Nuclear Security: DOE Must Address Significant Issues to Meet the
Requirements of the New Design Basis Threat (11-MAY-04, 	 
GAO-04-773T).							 
                                                                 
A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites
containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear	 
weapons could have devastating consequences for the site and its 
surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an	 
effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an 
effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified 
document that identifies, among other things, the potential size 
and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of	 
September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete,	 
resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003. GAO (1)	 
identified why DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, (2) 
analyzed the higher threat in the new DBT, and (3) identified	 
remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to	 
meet the threat contained in the new DBT.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-773T					        
    ACCNO:   A09998						        
  TITLE:     Nuclear Security: DOE Must Address Significant Issues to 
Meet the Requirements of the New Design Basis Threat		 
     DATE:   05/11/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Nuclear weapons plant security			 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Agency proceedings 				 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Risk assessments					 
	     Timeliness 					 

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GAO-04-773T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT NUCLEAR SECURITY

Tuesday, May 11, 2004

 DOE Must Address Significant Issues to Meet the Requirements of the New Design
                                  Basis Threat

Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director Natural Resources and Environment Team

GAO-04-773T

Highlights of GAO-04-773T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives

A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites
containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons could
have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding
communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and
security program. A key component of an effective program is the design
basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies, among other
things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT
obsolete, resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003.

GAO (1) identified why DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, (2)
analyzed the higher threat in the new DBT, and (3) identified remaining
issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to meet the threat
contained in the new DBT.

May 2004

NUCLEAR SECURITY

DOE Must Address Significant Issues to Meet the Requirements of the New Design
Basis Threat

DOE took a series of actions in response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. While each of these has been important, in and of
themselves, they are not sufficient to ensure that all of DOE's sites are
adequately prepared to defend themselves against the higher terrorist
threat present in the post September 11, 2001 world. Specifically, GAO
found:

o  	DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT because of (1) delays in
developing an intelligence community assessment-known as the Postulated
Threat-of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, (2) DOE's
lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and (3) sharp
debates within DOE and other government organizations over the size and
capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of resources
to meet these threats.

o  	While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did
the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is
less than the threat identified in the intelligence community's Postulated
Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT
identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or
biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for
determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms
of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for chemical sabotage, the
2003 DBT requires sites to protect to "industry standards;" however, such
standards currently do not exist. In response to these concerns, DOE has
recently agreed to reexamine some of the key aspects and assumptions of
the May 2003 DBT.

o  	DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as
issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT
implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, that
may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in
the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's deadline to meet the
requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not
realistic for some sites.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-773T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro at (202)
512-3841 or [email protected].

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on physical security at
the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA)-a separately organized agency within DOE.

DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site
containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons- called
special nuclear material-could have devastating consequences for the site
and its surrounding communities. Because terrorist attacks against sites
that contain special nuclear material could have such devastating
consequences, DOE's effective management of the safeguards and security
program, which includes developing safeguards and security policies, is
essential to preventing an unacceptable, adverse impact on national
security.1 For many years, DOE has employed risk-based security practices.
To manage potential risks, DOE has developed a design basis threat (DBT),
a classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities
of terrorist forces. DOE's DBT is based on an intelligence community
assessment known as the Postulated Threat. DOE requires the contractors
operating its sites to provide sufficient protective forces and equipment
to defend against the threat contained in the DBT. The DBT in effect on
September 11, 2001, had been DOE policy since June 1999. DOE replaced the
1999 DBT in May 2003 to better reflect the current and projected terrorist
threats that resulted from the September 11, 2001, attacks.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, we reviewed physical
security at DOE sites that have facilities with Category I special nuclear
material. Category I special nuclear material includes specified
quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in forms of assembled
nuclear weapons and test devices, major nuclear components, and other
highgrade materials such as solutions and oxides. Specifically, we
examined, among other things, (1) the reasons DOE needed almost 2 years to
develop a new DBT; (2) the higher threat contained in the new DBT; and (3)
the

1See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to
Better Manage Its Safeguards and Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington,
D.C.: May 30, 2003).

remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to fully defend
against the threat contained in the new DBT.2

To carry out our objectives, we reviewed draft DBTs, the final May 2003
DBT, and DOE policy and planning documents, including orders,
implementation guidance, and reports. We met with officials from DOE and
NNSA headquarters and field offices. We obtained information primarily
from DOE's Office of Security, Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance, and Office of Environmental Management; NNSA's
Office of Defense Nuclear Security; and NNSA's Nuclear Safeguards and
Security Program. We visited all three of NNSA's three design laboratories
and its two production plants that possess Category I special nuclear
material, as well as NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation. We also
visited the four EM sites that, at the time, contained Category I special
nuclear materials. At each site we met with both federal and contractor
officials and reviewed pertinent supporting documentation. We also
discussed postulated terrorist threats to nuclear weapon facilities with
two Department of Defense (DOD) organizations: the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence; and the Defense Intelligence Agency. We also reviewed The
Postulated Threat to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Facilities and Other Selected
Strategic Facilities, henceforth referred to as the Postulated Threat,
which is the intelligence community's January 2003 official assessment of
potential terrorist threats to nuclear weapon facilities.

We performed our work from December 2001 through May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

In summary, we found that while DOE has taken some important actions in
its response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE struggled
to develop its new DBT. The DBT that DOE ultimately developed, however, is
substantially more demanding than the previous one. Because the new DBT is
more demanding and because DOE wants to implement new protective
strategies within 2 years, DOE must press forward with additional actions
to ensure that it is fully prepared to

2We testified on these issues before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee
on Government Reform, on June 24, 2003. See U.S. General Accounting
Office, Nuclear Security: DOE's Response to the September 11, 2001
Terrorist Attacks, GAO-03-898TC (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003).

provide a timely and cost effective defense of its most sensitive
facilities. Specifically, we found the following:

o  	Development of the new DBT took almost 2 years because of (1) delays
in developing an intelligence community assessment-known as the Postulated
Threat-of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, (2) DOE's
lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and (3) sharp
debates within DOE and other government organizations over the size and
capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of resources
to meet these threats.

o  	While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did
the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is
less than the threat identified in the intelligence community's Postulated
Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT
identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or
biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for
determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms
of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for chemical sabotage, the
2003 DBT requires sites to protect to "industry standards;" however, such
standards currently do not exist.

o  	DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as
issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT
implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, that
may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in
the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's deadline to meet the
requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not
realistic for some sites.

In our recent report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant
Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat (GAO-04-623), we
made seven recommendations to the Secretary of Energy that are intended to
strengthen DOE's ability to meet the requirements of the new DBT, improve
the department's ability to deal with future terrorist threats, and better
inform Congress on departmental progress in meeting the threat contained
in the new DBT and reducing risks to critical facilities at DOE sites. DOE
said that the department would consider these recommendations as part of
its Departmental Management Challenges for 2004. DOE has identified the
DBT as a major departmental initiative within the National Security
Management Challenge. Recently, in response to our recommendations, DOE
agreed to reexamine some of the key aspects and assumptions of the May
2003 DBT.

Background

Category I special nuclear materials are present at the three design
laboratories-the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico;
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California; and
the Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico-and two
production sites-the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, and the Y-12 Plant
in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, operated by NNSA. Special nuclear material is
also present at former production sites, including the Savannah River Site
in Savannah River, South Carolina, and the Hanford Site in Richland,
Washington. These former sites are now being cleaned up by DOE's Office of
Environmental Management (EM).3 Furthermore, NNSA's Office of Secure
Transportation transports these materials among the sites and between the
sites and DOD bases. Contractors operate each site for DOE.4 NNSA and EM
have field offices collocated with each site. In fiscal year 2004, NNSA
and EM expect to spend nearly $900 million on physical security at their
sites.5 Physical security combines security equipment, personnel, and
procedures to protect facilities, information, documents, or material
against theft, sabotage, diversion, or other criminal acts.

In addition to NNSA and EM, DOE has other important security
organizations. DOE's Office of Security develops and promulgates orders
and policies, such as the DBT, to guide the department's safeguards and
security programs. DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance supports the department by, among other things, independently
evaluating the effectiveness of contractors' performance in safeguards and
security. It also performs follow-up reviews to ensure that contractors
have taken effective corrective actions and appropriately addressed
weaknesses in safeguards and security. Under a recent reorganization,
these two offices were incorporated into the new Office of

3At the time of our review, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
in Rocky Flats, Colorado, was in the process of shipping its remaining
Category I special nuclear material primarily to the Savannah River Site.
This has now been completed. In addition, responsibility for the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, in Idaho Falls, Idaho,
which is also a Category I special nuclear material site, was transferred
from DOE's EM to DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy in May 2003.

4Federal employees instead of contractors operate the assets of the Office
of Secure Transportation.

5Other DOE program offices, such as the Office of Science and Office of
Nuclear Energy operate sites that contain Category I special nuclear
material. In fiscal year 2004, these program offices expect to spend $118
million on security.

Security and Safety Performance Assurance. Each office, however, retains
its individual missions, functions, structure, and relationship to the
other.

The risks associated with Category I special nuclear materials vary but
include the nuclear detonation of a weapon or test device at or near
design yield, the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of
producing a nuclear yield, theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon, and
the potential for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal. Because
of these risks, DOE has long employed risk-based security practices.

The key component of DOE's well-established, risk-based security practices
is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the characteristics of
the potential threats to DOE assets. The DBT has been traditionally based
on a classified, multiagency intelligence community assessment of
potential terrorist threats, known as the Postulated Threat. The DBT
considers a variety of threats in addition to the terrorist threat. Other
adversaries considered in the DBT include criminals, psychotics,
disgruntled employees, violent activists, and spies. The DBT also
considers the threat posed by insiders, those individuals who have
authorized, unescorted access to any part of DOE facilities and programs.
Insiders may operate alone or may assist an adversary group. Insiders are
routinely considered to provide assistance to the terrorist groups found
in the DBT. The threat from terrorist groups is generally the most
demanding threat contained in the DBT.

DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted
protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all
protective systems at DOE's most sensitive sites employ a defense-indepth
concept that includes sensors, physical barriers, hardened facilities and
vaults, and heavily armed paramilitary protective forces equipped with
such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and
chemical protective gear.

Depending on the material, protective systems at DOE Category I special
nuclear material sites are designed to accomplish the following objectives
in response to the terrorist threat:

o  	Denial of access. For some potential terrorist objectives, such as the
creation of an improvised nuclear device, DOE may employ a protection
strategy that requires the engagement and neutralization of adversaries
before they can acquire hands-on access to the assets.

o  	Denial of task. For nuclear weapons or nuclear test devices that
terrorists might seek to steal, DOE requires the prevention and/or
neutralization of the adversaries before they can complete a specific
task, such as stealing such devices.

o  	Containment with recapture. Where the theft of nuclear material
(instead of a nuclear weapon) is the likely terrorist objective, DOE
requires that adversaries not be allowed to escape the facility and that
DOE protective forces recapture the material as soon as possible. This
objective requires the use of specially trained and well-equipped special
response teams.

The effectiveness of the protective system is formally and regularly
examined through vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is
a systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative
techniques are applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective
protection of specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To
conduct such assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter
experts, such as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate
attacks; and force-on-force performance testing, in which the site's
protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists.

The results of these assessments are documented at each site in a
classified document known as the Site Safeguards and Security Plan. In
addition to identifying known vulnerabilities, risks, and protection
strategies for the site, the Site Safeguards and Security Plan formally
acknowledges how much risk the contractor and DOE are willing to accept.
Specifically, for more than a decade, DOE has employed a risk management
approach that seeks to direct resources to its most critical assets-in
this case Category I special nuclear material-and mitigate the risks to
these assets to an acceptable level. Levels of risk-high, medium, and
low-are assigned classified numerical values and are derived from a
mathematical equation that compares a terrorist group's capabilities with
the overall effectiveness of the crucial elements of the site's protective
forces and systems.

Historically, DOE has striven to keep its most critical assets at a low
risk level and may insist on immediate compensatory measures should a
significant vulnerability develop that increases risk above the low risk
level. Compensatory measures could include such things as deploying
additional protective forces or curtailing operations until the asset can
be better protected. In response to a September 2000 DOE Inspector
General's report recommending that DOE establish a policy on what actions
are required once high or moderate risk is identified, in September

  Development of the New DBT Took Almost 2 Years Because of Delays in Developing
  the Postulated Threat and DOE's Lengthy Review and Comment Process

2003, DOE's Office of Security issued a policy clarification stating that
identified high risks at facilities must be formally reported to the
Secretary of Energy or Deputy Secretary within 24 hours. In addition,
under this policy clarification, identified high and moderate risks
require corrective actions and regular reporting.

Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its
safeguards and security policies are being complied with and are
performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-assessments and
are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. DOE Orders also require
field offices to comprehensively survey contractors' operations for
safeguards and security every year. DOE's Office of Independent Oversight
and Performance Assurance provides yet another check through its
comprehensive inspection program. All deficiencies identified during
surveys and inspections require the contractors to take corrective action.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized
that the then current DBT, issued in April 1999 and based on a 1998
intelligence community assessment, was obsolete. The September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks suggested larger groups of terrorists, larger vehicle
bombs, and broader terrorist aspirations to cause mass casualties and
panic than were envisioned in the 1999 DOE DBT. However, formally
recognizing these new threats by updating the DBT was difficult and took
21 months because of delays in issuing the Postulated Threat, debates over
the size of the future threat and the cost to meet it, and the DOE policy
process.

As mentioned previously, DOE's new DBT is based on a study known as the
Postulated Threat, which was developed by the U.S. intelligence community.
The intelligence community originally planned to complete the Postulated
Threat by April 2002; however, the document was not completed and
officially released until January 2003, about 9 months behind the original
schedule. According to DOE and DOD officials, this delay resulted from
other demands placed on the intelligence community after September 11,
2001, as well as from sharp debates among the organizations developing the
Postulated Threat over the size and capabilities of future terrorist
threats and the resources needed to meet these threats.

While waiting for the new Postulated Threat, DOE developed several drafts
of its new DBT. During this process, debates, similar to those that
occurred during the development of the Postulated Threat, emerged in

DOE. Like the participants responsible for developing the Postulated
Threat, during the development of the DBT, DOE officials debated the size
of the future terrorist threat and the costs to meet it. DOE officials at
all levels told us that concern over resources played a large role in
developing the 2003 DBT, with some officials calling the DBT the "funding
basis threat," or the maximum threat the department could afford. This
tension between threat size and resources is not a new development.
According to a DOE analysis of the development of prior DBTs, political
and budgetary pressures and the apparent desire to reduce the requirements
for the size of protective forces appear to have played a significant role
in determining the terrorist group numbers contained in prior DBTs.

Finally, DOE developed the DBT using DOE's policy process, which
emphasizes developing consensus through a review and comment process by
program offices, such as EM and NNSA. However, many DOE and contractor
officials found that the policy process for developing the new DBT was
laborious and not timely, especially given the more dangerous threat
environment that has existed since September 11, 2001. As a result, during
the time it took DOE to develop the new DBT, its sites were only required
to defend against the terrorist group defined in the 1999 DBT, which, in
the aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized was obsolete.

While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist group than did the
previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less
than the terrorist threat identified in the intelligence community's
Postulated Threat. The Postulated Threat estimated that the force
attacking a nuclear weapons site would probably be a relatively small
group of terrorists, although it was possible that an adversary might use
a greater number of terrorists if that was the only way to attain an
important strategic goal. In contrast to the Postulated Threat, DOE is
preparing to defend against a significantly smaller group of terrorists
attacking many of its facilities. Specifically, only for its sites and
operations that handle nuclear weapons is DOE currently preparing to
defend against an attacking force that approximates the lower range of the
threat identified in the Postulated Threat. For its other Category I
special nuclear material sites, all of which fall under the Postulated
Threat's definition of a nuclear weapons site, DOE is requiring
preparations to defend against a terrorist force significantly smaller
than was identified in the Postulated Threat. DOE calls this a graded
threat approach.

  The May 2003 DBT Identifies a Larger Terrorist Threat, but in Most Cases is
  Less Than the Terrorist Threat Identified by the Postulated Threat

Some of these other sites, however, may have improvised nuclear device
concerns that, if successfully exploited by terrorists, could result in a
nuclear detonation. Nevertheless, under the graded threat approach, DOE
requires these sites only to be prepared to defend against a smaller force
of terrorists than was identified by the Postulated Threat. Officials in
DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance disagreed
with this approach and noted that sites with improvised nuclear device
concerns should be held to the same requirements as facilities that
possess nuclear weapons and test devices since the potential worst-case
consequence at both types of facilities would be the same-a nuclear
detonation. Other DOE officials and an official in DOD's Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence disagreed with the overall graded threat approach, believing
that the threat should not be embedded in the DBT by adjusting the number
of terrorists that might attack a particular target.

DOE Office of Security officials cited three reasons for why the
department departed from the Postulated Threat's assessment of the
potential size of terrorist forces. First, these officials stated that
they believed that the Postulated Threat only applied to sites that
handled completed nuclear weapons and test devices. However, both the 2003
Postulated Threat, as well as the preceding 1998 Postulated Threat, state
that the threat applies to nuclear weapons and special nuclear material
without making any distinction between them. Second, DOE Office of
Security officials believed that the higher threat levels contained in the
2003 Postulated Threat represented the worst potential worldwide terrorist
case over a 10-year period. These officials noted that while some U.S.
assets, such as military bases, are located in parts of the world where
terrorist groups receive some support from local governments and societies
thereby allowing for an expanded range of capabilities, DOE facilities are
located within the United States, where terrorists would have a more
difficult time operating. Furthermore, DOE Office of Security officials
stated that the DBT focuses on a nearer-term threat of 5 years. As such,
DOE Office of Security officials said that they chose to focus on what
their subject matter experts believed was the maximum, credible, near-term
threat to their facilities. However, while the 1998 Postulated Threat made
a distinction between the size of terrorist threats abroad and those
within the United States, the 2003 Postulated Threat, reflecting the
potential implications of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, did not
make this distinction. Finally, DOE Office of Security officials stated
that the Postulated Threat document represented a reference guide instead
of a policy document that had to be rigidly followed. The Postulated
Threat does acknowledge that it should not be used as the sole
consideration to

dictate specific security requirements and that decisions regarding
security risks should be made and managed by decision makers in policy
offices. However, DOE has traditionally based its DBT on the Postulated
Threat. For example, the prior DBT, issued in 1999, adopted exactly the
same terrorist threat size as was identified by the 1998 Postulated
Threat.

Finally, the department's criteria for determining the severity of
radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage may be insufficient. For
example, the criterion used for protection against radiological sabotage
is based on acute radiation dosages received by individuals. However, this
criterion may not fully capture or characterize the damage that a major
radiological dispersal at a DOE site might cause. For example, according
to a March 2002 DOE response to a January 23, 2002, letter from
Representative Edward J. Markey, a worst-case analysis at one DOE site
showed that while a radiological dispersal would not pose immediate, acute
health problems for the general public, the public could experience
measurable increases in cancer mortality over a period of decades after
such an event. Moreover, releases at the site could also have
environmental consequences requiring hundreds of millions to billions of
dollars to clean up. Contamination could also affect habitability for tens
of miles from the site, possibly affecting hundreds of thousands of
residents for many years. Likewise, the same response showed that a
similar event at a NNSA site could result in a dispersal of plutonium that
could contaminate several hundred square miles and ultimately cause
thousands of cancer deaths. For chemical sabotage standards, the 2003 DBT
requires sites to protect to industry standards. However, we reported
March 2003 year that such standards currently do not exist.6 Specifically,
we found that no federal laws explicitly require chemical facilities to
assess vulnerabilities or take security actions to safeguard their
facilities against a terrorist attack. Finally, the protection criteria
for biological sabotage are based on laboratory safety standards developed
by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and not physical security
standards.

In response to our concerns, DOE recently agreed to reexamine some of the
key aspects and assumptions of the May 2003 DBT. DOE expects to complete
this review by June 30, 2004.

6See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Voluntary
Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of
Security Preparedness is Unknown, GAO-03-439 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14,
2003).

  DOE Has Been Slow to Resolve a Number of Significant Issues That May Affect
  the Ability of its Sites to Fully Meet the Threat Contained in the New DBT

While DOE issued the final DBT in May 2003, it has only recently resolved
a number of significant issues that may affect the ability of its sites to
fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion and is
still addressing other issues. Fully resolving all of these issues may
take several years, and the total cost of meeting the new threats is
currently unknown. Because some sites will be unable to effectively
counter the higher threat contained in the new DBT for up to several
years, these sites should be considered to be at higher risk under the new
DBT than they were under the old DBT.

In order to undertake the necessary range of vulnerability assessments to
accurately evaluate their level of risk under the new DBT and implement
necessary protective measures, DOE recognized that it had to complete a
number of key activities. DOE only recently completed three of these key
activities. First, in February 2004, DOE issued its revised Adversary
Capabilities List, which is a classified companion document to the DBT,
that lists the potential weaponry, tactics, and capabilities of the
terrorist group described in the DBT. This document has been amended to
include, among other things, heavier weaponry and other capabilities that
are potentially available to terrorists who might attack DOE facilities.
DOE is continuing to review relevant intelligence information for possible
incorporation into future revisions of the Adversary Capabilities List.

Second, DOE also only recently provided additional DBT implementation
guidance. In a July 2003 report, DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance noted that DOE sites had found initial DBT
implementation guidance confusing. For example, when the Deputy Secretary
of Energy issued the new DBT in May 2003, the cover memo said the new DBT
was effective immediately but that much of the DBT would be implemented in
fiscal years 2005 and 2006. According to a 2003 report by the Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, many DOE sites
interpreted this implementation period to mean that they should, through
fiscal year 2006, only be measured against the previous, less demanding
1999 DBT.

In response to this confusion, the Deputy Secretary issued further
guidance in September 2003 that called for the following, among other
things:

o  	DOE's Office of Security to issue more specific guidance by October
22, 2003, regarding DBT implementation expectations, schedules, and
requirements. DOE issued this guidance January 30, 2004.

o  	Quarterly reports showing sites' incremental progress in meeting the
new DBT for ongoing activities. The first series of quarterly progress
reports may be issued in July 2004.

o  	Immediate compliance with the new DBT for new and reactivated
operations.

A third important DBT-related issue was just completed in early April
2004. A special team created in the 2003 DBT, composed of weapons
designers and security specialists, finalized its report on each site's
improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. The results of this report were
briefed to senior DOE officials in March 2004 and the Deputy Secretary of
Energy issued guidance, based on this report, to DOE sites in early April
2004. As a result, some sites may be required under the 2003 DBT to shift
to enhanced protection strategies, which could be very costly. This
special team's report may most affect EM sites because their improvised
nuclear device potential had not previously been explored.

Fourth, as mentioned earlier, DOE recently agreed to reexamine some of the
key aspects and assumptions of the new DBT. DOE expects to complete this
review by June 30, 2004. If DOE's reexamination results in a revised DBT
that contains increases in terrorist threat levels or changed assumptions
regarding the threats it faces, DOE sites could need additional security
funding.

Finally, DOE's Office of Security has not completed all of the activities
associated with the new vulnerability assessment methodology it has been
developing for over a year. DOE's Office of Security believes this
methodology, which uses a new mathematical equation for determining levels
of risk, will result in a more sensitive and accurate portrayal of each
site's defenses-in-depth and the effectiveness of sites' protective
systems (i.e., physical security systems and protective forces) when
compared with the new DBT. DOE's Office of Security decided to develop
this new equation because its old mathematical equation had been
challenged on technical grounds and did not give sites credit for the full
range of their defenses-in-depth. While DOE's Office of Security completed
this equation in December 2002, officials from this office believe it will
probably not be completely implemented at the sites for at least another
year for two reasons. First, site personnel who implement this methodology
will require additional training to ensure they are employing it properly.
DOE's Office of Security conducted initial training in December 2003, as
well as a prototype course in February 2004, and has developed a
nine-course vulnerability assessment certification program. Second, sites
will have to

collect additional data to support the broader evaluation of their
protective systems against the new DBT. Collecting these data will require
additional computer modeling and force-on-force performance testing.

Because of the slow resolution of some of these issues, DOE has not
developed any official long-range cost estimates or developed any
integrated, long-range implementation plans for the May 2003 DBT.
Specifically, neither the fiscal year 2003 nor 2004 budgets contained any
provisions for DBT implementation costs. However, during this period, DOE
did receive additional safeguards and security funding through budget
reprogramming and supplemental appropriations. DOE is using most of these
additional funds to cover the higher operational costs associated with the
increased security condition (SECON) measures. DOE has gathered initial
DBT implementation budget data and has requested additional DBT
implementation funding in the fiscal year 2005 budget: $90 million for
NNSA, $18 million for the Secure Transportation Asset within the Office of
Secure Transportation, and $26 million for EM. However, DOE officials
believe the budget data collected so far has been of generally poor
quality because most sites have not yet completed the necessary
vulnerability assessments to determine their resource requirements.
Consequently, the fiscal year 2006 budget may be the first budget to begin
to accurately reflect the safeguards and security costs of meeting the
requirements of the new DBT.

Reflecting these various delays and uncertainties, in September 2003, the
Deputy Secretary changed the deadline for DOE program offices, such as EM
and NNSA, to submit DBT implementation plans from the original target of
October 2003 to the end of January 2004. NNSA and EM approved these plans
in February 2004. DOE's Office of Security has reviewed these plans and is
planning to provide implementation assistance to sites that request it.
DOE officials have described these plans as being ambitious in terms of
the amount of work that has to be done within a relatively short time
frame and dependent on continued increases in safeguards and security
funding, primarily for additional protective force personnel. However,
some plans may be based on assumptions that are no longer valid. Revising
these plans could require additional resources, as well as add time to the
DBT implementation process.

A DOE Office of Budget official told us that current DBT implementation
cost estimates do not include items such as closing unneeded facilities,
transporting and consolidating materials, completing line item
construction projects, and other important activities that are outside of
the responsibility of the safeguards and security program. For example,
EM's

Security Director told us that for EM to fully comply with the DBT
requirements in fiscal year 2006 at one of its sites, it will have to

o  close and de-inventory two facilities,

o  	consolidate excess materials into remaining special nuclear materials
facilities, and

o  	move consolidated Category I special nuclear material, which NNSA's
Office of Secure Transportation will transport, to another site.

Likewise, the EM Security Director told us that to meet the DBT
requirements at another site, EM will have to accelerate the closure of
one facility and transfer special nuclear material to another facility on
the site. The costs to close these facilities and to move materials within
a site are borne by the EM program budget and not by the EM safeguards and
security budget. Similarly, the costs to transport the material between
sites are borne by NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation budget and not
by EM's safeguards and security budget. A DOE Office of Budget official
told us that a comprehensive, department-wide approach to budgeting for
DBT implementation that includes such important program activities as
described above is needed; however, such an approach does not currently
exist.

The department plans to complete DBT implementation by the end of fiscal
year 2006. However, most sites estimate that it will take 2 to 5 years, if
they receive adequate funding, to fully meet the requirements of the new
DBT. During this time, sites will have to conduct vulnerability
assessments, undertake performance testing, and develop Site Safeguards
and Security Plans. Consequently, full DBT implementation could occur
anywhere from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2008. Some sites may be able
to move more quickly and meet the department's deadline of the end of
fiscal year 2006.

Because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the threat
contained in the new DBT for a period of up to several years, these sites
should be considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than they were
under the old DBT. For example, the Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance has concluded in recent inspections that at least
two DOE sites face fundamental and not easily resolved security problems
that will make meeting the requirements of the new DBT difficult. For
other DOE sites, their level of risk under the new DBT

remains largely unknown until they can conduct the necessary vulnerability
assessments.

In closing, while DOE struggled to develop its new DBT, the DBT that DOE
ultimately developed is substantially more demanding than the previous
one. Because the new DBT is more demanding and because DOE wants to
implement it by end of fiscal year 2006-a period of about 29 months-DOE
must press forward with a series of additional actions to ensure that it
is fully prepared to provide a timely and cost effective defense of its
most sensitive facilities.

First, because the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks suggested larger
groups of terrorists with broader aspirations for causing mass casualties
and panic, we believe that the DBT development process that was used
requires reexamination. While DOE may point to delays in the development
of the Postulated Threat as the primary reason for the almost 2 years it
took to develop a new DBT, DOE was also working on the DBT itself for most
of that time. We believe the difficulty associated with developing a
consensus using DOE's traditional policy-making process was a key factor
in the time it took to develop a new DBT. During this extended period,
DOE's sites were only being defended against what was widely recognized as
an obsolete terrorist threat level.

Second, we are concerned about two aspects of the resulting DBT. We are
not persuaded that there is sufficient difference, in its ability to
achieve the objective of causing mass casualties or creating public panic,
between the detonation of an improvised nuclear device and the detonation
of a nuclear weapon or test device at or near design yield that warrants
setting the threat level at a lower number of terrorists. Furthermore,
while we applaud DOE for adding additional requirements to the DBT such as
protection strategies to guard against radiological, chemical, and
biological sabotage, we believe that DOE needs to reevaluate its criteria
for terrorist acts of sabotage, especially in the chemical area, to make
it more defensible from a physical security perspective. We are encouraged
that the Department has agreed to reexamine the May 2003 DBT.

Finally, because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the
threat contained in the new DBT for a period of up to several years, these
sites should be considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than
they were under the old DBT. As a result, DOE needs to take a series of
actions to mitigate these risks to an acceptable level as quickly as
possible. To accomplish this, it is important for DOE to go about the hard
business of a comprehensive department-wide approach to implementing
needed

changes in its protective strategy. Because the consequences of a
successful terrorist attack on a DOE site could be so devastating, we
believe it is important for DOE to better inform Congress about what sites
are at high risk and what progress is being made to reduce these risks to
acceptable levels.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

GAO Contact and For further information on this testimony, please contact
Robin M. Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841. James Noel and Jonathan Gill also made
keyStaff contributions to this testimony.

  Acknowledgments

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