    Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation
    Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and
    Comprehensive Planning (12-AUG-04, GAO-04-855).

    Terrorist incidents in the United States and abroad have
    underscored the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to safeguard
    military personnel and facilities from potential terrorist
    attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
    weapons and high-yield explosive devices. In the 2003 National
    Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed DOD to develop a
    comprehensive plan to help guide departmentwide efforts in
    improving installation preparedness against such attacks. The act
    also directed GAO to assess DOD's plan. DOD submitted its report
    to Congress in September 2003. This review addresses two
    questions: (1) Does DOD's report represent a comprehensive plan
    that can guide installation preparedness efforts? and (2) What
    obstacles, if any, hinder DOD's ability to develop and
    effectively implement a comprehensive approach to installation
    preparedness?
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-855
        ACCNO:   A11574
      TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation
    Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and
    Comprehensive Planning
         DATE:   08/12/2004
      SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism
    	     Defense contingency planning
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     Facility security
    	     Federal agency reorganization
    	     Jurisdictional authority
    	     Military facilities
    	     Military personnel
    	     National defense operations
    	     National preparedness
    	     Performance measures
    	     Reporting requirements
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Terrorism
    	     Policy evaluation
    	     Homeland security

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    GAO-04-855

                     United States Government Accountability Office

                         GAO Report to Congressional Committees

    August 2004

                                       COMBATING
                                       TERRORISM

                                     DOD Efforts to
                                  Improve Installation
                                      Preparedness
                                    Can Be Enhanced
                                     with Clarified
                                  Responsibilities and
                                     Comprehensive
                                        Planning

    On August 20, 2004, this report was reproduced for the Web version only
    because figures 1 and 2, pages 8 and 20, respectively should have appeared
    in color.

                                           a

    GAO-04-855

    Highlights of GAO-04-855, a report to congressional committees.

    Terrorist incidents in the United States and abroad have underscored the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) need to safeguard military personnel and
    facilities from potential terrorist attacks involving chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and high-yield explosive
    devices. In the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed
    DOD to develop a comprehensive plan to help guide departmentwide efforts
    in improving installation preparedness against such attacks. The act also
    directed GAO to assess DOD's plan. DOD submitted its report to Congress in
    September 2003. This review addresses two questions: (1) Does DOD's report
    represent a comprehensive plan that can guide installation preparedness
    efforts? and (2) What obstacles, if any, hinder DOD's ability to develop
    and effectively implement a comprehensive approach to installation
    preparedness?

    GAO is recommending that a single authority be designated to integrate
    installation preparedness efforts, and that the roles of key organizations
    be clearly defined. It is also recommending that the 2003 plan be updated
    to fully incorporate results-oriented management principles and describe
    what military response capabilities need to be developed. DOD agreed with
    all the recommendations in this report.

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-855.

    To view the full product, including the scope
    and methodology, click on the link above.
    For more information, contact
    Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or
    stlaurentj@gao.gov.

    August 2004

    COMBATING TERRORISM

    DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified
    Responsibilities and Comprehensive Planning

    While DOD's September 2003 report generally met the requirements of the
    act, it does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management
    plan that could help guide DOD's installation preparedness efforts. For
    example, the report described annual performance goals that were general
    in nature and did not have good metrics to gauge progress; it did not
    describe a comprehensive process and total resources needed to achieve
    long-term goals; and it did not define an objective and formal process for
    evaluating results. As a result, it is unclear how improvement goals will
    be achieved, what resources will be required, or when improvements are
    expected to be completed. In addition, it did not fully describe the
    national, regional, and local military response capabilities that will be
    developed, or how these capabilities will be integrated with local
    civilian capabilities. As a result, it is unclear how duplication of
    requirements and redundant capabilities will be avoided. DOD officials
    attributed the report's limitations to evolving organizational
    responsibilities, and a lack of resources and guidance. GAO believes that
    until a more results-oriented, comprehensive plan is developed that
    clearly articulates the military response capabilities to be developed and
    integrated with the civilian community, DOD's ongoing initiatives and
    other opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be
    effectively or efficiently implemented.

    Two obstacles impede DOD's ability to effectively develop a comprehensive
    approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. First, while a
    large number of organizations are engaged in efforts to improve
    installation preparedness, the responsibilities of two newly established
    organizations- the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
    the U.S. Northern Command-are evolving, and the installation preparedness
    related responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense
    is not clearly defined. Second, no single entity has been given the
    authority and responsibility to integrate and manage departmentwide
    installation preparedness efforts. In discussions with officials at the
    department, Joint Staff, service and installation levels, there was
    general agreement that a lack of a single focal point having the
    appropriate authority and responsibility to integrate overall installation
    preparedness improvement efforts among the many organizations involved has
    adversely affected their ability to effectively plan for and manage
    departmentwide installation preparedness improvements. As a result, DOD
    has faced difficulties in developing departmentwide standards and concepts
    of operations and in preparing a comprehensive plan for installation
    preparedness. Until organization roles and responsibilities are clarified,
    and an integrating authority is designated, DOD will be limited in its
    ability to develop a comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide
    guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing billion-dollar improvement
    initiatives at the installation level.

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    DOD's Report Does Not Represent a Comprehensive,

    Results-Oriented Plan to Improve Installation Preparedness Two Obstacles
    Hinder DOD's Ability to Improve Installation

    Preparedness Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency
    Comments and Our Evaluation

                                           1

                                          3 5

                                           9

    15 25 25 26

    Appendix I	Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2003

    Appendix II Scope and Methodology

    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Related GAO Products

      Tables

    Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements 10 Table 2: Key DOD and
    Joint Staff Organizations Involved in Installation Preparedness 16 Table
    3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations Visited or
    Contacted for this Assignment 31

      Figures

    Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise 8 Figure
    2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in Chemical/Biological Exercise
    20

    Abbreviations

    CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield

    explosives DOD Department of Defense WMD weapons of mass destruction

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

    August 12, 2004

    The Honorable John W. Warner
    Chairman
    The Honorable Carl Levin
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
    Chairman
    The Honorable Ike Skelton
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives

    Terrorist incidents within the United States and abroad have underscored
    the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to safeguard military personnel
    and infrastructure from potential terrorist attacks involving weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD).1 While many of the department's past efforts
    have focused on enhancing protection and response capabilities against
    high-yield explosives, the new security environment underscores the need
    for the department to expand its safeguards to include chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. To address these
    potential
    threats, the department has begun to direct billions of dollars toward
    departmentwide initiatives designed to safeguard personnel and facilities.
    At the same time, the military services are continuing to pursue
    initiatives
    at specific installations to lessen their vulnerabilities to terrorist
    activities.

    In recent years, both legislative actions and our prior work have focused
    on DOD's need to develop an effective program to improve its installation
    preparedness against terrorists' incidents. In response to a committee
    mandate2 to review DOD's plans for improving installation preparedness

    1 DOD defines weapons of mass destruction as weapons that are capable of a
    high order of destruction and are used to destroy large numbers of people.
    WMD can consist of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons
    and high-yield explosives (CBRNE).

    2 S. Rep. No. 107-62, at 352 (2001).

    for WMD, we concluded in an April 2002 report that while the department
    had made some progress, it did not have a comprehensive plan or overall
    framework to guide its installation preparedness improvement efforts.3 We
    also discussed with the department during the course of that work the
    importance of clearly articulating the national, regional, and local
    response capabilities that would be developed and integrated with the
    civilian community so that unnecessary redundant capabilities could be
    avoided.

    Following our initial assessment and report, in September 2002, the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that called for the development
    of a departmentwide integrated CBRNE approach to installation
    preparedness, with complete integration of policies, technologies,
    equipment, and operational concepts. The memorandum noted that the
    department would begin providing all installation personnel, including
    military and civilian personnel, contractors, and others who live or work
    on base, with protection against the wider range of threats.

    Also following our initial report, Congress, in section 1402 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (see app. I),4
    directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive plan, with
    annual updates in 2004, 2005, and 2006, for improving the preparedness of
    military installations worldwide for terrorist incidents, including
    attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. The legislation also
    directed us to review DOD's plan and provide our assessment to the Senate
    and House Armed Services Committees. In September 2003, the department
    complied with the section 1402 mandate by submitting its plan, entitled
    "Report to Congress on Preparedness of Military Installations for
    Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Incidents."

    This report summarizes our assessment of DOD's September 2003 report to
    Congress. Specifically, it addresses two questions: (1) Does the
    department's report represent a comprehensive plan that can guide
    installation preparedness efforts? and (2) What obstacles, if any, hinder

    3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Preparedness of
    Military Installations for Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass
    Destruction, GAO-02-644R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2002).

    4 Pub. L. 107-314, S:1402 (2002).

    the department's ability to develop and effectively implement a
    comprehensive approach to installation preparedness?

    In conducting our assessment, we examined DOD's 2003 report to determine
    if it addressed the elements required by the act, and evaluated the
    quality of the information by comparing it to management principles
    embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,5 such as
    the desired characteristics for long-term goals and strategies to
    accomplish those goals, and performance criteria for measuring progress.
    We also discussed the content of the report with department officials who
    prepared it to better understand how it was developed. To identify
    obstacles, if any, that may prevent DOD from developing a comprehensive
    approach to improve installation preparedness, we discussed with
    department, service, and installation officials the roles and
    responsibilities of organizations and offices involved in the department's
    installation preparedness efforts, as well as the challenges they faced in
    planning and implementing preparedness efforts. As part of our evaluation,
    we discussed and observed installation preparedness capabilities at 13
    military installations. Although the information obtained at these
    locations cannot be generalized to describe DOD's worldwide installation
    preparedness improvement efforts, it provided us with insights on
    preparedness challenges at the installation level. We assessed the
    reliability of the data used in this report and determined that it was
    sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

    We conducted our review between April 2003 and May 2004 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards. Further information on
    our scope and methodology appears in appendix II.

                                    Results in Brief

    While DOD's September 2003 report generally met the requirements of
    section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2003 by discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the report
    does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management plan to
    help guide installation preparedness improvement efforts. For example, the
    report described annual performance goals that were general in nature and
    did not have adequate metrics to gauge progress, it did not describe a

    5 Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act to provide
    for, among other things, the establishment of strategic planning and
    performance measurement in the federal government. Pub. L. 103-62 (2003).

    comprehensive process and total resources needed to achieve long-term
    goals, and it did not define an objective and formal process for
    evaluating results. As a result, it is unclear how long-term goals will be
    measured, what resources will be needed to achieve the desired goals, when
    the goals are expected to be achieved, and how the results of improvement
    efforts will be evaluated. In addition, the report did not fully describe
    the national, regional, and local military response capabilities that will
    be developed, or how those capabilities will be integrated with local
    civilian capabilities. As a result, it is unclear how duplication of
    requirements and unnecessarily redundant capabilities will be avoided.
    Department officials acknowledged that the report does not reflect the
    results-oriented management elements we describe nor are military response
    capabilities clearly articulated in the report, because, in their opinion,
    DOD organizations' roles and responsibilities were still evolving in the
    aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and because they
    had limited resources and guidance to prepare the report. Officials also
    stated that responsibility for preparing the legislatively required annual
    updates to the plan has not been assigned, and that the department has not
    yet submitted the 2004 update, which was required to be sent with
    materials supporting the fiscal year 2005 budget request in March 2004.
    Until a comprehensive plan is prepared that more fully incorporates
    results-oriented management principles and better defines the desired
    military response capabilities, the department's installation preparedness
    improvement initiatives may not be implemented in the most effective and
    efficient manner, the department may be limited in its ability to
    determine if improvement efforts are achieving the desired outcome, and
    opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be fully
    realized.

    Two obstacles impede DOD's ability to effectively develop a comprehensive
    approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. First, a large
    number of organizations are engaged in efforts to improve the preparedness
    of military installations, but the installation preparedness-related
    responsibilities of two recently established organizations-the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern
    Command-are still evolving. On May 7, 2004, the U.S. Northern Command was
    assigned specific antiterrorism and force protection responsibilities for
    domestic installations, which was a significant step toward clarifying its
    installation preparedness role, but those of the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Homeland Defense are still undefined. Secondly, no single
    entity has been assigned the authority or responsibility to integrate and
    manage departmentwide installation preparedness efforts. As a result, DOD
    has not developed departmentwide installation preparedness policies,
    including integrated concepts of

    operations and standards, as required by the Assistant Secretary in his
    September 5, 2002, memorandum; the comprehensive plan called for by the
    act was prepared by an organization that had no formal authority to
    integrate departmentwide efforts and resolve disagreements between the
    parties involved; and DOD has not taken any specific steps to evaluate the
    overall progress in implementing this plan. Until these obstacles are
    removed, the department will be limited in its ability to develop a
    comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide installation
    preparedness guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing improvement
    initiatives.

    We are recommending the department take steps to fully incorporate
    results-oriented management principles in the next update to the plan,
    clarify the installation preparedness related responsibilities of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and designate a
    single integrating authority with the responsibility to coordinate and
    integrate worldwide installation preparedness improvement efforts. In
    comments on a draft of this report, the department agreed with our
    recommendations, and stated it will take specific actions to implement
    them.

    The department's policies, programs, and organizational responsibilities
    related to installation preparedness for attacks involving weapons of mass
    destruction have been evolving over the last few years as the department
    adapted to meet new challenges arising from terrorist attacks. Especially
    since the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the general focus
    of the department's installation preparedness activities emphasized
    antiterrorism, or defensive measures such as gates, fencing, perimeter
    lighting, and security patrols used to reduce the vulnerability of
    individuals and property. After the attack on the USS Cole in October
    2000, antiterrorism measures received even greater emphasis, resulting in
    additional standards and measures to better protect military forces. The
    September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States heightened the emphasis
    and focus on installation preparedness against a wider spectrum of
    threats.

    Background

    DOD's Antiterrorism/Force In August 2003, DOD updated its directive signed
    by the Deputy Secretary Protection Policy and of Defense that provides
    DOD's antiterrorism policy and assigns Guidance responsibilities to
    defense organizations implementing antiterrorism

    initiatives.6 This directive places responsibility for developing

    6 DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18, 2003.

    antiterrorism policy and guidance with the Office of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. In
    this capacity, the Assistant Secretary of Defense issued an instruction
    that established 31 antiterrorism standards that DOD organizations,
    including the services, are required to implement.7 These standards
    address antiterrorism planning, training requirements, physical security
    measures, and related issues. The Assistant Secretary also issued a
    handbook containing additional detailed guidance on antiterrorism policies
    and practices, including guidance on assessing these practices, which was
    updated in February 2004.8 Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    manage antiterrorism funding, conduct inspections, and work with the
    Assistant Secretary to develop DOD antiterrorism policies. Additionally,
    each of the military services has issued regulations, orders, or
    instructions to implement the DOD guidance and establish its own specific
    policies and standards. Overseas, the geographic combatant commanders have
    ultimate antiterrorism and force protection authority and responsibility
    within their areas of responsibility.9

        DOD Installation Preparedness Guidance and Improvement Initiatives

    In a September 5, 2002, memorandum, DOD clarified its policy to protect
    military installations from CBRNE attacks, respond to these attacks with
    trained and equipped emergency responders, and ensure that installations
    are able to continue critical operations during an attack and resume
    essential operations afterwards.10 The policy also required DOD to
    approach preparedness from a departmentwide perspective, with complete
    integration of policies, technologies, equipment, and operational
    concepts. The memorandum noted that the department would begin providing
    all installation personnel, including military and civilian personnel,
    contractors, and others who live or work on base, with protection against
    the wider range of threats.

    DOD's September 2003 report to Congress was the first to offer a
    definition of installation preparedness. It was defined as a collective,

    7 DOD Instruction 2000.16: DOD Antiterrorism Standards, June 14, 2001.

    8 DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9, 2004.

    9 DOD Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards S: E3.1.1.11 (June
    14, 2001).

    10 Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Preparedness of U.S. Military
    Installations and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack,"
    Memorandum, Sept. 5, 2002.

    proactive effort to prevent, detect, respond, and protect department
    bases, personnel, their families, and infrastructure critical to mission
    accomplishment against terrorists' use of weapons of mass destruction.
    This definition combines the fundamental elements of antiterrorism-
    defensive measures to prevent and detect attacks-with elements related to
    responding to and mitigating the effects of an attack.

    DOD has recently committed significant resources and undertaken a number
    of initiatives to improve installation preparedness to protect personnel
    and facilities. For example, in September 2002, the department began a $61
    million project called the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project, to
    provide equipment and training to enhance chemical and biological
    detection and emergency response capabilities on nine diverse DOD
    installations. In October 2003, it started the Guardian project to improve
    the detection and protection against chemical, biological, radiological,
    and nuclear threats at 200 domestic and overseas installations at an
    estimated cost of $1.6 billion over the next 5 years. The project is
    designed to tailor requirements according to installation needs, and will
    include the design and installation of detection systems. Figure 1
    illustrates a decontamination operation during a recent installation
    training exercise responding to a chemical/biological incident.

    Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise

    Source: Navy Region Southwest.

    In a number of reports that we have issued during the past few years, we
    have underscored the need for DOD to institute sound management principles
    to guide its installation preparedness efforts. Such management principles
    are embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and
    consist of a number of critical elements considered essential in
    developing an effective strategy, guiding resource allocations, and
    monitoring results. In this previous work, we concluded that without sound
    management principles, DOD faces, among other things, the potential for
    inappropriate or redundant allocation of resources and limited or lost
    preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress and DOD
    managers may not be able to determine if desired program outcomes are
    being achieved.

      DOD's Report Does Not Represent a Comprehensive, Results-Oriented Plan to
      Improve Installation Preparedness

    While the department's report generally met the requirements of section
    1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 by
    discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the report does not
    represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management plan to help guide
    installation preparedness improvement efforts. The legislation required
    the department to address nine elements-seven associated with management
    principles and two associated with military response capabilities. The
    department's report described each of these nine elements, but the
    management elements were not addressed in a results-oriented manner, and
    the military capability elements were not discussed in a manner that
    provides a clear description of the response capabilities needed, or how
    they will be integrated with civilian capabilities. As a result,
    installation preparedness improvement goals, objectives, resource
    requirements, and methods to evaluate the outcome of new initiatives
    remain unclear, as well as how the department intends to develop national,
    regional and local military response capabilities that are coordinated
    with civilian response capabilities.

    The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required DOD
    to develop a comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military
    installations for terrorist incidents. Specifically, it required the
    department to address five elements of a preparedness strategy, and four
    elements of a performance plan. We analyzed these nine requirements and
    found that seven of them were collectively related to management
    principles, and two of them were discussion points related to the
    development of military response capabilities. Table 1 lists these nine
    elements.

                   Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements

    Seven management-related elements

    1. Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving the
    preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to
    terrorist attacks.

    2. Description of the process, together with a discussion of the
    resources, necessary to achieve those goals and objectives.

    3. A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals and
    objectives of the strategy.

    4. Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary that
    could impede the achievement of these goals and objectives.

    5. Identification of budget and other resource requirements necessary to
    achieve those goals and objectives.

    6. Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those goals
    and objectives.

    7. A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving those
    goals and objectives.

    Two military response capability discussion elements

    8. A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national
    military response capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and used.

    9. A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the capabilities
    referred to in #8 above with local, regional, or national civilian and
    other military capabilities.

    Source: GAO analysis of section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2003.

    DOD's September report to Congress discussed each of the nine
    required elements and was therefore technically in compliance with
    the requirements of the act. However, the report did not address the
    seven management-related elements in a manner that fully incorporates
    results-oriented management principles so that the report could serve as a
    useful tool in guiding installation improvement efforts. The following is
    our assessment of the adequacy of the information provided in the
    department's report when compared to results-oriented management
    principles:

    o  	Long-Term Goals-Long-term goals should explain what results are
    expected, should be results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way
    that allows them to be assessed in terms of achievement. They should also
    describe how managers are to be held accountable for achieving such goals.
    Although the department's report identifies four long-term goals, which it
    calls "preparedness strategy elements"-prevention, detection, protection,
    and emergency response-it does not clearly express these goals in a way
    that would allow the department to measure progress toward achieving them.
    For example, the prevention strategy element was described as "The
    Department's

    antiterrorism (AT) strategy is to maximize efforts to prevent, deter, and
    detect terrorist attacks against DOD personnel, their families,
    facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission
    accomplishment as well as the preparation needed to defend against and
    respond to the consequences of terrorist incidents." This description does
    not provide the information necessary to explain what results are to be
    expected nor is it described in a way that allows progress to be assessed.
    Furthermore, the report did not identify the organizations accountable for
    achieving the goals.

    o  	Process to Achieve Goals-The act required that the plan describe the
    process, together with a discussion of the resources, necessary to achieve
    those goals and objectives. In describing how the installation
    preparedness improvement strategy would be achieved, the department's
    report provided some general narrative such as "DOD...policies support
    this...strategy by ensuring a comprehensive and integrated approach that
    continuously identifies and overcomes vulnerabilities, thereby reducing
    risk to our personnel and resources; enhancing the planning, training and
    equipping of the force; and providing prudent guidance and direction..."
    The department's report also describes ongoing improvement initiatives
    such as the Joint Service Installation Pilot Project and the Guardian
    Program.11 Because of the general nature of the discussion in the report,
    it was not clear the extent to which the goals would be met with the cited
    initiatives, or, as discussed below, the full extent to which resources
    would be required to achieve each goal.

    o  	Schedule with milestones-The act required the plan to include a
    reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the installation
    preparedness long-term goals. Such a schedule should include details on
    incremental performance goals that are tangible, measurable, and
    objective; usually expressed within certain timeframes such as "by the end
    of 200X, at least 95 percent of commanders will have completed required
    annual terrorism risk assessments." The department's report contained 25
    performance goals identified in the report as strategic objectives. These
    objectives were general in nature, and most contained a specific year in
    which the goal was to be either started or achieved. However, as discussed
    in the performance criteria section below, they all lacked specific
    targets that could be used to measure progress. For example, one strategic
    objective listed in the plan states

    11 Referred to in the report as the "Chemical, Biological
    Installation/Force Protection Program."

    "beginning in fiscal year 2003, improve robotic vehicles for
    [antiterrorism] operations as well as for emergency responders."

    o  	External factors that could impede achievement of the long-term
    goals-External impediments should be identified, and the actions needed to
    mitigate these impediments should be addressed. Although the department's
    report identifies a number of external impediments (e.g., the feasibility,
    availability, and affordability of technological solutions and the degree
    to which state and local responders are trained and equipped), it does not
    clearly describe how these factors may affect the department's ability to
    achieve its goals, or ways of reducing the potential impact of these
    impediments.

    o  	Identification of budget and other resources-Good management
    principles call for the identification of resources, including funding,
    personnel, and equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level of
    performance. Although the department's report identifies funding resources
    needed for antiterrorism and consequence management12- for example, $8.5
    billion in fiscal year 2004-the report indicates that this amount is part
    of a larger funding requirement, but it does not provide further details.
    In addition, the report does not include any information on additional
    personnel or equipment that would be needed.

    o  	Performance criteria-Performance criteria or measures are indicators
    used to measure progress in achieving goals and objectives. They should be
    objective and outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet
    performance goals. The department's report identifies 25 performance
    indicators (one for each performance goal), which it calls measures of
    effectiveness. However, many of them are not outcome-oriented and all of
    them lack specific targets or baselines that could be used to measure
    progress. For example, as discussed previously, although the report notes
    that robotic vehicles will be improved, it does not provide a quantifiable
    target, nor does it present a baseline to assess progress. In another
    example, a strategic objective listed in the plan is "develop standardized
    installation CBRNE scenario exercises for training and equipment
    requirements." The related measure of effectiveness described in the
    report is "standardized

    12 Consequence management is defined in DOD Directive 2000.12 as those
    measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential
    government services, and provide emergency relief to governments,
    business, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE
    situation.

    exercise scenarios will improve efficiencies and consistency in equipment
    and training, leading to improved interoperability." This measure of
    effectiveness is highlighting the potential benefit of achieving the
    objective; it does not provide specific criteria for how it will be
    measured, or any baseline data that can be used to measure progress in
    achieving the stated goal.

    o  	Process for evaluating results-Program evaluations are defined as
    objective and formal assessments of the results, impact, or effects of a
    program or policy. Such information can be used to assess the extent to
    which performance goals were met and identify appropriate strategies to
    meet those goals that were not met. The department's report indicates that
    it will provide general oversight, semiannual review of action plans, and
    annual reviews of antiterrorism plans. However, the report does not define
    how it will evaluate the impact of current initiatives or describe how
    such evaluations could be used to improve the department's overall efforts
    to improve installation preparedness.

    In addition to the seven management-related elements, the legislation
    required DOD to discuss two elements related to military response
    capabilities. In the first element, the department was required to discuss
    the extent to which local, regional, or national military response
    capabilities were to be developed, integrated, and used. In our view, it
    is important that DOD articulate the extent to which it will develop such
    capabilities because national and regional capabilities can supplement or
    enhance those available at individual installations and redundant
    capabilities could be avoided. In the report, however, DOD discussed
    non-military capabilities, such as the Federal Response Plan, which
    provides a government-integrated response to disasters through the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency. The report also discussed the department's
    Joint Task Force for Civil Support, which serves as a military
    headquarters unit responsible for coordinating department activities
    supporting civil authorities, but does not have specific operational
    response capabilities of its own.

    In the second discussion element, DOD was directed to discuss how it would
    coordinate its proposed military response capabilities with civilian
    capabilities. Such a discussion would provide information on how overlap
    and duplication of efforts between military and civilian organizations at
    all levels could be reduced. However, DOD's report discussed the need to
    use memorandums of agreement between, for example, military installations
    and civilian local-community first responders to fill in the gaps in

    emergency response capabilities on and off base. However, because it did
    not address how military regional and national response capabilities were
    to be developed, integrated, and used, the report did not describe how
    those capabilities would be coordinated with those of the civilian sector.
    Furthermore, while the report discussed a national-level response
    exercise, called "Top Officials,"13 involving cooperation and coordination
    between the federal response community (such as the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency) and local and regional civilian response organizations,
    the report did not describe how military response capabilities would be
    integrated into such exercises, nor how lessons learned from national
    exercises would be shared with military organizations.

    In discussions with us, officials from the Office of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, who were responsible for
    preparing the report, agreed that the report does not fully reflect the
    results-oriented management elements that we have described above. In
    addition, they agreed that the report does not clearly articulate the
    military response capabilities to be developed at the national, regional
    and local levels. They told us that, in their opinion, the department
    organizations' roles and responsibilities were still evolving in the
    aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (discussed in
    more detail later in this report), and they prepared the report with
    limited staff and limited guidance. As a result, they approached the
    preparation of the report by generally summarizing the key efforts
    underway in the department to improve installation preparedness, and by
    drawing on key elements of the existing antiterrorism program.

    Based on the concerns of Congress regarding the need for DOD to
    effectively plan for installation preparedness improvements against
    terrorist incidents, and our past work concluding that DOD did not have a
    comprehensive plan or overall framework to guide its installation
    preparedness improvement efforts, we believe that without clearly
    articulated results-oriented management elements, the report-and the
    comprehensive plan it is supposed to reflect-cannot serve as a useful tool

    13 Congress mandated the Department of State and Department of Justice to
    conduct a series of challenging, role-playing exercises involving the
    senior federal, state, and local officials who would direct crisis
    management and consequence management response to an actual WMD attack.
    The result was Top Officials (TOPOFF), a national-level domestic and
    international exercise series designed to produce a more effective,
    coordinated, global response to WMD terrorism.

    to guide and manage installation improvement efforts and provide a
    mechanism to adequately assess progress. For example, DOD's report is
    unclear in its discussion of how long-term goals will be measured, what
    resources will be needed to achieve the desired goals, when the goals are
    expected to be achieved, and how the results of ongoing improvement
    efforts will be evaluated. In addition, without a clear description of how
    national, regional, and local military response capabilities will be
    developed and integrated with civilian capabilities, it is unclear how
    duplication of requirements and redundant capabilities will be avoided.
    Therefore, without a comprehensive plan that more fully incorporates
    results-oriented management principles and better defines the desired
    military response capabilities, the department's installation preparedness
    improvement initiatives may not be implemented in the most effective and
    efficient manner, the department may be limited in its ability to
    determine if improvement efforts are achieving the desired outcome, and
    opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be fully
    realized.

    Furthermore, the act requires that DOD submit annual updates to the plan
    in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006 that include a discussion of any
    revision to the plan, and an assessment of the progress made in achieving
    the goals and objectives of the strategy set forth in the plan. DOD,
    however, has not assigned responsibility for preparing the required
    updates to any organization and has not taken any specific steps to
    evaluate the overall progress in implementing this plan. In fact, the
    first annual update, which was due March 2004 with the materials that the
    Secretary of Defense submits to Congress in support of the budget
    submission, has not yet been submitted. According to the officials we
    spoke with, until specific responsibility for updating the plan is
    assigned, it is unclear who will prepare the updates or when they will be
    prepared.

    Two obstacles have impeded DOD's ability to effectively develop a
    comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts.
    First, although numerous organizations currently engaged in installation
    preparedness improvement efforts have clear roles and responsibilities,
    two key organizations-the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
    Defense and the U.S. Northern Command-have only been recently established,
    and their installation preparedness responsibilities are still evolving.
    On May 7, 2004, the Northern Command was assigned specific antiterrorism
    and force protection responsibilities for domestic installations, which
    was a significant step toward clarifying its installation preparedness
    role, but those of Homeland Defense are still undefined.

      Two Obstacles Hinder DOD's Ability to Improve Installation Preparedness

    Second, no organization has been given the authority and responsibility to
    integrate and coordinate installation preparedness policies and
    improvement efforts and monitor progress in achieving the plan's
    objectives. Until these issues are resolved, DOD will be unable to pursue
    installation preparedness improvements in a comprehensive and integrated
    manner, and the significant resources being applied to accomplish
    improvement goals may not be spent in the most efficient and effective
    manner.

        Numerous Organizations
        Involved in Installation
        Preparedness and
        Two Have Evolving Roles
        and Responsibilities

    Many organizations at various levels within DOD are engaged in activities
    to improve installation preparedness. The military services and their
    installation commanders play a key role in safeguarding their individual
    bases, while combatant commanders are responsible for protecting forces
    within their geographic areas of responsibility. In addition, there are
    several department and Joint-Staff-level organizations that have key roles
    and responsibilities for installation preparedness policies and
    procedures. The roles of most of these organizations are clearly defined
    but those of two recently established department organizations-the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U. S. Northern
    Command-are still evolving. Table 2 lists the key organizations involved
    in installation preparedness at the department and Joint Staff levels, and
    briefly describes their roles and responsibilities.

    Table 2: Key DOD and Joint Staff Organizations Involved in Installation
    Preparedness

    Installation preparedness Organization related responsibilities

    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special

                         Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

    Develops worldwide antiterrorism policy and guidance for the DOD
    components. Such guidance currently includes DOD Directive 2000.12, "DOD
    Antiterrorism Program"; DOD Instruction 2000.16, "DOD Antiterrorism
    Standards"; and DOD O-2000.12-H, "DOD Antiterrorism Handbook."

    Organization

    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

    Installation preparedness related responsibilities

    Provides overall supervision of homeland defense activities of the
    department under the authority, direction, and control of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy. As such, will oversee homeland defense
    activities, develop policies, conduct analyses, provide advice, and make
    recommendations on homeland defense, support to civil authorities,
    emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management matters with the
    department. DOD defines homeland defense as the military protection of
    United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense
    infrastructure against external threats and aggression.

    Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

    Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
    Biological Defense Programs Oversees the Chemical Biological Defense
    Program, including programs such as Project Guardian, run by the Joint
    Program Executive Office for Chemical-Biological Defense.

    Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Prepares and defends the Military
    Installations and Environment Construction Bill, which funds installation

    construction projects that include

    antiterrorism measures; monitors and

    reports on installations' readiness; and is

    responsible for the development of DOD's

    minimum antiterrorism standards for

    buildings.

    a

                            Defense Threat Reduction Agency

    The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency reports directly to
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

    Safeguards America's interests from weapons of mass destruction by
    controlling and reducing the threat and providing tools and services for
    the warfighter.

    Provides direction and oversight of the Joint Services Installation Pilot
    Project to upgrade nine military installations to be model sites for
    biological and chemical safety.

    Manages the Unconventional Nuclear Weapons Defense program, in conjunction
    with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics.

    Installation preparedness Organization related responsibilities

    Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

    Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
    Nuclear Defense Develops departmentwide concepts of operations and
    comprehensive CBRNE standards for the preparedness of military
    installations, as directed by the Joint Staff.

    Serves as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's focal point for all
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense issues in passive
    defense, force protection, consequence management, and homeland security,
    including installation protection responsibilities.

    Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical-Biological Defense

    Implements the Guardian Program to improve CBRN capabilities on 200
    installations under the purview of the Assistant to the Secretary of
    Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense programs.

    Developed equipment standards for selecting equipment for its
    installations, and will update that equipment list on an annual basis
    throughout different phases of the Guardian program.

    Combatant Commands

    Geographic Combatant Commanders 	Responsible for implementing
    antiterrorism policies and programs for the protection of all department
    elements and personnel in their area of responsibility.

                                 U. S. Northern Command

    Responsible for conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat
    threats and aggression aimed at the continental United States and other
    nearby areas within its area of responsibility.

    Effective not later than October 1, 2004, will exercise tactical control
    for department force protection and assume overall department
    antiterrorism program and force protection responsibility in the
    continental United States.

                                   Military Services

    Military departments 	Each of the military services has issued
    regulations, orders, or instructions to implement the DOD guidance and
    establish its own specific policies and standards. The services assign
    responsibility for protecting installations from terrorist attacks to
    installation commanders.

    Installation preparedness Organization related responsibilities

    Installation commanders 	Responsible for protecting installations from
    terrorist attacks, including identifying and prioritizing requirements
    using annual assessments of threat, vulnerability, and the criticality of
    assets.

    Source: GAO analysis.

    aCombat Support Agency.

    Three organizations have responsibilities for recent departmentwide
    improvement initiatives. First, the Joint Program Executive Office for
    Chemical-Biological Defense, under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, is in charge of implementing the Guardian program to safeguard 200
    military installations within the next 5 years, at an estimated cost of
    $1.6 billion. Oversight of this project is assigned to the Office of the
    Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
    Biological Defense Programs. Second, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
    a combat support agency that reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, is responsible for managing the
    Joint Services Installation Pilot Project-an initiative to enhance
    chemical/biological detection and emergency response capabilities at nine
    installations. Figure 2 shows a first responder in protective gear
    assisting a person exposed to a chemical/biological agent during a Pilot
    Project exercise. Third, the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical,
    Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense, under the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, is responsible for developing CBRNE concepts of
    operations and standards for installation preparedness.

    Figure 2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in Chemical/Biological Exercise

                             Source: Navy Region Southwest.

    Two recently established organizations have key roles in homeland defense,
    but their roles and responsibilities for improving the preparedness of
    military installations for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks
    are still evolving. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Homeland Defense, which was established as part of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,14 has responsibility for the
    overall supervision of homeland defense (including land, maritime, and
    aerospace) activities. More specifically, the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Homeland Defense is to lead and focus the department's
    activities in homeland defense and homeland security; ensure internal
    coordination of DOD policy direction; provide guidance to the U.S.
    Northern Command for its homeland defense mission and its military
    activities in support of homeland security, support to civil authorities;
    and coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security and other
    government agencies. However, as of May 2004, DOD had not yet published or
    promulgated a charter for this organization that would clearly define its
    roles and responsibilities for installation preparedness. Although this
    organization prepared DOD's September 2003 report to Congress, it does not
    have the authority or responsibility to integrate and coordinate the
    various aspects of installation preparedness, which are currently
    scattered throughout the department.

    Similarly, an April 2002 revision to DOD's Unified Command Plan,15
    approved by the President, created the new U.S. Northern Command, a
    geographic combatant command with the responsibility to militarily defend
    the continental United States and other nearby areas. More specifically,
    the command is responsible for conducting operations to deter, prevent,
    and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States and its
    territories and interests within its area of responsibility; moreover, as
    directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, it provides military
    assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management
    operations in response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
    high-yield explosive events.

    Until recently, Northern Command's specific role in supporting the
    department's efforts to improve installation preparedness was not clearly

    14 Pub. L. 107-314, S: 902 (2002).

    15 Unified command plans provide guidance to combatant commanders and
    establish their missions, responsibilities, force structure, geographic
    area of responsibility, and other attributes.

    defined. On May 7, 2004, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff assigned U.S. Northern Command the responsibilities for force
    protection and the department's antiterrorism program in the continental
    United States, effective no later than October 1, 2004.16 This step
    significantly clarified the command's role, but the specific details of
    how those responsibilities will be carried out are still being developed.
    In addition, because the Northern Command's area of responsibility covers
    domestic installations, its efforts to support installation preparedness
    may be much more complex than in overseas locations, due to the additional
    responsibilities to provide military assistance to civil authorities,
    including consequence management operations.

        The Department Lacks a Focal Point for Installation Preparedness Efforts

    DOD has not designated a single focal point with the authority and
    responsibility to integrate and coordinate all aspects of installation
    preparedness, thereby hindering its ability to develop a comprehensive
    approach to installation preparedness. This has been evident in a number
    of areas, for example:

    o  	Although the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
    Defense does not have overall authority to integrate installation
    preparedness activities for the department, its staff was tasked with
    preparing DOD's report on installation preparedness. Homeland Defense
    officials told us that developing the report and obtaining agreement on
    its content from the many organizations involved in preparedness
    activities was hampered because they did not have overall authority and
    responsibility for planning the department's approach to installation
    preparedness. For example, they said they had limited ability to resolve
    disagreements among various organizations over many issues, such as the
    definition of installation preparedness or the specific language used in
    the report, and thus faced delays in moving the report forward.

    o  	DOD has not assigned responsibility to any organization for updating
    the 2003 report or monitoring progress in achieving its goals. Although
    the 2003 report discussed some oversight and coordination mechanisms,
    these were primarily related to the department's existing antiterrorism
    program. Because of the lack of an assignment, the 2004

    16 In a message from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated May 7,
    2004, with subject: Executive Order for standup of U.S. Northern Command's
    antiterrorism and force protection responsibilities for the continental
    United States.

    update was not submitted to Congress, and the department has not taken any
    specific steps to evaluate the overall progress in implementing this plan.

    o  	Responsibilities for developing DOD policy, standards and other
    guidance related to installation preparedness are fragmented. On one hand,
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
    Low-Intensity Conflict is responsible for preparing worldwide
    antiterrorism policies,17 standards,18 implementation guidance,19 and an
    antiterrorism strategic plan.20 The mission of the DOD antiterrorism

    program, according to officials drafting the new antiterrorism strategic
    plan, is to provide worldwide protection of DOD personnel and their
    families; selected DOD contractors; and installations, infrastructure, and
    key assets/information essential to mission accomplishment from acts of
    terrorism, including CBRNE hazards. Over the past 10 months, this office
    has updated the antiterrorism policy and implementation guidance, drafted
    the antiterrorism strategic plan, and is currently revising the
    antiterrorism standards. The Assistant Secretary was also tasked by the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense in his September 5, 2002, memo to ensure that
    CBRNE standards were developed in coordination with the Joint Staff; the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and
    the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, with a target issue date of
    May 2003. However, as of May 2004, the Joint Requirements Office, tasked
    by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with preparing these
    standards, together with the concepts of operations, had not been able to
    obtain final approval for either of these documents. Furthermore,
    according to agency officials, future updates to the CBRNE emergency
    response guidelines will be prepared under the direction of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.21

    o  	Military installations are facing challenges in prioritizing
    requirements for funding and personnel resources because DOD has been
    unable to develop departmentwide CBRNE concepts of operations and

    17 DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18, 2003.

    18 DOD Instruction 2000.16, "DOD Antiterrorism Standards," June 14, 2001.

    19 DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9, 2004.

    20 DOD O-20012-P Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, June
    15, 2004.

    21 DOD Instruction 2000.18, "DOD Installation Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response
    Guidelines," December 4, 2002.

    standards, which provide the basis for calculating requirements. Until
    they receive this guidance, the military services and installations will
    not be able to develop rational funding and personnel requirements; in
    addition, they may encounter difficulties in operating and maintaining new
    detection and protection equipment that they receive as a result of
    departmentwide initiatives such as the Joint Services Installation Pilot
    Project or the Guardian program. For example, at three installations
    participating in the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project, officials
    noted the need for additional resources to support the new equipment,
    which created unfunded requirements in fiscal year 2004 ranging from $2.1
    to $6.5 million at each installation.

    In our discussions with officials at the department, Joint Staff, service,
    and installation levels, there was general agreement that the lack of a
    single focal point with the appropriate authority and responsibility to
    integrate departmentwide installation preparedness improvement efforts
    among the many organizations involved has adversely affected their ability
    to effectively plan for and manage these efforts. More specifically, the
    officials said that this lack of a focal point has hindered their ability
    to develop needed overarching guidance, such as the comprehensive plan,
    concepts of operations, and CBRNE standards.

    The evolving roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
    Defense and the Northern Command as the Combatant Command responsible for
    domestic military installations and facilities, combined with the lack of
    an integrating authority to oversee the efforts of various department
    organizations and improvement efforts, has limited the department's
    ability to develop a comprehensive improvement plan, integrated concepts
    of operations, and specific installation preparedness standards. The
    recent decision to assign antiterrorism and force protection
    responsibilities for domestic installations to Northern Command has been a
    significant step in clarifying its overall responsibilities, but the role
    of Homeland Defense remains unclear because its charter has not been
    approved. Until Homeland Defense roles and responsibilities are clarified
    as to how it will support the department's plan to improve installation
    preparedness, and an integrating authority is established, the department
    may continue to struggle with these issues, and the improvement efforts at
    all levels within the department may not be fully coordinated or
    efficiently executed.

    Conclusions

    Improving the preparedness of military installations worldwide for attacks
    using weapons of mass destruction is a challenging and complex task that
    will require a significant allocation of resources; involve numerous
    organizations within the department; and necessitate the coordination with
    other federal agencies and civilian organizations within the United
    States, and host nation organizations in overseas locations. Although the
    department has taken several steps and committed significant resources to
    immediately begin installation preparedness improvements, it lacks a
    comprehensive approach required by Congress that incorporates
    results-oriented management principles to guide improvement initiatives in
    the most efficient and effective manner. Congress has also required the
    department to prepare annual updates to the plan, which presents an
    opportunity to address the plan's weaknesses, but several obstacles exist
    that have stymied the department's ability to develop a comprehensive,
    results-oriented plan. The major obstacle we identified is the lack of a
    single organization or entity with the responsibility and authority to
    oversee and integrate the installation preparedness improvement efforts of
    various DOD organizations. This is a complex issue, because it involves
    those installations located within the continental United States, and
    those located in foreign countries. Other obstacles we noted include
    evolving or unclear responsibilities of key organizations, and an
    unassigned responsibility to update the plan. Without a revised plan that
    fully incorporates results-oriented management principles and clearly
    articulates the military response capabilities to be developed and
    integrated with the civilian community, the significant resources being
    applied to improve preparedness may not be spent in the most efficient and
    effective manner, and more importantly, opportunities to improve
    preparedness and protect military personnel, facilities, and capabilities
    from attacks using weapons of mass destruction may be lost.

      Recommendations for Executive Action

    To develop a more useful plan to guide installation preparedness
    improvement efforts, and to address barriers that inhibit DOD's ability to
    develop a comprehensive approach to improve installation preparedness, we
    recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:

    o  	Designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to
    coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness improvement
    efforts at the department, service and installation levels.

    o  	Assign that organization with responsibility for preparing the 2004,
    2005, and 2006 updates to the plan, which are required by section 1402 of
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.

    o  	Clarify the installation preparedness responsibilities of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

    o  	Require the next update to the plan to fully incorporate
    results-oriented management principles in the legislatively required
    elements. Specifically, the plan should contain:

                                           o

                                           o

                                           o

                                         o   o

                                           o

                                           o

    Long-term goals that explain what results are expected, are
    results-oriented, and are expressed in a way that allows them to be
    assessed in terms of achievement.
    Strategies that articulate the processes necessary to achieve the
    organization's goals and describe how managers are to be held
    accountable for achieving such goals.
    Annual performance goals that include a schedule with milestones
    to measure progress toward the long-term goals, and are tangible
    and measurable.
    A description of external impediments to achieving the goals and
    the actions needed to mitigate these impediments;
    Identification of resources, including funding, personnel, and
    equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level of
    performance.
    Performance criteria or indicators used to measure progress in
    achieving goals and objectives; these criteria should be objective
    and outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet
    performance goals.
    Evaluation plans that are objective and formal assessments of the
    results, impact, or effects of installation preparedness improvement
    efforts.

      Agency Comments
      and Our Evaluation

    o  	Require the next update to the plan to clearly describe the military
    response capabilities that will be developed at the national, regional,
    and local levels; and how those capabilities will be developed in
    conjunction with civilian capabilities.

    In comments on a draft of this report provided by the Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Homeland Defense, the department agreed with our
    recommendations recognizing the need for centralized management and
    operational oversight of a comprehensive preparedness program. The
    Assistant Secretary's comments also stated that oversight and policy
    development for worldwide installation preparedness will be assigned to
    the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and
    the charter directive for that organization will promulgate responsibility
    and required authority for worldwide installation preparedness. The
    Assistant Secretary will also be responsible for preparing the 2004, 2005,
    and 2006 updates to the comprehensive plan required by section 1402 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for

    Fiscal Year 2003. DOD agreed that these future updates would fully
    incorporate results-oriented management principles in the legislatively
    required elements, clearly describe the military response capabilities
    that will be developed at the national, regional, and local levels, and
    address how those capabilities will be developed in conjunction with
    civilian capabilities. In regard to the military response capabilities,
    DOD stated it was of paramount importance that the department work with
    other local, state, and federal entities to ensure redundant capabilities
    are avoided.

    We believe the actions DOD has outlined, when implemented, will be
    responsive to our recommendations, and they represent positive steps
    toward integrating installation preparedness improvement efforts and
    establishing a more results-oriented management framework to guide these
    efforts. The future updates to the comprehensive plan will also serve as a
    mechanism to provide Congress, DOD managers, and other organizations with
    an annual assessment of the progress achieved in improving installation
    preparedness.

    DOD's comments are included in their entirety in appendix III.

    We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
    committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the
    Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force; the Commandant of
    the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of the Management and Budget.
    We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
    the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
    http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding
    this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402, or my Assistant
    Director,
    Robert L. Repasky, at (202) 512-9868. Key contributors to this report are
    listed in appendix IV.

    Janet St. Laurent, Director
    Defense Capabilities and Management

    Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2003

    SEC. 1402. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE PREPAREDNESS OF MILITARY
    INSTALLATIONS FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS

    (a) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN-The Secretary of Defense shall develop a
    comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military
    installations for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks,
    including attacks involving the use or threat of use of weapons of mass
    destruction.

    (b) PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY-The plan under subsection (a) shall include a
    preparedness strategy that includes each of the following:

    (1) Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving the
    preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to
    terrorist attacks.

    (2) Identification of budget and other resource requirements necessary to
    achieve those goals and objectives.

    (3) Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary that
    could impede the achievement of these goals and objectives.

    (4) A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national
    military response capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and used.

    (5) A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the capabilities
    referred to in paragraph (4) with local, regional, or national civilian
    and other military capabilities.

    (c) PERFORMANCE PLAN.-The plan under subsection (a) shall include a
    performance plan that includes each of the following:

    (1) A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals and
    objectives of the strategy under subsection (b).

    (2) Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those goals
    and objectives.

    (3) A description of the process, together with a discussion of the
    resources, necessary to achieve those goals and objectives

    Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2003

    (4) A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving those
    goals and objectives.

    (d) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.-The Secretary shall submit the comprehensive
    plan developed under subsection (a) to the Committee on Armed Services of
    the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
    Representatives not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
    this Act.

    (e) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REVIEW AND REPORT.-Not later than 60 days after
    the date on which the Secretary submits the comprehensive plan under
    subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall review the plan and submit
    to the committees referred to in subsection (d) the Comptroller General's
    assessment of the plan.

    (f) ANNUAL REPORT.-(1) In each of 2004, 2005, and 2006, the Secretary of
    Defense shall include a report on the comprehensive plan developed under
    subsection (a) with the materials that the Secretary submits to Congress
    in support of the budget submitted by the President that year pursuant to
    section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.

    (2) Each such report shall include

    (A) a discussion of any revision that the Secretary has made in the
    comprehensive plan developed under subsection (a) since the last report
    under this subsection or, in the case of the first such report, since the
    plan was submitted under subsection (d); and

    (B) an assessment of the progress made in achieving the goals and
    objectives of the strategy set forth in the plan.

    (3) If the Secretary includes in the report for 2004 or 2005 under this
    subsection a declaration that the goals and objectives of the preparedness
    strategy set forth in the comprehensive plan have been achieved, no
    further report is required under this subsection.

                           Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    To determine if the Department of Defense's (DOD) September 2003 report to
    Congress represents a comprehensive plan that can guide installation
    preparedness efforts, we based our analysis on our past work that
    addressed the need for DOD to develop comprehensive strategies and
    implementation plans with results-oriented elements that focused on
    program outcomes or results, rather than program activities and processes.
    We discussed the concerns of Congress with committee staffs who were
    involved in developing section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for fiscal year 2003 to better understand the requirements of the Act.
    We also discussed the report content with department officials who
    prepared it to ensure we had an agreed upon interpretation of the elements
    presented in the report. We then compared the nine elements discussed in
    the report with those specifically required by the legislation. We also
    compared the report's seven managementrelated elements with those
    developed from sound management principles as embodied in the Government
    Results and Performance Act (GPRA) of 1993 and further refined in GPRA
    user guides and prior GAO reports. To assess the two discussion elements
    related to military response capabilities required by the legislation, we
    reviewed information presented in the report to determine if it presented
    a clear discussion of the national, regional, local response capabilities,
    and how they would be developed in conjunction with civilian capabilities.
    We also discussed the content of the report in these two areas with
    officials at the department, Service, and installation levels to obtain
    their views on the report content and the usefulness of that information.

    To identify obstacles that may hinder the department's ability to develop
    and implement an integrated and comprehensive installation preparedness
    approach, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military services who are
    responsible for policies, programs, and key initiatives related to various
    aspects of installation preparedness against chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive incidents. We also
    gathered and reviewed relevant policy guidance, instructions, and
    implementation documents for current improvement initiatives, including
    the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project and project Guardian, and
    discussed these initiatives with department and service headquarters and
    installation officials.

    We discussed and observed installation preparedness capabilities at 13
    military installations. We selected east and west coast military
    installations, representing each of the military services, including
    locations in close proximity to large civilian communities, some that were
    more

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    isolated, and some that were participating in the Joint Services
    Installation Pilot Project. Specific discussions with military
    installation officials included installation preparedness criteria, roles
    and responsibilities, major efforts to improve installation preparedness
    as well as the financial impact to the installations with regard to
    current improvement initiatives, efforts to ensure effective coordination
    among and between military and civilian organizations, particularly first
    responders and those involved in consequence management, and what they
    believe should be included in the comprehensive plan to make it a useful
    management tool. In addition, we observed installation preparedness
    exercises in the Norfolk and San Diego areas. Although the information
    obtained at these locations cannot be generalized to describe DOD's
    worldwide installation preparedness improvement efforts, it provided us
    with insights on preparedness challenges at the installation level. Table
    3 lists the military organizations and installations we visited or
    contacted to obtain our data.

    Table 3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations Visited or
    Contacted for this Assignment

    Department headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area

    o  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

    o  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
    Conflict

    o  	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and
    Defense Programs

    o  Defense Threat Reduction Agency

    o  National Guard Bureau, Homeland Defense

     Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area

    o  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Operations J-3

    o  Joint Program Executive Office, Chemical Biological Program

    o  Joint Requirements Office

    Military service headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area

    o  	Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans (G-3)
    and Army Installation Management Agency

    o  Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics (N4)) and Chief of Navy
    Installations

    o  Commandant of the Marine Corps

    o  Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations & Logistics

                                 Military Installations

    o  Army-Fort Lewis, Wash.

    o  Marine Corps-Camp Lejeune, N.C.

    o  Army-Fort Eustis, Newport News, Va.

    o  Navy Region Mid-Atlantic

    o  Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Va.

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    o  Naval Station Norfolk, Va.

    o  Oceana Master Jet Base, Va.

    o  Navy Region Northwest, Wash.

    o  Sub Base Bangor, Wash.

    o  Naval Station Everett, Everett, Wash.

    o  Navy Region Southwest, San Diego, Calif.

    o  Navy Base Point Loma, San Diego, Calif.

    o  Navy Station San Diego, Calif.

    o  Navy Base, Coronado, Calif.

    o  Langley Air Force Base, Va.

    o  McChord Air Force Base, Wash.

    Source: GAO analysis.

    To estimate fiscal year 2004 unfunded requirements for installation
    preparedness at three installations, we requested and obtained budget
    estimates from installation officials. We also obtained fiscal year 2005
    unfunded requirements as prioritized by the services and analyzed them to
    determine that installation preparedness activities were included in their
    estimates. Based on our discussions with department officials and the
    budget documentation provided, we determined that the data we used were
    sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

    We conducted our review from April 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact Robert L. Repasky (202) 512-9868

    Acknowledgments 	In addition to those named above, Hugh Brady, Nancy
    Benco, Pat Seaton, Elisabeth Ryan, and Corinna Wengryn made key
    contributions to this report.

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