Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies	 
(19-MAY-04, GAO-04-785T).					 
                                                                 
One of the primary functions of any security system is the	 
control of people moving into or out of protected areas, such as 
physical buildings, information systems, and our national border.
Technologies called biometrics can automate the identification of
people by one or more of their distinct physical or behavioral	 
characteristics. The term biometrics covers a wide range of	 
technologies that can be used to verify identity by measuring and
analyzing human characteristics--relying on attributes of the	 
individual instead of things the individual may have or know.	 
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, laws have been  
passed that require a more extensive use of biometric		 
technologies in the federal government. In 2002, GAO conducted a 
technology assessment on the use of biometrics for border	 
security. GAO was asked to testify about the issues that it	 
raised in the report, the current state of the technology, and	 
the application of biometrics to aviation security.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-785T					        
    ACCNO:   A10128						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric	      
Technologies							 
     DATE:   05/19/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Airport security					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Facility security					 
	     Identity verification				 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Systems design					 
	     Transportation workers				 
	     Biometrics 					 
	     TSA Registered Traveler Program			 
	     TSA Transportation Worker Identification		 
	     Credential Project 				 
                                                                 

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GAO-04-785T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT AVIATION SECURITY

Wednesday, May 19, 2004

                   Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies

Statement of Keith A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist Applied Research and Methods

GAO-04-785T

Highlights of GAO-04-785T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives

One of the primary functions of any security system is the control of
people moving into or out of protected areas, such as physical buildings,
information systems, and our national border. Technologies called
biometrics can automate the identification of people by one or more of
their distinct physical or behavioral characteristics. The term biometrics
covers a wide range of technologies that can be used to verify identity by
measuring and analyzing human characteristics-relying on attributes of the
individual instead of things the individual may have or know. Since the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, laws have been passed that require
a more extensive use of biometric technologies in the federal government.

In 2002, GAO conducted a technology assessment on the use of biometrics
for border security. GAO was asked to testify about the issues that it
raised in the report, the current state of the technology, and the
application of biometrics to aviation security.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-785T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Keith Rhodes at (202)
512-6412 or [email protected].

May 19, 2004

AVIATION SECURITY

Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies

Biometric technologies are available today that can be used for aviation
security. Biometric technologies vary in complexity, capabilities, and
performance, and can be used to verify or establish a person's identity.
Leading biometric technologies include facial recognition, fingerprint
recognition, hand geometry, and iris recognition. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and subsequently, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), has
been examining the use of biometrics for aviation security for several
years. TSA has three current pilot projects that will study the use of
biometrics to enhance aviation security: the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC), registered traveler, and an access
control pilot program designed to secure sensitive areas of an airport.

It is important to bear in mind that effective security cannot be achieved
by relying on technology alone. Technology and people must work together
as part of an overall security process. Weaknesses in any of these areas
diminish the effectiveness of the security process. The security process
needs to account for limitations in biometric technology. For example,
some people cannot enroll in a biometrics system because they lack the
appropriate body part. Similarly, errors sometimes occur during matching
operations. Exception processing that is not as good as biometric-based
primary processing could be exploited as a security hole. Further,
nontechnological processes for enrollment are critical to the success of a
biometrics-based identity management system. Before a person is granted a
biometric credential, the issuing authority needs to assure itself that
the person is eligible to receive such a credential.

We have found that three key considerations need to be addressed before a
decision is made to design, develop, and implement biometrics into a
security system:

1. Decisions must be made on how the technology will be used.

2. 	A detailed cost-benefit analysis must be conducted to determine that
the benefits gained from a system outweigh the costs.

3. 	A trade-off analysis must be conducted between the increased security,
which the use of biometrics would provide, and the effect on areas such as
privacy and convenience.

Security concerns need to be balanced with practical cost and operational
considerations as well as political and economic interests. A risk
management approach can help federal agencies identify and address
security concerns. To develop security systems with biometrics, the
highlevel goals of these systems need to be defined, and the concept of
operations that will embody the people, process, and technologies required
to achieve these goals needs to be developed. With these answers, the
proper role of biometric technologies in aviation security can be
determined.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on the use
of biometrics for aviation security. The security of the U.S. commercial
aviation system has been a long-standing concern. Following the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks, virtually all aviation security
responsibilities now reside within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and its Transportation Security Administration (TSA). These
responsibilities include the conduct of passenger and baggage screening
and overseeing security measures for airports, commercial aircraft, air
cargo, and general aviation. DHS and TSA have undertaken several
initiatives to improve aviation security. Some efforts, including those
involving access control to secure areas of an airport and identifying
travelers, include biometric technologies.

One of the primary functions of any security system is the control of
people moving into or out of protected areas, such as physical buildings,
information systems, and our national border. People are identified by
three basic means: by something they know, something they have, or
something they are. People and systems regularly use these means to
identify people in everyday life. For example, members of a community
routinely recognize one another by how they look or how their voices
sound-by something they are. Automated teller machines (ATM) recognize
customers from their presentation of a bank card-something they have-and
their entering a personal identification number (PIN)- something they
know. Using keys to enter a locked building is another example of using
something you have. More secure systems may combine two or more of these
approaches.

Technologies called biometrics can automate the identification of people
by one or more of their distinct physical or behavioral characteristics-by
something they are. The term biometrics covers a wide range of
technologies that can be used to verify identity by measuring and
analyzing human characteristics. Biometrics theoretically represent a more
effective approach to security because each person's characteristics are
thought to be distinct and, when compared with identification cards and
passwords, are less easily lost, stolen, counterfeited, or otherwise
compromised.

As requested, I will provide an overview of biometric technologies that
are currently available, describe some of the current uses of these
technologies, and discuss the issues and challenges associated with the
implementation of biometrics. My testimony today is based on a body of

  Biometric Technologies for Personal Identification

work we completed in 2002 that examined the use of biometrics for border
control. In that report, we discussed the maturity of several biometric
technologies, the possible implementation of these technologies in current
border control processes, and the policy implications and key
considerations for using these technologies.1 We also researched selected
prior and current TSA and DHS biometrics initiatives and summarize them in
this statement. We performed our work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

When used for personal identification, biometric technologies measure and
analyze human physiological and behavioral characteristics. Identifying a
person's physiological characteristics is based on direct measurement of a
part of the body-fingertips, hand geometry, facial geometry, and eye
retinas and irises. The corresponding biometric technologies are
fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, and facial, retina, and iris
recognition. Identifying behavioral characteristics is based on data
derived from actions, such as speech and signature, the corresponding
biometrics being speaker recognition and signature recognition. Unlike
conventional identification methods that use something you have, such as
an identification card to gain access to a building, or something you
know, such as a password to log on to a computer system, these
characteristics are integral to something you are.

How Biometric Technologies Work

Biometric technologies vary in complexity, capabilities, and performance,
but all share several elements. Biometric identification systems are
essentially pattern recognition systems. They use acquisition devices such
as cameras and scanning devices to capture images, recordings, or
measurements of an individual's characteristics and computer hardware and
software to extract, encode, store, and compare these characteristics.
Because the process is automated, biometric decision-making is generally
very fast, in most cases taking only a few seconds in real time.

Depending on the application, biometric systems can be used in one of two
modes: verification or identification. Verification-also called
authentication-is used to verify a person's identity-that is, to
authenticate that individuals are who they say they are. Identification is

1U.S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics
for Border Security, GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).

                                   Enrollment

                                  Verification

used to establish a person's identity-that is, to determine who a person
is. Although biometric technologies measure different characteristics in
substantially different ways, all biometric systems start with an
enrollment stage followed by a matching stage that can use either
verification or identification.

In enrollment, a biometric system is trained to identify a specific
person. The person first provides an identifier, such as an identity card.
The biometric is linked to the identity specified on the identification
document. He or she then presents the biometric (e.g., fingertips, hand,
or iris) to an acquisition device. The distinctive features are located
and one or more samples are extracted, encoded, and stored as a reference
template for future comparisons. Depending on the technology, the
biometric sample may be collected as an image, a recording, or a record of
related dynamic measurements. How biometric systems extract features and
encode and store information in the template is based on the system
vendor's proprietary algorithms. Template size varies depending on the
vendor and the technology. Templates can be stored remotely in a central
database or within a biometric reader device itself; their small size also
allows for storage on smart cards or tokens.

Minute changes in positioning, distance, pressure, environment, and other
factors influence the generation of a template. Consequently, each time an
individual's biometric data are captured, the new template is likely to be
unique. Depending on the biometric system, a person may need to present
biometric data several times in order to enroll. Either the reference
template may then represent an amalgam of the captured data or several
enrollment templates may be stored. The quality of the template or
templates is critical in the overall success of the biometric application.
Because biometric features can change over time, people may have to
reenroll to update their reference template. Some technologies can update
the reference template during matching operations.

The enrollment process also depends on the quality of the identifier the
enrollee presents. The reference template is linked to the identity
specified on the identification document. If the identification document
does not specify the individual's true identity, the reference template
will be linked to a false identity.

In verification systems, the step after enrollment is to verify that a
person is who he or she claims to be (i.e., the person who enrolled).
After the individual provides an identifier, the biometric is presented,
which the biometric system captures, generating a trial template that is
based on the

                                 Identification

vendor's algorithm. The system then compares the trial biometric template
with this person's reference template, which was stored in the system
during enrollment, to determine whether the individual's trial and stored
templates match.

Verification is often referred to as 1:1 (one-to-one) matching.
Verification systems can contain databases ranging from dozens to millions
of enrolled templates but are always predicated on matching an
individual's presented biometric against his or her reference template.
Nearly all verification systems can render a match-no-match decision in
less than a second. A system that requires employees to authenticate their
claimed identities before granting them access to secure buildings or to
computers is a verification application.

In identification systems, the step after enrollment is to identify who
the person is. Unlike verification systems, no identifier is provided. To
find a match, instead of locating and comparing the person's reference
template against his or her presented biometric, the trial template is
compared against the stored reference templates of all individuals
enrolled in the system. Identification systems are referred to as 1:N
(one-to-N, or one-tomany) matching because an individual's biometric is
compared against multiple biometric templates in the system's database.

There are two types of identification systems: positive and negative.
Positive identification systems are designed to ensure that an
individual's biometric is enrolled in the database. The anticipated result
of a search is a match. A typical positive identification system controls
access to a secure building or secure computer by checking anyone who
seeks access against a database of enrolled employees. The goal is to
determine whether a person seeking access can be identified as having been
enrolled in the system.

Negative identification systems are designed to ensure that a person's
biometric information is not present in a database. The anticipated result
of a search is a nonmatch. Comparing a person's biometric information
against a database of all who are registered in a public benefits program,
for example, can ensure that this person is not "double dipping" by using
fraudulent documentation to register under multiple identities.

Another type of negative identification system is a watch list system.
Such systems are designed to identify people on the watch list and alert
authorities for appropriate action. For all other people, the system is to
check that they are not on the watch list and allow them normal passage.

Matches Are Based on Threshold Settings

The people whose biometrics are in the database in these systems may not
have provided them voluntarily. For instance, for a surveillance system,
the biometric may be faces captured from mug shots provided by a law
enforcement agency.

No match is ever perfect in either a verification or an identification
system, because every time a biometric is captured, the template is likely
to be unique. Therefore, biometric systems can be configured to make a
match or no-match decision, based on a predefined number, referred to as a
threshold, that establishes the acceptable degree of similarity between
the trial template and the enrolled reference template. After the
comparison, a score representing the degree of similarity is generated,
and this score is compared to the threshold to make a match or no-match
decision. Depending on the setting of the threshold in identification
systems, sometimes several reference templates can be considered matches
to the trial template, with the better scores corresponding to better
matches.

Leading Biometric Technologies

Facial Recognition

A growing number of biometric technologies have been proposed over the
past several years, but only in the past 5 years have the leading ones
become more widely deployed. Some technologies are better suited to
specific applications than others, and some are more acceptable to users.
We describe seven leading biometric technologies:

o  Facial Recognition

o  Fingerprint Recognition

o  Hand Geometry

o  Iris Recognition

o  Retina Recognition

o  Signature Recognition

o  Speaker Recognition

Facial recognition technology identifies people by analyzing features of
the face that are not easily altered-the upper outlines of the eye
sockets, the areas around the cheekbones, and the sides of the mouth. The
technology is typically used to compare a live facial scan to a stored
template, but it can also be used in comparing static images such as
digitized passport photographs. Facial recognition can be used in both
verification and identification systems. In addition, because facial
images can be captured from video cameras, facial recognition is the only
biometric that can be used for surveillance purposes.

Fingerprint Recognition

Hand Geometry

Iris Recognition

Fingerprint recognition is one of the best known and most widely used
biometric technologies. Automated systems have been commercially available
since the early 1970s, and at the time of our study, we found there were
more than 75 fingerprint recognition technology companies. Until recently,
fingerprint recognition was used primarily in law enforcement
applications.

Fingerprint recognition technology extracts features from impressions made
by the distinct ridges on the fingertips. The fingerprints can be either
flat or rolled. A flat print captures only an impression of the central
area between the fingertip and the first knuckle; a rolled print captures
ridges on both sides of the finger.

An image of the fingerprint is captured by a scanner, enhanced, and
converted into a template. Scanner technologies can be optical, silicon,
or ultrasound technologies. Ultrasound, while potentially the most
accurate, has not been demonstrated in widespread use. In 2002, we found
that optical scanners were the most commonly used. During enhancement,
"noise" caused by such things as dirt, cuts, scars, and creases or dry,
wet, or worn fingerprints is reduced, and the definition of the ridges is
enhanced. Approximately 80 percent of vendors base their algorithms on the
extraction of minutiae points relating to breaks in the ridges of the
fingertips. Other algorithms are based on extracting ridge patterns.

Hand geometry systems have been in use for almost 30 years for access
control to facilities ranging from nuclear power plants to day care
centers. Hand geometry technology takes 96 measurements of the hand,
including the width, height, and length of the fingers; distances between
joints; and shapes of the knuckles.

Hand geometry systems use an optical camera and light-emitting diodes with
mirrors and reflectors to capture two orthogonal two-dimensional images of
the back and sides of the hand. Although the basic shape of an
individual's hand remains relatively stable over his or her lifetime,
natural and environmental factors can cause slight changes. The shape and
size of our hands are reasonably diverse, but are not highly distinctive.
Thus, hand geometry is not suitable for performing identification matches.

Iris recognition technology is based on the distinctly colored ring
surrounding the pupil of the eye. Made from elastic connective tissue, the
iris is a very rich source of biometric data, having approximately 266
distinctive characteristics. These include the trabecular meshwork, a
tissue that gives the appearance of dividing the iris radially, with
striations,

                               Retina Recognition

                             Signature Recognition

rings, furrows, a corona, and freckles. Iris recognition technology uses
about 173 of these distinctive characteristics. These characteristics,
which are formed during the 8th month of gestation, reportedly remain
stable throughout a person's lifetime, except in cases of injury. Iris
recognition can be used in both verification and identification systems.

Iris recognition systems use a small, high-quality camera to capture a
black and white, high-resolution image of the iris. The systems then
define the boundaries of the iris, establish a coordinate system over the
iris, and define the zones for analysis within the coordinate system.

Retina recognition technology captures and analyzes the patterns of blood
vessels on the thin nerve on the back of the eyeball that processes light
entering through the pupil. Retinal patterns are highly distinctive
traits. Every eye has its own totally unique pattern of blood vessels;
even the eyes of identical twins are distinct. Although each pattern
normally remains stable over a person's lifetime, it can be affected by
diseases such as glaucoma, diabetes, high blood pressure, and autoimmune
deficiency syndrome.

The fact that the retina is small, internal, and difficult to measure
makes capturing its image more difficult than most biometric technologies.
An individual must position the eye very close to the lens of the
retina-scan device, gaze directly into the lens, and remain perfectly
still while focusing on a revolving light while a small camera scans the
retina through the pupil. Any movement can interfere with the process and
can require restarting. Enrollment can easily take more than a minute.

Signature recognition authenticates identity by measuring handwritten
signatures. The signature is treated as a series of movements that contain
unique biometric data, such as personal rhythm, acceleration, and pressure
flow. Unlike electronic signature capture, which treats the signature as a
graphic image, signature recognition technology measures how the signature
is signed.

In a signature recognition system, a person signs his or her name on a
digitized graphics tablet or personal digital assistant. The system
analyzes signature dynamics such as speed, relative speed, stroke order,
stroke count, and pressure. The technology can also track each person's
natural signature fluctuations over time. The signature dynamics
information is encrypted and compressed into a template.

Speaker Recognition

Differences in how different people's voices sound result from a
combination of physiological differences in the shape of vocal tracts and
learned speaking habits. Speaker recognition technology uses these
differences to discriminate between speakers.

During enrollment, speaker recognition systems capture samples of a
person's speech by having him or her speak some predetermined information
into a microphone a number of times. This information, known as a
passphrase, can be a piece of information such as a name, birth month,
birth city, or favorite color or a sequence of numbers. Text independent
systems are also available that recognize a speaker without using a
predefined phrase. This phrase is converted from analog to digital format,
and the distinctive vocal characteristics, such as pitch, cadence, and
tone, are extracted, and a speaker model is established. A template is
then generated and stored for future comparisons.

Speaker recognition can be used to verify a person's claimed identity or
to identify a particular person. It is often used where voice is the only
available biometric identifier, such as telephone and call centers.

Accuracy of Biometric Technology

Biometrics is a young technology, having only recently reached the point
at which basic matching performance can be acceptably deployed. It is
necessary to analyze several metrics to determine the strengths and
weaknesses of each technology and vendor for a given application.

The three key performance metrics are false match rate (FMR), false
nonmatch rate (FNMR), and failure to enroll rate (FTER). A false match
occurs when a system incorrectly matches an identity, and FMR is the
probability of individuals being wrongly matched. In verification and
positive identification systems, unauthorized people can be granted access
to facilities or resources as the result of incorrect matches. In a
negative identification system, the result of a false match may be to deny
access. For example, if a new applicant to a public benefits program is
falsely matched with a person previously enrolled in that program under
another identity, the applicant may be denied access to benefits.

A false nonmatch occurs when a system rejects a valid identity, and FNMR
is the probability of valid individuals being wrongly not matched. In
verification and positive identification systems, people can be denied
access to some facility or resource as the result of a system's failure to
make a correct match. In negative identification systems, the result of a
false nonmatch may be that a person is granted access to resources to

which he or she should be denied. For example, if a person who has
enrolled in a public benefits program under another identity is not
correctly matched, he or she will succeed in gaining fraudulent access to
benefits.

False matches may occur because there is a high degree of similarity
between two individuals' characteristics. False nonmatches occur because
there is not a sufficiently strong similarity between an individual's
enrollment and trial templates, which could be caused by any number of
conditions. For example, an individual's biometric data may have changed
as a result of aging or injury. If biometric systems were perfect, both
error rates would be zero. However, because biometric systems cannot
identify individuals with 100 percent accuracy, a trade-off exists between
the two.

False match and nonmatch rates are inversely related; they must,
therefore, always be assessed in tandem, and acceptable risk levels must
be balanced with the disadvantages of inconvenience. For example, in
access control, perfect security would require denying access to everyone.
Conversely, granting access to everyone would result in denying access to
no one. Obviously, neither extreme is reasonable, and biometric systems
must operate somewhere between the two.

For most applications, how much risk one is willing to tolerate is the
overriding factor, which translates into determining the acceptable FMR.
The greater the risk entailed by a false match, the lower the tolerable
FMR. For example, an application that controlled access to a secure area
would require that the FMR be set low, which would result in a high FNMR.
However, an application that controlled access to a bank's ATM might have
to sacrifice some degree of security and set a higher FMR (and hence a
lower FNMR) to avoid the risk of irritating legitimate customers by
wrongly rejecting them. As figure 1 shows, selecting a lower FMR increases
the FNMR. Perfect security would require setting the FMR to 0, in which
case the FNMR would be 1. At the other extreme, setting the FNMR to 0
would result in an FMR of 1.

Vendors often use equal error rate (EER), an additional metric derived
from FMR and FNMR, to describe the accuracy of their biometric systems.
EER refers to the point at which FMR equals FNMR. Setting a system's
threshold at its EER will result in the probability that a person is
falsely matched equaling the probability that a person is falsely not
matched. However, this statistic tends to oversimplify the balance between
FMR and FNMR, because in few real-world applications is the need for
security identical to the need for convenience.

Figure 1: The General Relationship between FMR and FNMR

1.0

0.75

0.5

0.25

0 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 False nonmatch rate (FNMR) Source: GAO.

Note: Equal error rate is the point at which FMR equals FNMR.

FTER is a biometric system's third critical accuracy metric. FTER measures
the probability that a person will be unable to enroll. Failure to enroll
(FTE) may stem from an insufficiently distinctive biometric sample or from
a system design that makes it difficult to provide consistent biometric
data. The fingerprints of people who work extensively at manual labor are
often too worn to be captured. A high percentage of people are unable to
enroll in retina recognition systems because of the precision such systems
require. People who are mute cannot use voice systems, and people lacking
fingers or hands from congenital disease, surgery, or injury cannot use
fingerprint or hand geometry systems. Although between 1 and 3 percent of
the general public does not have the body part required for

Using Multiple Biometrics

using any one biometric system, they are normally not counted in a
system's FTER.

Because biometric systems based solely on a single biometric may not
always meet performance requirements, the development of systems that
integrate two or more biometrics is emerging as a trend. Multiple
biometrics could be two types of biometrics, such as combining facial and
iris recognition. Multiple biometrics could also involve multiple
instances of a single biometric, such as 1, 2, or 10 fingerprints, 2
hands, and 2 eyes. One prototype system integrates fingerprint and facial
recognition technologies to improve identification. A commercially
available system combines face, lip movement, and speaker recognition to
control access to physical structures and small office computer networks.
Depending on the application, both systems can operate for either
verification or identification. Experimental results have demonstrated
that the identities established by systems that use more than one
biometric could be more reliable, be applied to large target populations,
and improve response time.

Standards for Biometric Technology

Identifying, exchanging, and integrating information from different and
perhaps unfamiliar sources and functions are essential to an effective
biometrics application. Without standards, system developers may need to
define in detail the precise steps for exchanging information, a
potentially complex, time-consuming, and expensive process. Progress has
been made in developing biometrics standards. However, the majority of
biometric devices and their software are still proprietary in many
respects. For example, the method for extracting features from a biometric
sample, such as a fingerprint, differs among most, if not all, vendors.
Devices from company A do not necessarily work compatibly with devices
from companies B and C.

Standards such as the National Institute of Science and Technology's
(NIST) Common Biometric Exchange File Format (CBEFF) facilitate data
exchange between different system components and simplify the integration
of software and hardware from different vendors. The wavelet scalar
quantization (WSQ) gray-scale fingerprint image compression algorithm is
the standard for exchanging fingerprint images within the criminal justice
system. Similarly, the Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) has
established an image compression standard that is designed to facilitate
the transfer of images for facial recognition systems.

The American Association for Motor Vehicle Administration (AAMVA) included
a format for fingerprint minutiae data in its Driver License and

Identification Standard, which provides a uniform means to identify
issuers and holders of driver's licenses in the United States and Canada.
However, the standard still allows for including data in a vendor-specific
format. Biometric templates, which capture only the critical data needed
to make a match, are small, but the template one vendor uses cannot
generally be used by another for some biometric technologies, such as
fingerprints. Without the creation and industry adoption of a biometric
template standard, it could be necessary to store the larger biometric
sample as well as the biometric template for each user during enrollment.
Last year, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) New
Technologies Working Group concluded that the only reliable globally
interoperable method for exchanging face, fingerprint, or iris biometric
data was the storage of the respective image. ICAO is studying the use of
biometrics in machine-readable travel documents, such as passports and
visas.

In November 2001, the executive board of the International Committee for
Information Technology Standards (INCITS) established a technical
committee for biometrics for the rapid development and approval of formal
national and international generic biometric standards. Four task groups
were created to conduct the work. The first task group is focused on the
standardization of the content, meaning, and representation of biometric
data interchange formats. This task group is working on formats for
representing fingerprints, faces, irises, hand geometry, and signatures.
The second task group covers the standardization of interfaces and
interactions between biometric components and subsystems. CBEFF is an
example of an interface standard. The third task group focuses on the
development of biometric application profiles. It currently has projects
in the areas of border crossings, transportation workers, and point of
sale. The fourth task group handles the standardization of biometric
performance metric definitions and calculations, approaches to test
performance, and requirements for reporting the results of these tests.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently, DHS and TSA,
has been examining the use of biometrics for aviation security for several
years. In 2001, the FAA and the Department of Defense Counterdrug
Technology Development Program Office co-chaired the Aviation Security
Biometrics Working Group (ASBWG). They examined the use of biometrics in
four aviation security applications: (1) identity verification of
employees and ensuring that access to secured areas within an airport is
restricted to authorized personnel; (2) protection of public areas in and
around airports using surveillance; (3) identity verification of

  Using Biometrics for Aviation Security

passengers boarding aircraft; and (4) identity verification of flight
crews prior to and during a flight. Subsequently, in 2002, TSA contracted
with the International Biometric Group to evaluate the use of biometrics
for automated surveillance within airports, trusted traveler cards for
passengers, and identity verification of employees for access control in
airports.2

Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Congress has directed a greater use
of biometrics. For example, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA), which created TSA and mandated several actions designed to enhance
aviation security, includes several provisions regarding the use of
biometrics for applications, such as perimeter security or access
control.3

                                 Access Control

Biometric systems have long been used to complement or replace badges and
keys in controlling access to entire facilities or specific areas within a
facility. The entrances to more than half the nuclear power plants in the
United States employ hand geometry systems. Further, recent reductions in
the price of biometric hardware have spurred logical access control
applications. Fingerprint, iris, and speaker recognition are replacing
passwords to authenticate individuals accessing computers and networks.
The Office of Legislative Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives,
for example, is using an iris recognition system to protect confidential
files and working documents. Other federal agencies, including the
Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and Department of Justice, as
well as the intelligence community, are adopting similar technologies.

We have previously reported on the critical need to limit access to secure
airport areas. In 2000, we reported on the ability of our special agents
to use fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to
secure areas of two commercial airports.4 The agents, who had been issued
tickets and boarding passes, were not screened through magnetometers at
the security checkpoints nor was their baggage inspected. This
vulnerability could have allowed our agents to carry weapons, explosives,
or other dangerous objects onto an aircraft.

2International Biometric Group, "Framework for Evaluating and Deploying
Biometrics in Air Travel Applications: Surveillance, Trusted Travel,
Access Control" (Apr. 3, 2002).

3Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71, Nov. 19,
2001).

4U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies
and Airports, GAO/T-OSI-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000).

Since 1991, San Francisco International Airport has used hand geometry
devices in conjunction with identification cards to protect secure areas
of the airport, such as the tarmac and loading gates. Last year, Toledo
(Ohio) Express Airport also installed hand geometry devices to ensure that
only authorized personnel can gain access to critical areas of the
airport.

FAA has conducted several tests and pilots of biometrics for access
control to secure areas of airports. In 1998, FAA funded an operational
test at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport involving smart cards and
fingerprint recognition to identify employees of motor carrier and air
cargo companies at access control points to cargo areas. Further, in 2001,
FAA conducted tests of hand geometry and fingerprint and facial
recognition technologies for employee access control at airports.

TSA has two current efforts examining the use of biometrics for access
control. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) is
designed to be a common credential for all transportation workers
requiring unescorted physical access to secure areas of the national
transportation system, such as airports, seaports, and railroad terminals.
It will also be used to help secure logical access to computers, networks,
and applications. The program was developed in response to ATSA and the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and will include the use of
biometrics to provide a positive match of a credential for up to 6 million
transportation workers across the United States.5 The TWIC program is
designed as an identity authentication tool for individual facilities and
to provide assurance that individuals with a TWIC card have undergone a
threat assessment to ensure that they are not known terrorists. Individual
facilities will be able to use the TWIC cards to control access to secure
areas to only authorized individuals.

Last week, TSA issued a request for proposal for a TWIC prototype to
determine the performance of TWIC as an access control tool. For the
prototype, TSA will be examining the use of at least fingerprint and iris
recognition. During a technology evaluation last year, TSA evaluated six
card technologies and determined that an integrated circuit chip smart
card was the most appropriate for the TWIC card. As part of the prototype,
TSA will also examine the use of cards with 2-dimensional bar codes and
optical stripes. The prototype phase is expected to last 7 months and will

5Aviation and Transportation Security Act, S:106(c) and S:136, and
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-295, Nov. 25,
2002), S:102.

be conducted in Philadelphia, PA; Wilmington, DE; the ports of Long Beach
and Los Angeles, CA; and the 14 major port facilities in the state of
Florida. TSA anticipates that up to 200,000 workers will be enrolled in
the program. Following the prototype, TSA will make a decision on whether
to proceed with implementation of the program.

Earlier this month, TSA announced an access control pilot program that
will test various technologies, including biometrics, that are designed to
ensure that only authorized personnel have access to non-passenger
controlled areas. Developed in response to a section in ATSA that directed
the establishment of pilot programs to test and evaluate technologies for
providing access control to closed or secure areas of airports, the
program will test fingerprint recognition at four airports and iris
recognition at one airport.6 Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field Airport,
Southwest Florida International Airport, and Tampa International Airport
will test fingerprint recognition to control vehicle access. Newark
International Airport will test fingerprint recognition to allow only
authorized persons into secure areas of the airport. T.F. Green State
Airport (Providence, RI) will test iris recognition to control access to
secure areas of the airport.

                              Registered Traveler

The concept of a registered traveler program is to provide an expedited
security screening for passengers who meet the eligibility criteria and
who voluntarily provide personal information and clear a background check.
ATSA permits TSA to "establish requirements to implement trusted passenger
programs and use available technologies to expedite the security screening
of passengers who participate in such programs, thereby allowing security
screening personnel to focus on those passengers who should be subject to
more extensive screening."7

In 2002, we reviewed the policy and implementation issues associated with
a registered traveler program.8 We identified four key questions that need
to be addressed by the federal government before proceeding with such a
program: (1) What criteria should be established to determine eligibility
to apply for the program? (2) What kinds of background checks should be

6Aviation and Transportation Security Act, S:106(d).

7Aviation and Transportation Security Act, S:109(a)(3).

8U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Registered Traveler
Program Policy and Implementation Issues, GAO-03-253 (Washington D.C.:
Nov. 22, 2002).

used to certify that applicants are eligible to enroll in the program, and
who should perform these? (3) Which security-screening procedures should
registered travelers undergo, and how should these differ from those used
for unregistered travelers? and (4) To what extent do equity, privacy, and
liability issues have to be resolved prior to program implementation?

In April 2004, TSA issued a combined solicitation synopsis for a
registered traveler pilot program. TSA has evaluated the capabilities
statements from about 40 proposals. TSA expects to award contracts for the
pilot program in early June 2004. The pilot program will run for about 90
days at up to five airports. TSA expects to enroll up to 10,000 travelers
in the program using fingerprint and/or iris recognition. To enroll,
travelers will submit biographic and biometric data at the selected
airports. A security assessment will be conducted on the applicants to
verify their eligibility for the program. TSA may use a TSA-issued card or
an airline frequent flier card as an identifier to conduct biometric
verification matches of registered travelers at airport security
checkpoints. TSA is also considering the use of identification (1-to-many)
matching to ascertain the identity of the registered traveler. Once
registered travelers are identified, they will undergo an adjusted
screening process, designed to expedite throughput for low-risk travelers.

Similar programs have been used for expediting border control processes.
For example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Passenger
Accelerated Service System (INSPASS), a pilot program in place since 1993,
has more than 45,000 frequent fliers enrolled at nine airports, and has
admitted more than 300,000 travelers. It is open to citizens of the United
States, Canada, Bermuda, and visa waiver program countries who travel to
the United States on business three or more times a year.9 To participate,
users provide a passport or travel document and submit two fingerprints
and a hand geometry biometric. Once travelers successfully undergo a
background screening and are enrolled, they can circumvent immigration
procedures and lines. An INSPASS participant presents their hand geometry
biometric at an airport kiosk for comparison against the reference
template stored in a central database for that traveler. INSPASS has
reduced the inspection time for participants to less than 15 seconds.

9The visa waiver program permits nationals from designated countries to
apply for admission to the United States for 90 days or less as
nonimmigrant visitors for business or pleasure without first obtaining a
U.S. nonimmigrant visa.

Airport Surveillance

It has been suggested that facial recognition could be used in airports as
a surveillance tool that could identify persons of interest without the
subject's cooperation or knowledge. Key to such an effort is the
availability of a database of biometric information of persons of interest
(i.e., a watch list). Surveillance activities are often conducted by
humans who are looking for persons of interest using closed-circuit
televisions. However, because it is well understood that humans are
limited in their ability to recognize individuals they are not familiar
with, and that there are limits of human attention when conducting
surveillance activities, facial recognition has been cited as a potential
surveillance tool.

In 2001, the ASBWG found that facial recognition technology was not
sufficiently mature to be relied upon for wide-area surveillance. Further,
as we reported in 2002, one vendor conducted pilots using facial
recognition technology to conduct surveillance at U.S. airports. For these
pilots, video cameras were installed at the security checkpoints, near the
magnetometers. From the pilots, it was learned that lighting was the
primary factor in determining the performance of facial recognition.

Other Federal Biometric Applications

Criminal Identification

There are two other primary uses of biometrics in the federal government:
criminal identification and border security.

Fingerprint identification has been used in law enforcement over the past
100 years and has become the de facto international standard for
positively identifying individuals. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) has been using fingerprint identification since 1928. The first
fingerprint recognition systems were used in law enforcement about 4
decades ago.

The FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)
is an automated 10-fingerprint matching system that stores rolled
fingerprints. The more than 40 million records in its criminal master file
are connected electronically with all 50 states and some federal agencies.
IAFIS was designed to handle a large volume of fingerprint checks against
a large database of fingerprints. In 2002, we found that IAFIS processes,
on average, approximately 48,000 fingerprints per day and has processed as
many as 82,000 in a single day. IAFIS's target response time for criminal
fingerprints submitted electronically is 2 hours; for civilian fingerprint
background checks, 24 hours.

Border Security

There are several uses of biometrics for border security in the United
States and worldwide.10 Two notable examples are the INS Automated
Biometric Fingerprint Identification System (IDENT) and the United States
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) system.

INS began developing IDENT around 1990 to identify illegal aliens who are
repeatedly apprehended trying to enter the United States illegally. INS's
goal was to enroll virtually all apprehended aliens. IDENT can also
identify aliens who have outstanding warrants or who have been deported.
When such aliens are apprehended, a photograph and two index fingerprints
are captured electronically and queried against three databases. In 2002,
IDENT had over 4.5 million entries. A fingerprint query of IDENT normally
takes about 2 minutes.

Laws passed since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks require a more
extensive use of biometrics for border control.11 The Attorney General and
the Secretary of State jointly, through NIST are to develop a technology
standard, including biometric identifier standards.12 When developed, this
standard is to be used to verify the identity of persons applying for a
U.S. visa for the purpose of conducting a background check, confirming
identity, and ensuring that a person has not received a visa under a
different name. Further, aliens are to be issued machine-readable,
tamperresistant visas and other travel and entry documents that use
biometric identifiers. Similarly, equipment and software are to be
installed at all ports of entry that can allow the biometric comparison
and authentication of all U.S. visas and other travel and entry documents
issued to aliens and machine-readable passports.

10We describe several of these uses in Technology Assessment: Biometrics
for Border Security, GAO-03-174.

11See the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act)
(Public Law 107-56, Oct. 26, 2001), S:403(c) and S:414, and the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173, May
14, 2002), S:202(a)(4) and S:303.

12In January 2003, in response to this requirement, NIST submitted its
technical standards for biometric identifiers and tamper-resistance for
travel documents as a part of a joint report to the Congress from the
Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and NIST. NIST recommended that
10 fingerprints be used for background identification checks and that a
dual biometric system using 2 fingerprint images and a face image may be
needed to meet projected system requirements for verification.

DHS is developing the US-VISIT system to address these requirements. The
US-VISIT system currently uses IDENT technology to collect a photograph
and two index fingerprints from travelers holding nonimmigrant visas.
Travelers are initially enrolled either at a port of entry using US-VISIT
entry procedures or at a U.S. consulate or embassy when they apply for
their visa. US-VISIT entry procedures are currently in place at 115
airports and 14 seaports. By December 31, 2004, US-VISIT is planned to be
in place at the 50 busiest land ports of entry. By December 31, 2005,
US-VISIT is planned to be in place at all 165 land ports of entry. As of
March 4, 2004, biometric data collection was in place at more than 80
visa-adjudicating posts. By October 2004, biometric data collection is
expected to be in use at all 211 visa-issuing embassies and consulates. By
September 30, 2004, US-VISIT procedures will be expanded to include
visitors traveling to the United States under the visa waiver program
arriving at air and sea ports of entry.

Each time a visitor enters the United States at a port of entry employing
US-VISIT entry procedures, the visitor's fingerprints will be matched
against the reference fingerprints captured during enrollment. During
enrollment and each subsequent visit, the biographic and biometric data of
the visitor is compared to watch lists to assist the inspectors in making
admissibility decisions. At one airport and one seaport, visitors are also
expected to record their departure from the United States using an
automated self-service kiosk that can scan the visitor's travel documents
and capture the visitor's fingerprints.13

While biometric technology is currently available and used in a variety of
applications, questions remain regarding the technical and operational
effectiveness of biometric technologies in large-scale applications. We
have found that a risk management approach can help define the need and
use for biometrics for security. In addition, a decision to use biometrics
should consider the costs and benefits of such a system and its potential
effect on convenience and privacy.

13GAO has conducted reviews of annual expenditure plans of the US-VISIT
program. The review of the fiscal year 2004 expenditure plan can be found
in U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: First Phase of
Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but Improvements Needed,
GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004).

  Challenges and Issues in Using Biometrics

Risk Management Is the The approach to good security is fundamentally
similar regardless of the Foundation of Effective assets being protected.
As we have previously reported, these principles Strategy can be reduced
to five basic steps that help to determine responses to five

                     essential questions (see figure 2).14

Figure 2: Five Steps in the Risk Management Process

Source: GAO.

What Am I Protecting?

The first step in risk management is to identify assets that must be
protected and the impact of their potential loss.

Who Are My Adversaries?

The second step is to identify and characterize the threat to these
assets. The intent and capability of an adversary are the principal
criteria for establishing the degree of threat to these assets.

How Am I Vulnerable?

The third step involves identifying and characterizing vulnerabilities
that would allow identified threats to be realized. In other words, what
weaknesses can allow a security breach?

14U.S. General Accounting Office, National Preparedness: Technologies to
Secure Federal Buildings, GAO-02-687T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2002).

What Are My Priorities?

In the fourth step, risk must be assessed and priorities determined for
protecting assets. Risk assessment examines the potential for the loss or
damage to an asset. Risk levels are established by assessing the impact of
the loss or damage, threats to the asset, and vulnerabilities.

What Can I Do?

The final step is to identify countermeasures to reduce or eliminate
risks. In doing so, the advantages and benefits of these countermeasures
must also be weighed against their disadvantages and costs.

Protection, Detection, and Reaction Are Integral Security Concepts

Countermeasures identified through the risk management process support the
three integral concepts of a holistic security program: protection,
detection, and reaction. Protection provides countermeasures such as
policies, procedures, and technical controls to defend against attacks on
the assets being protected. Detection monitors for potential breakdowns in
protective mechanisms that could result in security breaches. Reaction,
which requires human involvement, responds to detected breaches to thwart
attacks before damage can be done. Because absolute protection is
impossible to achieve, a security program that does not incorporate
detection and reaction is incomplete.

Biometrics can support the protection component of a security program. It
is important to realize that deploying them will not automatically
eliminate all security risks. Technology is not a solution in isolation.
Effective security also entails having a well-trained staff to follow and
enforce policies and procedures. Weaknesses in the security process or
failures by people to operate the technology or implement the security
process can diminish the effectiveness of technology.

Accordingly, there is a need for the security process to account for
limitations in technology. For example, procedures for exception
processing would also need to be carefully planned. As we described, not
all people can enroll in a biometrics system. Similarly, false matches and
false nonmatches will also sometimes occur. Procedures need to be
developed to handle these situations. Exception processing that is not as
good as biometric-based primary processing could be exploited as a
security hole. The effect on the process is directly related to the
performance of the technology. In our study of biometrics for border
security, we found that fingerprint recognition appears to be the most

mature of the biometric technologies. Fingerprint recognition has been
used the longest and has been used with databases containing up to 40
million entries. Iris recognition is a young technology and has not been
used with large populations. While facial recognition has also been used
with large databases, its accuracy results in testing have lagged behind
those of iris and fingerprint recognition.

As with any credentialing or identity management system, it is critical to
consider the process used to issue the credential. Biometrics can help
ensure that people can only enroll into a security system once and to
ensure that a person presenting himself before the security system is the
same person that enrolled into the system. However, biometrics cannot
necessarily link a person to his or her true identity. While biometrics
would make it more difficult for people to establish multiple identities,
if the one identity a person claimed were not his or her true identity,
then the person would be linked to the false identity in the biometric
system. The use of biometrics does not relieve the credential-issuing
authority of the responsibility of ensuring the identity of the person
requesting the credential or of conducting a security check, commensurate
with the level of access being granted, to assure itself that the person
is entitled to receive the credential. The quality of the identifier
presented during the enrollment process is key to the integrity of a
biometrics system.

Even if the biometric is checked against a biometrics-based watch list,
the effectiveness of such a list is also dependent on nontechnological
processes. The policies and procedures governing the population of the
watch list as well as the effectiveness of the law enforcement and
intelligence communities to identify individuals to place on the watch
list are critical to the success of the program. People who are not on the
watch list cannot be flagged as someone who is not eligible to receive a
credential.

Deciding to Use Biometric Technology

Weighing Costs and Benefits

A decision to use biometrics in a security solution should also consider
the benefits and costs of the system and the potential effects on
convenience and privacy.

Best practices for information technology investment dictate that prior to
making any significant project investment, the benefit and cost
information of the system should be analyzed and assessed in detail. A
business case should be developed that identifies the organizational needs
for the project and a clear statement of high-level system goals should be
developed. The high-level goals should address the system's expected

Effects on Privacy and Convenience

outcomes such as the binding of a biometric feature to an identity or the
identification of undesirable individuals on a watch list. Certain
performance parameters should also be specified such as the time required
to verify a person's identity or the maximum population that the system
must handle.

Once the system parameters are developed, a cost estimate can be
developed. Not only must the costs of the technology be considered, but
also the costs of the effects on people and processes. Both initial costs
and recurring costs need to be estimated. Initial costs need to account
for the engineering efforts to design, develop, test, and implement the
system; training of personnel; hardware and software costs; network
infrastructure improvements; and additional facilities required to enroll
people into the biometric system. Recurring cost elements include program
management costs, hardware and software maintenance, hardware replacement
costs, training of personnel, additional personnel to enroll or verify the
identities of people in the biometric system, and possibly the issuance of
token cards for the storage of biometrics.

Weighed against these costs are the security benefits that accrue from the
system. Analyzing this cost-benefit trade-off is crucial when choosing
specific biometrics-based solutions. The consequences of performance
issues-for example, accuracy problems, and their effect on processes and
people-are also important in selecting a biometrics solution.

The Privacy Act of 1974 limits federal agencies' collection, use, and
disclosure of personal information, such as fingerprints and
photographs.15 Accordingly, the Privacy Act generally covers federal
agency use of personal biometric information. However, the act includes
exemptions for law enforcement and national security purposes.
Representatives of civil liberties groups and privacy experts have
expressed concerns regarding (1) the adequacy of protections for security,
data sharing, identity theft, and other identified uses of biometric data
and (2) secondary uses and "function creep." These concerns relate to the
adequacy of protections under current law for large-scale data handling in
a biometric system. Besides information security, concern was voiced about
an absence of clear criteria for governing data sharing. The broad
exemptions of the Privacy Act, for example, provide no guidance on the
extent of the appropriate uses law enforcement may make of biometric
information.

155 U.S.C. S:552a.

Because there is no general agreement on the appropriate balance of
security and privacy to build into a system using biometrics, further
policy decisions are required. The range of unresolved policy issues
suggests that questions surrounding the use of biometric technology center
as much on management policies as on technical issues.

Finally, consideration must be given to the convenience and ease of using
biometrics and their effect on the ability of the agency to complete its
mission. For example, some people find biometric technologies difficult,
if not impossible, to use. Still others resist biometrics because they
believe them to be intrusive, inherently offensive, or just uncomfortable
to use. Lack of cooperation or even resistance to using biometrics can
affect a system's performance and widespread adoption.

Furthermore, if the processes to use biometrics are lengthy or erroneous,
they could negatively affect the ability of the assets being protected to
operate and fulfill its mission. For example, in 2002, we found that there
are significant challenges in using biometrics for border security. The
use of biometric technologies could potentially impact the length of the
inspection process. Any lengthening in the process of obtaining travel
documents or entering the United States could affect travelers
significantly. Delays inconvenience travelers and could result in fewer
visits to the United States or lost business to the nation. Further
studies could help determine whether the increased security from
biometrics could result in fewer visits to the United States or lost
business to the nation, potentially adversely affecting the American
economy and, in particular, the border communities. These communities
depend on trade with Canada and Mexico, which totaled $653 billion in
2000.

In conclusion, biometric technologies are available today that can be used
for aviation security. However, it is important to bear in mind that
effective security cannot be achieved by relying on technology alone.
Technology and people must work together as part of an overall security
process. As we have pointed out, weaknesses in any of these areas
diminishes the effectiveness of the security process. We have found that
three key considerations need to be addressed before a decision is made to
design, develop, and implement biometrics into a security system:

1. Decisions must be made on how the technology will be used.

2. 	A detailed cost-benefit analysis must be conducted to determine that
the benefits gained from a system outweigh the costs.

3. 	A trade-off analysis must be conducted between the increased security,
which the use of biometrics would provide, and the effect on areas such as
privacy and convenience.

Security concerns need to be balanced with practical cost and operational
considerations as well as political and economic interests. A risk
management approach can help federal agencies identify and address
security concerns. To develop security systems with biometrics, the
highlevel goals of these systems need to be defined, and the concept of
operations that will embody the people, process, and technologies required
to achieve these goals needs to be developed. With these answers, the
proper role of biometric technologies in aviation security can be
determined. If these details are not resolved, the estimated cost and
performance of the resulting system will be at risk.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have.

Contacts 	For further information, please contact Keith Rhodes at
(202)-512-6412 or Richard Hung at (202)-512-8073.

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