Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation	 
Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and 
Comprehensive Planning (12-AUG-04, GAO-04-855). 		 
                                                                 
Terrorist incidents in the United States and abroad have	 
underscored the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to safeguard  
military personnel and facilities from potential terrorist	 
attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons and high-yield explosive devices. In the 2003 National	 
Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed DOD to develop a	 
comprehensive plan to help guide departmentwide efforts in	 
improving installation preparedness against such attacks. The act
also directed GAO to assess DOD's plan. DOD submitted its report 
to Congress in September 2003. This review addresses two	 
questions: (1) Does DOD's report represent a comprehensive plan  
that can guide installation preparedness efforts? and (2) What	 
obstacles, if any, hinder DOD's ability to develop and		 
effectively implement a comprehensive approach to installation	 
preparedness?							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-855 					        
    ACCNO:   A11574						        
  TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation 
Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and 
Comprehensive Planning						 
     DATE:   08/12/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Facility security					 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     Jurisdictional authority				 
	     Military facilities				 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     National defense operations			 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Homeland security					 

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GAO-04-855

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                     GAO Report to Congressional Committees

August 2004

                                   COMBATING
                                   TERRORISM

                                 DOD Efforts to
                              Improve Installation
                                  Preparedness
                                Can Be Enhanced
                                 with Clarified
                              Responsibilities and
                                 Comprehensive
                                    Planning

On August 20, 2004, this report was reproduced for the Web version only
because figures 1 and 2, pages 8 and 20, respectively should have appeared
in color.

                                       a

GAO-04-855

Highlights of GAO-04-855, a report to congressional committees.

Terrorist incidents in the United States and abroad have underscored the
Department of Defense's (DOD) need to safeguard military personnel and
facilities from potential terrorist attacks involving chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and high-yield explosive
devices. In the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed
DOD to develop a comprehensive plan to help guide departmentwide efforts
in improving installation preparedness against such attacks. The act also
directed GAO to assess DOD's plan. DOD submitted its report to Congress in
September 2003. This review addresses two questions: (1) Does DOD's report
represent a comprehensive plan that can guide installation preparedness
efforts? and (2) What obstacles, if any, hinder DOD's ability to develop
and effectively implement a comprehensive approach to installation
preparedness?

GAO is recommending that a single authority be designated to integrate
installation preparedness efforts, and that the roles of key organizations
be clearly defined. It is also recommending that the 2003 plan be updated
to fully incorporate results-oriented management principles and describe
what military response capabilities need to be developed. DOD agreed with
all the recommendations in this report.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-855.

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact
Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or
[email protected].

August 2004

COMBATING TERRORISM

DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified
Responsibilities and Comprehensive Planning

While DOD's September 2003 report generally met the requirements of the
act, it does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management
plan that could help guide DOD's installation preparedness efforts. For
example, the report described annual performance goals that were general
in nature and did not have good metrics to gauge progress; it did not
describe a comprehensive process and total resources needed to achieve
long-term goals; and it did not define an objective and formal process for
evaluating results. As a result, it is unclear how improvement goals will
be achieved, what resources will be required, or when improvements are
expected to be completed. In addition, it did not fully describe the
national, regional, and local military response capabilities that will be
developed, or how these capabilities will be integrated with local
civilian capabilities. As a result, it is unclear how duplication of
requirements and redundant capabilities will be avoided. DOD officials
attributed the report's limitations to evolving organizational
responsibilities, and a lack of resources and guidance. GAO believes that
until a more results-oriented, comprehensive plan is developed that
clearly articulates the military response capabilities to be developed and
integrated with the civilian community, DOD's ongoing initiatives and
other opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be
effectively or efficiently implemented.

Two obstacles impede DOD's ability to effectively develop a comprehensive
approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. First, while a
large number of organizations are engaged in efforts to improve
installation preparedness, the responsibilities of two newly established
organizations- the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
the U.S. Northern Command-are evolving, and the installation preparedness
related responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense
is not clearly defined. Second, no single entity has been given the
authority and responsibility to integrate and manage departmentwide
installation preparedness efforts. In discussions with officials at the
department, Joint Staff, service and installation levels, there was
general agreement that a lack of a single focal point having the
appropriate authority and responsibility to integrate overall installation
preparedness improvement efforts among the many organizations involved has
adversely affected their ability to effectively plan for and manage
departmentwide installation preparedness improvements. As a result, DOD
has faced difficulties in developing departmentwide standards and concepts
of operations and in preparing a comprehensive plan for installation
preparedness. Until organization roles and responsibilities are clarified,
and an integrating authority is designated, DOD will be limited in its
ability to develop a comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide
guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing billion-dollar improvement
initiatives at the installation level.

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
DOD's Report Does Not Represent a Comprehensive,

Results-Oriented Plan to Improve Installation Preparedness Two Obstacles
Hinder DOD's Ability to Improve Installation

Preparedness Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency
Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      3 5

                                       9

15 25 25 26

Appendix I	Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003

Appendix II Scope and Methodology

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products

  Tables

Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements 10 Table 2: Key DOD and
Joint Staff Organizations Involved in Installation Preparedness 16 Table
3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations Visited or
Contacted for this Assignment 31

  Figures

Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise 8 Figure
2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in Chemical/Biological Exercise
20

Abbreviations

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield

explosives DOD Department of Defense WMD weapons of mass destruction

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

August 12, 2004

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Terrorist incidents within the United States and abroad have underscored
the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to safeguard military personnel
and infrastructure from potential terrorist attacks involving weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).1 While many of the department's past efforts
have focused on enhancing protection and response capabilities against
high-yield explosives, the new security environment underscores the need
for the department to expand its safeguards to include chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. To address these
potential
threats, the department has begun to direct billions of dollars toward
departmentwide initiatives designed to safeguard personnel and facilities.
At the same time, the military services are continuing to pursue
initiatives
at specific installations to lessen their vulnerabilities to terrorist
activities.

In recent years, both legislative actions and our prior work have focused
on DOD's need to develop an effective program to improve its installation
preparedness against terrorists' incidents. In response to a committee
mandate2 to review DOD's plans for improving installation preparedness

1 DOD defines weapons of mass destruction as weapons that are capable of a
high order of destruction and are used to destroy large numbers of people.
WMD can consist of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons
and high-yield explosives (CBRNE).

2 S. Rep. No. 107-62, at 352 (2001).

for WMD, we concluded in an April 2002 report that while the department
had made some progress, it did not have a comprehensive plan or overall
framework to guide its installation preparedness improvement efforts.3 We
also discussed with the department during the course of that work the
importance of clearly articulating the national, regional, and local
response capabilities that would be developed and integrated with the
civilian community so that unnecessary redundant capabilities could be
avoided.

Following our initial assessment and report, in September 2002, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that called for the development
of a departmentwide integrated CBRNE approach to installation
preparedness, with complete integration of policies, technologies,
equipment, and operational concepts. The memorandum noted that the
department would begin providing all installation personnel, including
military and civilian personnel, contractors, and others who live or work
on base, with protection against the wider range of threats.

Also following our initial report, Congress, in section 1402 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (see app. I),4
directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive plan, with
annual updates in 2004, 2005, and 2006, for improving the preparedness of
military installations worldwide for terrorist incidents, including
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. The legislation also
directed us to review DOD's plan and provide our assessment to the Senate
and House Armed Services Committees. In September 2003, the department
complied with the section 1402 mandate by submitting its plan, entitled
"Report to Congress on Preparedness of Military Installations for
Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Incidents."

This report summarizes our assessment of DOD's September 2003 report to
Congress. Specifically, it addresses two questions: (1) Does the
department's report represent a comprehensive plan that can guide
installation preparedness efforts? and (2) What obstacles, if any, hinder

3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Preparedness of
Military Installations for Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction, GAO-02-644R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2002).

4 Pub. L. 107-314, S:1402 (2002).

the department's ability to develop and effectively implement a
comprehensive approach to installation preparedness?

In conducting our assessment, we examined DOD's 2003 report to determine
if it addressed the elements required by the act, and evaluated the
quality of the information by comparing it to management principles
embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,5 such as
the desired characteristics for long-term goals and strategies to
accomplish those goals, and performance criteria for measuring progress.
We also discussed the content of the report with department officials who
prepared it to better understand how it was developed. To identify
obstacles, if any, that may prevent DOD from developing a comprehensive
approach to improve installation preparedness, we discussed with
department, service, and installation officials the roles and
responsibilities of organizations and offices involved in the department's
installation preparedness efforts, as well as the challenges they faced in
planning and implementing preparedness efforts. As part of our evaluation,
we discussed and observed installation preparedness capabilities at 13
military installations. Although the information obtained at these
locations cannot be generalized to describe DOD's worldwide installation
preparedness improvement efforts, it provided us with insights on
preparedness challenges at the installation level. We assessed the
reliability of the data used in this report and determined that it was
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

We conducted our review between April 2003 and May 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Further information on
our scope and methodology appears in appendix II.

                                Results in Brief

While DOD's September 2003 report generally met the requirements of
section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 by discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the report
does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management plan to
help guide installation preparedness improvement efforts. For example, the
report described annual performance goals that were general in nature and
did not have adequate metrics to gauge progress, it did not describe a

5 Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act to provide
for, among other things, the establishment of strategic planning and
performance measurement in the federal government. Pub. L. 103-62 (2003).

comprehensive process and total resources needed to achieve long-term
goals, and it did not define an objective and formal process for
evaluating results. As a result, it is unclear how long-term goals will be
measured, what resources will be needed to achieve the desired goals, when
the goals are expected to be achieved, and how the results of improvement
efforts will be evaluated. In addition, the report did not fully describe
the national, regional, and local military response capabilities that will
be developed, or how those capabilities will be integrated with local
civilian capabilities. As a result, it is unclear how duplication of
requirements and unnecessarily redundant capabilities will be avoided.
Department officials acknowledged that the report does not reflect the
results-oriented management elements we describe nor are military response
capabilities clearly articulated in the report, because, in their opinion,
DOD organizations' roles and responsibilities were still evolving in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and because they
had limited resources and guidance to prepare the report. Officials also
stated that responsibility for preparing the legislatively required annual
updates to the plan has not been assigned, and that the department has not
yet submitted the 2004 update, which was required to be sent with
materials supporting the fiscal year 2005 budget request in March 2004.
Until a comprehensive plan is prepared that more fully incorporates
results-oriented management principles and better defines the desired
military response capabilities, the department's installation preparedness
improvement initiatives may not be implemented in the most effective and
efficient manner, the department may be limited in its ability to
determine if improvement efforts are achieving the desired outcome, and
opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be fully
realized.

Two obstacles impede DOD's ability to effectively develop a comprehensive
approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. First, a large
number of organizations are engaged in efforts to improve the preparedness
of military installations, but the installation preparedness-related
responsibilities of two recently established organizations-the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern
Command-are still evolving. On May 7, 2004, the U.S. Northern Command was
assigned specific antiterrorism and force protection responsibilities for
domestic installations, which was a significant step toward clarifying its
installation preparedness role, but those of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense are still undefined. Secondly, no single
entity has been assigned the authority or responsibility to integrate and
manage departmentwide installation preparedness efforts. As a result, DOD
has not developed departmentwide installation preparedness policies,
including integrated concepts of

operations and standards, as required by the Assistant Secretary in his
September 5, 2002, memorandum; the comprehensive plan called for by the
act was prepared by an organization that had no formal authority to
integrate departmentwide efforts and resolve disagreements between the
parties involved; and DOD has not taken any specific steps to evaluate the
overall progress in implementing this plan. Until these obstacles are
removed, the department will be limited in its ability to develop a
comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide installation
preparedness guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing improvement
initiatives.

We are recommending the department take steps to fully incorporate
results-oriented management principles in the next update to the plan,
clarify the installation preparedness related responsibilities of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and designate a
single integrating authority with the responsibility to coordinate and
integrate worldwide installation preparedness improvement efforts. In
comments on a draft of this report, the department agreed with our
recommendations, and stated it will take specific actions to implement
them.

The department's policies, programs, and organizational responsibilities
related to installation preparedness for attacks involving weapons of mass
destruction have been evolving over the last few years as the department
adapted to meet new challenges arising from terrorist attacks. Especially
since the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the general focus
of the department's installation preparedness activities emphasized
antiterrorism, or defensive measures such as gates, fencing, perimeter
lighting, and security patrols used to reduce the vulnerability of
individuals and property. After the attack on the USS Cole in October
2000, antiterrorism measures received even greater emphasis, resulting in
additional standards and measures to better protect military forces. The
September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States heightened the emphasis
and focus on installation preparedness against a wider spectrum of
threats.

Background

DOD's Antiterrorism/Force In August 2003, DOD updated its directive signed
by the Deputy Secretary Protection Policy and of Defense that provides
DOD's antiterrorism policy and assigns Guidance responsibilities to
defense organizations implementing antiterrorism

initiatives.6 This directive places responsibility for developing

6 DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18, 2003.

antiterrorism policy and guidance with the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. In
this capacity, the Assistant Secretary of Defense issued an instruction
that established 31 antiterrorism standards that DOD organizations,
including the services, are required to implement.7 These standards
address antiterrorism planning, training requirements, physical security
measures, and related issues. The Assistant Secretary also issued a
handbook containing additional detailed guidance on antiterrorism policies
and practices, including guidance on assessing these practices, which was
updated in February 2004.8 Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
manage antiterrorism funding, conduct inspections, and work with the
Assistant Secretary to develop DOD antiterrorism policies. Additionally,
each of the military services has issued regulations, orders, or
instructions to implement the DOD guidance and establish its own specific
policies and standards. Overseas, the geographic combatant commanders have
ultimate antiterrorism and force protection authority and responsibility
within their areas of responsibility.9

    DOD Installation Preparedness Guidance and Improvement Initiatives

In a September 5, 2002, memorandum, DOD clarified its policy to protect
military installations from CBRNE attacks, respond to these attacks with
trained and equipped emergency responders, and ensure that installations
are able to continue critical operations during an attack and resume
essential operations afterwards.10 The policy also required DOD to
approach preparedness from a departmentwide perspective, with complete
integration of policies, technologies, equipment, and operational
concepts. The memorandum noted that the department would begin providing
all installation personnel, including military and civilian personnel,
contractors, and others who live or work on base, with protection against
the wider range of threats.

DOD's September 2003 report to Congress was the first to offer a
definition of installation preparedness. It was defined as a collective,

7 DOD Instruction 2000.16: DOD Antiterrorism Standards, June 14, 2001.

8 DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9, 2004.

9 DOD Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards S: E3.1.1.11 (June
14, 2001).

10 Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Preparedness of U.S. Military
Installations and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack,"
Memorandum, Sept. 5, 2002.

proactive effort to prevent, detect, respond, and protect department
bases, personnel, their families, and infrastructure critical to mission
accomplishment against terrorists' use of weapons of mass destruction.
This definition combines the fundamental elements of antiterrorism-
defensive measures to prevent and detect attacks-with elements related to
responding to and mitigating the effects of an attack.

DOD has recently committed significant resources and undertaken a number
of initiatives to improve installation preparedness to protect personnel
and facilities. For example, in September 2002, the department began a $61
million project called the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project, to
provide equipment and training to enhance chemical and biological
detection and emergency response capabilities on nine diverse DOD
installations. In October 2003, it started the Guardian project to improve
the detection and protection against chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear threats at 200 domestic and overseas installations at an
estimated cost of $1.6 billion over the next 5 years. The project is
designed to tailor requirements according to installation needs, and will
include the design and installation of detection systems. Figure 1
illustrates a decontamination operation during a recent installation
training exercise responding to a chemical/biological incident.

Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise

Source: Navy Region Southwest.

In a number of reports that we have issued during the past few years, we
have underscored the need for DOD to institute sound management principles
to guide its installation preparedness efforts. Such management principles
are embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and
consist of a number of critical elements considered essential in
developing an effective strategy, guiding resource allocations, and
monitoring results. In this previous work, we concluded that without sound
management principles, DOD faces, among other things, the potential for
inappropriate or redundant allocation of resources and limited or lost
preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress and DOD
managers may not be able to determine if desired program outcomes are
being achieved.

  DOD's Report Does Not Represent a Comprehensive, Results-Oriented Plan to
  Improve Installation Preparedness

While the department's report generally met the requirements of section
1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 by
discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the report does not
represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management plan to help guide
installation preparedness improvement efforts. The legislation required
the department to address nine elements-seven associated with management
principles and two associated with military response capabilities. The
department's report described each of these nine elements, but the
management elements were not addressed in a results-oriented manner, and
the military capability elements were not discussed in a manner that
provides a clear description of the response capabilities needed, or how
they will be integrated with civilian capabilities. As a result,
installation preparedness improvement goals, objectives, resource
requirements, and methods to evaluate the outcome of new initiatives
remain unclear, as well as how the department intends to develop national,
regional and local military response capabilities that are coordinated
with civilian response capabilities.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required DOD
to develop a comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military
installations for terrorist incidents. Specifically, it required the
department to address five elements of a preparedness strategy, and four
elements of a performance plan. We analyzed these nine requirements and
found that seven of them were collectively related to management
principles, and two of them were discussion points related to the
development of military response capabilities. Table 1 lists these nine
elements.

               Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements

Seven management-related elements

1. Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving the
preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to
terrorist attacks.

2. Description of the process, together with a discussion of the
resources, necessary to achieve those goals and objectives.

3. A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals and
objectives of the strategy.

4. Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary that
could impede the achievement of these goals and objectives.

5. Identification of budget and other resource requirements necessary to
achieve those goals and objectives.

6. Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those goals
and objectives.

7. A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving those
goals and objectives.

Two military response capability discussion elements

8. A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national
military response capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and used.

9. A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the capabilities
referred to in #8 above with local, regional, or national civilian and
other military capabilities.

Source: GAO analysis of section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003.

DOD's September report to Congress discussed each of the nine
required elements and was therefore technically in compliance with
the requirements of the act. However, the report did not address the
seven management-related elements in a manner that fully incorporates
results-oriented management principles so that the report could serve as a
useful tool in guiding installation improvement efforts. The following is
our assessment of the adequacy of the information provided in the
department's report when compared to results-oriented management
principles:

o  	Long-Term Goals-Long-term goals should explain what results are
expected, should be results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way
that allows them to be assessed in terms of achievement. They should also
describe how managers are to be held accountable for achieving such goals.
Although the department's report identifies four long-term goals, which it
calls "preparedness strategy elements"-prevention, detection, protection,
and emergency response-it does not clearly express these goals in a way
that would allow the department to measure progress toward achieving them.
For example, the prevention strategy element was described as "The
Department's

antiterrorism (AT) strategy is to maximize efforts to prevent, deter, and
detect terrorist attacks against DOD personnel, their families,
facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission
accomplishment as well as the preparation needed to defend against and
respond to the consequences of terrorist incidents." This description does
not provide the information necessary to explain what results are to be
expected nor is it described in a way that allows progress to be assessed.
Furthermore, the report did not identify the organizations accountable for
achieving the goals.

o  	Process to Achieve Goals-The act required that the plan describe the
process, together with a discussion of the resources, necessary to achieve
those goals and objectives. In describing how the installation
preparedness improvement strategy would be achieved, the department's
report provided some general narrative such as "DOD...policies support
this...strategy by ensuring a comprehensive and integrated approach that
continuously identifies and overcomes vulnerabilities, thereby reducing
risk to our personnel and resources; enhancing the planning, training and
equipping of the force; and providing prudent guidance and direction..."
The department's report also describes ongoing improvement initiatives
such as the Joint Service Installation Pilot Project and the Guardian
Program.11 Because of the general nature of the discussion in the report,
it was not clear the extent to which the goals would be met with the cited
initiatives, or, as discussed below, the full extent to which resources
would be required to achieve each goal.

o  	Schedule with milestones-The act required the plan to include a
reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the installation
preparedness long-term goals. Such a schedule should include details on
incremental performance goals that are tangible, measurable, and
objective; usually expressed within certain timeframes such as "by the end
of 200X, at least 95 percent of commanders will have completed required
annual terrorism risk assessments." The department's report contained 25
performance goals identified in the report as strategic objectives. These
objectives were general in nature, and most contained a specific year in
which the goal was to be either started or achieved. However, as discussed
in the performance criteria section below, they all lacked specific
targets that could be used to measure progress. For example, one strategic
objective listed in the plan states

11 Referred to in the report as the "Chemical, Biological
Installation/Force Protection Program."

"beginning in fiscal year 2003, improve robotic vehicles for
[antiterrorism] operations as well as for emergency responders."

o  	External factors that could impede achievement of the long-term
goals-External impediments should be identified, and the actions needed to
mitigate these impediments should be addressed. Although the department's
report identifies a number of external impediments (e.g., the feasibility,
availability, and affordability of technological solutions and the degree
to which state and local responders are trained and equipped), it does not
clearly describe how these factors may affect the department's ability to
achieve its goals, or ways of reducing the potential impact of these
impediments.

o  	Identification of budget and other resources-Good management
principles call for the identification of resources, including funding,
personnel, and equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level of
performance. Although the department's report identifies funding resources
needed for antiterrorism and consequence management12- for example, $8.5
billion in fiscal year 2004-the report indicates that this amount is part
of a larger funding requirement, but it does not provide further details.
In addition, the report does not include any information on additional
personnel or equipment that would be needed.

o  	Performance criteria-Performance criteria or measures are indicators
used to measure progress in achieving goals and objectives. They should be
objective and outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet
performance goals. The department's report identifies 25 performance
indicators (one for each performance goal), which it calls measures of
effectiveness. However, many of them are not outcome-oriented and all of
them lack specific targets or baselines that could be used to measure
progress. For example, as discussed previously, although the report notes
that robotic vehicles will be improved, it does not provide a quantifiable
target, nor does it present a baseline to assess progress. In another
example, a strategic objective listed in the plan is "develop standardized
installation CBRNE scenario exercises for training and equipment
requirements." The related measure of effectiveness described in the
report is "standardized

12 Consequence management is defined in DOD Directive 2000.12 as those
measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential
government services, and provide emergency relief to governments,
business, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE
situation.

exercise scenarios will improve efficiencies and consistency in equipment
and training, leading to improved interoperability." This measure of
effectiveness is highlighting the potential benefit of achieving the
objective; it does not provide specific criteria for how it will be
measured, or any baseline data that can be used to measure progress in
achieving the stated goal.

o  	Process for evaluating results-Program evaluations are defined as
objective and formal assessments of the results, impact, or effects of a
program or policy. Such information can be used to assess the extent to
which performance goals were met and identify appropriate strategies to
meet those goals that were not met. The department's report indicates that
it will provide general oversight, semiannual review of action plans, and
annual reviews of antiterrorism plans. However, the report does not define
how it will evaluate the impact of current initiatives or describe how
such evaluations could be used to improve the department's overall efforts
to improve installation preparedness.

In addition to the seven management-related elements, the legislation
required DOD to discuss two elements related to military response
capabilities. In the first element, the department was required to discuss
the extent to which local, regional, or national military response
capabilities were to be developed, integrated, and used. In our view, it
is important that DOD articulate the extent to which it will develop such
capabilities because national and regional capabilities can supplement or
enhance those available at individual installations and redundant
capabilities could be avoided. In the report, however, DOD discussed
non-military capabilities, such as the Federal Response Plan, which
provides a government-integrated response to disasters through the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. The report also discussed the department's
Joint Task Force for Civil Support, which serves as a military
headquarters unit responsible for coordinating department activities
supporting civil authorities, but does not have specific operational
response capabilities of its own.

In the second discussion element, DOD was directed to discuss how it would
coordinate its proposed military response capabilities with civilian
capabilities. Such a discussion would provide information on how overlap
and duplication of efforts between military and civilian organizations at
all levels could be reduced. However, DOD's report discussed the need to
use memorandums of agreement between, for example, military installations
and civilian local-community first responders to fill in the gaps in

emergency response capabilities on and off base. However, because it did
not address how military regional and national response capabilities were
to be developed, integrated, and used, the report did not describe how
those capabilities would be coordinated with those of the civilian sector.
Furthermore, while the report discussed a national-level response
exercise, called "Top Officials,"13 involving cooperation and coordination
between the federal response community (such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency) and local and regional civilian response organizations,
the report did not describe how military response capabilities would be
integrated into such exercises, nor how lessons learned from national
exercises would be shared with military organizations.

In discussions with us, officials from the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, who were responsible for
preparing the report, agreed that the report does not fully reflect the
results-oriented management elements that we have described above. In
addition, they agreed that the report does not clearly articulate the
military response capabilities to be developed at the national, regional
and local levels. They told us that, in their opinion, the department
organizations' roles and responsibilities were still evolving in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (discussed in
more detail later in this report), and they prepared the report with
limited staff and limited guidance. As a result, they approached the
preparation of the report by generally summarizing the key efforts
underway in the department to improve installation preparedness, and by
drawing on key elements of the existing antiterrorism program.

Based on the concerns of Congress regarding the need for DOD to
effectively plan for installation preparedness improvements against
terrorist incidents, and our past work concluding that DOD did not have a
comprehensive plan or overall framework to guide its installation
preparedness improvement efforts, we believe that without clearly
articulated results-oriented management elements, the report-and the
comprehensive plan it is supposed to reflect-cannot serve as a useful tool

13 Congress mandated the Department of State and Department of Justice to
conduct a series of challenging, role-playing exercises involving the
senior federal, state, and local officials who would direct crisis
management and consequence management response to an actual WMD attack.
The result was Top Officials (TOPOFF), a national-level domestic and
international exercise series designed to produce a more effective,
coordinated, global response to WMD terrorism.

to guide and manage installation improvement efforts and provide a
mechanism to adequately assess progress. For example, DOD's report is
unclear in its discussion of how long-term goals will be measured, what
resources will be needed to achieve the desired goals, when the goals are
expected to be achieved, and how the results of ongoing improvement
efforts will be evaluated. In addition, without a clear description of how
national, regional, and local military response capabilities will be
developed and integrated with civilian capabilities, it is unclear how
duplication of requirements and redundant capabilities will be avoided.
Therefore, without a comprehensive plan that more fully incorporates
results-oriented management principles and better defines the desired
military response capabilities, the department's installation preparedness
improvement initiatives may not be implemented in the most effective and
efficient manner, the department may be limited in its ability to
determine if improvement efforts are achieving the desired outcome, and
opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be fully
realized.

Furthermore, the act requires that DOD submit annual updates to the plan
in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006 that include a discussion of any
revision to the plan, and an assessment of the progress made in achieving
the goals and objectives of the strategy set forth in the plan. DOD,
however, has not assigned responsibility for preparing the required
updates to any organization and has not taken any specific steps to
evaluate the overall progress in implementing this plan. In fact, the
first annual update, which was due March 2004 with the materials that the
Secretary of Defense submits to Congress in support of the budget
submission, has not yet been submitted. According to the officials we
spoke with, until specific responsibility for updating the plan is
assigned, it is unclear who will prepare the updates or when they will be
prepared.

Two obstacles have impeded DOD's ability to effectively develop a
comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts.
First, although numerous organizations currently engaged in installation
preparedness improvement efforts have clear roles and responsibilities,
two key organizations-the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and the U.S. Northern Command-have only been recently established,
and their installation preparedness responsibilities are still evolving.
On May 7, 2004, the Northern Command was assigned specific antiterrorism
and force protection responsibilities for domestic installations, which
was a significant step toward clarifying its installation preparedness
role, but those of Homeland Defense are still undefined.

  Two Obstacles Hinder DOD's Ability to Improve Installation Preparedness

Second, no organization has been given the authority and responsibility to
integrate and coordinate installation preparedness policies and
improvement efforts and monitor progress in achieving the plan's
objectives. Until these issues are resolved, DOD will be unable to pursue
installation preparedness improvements in a comprehensive and integrated
manner, and the significant resources being applied to accomplish
improvement goals may not be spent in the most efficient and effective
manner.

    Numerous Organizations
    Involved in Installation
    Preparedness and
    Two Have Evolving Roles
    and Responsibilities

Many organizations at various levels within DOD are engaged in activities
to improve installation preparedness. The military services and their
installation commanders play a key role in safeguarding their individual
bases, while combatant commanders are responsible for protecting forces
within their geographic areas of responsibility. In addition, there are
several department and Joint-Staff-level organizations that have key roles
and responsibilities for installation preparedness policies and
procedures. The roles of most of these organizations are clearly defined
but those of two recently established department organizations-the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U. S. Northern
Command-are still evolving. Table 2 lists the key organizations involved
in installation preparedness at the department and Joint Staff levels, and
briefly describes their roles and responsibilities.

Table 2: Key DOD and Joint Staff Organizations Involved in Installation
Preparedness

Installation preparedness Organization related responsibilities

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special

                     Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

Develops worldwide antiterrorism policy and guidance for the DOD
components. Such guidance currently includes DOD Directive 2000.12, "DOD
Antiterrorism Program"; DOD Instruction 2000.16, "DOD Antiterrorism
Standards"; and DOD O-2000.12-H, "DOD Antiterrorism Handbook."

Organization

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

Installation preparedness related responsibilities

Provides overall supervision of homeland defense activities of the
department under the authority, direction, and control of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. As such, will oversee homeland defense
activities, develop policies, conduct analyses, provide advice, and make
recommendations on homeland defense, support to civil authorities,
emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management matters with the
department. DOD defines homeland defense as the military protection of
United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense
infrastructure against external threats and aggression.

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs Oversees the Chemical Biological Defense
Program, including programs such as Project Guardian, run by the Joint
Program Executive Office for Chemical-Biological Defense.

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Prepares and defends the Military
Installations and Environment Construction Bill, which funds installation

construction projects that include

antiterrorism measures; monitors and

reports on installations' readiness; and is

responsible for the development of DOD's

minimum antiterrorism standards for

buildings.

a

                        Defense Threat Reduction Agency

The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency reports directly to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Safeguards America's interests from weapons of mass destruction by
controlling and reducing the threat and providing tools and services for
the warfighter.

Provides direction and oversight of the Joint Services Installation Pilot
Project to upgrade nine military installations to be model sites for
biological and chemical safety.

Manages the Unconventional Nuclear Weapons Defense program, in conjunction
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics.

Installation preparedness Organization related responsibilities

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Defense Develops departmentwide concepts of operations and
comprehensive CBRNE standards for the preparedness of military
installations, as directed by the Joint Staff.

Serves as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's focal point for all
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense issues in passive
defense, force protection, consequence management, and homeland security,
including installation protection responsibilities.

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical-Biological Defense

Implements the Guardian Program to improve CBRN capabilities on 200
installations under the purview of the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense programs.

Developed equipment standards for selecting equipment for its
installations, and will update that equipment list on an annual basis
throughout different phases of the Guardian program.

Combatant Commands

Geographic Combatant Commanders 	Responsible for implementing
antiterrorism policies and programs for the protection of all department
elements and personnel in their area of responsibility.

                             U. S. Northern Command

Responsible for conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat
threats and aggression aimed at the continental United States and other
nearby areas within its area of responsibility.

Effective not later than October 1, 2004, will exercise tactical control
for department force protection and assume overall department
antiterrorism program and force protection responsibility in the
continental United States.

                               Military Services

Military departments 	Each of the military services has issued
regulations, orders, or instructions to implement the DOD guidance and
establish its own specific policies and standards. The services assign
responsibility for protecting installations from terrorist attacks to
installation commanders.

Installation preparedness Organization related responsibilities

Installation commanders 	Responsible for protecting installations from
terrorist attacks, including identifying and prioritizing requirements
using annual assessments of threat, vulnerability, and the criticality of
assets.

Source: GAO analysis.

aCombat Support Agency.

Three organizations have responsibilities for recent departmentwide
improvement initiatives. First, the Joint Program Executive Office for
Chemical-Biological Defense, under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, is in charge of implementing the Guardian program to safeguard 200
military installations within the next 5 years, at an estimated cost of
$1.6 billion. Oversight of this project is assigned to the Office of the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs. Second, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
a combat support agency that reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, is responsible for managing the
Joint Services Installation Pilot Project-an initiative to enhance
chemical/biological detection and emergency response capabilities at nine
installations. Figure 2 shows a first responder in protective gear
assisting a person exposed to a chemical/biological agent during a Pilot
Project exercise. Third, the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense, under the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is responsible for developing CBRNE concepts of
operations and standards for installation preparedness.

Figure 2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in Chemical/Biological Exercise

                         Source: Navy Region Southwest.

Two recently established organizations have key roles in homeland defense,
but their roles and responsibilities for improving the preparedness of
military installations for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks
are still evolving. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense, which was established as part of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,14 has responsibility for the
overall supervision of homeland defense (including land, maritime, and
aerospace) activities. More specifically, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense is to lead and focus the department's
activities in homeland defense and homeland security; ensure internal
coordination of DOD policy direction; provide guidance to the U.S.
Northern Command for its homeland defense mission and its military
activities in support of homeland security, support to civil authorities;
and coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security and other
government agencies. However, as of May 2004, DOD had not yet published or
promulgated a charter for this organization that would clearly define its
roles and responsibilities for installation preparedness. Although this
organization prepared DOD's September 2003 report to Congress, it does not
have the authority or responsibility to integrate and coordinate the
various aspects of installation preparedness, which are currently
scattered throughout the department.

Similarly, an April 2002 revision to DOD's Unified Command Plan,15
approved by the President, created the new U.S. Northern Command, a
geographic combatant command with the responsibility to militarily defend
the continental United States and other nearby areas. More specifically,
the command is responsible for conducting operations to deter, prevent,
and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States and its
territories and interests within its area of responsibility; moreover, as
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, it provides military
assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management
operations in response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-yield explosive events.

Until recently, Northern Command's specific role in supporting the
department's efforts to improve installation preparedness was not clearly

14 Pub. L. 107-314, S: 902 (2002).

15 Unified command plans provide guidance to combatant commanders and
establish their missions, responsibilities, force structure, geographic
area of responsibility, and other attributes.

defined. On May 7, 2004, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff assigned U.S. Northern Command the responsibilities for force
protection and the department's antiterrorism program in the continental
United States, effective no later than October 1, 2004.16 This step
significantly clarified the command's role, but the specific details of
how those responsibilities will be carried out are still being developed.
In addition, because the Northern Command's area of responsibility covers
domestic installations, its efforts to support installation preparedness
may be much more complex than in overseas locations, due to the additional
responsibilities to provide military assistance to civil authorities,
including consequence management operations.

    The Department Lacks a Focal Point for Installation Preparedness Efforts

DOD has not designated a single focal point with the authority and
responsibility to integrate and coordinate all aspects of installation
preparedness, thereby hindering its ability to develop a comprehensive
approach to installation preparedness. This has been evident in a number
of areas, for example:

o  	Although the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense does not have overall authority to integrate installation
preparedness activities for the department, its staff was tasked with
preparing DOD's report on installation preparedness. Homeland Defense
officials told us that developing the report and obtaining agreement on
its content from the many organizations involved in preparedness
activities was hampered because they did not have overall authority and
responsibility for planning the department's approach to installation
preparedness. For example, they said they had limited ability to resolve
disagreements among various organizations over many issues, such as the
definition of installation preparedness or the specific language used in
the report, and thus faced delays in moving the report forward.

o  	DOD has not assigned responsibility to any organization for updating
the 2003 report or monitoring progress in achieving its goals. Although
the 2003 report discussed some oversight and coordination mechanisms,
these were primarily related to the department's existing antiterrorism
program. Because of the lack of an assignment, the 2004

16 In a message from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated May 7,
2004, with subject: Executive Order for standup of U.S. Northern Command's
antiterrorism and force protection responsibilities for the continental
United States.

update was not submitted to Congress, and the department has not taken any
specific steps to evaluate the overall progress in implementing this plan.

o  	Responsibilities for developing DOD policy, standards and other
guidance related to installation preparedness are fragmented. On one hand,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict is responsible for preparing worldwide
antiterrorism policies,17 standards,18 implementation guidance,19 and an
antiterrorism strategic plan.20 The mission of the DOD antiterrorism

program, according to officials drafting the new antiterrorism strategic
plan, is to provide worldwide protection of DOD personnel and their
families; selected DOD contractors; and installations, infrastructure, and
key assets/information essential to mission accomplishment from acts of
terrorism, including CBRNE hazards. Over the past 10 months, this office
has updated the antiterrorism policy and implementation guidance, drafted
the antiterrorism strategic plan, and is currently revising the
antiterrorism standards. The Assistant Secretary was also tasked by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense in his September 5, 2002, memo to ensure that
CBRNE standards were developed in coordination with the Joint Staff; the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and
the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, with a target issue date of
May 2003. However, as of May 2004, the Joint Requirements Office, tasked
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with preparing these
standards, together with the concepts of operations, had not been able to
obtain final approval for either of these documents. Furthermore,
according to agency officials, future updates to the CBRNE emergency
response guidelines will be prepared under the direction of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.21

o  	Military installations are facing challenges in prioritizing
requirements for funding and personnel resources because DOD has been
unable to develop departmentwide CBRNE concepts of operations and

17 DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18, 2003.

18 DOD Instruction 2000.16, "DOD Antiterrorism Standards," June 14, 2001.

19 DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9, 2004.

20 DOD O-20012-P Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, June
15, 2004.

21 DOD Instruction 2000.18, "DOD Installation Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response
Guidelines," December 4, 2002.

standards, which provide the basis for calculating requirements. Until
they receive this guidance, the military services and installations will
not be able to develop rational funding and personnel requirements; in
addition, they may encounter difficulties in operating and maintaining new
detection and protection equipment that they receive as a result of
departmentwide initiatives such as the Joint Services Installation Pilot
Project or the Guardian program. For example, at three installations
participating in the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project, officials
noted the need for additional resources to support the new equipment,
which created unfunded requirements in fiscal year 2004 ranging from $2.1
to $6.5 million at each installation.

In our discussions with officials at the department, Joint Staff, service,
and installation levels, there was general agreement that the lack of a
single focal point with the appropriate authority and responsibility to
integrate departmentwide installation preparedness improvement efforts
among the many organizations involved has adversely affected their ability
to effectively plan for and manage these efforts. More specifically, the
officials said that this lack of a focal point has hindered their ability
to develop needed overarching guidance, such as the comprehensive plan,
concepts of operations, and CBRNE standards.

The evolving roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and the Northern Command as the Combatant Command responsible for
domestic military installations and facilities, combined with the lack of
an integrating authority to oversee the efforts of various department
organizations and improvement efforts, has limited the department's
ability to develop a comprehensive improvement plan, integrated concepts
of operations, and specific installation preparedness standards. The
recent decision to assign antiterrorism and force protection
responsibilities for domestic installations to Northern Command has been a
significant step in clarifying its overall responsibilities, but the role
of Homeland Defense remains unclear because its charter has not been
approved. Until Homeland Defense roles and responsibilities are clarified
as to how it will support the department's plan to improve installation
preparedness, and an integrating authority is established, the department
may continue to struggle with these issues, and the improvement efforts at
all levels within the department may not be fully coordinated or
efficiently executed.

Conclusions

Improving the preparedness of military installations worldwide for attacks
using weapons of mass destruction is a challenging and complex task that
will require a significant allocation of resources; involve numerous
organizations within the department; and necessitate the coordination with
other federal agencies and civilian organizations within the United
States, and host nation organizations in overseas locations. Although the
department has taken several steps and committed significant resources to
immediately begin installation preparedness improvements, it lacks a
comprehensive approach required by Congress that incorporates
results-oriented management principles to guide improvement initiatives in
the most efficient and effective manner. Congress has also required the
department to prepare annual updates to the plan, which presents an
opportunity to address the plan's weaknesses, but several obstacles exist
that have stymied the department's ability to develop a comprehensive,
results-oriented plan. The major obstacle we identified is the lack of a
single organization or entity with the responsibility and authority to
oversee and integrate the installation preparedness improvement efforts of
various DOD organizations. This is a complex issue, because it involves
those installations located within the continental United States, and
those located in foreign countries. Other obstacles we noted include
evolving or unclear responsibilities of key organizations, and an
unassigned responsibility to update the plan. Without a revised plan that
fully incorporates results-oriented management principles and clearly
articulates the military response capabilities to be developed and
integrated with the civilian community, the significant resources being
applied to improve preparedness may not be spent in the most efficient and
effective manner, and more importantly, opportunities to improve
preparedness and protect military personnel, facilities, and capabilities
from attacks using weapons of mass destruction may be lost.

  Recommendations for Executive Action

To develop a more useful plan to guide installation preparedness
improvement efforts, and to address barriers that inhibit DOD's ability to
develop a comprehensive approach to improve installation preparedness, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:

o  	Designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to
coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness improvement
efforts at the department, service and installation levels.

o  	Assign that organization with responsibility for preparing the 2004,
2005, and 2006 updates to the plan, which are required by section 1402 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.

o  	Clarify the installation preparedness responsibilities of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

o  	Require the next update to the plan to fully incorporate
results-oriented management principles in the legislatively required
elements. Specifically, the plan should contain:

                                       o

                                       o

                                       o

                                     o   o

                                       o

                                       o

Long-term goals that explain what results are expected, are
results-oriented, and are expressed in a way that allows them to be
assessed in terms of achievement.
Strategies that articulate the processes necessary to achieve the
organization's goals and describe how managers are to be held
accountable for achieving such goals.
Annual performance goals that include a schedule with milestones
to measure progress toward the long-term goals, and are tangible
and measurable.
A description of external impediments to achieving the goals and
the actions needed to mitigate these impediments;
Identification of resources, including funding, personnel, and
equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level of
performance.
Performance criteria or indicators used to measure progress in
achieving goals and objectives; these criteria should be objective
and outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet
performance goals.
Evaluation plans that are objective and formal assessments of the
results, impact, or effects of installation preparedness improvement
efforts.

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

o  	Require the next update to the plan to clearly describe the military
response capabilities that will be developed at the national, regional,
and local levels; and how those capabilities will be developed in
conjunction with civilian capabilities.

In comments on a draft of this report provided by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense, the department agreed with our
recommendations recognizing the need for centralized management and
operational oversight of a comprehensive preparedness program. The
Assistant Secretary's comments also stated that oversight and policy
development for worldwide installation preparedness will be assigned to
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and
the charter directive for that organization will promulgate responsibility
and required authority for worldwide installation preparedness. The
Assistant Secretary will also be responsible for preparing the 2004, 2005,
and 2006 updates to the comprehensive plan required by section 1402 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2003. DOD agreed that these future updates would fully
incorporate results-oriented management principles in the legislatively
required elements, clearly describe the military response capabilities
that will be developed at the national, regional, and local levels, and
address how those capabilities will be developed in conjunction with
civilian capabilities. In regard to the military response capabilities,
DOD stated it was of paramount importance that the department work with
other local, state, and federal entities to ensure redundant capabilities
are avoided.

We believe the actions DOD has outlined, when implemented, will be
responsive to our recommendations, and they represent positive steps
toward integrating installation preparedness improvement efforts and
establishing a more results-oriented management framework to guide these
efforts. The future updates to the comprehensive plan will also serve as a
mechanism to provide Congress, DOD managers, and other organizations with
an annual assessment of the progress achieved in improving installation
preparedness.

DOD's comments are included in their entirety in appendix III.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the
Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force; the Commandant of
the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of the Management and Budget.
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402, or my Assistant
Director,
Robert L. Repasky, at (202) 512-9868. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.

Janet St. Laurent, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003

SEC. 1402. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE PREPAREDNESS OF MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS

(a) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN-The Secretary of Defense shall develop a
comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military
installations for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks,
including attacks involving the use or threat of use of weapons of mass
destruction.

(b) PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY-The plan under subsection (a) shall include a
preparedness strategy that includes each of the following:

(1) Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving the
preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to
terrorist attacks.

(2) Identification of budget and other resource requirements necessary to
achieve those goals and objectives.

(3) Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary that
could impede the achievement of these goals and objectives.

(4) A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national
military response capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and used.

(5) A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the capabilities
referred to in paragraph (4) with local, regional, or national civilian
and other military capabilities.

(c) PERFORMANCE PLAN.-The plan under subsection (a) shall include a
performance plan that includes each of the following:

(1) A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals and
objectives of the strategy under subsection (b).

(2) Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those goals
and objectives.

(3) A description of the process, together with a discussion of the
resources, necessary to achieve those goals and objectives

Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003

(4) A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving those
goals and objectives.

(d) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.-The Secretary shall submit the comprehensive
plan developed under subsection (a) to the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.

(e) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REVIEW AND REPORT.-Not later than 60 days after
the date on which the Secretary submits the comprehensive plan under
subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall review the plan and submit
to the committees referred to in subsection (d) the Comptroller General's
assessment of the plan.

(f) ANNUAL REPORT.-(1) In each of 2004, 2005, and 2006, the Secretary of
Defense shall include a report on the comprehensive plan developed under
subsection (a) with the materials that the Secretary submits to Congress
in support of the budget submitted by the President that year pursuant to
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.

(2) Each such report shall include

(A) a discussion of any revision that the Secretary has made in the
comprehensive plan developed under subsection (a) since the last report
under this subsection or, in the case of the first such report, since the
plan was submitted under subsection (d); and

(B) an assessment of the progress made in achieving the goals and
objectives of the strategy set forth in the plan.

(3) If the Secretary includes in the report for 2004 or 2005 under this
subsection a declaration that the goals and objectives of the preparedness
strategy set forth in the comprehensive plan have been achieved, no
further report is required under this subsection.

                       Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

To determine if the Department of Defense's (DOD) September 2003 report to
Congress represents a comprehensive plan that can guide installation
preparedness efforts, we based our analysis on our past work that
addressed the need for DOD to develop comprehensive strategies and
implementation plans with results-oriented elements that focused on
program outcomes or results, rather than program activities and processes.
We discussed the concerns of Congress with committee staffs who were
involved in developing section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2003 to better understand the requirements of the Act.
We also discussed the report content with department officials who
prepared it to ensure we had an agreed upon interpretation of the elements
presented in the report. We then compared the nine elements discussed in
the report with those specifically required by the legislation. We also
compared the report's seven managementrelated elements with those
developed from sound management principles as embodied in the Government
Results and Performance Act (GPRA) of 1993 and further refined in GPRA
user guides and prior GAO reports. To assess the two discussion elements
related to military response capabilities required by the legislation, we
reviewed information presented in the report to determine if it presented
a clear discussion of the national, regional, local response capabilities,
and how they would be developed in conjunction with civilian capabilities.
We also discussed the content of the report in these two areas with
officials at the department, Service, and installation levels to obtain
their views on the report content and the usefulness of that information.

To identify obstacles that may hinder the department's ability to develop
and implement an integrated and comprehensive installation preparedness
approach, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military services who are
responsible for policies, programs, and key initiatives related to various
aspects of installation preparedness against chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive incidents. We also
gathered and reviewed relevant policy guidance, instructions, and
implementation documents for current improvement initiatives, including
the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project and project Guardian, and
discussed these initiatives with department and service headquarters and
installation officials.

We discussed and observed installation preparedness capabilities at 13
military installations. We selected east and west coast military
installations, representing each of the military services, including
locations in close proximity to large civilian communities, some that were
more

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

isolated, and some that were participating in the Joint Services
Installation Pilot Project. Specific discussions with military
installation officials included installation preparedness criteria, roles
and responsibilities, major efforts to improve installation preparedness
as well as the financial impact to the installations with regard to
current improvement initiatives, efforts to ensure effective coordination
among and between military and civilian organizations, particularly first
responders and those involved in consequence management, and what they
believe should be included in the comprehensive plan to make it a useful
management tool. In addition, we observed installation preparedness
exercises in the Norfolk and San Diego areas. Although the information
obtained at these locations cannot be generalized to describe DOD's
worldwide installation preparedness improvement efforts, it provided us
with insights on preparedness challenges at the installation level. Table
3 lists the military organizations and installations we visited or
contacted to obtain our data.

Table 3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations Visited or
Contacted for this Assignment

Department headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area

o  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

o  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict

o  	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and
Defense Programs

o  Defense Threat Reduction Agency

o  National Guard Bureau, Homeland Defense

 Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area

o  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Operations J-3

o  Joint Program Executive Office, Chemical Biological Program

o  Joint Requirements Office

Military service headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area

o  	Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans (G-3)
and Army Installation Management Agency

o  Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics (N4)) and Chief of Navy
Installations

o  Commandant of the Marine Corps

o  Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations & Logistics

                             Military Installations

o  Army-Fort Lewis, Wash.

o  Marine Corps-Camp Lejeune, N.C.

o  Army-Fort Eustis, Newport News, Va.

o  Navy Region Mid-Atlantic

o  Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Va.

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

o  Naval Station Norfolk, Va.

o  Oceana Master Jet Base, Va.

o  Navy Region Northwest, Wash.

o  Sub Base Bangor, Wash.

o  Naval Station Everett, Everett, Wash.

o  Navy Region Southwest, San Diego, Calif.

o  Navy Base Point Loma, San Diego, Calif.

o  Navy Station San Diego, Calif.

o  Navy Base, Coronado, Calif.

o  Langley Air Force Base, Va.

o  McChord Air Force Base, Wash.

Source: GAO analysis.

To estimate fiscal year 2004 unfunded requirements for installation
preparedness at three installations, we requested and obtained budget
estimates from installation officials. We also obtained fiscal year 2005
unfunded requirements as prioritized by the services and analyzed them to
determine that installation preparedness activities were included in their
estimates. Based on our discussions with department officials and the
budget documentation provided, we determined that the data we used were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

We conducted our review from April 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Robert L. Repasky (202) 512-9868

Acknowledgments 	In addition to those named above, Hugh Brady, Nancy
Benco, Pat Seaton, Elisabeth Ryan, and Corinna Wengryn made key
contributions to this report.

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