an integrated set of systems was also apparent in the 
relationship between JUSTIS and the order writing systemï¿½AFCOS. 
Currently, certain personnel and order information entered and stored in 
the AFCOS database is automatically filled in the JUSTIS input screens 
pertaining to active duty tours for state missions upon entry of the soldierï¿½s 
Social Security Number and order number. This auto-fill functionality 
eliminates the need for some error-prone, manual reentry of data into 
JUSTIS. However, currently, manual entry of data from a hard copy of the 
soldierï¿½s orders and other documentation is required to initiate the soldierï¿½s 
pay and allowancesï¿½a procedure that defeats the purpose of an effective 
interface. For example, at one of the case study units we audited, USPFO 
pay personnel had to manually enter the soldierï¿½s active duty tour start and 
stop dates into JUSTIS from a hard copy of the actual mobilization order. 
When we brought this to the attention of NGB officials, they stated that 
providing the auto-fill functionality to the mobilization input screens would 
require minimal programming changes. NGB officials stated that they 
planned to release a programming software change to all 54 USPFOs that 
would allow the start and stop dates to be automatically filled into the 
mobilization screens to reduce the need for reentry of some mobilization 
information. Because this software change was scheduled to occur after 
the conclusion of our fieldwork, we did not verify its effectiveness. In any 
case, while this proposed programming change may be beneficial, it does not eliminate the need for manual entry and review of certain other 
mobilization data needed to initiate a soldierï¿½s basic pay and allowances. 
Pay System Has Limited 
Active Duty Pay Processing 
Capabilities 
DOD has acknowledged that DJMS-RC is an aging, COBOL/mainframebased 
system. Consequently, it is not surprising that we found DFAS 
established a number of ï¿½workaroundsï¿½ï¿½procedures to compensate for 
existing DJMS-RC processing limitations with respect to processing active 
duty pays and allowances to mobilized Army guard soldiers. Such manual 
workarounds are inefficient and create additional labor-intensive, errorprone 
transaction processing. We observed a number of such system 
workaround procedures at the case study units we audited. 
For example, for the special forces units we audited, our analysis disclosed 
a workaround used to exclude soldiersï¿½ pay from federal taxes while in 
combat. Specifically, DJMS-RC was not designed to make active duty pays 
and exclude federal taxes applicable to those pays in a single pay 
transaction. To compensate for this system constraint, DFAS established a 
workaround that requires two payment transactions over a 2-month payroll 
cycle to properly exempt soldiersï¿½ pay for the combat zone tax exclusion. 
That is, for those soldiers entitled to this exclusion, DJMS-RC withholds 
federal taxes the first month, identifies the taxes to be refunded during endof-
month pay processing, and then makes a separate payment during the 
first pay update the following month to refund the taxes that should not 
have been withheld. Soldiersï¿½ taxes could not be refunded the same month 
because the DJMS-RC refund process occurs only one time a month. 
In addition, because of limited DJMS-RC processing capabilities, the Army 
Guard USPFO and in-theatre active Army area servicing finance office pay 
technicians are required to manually enter transactions for nonautomated 
pay and allowances every month. DJMS-RC was originally designed to 
process payroll payments to Army Reserve and Army Guard personnel on 
weekend drills or on short periods of annual active duty (periods of less 
than 30 days in duration) or for training. With Army Guard personnel now 
being paid from DJMS-RC for extended periods of active duty (as long as 2 
years at a time), DFAS officials told us that the system is now stretched 
because it is being used to make payments and allowances that it was not 
structured or designed to make, such as hostile fire pay and the combat 
zone tax exclusion. Many of these active duty pay and allowances require 
manual, monthly verification and reentry into DJMS-RC because, while 
some pays, such as basic active duty pay and jump pay, can be generated automatically, DJMS-RC is not programmed to generate automatic payment 
of certain other types of pay and allowances. 
For example, each month USPFO pay personnel are responsible for 
entering into JUSTIS special duty assignment pay, foreign language 
proficiency pay, and high altitude low opening (HALO) pay, and Army area 
servicing finance offices are responsible for entering into DMO hardship 
duty pay, for deployed soldiers entitled to these types of pays and for which 
a performance certification is received from the respective unit 
commanders. However, because pay transactions must be manually 
entered every month soldiers are entitled to receive these pays, it is often 
difficult to ensure that mobilized soldiers receive their entitled 
nonautomated pays and allowances. For example, we found a number of 
instances in which soldiers were underpaid their entitled jump, foreign 
language proficiency, special duty assignment, or hardship duty pays 
because pay technicians inadvertently omitted the monthly manual input 
required to initiate these types of pays every month. 
At one of the case study units, we found USPFO pay personnel had a 
procedure in place to help prevent inadvertently omitting month-to-month 
entry of nonautomated pays for entitled soldiers. Specifically, pay 
personnel at the USPFO in Maryland used a warning screen within JUSTIS 
as a mechanism to alert them that soldiers were eligible to receive that 
particular pay component that month. Although this does not alleviate the 
problem of month-to-month manual entry, the warning screen could be 
used to help preclude some of the pay problems we found resulting from 
failures to enter transactions for nonautomated, month-to-month pay and 
allowance entitlements. 
Further, these month-to-month pays and allowances were not separately 
itemized on the soldiersï¿½ leave and earnings statements in a user-friendly 
format. 
In contrast, at four of our six case study units, we found that a significant 
number of soldiers were overpaid their entitled automated pays when they 
were demobilized from active duty before the stop date specified in their 
original mobilization orders. This occurred because pay technicians did 
not update the stop date in DJMS-RC, which is necessary to terminate the 
automated active duty pays when soldiers leave active duty early. For 
example, the military finance office in Kuwait, which was responsible for 
paying Virginia 20th Special Forces soldiers in the fall of 2002, did not stop 
hostile fire and hardship duty pays as required when these soldiers left Afghanistan in October 2002. We found that 55 of 64 soldiers eligible for 
hostile fire pay were overpaid for at least 1 month beyond their departure 
from Afghanistan. 
Individual Case Illustration: Problems in Deciphering a Leave and Earnings 
Statement 
An Army National Guard Special Forces sergeant believed that he was not receiving 
certain active duty pays and allowances during his mobilization to active duty in support 
of Operation Enduring Freedom. On March 23, 2002, the sergeant wrote a letter from 
Afghanistan to a fellow battalion soldier back in his home state, discussing his pay 
problems. The sergeant stated that he was not receiving his special duty assignment pay 
from November 2001 to March 2002. The sergeantï¿½s letter also stated he was not 
receiving his hostile fire pay and combat zone tax exclusion. His letter concluded, ï¿½Are 
they really fixing pay issues or are they putting them off till we return? If they are waiting, 
then what happens to those who (god forbid) donï¿½t make it back?ï¿½ The sergeant was 
killed in action in Afghanistan on April 15, 2002, before he knew if his pay problems were 
resolved. Our review determined that some of the sergeantï¿½s pays were started up to 2 
months late, but others had actually been paid properly. The sergeant apparently was not 
aware of receiving these payments because of the way they were combined. 
Soldiersï¿½ pays may appear as lump sum payments under ï¿½other creditsï¿½ on 
their leave and earnings statements. In many cases these other credit pay 
and allowances appeared on their leave and earning statements without 
adequate explanation. As a result, we found indications that Army Guard 
soldiers had difficulty using the leave and earnings statements to determine 
if they received all entitled active duty pays and allowances. In addition, 
several Army Guard soldiers told us that they had difficulty discerning from 
their leave and earnings statements whether lump sum catch-up payments 
fully compensated them for previously underpaid active duty pay and 
allowance entitlements. Without such basic customer service, the soldiers 
cannot readily verify that they received all the active duty pays and 
allowances to which they were entitled. 
As shown in the example leave and earnings statement extract included in 
figure 7, an Army Guard soldier who received a series of corrections to 
special duty assignment pay along with a current special duty assignment 
payment of $110 is likely to have difficulty discerning whether he or she 
received all and only entitled active duty pays and allowances. Figure 
7: Sample Army Guard Leave and Earnings Statement 
Source: Individual Leave and Earnings Statement.
System Edits Do Not 
Prevent Large Payments or 
Debts 
While DJMS-RC has several effective edits to prevent certain 
overpayments, it lacks effective edits to reject large proposed net pays over 
$4,000 at midmonth and over $7,000 at end-of-month before their final 
processing. DOD established these thresholds to monitor and detect 
abnormally large payments. As a result of the weaknesses we identified, 
we found several instances in our case studies in which soldiers received 
large lump sum payments, probably related to previous underpayments or 
other pay errors, with no explanation. Further, the lack of preventive 
controls over large payments poses an increased risk of fraudulent 
payments. DJMS-RC does have edits that prevent soldiers from (1) being 
paid for pay and allowances beyond the stop date for the active duty tour, 
(2) being paid for more than one tour with overlapping dates, or (3) being 
paid twice during a pay period. 
Each month, DFAS Indianapolis pay personnel receive an Electronic Fund 
Transfer Excess Dollar Listing after the electronic fund transfer payment 
has been processed in DJMS-RC and deposited to the soldierï¿½s bank 
account. DJMS-RC does not contain edit checks to reject payments over 
the threshold amounts or to require review and approval of payments over 
these amounts prior to their final processing. For example, at one of the 
case study units we audited, DJMS-RC did not have edit checks to prevent 
one soldier from receiving an erroneous electronic payment totaling 
$20,110 without prior approval (see the individual case illustration below 
for details). In addition, our analysis showed 76 other payroll-related 
payments during the period October 1, 2001, through March 31, 2003, of 
over $7,000 (net) each that were paid by DJMS-RC. Because the Electronic 
Fund Transfer Excess Dollar Listing is printed after the payment is made, 
timely detection of errors is critical to help ensure that erroneous payments 
are recovered and that fraud does not occur. 
Similarly, DJMS-RC does not have system edits to prevent large debts from 
being assessed without review and approval prior to being processed and 
does not provide adequate explanations for pay-related debt assessments. 
Our case studies identified individuals who received debt notices in excess 
of $30,000 with no explanation. At five of the 6 units audited, we identified 
86 individuals who had total pay and allowance debts of approximately 
$300,000 as of March 31, 2003. Individual Case Illustration: System Edits Do Not Prevent Large Payments and 
Debts 
A sergeant with the Colorado Army National Guard, Special Forces, encountered 
numerous severe pay problems associated with his mobilization to active duty, including 
his deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The 
sergeantï¿½s active duty pay and other pay and allowances should have been stopped on 
December 4, 2002, when he was released from active duty. However, because the 
sergeantï¿½s mobilization orders called him to active duty for 730 days and not the 365 
days that he was actually mobilized, and the Army area servicing finance office at the 
demobilization station, Fort Campbell, did not enter the release from active duty date 
into DJMS-RC, the sergeant continued to improperly receive payments, as if he were still 
on active duty, for 2 and a half months after he was released from active duty totaling 
over $8,000. The sergeant was one of 34 soldiers in the company whose pay continued 
after their release from active duty. In an attempt to stop the erroneous payments, in 
February 2003, pay personnel at the Colorado USPFO created a transaction to cancel 
the tour instead of processing an adjustment to amend the stop date consistent with the 
date on the Release from Active Duty Order. When this occurred, DJMS-RC 
automatically processed a reversal of 11 months of the sergeantï¿½s pay and allowances 
that he earned while mobilized from March 1, 2002, through February 4, 2003, which 
created a debt in the amount of $39,699 on the soldierï¿½s pay record; however, the 
reversal should have only been from December 5, 2002, through February 4, 2003. In 
April 2003, at our request, DFAS-Indianapolis personnel intervened in an attempt to 
correct the large debt and to determine the actual amount the sergeant owed. In May 
2003, DFAS-Indianapolis erroneously processed a payment transaction instead of a debt 
correction transaction in DJMS-RC. This created a payment of $20,111, which was 
electronically deposited to the sergeantï¿½s bank account without explanation, while a debt 
of $30,454 still appeared on his Leave and Earnings Statement. About 9 months after 
his demobilization, the sergeantï¿½s unpaid debt balance was reportedly $26,559, but the 
actual amount of his debt had not yet been determined as of September 2003. 
In addition, we found that current procedures used to notify soldiers of 
large payroll-related debts did not facilitate customer service. Under 
current procedures, if a soldier is determined to owe the government 
money while on active duty, he is assessed a debt and informed of this 
assessment with a notation of an ï¿½Unpaid Debt Balanceï¿½ in the remarks 
section of his Leave and Earnings Statement. A soldier at one of our case 
study units told us that he was not notified in advance of his receipt of his 
Leave and Earnings Statement that he had a debt assessment and that twothirds 
of his pay would be garnished. As a result, he was not able to plan his 
financial affairs to avoid late payments on his car and other loans. 
This debt assessment notification procedure is even more egregious when 
debts, particularly large debts, are assessed in error and up to two-thirds of the soldierï¿½s pay may be garnished to begin repaying the erroneous debt. 
For example, at our case study units, we found that the only notice several 
soldiers received when they were erroneously assessed payroll debts was 
an ï¿½Unpaid Debt Balanceï¿½ buried in the remarks section of their Leave and 
Earnings Statements. One such assessment showing a $39,489.28 debt is 
shown in figure 8.
Figure 
8: Sample Leave and Earnings Statement with Large Debt Balance 
Source: Individual Leave and Earnings Statement.
Status of System Redesign 
Efforts 
DOD has a major system enhancement effort under way in this area 
described as the largest personnel and pay system in the world in both 
scope and number of people servedï¿½the Defense Integrated Military 
Human Resources System (DIMHRS). One of the major benefits expected 
with DIMHRS is ï¿½service members receiving accurate and timely pay and 
benefits.ï¿½ Begun in 1998, DIMHRS is ultimately intended to replace more 
than 80 legacy systems (including DJMS-RC) and integrate all pay, 
personnel, training, and manpower functions across the department by 
2007. 
By the end of fiscal year 2003, DOD reporting shows that it will have 
invested over 5 years and about $360 million in conceptualizing and 
planning the system. In 2002, DOD estimated that integrated personnel and 
pay functions of DIMHRS would be fully deployed by fiscal year 2007. It 
also reported a development cost of about $427 million. However, our 
review of the fiscal year 2004 DOD Information Technology budget request 
shows that DOD is requesting $122 million and $95 million, respectively, for 
fiscal years 2004 and 2005. In addition, the department reported that the 
original DIMHRS project completion milestone date has slipped about 15 
months. 
Part of the requested funding for fiscal year 2004 was to acquire a payroll 
module, Forward Compatible Payroll. According to program officials, this 
module, in conjunction with a translation module and a Web services 
component, is to replace DJMS-RC and DJMS-AC systems by March 2006, 
with the first deployment to the Army Reserve and Army Guard in March 
2005. 
In assessing the risks associated with DIMHRS implementation as part of 
its fiscal year 2004 budget package, DOD highlighted 20 such risks. For 
example, DOD reported a 60 percent risk associated with ï¿½Service issues 
with business process reengineering and data migration.ï¿½ The 
departmentï¿½s ability to effectively mitigate such risks is of particular 
concern given its poor track record in successfully designing and 
implementing major systems in the past.15 Consequently, given the 
schedule slippages that have already occurred combined with the many 
risks associated with DIMHRS implementation, Army Guard soldiers will likely be required to rely on existing pay systems for at least several more 
years. 
Army Guard Active 
Duty Pay Problems 
Continue with Current 
Deployments to Iraq 
Our limited review of the pay experiences of the soldiers in the Colorado 
Army Guardï¿½s 220th Military Police Company, which was mobilized to active 
duty in January 2003, sent to Kuwait in February 2003, and deployed to Iraq 
on military convoy security and highway patrol duties in April 2003, 
indicated that some of the same types of pay problems that we found in our 
six case study units continued to occur. Of the 152 soldiers mobilized in 
this unit, we identified 54 soldiers who our review of available records 
indicated were either overpaid, underpaid, or received entitled active duty 
pays and allowances over 30 days late, or for whom erroneous pay-related 
debts were created. We found that these pay problems could be attributed 
to control breakdowns similar to those we found at our case study units, 
including pay system input errors associated with amended orders, delays 
and errors in coding pay and allowance transactions, and slow customer 
service response. For example, available documentation and interviews 
indicate that while several soldiers submitted required supporting 
documentation to start certain pays and allowances at the time of their 
initial mobilization in January 2003, over 20 soldiers were still not receiving 
these pays in August 2003. Colorado USPFO military pay-processing 
personnel told us they are reviewing pay records for all deployed soldiers 
from this unit to ensure that they are receiving all entitled active duty pays 
and allowances. 
Conclusions The extensive problems we identified at the case study units vividly 
demonstrate that the controls currently relied on to pay mobilized Army 
Guard personnel are not working and cannot provide reasonable assurance 
that such pays are accurate or timely. The personal toll that these pay 
problems have had on mobilized soldiers and their families cannot be 
readily measured, but clearly may have a profound effect on reenlistment 
and retention. It is not surprising that cumbersome and complex processes 
and ineffective human capital strategies, combined with the use of an 
outdated system that was not designed to handle the intricacies of active 
duty pay and allowances, would result in significant pay problems. While it 
is likely that DOD will be required to rely on existing systems for a number 
of years, a complete and lasting solution to the pay problems we identified 
will only be achieved through a complete reengineering, not only of the 
automated systems, but also of the supporting processes and human capital practices in this area. However, immediate actions can be taken in 
these areas to improve the timeliness and accuracy of pay and allowance 
payments to activated Army Guard soldiers. The need for such actions is 
increasingly imperative in light of the current extended deployment of 
Army Guard soldiers in their crucial role in Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
anticipated additional mobilizations in support of this operation and the 
global war on terrorism. Immediate steps to at least mitigate the most 
serious of the problems we identified are needed to help ensure that the 
Army Guard can continue to successfully fulfill its vital role in our national 
defense. 
Recommendations for 
Executive Action 
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Army, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 
to take the following actions to address the issues we found with respect to 
the existing processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on to 
pay activated Army Guard personnel. 
Process ï¿½ Establish a unified set of policies and procedures for all Army Guard, 
Army, and DFAS personnel to follow for ensuring active duty pays for 
Army Guard personnel mobilized to active duty. 
ï¿½ Establish performance measures for obtaining supporting 
documentation and processing pay transactions (for example, no more 
than 5 days would seem reasonable). 
ï¿½ Establish who is accountable for stopping active duty pays for soldiers 
who return home earlier than their units. 
ï¿½ Clarify the policies and procedures for how to properly amend active 
duty orders, including medical extensions. 
ï¿½ Require Army Guard commands and unit commanders to carry out 
complete monthly pay and personnel records reconciliations and take 
necessary actions to correct any pay and personnel record mismatches 
found each month. 
ï¿½ Update policies and procedures to reflect current legal and DOD 
administrative requirements with respect to active duty pays and allowances and transaction processing requirements for mobilized 
Army Guard soldiers. 
Human Capital ï¿½ Consider expanding the scope of the existing memorandum of 
understanding between DFAS and the Army concerning the provision of 
resources to support surge processing at mobilization and 
demobilization sites to include providing additional resources to 
support surge processing for pay start and stop transaction 
requirements at Army Guard home stations during initial soldier 
readiness programs. 
ï¿½ Determine whether issues concerning resource allocations for the 
military pay operations identified at our case study units exist at all 54 
USPFOs, and if so, take appropriate actions to address these issues. 
ï¿½ Determine whether issues concerning relatively low-graded military pay 
technicians identified at our case study units exist at all 54 USPFOs, and 
if so, take appropriate actions to address these issues. 
ï¿½ Modify existing training policies and procedures to require all USPFO 
and active Army pay and finance personnel responsible for entering pay 
transactions for mobilized Army Guard soldiers to receive appropriate 
training upon assuming such duties. 
ï¿½ Require unit commanders to receive training on the importance of 
adhering to requirements to conduct annual pay support documentation 
reviews and carry out monthly reconciliations. 
ï¿½ Establish an ongoing mechanism to monitor the quality and completion 
of training for both pay and finance personnel and unit commanders. 
ï¿½ Identify and evaluate options for improving customer service provided 
to mobilized Army Guard soldiers by providing improved procedures for 
informing soldiers of their pay and allowance entitlements throughout 
their active duty mobilizations. 
ï¿½ Identify and evaluate options for improving customer service provided 
to mobilized Army Guard soldiers to ensure a single, well-advertised 
source for soldiers and their families to access for customer service for 
any pay problems.
ï¿½ Review the pay problems we identified at our six case study units to 
identify and resolve any outstanding pay issues for the affected soldiers. 
Systems 
Interim Improvements to 
Current Automated Pay System 
Structure 
ï¿½ Evaluate the feasibility of using the personnel-to-pay interface as a 
means to proactively alert pay personnel of actions needed to start 
entitled active duty pays and allowances. 
ï¿½ Evaluate the feasibility of automating some or all of the current manual 
monthly pays, including special duty assignment pay, foreign language 
proficiency pay, hardship duty pay, and HALO pay. 
ï¿½ Evaluate the feasibility of eliminating the use of the ï¿½other creditsï¿½ for 
processing hardship duty (designated areas), HALO pay, and special 
duty assignment pay, and instead establish a separate component of pay 
for each type of pay. 
ï¿½ Evaluate the feasibility of using the JUSTIS warning screen to help 
eliminate inadvertent omissions of required monthly manual pay inputs. 
ï¿½ Evaluate the feasibility of redesigning Leave and Earnings Statements to 
provide soldiers with a clear explanation of all pay and allowances 
received so that they can readily determine if they received all and only 
entitled pays. 
ï¿½ Evaluate the feasibility of establishing an edit check and requiring 
approval before processing any debt assessments above a specified 
dollar amount. 
ï¿½ Evaluate the feasibility of establishing an edit check and requiring 
approval before processing any payments above a specified dollar 
amount. 
Longer-Term System 
Improvements 
ï¿½ As part of the effort currently under way to reform DODï¿½s pay and 
personnel systemsï¿½referred to as DIMHRSï¿½incorporate a complete 
understanding of the Army Guard pay problems as documented in this 
report into the requirements development for this system. ï¿½ In developing DIMHRS, consider a complete reengineering of the 
processes and controls and ensure that this reengineering effort deals 
not only with the systems aspect of the problems we identified, but also 
with the human capital and process aspects. 
Agency Comments and 
our Evaluation 
In its written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendations and 
identified actions to address the identified deficiencies. Speciifically, DODï¿½s 
response outlined some actions already taken, others that are underway, 
and further planned actions with respect to our recommendations. If 
effectively implemented, these actions should substantially resolve the 
deficiencies pointed out in our report. DODï¿½s comments are reprinted in 
appendix VIII. 
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its 
date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to interested 
congressional committees. We will also send copies of this report to the 
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the 
Secretary of the Army, the Director of the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service, the Director of the Army National Guard, and the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau. We will make copies available to others upon 
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 
Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions 
regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9505 or 
[email protected] or Geoffrey Frank, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-9518 or 
[email protected]. 
Sincerely yours, 
Gregory D. Kutz 
Director, Financial Management and Assurance
Colorado Army National Guard B Company, 
5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Appendix I 
On December 5, 2001, the Colorado Army National Guardï¿½s B Company, 5th 
Battalion, 19th Special Forces, was mobilized to active duty on orders for a 
2-year periodï¿½through December 4, 2003. The unit was mobilized at Fort 
Knox and subsequently deployed in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and 
surrounding areas to search for Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists as part of 
Operation Enduring Freedom. The unit returned to Fort Campbell for 
demobilization and was released from active duty on December 4, 2002ï¿½1 
year before the end of the unitï¿½s original mobilization orders. A timeline of 
the unitï¿½s actions associated to its mobilization under Operation Enduring 
Freedom is shown in figure 9. 
Figure 
9: Timeline Showing Key Actions Associated with Colorado National Guard 
Special Forces Unitï¿½s Mobilization 
Active duty tour 
officially ends. 
12/4/02 
Dec 01 Jan 02 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Soldiers in-process 
at Pueblo, CO home station. 
12/5/01 
Soldiers demobilize at 
Ft. Campbell, KY. 
7/02 through 
10/02 
Travel to 
Ft. Knox, KY. 
12/15/01 
Travel to 
Ft. Campbell, KY. 
12/20/01 Travel to 
Uzbekistan/Afghanistan. 
2/15/02 
Arrival in 
Uzbekistan/Afghanistan. 
2/22/02 
2/22/02 through 
10/02 
Deployed in 
Uzbekistan/Afghanistan. 
12/20/01 through 
2/15/02 
Preparing for 
overseas 
deployment. 
Source: GAO 
As summarized in table 3, the majority of soldiers from Coloradoï¿½s B 
Company experienced some sort of pay problem during one or more of the 
three phases of their active duty mobilization. Overall, all 62 soldiers with 
the company had at least one pay problem associated with their 
mobilization. These pay problems included not receiving entitled pays and 
allowances at all; not receiving some entitled pays and allowances within 
30 days; and for some, overpayments of pays and allowances. Specifically, we found (1) 56 soldiers did not receive certain pay and allowance 
entitlements at all, or within 30 days of their initial mobilization, (2) 61 
soldiers either did not receive, or did not receive within 30 days, the hostile 
fire pay or other ï¿½high-risk locationï¿½ pays they were entitled to receive 
based on their deployment in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, and (3) 53 
soldiers either improperly continued to receive hostile fire pay after leaving 
high-risk locations overseas or continued to receive paychecks, as if they 
were still on active duty status, for over 2 months beyond their release from 
active duty. 
Table 
3: Summary of Identified Pay Problems by Phase 
Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems 
Mobilization 56 of 62 
Deployed 61 of 62 
Demobilization 53 of 62 
Source: GAO analysis. 
In total, we identified estimated overpayments of $494,000, underpayments 
of $28,000, and late payments of $64,000, associated with the pay problems 
we found. Of the estimated $494,000 in overpayments, we identified about 
$88,000 that was subsequently collected from the soldiers of Coloradoï¿½s B 
Company. In addition, in trying to correct overpayments associated with 
Colorado B Companyï¿½s departure from high-risk locations and release from 
active duty, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) billed 34 
of the unitï¿½s soldiers an average of $48,000 each, for a largely erroneous 
total debt of over $1.6 million. 
Many soldiers with the company characterized the service they received 
from the state United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) and the 
active Army finance offices while deployed in Afghanistan and surrounding 
areas as ï¿½poorï¿½ or ï¿½openly hostile.ï¿½ Some of the soldiers in the unit 
expressed significant dissatisfaction with the time and effort they, or their 
spouses were required to spend attempting to identify and correct their 
pay. 
These pay problems had a variety of adverse effects. The labor-intensive 
efforts by the special forces soldiers to address pay problems, in some 
cases, distracted them from important mission operations. In addition, 
several soldiers told us that the numerous pay problems they encountered would play a major role in their decision whether to reenlist. According to 
several soldiers from Coloradoï¿½s B Company, the combined effect of 
(1) recurring pay problems, (2) having two-thirds of their monthly training 
paychecks garnished to pay off often erroneous payroll-related debts, and 
(3) receiving poor payroll customer service during their active duty tours 
adversely affects morale and may have an adverse effect on a soldierï¿½s 
willingness to continue his or her service with the Army Guard. For 
example, a unit official advised us that as of September 30, 2003, three 
soldiers had left B Company primarily due to frustration over pay 
problems. The unit official indicated that he expected additional soldiers 
would depart as a result of the current debt problems. 
Mobilization Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 4, we identified a number of pay problems 
associated with eight different types of active duty pays and allowances 
related to the unitï¿½s mobilization to active duty. These problems resulted 
from failure to enter data, data entry errors, or late entry of data needed by 
Army Guard USPFO military pay personnel and by active Army military pay 
personnel at the unitï¿½s mobilization station to start active duty pays. We 
also found that these pay problems were exacerbated by breakdowns in 
customer service. 
Table 
4: Identified Mobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay or allowance 
Number of 
soldiers who did 
not receive pay or 
allowance within 
30 days of 
entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Basic pay 5 2 0 
Basic allowance for housing 5 3 0 
Basic allowance for 
subsistence 6 4 0 
Family separation allowance 7 7 1 
Jump pay 11 2 0 
HALO pay 10 2 8 
Foreign language proficiency 
pay 4 0 0 
Special duty assignment pay 44 41 2 
Source: GAO analysis.
In total, 56 out of 62 soldiers did not receive certain pays and allowances at 
all, or in a timely manner, after being activated on December 5, 2001. As 
illustrated in table 4, 11 soldiers did not receive entitled Jump pay within 30 
days of entitlement,1 10 did not receive HALO pay within 30 days of 
entitlement,2 and 41 soldiers did not receive at least 1 month of their special 
duty assignment pay.3 
According to DFAS procedures, the unitï¿½s Army Guard USPFO should have 
initiated these pays. In addition, these problems could have been 
minimized if they were identified and corrected by the Army mobilization 
station finance office at Fort Knox during the soldier readiness processing 
at that location. According to Army regulations, the active Army 
mobilization station is required to conduct a soldier readiness program to 
review every mobilizing soldierï¿½s pay account for accuracy. In essence, 
under Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, the active Army 
mobilization stations are to act as a ï¿½safety netï¿½ to catch and correct any 
errors in soldiersï¿½ active duty pays and allowances before they are 
deployed on their active duty missions. 
The underpayments and late payments resulted in adverse financial 
repercussions for a number of the unitï¿½s members and their families. We 
were told that many of the unit membersï¿½ spouses tried to contact the 
soldiers while they were deployed to find out why they were not receiving 
the anticipated funds. We were told that neither the spouses nor the 
soldiers received clear guidance on whom to contact to address their pay 
concerns. For example, some soldiers sought help from the active Armyï¿½s 
finance offices at Fort Knox and Fort Campbell. However, upon contacting 
officials at those locations, soldiers were told that the active Army could 
not help them because they were Army Guard soldiers and should 
therefore contact their home state Army Guard USPFO. According to 
DFAS officials, the active Army finance offices have the capability to 
service Army Guard soldiers. Fort Knox and Fort Campbell finance 
personnel were either unaware of their capability or unwilling to take the 
actions needed to address the unitï¿½s active duty pay concerns.
Coloradoï¿½s B Company soldiers turned back to the USPFO for assistance. 
Although the USPFO did process a number of transactions to start entitled 
active duty pays and allowances for the unitï¿½s soldiers, such pays were 
started more than 30 days after the date they were entitled to receive such 
pays. In one case, a soldierï¿½s spouse had to obtain a $500 grant from the 
Colorado National Guard in order to pay bills while her husband was on 
active duty. 
Deployment Pay 
Problems 
Coloradoï¿½s B Company was deployed to Uzbekistan and Afghanistan in 
February 2002. As summarized in table 5, we identified pay problems 
associated with the hostile fire pay, combat zone tax exclusion, and 
hardship duty pay that unit soldiers were entitled to receive based on their 
deployment to Afghanistan and surrounding areas. 
Table 
5: Identified Deployment Pay Problems 
Type of pay or 
allowance 
Number of soldiers who 
did not receive pays or 
allowances within 30 
days of entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Hostile fire pay 51 2 2 
Combat zone tax 
exclusion 56 7 0 
Hardship duty pay 59 33 14 
Source: GAO analysis. 
Specifically, after arriving in Afghanistan, some soldiers in Coloradoï¿½s B 
Company received these pays sporadically, were not paid at all, were paid 
but for inexplicable dollar amounts, or were overpaid their entitled active 
duty pays and allowances while deployed. For example, 16 of the 62 
soldiers in B Company received the wrong type of hardship duty pay, 
formerly called Foreign Duty Pay, in addition to the correct hardship duty 
location pay while they were deployed in Afghanistan. 
We found that these pay problems could be attributed, in part, to the active 
Army servicing finance officeï¿½s lack of knowledge about how to process 
transactions through the Defense Joint Military Pay System-Reserve 
Component system (DJMS-RC) to start location-based pays and allowances 
for the unitï¿½s soldiers. For example, we were told that because active Army 
in-theater finance personnel were unfamiliar with the required procedures to follow in starting hardship duty pays, they entered transactions that 
resulted in soldiers receiving two different location-based types of hardship 
duty pay for the same duty. Further, Army Guard soldiers told us the active 
Army finance office could not effectively answer questions concerning 
their pay entitlements or transaction processing documentation 
requirements. After not receiving any pay support from the active Army 
servicing finance location, the unitï¿½s soldiers told us they contacted their 
Army Guard USPFO in Colorado for assistance. However, Colorado 
USPFO officials informed them that they did not have the capability to start 
location-based pays and allowances for Army Guard soldiers. 
A frequent complaint we received from Coloradoï¿½s B Company soldiers 
concerned the circular nature of any attempts to get assistance on pay 
issues while deployed overseas. B Companyï¿½s soldiers told us they spent 
significant amounts of time and effort trying to correct the pay problems 
while deployed on critical mission operations in Afghanistan and 
surrounding areasï¿½time and focus away from the mission at hand. For 
example, as discussed in greater detail in our West Virginia case study 
summary, a soldier from that unit took several days away from his unit to 
get location-based pay started for both the West Virginia and Colorado 
special forces units. We were also told that some members of the unit used 
their satellite radios to attempt to resolve their pay problems while 
deployed in Afghanistan. In addition, several of the unitï¿½s soldiers told us 
their ability to identify and correct pay problems while deployed was 
impaired by limited access to telephones, faxes, e-mail, and their current 
Leave and Earnings Statements. 
Pay Problems 
Associated with 
Demobilization and 
Release from Active 
Duty 
In the late summer to early fall of 2002, soldiers from Coloradoï¿½s B 
Company began returning from Afghanistan and surrounding areas to Fort 
Campbell to begin their demobilization from active duty. However, the 
active Armyï¿½s finance office at Fort Campbell failed to properly stop 
soldiersï¿½ pay as of their demobilization dates, which for most of the unitï¿½s 
soldiers was December 4, 2002. As summarized in table 6, 39 of the unitï¿½s 
62 soldiers continued to receive active duty pay and allowances, some 
until February 14, 2003ï¿½2 and a half months after the date of their release 
from active duty. Table 
6: Identified Demobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay or allowance continued in error Number of soldiers overpaid 
Basic pay 39 
Hostile fire pay 41 
Combat zone tax exclusion 39 
Hardship duty pay 1 
Source: GAO analysis. 
We found that both the active Army servicing finance location for the unit 
while it was in Afghanistan and at Fort Campbell upon its return to the 
United States did not take action to stop active duty pays and allowances. 
According to DFAS procedures, the finance office at the servicing 
demobilization station is to conduct a finance out-processing, which would 
include identifying and stopping any active duty pays that soldiers were no 
longer entitled to receive. According to DFAS-Indianapolis Reserve 
Component mobilization procedures, the local servicing active Army 
finance office also has primary responsibility for entering transactions to 
stop hardship duty pay, hostile fire pay, and the combat zone tax exclusion 
when soldiers leave an authorized hostile fire/combat zone. However, in 
this case, that office did not take action to stop these types of pay and 
allowances for many of the unitï¿½s soldiers. For example, military pay 
personnel at Fort Campbell failed to deactivate hostile fire pay for 41 out of 
62 B Company soldiers. With regard to customer service, some soldiers in 
the unit told us that upon their return from overseas deployments, they 
were informed that they should have corrected these problems while intheater, 
despite the fact that these problems were not detected until the 
demobilization phase. 
Coloradoï¿½s B Company demobilization was complicated by the fact that the 
unit did not demobilize through the same active Army location used to 
mobilize the unit. DFAS procedures provide that Army Guard soldiers are 
to demobilize and have their active duty pays stopped by the installation 
from which they originally mobilized. However, the unit received orders to 
demobilize at Fort Campbell rather than Fort Knox where they originally 
mobilized. According to Fort Campbell personnel, Coloradoï¿½s B Company 
out-processed through the required sections, including finance, during their 
demobilization. Nonetheless, the finance office at that active Army 
location failed to stop all active duty pays and allowances when the unit 
was demobilized from active duty. Fort Campbell finance office personnel 
we interviewed were not present during B Companyï¿½s demobilization and had no knowledge of why pay was not stopped during the demobilization 
process. 
Failure to stop location-based and other active duty pays and allowances 
for the unitï¿½s soldiers resulted in overpayments. As a result of the Colorado 
USPFOï¿½s errors made in attempting to amend the unitï¿½s orders to reflect an 
earlier release date than the date reflected in the unitï¿½s original mobilization 
orders, large debts were created for many soldiers in the unit. Specifically, 
largely erroneous soldier debts were created when personnel at the 
Colorado USPFO inadvertently revoked the soldiersï¿½ original mobilization 
orders when attempting to amend the orders to reflect the unitï¿½s actual 
release date of December 4, 2002ï¿½1 year before the end of the unitï¿½s 
original orders. As a result, 34 soldiers received notice on their Leave and 
Earnings Statements that rather than a debt for the 2 and a half months of 
active duty pay and allowances they received after their entitlement had 
ended, they owed debts for the 11 months of their active duty tourï¿½an 
average of $48,000 per soldier, for a total debt of $1.6 million. 
Several of the soldiers in the company noticed the erroneous debt and 
called their unit commander. Some of the soldiers wanted to settle the debt 
by writing a check to DFAS. However, they were told not to because the 
exact amount of each soldierï¿½s debt could not be readily determined and 
tracking such a payment against an as-yet undetermined amount of debt 
could confuse matters. Meanwhile, some soldiers now returned from 
active duty, resumed participation in monthly training, and began having 
two-thirds of their drill pay withheld and applied to offset their largely 
erroneous debt balances. We were told that it would take approximately 4 
to 5 years for the soldiers to pay off these debts using this approach. 
On April 17, 2003, and in a subsequent June 20, 2003, letter, we brought this 
matter to the attention of DFAS and the DOD Comptroller, respectively. 
Table 7 provides an overview of the actions leading to the creation of 
largely erroneous payroll-related debts for many of the unitï¿½s soldiers and 
DODï¿½s actions to address these largely erroneous debts. Table 
7: Timetable of Colorado B Companyï¿½s Unresolved Pay-Related Debts 
Date Action 
December 5, 2001 B Company begins active duty tour in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom. 
July to October 2002 Soldiers demobilize through Fort Campbell. Active duty pay 
and other location-based pays are not stopped by finance 
office. 
December 4, 2002 Active duty tour officially ends (1 year before the end of the 
unitï¿½s original 2-year orders). Pay is stopped for 28 of 62 
soldiers; pay erroneously continues for 34 others. 
February 14, 2003 Thirty-four soldiersï¿½ pay was not stopped until more than 70 
days after tour officially ended. In attempting to amend orders 
to stop active duty pay and allowances and correct the length of 
the unitï¿½s original 2-year orders, the state USPFO pay chief 
revokes the original orders. This action triggers a systemic 
reversal of pay already earned from March 2002 through 
February 15, 2003, and establishes debts for these soldiers 
from $34,000 to $68,000. The soldiers were first notified of 
these large debts by notations in the ï¿½Remarksï¿½ section of their 
Leave and Earnings Statements. 
April 17, 2003 GAO alerts DFAS Indianapolis of B Companyï¿½s continuing pay 
problem. 
June 20, 2003 GAO sends the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) a 
letter requesting assistance on correcting pay issues and 
making soldiers whole, including any tax consequences of 
errors. DFAS-Indianapolis suspends 24 soldiersï¿½ pay-related 
debts from collection activity. 
July 19, 2003 DFAS-Indianapolis sends representative to B Company 
monthly unit training to discuss debt computations. Debt 
computations did not reflect underpayments due soldiers for 
location-based pays. 
July 31, 2003 DFAS Indianapolis agrees to again visit B Company after 
completion of audit of soldiersï¿½ entire active duty tour in order to 
make soldiers financially whole. 
Source: GAO analysis. 
Despite considerable time and effort of DFAS and others across the Army 
Guard and Army, as of the end of our fieldwork in September 2003, 
Coloradoï¿½s B Company debt problems had not been resolved. In fact, for 
one sergeant, his pay problems were further complicated by these efforts. 
For example, in attempting to reduce the soldierï¿½s recorded $30,454 debt by 
$20,111, DFAS instead sent the soldier a payment of $20,111. As of 
September 2003, about 9 months after his demobilization, the sergeantï¿½s 
reported unpaid debt balance was $26,806, but the actual amount of his 
debt remained unresolved.
Virginia Army National Guard B Company, 3rd 
Battalion, 20th Special Forces Appendix I 
On January 2, 2002, the Virginia Army National Guardï¿½s B Company, 3rd 
Battalion, 20th Special Forces, was called to active duty in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom for a 1-year tour. The unit in-processed at 
Fort Pickett, Virginia, and departed for Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 
unit mobilized at Fort Bragg and for the next several months performed 
various duties on base until May 2002. In early May 2002, Virginiaï¿½s B 
Company deployed to Afghanistan to perform search and destroy missions 
against al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. Although several of B Companyï¿½s 
soldiers returned from Afghanistan during August and September 2002, 
most of the unitï¿½s members returned to Fort Bragg for demobilization 
during October 2002 and were released from active duty on January 2, 2003. 
A timeline of the unitï¿½s actions associated with its mobilization under 
Operation Enduring Freedom is shown in figure 10. 
Figure 
10: Timeline Showing Key Actions Associated with Virginia Army National 
Guard Special Forces Unitï¿½s Mobilization 
Dec 01 Jan 02 Jan 03 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Soldiers in-process 
at Fort Pickett, VA. 
12/15/01 
Soldiers leave Fort 
Bragg for 
In-Theater location. 
5/3/02 
Arrival in 
Afghanistan. 
5/10/02 
Demobilization 
through Ft. Bragg. 
9/02 through 
11/02 
1/02 through 4/02 
Training at Fort 
Bragg, NC. 
5/3/02 through 
5/10/02 
En route 
to Afghanistan. 
5/10/02 through 
10/02 
Deployed in and 
around Afghanistan. 
1/02/03 
Active duty tour 
officially ends. 
Source: GAO. 
As summarized in table 8, the majority of soldiers from Virginiaï¿½s B 
Company experienced some sort of pay problem during one or more of the 
three phases of their active duty mobilization. Overall, 64 of the 65 soldiers 
with the company experienced at least one pay problem associated with 
their mobilization. These pay problems included not receiving entitled 
pays and allowances at all; not receiving some entitled pays and allowances 
within 30 days; and for some, overpayments of pays and allowances. 
Specifically, we found (1) 31 soldiers did not receive certain pay and allowance entitlements at all, or within 30 days of their initial mobilization 
entitlement, or were overpaid, (2) 63 soldiers either did not receive, or did 
not receive within 30 days, the hardship duty pay or other high-risk location 
pays they were entitled to receive based on their deployment to 
Afghanistan, and (3) 60 soldiers improperly continued to receive hardship 
duty pay or hostile fire pay after leaving high-risk locations overseas. 
Table 
8: Summary of Identified Pay Problems by Phase 
Process stage Number of soldiers with pay problems 
Mobilization 31 of 65 
Deployed 63 of 65 
Demobilization 60 of 65 
Source: GAO analysis. 
In total, we identified estimated overpayments of $25,000, underpayments 
of $12,000, and late payments of $28,000 associated with the pay problems 
we found. Of the estimated $25,000 in overpayments, we identified about 
$2,000 that was subsequently collected from the soldiers. 
Our audit showed that the pay problems experienced by Virginiaï¿½s B 
Company were the result of a number of factors, including late submission 
of required pay support documents, incorrect pay inputs by Army 
personnel, and an active Army in-theater finance officeï¿½s lack of knowledge 
about the unitï¿½s presence in Afghanistan. 
These pay problems had a number of adverse effects. Several B Company 
soldiers we interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the time and effort 
they, or their spouses, were required to spend attempting to identify and 
correct problems with their pay. Another complaint concerned the circular 
nature of any attempts to get assistance. For example, we were told the 
USPFO referred soldiers to the active Army finance office and that office 
referred them back to the USPFO. Virginia USPFO officials informed us 
that the circular nature of giving assistance to soldiers was sometimes 
unavoidable. For example, they said that once soldiers left their home unit 
and the Fort Bragg and in-theater finance offices assumed pay 
responsibilities, the USPFO informed soldiers and their spouses to contact 
these active Army finance offices to discuss active duty payment problems. 
USPFO officials acknowledged that in instances in which the active Army finance office did not resolve soldiersï¿½ pay problems, USPFO staff would 
try to fix the problems. 
According to several soldiers, the combined effect of recurring pay 
problems and receiving poor payroll customer service during their active 
duty tours adversely affects morale and may have a negative effect on the 
soldiersï¿½ willingness to continue serving with the Army National Guard. 
Several soldiers told us that the numerous pay problems they encountered 
would play a major role in their decisions whether to reenlist. 
Mobilization Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 9, we identified a number of pay problems 
associated with the unitï¿½s mobilization to active duty. These problems 
resulted from failures by unit soldiers to provide necessary documentation 
to initiate certain pays, and data entry errors or late entry of data needed to 
start active duty pays by Army Guard USPFO military pay personnel and/or 
by active Army military pay personnel at the unitï¿½s mobilization station. 
Table 
9: Identified Mobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay 
Number of soldiers 
who did not receive 
pay within 30 days of 
entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Jump pay 3 8 0 
Foreign language 
proficiency pay 0 10 0 
HALO pay 0 0 10 
Basic pay 13 0 0 
Source: GAO analysis. 
We identified 31 out of 65 soldiers from Virginiaï¿½s B Company who did not 
receive certain types of pay at all, were not paid in a timely manner, or were 
overpaid after being activated on January 2, 2002. The types of pay for 
which most problems occurred during mobilization were parachute jump 
pay, foreign language proficiency pay, HALO pay, and basic pay. As shown 
in table 9, we identified 8 soldiers who were underpaid for jump pay, 10 
soldiers who were underpaid for foreign language pay, and 10 soldiers who 
were overpaid for HALO pay.
Prior to being mobilized, the soldiers in Virginiaï¿½s B Company attended a 
soldier readiness program at the USPFO at Fort Pickett, Virginia. Part of 
this program was intended to ensure that soldiers had proper 
administrative paperwork and financial documents necessary to start all 
entitled active duty pays at mobilization. Virginia USPFO personnel who 
conducted the finance portion of B Companyï¿½s soldier readiness program 
verified soldiersï¿½ supporting financial documentation and updated, if 
necessary, each soldierï¿½s Master Military Pay Accounts (MMPA). 
This verification process disclosed that many soldiers had unresolved pay 
errors that had occurred as far back as 1996. According to U.S. Army 
Forces Command Regulation 500-3-3, these problems should have been 
corrected during required annual soldier readiness reviews conducted at 
the unitï¿½s home station. As part of our analysis of the unitï¿½s pay, we 
determined that some of these long-standing pay problems had been 
resolved. For example, over $22,500 was processed for 52 B Company 
soldiersï¿½ and included in soldiersï¿½ pay distributions from October 2001 to 
March 2003. USPFO officials told us that they have been working with a 
sergeant from Virginiaï¿½s B Company who performed a detailed analysis of 
soldiersï¿½ long-standing pay problems in addition to pay problems that 
occurred subsequent to January 2002 for the majority of their mobilization.1 
This sergeant performed these pay-related tasks in addition to his missionrelated 
duties as a professional engineer. 
After leaving the unitï¿½s home station, B Company traveled to Fort Bragg, its 
active Army mobilization station. Fort Bragg personnel conducted a 
second soldier readiness program that was intended to identify and fix any 
pay issues not resolved at the home station. According to USPFO officials 
and active Army finance office officials at Fort Bragg, problems with jump 
pay and foreign language pay occurred at mobilization because the 
necessary documentation to support jump pay eligibility or language 
proficiency for a number of soldiers was not always provided to the USPFO 
or the mobilization station. For example, of the 8 soldiers in the unit who 
were underpaid for jump pay, 4 did not receive jump pay until mid- 
February 2002 and 1 did not begin to receive jump pay until mid-March. In 
another instance, we identified 10 soldiers who were eligible to receive 
foreign language proficiency pay in January 2002, but did not receive 
payments for 1 or more months after they became eligible. Further, nine soldiers in the unit were eligible for HALO pay in January 
2002. However, again, in part because of the lack of proper documentation 
from the unitï¿½s soldiers, but also because of pay input errors at the active 
Army finance unit at Fort Bragg, pay problems occurred for seven of the 
nine soldiers during January 2002, the initial month of their mobilization. 
The seven soldiers eligible for HALO pay received both jump pay as well as 
HALO pay during January 2002, which resulted in overpayments to these 
soldiers. These overpayments occurred because Fort Bragg, unaware that 
the USPFO had previously processed HALO pay for these soldiers, 
processed HALO pay a second time, based on supporting documentation 
received from the unit. Also, we found that two soldiers, who were not 
eligible to receive HALO pay, received HALO pay for 3 months and another 
soldier received HALO pay starting in January but did not become eligible 
for this pay until mid-April 2002. Documentation was not available to 
explain these errors. 
Deployment Pay 
Problems 
In May 2002, Virginiaï¿½s B Company left Fort Bragg and traveled to 
Afghanistan to assist in missions against al Qaeda and Taliban forces. 
While in Afghanistan, the soldiers encountered additional pay problems 
related to hardship duty pay, special duty assignment pay, and, to a lesser 
extent, hostile fire pay and basic pay. Also, the soldiers experienced 
problems in receiving the full amounts of their entitled HALO pay. Table 10 
summarizes the pay problems we identified for the unit while it was 
deployed. 
Table 
10: Identified Deployment Pay Problems 
Type of pay or 
allowance 
Number of soldiers 
who did not receive 
pays or allowances 
within 30 days of 
entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Hardship duty pay 63 0 0 
Special duty 
assignment pay 0 10 24 
HALO pay 0 11 0 
Hostile Fire pay 0 2 0 
Basic pay 3 0 0 
Source: GAO analysis.
Once the soldiers arrive in-theater, an active Army finance office assigned 
to the unit is responsible for initiating assignment and location-based pays 
for the unitï¿½s soldiers in DJMS-RC. However, we found that the active Army 
in-theater finance offices did not always know which units they were 
responsible for servicing or their location. The in- theater finance office for 
Virginiaï¿½s B Company, located in Kuwait, did not start these pays as 
required. We were told that this occurred because finance personnel in 
Kuwait did not know that B Company had arrived in Afghanistan. Virginiaï¿½s 
B Company soldiers, who were not regularly receiving their leave and 
earnings statements while in Afghanistan, told us they became concerned 
that they were not receiving pays they were entitled to while deployed 
based on conversations with their spouses. 
After attempts to initiate location-based pays at the battalion finance unit in 
Afghanistan were unsuccessful because finance personnel at that location 
were not familiar with DJMS-RCï¿½s transaction processing requirements for 
starting these types of pay, two soldiers were ordered to travel to Camp 
Snoopy, Qatar, where another Army finance office was located. Attempts 
to start assignment and location-based pays for the unitï¿½s soldiers at Camp 
Snoopy were also unsuccessful. One of the soldiers told us that they flew 
to Kuwait because they were advised that the finance unit at that active 
Army finance office was more knowledgeable about how to enter the 
necessary transactions into DJMS-RC to pay the unitï¿½s soldiers. The soldier 
told us he took an annotated battle roster listing the names of all Virginiaï¿½s 
B Company soldiers deployed in and around Afghanistan at that time and 
the dates they arrived in country with him as support for starting the unitï¿½s 
in theater-based pays.2 Finally, at Kuwait the appropriate in-theater pays 
were activated and the two soldiers returned to Afghanistan. As shown in 
figure 11, the entire trip required interim stops at eight locations because of 
limited air transportation and took about a week. Figure 
11: Itinerary of Two B Company Soldiersï¿½ Efforts to Start Location-Based Pays for the Unit 
Armenia 
Georgia 
Azerbaijan Tajikistan 
Qatar 
U. A. E. 
Yemen 
Iraq 
Iran 
Oman 
Saudi Arabia 
Russia 
Afghanistan 
Pakistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Caspian 
Sea 
Arabian Sea 
Indian Ocean 
Gulf of Oman 
Persian 
Gulf 
Kazakhstan 
Camp 
Snoopy 
Shabaz 
AFB 
Dushanbe 
Kandahar AFB 
Seeb AFB 
Bagram AFB 
Kuwait Intl Airport/ 
Camp Doha 5 
1 Sgt. and SFC fly from Bagram AFB, 
Afghanistan, to Dushanbe, Tajikistan. 
2 Sgt. and SFC fly from Dushanbe to Camp 
Snoopy, Qatar, and are informed of inability to 
make pay changes from Camp Snoopy. 
Sgt. and SFC spend the weekend in Qatar due 
to limited flight availablilty. 
3 Sgt. and SFC fly from Camp Snoopy to 
Jacobabad, Pakistan. 
4 Sgt. and SFC fly from Jacobabad, Pakistan 
to Kuwait International Airport. 
5 Sgt. and SFC travel 45 minutes to Camp 
Doha, Kuwait, and uses Camp Doha 
finance office to input name, SSN, rank, 
arrival date, and other pertinent information 
for each battalion member. Sgt. and SFC 
return to Kuwait International Airport. 
7 Sgt. and SFC fly from Seeb 
AFB to Kandahar AFB, Afghanistan. 
8 Sgt. and SFC fly from Kandahar AFB, 
returning to Bagram AFB, Afghanistan. 
6 Sgt. and SFC fly from Kuwait 
International Airport to Seeb AFB, Oman. Kuwait 
Source: GAO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
8 
Despite this costly, time-consuming, and risky procedure to start locationbased 
pays for the unit, 63 of Virginiaï¿½s B Company soldiers, who became eligible for hardship duty pay in May 2002, not receive their location-based 
pay entitlements until July 2002. 
Problems with special duty assignment pay also occurred during the unitï¿½s 
deployment. We found that both underpayments and overpayments of this 
type of pay were made as a result of confusion about who was responsible 
for making the manual monthly transactions necessary for entitled soldiers 
in the unit to receive these pays.. For example, 10 soldiers in B Company 
did not receive at least 1 month of entitled special duty assignment pay. 
Conversely, overpayments of this type of pay were made when B Company 
left Afghanistan and returned to Fort Bragg to demobilize in October 2002, 
and both the active Army finance office at Fort Bragg and the Virginia 
USPFO entered special duty assignment pay transactions for the unitï¿½s 
eligible soldiers. Fort Bragg processed October and November 2002 
special duty assignment duty payments for 24 of the unitï¿½s soldiers in 
December 2002. Virginiaï¿½s USPFO, unaware that Fort Bragg had made 
these payments in December 2002, also paid all 24 eligible soldiers special 
duty assignment pay for October and November 2002 several months later. 
USPFO officials explained that their military pay office processed the 
payments because B Company submitted the necessary documentation 
certifying that the unitï¿½s soldiers were entitled to receive back pay for 
missed special assignment duty pays. The officials told us that special duty 
assignment pay was processed because, having received this certification 
from the unit, they assumed that payments had not yet been made. 
Virginiaï¿½s B Company soldiers also experienced problems with HALO pay 
during deployment. We identified 11 B Company soldiers eligible for HALO 
pay who did not receive 1 or more months of this pay as of March 31, 2003. 
We determined that these problems occurred because such pays require 
manual monthly input, and the pay technicians inadvertently did not make 
the required entries each month. In addition, 2 of the unitï¿½s soldiers did not 
receive all hostile fire payments to which they were entitled. One soldier 
did not receive the first month of entitled hostile fire pay for May 2002, and 
the other soldier received hostile fire pay for May 2002 but not for the 
remaining months of his deployment.
Pay Problems 
Associated with 
Demobilization and 
Release from Active 
Duty 
Although some soldiers in B Company left Afghanistan during August and 
September 2002, most of the unit returned to Fort Bragg in October 2002 to 
begin the demobilization process. As summarized in table 11, 57 soldiers 
continued to receive pays to which they were no longer entitled because 
they left Afghanistan, including either hostile fire pay, hardship duty pay, or 
both. 
Table 
11: Identified Demobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay or allowance 
continued in error 
Number of soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Number of soldiers having 
an overpayment collected 
Hostile fire pay 55 0 
Hardship duty pay 57 23 
Source: GAO analysis. 
According to DOD mobilization procedures, the finance office at the 
servicing demobilization station is to conduct a finance out-processing. 
The finance office is responsible for inputting transactions to stop certain 
location-based pays, such as hardship duty pay and hostile fire pay. In 
addition, according to DODï¿½s Financial Management Regulation (FMR), 
Volume 7A, chapters 10 and 17, location-based pays must be terminated 
when the soldier leaves the hostile fire/combat zone. 
Overpayments to B Company soldiers occurred during demobilization 
because the in-theater finance office continued to make hostile fire and 
hardship duty pays after soldiers left Afghanistan in October 2002, and the 
Fort Bragg active Army finance office did not enter transactions into DJMSRC 
to stop these payments as required. We found that 55 of 64 soldiers 
eligible for hostile fire pay were overpaid for at least 1 month beyond their 
departure from Afghanistan. Also, we found that 57 of 64 soldiers eligible 
for hardship duty pay were overpaid at least part of 1 month. A Fort Bragg 
official explained that the Army finance office personnel at Fort Bragg 
were not aware that these payments were still being made after the soldiers 
had returned to the United States, but, subsequently determined that 
hostile fire and hardship duty overpayments were occurring and took 
action to terminate the payments. 
Also, four members of Virginiaï¿½s B Company, who were injured while 
deployed in Afghanistan, returned to Fort Bragg and requested medical 
extensions to their active duty tours so they could continue to receive active duty pay and medical benefits until they recovered. One of the 
soldiers told us, ï¿½People did not know who was responsible for what. No 
one knew who to contact or what paperwork was needed ï¿½.ï¿½ To support 
themselves and their families, these four soldiers needed the active duty 
military pay they were entitled to receive while obtaining medical 
treatment and recovering from their injuries. However, after risking their 
lives for their country, all four have had gaps in receiving active duty pay 
while they remained under a physicianï¿½s care after their demobilization 
date and have experienced financial difficulties. In addition, when active 
duty pay was stopped, the soldiersï¿½ medical benefits were discontinued. As 
discussed earlier in this report, these pay-related problems for wounded 
soldiers caused significant hardship for them and their families.
C Company, 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces 
Group, West Virginia Appendix I 
On December 5, 2001, West Virginiaï¿½s 19th Special Forces Group, 2nd 
Battalion, C Company, was called to active duty in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom for a 1-year tour. The unit was mobilized at Fort Knox 
and subsequently deployed in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and surrounding 
areas to search for possible Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists. The unit 
returned to Fort Campbell for demobilization and was released from active 
duty on December 4, 2002. A timeline of the unitï¿½s actions associated with 
its mobilization under Operation Enduring Freedom is summarized in 
figure 12. 
Figure 
12: Timeline Showing Key Actions Associated with West Virginia National 
Guard Special Forces Unitï¿½s Mobilization 
Active duty tour 
officially ends. 
12/4/02 
Dec 01 Jan 02 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Soldiers in-process 
at Fort Knox, KY. 
12/10/01 
Travel to 
Ft. Campbell, KY. 
12/14/01 
Travel to 
Afghanistan. 
12/25/01 
Arrival in 
Afghanistan. 
12/27/01 
Arrival at 
Ft. Campbell, KY. 
10/3/02 
12/14/01 through 
12/25/01 
Preparing for 
overseas deployment. 
12/27/01 through 
10/01/02 
Deployed in 
Afghanistan. 
10/3/02 through 
10/18/02 
Demobilization at 
Ft. Campbell, KY. 
Source: GAO 
As summarized in table 12, the majority of soldiers from C Company 
experienced some sort of pay problem during one or more of the three 
phases of their active duty mobilization. Overall, 86 of the 94 soldiers with 
the company experienced at least one pay problem associated with its 
mobilization. Specifically, we identified (1) 36 soldiers who were either 
overpaid, did not receive certain pay and allowance entitlements at all, or 
did not receive pay within 30 days of their initial mobilization entitlement, 
(2) 84 soldiers who were either overpaid, did not receive, or did not receive 
within 30 days, the hostile fire pay or other high-risk location pays they were entitled to receive based on their deployment in Uzbekistan and 
Afghanistan, and (3) 66 soldiers who did not receive, or did not receive 
within 30 days, their special duty assignment pay during their 
demobilization. 
Table 
12: Summary of Identified Pay Problems by Phase 
Process stage Number of soldiers with pay problems 
Mobilization 36 of 94 
Deployed 84 of 94 
Demobilization 66 of 94 
Source: GAO analysis. 
In total, we identified estimated overpayments of $31,000, underpayments 
of $9,000, and late payments of $61,000 associated with the identified pay 
problems. We did not identify any collections related to overpayments for 
this unit. 
Mobilization Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 13, several soldiers from C Company did not 
receive the correct pay or allowance when called to active duty. We found 
that some soldiers received payments over 5 months late and other soldiers 
had been overpaid. Seven soldiers did not receive their $225 per month 
HALO pay until over a month after mobilization, and 18 other soldiers 
received combat diver pay and HALO pay to which they were not entitled. 
Table 
13: Identified Mobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay or 
allowance 
Number of soldiers who 
did not receive pay or 
allowance within 30 
days of entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
HALO pay 7 0 10 
Combat diver pay 0 0 8 
Jump pay 0 7 0 
Special duty assignment 
pay 4 0 0 
Foreign language 
proficiency pay 3 3 0
Family separation 
allowance 2 0 0 
All entitled pays and 
allowances 0 0 1 
Source: GAO analysis. 
Prior to being mobilized, the soldiers in C Company attended a soldier 
readiness program at their unit armory. This program was intended to 
ensure that all soldiers had proper administrative paperwork and financial 
documents and were physically fit for the ensuing mobilization. West 
Virginia USPFO personnel who conducted the finance portion of C 
Companyï¿½s soldier readiness program were required to verify soldiersï¿½ 
supporting financial documentation, and update, if necessary, soldiersï¿½ pay 
records in DJMS-RC. Soldiers not submitting the correct paperwork at the 
time of the Soldier Readiness Program caused some payments to be late. 
For example, according to the USPFO, one soldier did not submit the 
proper paperwork for his family separation allowance. The delay in 
submission caused his first payment to be over 3 months late. 
Another problem with the unitï¿½s mobilization related to 17 soldiers who had 
significant problems with their HALO pay. According to USPFO personnel, 
the unit commander for C Company did not provide the USPFO a list of the 
unit members who were eligible to receive HALO pay. Therefore, the 
USPFO paid all the unit members who were parachute qualified the regular 
parachute pay. Once the USPFO received a list of the unitï¿½s 17 HALOqualified 
soldiers, pay personnel attempted to recoup the regular jump pay 
and pay the HALO team the increased HALO pay amount. USPFO 
personnel told us they did not know how to initiate a payment for the 
difference between regular jump and HALO pay. Consequently, they 
entered transactions to recoup the entire amount of jump pay and then 
initiated a separate transaction to pay the correct amount of HALO pay. 
According to the DOD FMR, volume 7A, chapter 24, soldiers who are 
eligible to receive regular parachute pay and HALO pay are paid the higher 
of the two amounts, but not both. In this case, the 17 members of C 
Companyï¿½s HALO team should have received a $225 per month payment 
from the beginning of their mobilization. Pay records indicate that this 
correction initiated by the USPFO occurred about 2 months after the unit mobilized. When the USPFO personnel attempted to collect the soldiersï¿½ 
regular parachute pay, they inadvertently collected a large amount of the 
soldiersï¿½ basic active duty pay for the first month of their mobilization. 
Personnel at the USPFO stated that the error caused debts on soldiersï¿½ 
accounts but was corrected immediately after a pay supervisor at the 
USPFO detected the error in February. Even after the soldiersï¿½ pay was 
corrected, USPFO personnel did not stop the regular parachute pay for the 
HALO team members, but instead let it continue, then collected the $150 
per month parachute pay manually, and then paid the correct $225 per 
month HALO pay. This error-prone, labor- intensive manual collection and 
subsequent payment method used by the USPFO personnel to pay C 
Companyï¿½s HALO team the higher HALO rate of pay was not consistently 
applied each month and resulted in 7 soldiers being overpaid when their 
regular parachute pay was not collected. 
In addition to the 7 soldiers who were actually on the HALO team, 10 other 
soldiers were on the initial list given to the USPFO but were actually not on 
the HALO team. The unit commander for C Company provided a more 
accurate list to the USPFO some time after the first list, and only members 
on the more accurate list continued to receive HALO pay. However, 
USPFO pay personnel did not attempt to collect the HALO pay from unit 
members on the first list who had incorrectly received HALO pay. As a 
result of this complex collection and payment process, the unitï¿½s soldiers 
were confused about whether they were receiving all their entitled active 
duty pays while mobilized. 
After leaving the unitï¿½s home station, C Company traveled to Fort Knox, its 
active Army mobilization station. As required by Army guidance, Fort 
Knox personnel conducted a second soldier readiness program to identify 
and fix unresolved pay issues associated with the unitï¿½s mobilization. 
Based on our findings that the pay problems continued after this review, it 
does not appear that the active Army finance office at Fort Knox carried 
out its responsibility to review and validate all of C Company soldiersï¿½ 
active duty pays and allowance support records. Problems with HALO and 
family separation pay were not resolved for several months after the 
mobilization. As a result, the soldiersï¿½ pay problems persisted into their 
deployment overseas. 
Deployment Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 14, we identified a number of pay problems 
associated with three different types of active duty pays related to the unitï¿½s 
deployment.
Table 
14: Identified Deployment Pay Problems 
Type of pay or allowance 
Number of soldiers 
who did not receive 
pay or allowance 
within 30 days of 
entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Hostile fire pay 45 18 40 
Hardship duty pay 
(designated areas) 75 5 12 
Hardship duty pay (certain 
places) 0 0 29 
Source: GAO analysis. 
After going through initial in-processing at Fort Knox, C Company soldiers 
traveled to Fort Campbell where they prepared to deploy overseas. 
Starting in December 2001, members of C Company traveled to Uzbekistan 
and Afghanistan to perform special forces missions. During their 
deployment overseas, C Company soldiers consistently experienced 
problems related to specific location-based payments such as hostile fire 
pay and hardship duty pay. In 78 cases, the payments were not started 
within 30 days from when the soldiers were entitled to the payments. In 22 
other cases, we determined that soldiers had not received all locationbased 
pays as of March 31, 2003. In 60 cases, the soldiers were overpaid or 
payments were not stopped when they left the combat zones. Due to the 
lack of supporting documents at the state, unit, and battalion-levels, dates 
for when each soldier entered and left combat zones were not always 
available. Consequently, there may have been other deployment-related 
pay problems for C Company that we were not able to identify. 
According to DFAS policy, when soldiers from C Company arrived in 
Uzbekistan the in-theater finance office in Uzbekistan was responsible for 
initiating location-based payments for the unit. Unit personnel stated that 
the staff in the finance office in Uzbekistan were not adequately trained in 
how to input pays into DJMS-RC. Initially, we were told the Uzbekistan 
finance office incorrectly believed it was the West Virginia USPFOï¿½s 
responsibility to start location-based pays for the deployed soldiers from C 
Company. The active Army finance office in Uzbekistan instructed the unit 
to contact the West Virginia USPFO to start location-based pays. However, 
DFAS policy clearly states that it is the active Army in-theater finance 
officeï¿½s responsibility to start and maintain monthly location-based 
payments.
After attempts by the unit administrator and the Uzbekistan finance office 
failed to initiate the payments, a sergeant in C Company was ordered to 
travel to Camp Doha, Kuwait, to have the unitï¿½s location-based pays started. 
The soldier stated that he traveled to Camp Doha because he was told that 
the finance unit at that active Army finance location was more 
knowledgeable in how to enter transactions into DJMS-RC to initiate 
location-based pays for the unitï¿½s soldiers. The soldier took with him all the 
necessary paperwork to have the pays started for all the companies under 
the battalion, including C Company. On the return flight from the 
sergeantï¿½s mission in Kuwait, his plane encountered enemy fire and was 
forced to return to a safe airport until the next day. The failure by active 
Army personnel at the finance office in Uzbekistan to enter the 
transactions necessary to start location-based pays for the unit delayed 
payments to some soldiers for up to 9 months and put one soldier in harmï¿½s 
way. 
Per DOD FMR, volume 7A, chapter 10, soldiers who perform duty in hostile 
fire zones are entitled to hostile fire pay as soon as they enter the zone. 
However, we found that 45 soldiers in C Company did not have their hostile 
fire pay started until over 30 days after they were entitled to receive it. 
Some of C Companyï¿½s soldiers received retroactive payments over 2 
months after they should have received their pay. In addition, as of March 
31, 2003, we determined that 18 soldiers from the unit were not yet paid for 
1 or more months that they were in the hostile fire zone. We also identified 
40 soldiers who received hostile fire pay after they had left the country and 
were no longer entitled to receive such pays. These overpayments 
occurred primarily because hostile fire pay is an automatic recurring 
payment based on the start and stop date for the soldierï¿½s mobilization 
entered into DJMS-RC. However, in this case, the active Army finance 
office in Uzbekistan did not amend the stop dates for automated active 
duty pays in DJMS-RC to reflect that C Company left the designated area 
before the stop date entered into DJMS-RC. The active Army finance 
officeï¿½s failure to follow prescribed procedures resulted in overpayment of 
this pay to 40 soldiers. 
Per DOD FMR, volume 7A, chapter 17, soldiers who perform duties in 
designated areas for over 30 days are entitled to the hardship duty pay 
incentive. The FMR provides for two mutually exclusive types of hardship 
duty pay for identified locationsï¿½one according to specified ï¿½designated 
areasï¿½ and the other for specified ï¿½certain places.ï¿½ Effective December 31, 
2001, the regulation no longer permitted soldiers newly assigned to 
locations specified as ï¿½certain placesï¿½ to begin receiving hardship duty pay. However, the regulation specified Afghanistan and Uzbekistan as 
designated areas and provided for paying $100 a month to each soldier 
serving there. 
While deployed to Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, 29 soldiers in C Company 
were mistakenly provided both types of hardship duty pay. The local 
finance office in Uzbekistan correctly entered transactions to start C 
Companyï¿½s hardship duty pay for designated areas into the DJMS-RC pay 
system. Due to limitations in DJMS-RC, the local finance office was 
required to manually enter the designated area payments for each soldier 
every month the unit was in a designated area. However, DFAS 
documentation shows that finance personnel at Fort Bragg incorrectly 
initiated a recurring certain places hardship duty payment for soldiers in C 
Company.1 For some soldiers, payments continued until May 31, 2002 and 
for others the payments continued until the end of their tour of active duty 
on December 4, 2002. These erroneous certain places hardship duty pays 
resulted in overpayments. 
In addition, because DJMS-RC processing capability limitations required 
the designated areas payment to be manually entered every month the unit 
was in the designated area, the in-theater finance office in Uzbekistan 
failed to consistently enter the monthly designated area payments for all 
entitled soldiers. Throughout the time C Company was in Uzbekistan and 
Afghanistan, we identified a total of 5 soldiers who missed one or more 
monthly payments of entitled hardship duty designated area pay. Other 
soldiers received entitled payments over 9 months late. Still others were 
paid more than once for the same month or paid after leaving the 
designated area, resulting in overpayments to 12 soldiers. The mix of 
erroneous certain places hardship duty payments along with sporadic 
payments of the correct type of designated area hardship duty pay caused 
confusion for the soldiers of C Company and their families regarding what 
types of pay they were entitled to receive and whether they received all 
active duty entitlements. Demobilization and 
Release from Active 
Duty Pay Problems 
C Company returned to Fort Campbell during the fall of 2002 to begin the 
demobilization process. By October 2002, all of the unit had returned from 
overseas and was demobilized on December 4, 2002. As shown in table 15, 
66 of C Companyï¿½s 94 soldiers experienced pay problems associated with 
their demobilization from active duty. 
Table 
15: Identified Pay Demobilization Problems 
Type of Pay or Allowance 
Number of soldiers who did not 
receive pay or allowances within 
30 days of entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Special duty assignment pay 63 3 
Source: GAO analysis. 
In October 2002, eligible soldiers in the unit were entitled to a special duty 
assignment pay increase from $110 per month to $220 per month. To 
initiate this higher pay rate, the West Virginia Army National Guard military 
personnel office was required to cut new special duty assignment pay 
orders for all eligible C Company soldiers. USPFO officials stated that they 
could not pay the increased amount until they received a copy of the new 
orders. The USPFO personnel did not continue to pay the $110 a month to 
the soldiers because they did not want to have to recoup the old amount 
and then pay the correct amount when orders were received. However, the 
orders for the soldiers were not received by the USPFO for several months, 
which created a delay in the payment of the soldiersï¿½ special duty 
assignment pay. Supporting documents showed that a delay in the 
production of the orders by the West Virginia Army National Guard military 
personnel office caused the late payments. For C Company, 63 soldiers 
received their last 3 months of special duty assignment pay over 30 days 
late. Another 3 soldiers did not receive their last 3 months of special duty 
assignment pay because the USPFO inadvertently overlooked the manual 
transaction entries required to process special duty assignment pay for 
those soldiers. Mississippi 114th Military Police Company Appendix IV 
On December 27, 2001, the Mississippi Army National Guardï¿½s 114th 
Military Police Company was called to active duty in support of Operation 
Noble Eagle for a 1-year tourï¿½through January 5, 2003. The unit 
mobilized in Clinton, Mississippi, and departed for Fort Campbell, 
Kentucky, on January 6, 2002. The unit in-processed at Fort Campbell and 
for the next 5 months performed military police duties at Fort Campbell 
until early June. On June 10, 2002, the 114th Military Police Company 
deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to perform base security and guard 
duties for Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners. After guarding detainees in Cuba 
for approximately 6 months, the unit returned to Fort Campbell in late 
November 2002. At Fort Campbell the unit out-processed and returned to 
Clinton, Mississippi, and was released from active duty on January 5, 2003. 
A time line of actions associated with the unitï¿½s active duty mobilization is 
shown in figure 13. 
Figure 
13: Timeline Showing Key Actions Associated with the Mississippi Army 
National Guard Military Police Unitï¿½s Mobilization 
Jan 02 Dec Nov Jan 03 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct 
To Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. 
6/10/02 
Return to 
Ft. Campbell, KY. 
11/23/02 
Release from 
active duty. 
1/05/03 
Soldiers mobilize at 
Clinton, MS home station. 
1/6/02 
1/6/02 through 
6/10/02 
Guard duty at 
Fort Campbell, KY. approx. 1/7/02 
Soldiers go to 
Ft. Campbell, KY 
Mobilization station. 
6/10/02 through 
11/23/02 
Deployed in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
12/02 
Return to 
Clinton, MS 
home station. 
Source: GAO 
As summarized in table 16, at every stage of the unitï¿½s 1-year tour of active 
duty, soldiers experienced various pay problems. Of the 119 soldiers of the 
Mississippi Army National Guardï¿½s 114th Military Police Company, 105 
experienced at least one pay problem associated with mobilization in 
support of Operation Noble Eagle. Specifically, we found that (1) 21 
soldiers experienced underpayments, overpayments, or late payments, or a 
combination of these, during their initial mobilization, including some 
soldiers who did not receive payments for up to 7 months after their 
mobilization dates, and others who still have not received certain payments, (2) 93 soldiers experienced underpayments, overpayments, late 
payments, or some combination, during their tour of active duty at Fort 
Campbell and in Cuba, including in-theater incentives such as hardship 
duty pay, and (3) 90 soldiers experienced underpayments, overpayments, 
late payments, or a combination of these, during their demobilization at 
Fort Campbell, including problems related to the continuation of in-theater 
incentives and overpayment of active duty pay after demobilization. 
Table 
16: Summary of Identified Pay Problems by Phase 
Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems 
Mobilization 21 of 119 
Deployed 93 of 119 
Demobilization 90 of 119 
Source: GAO analysis. 
In total, we identified estimated overpayments of $50,000, underpayments 
of $6,000, and late payments of $15,000 associated with the pay problems 
we found. Of the estimated $50,000 in overpayments, we identified about 
$13,000 that was subsequently collected from the unitï¿½s soldiers. 
Mobilization Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 17, we found that 21 soldiers from the 114th Military 
Police Company experienced underpayments, overpayments, late 
payments, or some combination related to pay and allowance entitlements 
when called to active duty. For example, several soldiers did not receive 
their entitled $100 per month family separation allowance until 7 months 
after mobilization, and several other soldiers did not receive the correct 
type of basic allowance for housing as specified in the DOD FMR, Volume 
7A, chapter 26. Table 
17: Identified Mobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay or 
allowance 
Number of soldiers who 
did not receive pay or 
allowances within 30 
days of entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Basic pay 2 1 5 
Family separation 
allowance 11 1 0 
Basic allowance for 
housing 2 3 0 
Jump pay 0 0 1 
Source: GAO analysis. 
Prior to being mobilized, the soldiers in the 114th Military Police Company 
attended a soldier readiness program at their unit armory. The purpose of 
this review was to ensure that all soldiers had proper administrative 
paperwork and financial documents and were physically fit for the ensuing 
mobilization. Mississippi USPFO personnel, who conducted the finance 
portion of the 114th Military Police unitï¿½s soldier readiness program, were 
required to verify soldiersï¿½ supporting financial documentation, and update, 
if necessary, soldiersï¿½ MMPAs. Not submitting the complete and current 
paperwork at the time of the soldier readiness program contributed to 
some of the late payments we identified. For example, some soldiers did 
not receive their family separation allowance because they did not provide 
documentation supporting custody arrangements. However, we also found 
that confusion at the USPFO over the eligibility of single parents 
contributed to these late pays. It was later in the unitï¿½s active duty tour that 
finance officers initiated action for 11 of the 114th Military Police unitï¿½s 
soldiers to receive retroactive payments, some for as much as 7-months of 
back pay. In another case, a former Special Forces soldier improperly 
received jump pay even though his assignment to this military police unit 
did not require that special skill. 
Five soldiers improperly received active duty pay and allowances even 
though they did not mobilize with the unit. Because these five soldiers 
were not deployable for a variety of reasons, they were transferred to 
another unit that was not subject to the current mobilization. However, the 
delay in entering the transfer and stopping pay caused each of these 
soldiers to receive active duty pay for 10 days. Several other soldiers 
received promotions at the time of their mobilization, but state military pay 
personnel at the USPFO did not enter transactions for the promotions until several months later, resulting in late promotion pay to the affected 
soldiers. Delays by the unit in submitting the promotion paperwork or by 
the state personnel office in entering the promotion paperwork into the 
personnel system caused these problems. However, supporting documents 
were not available to enable us to determine the specific cause of the 
delays. 
After leaving the unitï¿½s home station, the 114th Military Police Company 
traveled to Fort Campbell, its active Army mobilization station. As required 
by Army guidance, Fort Campbell personnel conducted a second soldier 
readiness program intended, in part, to verify the accuracy of soldiersï¿½ pay 
records. However, instead of conducting a thorough review of each 
soldierï¿½s pay record, Fort Campbell finance personnel performed only a 
perfunctory review by asking the soldiers if they were experiencing pay 
problems. At this point, because the soldiers had only recently mobilized 
and had not received their first paychecks, they were unaware of pay 
problems. Failure to follow requirements for finance verification at Fort 
Campbell of each soldierï¿½s pay account caused pay problems to persist past 
the mobilization stage. In addition, we were unable to determine specific 
causes for certain pay problems associated with the unitï¿½s mobilization 
because the unit remobilized in February 2003, and unit administrative 
personnel did not retain payroll source documents relating to the prior 
mobilization. 
Deployment Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 18, we identified a number of pay problems 
associated with four types of active duty pays and allowances associated 
with the unitï¿½s deployment while on active duty.
Table 
18: Identified Deployment Pay Problems 
Type of pay or 
allowance 
Number of soldiers who 
did not receive pay or 
allowances within 30 
days of entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Basic pay 10 0 0 
Family separation 
allowance 3 0 3 
Basic allowance for 
housing 1 0 0 
Hardship duty pay 0 11 88 
Source: GAO analysis. 
While at Fort Campbell, eight soldiers experienced problems resulting from 
delays in entering changes in the family separation allowance, basic 
allowance for housing, and active duty pay increases from promotions. For 
example, one soldier was promoted to the rank of Private First Class at the 
end of May, but the pay system did not reflect the promotion until October. 
Although the soldier eventually received retroactive promotion pay, the 
delay caused the soldier to be paid at her old rank for 5 months. According 
to DFAS guidance, when a change occurs in a soldierï¿½s pay, the on-site 
Army finance office should input the change. In cases where personnel 
changes occurred that affected pay, either the soldiers failed to submit 
documents or personnel at Fort Campbell failed to input the changes. Due 
to the lack of documentation, we could not determine the origin of the 
delays. 
During the unitï¿½s deployment to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the soldiers 
encountered additional pay problems related to hardship duty pay, a 
location-based payment for soldiers located at designated hardship duty 
locations. Some soldiers received extra hardship duty payments, while 
others were only paid sporadically. In total, only 9 of the 100 soldiers who 
deployed to Guantanamo Bay with the 114th Military Police Company 
received the correctly computed hardship duty pay. 
Per DOD FMR, Volume 7A, chapter 17, soldiers who perform duties in 
designated areas for over 30 days are entitled to the hardship duty pay 
incentive. The FMR provides for two mutually exclusive types of hardship 
duty pay for identified locations; one according to specified ï¿½designated 
areasï¿½ and the other for specified ï¿½certain places.ï¿½ Effective December 
2001, the regulation no longer permitted soldiers newly assigned to locations specified as certain places to begin receiving hardship duty pay. 
However, the regulation specified Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as a designated 
area and provided for paying $50 a month to each soldier serving there. 
Most of the 114th Military Police unitï¿½s soldiers were mistakenly provided 
both types of hardship duty pay while deployed to Cuba. Upon arrival in 
Cuba, the local Guantanamo Bay finance office correctly entered 
transactions to start hardship duty pay for designated areas for the 114th 
Military Police unitï¿½s soldiers into DJMS-RC. However, unknown to 
Guantanamo finance personnel, Fort Campbell finance personnel, upon the 
unitï¿½s departure to Cuba, incorrectly initiated recurring certain places 
hardship duty payments for the soldiers of the 114th Military Police unit. 
These payments of both types of hardship duty pay resulted in 
overpayments to 88 enlisted soldiers of the 114th Military Police Company 
during the time the soldiers were stationed in Cuba. 
In addition, as a result of personnel turnover and heavy workload in the 
active Armyï¿½s Guantanamo Bay finance office and limitations in DJMS-RC, 
the Guantanamo Bay finance office did not make all the required monthly 
manual transaction entries required to pay hardship duty pays to the 114th 
Military Police Companyï¿½s soldiers. As a result, several soldiers in the unit 
did not receive one or more monthly hardship duty payments. Limitations 
in DJMS-RC required the local finance office to manually enter the 
designated area payments for each soldier on a monthly basis. For 11 
soldiers, the finance office inadvertently overlooked entering one or more 
monthly hardship duty payments. The combination of erroneous certain 
places payments, along with sporadic payments of hardship duty 
designated area pays caused confusion for the soldiers who were 
performing a stressful mission in Cuba regarding whether they were 
receiving all their active duty pay entitlements. 
Pay Problems 
Associated with 
Demobilization and 
Release from Active 
Duty 
The 114th Military Police Company returned to Fort Campbell on November 
23, 2002, to begin the demobilization process. During demobilization, 
soldiers continued to experience pay problems. As summarized in table 19, 
overpayment problems consisted of improper continuation of hardship 
duty pay following the unitï¿½s return from Cuba and failure to stop active 
duty pay and allowances to soldiers who were discharged or returned from 
active duty early. Table 
19: Identified Demobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay or allowance Number of soldiers who were overpaid 
Basic pay 5 
Family separation allowance 5 
Basic allowance for subsistence 5 
Basic allowance for housing 5 
Hardship duty pay 85 
Source: GAO analysis. 
According to the DOD FMR, Volume 7A, chapter 17, soldiers are entitled to 
receive hardship duty pay only while they are stationed in a hardship duty 
location. While the active Armyï¿½s Guantanamo Bay finance office stopped 
monthly designated area payments upon the unitï¿½s departure from Cuba, 
the Fort Campbell finance office did not discontinue the incorrect certain 
places payments that its finance office had initiated months earlier. 
Consequently, 85 of 88 soldiers of the 114th Military Police unitï¿½s soldiers 
continued receiving the incorrect certain places payments through their 
last day of active duty. 
In addition, five soldiers continued to receive active duty pay and 
allowances after being discharged or returned from active duty. Instead of 
demobilizing on schedule with their unit, these five soldiers demobilized 
individually earlier due to various reasons. According to DFAS guidance, 
Fort Campbell, the designated demobilization station for the 114th Military 
Police Company, was responsible for stopping active duty pay for the unitï¿½s 
demobilizing soldiers. However, when these individual soldiers were 
released from active duty, Fort Campbell processed discharge orders but 
Fort Campbellï¿½s finance office failed to stop their pay. Further, in at least 
one case in which documentation was available, state USPFO military pay 
personnel did not immediately detect the overpayments in monthly pay 
system mismatch reports.1 For these five soldiers, overpayments 
continued for up to 3 months. One of these soldiers was discharged early because of drug-related 
charges. However, his pay continued for 3 months past his discharge date. 
By the time the USPFO stopped the active duty pay, the former soldier had 
received overpayments of about $9,400. Although the state USPFO military 
pay personnel stopped the active duty pay in September 2002, no attempt 
to collect the overpayment was made until we identified the problem. In 
July 2003, state military pay personnel initiated collection for the 
overpayment. 
Another soldier was discharged on July 8, 2002, for family hardship 
reasons, but his active duty pay was not stopped until August 15, resulting 
in an overpayment. Another 114th Military Police soldier was returned from 
active duty on September 11, 2002, for family hardship reasons, but his 
active duty pay was not stopped until November 30, resulting in an 
overpayment of about $8,600. Another soldier, facing disciplinary 
proceedings related to a domestic violence incident, agreed to an early 
discharge on May 22, 2002. However, the soldierï¿½s active duty pay was not 
stopped until the unit administrative officer, while deployed in Cuba, 
reviewed the unit commanderï¿½s finance report and discovered the soldier 
still on company pay records and reported the error. Following his 
discharge, this soldier continued to receive active duty pay until August 31, 
resulting in an overpayment. Maryland 200th Military Police Company Appendix V 
The 200th Military Police Company was called to active duty in support of 
Operation Noble Eagle on October 1, 2001, for a period not to exceed 365 
days. The unit, including 90 soldiers who received orders to mobilize with 
the 200th Military Police Company, reported to its home station, Salisbury, 
Maryland, on October 1, 2001, and then proceeded to Camp Fretterd 
located in Reisterstown, Maryland, for the soldier readiness program (SRP) 
in- processing. On October 13, 2001, they arrived at their designated 
mobilization station at Fort Stewart, Georgia, where they remained for the 
next 2 weeks undergoing additional in-processing.1 The unit performed 
general military police guard duties at Fort Stewart until December 15, 
2001, when 87 of the soldiers in the unit were deployed to guard the 
Pentagon. The company arrived at Ft. Eustis, Virginia, in late August 2002 
and was released from active duty on September 30, 2002. In addition, 3 of 
the 90 soldiers who received orders from the 200th Military Police Company 
were deployed in January 2002 to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to perform base 
security and guard duties with Marylandï¿½s 115th Military Police Company. 
These soldiers demobilized at Fort Stewart, Georgia, where they were 
released from active duty on July 10, 2002. A time line of key actions 
associated with the unitï¿½s mobilization under Operation Noble Eagle is 
shown in figure 14. Figure 
14: Timeline Showing Key Actions Associated with the Maryland National 
Guard Military Police Unitï¿½s Mobilization 
Dec Nov Oct Jan 02 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct 
Unit called to 
active duty 
10/1/01 
Unit travels to Fort Stewart, GA 
mobilization station 
10/13/01 
Deployed to Ft. Myer, VA 
to perform Pentagon guard duty 
12/15/01 
Demobilized at 
Fort Eustis, VA 
Late August 2002 
Active duty 
officially ends. 
9/30/02 
10/13/01 through 
12/14/01 
In processing and guard duty 
at Fort Stewart, GA. 
12/15/01 through 
late August 2002 
Performed Pentagon 
guard duty 
Source: GAO 
As summarized in table 20, the majority of soldiers from the company 
experienced some sort of pay problem during one or more phases of the 
three phases of their active duty mobilization. Overall, 83 of the companyï¿½s 
90 soldiers experienced at least one pay problem associated with their 
mobilization in support of Operation Noble Eagle. Pay problems included 
overpayments, underpayments, and late payments of entitlements, such as 
basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, 
family separation allowance and hardship duty pay associated with their 
initial mobilization, deployment to Fort Stewart, the Pentagon, and Cuba; 
and demobilization from active duty status. 
Table 
20: Summary of Identified Pay Problems by Phase 
Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems 
Mobilization 75 of 90 
Deployed 64 of 90 
Demobilization 3 of 90 
Source: GAO analysis. 
In total, we identified estimated overpayments of $74,000, underpayments 
of $11,000, and late payments of $10,000, associated with the pay problems we identified. Of the estimated $74,000 in identified overpayments, we 
identified about $32,000 that was subsequently collected from the unitï¿½s 
soldiers. Specifically, we determined that 
ï¿½ 75 soldiers were overpaid, underpaid, and/or paid late during the period 
of mobilization, including a soldier who did not receive correct 
payments for up to 7 months after the mobilization date; 
ï¿½ 64 soldiers experienced pay problems during their tour of active duty 
related to the proper payment of basic pay, basic allowance for 
subsistence, basic allowance for housing, family separation allowance, 
and location-based pays such as hardship duty pay; and 
ï¿½ 3 soldiers experienced pay problems during their demobilization from 
Fort Stewart related to continuation of active duty pay entitlements 
after they were released early from active duty. 
We identified a number of causes associated with these pay problems, 
including delays in submitting documents, incorrect data entry, and limited 
personnel to process the mass mobilizations. Marylandï¿½s USPFO officials 
told us they had not experienced a large-scale mobilization to active duty in 
more than 10 years. 
Mobilization Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 21, we identified a number of pay problems 
associated with eight different types of active duty pays and allowances 
associated with the unitï¿½s mobilization to active duty. Seventy-five of 90 
soldiers from the 200thth Military Police Company did not receive the 
correct or timely entitlements related to basic pay, basic allowance for 
housing, basic allowance for subsistence, or family separation allowance 
when called to active duty. Table 
21: Identified Mobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay or 
allowance 
Number of soldiers 
who did not receive 
pay or allowances 
within 30 days of 
entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Basic pay 4 0 13 
Basic allowance for 
housing 4 24 16 
Basic allowance for 
subsistence 3 1 21 
Family separation 
allowance 11 42 2 
Source: GAO analysis. 
Thirteen soldiers received overpayments because they continued to receive 
pay after they were released early from active duty. These soldiers 
mobilized on October 1, 2001, and then received amended orders to be 
released from active duty around October 13, 2001. However, many 
continued to receive basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence, basic 
allowance for housing, and family separation allowance payments through 
the end of November 2001. The unit administrator stated that many of 
these soldiers received amended orders after their initial mobilization 
when it was determined that they were not deployable for a variety of 
reasons, such as health or family problems. The overpayments occurred 
because the Maryland Army Guard command was not informed by either 
unit personnel or the active component that individuals (1) did not deploy 
or (2) were released from active duty early. The Maryland Army Guard 
command initiated amendment orders to stop the active duty pays when it 
became aware of the problem; however, the orders were not generated in 
time for the USPFO to stop active duty pays in the system. Specifically, in 
order for pay to be stopped by October 13, 2001, the USPFO must have 
received and processed the amended orders by October 8, 2001. However, 
the Maryland Army Guard command did not generate many of the amended 
orders until November 14, 2001, at which time they would have been sent to 
the unit and then forwarded to the USPFO too late to meet the pay cutoff. 
An additional soldier was issued an amended order to release him from 
active duty on October 13, 2001. Upon our review of his pay account, we 
determined that he continued to receive active duty pay and allowances for 
an entire year. We spoke with the unit administrator about this soldier and determined that he mobilized with the unit and was deployed for the entire 
year that he was paid. The unit administrator and Maryland Army Guard 
command, along with the USPFO pay officials, were not sure why the 
amendment order was never processed. They believe that the amendment 
fell through the cracks due to the general confusion and the limited 
personnel processing the mass mobilizations after September 11, 2001. 
Based on our inquiries, the Maryland Army Guard command generated an 
amendment on August 21, 2003, to reinstate the original order to avoid 
future questions regarding the soldierï¿½s tour of duty. 
Further, 42 soldiers from the unit were underpaid their entitled family 
separation allowance when they mobilized. Soldiers are entitled to receive 
a family separation allowance after they have been deployed away from 
home for more than 30 days. We found that these underpayments occurred 
as a result of Maryland USPFO military pay officialsï¿½ errors in calculating 
the start and stop dates for this allowance. 
Several soldiers did not receive the correct type of basic allowance for 
housing after being mobilized as specified in the DOD FMR, Volume 7A, 
chapter 26. We were unable to determine specific causes and amounts of 
all the unitï¿½s problems associated with the basic allowance for housing 
because the unit had remobilized in July 2003 and some of the historical 
records relating to housing entitlements applicable to the prior 
mobilization could not be located. Furthermore, the original unit 
administrator had retired, leaving limited records of the prior mobilization 
for the current unit administrator. Based on our inquiries, we determined 
that some soldiers were underpaid their housing allowance because the 
Maryland USPFO military pay officials entered the incorrect date for the 
tour and therefore shortened the unitï¿½s soldiersï¿½ allowance by 1 day. Other 
soldiers did not receive the correct amount for this allowance as a result of 
different interpretations of how to enter ï¿½dependentï¿½ information provided 
on housing allowance application forms (Form 5960). According to 
personnel officials, married soldiers are required to write in their spousesï¿½ 
names as dependents on Form 5960 in order to receive the higher housing 
allowance amount. However, guidance did not clearly specify that simply 
checking the box indicating that they are married is not sufficient support 
to receive the higher housing allowance (with dependents) rate. As a 
result, several soldiersï¿½ dependent information was not loaded into the 
personnel system correctly, and they were paid a single rate housing 
allowance instead of the higher married rate allowance. Other soldiers did not receive the correct housing allowance because they 
did not turn in complete forms and documentation to initiate the correct 
allowance rate or were late in turning in documents. For example, one 
soldier, who appeared to have submitted his lease agreement 6 days after 
being called to active duty, did not receive the correct housing allowance 
amount for the first 2 months of active duty. During his entire deployment, 
the soldier attempted to get various unit and military pay officials to take 
action to initiate back pay for these housing allowance underpayments, 
including forwarding copies of the lease agreement as proof for payment 
on three different occasions. As of March 30, 2003, the soldier had not 
received the correct housing allowance for October and November 2001. 
Another soldier did not receive the correct amount of housing allowance 
after his mobilization and complained to the unit administrator. Seven 
months after his initial mobilization to active duty, finance officials at the 
active duty station in Fort Belvoir, Virginia, who were attempting to correct 
the soldierï¿½s housing allowance instead inadvertently entered a transaction 
to collect the entire amount of the housing allowance previously paid to the 
soldier. Finance officials at Fort Belvoir subsequently entered a 
transaction to reverse the error and pay the soldier a ï¿½catch-upï¿½ housing 
allowance payment. 
Deployment Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 22, we identified a number of pay problems 
associated with five different types of active duty pays and allowances 
associated with the unitï¿½s deployment. 
Table 
22: Identified Deployment Pay Problems 
Type of pay or 
allowance 
Number of soldiers who 
did not receive pay or 
allowance within 30 days 
of entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Basic pay 1 0 1 
Basic allowance for 
housing 0 0 1 
Basic allowance for 
subsistence 0 1 62 
Family separation 
allowance 0 1 1 
Hardship duty pay 3 3 0 
Source: GAO analysis.
Sixty-two soldiers from the unit were overpaid their entitled subsistence 
allowance by active Army finance personnel while stationed at the 
Pentagon during the period of December 15, 2001, through December 31, 
2001. Prior to this period, the soldiers were stationed at Fort Stewart and 
were not provided lodging or mess and properly received the full 
subsistence allowance. When the unit was redeployed to the Pentagon, 
mess facilities became available. However, active Army finance personnel 
did not reduce the unitï¿½s subsistence allowance rate to reflect the available 
mess facilities. According to DOD FMR, Volume 7A, chapter 25, enlisted 
soldiers are not entitled to the full subsistence allowance when mess 
facilities are provided. 
In January 2002, three soldiers who received mobilization orders from the 
200th MP Company left Fort Stewart and traveled with the 115th Military 
Police Company to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to assist with base security and 
guard duties. While in Cuba, the soldiers were either underpaid, or were 
late in receiving their entitled hardship duty pays. In accordance with DOD 
FMR Volume 7A, chapter 17, soldiers who perform duties in ï¿½designated 
areasï¿½ for over 30 days are entitled to hardship duty pay. The FMR 
specifies Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as a designated area and provides 
payment of $50 a month to soldiers serving there. While deployed to Cuba, 
the three soldiers were mistakenly paid the old type of hardship duty pay. 
Since hardship duty pay is not an automated pay, the active Army finance 
office at Guantanamo Bay was required to manually enter the ï¿½designated 
areasï¿½ payment each month for each soldier. While they were in Cuba, the 
three soldiers did not receive all their entitled hardship duty pays. 
Furthermore, the hardship duty pays they did receive were more than 30 
days late. 
Demobilization and 
Release from Active 
Duty Pay Problems 
The 200th Military Police Company returned to Fort Eustis around the end 
of August 2002 to begin the demobilization process. We did not identify any 
pay issues associated with the unitï¿½s soldiers who were released from 
active duty on September 30, 2002 (the original date for the unitï¿½s 
demobilization, designated on the mobilization orders). However, as 
shown in table 23, we did identify three soldiers who continued to receive 
active duty pay after their early release from active duty. Table 
23: Identified Demobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay or allowance Number of soldiers who were overpaid 
Basic pay 3 
Basic allowance for housing 3 
Basic allowance for subsistence 3 
Family separation allowance 3 
Hardship duty pay 2 
Source: GAO analysis. 
Specifically, the three soldiers from the unit returned from Cuba, 
demobilized at Fort Stewart, and were released from active duty on July 10, 
2002, while their original orders showed a September 30, 2002, release date. 
They continued to receive active duty pay and allowances through July 15, 
2002. Fort Stewart did not provide the amended orders with the earlier 
release date to the Maryland USPFO office in time to stop the pay. California 49th Military Police Headquarters 
and Headquarters Detachment Appendix VI 
On October 2, 2001, Californiaï¿½s 49th Military Police Headquarters and 
Headquarters Detachment (HHD) was mobilized to active duty for a period 
not to exceed 24 months. The 49 th MP HHD mobilized at its home station, 
Pittsburg, California, and then proceeded to its designated mobilization 
station, Fort Lewis, Washington, on October 12, 2001. The unit performed 
its active duty mission at Fort Lewis, where it provided base security as 
part of Operation Noble Eagle. The unit was demobilized from active duty 
at Fort Lewis on July 28, 2002. A time line of the unitï¿½s actions with respect 
to its mobilization under Operation Noble Eagle is shown in figure 15. 
Figure 
15: Timeline Showing Key Actions Associated with the California Army 
National Guard Military Police Unitï¿½s Mobilization 
Active duty tour 
officially ends 
10/8/02 
Dec Nov Oct Jan 02 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct 
Soldiers depart Pittsburg, CA 
home station 
10/9/01 
Arrival at Fort Lewis, WA 
for in-process 
10/12/01 
Unit demobilizes at 
Fort Lewis, WA. 
7/28/02 
10/12/01 through 
7/28/02 
Deployed at 
Fort Lewis, WA. 
7/29/02 through 
10/8/02 
Soldiers continue 
to demobilize 
individually 
Source: GAO 
Almost all soldiers from the 49th Military Police Company experienced 
some sort of pay problem during one or more phases of the three phases of 
the active duty mobilization. Overall, 50 of the 51 soldiers with the unit had 
at least one pay problem associated with their mobilization to active duty in 
support of Operation Noble Eagle. These pay problems included not 
receiving pays and allowances at all (underpayments), receiving some pays 
and allowances over 30 days after entitlement (late payments), and the 
overpayment of allowances. Specifically, as summarized in table 24, we 
found that (1) 48 soldiers did not receive certain pay and allowances within 
30 days of their initial mobilization entitlement and (2) 41 soldiers did not 
receive, or did not receive within 30 days, the pay and allowances they 
were entitled to receive during their deployment.
Table 
24: Summary of Identified Pay Problems by Phase 
Phase Number of Soldiers with pay problems 
Mobilization 48 of 51 
Deployed 41 of 51 
Demobilization 0 of 51 
Source: GAO analysis. 
In total, we identified estimated overpayments of $17,000, underpayments 
of $1,300, and late payments of $67,000 associated with the pay problems 
we found. In addition, of the $17,000 in overpayments, we found that less 
than $100 was subsequently collected from the soldiers. 
We determined a number of causes for these pay problems. First, we found 
a lack of sufficient numbers of knowledgeable staff. In addition, after-thefact 
detective controls were not in place, including a reconciliation of pay 
and personnel records and the reconciliation of pay records with the unit 
commanderï¿½s records of personnel actually onboard. Currently, as a matter 
of practice, pay and personnel representatives from the USPFO conduct a 
manual reconciliation between the pay and personnel system records 
approximately every 2 months. The purpose of the reconciliation is to 
ensure that for common data elements, the pay and personnel systems 
contain the same data. A USPFO official told us that while it is the 
USPFOï¿½s goal to carry out such reconciliations each month, it currently 
does not have the resources required to do so. 
Mobilization Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 25, we identified a number of pay problems 
associated with the unitï¿½s mobilization to active duty. Failures to enter 
transactions or late entry of transactions needed to start active duty pays 
by Army Guard USPFO military pay personnel and by active Army military 
pay personnel at the unitï¿½s mobilization station were the initial cause of the 
pay problems. We also found that the underlying cause of the pay problems 
was a lack of sufficient numbers of knowledgeable personnel at the 
California USPFO and the Fort Lewis Finance Office. In addition, 
according to Army Guard and active Army officials, neither organization 
was prepared for the sheer volume of pay transactions associated with 
mobilizing soldiers to active duty.
Table 
25: Identified Mobilization Pay Problems 
Type of pay or allowance 
Number of soldiers who did not receive pay or 
allowance within 30 days of entitlement 
Basic pay 17 
Basic allowance for housing 18 
Basic allowance for subsistence 18 
Family separation allowance 39 
Cost of living allowance 36 
Source: GAO analysis. 
In total, 48 out of 51 soldiers of the 49th Military Police Company did not 
receive certain pay and allowances and incentive pays at all, or did not 
receive them within 30 days after being mobilized on October 2, 2001. The 
types of pay entitlements either not paid at all or paid late associated with 
the unitï¿½s initial mobilization included basic pay, basic allowance for 
subsistence, basic allowance for housing, family separation allowance, and 
the continental United States cost of living allowance. 
The late payments during the mobilization phase primarily resulted from 
California USPFO military pay personnelï¿½s lack of understanding of their 
responsibility for initiating active duty pays. According to DFAS reserve 
component mobilization procedures; the California USPFO was 
responsible for initiating these pays. However, a USPFO military pay 
official mistakenly instructed the unit to take its pay data to the 
mobilization station to enter transactions to start active duty pays. The 
USPFO official stated that the USPFO did not start the active duty pay and 
allowances at that time because a copy machine was not available to make 
copies of relevant active duty pay support documentation (such as a lease 
agreement needed to support a housing allowance entitlement). As a 
result, the responsibility for initiating this allowance was improperly 
passed to the active Army finance office at the Fort Lewis mobilization 
station. 
The Fort Lewis finance office lacked sufficient numbers of knowledgeable 
military pay staff to expeditiously enter the large volume of transactions 
necessary to start active duty pay entitlements for the 49th Military Police 
Companyï¿½s soldiers. DFAS guidance requires finance personnel at the 
mobilization station to review each soldierï¿½s pay account to identify any 
errors and input the necessary correcting transactions into DJMS-RC. 
Initially, the mobilization station finance office assigned an insufficient number of personnel to the task of starting active duty pays for the unitï¿½s 51 
mobilizing soldiers. Moreover, one of the assigned pay technicians was not 
familiar with DJMS-RC and consequently entered data incorrectly for some 
of the unitï¿½s soldiers. Also, the assigned pay technician initially failed to 
enter transactions to start pay and allowances for a significant number of 
the unitï¿½s soldiers because the supporting documentation was misplaced. 
These documents were later found under a desk in the finance office. 
Recognizing this shortage of staff knowledgeable about DJMS-RC 
processing procedures, the Fort Lewis finance office asked the California 
USPFO to supply additional personnel and also temporarily reassigned 
soldiers from other units stationed at Fort Lewis to assist in the pay 
processing. Working together over a 2-month period after the unit was 
mobilized to active duty, these personnel were able to enter the omitted 
transactions needed to start active duty pays and correct the previous 
erroneous entries. 
In addition, the USPFO did not enter the required data to DJMS-RC to begin 
cost of living allowance pays for 36 of the unitï¿½s soldiers. DFAS reserve 
component mobilization procedures state that the USPFO has the initial 
responsibility for initiating these pays. However, as discussed previously, 
the USPFO mistakenly sent the 49th Military Police Company to Fort Lewis 
with their pay documentation, and as a result, it was not until more than 2 
months after the unitï¿½s mobilization date that the Fort Lewis finance office 
pay technicians began to enter these transactions into DJMS-RC. 
The company commander for the unit told us that he was frustrated with 
the level of customer support his unit received as it moved through the 
initial mobilization process. Only two knowledgeable military pay officials 
were present to support active duty pay transaction processing for the 51 
soldiers mobilized for his unit. He characterized the customer service his 
unit received at initial mobilization as very time-consuming and frustrating. 
Deployment Pay 
Problems 
As summarized in table 26, we identified a number of pay problems 
associated with six different types of active duty pays and allowances 
associated with the unitï¿½s deployment while on active duty. These 
problems primarily resulted from a data entry error and inadequate 
document retention practices. Table 
26: Identified Deployment Pay Problems 
Type of pay or 
allowance 
Number of soldiers who 
did not receive pay or 
allowances within 30 
days of entitlement 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were underpaid 
Number of 
soldiers who 
were overpaid 
Basic pay 1 0 5 
Basic allowance for 
subsistence 1 0 5 
Basic allowance for 
housing 1 0 5 
Family separation 
allowance 0 0 6 
Foreign language 
proficiency pay 4 2 1 
Cost of living allowance 37 4 0 
Source: GAO analysis. 
For example, the USPFO paid one soldier her basic pay, basic allowance 
for subsistence, and basic allowance for housing nearly 4 months late. A 
USPFO official told us these late payments were caused when a USPFO pay 
technician entered an incorrect stop date for the soldierï¿½s active duty tour 
into DJMS-RC. The pay technician, after being notified of the error by the 
soldier, corrected the data in DJMS-RC, which resulted in the soldier 
receiving her pay nearly 4 months late. Additionally, USPFO officials were 
unable to provide support explaining why five other soldiers continued to 
receive basic pay, the basic allowance for subsistence, and the basic 
allowance for housing after the date available records show their active 
duty tours had ended. Consequently, we identified the payments made to 
these five soldiers as overpayments. 
Overpayments of family separation allowances to soldiers in the unit 
resulted from a data entry error and inadequate USPFO document 
retention practices. A USPFO pay technician incorrectly coded a soldierï¿½s 
account to receive a family separation allowance when the soldier had only 
been on active duty for 2 weeks. According to the DOD FMR, Volume 7A, 
chapter 27, soldiers are only eligible for this allowance after they have been 
separated more than 30 days from their families on a continuous active 
duty assignment. This overpayment problem had not been resolved as of 
March 31, 2003. Additionally, USPFO officials were unable to provide 
supporting documentation explaining why five soldiers continued to 
receive a family separation allowance after available documentation showed that these soldiersï¿½ active duty tours had officially ended. We 
identified these family separation allowance payments for the five soldiers 
as overpayments. 
Late, under- and overpayments of foreign language proficiency pays to the 
unitï¿½s soldiers primarily resulted from delayed or inadequate data entry. 
For example, our audit showed that USPFO pay technicians failed to enter 
transactions into DJMS-RC in a timely manner for four soldiers resulting in 
late foreign language proficiency payments. In addition, USPFO pay 
technicians failed to enter any foreign language proficiency payment 
transactions for 1 month for one soldier and for 3 months for another 
soldier resulting in those soldiers being underpaid. This underpayment 
issue had not been resolved as of March 31, 2003. In another instance, a 
soldier received an overpayment of his entitled foreign language 
proficiency payment when a USPFO pay technician entered the wrong 
code. Approximately 3 months later, the USPFO pay technician identified 
the error and recovered the overpayment. 
Late payment, underpayment, and overpayment of cost of living allowances 
resulted from the inability of DJMS-RC to pay certain active duty pays and 
allowances automatically, inaccurate data entry, and inadequate 
documentation retention practices. For example, our audit discovered that 
USPFO pay technicians failed to manually enter cost of living allowance 
transactions into DJMS-RC in a timely manner for 37 soldiers, resulting in 
late payments to the soldiers. In addition, USPFO officials were unable to 
provide sufficient documentation to explain why 3 soldiers appeared not to 
have received cost of living allowance payments due them for a 2-month 
period. We considered these pay omissions to be underpayments. An 
Army pay technician at the Fort Lewis finance office entered the incorrect 
code, thereby paying a soldier the wrong type of allowance, which resulted 
in an underpayment. 
Pay Problems 
Associated with 
Demobilization and 
Release from Active 
Duty 
Californiaï¿½s 49th Military Police Company demobilized at Fort Lewis on 
July 28, 2002, and returned to its home station in Pittsburg, California. We 
did not identify any pay problems for this unit in the demobilization phase.
Scope and Methodology Appendix VI 
To obtain an understanding and assess the processes, personnel (human 
capital), and systems used to provide assurance that mobilized Army Guard 
soldiers were paid accurately and timely, we reviewed applicable policies, 
procedures, and program guidance; observed pay processing operations; 
and interviewed cognizant agency officials. With respect to applicable 
policies and procedures, we obtained and reviewed 10 U.S.C. Section 
12302, DOD Directive Number 1235.10, ï¿½Activation, Mobilization & 
Demobilization of the Ready Reserve;ï¿½ DOD FMR, Volume 7A, ï¿½Military Pay 
Policy and Procedures Active Duty and Reserve Payï¿½; and the Army Forces 
Command Regulations 500-3-3, Reserve Component Unit Commander 
Handbook, 500-3-4, Installation Commander Handbook, and 500-3-5, 
Demobilization Plan. We also reviewed various Under Secretary of 
Defense memorandums, a memorandum of agreement between Army and 
DFAS, DFAS, Army, Army Forces Command, and Army National Guard 
guidance applicable to pay for mobilized reserve component soldiers. We 
also used the internal controls standards provided in the Standards for 
Internal Control in Federal Government.1 
We applied the policies and procedures prescribed in these documents to 
the observed and documented procedures and practices followed by the 
various DOD components involved in providing active duty pays to Army 
Guard soldiers. We also interviewed officials from the National Guard 
Bureau, State USPFOs, Army and DOD military pay offices, as well as unit 
commanders to obtain an understanding of their experiences in applying 
these policies and procedures. 
In addition, as part of our audit, we performed a review of certain edit and 
validation checks in DJMS-RC. Specifically, we obtained documentation 
and performed walk-throughs associated with DJMS-RC edits performed 
on pay status/active duty change transactions, such as those to ensure that 
tour start and stop dates match MMPA dates and that the soldier cannot be 
paid basic pay and allowances beyond the stop date that was entered into 
DJMS-RC. We also obtained documentation on and walk-throughs of the 
personnel-to-pay system interface process, the order writing-to-pay system 
interface process, and on the process for entering mobilization information 
into the pay system. We held interviews with officials from the Army National Guard Readiness Center, the National Guard Bureau, and DFAS 
Indianapolis and Denver to augment our documentation and walkthroughs. 
Because our preliminary assessment determined that current operations 
used to pay mobilized Army Guard soldiers relied extensively on errorprone 
manual transactions entry into multiple, nonintegrated systems, we 
did not statistically test current processes and controls. Instead, we used a 
case study approach to provide a more detailed perspective of the nature of 
pay deficiencies in the three key areas of processes, people (human 
capital), and systems. Specifically, we gathered available data and analyzed 
the pay experiences of Army Guard special forces and military police units 
mobilized to active duty in support of Operations Noble Eagle and 
Enduring Freedom during the period from October 2001 through March 
2003. We audited six Army Guard units as case studies of the effectiveness 
of the controls over active duty pays in place for soldiers assigned to those 
units: 
ï¿½ Colorado B Company, 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces; 
ï¿½ Virginia B Company, 3rd Battalion, 20th Special Forces; 
ï¿½ West Virginia C Company, 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces; 
ï¿½ Mississippi 114th Military Police Company; 
ï¿½ California 49th Military Police Headquarters and Headquarters 
Detachment; and 
ï¿½ Maryland 200th Military Police Company. 
In selecting these six units for our case studies, we sought to obtain the pay 
experiences of units assigned to either Operation Enduring Freedom or 
Operation Noble Eagle. We further limited our case study selection to 
those units both mobilized to active duty and demobilized from active duty 
during the period from October 1, 2001 through March 31, 2003. From the 
population of all Army Guard units mobilized and demobilized during this 
period, we selected three special forces units and three military police 
units. These case studies are presented to provide a more detailed view of 
the types and causes of pay problems and the pay experiences of these 
units as well as the financial impact of pay problems on individual soldiers 
and their families. We used mobilization data supplied by the Army Operations Center to 
assist us in selecting the six units we used as our case studies. We did not 
independently verify the reliability of the Army Operations Center 
database. We used the Army Operations Center data to select six states that 
had a large number of special forces or military police units that had been 
mobilized, deployed, and returned from at least one tour of active duty in 
support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. We chose 
California, Colorado, Maryland, Mississippi, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
From these six states, we selected three special forces and three military 
police units that had a variety of deployment locations and missions. We 
also identified and performed a limited review of the pay experiences of a 
unit still deployed during the period of our review; Coloradoï¿½s 220th 
Military Police Company. The purpose of our limited review was to 
determine if there were any pay problems experienced by a more recently 
mobilized unit. 
We also obtained in-depth information from soldiers at four of the six case 
study units. Using a data collection instrument, we asked for soldier views 
on pay problems and customer service experiences before, during, and 
after mobilization. Unit commanders distributed the instrument to soldiers 
in their units. There were 325 soldiers in these units; in total, we received 
87 responses. The information we received from these data collection 
instruments is not representative of the views of the Army Guard members 
in these units nor of those of Army Guard members overall. The 
information provides further insight into some of the pay experiences of 
selected Army Guard soldiers who were mobilized under Operations Noble 
Eagle and Enduring Freedom. 
We used DJMS-RC pay transaction extracts to identify pay problems 
associated with our case study units. However, we did not perform an exact 
calculation of the net pay soldiers should have received in comparison with 
what DJMS-RC records show they received. Rather, we used available 
documentation and follow-up inquiries with cognizant USPFO personnel to 
identify if (1) soldiersï¿½ entitled active duty pays and allowances were 
received within 30 days of initial mobilization date, (2) soldiers were paid 
within 30 days of the date they became eligible for active duty pays and 
allowances associated with their deployment locations, and (3) soldiers 
stopped receiving active duty pays and allowances as of the date of their 
demobilization from active duty. As such, our audit results only reflect 
problems we identified. Soldiers in our case study units may have 
experienced additional pay problems that we did not identify. In addition, our work was not designed to identify, and we did not identify, any 
fraudulent pay and allowances to any Army Guard soldiers. 
As a result of the lack of supporting documents, we likely did not identify 
all of the pay problems related to the active duty mobilizations of our case 
study units. However, for the pay problems we identified, we counted 
soldiersï¿½ pay problems as a problem only in the phase in which they first 
occurred even if the problems persisted into other phases. For purposes of 
characterizing pay problems for this report, we defined over- and 
underpayments as those pays or allowances for mobilized Army Guard 
soldiers during the period from October 1, 2001, through March 31, 2003, 
that were in excess of (overpayment) or less than (underpayment) the 
entitled payment. We considered as late payments any active duty pays or 
allowances paid to the soldier over 30 days after the date on which the 
soldier was entitled to receive such pays or allowances. As such, these 
payments were those that, although late, addressed a previously unpaid 
entitlement. 
We did not include any erroneous debts associated with these payments as 
pay problems. In addition, we used available data to estimate collections 
against identified overpayments through March 31, 2003. We did not 
attempt to estimate payments received against identified underpayments. 
We provided the support for the pay problems we identified to appropriate 
officials, at each of our case study locations so that they could fully develop 
and resolve any additional amounts owed to the government or to the Army 
Guard soldiers. 
We briefed DOD and Army officials, National Guard Bureau officials, DFAS 
officials, and USPFO officials in the selected states on the details of our 
audit, including our findings and their implications. On October 10, 2003, 
we requested comments on a draft of this report. We received comments 
on November 5, 2003, and have summarized those comments in the 
ï¿½Agency Comments and Our Evaluationï¿½ section of this report. DODï¿½s 
comments are reprinted in appendix VIII. We conducted our audit work 
from November 2002 through September 2003 in accordance with U.S. 
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix VI
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Appendix IX 
GAO Contacts Geoffrey B. Frank, (202) 512-9518 
Sheila D. Miller, (303) 572-7378 
Acknowledgments Staff making key contributions to this report include: Paul S. Begnaud, 
Ronald A. Bergman, James D. Berry, Jr., Amy C. Chang, Mary E. Chervenic, 
Francine M. DelVecchio, C. Robert DeRoy, Dennis B. Fauber, Jennifer L. 
Hall, Charles R. Hodge, Jason M. Kelly, Julia C. Matta, Jonathan T. Meyer, 
John J. Ryan, Rebecca Shea, Crawford L. Thompson, Jordan M. Tiger, 
Patrick S. Tobo, Raymond M. Wessmiller, and Jenniffer F. Wilson. 
(192080)
*** End of document. ***