Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate 	 
Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process (13-JUL-04,		 
GAO-04-795).							 
                                                                 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing 
foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal 
means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or	 
bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in	 
the United States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa	 
revocation process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism 
tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security	 
(DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and  
Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that 
appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on	 
terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether  
weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in its June 
2003 report were addressed.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-795 					        
    ACCNO:   A10850						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate  
Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process			 
     DATE:   07/13/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Criminal procedure 				 
	     Criminals						 
	     Immigration or emigration				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Passports						 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Border security					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Timeliness 					 
	     Visas						 
	     Customs Service/INS Interagency Border		 
	     Inspection System					 
                                                                 
	     Dept. of State Consular Lookout and		 
	     Support System					 
                                                                 
	     Dept. of State TIPOFF Program			 

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GAO-04-795

United States General Accounting Office

GAO	Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
     and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
                                Representatives

July 2004

BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process

                                       a

GAO-04-795

Highlights of GAO-04-795, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing foreign
terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means to
identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or
other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported
in June 2003 that the visa revocation process needed to be strengthened as
an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and
Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that
appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on terrorism
grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether weaknesses in the
visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report were addressed.

To improve the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, GAO
recommends that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State jointly (1)
develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines roles and
responsibilities and sets performance standards and (2) address
outstanding legal and policy issues in this area or provide Congress with
specific actions it could take to resolve them. DHS generally concurred
with the report and recommendations. State agreed to consult with DHS
regarding our recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-795.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4128 or [email protected].

July 2004

BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process

GAO's analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security
took some actions in the summer of 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa
revocation process identified in its June 2003 report. However, GAO's
review of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a
detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses
remained in the implementation of the revocation process, especially in
the timely transmission of information among federal agencies. For
example:

o  	Delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of
visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to State. In at least
3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or more to revoke visas after
receiving a recommendation to do so.

o  	In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas
to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not
know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country.

o  	In 10 cases, DHS either failed to notify or took several months to
notify immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may
be in the country. It then took over 2 months for immigration
investigators to request field investigations of these individuals.

After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004,
additional actions were taken to improve the process, including revising
procedures and reassessing the process. DHS and State believe these
actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past. In April and
May, State revised its procedures and formalized its tracking system for
visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new written procedures and
acted to ensure that immigration investigators are aware of all
individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. State and DHS
also took some steps to address legal and policy issues related to visa
revocations. In April, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an
interagency group organized under the FBI, identified the visa revocation
process as a potential homeland security vulnerability and developed an
informal process for TSC to handle visa revocation cases. However,
weaknesses remain. For example, State's and DHS's procedures are not fully
coordinated and lack performance standards, such as specific time frames,
for completing each step of the process. Outstanding legal and policy
issues continue to exist regarding the removal of individuals based solely
on their visa revocation.

Points of Delay Observed in the Visa Revocation Process

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Initial Actions Taken to Address Weaknesses Were Inadequate
Recent Actions Taken to Address Identified Weaknesses in the Visa

Revocation Process
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

1

3 5 9

19 22 23 23

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II	Comments from the Department of Homeland
Security 29

GAO Comments 33

Appendix III	Comments from the Department of State 34
GAO Comments 42

  Figures

Figure 1: The Visa Revocation Process in Effect from October

through December 2003 6
Figure 2: Points of Delay in the Visa Revocation Process 11
Figure 3: Inconsistencies among Agencies on Number of Visas

Revoked from October through December 2003 14

Abbreviations

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
NIIS Nonimmigrant Information System
TSC Terrorist Screening Center

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

July 13, 2004

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As stated in the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security, 1
the U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting the
homeland from future terrorist attacks. The strategy calls for preventing
the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means
to identify; halt; and, where appropriate, prosecute or initiate
immigration or other proceedings against terrorists in the United States.
The U.S. homeland security strategy, involving a variety of federal
agencies, has multiple tools for preventing potential terrorists from
entering the country and identifying potential terrorists that have
already entered. The visa revocation process is one such tool.

In June 2003 we reported2 that agencies lacked written procedures to
ensure that appropriate personnel are notified and take specific actions
when the Department of State (State) revokes visas3 on terrorism

1Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security
(Washington, D.C.: July 2002).

2U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and
Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process,
GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003).

3In this report, we use the term "visa" to refer to nonimmigrant visas
only. The United States also grants visas to people who intend to
immigrate to the United States. A visa is a travel document that allows a
foreign visitor to present himself or herself at a port of entry for
admission to the United States.

grounds.4 As a result, lookouts were not always posted, other agencies
were not always notified of visa revocations, and there were potential
investigative gaps on individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism
concerns who were in the United States.5 We recommended that the Secretary
of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State and
Attorney General, develop specific policies and procedures for the
interagency visa revocation process to ensure that revocation notices and
related information are transmitted to the appropriate immigration and law
enforcement agencies in a timely manner. We also recommended that they
develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law enforcement
agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals who remain in
the United States after their visas are revoked.

At your request, we examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation
process identified in our June 2003 report were addressed. To accomplish
our objective, we obtained information on policies and procedures put in
place to improve the visa revocation process; interviewed key State and
Homeland Security officials responsible for visa revocations; determined
the steps taken to address policy and legal issues regarding removal of
individuals with revoked visas raised in our June 2003 report; and
analyzed data on all visas revoked on terrorism grounds over a 3-month
period,6 including detailed information on a random sample of 35 cases
selected from data provided by the Department of State in February 2004.
This sample is not projectable because of data problems discussed in
appendix

I. We did not review Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activities to

4The Department of State revokes a person's visa as a precautionary
measure after it learns that person might be a suspected terrorist. The
purpose of this revocation is to obtain additional information from the
person to determine if they are the same person that is suspected to be a
terrorist by requiring them to return to the consulate that issued their
visa. According to State officials, this authority is an important and
useful tool for more closely scrutinizing the individual as they reapply
for a new visa. The Department of State also revokes visas for reasons
other than terrorism, such as alien smuggling, drug trafficking, and
misrepresentation. State officials told us that visas revoked on terrorism
grounds account for the vast majority of all visas revoked on national
security grounds.

5In this report, when we refer to individuals whose visas have been
revoked, we are referring to those individuals for whom the Department of
State has issued a visa revocation certificate. According to the terms of
the certificate, the revocation is effective immediately on the date the
certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the United States in
which case the revocation becomes effective immediately upon the alien's
departure from the United States.

6Our review covered only nonimmigrant visas that the Department of State
revoked on terrorism grounds from October 1, 2003, through December 31,
2003.

  Results in Brief

investigate suspected terrorists. We conducted our evaluation in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took some actions in
the summer of 2003 to address the weaknesses identified in our June 2003
report. State issued new procedures for revoking visas and notifying DHS
and other agencies of the revocation, and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, developed a workflow outline for
determining if individuals with revoked visas are in the country and, if
so, notifying officials responsible for enforcing our immigration laws.
However, our analysis of visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from
October through December 2003 revealed that weaknesses remained in the
implementation of the visa revocation process, especially relating to the
timely transmission of information among federal agencies. For instance,
we found that backlogs or long delays sometimes occurred in screening
names in the U.S. government's most complete database of potential
terrorists (called TIPOFF) against State's database of current visa
holders, in transmitting recommendations to revoke individual visas, and
in revoking individual visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. We
also found that agencies involved in the visa revocation process had
conflicting records of how many visas were revoked for terrorism concerns
between October and December 2003 and whether individuals who held these
visas may be in the country. In addition, officials from DHS's Customs and
Border Protection could not document that they consistently notified
immigration officials of the need to locate and investigate individuals
with revoked visas who were present in the United States. Additionally, we
found that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of
DHS, requested that field offices investigate individuals with visas
revoked on terrorism grounds who may be in the country more than 2 months
after receiving notification of the visa revocation. Our review of visa
revocations shows that DHS has located individuals in the country whose
visas were revoked because they may be suspected or actual terrorists. ICE
officials told us that some are still being investigated, three have been
arrested on immigration charges, and others have been cleared. With
respect to an alien already present in the United States, the Department
of State's current visa revocation certificate makes revocation effective
only upon the alien's departure. Therefore, according to DHS, if ICE
special agents locate an alien in the United States for whom State has
issued a revocation certificate that

states the revocation is effective upon his or her departure, ICE would be
unable to place the alien in removal proceedings based solely on a visa
revocation that had not yet taken place.7

After we initiated our inquiry for this report in January 2004, State and
DHS took additional actions to address the weaknesses we identified
through our analysis. DHS and State believe these actions will avoid
delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State made significant
revisions to its procedures8 and formalized its tracking system for visa
revocation cases. Starting in March, CBP took steps to ensure that ICE
officials are aware of individuals whose visas were revoked and who may be
in the country. Also in March, ICE developed written procedures
instructing personnel to determine if individuals with revoked visas are
in the country and, if necessary, investigate them. Finally, State and DHS
began discussing how to address the legal and policy issues regarding the
removal of individuals with revoked visas. In addition, the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the FBI and
established in December 2003, recently took some steps to improve the visa
revocation process. In March 2004, TSC developed written standard
operating procedures related to the screening of intelligence information
and later began training additional staff to perform this function.
Although the recent actions are important steps to improve the visa
revocation process, additional measures are needed to further improve the
process. There is no governmentwide policy regarding visa revocations, and
the individual agencies' written policies and procedures often do not
contain performance standards such as time frames for completing
individual steps of the visa revocation process, nor do they reflect a
fully coordinated approach to implementing the process. Further, State and
DHS continue their discussions of the legal and policy issues, with
assistance from the Department of Justice.

In light of our past work and the weaknesses we identified through our
review, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and
State work jointly and with other appropriate agencies to develop a
written governmentwide policy that clearly defines the roles and
responsibilities and sets performance standards for the agencies involved

7DHS could also attempt to remove these aliens based on the derogatory
information that led State to revoke the individual's visa.

8State told us that, in light of the evolving relationships between State,
DHS, and TSC, State revises its standard operating procedures as
necessary.

Background

in the visa revocation process. We also recommend that DHS and State
address outstanding legal and policy issues or, by October 1, 2004,
provide Congress with a list of specific actions that could help resolve
them. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security, State, and Justice for their comments. DHS generally concurred
with the report and recommendations. State said it would consult with DHS
regarding the recommendations, with a view to addressing GAO's concerns.
The Department of Justice did not provide comments.

Our nation's border security process includes multiple mechanisms for
addressing potential terrorist threats to the United States. One of these
mechanisms is the visa revocation process. The visa revocation process is
a homeland security tool that can prevent potential terrorists from
entering the United States and can help immigration and law enforcement
officials identify and investigate potential terrorists already in the
country. The visa revocation process begins after consular officers at the
Department of State's overseas consular posts adjudicate visa applications
for foreign nationals who wish to temporarily enter the United States for
business, tourism, or other reasons. After receiving a visa, foreign
nationals travel to ports of entry within the United States. At ports of
entry, inspectors from DHS's Customs and Border Protection determine
whether the visa holder is admitted to the United States and, if so, how
long he or she may remain in the country. Once foreign nationals have
entered the United States, DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement
assumes responsibility for enforcing our immigration laws, including
ensuring that foreign nationals are eligible to remain in the United
States.

According to State officials, most visa revocations on terrorism grounds
begin with information from the TIPOFF database, the U.S. government's
primary terrorist watch list. The TIPOFF database includes individuals the
U.S. government suspects may have ties to terrorism. Information in the
TIPOFF database is provided by various federal agencies including the FBI,
State, and others. At the time of our previous report, this information
was managed by State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. In December
2003, TSC assumed responsibility for this function. TSC was officially
formed in December 2003 as a result of a presidential directive designed
to increase information sharing across agencies and to facilitate better
understanding between the intelligence and investigation communities. As
an interagency organization under the administration of the FBI with
representatives from State, DHS, and other federal agencies, part of its
role is to work with federal agencies to provide access to the TIPOFF
database. Figure 1 depicts the visa revocation process in effect during
the

October to December 2003 time period we analyzed for this report as
described in agency procedures and as explained to us by agency officials.

Figure 1: The Visa Revocation Process in Effect from October through
December 2003

                           o  Department of Homeland     
                         Security  o  Federal Bureau of  
                                 Investigation           
                        Step 7: If alien is in the       
                        country, locate, investigate,    
                        and (as appropriate), remove     
                        them                             

Source: GAO.

State uses information in TIPOFF to determine if visa holders may be
suspected or actual terrorists. When TSC adds individuals in TIPOFF to the
Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), it
provides a list of these names to Consular Affairs. State officials told
us that the entry of these names into CLASS and the Interagency Border
Inspection System (IBIS) should help prevent any of those individuals from
entering the United States because border inspectors will be alerted to
deny them entry. This lookout process does not completely address the
potential vulnerability posed by individuals already in the country.
Therefore, the visa revocation process is an important tool to help
identify individuals whom immigration and law enforcement officials should
locate and investigate. After TSC adds names to CLASS and IBIS, Consular
Affairs compares these names with its database of all visa holders and
sends an electronic spreadsheet back to TSC containing probable or
possible matches. TSC refines this list by identifying direct matches and
recommends that Consular Affairs revoke these individuals' visas. It also
sends Consular Affairs an information package containing a summary of the
derogatory information that led TSC to the recommendation to revoke.

After determining that the revocation is appropriate, the Consular Affairs
officer posts a lookout in CLASS for the individual.9 According to State
and DHS officials, this lookout is then accessible in near real time to
DHS inspectors at border ports of entry through the IBIS database. CBP
inspectors at ports of entry use IBIS to check whether foreign nationals
are inadmissible and should be denied entry into the United States. When a
person comes to the United States by air or by sea, CBP inspectors are
required to check that person's name in IBIS before he or she is allowed
to enter the country. After posting the lookout, the Consular Affairs
officer writes an internal case file memo summarizing the derogatory
information, creates a draft revocation certificate and cable for
management review, and forwards these materials to the appropriate
officials within State. Once these officials clear and sign the revocation
certificate, Consular Affairs sends a cable instructing the overseas post
that issued the visa to contact the visa holder, physically cancel the
visa, and report all actions taken to State. State also notifies other
federal agencies of visa revocations. Specifically, Consular Affairs' Visa
Office faxes a copy of the revocation certificate to CBP. In addition, the
Visa Office sends a copy of

9The lookout entry-known by the acronym VRVK-is used for all visa
revocations, regardless of whether the reason for the revocation is
related to terrorism or other concerns.

the cable by email that includes the wording of the revocation certificate
to various other agencies, including CBP and ICE.

Upon receiving the notification from State, CBP determines whether the
individual may have already legally entered the United States by
electronically searching immigration records. If CBP determines that the
individual may be in the country, it notifies ICE. ICE officials also
attempt to determine whether the individual may be in the country. Once
ICE determines that an individual with a visa revoked on national security
grounds may be in the United States, ICE employees query law enforcement
and open source information to attempt to locate the individual. If they
determine that the individual is in the country, they conduct an
additional investigation in law enforcement and intelligence databases and
forward the results of this preliminary research to the appropriate
Special Agent in Charge (field) office or offices. The ICE Special Agent
in Charge office then coordinates with the FBI and conducts an
investigation to locate the individual and determine if the alien is in
compliance with all terms of his or her admission.10

    FBI's Role in Border Security

While FBI investigators do not play a formal role in the visa revocation
process, they play a key role in the U.S. government's overall border
security efforts, including investigating suspected terrorists in the
United States. The FBI supports border security by (1) working to deny
entry into the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of being
engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity and (2) aiding in supplying
information to locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens
already present in the United States. According to FBI officials, the
TIPOFF database is central to the FBI's efforts to track suspected
terrorists in the United States. When names of suspected terrorists are
added to TIPOFF, this information may originate from the FBI. When names
are added to TIPOFF, the FBI may forward investigative leads to the
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, which in turn may relay information
to one or more of the 84 Joint Terrorist Tracking Task Forces throughout
the country for investigation.

10As we have previously reported, efforts to locate aliens once they have
entered the United States are often complicated by incomplete or
inaccurate information provided at the time of entry. For example, see
U.S. General Accounting Office, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of
Homeland Security and a Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May
21, 2004). Additional information provided by aliens as a result of
US-VISIT may help ICE special agents locate individuals whose visas are
revoked after they enter the United States. US-VISIT is a governmentwide
program for collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain
foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States.

  Initial Actions Taken to Address Weaknesses Were Inadequate

Following our June 2003 report, State and DHS took some actions to address
weaknesses we identified in the visa revocation process, but these actions
did not adequately address all of the weaknesses we found. State developed
written procedures providing detailed instructions for personnel to follow
when revoking visas. DHS did not develop an agencywide policy for visa
revocations, but DHS's Customs and Border Protection developed a workflow
outline related to its role in the visa revocation process. Our review of
visas revoked from October through December 2003 showed that despite
State's and CBP's initial actions, weaknesses persisted in the visa
revocation process.

    State Developed Initial Procedures in 2003, but DHS Did Not

After our June 2003 report, State developed written standard operating
procedures for processing visa revocations. These procedures were issued
on July 7, 2003, and included written instructions for consular officers
to follow once they decide to revoke an individual's visa. Specifically,
they included directions for posting lookouts, preparing and finalizing
revocation certificates, and notifying appropriate State personnel of the
action taken. Additionally, these procedures provided instructions for
notifying both the overseas post that issued the visa and Homeland
Security officials. State published a less detailed version of these
procedures in its Foreign Affairs Manual on July 17, 2003, for use by
consular officers.

DHS did not develop an intra-agency policy regarding responsibilities for
handling visa revocation cases. However, following our June 2003 report,
DHS's Customs and Border Protection developed a workflow outline showing
the steps for determining whether individuals with revoked visas may be in
the United States and, if so, notifying ICE immigration officials to take
specific actions. These procedures were designed to ensure that
appropriate lookouts were recorded and that, in cases in which the visa
holder had entered the United States prior to the visa revocation, all
research information from CBP was immediately relayed to DHS's Immigration
and Customs Enforcement for investigation.

Review of Revocation Our review of visas revoked based on terrorism
concerns from October Process Identified Several through December 2003
indicated that, despite State's and CBP's initial Weaknesses efforts,
weaknesses remained in the visa revocation process. We found

that backlogs in cases to be screened, delays in forwarding the
appropriate intelligence to State, and delays in taking action to revoke
visas all created weaknesses in the visa revocation process. (See fig. 2
for the points of delay we observed in our review of visas revoked over a
3-month period.)

We also found instances of delays in State's notification to DHS. In
addition, conflicting records of how many individuals' visas were revoked
for terrorism concerns during our reporting period and which of these
people may be in the United States suggest a risk that agencies may have
been prevented from taking appropriate action in some cases. Further, we
found that ICE was not consistently or promptly notified after CBP
determined that aliens with revoked visas might be in the United States.
We also found that ICE officials were generally unaware of the basis for
individual revocations. Additionally, we found that ICE waited more than 2
months to request that field offices investigate individuals with visas
revoked on terrorism grounds who may be in the country. Finally,
outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the
removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocation.

            Figure 2: Points of Delay in the Visa Revocation Process

                           o  Department of Homeland    
                        Security  o  Federal Bureau of  
                                 Investigation          
                          Step 7: If alien is in the    
                         country, locate, investigate,  
                         and (as appropriate), remove   
                                     them               

                                  Source: GAO.

Delays Before Revoking Visas Posed Significant Risks

State's Lookouts Were Not Always Timely

Our review of all visas revoked on terrorism grounds from October through
December 2003 showed that delays occurred in identifying individuals whose
visas should be revoked. According to a State official, in August and
September 2003, there was a backlog of approximately 5,000 names of
suspected terrorists in TIPOFF that had not been screened to identify any
visa holders. Therefore, there was a delay between identifying individuals
who may be suspected terrorists and determining whether they had a visa.
This official explained that the backlog developed in part because of a
quadrupling in the amount of counterterrorism intelligence gathered after
September 11 without a commensurate increase in staff allocated to screen
this intelligence information. She added that the backlog was cleared in
December 2003 following the temporary assignment of additional staff from
Consular Affairs.

Our review of a sample of 35 visas revoked based on terrorism concerns
showed that delays occurred in transmitting recommendations to Consular
Affairs to revoke visas. To eliminate the backlog of names to be checked,
Consular Affairs temporarily assigned two full-time employees to screen
these intelligence data from TIPOFF. TSC officials told us that terrorism
intelligence should be screened to identify visa holders as quickly as
possible. A TSC contractor who typically performs this duty said that TSC
normally sends an average of no more than six recommendations for visa
revocation per day. However, according to a TSC official, during the time
that the Consular Affairs staff were temporarily assigned to screen
intelligence, these staff waited until they had collected large quantities
of recommendations and sent them to Consular Affairs in large batches. As
a result, about 260 visa revocations on terrorism grounds during the
3-month period we examined were processed on 2 days, November 25 and
December 1. This delay increased the risk that some of these individuals
could have entered the United States before State was able to post the
appropriate lookouts or revoke their visas.

Based on our review of a sample of visa revocations, the Department of
State did not always post lookouts in a timely manner. According to State
and DHS officials, posting this lookout is a key step in the border
security process because it is the primary mechanism for notifying border
inspectors that individuals' visas have been revoked and should not be
admitted to the United States. State's standard operating procedures
issued in July 2003 directed Consular Affairs officials to post a lookout
for an individual before the revocation is finalized. Although State
posted lookouts in all 35 visa revocations we examined in detail, we found
that in six instances, Consular Affairs did not do so until after the
revocation was

Delays Occurred in Revoking Visas

State's Notifications to DHS Were Not Always Timely

Agencies Reported Conflicting Information on Visa Revocations

finalized. In one case it took 8 days after the revocation certificate was
signed for Consular Affairs to post the lookout.

Our review of 35 visas revoked based on terrorism concerns also showed
that delays occurred in Consular Affairs' decisions to revoke visas after
receiving a recommendation to do so.11 State officials told us that it
should not take more than a week for them to complete the visa revocation
process after receiving a recommendation to revoke. We attempted to
determine how long it took Consular Affairs to revoke visas after
receiving a recommendation to do so for our sample of 35. However, this
information only existed for 6 of the 35 cases. In 3 of these cases,
Consular Affairs revoked the individuals' visas within 10 days of
receiving the recommendation. However, in the other 3 cases, Consular
Affairs took much longer to act on the recommendation. For example, in one
instance, a Consular Affairs official told us that State officials
deliberated for more than 6 months before deciding to revoke the
individual's visa. According to this official, Consular Affairs was
deliberating whether the individual's connection to terrorism was strong
enough to warrant revoking his or her visa. In another instance, more than
17 months elapsed between the recommendation to revoke and the actual
revocation.

We also observed delays in the Department of State notification to DHS of
visa revocations. It is particularly important that these notifications
are timely when the alien whose visa is revoked may already be in the
United States so that DHS can locate and investigate him or her. Of the 35
cases we reviewed in detail, CBP told us it received notification from
State the same day a revocation was finalized in 9 cases; within 1 to 6
days in 23 cases; and in 7 days or more in three cases.

State, CBP, and ICE each maintain separate records on visa revocations. We
found that for the October through December 2003 time period, each agency
reported different numbers of revocations based on terrorism concerns. As
shown in figure 3, State listed 338; ICE, 347; and CBP, 336. We found that
only 320 names were on all three lists and that some lists contained names
that were not on either of the other lists.

11State officials told us that there was no homeland security
vulnerability during its deliberations because procedures call for posting
lookouts to alert border inspectors to stop these individuals.

Figure 3: Inconsistencies among Agencies on Number of Visas Revoked from
October through December 2003

Source: Conceptual drawing of GAO's analysis of State and Department of
Homeland Security data.

Instances where a name did not appear on all three lists show a potential
breakdown in the visa revocation process. We could not determine why all
of the names were not on all lists. However, we determined that some of
the names were not included because the agencies disagreed over whether
some of these individuals' visas were revoked on terrorism grounds or when
their visas were revoked, and others were not included because we were
provided incomplete information. Regardless of the reason, this
discrepancy is a cause for concern because CBP and ICE may not have taken
timely action to determine if these individuals were in the country and,
if so, to locate and investigate them.

In our June 2003 report, we noted that State's Visa Office neither kept a
central log of visas it revoked on the basis of terrorism concerns, nor
did it monitor whether notifications were sent to other agencies. In
commenting on that report, State said the Visa Office had changed its
practices to keep a log of revocation cases and maintain all signed
certificates in a central file. However, in conducting this review, Visa
Office officials told us that State did not maintain a formal list of all
visas revoked. We also learned that State, CBP, and ICE did not have a
system in place to regularly

CBP and ICE Disagreed on Which Individuals May Have Been in the Country

reconcile their separate records of visa revocations to ensure that each
agency has consistent information.

Our review of a sample of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds shows
that CBP12 and ICE records also conflicted regarding whether certain
individuals may have been in the country. In 3 of the 35 cases, CBP and
ICE disagreed about whether an individual may have been in the country at
the time of visa revocation and whether they might still be in the
country. In two of the instances, CBP did not believe the individual was
in the country and, therefore, did not refer the cases to ICE for
investigation. However, ICE special agents determined that both of these
individuals were and still are in the country-one is awaiting adjudication
of a political asylum claim, and the other has a pending application to
become a lawful permanent resident of the United States.

In another instance, CBP believed an individual was in the country when
his visa was revoked and subsequently notified ICE of the need to locate
and investigate him. However, because ICE did not use CBP's notification,
it performed its own search of immigration records based on State's
notification and concluded that the individual was not in the country.
Therefore, it did not investigate him. According to CBP data, this
individual has been in the country for more than a year.

These disagreements are due in part to the lack of clearly defined
responsibilities for each of the DHS components. Because of DHS's lack of
an agencywide written policy regarding visa revocations, its component
units' procedures are sometimes duplicative. For example, CBP's written
procedures require its personnel to determine if individuals with revoked
visas may be in the United States and notify ICE of any such individuals.
According to ICE officials, they conduct their own record checks to
determine if individuals with revoked visas are in the country and rely
primarily on notifications from State to identify individuals on whom they
need to conduct records checks.

12CBP's data come from the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), which
does not have complete arrival and departure records for all non-U.S.
citizens. NIIS records arrivals and departures of foreign citizens through
the collection of I-94 forms. Some aliens are required to fill out and
turn in these forms to inspectors at air and seaports of entry, as well as
at land borders. (Canadians and U.S. permanent residents are not required
to fill out I-94 forms when they enter the United States). NIIS does not
have departure data for aliens if they fail to turn in the bottom portion
of their I-94 when they depart.

ICE May Not Have Been Informed of Aliens with Revoked Visas Who May Be in
the Country

ICE Officials Are Generally Unaware of Basis for Individual Revocations

An ICE official told us that CBP and ICE have different responsibilities
regarding visa revocations and, as a result, may have different levels of
sensitivity to information regarding whether individuals with revoked
visas may be in the country. CBP's primary responsibility is to post
lookouts to prevent individuals from entering the country. ICE's primary
responsibility is to prevent any national security threats by enforcing
immigration laws once individuals have already entered the country.
Therefore, ICE officials told us that they initiate investigations of
individuals out of an abundance of caution, even if CBP may not believe
the individual may be in the country. They added that notifications from
CBP merely supplement ICE's efforts to determine if individuals may be in
the country.

Once they receive notification of a visa revocation from State, DHS
personnel at CBP should notify ICE if they determine that the individual
whose visa was revoked may be in the country. CBP's workflow outline
states that CBP verifies that any lead information on individuals whose
visas are revoked and may be in the United States is immediately provided
to ICE for investigation. A CBP official confirmed that, because these
cases are highly urgent, they should be handled immediately. However, CBP
could not document that it had notified ICE promptly, or in several cases,
that it notified ICE at all. According to CBP data on the 35 cases in our
sample, 10 aliens may have been in the United States at the time of their
revocation. In 3 of these cases, CBP records indicate that ICE was never
notified that the alien might be in the country. In the other 7 cases, CBP
notified ICE but could not document that the notification occurred until
at least 3 months after the revocation.

While ICE could readily identify which visa revocation cases were based on
terrorism concerns, agency officials stated that they often received no
derogatory information showing that individuals whose visas State had
revoked on terrorism concerns might pose a national security threat.
Because ICE personnel are responsible for fully investigating every case
in which the individual may be in the country, they expend resources
conducting investigations on individuals who they believe may pose little
or no threat to national security. According to ICE officials, the growing
number of visa revocation cases based on terrorism concerns places a
significant strain on their investigative resources, and ICE was forced to
pull agents off active investigations of known national security threats
to investigate visa revocation cases.

As discussed earlier, State officials told us that the vast majority of
visas revoked for terrorism concerns are based on derogatory information

ICE Initiated Field Investigations More Than 2 Months after Receiving
Notification of Visa Revocation

DHS Investigated Individuals with Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds

contained in TIPOFF. According to TSC, of the 35 cases we examined in
detail, 32 of the individuals whose visas were revoked appeared in TIPOFF.
However, in May 2004, ICE officials told us that they were not aware that
most of State's visa revocations on terrorism grounds are based on
information in TIPOFF. In June 2004, they informed us that their records
check located only 6 of the 35 individuals from our sample in TIPOFF. Also
in June, State officials told us they recently began providing DHS with
the TIPOFF record number for each individual whose revocation was based on
derogatory information in TIPOFF.

Our review of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds from October
through December 2003 shows that ICE forwarded requests for field offices
to initiate investigations of individuals who may be in the United States
more than 2 months after receiving notification of the visa revocation.
ICE officials explained that requests sent to field offices specify a date
by which the field offices should complete their investigations. These
officials added that, in instances when the individual is in TIPOFF and in
the country, they take immediate action to locate and investigate him or
her. After receiving notification from State, ICE determined that field
offices should investigate 8 of the 35 cases we examined in detail. In all
8 of these cases, ICE waited more than 2 months to initiate field
investigations. In 2 cases, ICE received notification from the Department
of State of the visa revocation in mid-October 2003 but did not send a
request to field offices to investigate these individuals until the end of
February 2004. In the other 6 cases, ICE received notification from the
Department of State of the visa revocation in early December but again did
not send a request to field offices to investigate these individuals until
the end of February.

ICE officials told us that it might have taken longer than it usually
takes to initiate these investigations because of an increase in their
workload resulting from the raising of the nationwide terror threat level
to "code orange" (high) during the period of our review. On December 21,
2003, DHS raised the terror threat level from "code yellow" (elevated) to
"code orange" for 19 days. In June, ICE officials told us they were
considering revising their policies to ensure that all future
investigations are initiated promptly.

Separate from our sample of 35 visa revocations, we reviewed the more than
300 visa revocations based on terrorism concerns from October through
December 2003. According to ICE records, ICE determined that 64 of these
individuals needed to be investigated because they might have been in the
United States at the time of revocation. ICE indicated it had

Existing Law Does Not Expressly Provide for the Removal of Aliens Based
Solely on Visa Revocations

initiated investigations on all 64 of these individuals and has concluded
a majority of these investigations. Data provided by ICE show that these
investigations resulted in confirming departure of some aliens, clearing
others, and arresting 3 on administrative immigration charges.13 On June
8, 2004, ICE officials told us that they have no specific derogatory
information that would indicate that any of the individuals remaining in
the United States represent a threat to national security. We also noted
several cases where the visa revocation process prevented individuals with
visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from entering the United States
or helped remove them from the United States.

Revocation of a visa is not explicitly a stated grounds for removal under
the Immigration and Nationality Act.14 State's visa revocation certificate
states that the revocation shall become effective immediately on the date
the certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the United
States, in which case the revocation will become effective immediately
upon the alien's departure from the United States. Therefore, if ICE
special agents locate an alien in the United States for whom the
Department of State has issued a revocation certificate that states that
the alien's visa is revoked effective upon his or her departure, ICE would
be unable to place the alien in removal proceedings based solely on a visa
revocation that had not yet taken place. In light of the Department of
State's current revocation certificate, the issue whether, under the
current statute and regulations, DHS would have the authority to initiate
removal proceedings on the basis solely of a visa revocation has not been
litigated and remains unresolved legally. According to DHS officials, if
State changed the wording of the certificate to make the revocation
effective retroactively to the date of issuance of the visa, the
government would no longer be effectively barred from litigating the
issue. However, in June 2004 State and DHS officials told us that they had
reached an informal understanding that should the wording of the
revocation certificate be changed, it would not be changed in all
instances, but only on a case by case basis. In commenting on a draft of
this report, DHS stated that on a case by case basis DHS may ask that
State change its revocation certificate related to an admitted alien to
make the revocation effective retroactively to the date of issuance of the
visa,

13ICE provided us a breakdown of results of the 64 investigations, but we
have not included these data because DHS classified them as law
enforcement sensitive.

148 U.S.C. S: 1101 et seq. An alien may be placed in removal proceedings
under a charge of inadmissibility based on terrorist activities as defined
in Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. S: 1229a(a)(2).

  Recent Actions Taken to Address Identified Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation
  Process

and State will consider such a request in consultation with DHS and the
Department of Justice.

Since we initiated our inquiry in January 2004, State and DHS have taken
additional actions to address identified weaknesses in the process. These
included revisions to visa revocation procedures, reviewing past
revocations, and taking steps to address legal and policy issues. In
addition, in mid-April, TSC identified visa revocations as a potential
vulnerability that could compromise homeland security and developed an
informal process for coordinating actions and sharing information relating
to visa revocations. However, we identified some weaknesses that still
need to be addressed.

    State Revised Its Procedures and Formalized Its System for Tracking Cases

In April and May 2004, State took several actions to improve its
performance in the visa revocation process, including revising its
procedures and formalizing its tracking of visa revocations. In the course
of responding to our inquiries, State's Visa Office discovered that its
standard operating procedures had not always been followed correctly. In
response, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs informed
us on April 27, 2004, that in light of the importance of visa revocation
cases, the procedures were revised to provide more explicit details for
each step in the process. For example, the procedures were revised to
highlight the importance of posting a lookout code into CLASS before the
revocation certificate is signed. Additionally, the Visa Office now
requires its personnel performing visa revocations to certify that they
have completed all steps in the process and to provide the date on which
each step was completed. At the end of the process, a designated
supervisor must now review the revocation file and certify that the
standard operating procedures were completed correctly. State revised
these procedures again in late May 2004 to further clarify which federal
agencies should receive notification of the revocation. Finally, the
Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs told us that the Visa Office
planned to formalize its previously informal system for tracking visa
revocations to make it a definitive reference point for information about
all visa revocations.

CBP Reviewed Past Officials from CBP took two steps following the
initiation of our review to
Revocations to Provide ensure that appropriate action was taken on prior
visa revocations. On
Additional Information to March 25, 2004, CBP officials sent notifications
to ICE regarding
ICE individuals with visas revoked from October through December 2003 who

may be in the country. CBP officials told us that they sent these

notifications to ICE because, in responding to our inquiry, they
determined that they could not document previous notifications to ICE of
these individuals.

In May 2004, a CBP official informed us that CBP was performing a review
of all visa revocations in its lookout database to ensure that all
appropriate notifications had been sent to ICE. This review identified 656
individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. CBP provided
this information to ICE. We reviewed these data and determined that 34 of
these individuals' visas were revoked based on terrorism concerns from
October through December 2003.

    ICE Assigned Staff to CBP and Developed Written Standard Operating
    Procedures

In January 2004, ICE assigned a special agent to CBP in order to assist
with information exchange and coordination of visa revocation issues.
According to DHS, if CBP determines that an individual whose visa was
revoked is in the country, ICE is notified immediately. Also, on March 1,
2004, ICE issued written standard operating procedures for all visa
revocation investigations. ICE officials acknowledged that prior to March
2004, ICE did not have a policy that specifically addressed visa
revocations. However, ICE explained that it had procedures for handling
all investigative leads received, including visa revocations. ICE's March
2004 procedures outline the steps that ICE officials should take for cases
where an individual has entered the United States and subsequently has a
visa revoked. These procedures begin with the receipt of a visa revocation
cable from State and include steps for determining if individuals are in
the country, conducting records searches to determine where the individual
may be, and forwarding necessary information to field offices for further
investigation.

    State and DHS Took Steps to Address Legal and Policy Issues

In February 2004, officials from DHS, which has overall responsibility for
visa policy, told us they were considering a regulation relating to visa
revocations that could allow the removal of individuals from the United
States because their visas have been revoked by State. In June 2004, DHS
officials told us that they were still considering this regulation and
were coordinating with State and the Department of Justice. Additionally,
DHS was working with Justice to address questions regarding DHS's
authority to issue such a regulation. State officials told us that making
changes regarding removal of persons with revoked visas would require both
State and DHS to make legal and policy decisions and establish a formal
written agreement regarding procedures.

    TSC's Efforts to Improve the Visa Revocation Process

Since its formation in December 2003, TSC has taken actions to clarify its
role, increase its capacity to handle visa revocation cases, and analyze
the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. Specifically, in
March 2004, TSC developed written standard operating procedures outlining
the process for screening intelligence information to identify visa
holders who may be terrorists and for recommending that Consular Affairs
revoke these individuals' visas. TSC also recently began training
additional staff to screen terrorism intelligence for matches with visa
holders. Previously, the center had one full-time staff member dedicated
to performing this function.

TSC officials told us that, in mid-April 2004, TSC identified the visa
revocation process as a potential vulnerability to homeland security. As a
result, it developed a process for TSC to coordinate the sharing of
information on visa revocation cases. This process outlines
responsibilities for representatives from State, CBP, ICE, and the FBI who
are assigned to TSC. According to a TSC official, this process is designed
to coordinate the efforts of these representatives, without relying on
formal notifications transmitted among the agencies. When new names are
added to the TIPOFF database, all the agency representatives receive this
information at the same time. According to TSC's new process, State
personnel assigned to TSC determine if the person has a valid visa; CBP
personnel determine if the individual may be in the country; and, if the
individual is in the country, ICE and FBI personnel determine if they have
open investigations of the individual. Because this process was developed
after the October to December 2003 time period, we did not assess its
effectiveness.

In April 2004, TSC also initiated a review of pending visa revocation
cases based on terrorism concerns to determine whether any of the
individuals in question were in the United States and whether DHS and FBI
were aware of their presence and had open investigations on them. A senior
FBI official assigned to TSC told us that as of May 27, 2004, this review
was not complete, but that, in some instances, law enforcement or
immigration officials needed to open investigations on some of these
individuals.

Additional Actions Are Despite the steps taken by State and DHS,
additional actions are needed to Needed to Improve the improve the visa
revocation process. There is no governmentwide policy Visa Revocation
Process outlining roles and responsibilities for the visa revocation
process, and

State and DHS have not completed their discussions on legal and policy
issues related to removing individuals with revoked visas from the United
States. Although CBP and ICE have written internal procedures related to

their respective roles and responsibilities in the visa revocation
process, DHS has still not developed an agencywide policy governing the
process. As a result, CBP and ICE take responsibility for performing some
of the same tasks. While CBP's workflow outline states that CBP is
responsible for determining if individuals with revoked visas are in the
United States and referring cases to ICE, ICE's standard operating
procedures indicate that ICE staff are also responsible for performing
this function. In some cases, State, CBP, and ICE are not familiar with
what the different agencies' policies and procedures expect of them.
Because agency officials do not always recognize what other agencies'
written policies expect of them, important information may not be passed
from one agency to the next, and efforts may be duplicated. Further, since
the agencies do not have a system in place for routinely reconciling their
visa revocation records, there is a heightened chance that individuals
with visas revoked for terrorism concerns and who are in the country will
not be investigated.

State's and DHS's written procedures also lack specific time frames for
completing individual steps in the process. For instance, State's
procedures dated May 20, 2004 lack guidance on how quickly Consular
Affairs officials should act on recommendations from TSC to revoke
individuals' visas. Further, they lack guidance on how quickly Consular
Affairs officials should notify the overseas post and other federal
agencies once the revocation certificate is signed. In addition, ICE's
written procedures do not specify a time frame for referring cases to
Special Agent in Charge offices. This general lack of time frames is
significant, given the extent of delays we observed in the visa revocation
process and the potential threat posed by the individuals whose visas have
been revoked.

State's and DHS's discussions of legal and policy issues regarding the
visa revocation process have not been completed. DHS officials told us
that the agencies continue to discuss possible mechanisms for addressing
these issues, including possibly changing the wording of State's
revocation certificate or studying the feasibility of drafting a
regulation to address these issues. According to State and DHS, the
complexity of these issues have required an extraordinary amount of review
and coordination with various interested government agencies. As of June
2004, neither State nor DHS could provide a time line for addressing these
legal and policy issues.

Conclusions 	Our testing of the visa revocation process from October
through December 2003 identified several gaps in the process. Since then,
DHS and State have taken several actions to improve the process. DHS and
State believe that these actions will avoid the delays that were

experienced in the past. TSC's recent initiative to coordinate the sharing
of information on potential terrorists should also improve the process.
Nevertheless, some additional actions are needed to further improve the
process. A governmentwide commitment is necessary to address the
weaknesses in the implementation of the visa revocation process so that it
can be a more effective antiterrorism tool.

To strengthen and improve the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism
tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly
with the Secretary of State and other appropriate agencies to take the
following two actions:

                              Recommendations for

  Executive Action

o  	Develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines the roles
and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the visa revocation
process, including TSC. This policy should include directions for sharing
information and tracking visa revocation cases throughout the interagency
visa revocation process. It should incorporate performance standards
(e.g., time frames for completing each step in the process) and periodic
interagency assessments to determine whether information is being shared
among the agencies involved and appropriate follow-up action is being
taken and to reconcile data differences if they occur; and

o  	Address outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the status of
aliens with visas revoked on national security grounds who are in the
United States at the time of the revocation. If these issues cannot be
addressed, the Executive Branch should, by October 1, 2004, provide
Congress with a list of specific actions (including any potential
legislative changes) that could help resolve them.

                                Agency Comments
                               and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security, State, and Justice for their comments.

The Department of Homeland Security said it generally concurred with the
report and its recommendations. DHS believes that our identification of
areas where improvements are needed will contribute to ongoing efforts to
strengthen the visa revocation process. DHS emphasized that persons whose
visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns may not be terrorists and
that revoking a visa is a precautionary measure to preclude an alien from
gaining admission to the United States until more information is obtained
to decide if the person should be admitted to the United States.

The Department of State indicated that it believes that its handling of
the revocation process overall has been excellent and has improved over
time. State indicated it would consult with DHS regarding implementation
of our recommendations. State also provided additional information on the
visa revocation process and the procedures currently in effect.

DHS and State also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated
where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State, Secretary
of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General. We also will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff
have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128.
Key contributors to this report were John Brummet, Jason Bair,
Elizabeth Singer, Mary Moutsos, Janey Cohen, and Etana Finkler.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

The scope of our work covered the interagency process for visas revoked by
the Department of State (State) headquarters on the basis of terrorism
concerns between October 1 and December 31, 2003. To assess the policies
and procedures governing the visa revocation process, we obtained copies
of written procedures from the Department of State and the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In addition, we
interviewed officials from State, DHS, the Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

To assess the process for revoking visas on terrorism grounds, we examined
data and records provided by State's Visa Office on visa revocations from
October through December 2003. The Visa Office provided us an initial list
of such revocations in February 2004 and an amended list in April 2004. We
also obtained information from CBP and ICE on the number of visas revoked
on terrorism grounds during this time period and compared these data with
that provided by State's Visa Office. We found that the total number of
visa revocations differed among these three data sources. We identified
discrepancies and discussed these with agency officials. In addition, we
obtained copies of the official revocation certificates for individuals
whose visas State revoked during that time. We determined that State made
at least 338 visa revocations during this time period, but we also
determined that the data on visa revocations were not sufficiently
reliable to provide an exact count of the number of revocations. However,
the data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.

We used the Visa Office's February 2004 list of 318 cases to draw a random
sample of 35 to review in detail. We cannot generalize from this sample to
the full universe of all cases because, after we had drawn our sample, the
Visa Office subsequently supplied us with an amended list of 338 cases.
For the individuals in our sample of 35, we obtained printouts from
State's Consular Consolidated Database, which provided us with the
individuals' names, biographic data such as dates and places of birth,
passport numbers, and visa information such as issuing posts and types of
visa. We also obtained a copy of the cable sent by State headquarters to
the post that issued the visa that was revoked. This cable included a
reference to the specific section of the Immigration and Nationality Act
that was used as the basis for the revocation as well as a list of other
agencies the cable was sent to. The Visa Office also provided
documentation of the lookouts it posted in the Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We met with officials from TSC and State's Visa Office to determine the
steps taken prior to finalizing visa revocations. TSC officials provided
copies of their written policies and procedures for dealing with visa
revocations and described the process it follows in such cases. TSC
officials also informed us whether individuals in our sample of 35 visa
revocations are in the TIPOFF database and, if so, when a recommendation
to revoke these visas was sent to State. To calculate the length of time
between the recommendation to revoke and the actual revocation, we
compared the information provided by TSC with the dates on the revocation
certificates provided by State.

To determine when State posted lookouts and notified other agencies of
visa revocations, we obtained information from the Visa Office. This
included printouts from the CLASS system showing when a lookout was
posted, who posted the lookout, and what lookout code was used. In
addition, we examined the revocation cables sent to other agencies. We
also obtained information from CBP and ICE regarding when they received
notification from State. We determined that the CLASS system was
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of showing when lookouts were
posted.

To determine if and when ICE officials were informed by CBP of individuals
with revoked visas who might be in the country, we obtained documents from
and spoke with officials from CBP. These officials provided an electronic
version of CBP's Visa Revocation Case Tracking Spreadsheet for the period
we examined. This spreadsheet contained information on all visa
revocations during the period, not just those based on terrorism concerns.
The spreadsheet included the names, dates the notifications of the
revocations were received, dates of the most recent entry and exit from
the United States, and the date on which CBP informed ICE that the
individual might be in the country.

We also compared State, CBP, and ICE records regarding the number and
names of individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from
October through December 2003. We obtained lists of all such cases during
the period from State and ICE. We then compared these lists to one another
and to CBP's Visa Revocation Case Tracking Spreadsheet.

To determine which individuals with revoked visas might be in the country,
we examined CBP's entry and exit data in its Visa Revocation Case Tracking
Spreadsheet. These data are based on information from the Nonimmigrant
Information System, which does not have complete entry and exit data
(e.g., it does not include departure information if aliens fail

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

to turn in the bottom portion of their I-94 form when they leave the
country). As such, we determined that these data are not sufficiently
reliable for the purpose of determining which individuals with visas
revoked on terrorism grounds are in the country. In addition, because ICE
officials told us they do not rely on CBP to determine which individuals
might be in the country, we obtained additional entry and exit data from
ICE for our sample of 35 cases. To assess the reliability of the ICE data,
we interviewed officials who were knowledgeable about the data and
compared it with CBP's data. Where we found discrepancies, we discussed
these cases with officials from both CBP and ICE. We determined that the
ICE data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing the
ongoing results of investigations of individuals that had been in the
United States with revoked visas; however, some investigations were still
outstanding and, in some cases, ICE officials were not completely certain
whether the individuals had actually departed the United States.

We obtained information on actions taken to locate and investigate
individuals in the United States with visas revoked based on terrorism
concerns. ICE officials provided us with summary data on all visa
revocations based on terrorism concerns during the period. In addition,
they provided detailed information on their efforts to locate and
investigate each of the 35 individuals in our sample. We also met with
officials from the FBI and the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to
determine their activities regarding investigating individuals with visas
revoked based on terrorism concerns.

To determine the steps taken to improve the visa revocation process since
our June 2003 report, we met with State, DHS, FBI, and TSC officials. From
these officials we obtained copies of policies and procedures developed
since our previous report. We also obtained information on changes in the
visa revocation process since our prior report. In addition, we met with
State and DHS officials regarding the steps taken to resolve outstanding
legal issues regarding visa revocations. These officials described the
discussions they have had regarding changing the wording of State's
certificate of revocation and DHS's regulations. DHS declined to provide
us with a copy of a draft regulation they had prepared, noting that it was
the subject of ongoing intra-and interagency discussions.

We were briefed by FBI officials regarding their efforts to investigate
suspected terrorists in the TIPOFF database. However, we did not review
these efforts.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We conducted our work from January through June 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

                                 See comment 2.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland Security's
letter dated June 17, 2004.

                                  GAO Comments

1. 	We have revised the report to reflect the fact that, while ICE did not
have procedures specific to visa revocations prior to March 2004, it had
procedures that applied more generally to all investigative leads.

2. 	Our report did not indicate that any of the individuals included in
our review were necessarily suspected or actual terrorists. The Department
of State revokes a person's visa as a precautionary measure after it
learns that person might be a suspected terrorist. The purpose of this
revocation is to obtain additional information from the person to
determine if they are the same person that is suspected to be a terrorist
by requiring them to return to the consulate that issued their visa. In
commenting on our draft report, State explained that all of these
revocations were based on information suggesting possible terrorist
activities or links.

3. 	Based on our analysis, we reported that ICE and CBP records conflicted
regarding whether specific individuals whose visas were revoked on
terrorism grounds were or may still be in the country. With regard to one
of these individuals, ICE concluded that the individual was not in the
country and therefore, it did not investigate him. According to CBP data,
this individual has been in the country for more than a year. As a result
of such discrepancies between agency records, we are recommending that
State and DHS conduct periodic interagency assessments to determine
whether information is being shared among the agencies involved in the
visa revocation process and appropriate follow-up action is being taken
and to reconcile data differences if they occur.

4. 	We acknowledge that ICE requests sent to field offices specify a date
by which they should complete their investigations. However, our statement
refers to a lack of time frames for sending requests to field offices, not
to a lack of time frames for those field offices to complete their
investigations.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 1.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 2.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 3.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 4.

                                 See comment 5.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 6.

                                 See comment 7.

                                 See comment 8.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 9.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter dated
June 23, 2004.

                                  GAO Comments

1. 	The posting of lookouts in CLASS and IBIS is an important tool for
preventing potential terrorists from entering the country. However,
posting these lookouts is not designed to track individuals who entered
the United States before the Department of State revokes their visas. As
such, the visa revocation process remains a useful tool for promptly
identifying, locating, and investigating individuals who may be in the
United States and may pose a threat to homeland security.

2. 	We acknowledge that the Department of State should appropriately
deliberate over visa revocation cases. However, State officials told us
that their involvement in the entire visa revocation process should take
no longer than one week. Given this standard, State's delay in three cases
of more than 6 months appears excessive.

3. 	This report includes a review of all 330+ visas revoked on terrorism
grounds from October through December 2003, including a detailed review of
a random sample of 35 cases. We chose to review this 3month period to
allow some time for the agencies involved to implement our recommendations
for improving the visa revocation process contained in our June 2003
report. In addition to this report, we previously reviewed all 240 visas
revoked on terrorism grounds from September 11, 2001 through December 31,
2002, and found similar weaknesses. As noted earlier, posting CLASS and
IBIS lookouts is not intended to track individuals who entered the United
States before the Department of State revoked their visas. As such, the
visa revocation process remains a useful tool for promptly identifying,
locating, and investigating individuals who may be in the United States
and may pose a threat.

4. 	In February 2004, we requested detailed information from State on 35
individuals whose visas State had revoked on terrorism grounds from
October through December 2003. In April, we received this information.
After reviewing the data, we discussed our preliminary findings with the
Managing Director of State's Office of Visa Services, including delays in
State's decisions to revoke three individuals' visas. The same day, we
provided State the names of these three individuals and requested
information on why these delays occurred. In May, a State official
provided an explanation of State's actions regarding these individuals.
However, we chose to exclude this information from our report due to the
sensitivity of the type of information involved.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

5. 	In February 2004, we requested detailed information (including when
lookout codes were entered) for a random sample of 35 visa revocation
cases. In April 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular
Affairs informed us that in researching and gathering this information,
State discovered that, in some cases, the officer responsible for handling
revocations did not enter the revocation lookout code immediately into
CLASS before the revocation certificate was signed.

6. 	Based on information State provided during the course of our review,
we note that State revises its standard operating procedures for visa
revocations as necessary. After reviewing our draft report, State provided
us with a revised copy of its standard operating procedures dated June 17,
2004, which included more explicit time frames. We believe this is a good
step toward implementing our recommendation.

7. 	In conducting this review, we requested a list of individuals whose
visas were revoked based on terrorism concerns from October through
December 2003 from State, CBP, and ICE. State asserts that the conflicting
records were probably due to different methodologies for compiling various
agencies' lists. We note that we observed multiple instances where
conflicting records could not be explained by differing methodologies. For
example, in some cases the agencies disagreed over whether the
individuals' visas were revoked based on terrorism grounds and, in other
cases, agencies did not initially provide names that they later
acknowledged should have been included in their lists.

Given these conflicting records and the possible threat to homeland
security, we are recommending that State and DHS conduct periodic
interagency assessments to determine whether information is being shared
among the agencies involved in the visa revocation process and appropriate
follow-up action is being taken and to reconcile data differences if they
occur.

8. 	We have updated our report to reflect the current status of State's
and DHS's discussions of legal and policy issues and have removed all
references to unresolved legal disagreements. We have added information
reflecting a recent informal understanding reached by State and DHS that,
on a case by case basis, DHS may ask that State revoke a visa
retroactively. However, we note that legal and policy issues regarding the
removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocations continue to
exist, and agency discussions on how to address these issues have not been
completed.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

9. 	During the course of our review, State's and DHS's discussions evolved
regarding legal and policy issues relating to removing individuals from
the United States based on visa revocations. Based on discussions with
State and DHS officials, we have removed any implied linkage between
revising the visa revocation certificate and a regulatory or statutory
amendment.

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