Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD's 2004 Report on the	 
Need for a Base Realignment and Closure Round (17-MAY-04,	 
GAO-04-760).							 
                                                                 
The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, as amended,
required the Department of Defense (DOD) to address several base 
realignment and closure (BRAC) issues in 2004 for the 2005 BRAC  
round to proceed. The requirements included reporting on a	 
20-year force structure plan, an inventory of military		 
installations, and separately adopting selection criteria for the
upcoming round. The legislation also required DOD to certify	 
whether an additional BRAC round was needed, and, if so, that	 
annual net savings would be realized not later than fiscal year  
2011. If the certifications were provided, GAO was required to	 
evaluate DOD's submissions and report to Congress. DOD reported  
on March 23, 2004, and provided the certifications. In this	 
report GAO evaluates (1) DOD's responsiveness to legislative	 
requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure	 
inventory, and selection criteria; (3) other key issues included 
in DOD's report; and (4) DOD's certification regarding the need  
for an additional BRAC round.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-760 					        
    ACCNO:   A10100						        
  TITLE:     Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD's 2004 Report  
on the Need for a Base Realignment and Closure Round		 
     DATE:   05/17/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Base closures					 
	     Base realignments					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Evaluation criteria				 
	     Military facilities				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Military downsizing				 
	     Community development				 
	     DOD Base Realignment and Closure Program		 
	     DOD Force Structure Plan				 

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GAO-04-760

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Committees

May 2004

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

 Assessment of DOD's 2004 Report on the Need for a Base Realignment and Closure
                                     Round

GAO-04-760

Highlights of GAO-04-760, a report to congressional committees

The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, as amended, required
the Department of Defense (DOD) to address several base realignment and
closure (BRAC) issues in 2004 for the 2005 BRAC round to proceed. The
requirements included reporting on a 20-year force structure plan, an
inventory of military installations, and separately adopting selection
criteria for the upcoming round. The legislation also required DOD to
certify whether an additional BRAC round was needed, and, if so, that
annual net savings would be realized not later than fiscal year 2011. If
the certifications were provided, GAO was required to evaluate DOD's
submissions and report to Congress. DOD reported on March 23, 2004, and
provided the certifications.

In this report GAO evaluates (1) DOD's responsiveness to legislative
requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and
selection criteria; (3) other key issues included in DOD's report; and (4)
DOD's certification regarding the need for an additional BRAC round.

This report includes a recommendation for executive action by DOD and a
matter for congressional consideration to strengthen the BRAC process.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the report
contents.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-760.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202)
512-8412 or [email protected].

May 2004

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

Assessment of DOD's 2004 Report on the Need for a Base Realignment and Closure
Round

DOD's report to Congress generally addressed all legislative reporting
requirements in section 2912 of the Defense Base Realignment and Closure
Act of 1990, as amended, and separately complied with requirements under
Section 2913 in adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making.
The degree of coverage on some reporting requirements was limited to avoid
prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 round.

As directed, GAO analyzed DOD's worldwide installation inventory, force
structure plan, and selection criteria. While all three are important in
setting a framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure
prominently in guiding DOD's analyses for the 2005 round. The unclassified
portion of the 20-year force structure plan, extending through 2009,
provides a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions), and
reflects limited changes across the military services, even though the
services have initiatives under way that could affect future force
structure and infrastructure requirements. Today's security environment is
evolving, as are force structure requirements along with technology
advancements, and defense transformation efforts. The department must
consider these factors in its BRAC analyses with appropriate allowances
for future uncertainties. DOD's selection criteria closely parallel
criteria used in previous rounds, while incorporating the provisions
required by legislation authorizing the 2005 round. The analytical
sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed through their
application in the ongoing BRAC process.

GAO addressed other BRAC-related issues such as excess defense
infrastructure capacity and BRAC savings because of their importance to
DOD's certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round. DOD's excess capacity
analysis, completed for the 2004 report, has some limitations that could
result in either overstating or understating excess capacity across
various functional areas, and make it difficult to project a total amount
of excess capacity across DOD. While the analysis gives some indications
of excess capacity within the department, the issue warrants a more
complete assessment in the BRAC process. That process will also consider
joint base use with the potential for better identifying excess capacity.
DOD's historical financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar
to those in the 1993 and 1995 rounds, each of the military departments
could achieve annual net savings by 2011, as stipulated by the mandate.
While the potential exists for substantial savings from the upcoming
round, it is difficult to conclusively project the expected magnitude of
the savings because there are too many unknowns at this time.
Additionally, improvements are needed in DOD's accounting for savings
after BRAC decisions are made.

GAO found no basis to question DOD's certification of the need for an
additional BRAC round. While clear limitations exist in DOD's assessment
of excess capacity, it does point to some areas that warrant additional
analysis-and the current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing
so.

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
DOD's Report Generally Addressed All of the Legislatively

Required Information
Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and
Selection Criteria
Observations on Other Key BRAC-Related Issues Included in

DOD's Report
Certification of the Need for an Additional BRAC Round
Conclusion
Recommendation for Executive Action
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Agency Comments

                                       1

                                      2 4

                                       6

                                       8

16 23 23 24 25 25

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II BRAC 2005 Timeline

Appendix III	GAO's Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base
Closure Round

Appendix IV DOD's Methodology for Estimating Excess Capacity 39

Appendix V	Key Points from Prior GAO Products Regarding the
Need for an Additional BRAC Round 42

  Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Defense 45

Appendix VII	Key Prior GAO Reports on DOD's Base Realignments and Closures
46

Appendix VIII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

  Tables

Table 1: GAO Assessment of DOD's Responsiveness to Legislative
Requirements in its Section 2912 Report to Congress 7 Table 2: DOD's
20-year Force Structure Plan (unclassified portion through fiscal year
2009) 11 Table 3: Comparison of BRAC Criteria for the 1995 Round and Those
Adopted for the 2005 Round 14 Table 4: Net Annual Savings In the Sixth
Year of Implementation

for BRAC 1993 and 1995 Rounds by Military Department 20 Table 5: Army
Analysis of Proportional Capacity 39 Table 6: Estimated Percentage of
Excess Capacity 41

Abbreviations

BRAC base realignment and closure
CBO Congressional Budget Office
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DOD Department of Defense
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

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United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

May 17, 2004

Congressional Committees

While the Department of Defense (DOD) continues its work in preparing for
the upcoming base realignment and closure (BRAC) round in 2005,
legislation1 required DOD to report to Congress on several BRAC-related
issues in 2004 in order for the 2005 round to proceed. The legislation
directed, among other things, that the Secretary of Defense provide
Congress with a 20-year force structure plan and a worldwide inventory of
military installations in its submission of its fiscal year 2005 budget
documentation and separately publish the final selection criteria for the
2005 BRAC round no later than February 16, 2004. Of particular importance
was the requirement that the Secretary of Defense certify the need for
additional base realignments and closures and, if such a need exists,
certify that annual net savings would be realized by each military
department not later than fiscal year 2011. DOD published its final
selection criteria on February 12, 2004, and reported on the other
legislative requirements, including the necessary certifications, on March
23, 2004.2 The legislation also directed us, if DOD's certifications were
provided, to submit a report to Congress, within 60 days of the issuance
of DOD's report, evaluating specific aspects of DOD's legislatively
required submissions.

In this report, we evaluate (1) DOD's responsiveness to the legislative
reporting requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure
inventory, and final selection criteria for the 2005 BRAC round,
including, as appropriate, observations on the relative analytical
sufficiency and accuracy of each; (3) other key BRAC-related issues
included in DOD's report, such as excess infrastructure capacity,
estimated savings, and the economic impact of BRAC on nearby communities;
and (4) the Secretary's

1 The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L.
107-107, Title XXX, Dec. 28, 2001) authorized a defense base realignment
and closure round for 2005 by amending the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510, Title XXIX, Nov. 5, 1990).
Provisions in Section 2912 and 2913 of the 1990 Act, as amended, require
DOD to address various BRAC-related issues in order for the 2005 round to
continue.

2 Department of Defense, Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, (Washington, D.C., March
2004).

  Results in Brief

certification regarding the need for an additional BRAC round. While the
mandate did not direct us to address the third objective, we chose to
include this information because of widespread interest in the 2005 BRAC
process among Congress and the public and its relevance to the Secretary's
certification of the need for the 2005 BRAC round.

In performing our review, we conducted work at the BRAC Office in the
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment and the Army, Navy, and Air Force BRAC offices. We also relied
on our previous and ongoing work on BRAC-related issues. Because we were
required to report within 2 months after DOD issued its report, we did not
have time to fully assess the accuracy of all data used in the report; but
we did perform limited reliability assessments of key data contained in
DOD's report and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report with relevant limitations noted in our report.
We performed our work from March to May 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Further information on our scope
and methodology appears in appendix I.

DOD's report to Congress generally addressed all of the requirements in
section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as
amended, and separately complied with the requirements in section 2913 for
adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. According to
DOD officials, the degree of coverage on some reporting requirements, such
as the impact of joint basing and the extent of excess capacity, was
limited in order to avoid preempting or prejudging the ongoing analytical
process for the 2005 BRAC round.

While the worldwide military installation inventory, 20-year force
structure plan, and selection criteria are important in setting a
framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in
guiding DOD's analyses for the 2005 round. The worldwide inventory extends
well beyond that required for the domestic BRAC process,3 which focuses on
a smaller subset of the inventory. The unclassified portion of the 20-year
force structure plan covers only the 2005 through 2009 time period and
provides more of a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions). The

3 The BRAC legislation for the 2005 round applies to military
installations in the 50 states,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S.
Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of
the
United States.

plan depicts little change in the force structure through that period,
even though the services have a number of initiatives underway that could
affect force structure and infrastructure requirements. DOD's ongoing BRAC
analysis, however, will need to consider the impact of this and other
potential future force structure changes on infrastructure requirements.
Further, as provided in the legislation, DOD has an opportunity to update
the plan with its fiscal year 2006 budget submission in February 2005,
which would be expected prior to the Secretary's announcement of his
proposed closure and realignment recommendations in May 2005. DOD's
selection criteria for the 2005 round, while incorporating the
requirements required by legislation authorizing the 2005 round, closely
parallel the criteria that provided a solid foundation for BRAC analyses
conducted in previous rounds. Even so, the analytical sufficiency of the
criteria will best be assessed through their application, as DOD completes
its data collection and analyses for the upcoming round.

Other BRAC-related issues-excess defense infrastructure, estimated
savings, and community impact from BRAC actions-have historically been and
continue to be areas of widespread interest to Congress and the public in
considering the need for another BRAC round. DOD's analysis of excess
infrastructure capacity, which was completed for the 2004 report outside
the BRAC process, has some limitations that could result in either
overstating or understating the amount of excess capacity across various
functional areas, and make it difficult to project a total amount of
excess capacity across DOD. While the analysis gives some indication of
excess capacity within the department, the issue warrants a more complete
assessment in the official BRAC process. Moreover, in completing this
analysis, the military services assessed their bases as though they were
being used for a single function, and did not consider existing or the
potential for increased multi-functional/joint use that is expected to be
considered in the 2005 BRAC round-and provides the potential for better
identifying excess capacity. As to estimated savings, DOD's historical
financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the
1993 and 1995 rounds, each of the military departments could achieve
annual net savings in the 2005 round by fiscal year 2011, as stipulated by
the mandate. While the potential exists for substantial savings and
efficiencies to result from the BRAC 2005 round, it is difficult to
conclusively project levels of expected savings from the 2005 round. There
are too many unknowns at this time, such as the timing of individual
closure or realignment actions, and the implementation costs that may be
required. Further, important differences exist in the upcoming round,
compared with prior rounds that could affect costs and savings. For
example, this round has a greater focus on supporting force

transformation and the potential need to support stateside redeployment of
some forces currently based overseas as a result of separately ongoing
overseas basing reviews. Additionally, we have previously noted the need
for improvements in DOD's tracking and periodic updating of savings
estimates from BRAC recommendations once they have been approved and are
being implemented. DOD needs to firm up plans to implement previously
proposed improvements as it moves forward with the 2005 BRAC round. As to
economic impact, the department's report recognized that BRAC actions can
affect the local economies of the surrounding communities but also notes
that it has sought to minimize any adverse local impacts with a
coordinated program of federal assistance from both DOD and domestic
agencies. Our work has shown that many communities surrounding closed
bases from the previous rounds have fared better than the national
average, in terms of changes in unemployment rates and per capita income,
with more mixed results recently, allowing for some negative impact from
the economic downturn in recent years.

Although we identified some limitations with DOD's assessment of excess
capacity and factors that could affect the timing and amount of savings
from a future BRAC round, we found no basis to question DOD's
certification of the need for an additional BRAC round. As directed by
DOD, the upcoming round is expected to encompass more than a
capacity-reduction and cost-savings effort; rather, it is also an effort
to align the defense infrastructure with the transformation of its forces.
Further, the need for an additional BRAC round has long been recognized by
various defense officials and studies-and noted in several of our products
since the time of the 1995 BRAC round.

This report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to
strengthen the BRAC analytical process, documenting allowance for future
force structure and surge requirements, and a matter for congressional
consideration to ensure steps are taken by DOD to improve the accounting
for savings from BRAC decisions. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DOD agreed with the report contents.

Background 	The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20024
extended the authority of the 1990 BRAC legislation, with some
modifications, to authorize an additional BRAC round in 2005. Under
section 2912 of the

                  4 P.L. 107-107, Title XXX, (Dec. 28, 2001).

1990 Act and as part of its fiscal year 2005 budget submission, DOD was
required to submit a 20-year force structure plan, an infrastructure
inventory, and a certification that additional closures and realignments
were needed and that annual net savings would be achieved for each
military department by fiscal year 2011. The force structure plan was to
be based on assessments by the Secretary of Defense of the probable
threats to national security between fiscal years 2005 and 2025.
Furthermore, the plan was to be based on the probable end strengths and
major military force units (land divisions, carrier and other major
combatant vessels, and air wings) needed to meet these threats. DOD was
also required to prepare a comprehensive inventory of military
installations worldwide that indicated the number and type of facilities
in the active and reserve forces of each military department.

Using the force structure plan and the infrastructure inventory, the
Secretary of Defense's submission to Congress was required to address (1)
the inventory necessary to support the force structure, (2) the categories
of excess infrastructure and infrastructure capacity, and (3) an economic
analysis of the effect of the closure or realignment of military
installations to reduce excess capacity. In analyzing the infrastructure
requirements, DOD was to consider the continuing need for and availability
of military installations outside the United States and any efficiency
that may be gained from joint tenancy by more than one branch of the Armed
Forces on military bases. On the basis of the force structure plan, the
infrastructure inventory and the economic analysis, the Secretary was
required to certify whether the need existed for further closures and
realignments and, if so, that an additional round would result in annual
net savings for each military department, beginning not later than 2011.
Collectively, these requirements were to be addressed in a report to
Congress at the time it submitted its fiscal year 2005 budget
justification documentation. The legislation also stipulated that if the
certifications were provided in DOD's report to Congress, we were to
evaluate the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and the final
selection criteria, and the need for an additional BRAC round. We were
required to issue a report not later than 60 days after DOD submitted its
report to Congress.

Section 2913 of the 1990 Act, as amended, also required the Secretary of
Defense to publish in the Federal Register the selection criteria for use
in the BRAC 2005 round and to provide an opportunity for public comment.
The legislation required that military value be the primary criteria for
making recommendations to close or realign military installations, and
directed inclusion of a number of considerations in formulating the
selection criteria. The proposed selection criteria were published on

December 23, 2003, with a public comment period ending January 30, 2004.
The final criteria were published on February 12, 2004. We were also
required by the legislation to evaluate the final selection criteria as
part of our overall assessment of DOD's reporting on BRAC issues in 2004.
This is in keeping with GAO's longstanding role as an independent,
objective observer of the BRAC process.

Legislation authorizing the 2005 round continued the previous legislative
requirement, applicable to earlier BRAC rounds that we review the
Secretary's recommendations and selection process; it requires us to
report to the congressional defense committees no later than July 1, 2005,
45 days after the last date by which the Secretary must transmit to the
congressional defense committees and the BRAC Commission his
recommendations for closures and realignments.5 To make an informed and
timely assessment, we have consistently operated in a real-time setting
and have had access to significant portions of the process as it has
evolved, thus affording the department an opportunity to address any
concerns we raised on a timely basis. From our vantage point, we are
looking to see to what extent DOD follows a clear, transparent,
consistently applied process, where we can see a logical flow between
DOD's analysis and its decision making.

DOD's report to Congress generally addressed all of the requirements in
section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as
amended, and separately complied with the requirements in section 2913 for
adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. In some
instances, according to DOD officials there were limitations in the data
provided in DOD's Section 2912 report in order to avoid preempting or
prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 BRAC round. Table 1
details the legislative requirements for DOD's Section 2912 report,
indicates the pages in DOD's report where the issues are addressed, and
provides our observations on the extent to which DOD provided the
information required by each subsection in the legislation.

  DOD's Report Generally Addressed All of the Legislatively Required Information

                    5 See app. II for other key BRAC dates.

Table 1: GAO Assessment of DOD's Responsiveness to Legislative
Requirements in its Section 2912 Report to Congress

GAO assessment of Section 2912 citation Legislative requirement DOD report
citations information provided

Force structure plan and worldwide installation inventory

(a)(1)(A) 	A force structure plan for the Armed Force based on an
assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to national security
during the 20-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005, the probable
end strengths and major military force units (including land force
divisions, carrier and other major combatant vessels, air wings, and other
comparable units) needed to meet these threats, and the anticipated levels
of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during
such period.

Section 2, pp. 17-23	DOD provided an unclassified force structure plan
through fiscal year 2009 and a separate classified force structure plan
through fiscal year 2024.

(a)(1)(B)        A comprehensive inventory of   DOD provided a worldwide   
                  military Section 3, pp. 25-35. 
                installations worldwide for each  inventory of installations, 
                   military App. B, compact disk                      but the 
             department, with specifications of   inventory did not include   
                             the                             all              
              number and type of facilities in   overseas installations where 
                         the active              
                 and reserve forces of each                                   
                         department.              U.S. forces are deployed.

(a)(2)(A)   A description of the    Section 6, pp. DOD broadly compared    
                  infrastructure           43-54      the                     
              necessary to support the                infrastructure required 
                       force structure                          to            
                described in the force                support the force       
                       structure plan.                structure for           
                                                           certain functional 
                                                                areas through 
                                                        fiscal year 2009 (and 
                                                                    not 2024) 
                                                      without specificity     
                                                      concerning              
                                                      infrastructure          
                                                      requirements.           

(a)(2)(B) 	A discussion of categories of excess infrastructure and
infrastructure capacity.

(a)(2)(C) 	An economic analysis of the effect of the closure or
realignment of military installations to reduce excess infrastructure.

Section 6, pp. 43-54	DOD provided the required information for selected
functional areas, but the excess capacity methodology has some
limitations.

Section 7, pp. 55-62	DOD provided information on the savings realized from
the previous BRAC rounds and the reuse of selected former bases.

(a)(3)(A)  The anticipated continuing need for   DOD provided a general    
                         and Section 4, pp. 37-40 
                   availability of military        discussion on the need for 
                        installations                                     the 
              outside the United States, taking   availability of a worldwide 
                             into                 
             account current restrictions on the  network of bases, operating 
                            use of                
              military installations outside the     locations, and access    
                            United                
             States and the potential for future         arrangements, but no 
                                                                     specific 
             prohibitions or restrictions on the           information on the 
                            use of                                 continuing 
                 such military installations.     need for or restrictions on 
                                                                          the 
                                                    use of specific bases.    

                                                          GAO assessment of   
Section 2912       Legislative requirement DOD report information provided 
     citation                                  citations 
                Any efficiencies that may be gained from DOD did not identity 
    (a)(3)(B)   Section 5, p. 41                               specific       
                 joint tenancy by more than one branch       efficiencies but 
                                                              emphasized that 
                   of the Armed Forces at a military     joint basing is a    
                                                         priority for the     
                             installation.                 2005 BRAC round.   

Certifications of need for further closures and realignments and requisite
savings

(b)(1)(A) 	Certification regarding whether the need Cover letter DOD
provided the required exists for the closure or realignment of
certification. additional military installations.

(b)(1)(B)  Certification that the additional Cover letter DOD provided the 
                                       round of                      required 
                closures and realignments would               certification.  
                                         result              
              in annual net savings for each of              
                                            the              
             military departments beginning not              
                                          later              
                   than fiscal year 2011.                    

Source: GAO analysis of DOD's Report Required by Section 2912 of the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, March 2004.

Likewise, as discussed in a subsequent section, DOD also complied with the
requirements of Section 2913 in adapting its selection criteria for the
2005 BRAC round.

  Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and Selection Criteria

While DOD's worldwide military installation inventory, 20-year force
structure plan, and selection criteria are all important in setting a
framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in
guiding BRAC analyses for the 2005 round. Although DOD provided a
worldwide inventory of installations and facilities for each military
department as required by the legislation, it exceeds the needs of the
2005 BRAC process, which focuses on domestic bases.6 Further, to the
extent one looks to the inventory as providing a total accounting of DOD
facilities worldwide, it should be noted that the inventory lacks
completeness in that not all overseas installations and associated
facilities where U.S. forces are deployed are included-primarily because
some are considered temporary in nature. The unclassified portion of the
force structure plan, extending through 2009, has more of a macro-level
focus reflecting limited change across the military services, even though
the services have a

6 At the same time, DOD has indicated that the domestic BRAC process may
be used to accommodate any decisions to relocate forces from overseas
bases that may result from an ongoing but separate study of overseas
basing.

number of initiatives under way that could affect force structure and
infrastructure requirements. Nevertheless, DOD's ongoing BRAC
analysis will need to consider the impact of such changes on
infrastructure
requirements. The department's final selection criteria, although
incorporating legislatively directed language, essentially follows a
framework similar to that employed in prior BRAC rounds. The full
analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed through their
application, as DOD completes its data collection and analysis for the
2005 round.

    Worldwide Installation Inventory Provided but Extended Beyond Requirements
    for 2005 BRAC Round

As required by the legislation, DOD provided a worldwide inventory of
installations, which included the number and type of facilities in the
active and reserve forces. While the inventory provides a detailed listing
of facilities, it extends beyond the needs of the 2005 BRAC round with its
focus on domestic installations. At the same time, it has some limitations
in terms of a complete inventory for use beyond BRAC because it does not
include all overseas installations. For example, the inventory omits
various installations and associated facilities located in parts of the
Middle East, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. DOD and military
service officials told us that these installations are considered
temporary or classified in support of contingency operations, and are not
included in the database used to generate the inventory. This limitation
should not impact the conduct of the 2005 BRAC round since the focus is on
domestic bases, and DOD has identified the domestic bases in the database
to assess in the BRAC 2005 round.

The inventory of installations and facilities was derived from DOD's
Facilities Assessment Database, which is updated annually from the
military services' real property databases.7 Because of time constraints,
we performed only limited work on the accuracy of the inventory.
Contractors who maintain the Facilities Assessment Database told us that
since 1998 they have validated and verified facility data annually by
performing data queries-such as verifying the size of buildings or the
year a facility was acquired or built-to identify anomalies in the data.
Contractor officials stated the queries have been successful in correcting
erroneous data

7 These databases include the Army's Integrated Facilities System; the
Navy's and Marine Corp's Navy Facility Assets Database; and the Air
Force's Automated Civil Engineer System.

reported by the services and that the quality of the data has improved
since 1998.

    No Major Force Structure
    Changes Identified through
    Fiscal Year 2009 in
    DOD's 20-Year Force
    Structure Plan

As with prior BRAC rounds, DOD has provided Congress with a force
structure plan that will guide or inform BRAC decisions in 2005, except
legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round required development of a
20-year plan instead of a 6-year plan required in prior rounds. DOD's
Section 2912 report contains the unclassified portion of DOD's 20-year
plan extending through fiscal year 2009; the remaining years of the plan
are addressed in a classified annex to the report. The unclassified report
provides more of a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions)
reflecting limited changes across the military services, even though the
services have a number of initiatives under way that could affect force
structure and infrastructure requirements, and which will need to be
considered by DOD as it performs its 2005 round analyses. DOD has the
option of modifying its force structure plan, as needed, with its fiscal
year 2006 budget submission which would be expected prior to its issuance
of BRAC recommendations.

Table 2 summarizes DOD's force structure plans at the macro-level through
2009 by service force units and by end strength. It depicts limited
changes in force units and end strength for active and reserve components
of most services. Exceptions include the Navy, which expects to reduce
personnel but increase the number of ships in its inventory, and the Air
Force, which plans a slight increase in reserve personnel end strength.

Table 2: DOD's 20-year Force Structure Plan (unclassified portion through
fiscal year 2009)

                    Fiscal year End strength (in thousands)

                           Service force units            2005  2009   Change 
                                Army divisions    Active     10    10       - 
                                                Reserve       8     8       - 
                             Aircraft carriers               12    12       - 
                             Carrier air wings    Active     10    10       - 
                                                Reserve       1     1       - 
                            Battle force ships            332     347 
            Air and Space Expeditionary Forces               10    10       - 
                        Marine Corps divisions    Active      3     3       - 
                                                Reserve       1     1       - 

                         Army        aActive    482        482              - 
                                     Reserve    555        555              - 
                         Navy     Active        366        357            (9) 
                                     Reserve     83         76            (7) 
                 Marine Corps     Active        175        175              - 
                                     Reserve     40         40              - 
                    Air Force     Active        360        360              - 

Reserve 183 184

Source: DOD Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended though the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, March 2004.

aThe Army end strength figures do not reflect the temporary increase of
30,000 spaces for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2007 to accelerate
the Army transformation process while remaining fully engaged in worldwide
operations.

While the Army showed no force structure changes through 2009, Army
officials told us that they have a number of initiatives under way that
may affect the force structure and related infrastructure requirements.
Specifically, the Army is restructuring the way it organizes its forces to
achieve greater flexibility by increasing the number of brigade combat
teams from 33 to 43 or more. To achieve these goals while maintaining
global commitments, the Army has been authorized by the Secretary of
Defense to temporarily increase its end strength by 30,000 personnel
through fiscal year 2007. Congress is considering legislation to
permanently authorize this increase. In addition, the Army is in the
process of rebalancing capabilities between the active and reserve
components by moving certain early-deploying and high-demand

capabilities such as military police and civil affairs from the reserve
components into the active force. Although the BRAC statute allows DOD to
submit a revised force structure plan with the fiscal year 2006 budget
submission, Army officials told us that many of the details about this
restructuring would not be completed by this timeframe.

Navy officials told us that their plans include the commissioning of 17
new ships (13 Arleigh Burke destroyers, 2 submarines, 1 amphibious ship,
and 1 littoral combat ship) while decommissioning 2 older ships. Navy
officials indicated that the projected reductions in the number of active
personnel result primarily from decommissioning ships and air squadrons
and changes to crew requirements on some ships, and the projected
reduction in reserve personnel is caused primarily by plans to deactivate
7 maritime patrol squadrons. Navy officials also noted plans to increase
the number of ships in its inventory in future years but also have efforts
under way to reduce average crew size per ship. Although the force
structure plan shows a planned increase in the number of ships, available
information indicates some uncertainty over the total number of ships the
Navy may expect for its future force structure.

Air Force end strength levels shown in the force plan reflect authorized
levels and not the current over-strength levels, reflecting Air Force
expectations of reducing the current levels to those authorized. While the
Air Force showed minimal force structure changes through 2009, an Air
Force official stated that the service plans to increase the number of
aircraft per squadron as well as increase crew ratios to make more
effective use of fewer but more capable aircraft, which would most likely
reduce future infrastructure requirements. We have previously reported8
that the Air Force could not only reduce infrastructure by increasing the
number of aircraft per fighter squadron but could also save millions of
dollars annually by doing so.

We recognize that developing a 20-year force structure plan is a
challenging task for the department, given a host of uncertainties about
the future security environment, potential technology advances and their
application to the future force, and ongoing departmental transformation
efforts. The uncertainties are evident in various ongoing defense
programs. While increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles, for example,

8 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Aircraft: Consolidating
Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce Costs, GAO/NSIAD-96-82 (Washington, D.C.:
May 6, 1996).

could have far-reaching effects for future defense force structure, we
noted in a recent report that DOD's approach to planning for developing
and fielding this capability does not provide reasonable assurance that
its investment will facilitate the integration of these vehicles into the
force structure efficiently.9 Further, DOD officials told us that another
challenging aspect of its force structure planning resides in the longer
term (those years beyond 2009) of the plan. In addition to the
uncertainties cited above, these longer-term years are characterized by
additional unknowns regarding future funding levels that could impact the
future force structure and associated requirements, such as the total
number of ships for the Navy. Despite these inherent uncertainties,
however, the department must factor in relevant assumptions about
potential future force structure changes and surge requirements as it
performs its analyses for the upcoming BRAC round.

    Final Selection Criteria Address Legislative Requirements and Provide Sound
    Framework for Follow-on BRAC Analyses

The department's final selection criteria essentially follow a framework
similar to that employed in prior BRAC rounds, with specificity added in
selected areas in response to requirements contained in legislation
authorizing the 2005 BRAC round. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Act of 1990, as amended in 2002, required DOD to give priority to
selection criteria dealing with military value, including (1) the impact
on joint war fighting, training, and readiness; (2) the availability and
condition of training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air
forces throughout diverse climates and terrains and staging areas for use
by the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions; and (3) the ability to
accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements. The
legislation also required DOD to give special consideration to other
criteria, many of which parallel those used in prior BRAC rounds.
Furthermore, the legislation required DOD to consider cost impacts to
other federal entities as well as to DOD in its BRAC decision making.
Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
200410 requires DOD to consider surge requirements in the 2005 BRAC
process. Table 3 compares the 1995 BRAC criteria with that adopted for
2005, with changes highlighted in bold.

9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Improved Strategic
Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).

10 P.L. 108-136, section 2822, (Nov. 24, 2003).

 Table 3: Comparison of BRAC Criteria for the 1995 Round and Those Adopted for
                                 the 2005 Round

Criteria for 1995 Round Criteria for 2005 Round

Military Value Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on The
current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational
readiness of DOD's total force operational readiness of the Defense
Department's total force,

including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and

readiness

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated The
availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated

airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations
airspace-including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval,
or air forces throughout diversity of climate and terrain areas and
staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense
missions-at both existing and potential receiving locations

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and The ability
to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future future total force
requirements at both the existing and potential total force requirements
at both existing and potential receiving receiving locations locations to
support operations and training

4. Cost and manpower implications The cost of operations and the manpower
implications

Return on Investment Other Considerations

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including The
extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the

  the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or
                realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs

number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or
realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs

                               Community Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities The economic impact on existing
communities in the vicinity of military installations

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving The ability of
both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructures to
support forces, missions, and communities' infrastructure to support
forces, missions, and personnel personnel

8. The environmental impact The environmental impact, including the impact
of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management,
and environmental compliance activities

Source: DOD.

Note: Bolding added by GAO to denote changes from 1995.

Our analysis of lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds affirmed the
soundness of these basic criteria and generally endorsed their retention
for the future, while recognizing the potential for improving the process
by which the criteria are used in decision making.11 Notwithstanding our
endorsement of the criteria framework, in a January 27, 2004, letter to
DOD, we identified two areas in which we believed the draft selection

11 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Lessons Learned
From Prior Base Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-151 (Washington, D.C.: July
25, 1997).

criteria needed greater clarification to fully address special
considerations called for in the legislation (see app. III). Specifically,
we noted that the criterion related to cost and savings does not indicate
the department's intention to consider potential costs to other DOD
activities or federal agencies that may be affected by a proposed closure
or realignment recommendation. Also, we pointed out the criterion on
environmental impact does not clearly identify to what extent costs
related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and
environmental compliance activities would be included in cost and savings
analyses of individual BRAC recommendations. We suggested that DOD could
address our concerns by incorporating these considerations either
directly, in its final criteria, or through later explanatory guidance.
DOD indicated it would address our concerns through clarifying guidance
rather than a change to the criteria. We have not yet seen that guidance.

DOD also received a variety of other comments on the draft criteria from
members of Congress, other elected representatives, and the general public
but did not make any changes before issuing the final criteria. Most of
these comments involved the military value criteria (see table 3: 1-4) and
centered on the maintenance of adequate surge capacity; the roles military
installations fulfill in homeland defense missions; the unique features of
research, development, test, and evaluation facilities; and the
preservation of vital human capital in various support functions. In
responding to those comments, DOD expressed the view that the draft
criteria adequately addressed these issues and did not see the need to
make any changes to its draft criteria. For example, DOD said that surge
requirements will be addressed under criterion one, which requires the
department to consider "current and future mission capabilities," and
criterion three, which requires DOD to consider an installation's ability
to "accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force
requirements" to support operations and training. Furthermore, DOD noted
that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 requires
the Secretary of Defense to "assess the probable threats to national
security" and determine "potential, prudent, surge requirements" as part
of BRAC 2005. DOD also noted that criterion two recognizes the role of
military installations as staging areas for forces conducting homeland
defense missions.

Collectively, in our view, many of the public comments on DOD's criteria
expressed concern that the criteria for the 2005 BRAC round focused more
on assessing military value based on military missions and operational
capabilities without recognizing important support capabilities such as
research, development, test, and evaluation. Although modifications to the

criteria might have been made to address some of these concerns, the
absence of such changes does not necessarily mean that these issues will
not be considered in applying the criteria during the BRAC process. For
example, the department has established a variety of joint cross-service
groups12 to analyze various support functions during the upcoming round
and each group will have to adapt the final criteria for its particular
support area to assess military value related to each functional area.
While our monitoring of the ongoing BRAC process indicates this is
occurring, the effectiveness of these efforts will best be assessed as
these groups complete their work.

  Observations on Other Key BRAC-Related Issues Included in DOD's Report

Other BRAC-related issues included in DOD's report-excess infrastructure
capacity, estimated savings for the 2005 round, and the economic impact of
prior BRAC actions on communities-are of widespread interest to Congress
and the public and important to DOD's certification regarding the need for
a BRAC round. Although the methodology DOD employed to identify excess
capacity has some limitations, DOD's report does provides a rough
indication that excess base capacity exists. Further, historical financial
data would suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993
and 1995 round, each of the military departments could achieve annual net
savings by 2011. As to economic impact, our work has shown that many
communities surrounding closed bases from the previous rounds have fared
better than the national average, in terms of changes in unemployment
rates and per capita income, with more mixed results recently, allowing
for some negative effect from the economic downturn in recent years.

    DOD Analysis Indicates Excess Infrastructure Capacity Exists

While DOD's analysis of its infrastructure capacity for the 2004 report,
which was completed outside the 2005 BRAC process, gives some indication
of excess capacity across certain functional areas through fiscal year
2009, the methodology for that analysis has some limitations that could
cause the results to be either overstated or understated, and raises
questions about use of the methodology to project a total amount of excess
capacity across DOD. At the same time, DOD's methodology did not consider
any additional excess capacity that might occur by analyzing

12 DOD has established seven joint cross-service groups to examine the
following defense functional support areas-industrial, technical, medical,
headquarters and support activities, supply and storage, education and
training, and intelligence-during the 2005 BRAC process.

facilities or functions on a joint or cross-service basis, a priority for
the 2005 round. A more complete assessment of capacity and the potential
to reduce it must await the results of the current BRAC analyses being
conducted by DOD.

To estimate excess capacity, the military services and the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) compared the capacity for a sample of bases in 1989
with the projected capacity of a sample of bases in 2009. The services and
DLA categorized the bases according to their primary function, and they
identified a variety of indicators, or metrics, to measure capacity for
each functional category. For example, they used total maneuver acres per
brigade to establish capacity for Army training bases, total square feet
of parking apron space to establish capacity for active and reserve Air
Force bases, and total direct labor hours (versus budget or programmed
direct labor hours) to establish capacity for Navy aviation depots. See
app. IV for additional information on how DOD computed excess capacity.

This methodology has some limitations as we reported13 in 1998 when DOD
used it to project excess capacity in supporting the need for a future
BRAC round. DOD's use of 1989 as a baseline did not take into account the
excess base capacity that existed in that year prior to base closures in
the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds. As a result, the percentage of
increased excess capacity reported understated actual excess capacity by
an unknown amount for some functional categories, and may have overstated
excess capacity for other categories. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) also reported14 that the department's use of 1989 as a baseline did
not take into account the excess capacity that might have existed in 1989.
Furthermore, CBO reported that the approach could understate the capacity
required if some types of base support are truly a fixed cost, regardless
of the size of the force. The methodology also did not consider any
additional excess capacity that might occur by analyzing facilities or
functions on a cross-service basis, a priority for the 2005 round. In
addition, capacity for some functions was measured differently for each
service. For example, the Army and Air Force measured capacity for test
and evaluation facilities in terms of physical total square feet of space,
while the Navy measured its capacity for these facilities in terms of

13 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Review of DOD's
1988 Report on Base Realignment and Closure, GAO/NSIAD-99-17 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 13, 1998).

14 See Congressional Budget Office: Review of the Report of the Department
of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure (Washington, D.C.: July 1,
1998).

work years. Finally, as we recently noted, the variety of metrics and
differences across the military services makes it difficult to be precise
when trying to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD.15

Military service officials told us that they typically use most of the
capacity metrics included in DOD's report, along with other measures, to
assess excess capacity. For example, these officials stated that the
metrics for depots, industrial, shipyards, logistics bases, and supply are
used, along with other measures, as indicators of excess capacity.
However, we found that some of the metrics used in DOD's report were less
reliable than others as indicators of excess capacity. For example, the
metric for Marine Corps bases compared the acres at five Marine Corps
bases to the total authorized military personnel for the Marine Corps, and
not just the authorized personnel at the five bases. Marine Corps
officials acknowledged that this was not a requirements-based metric to
measure excess capacity at Marine Corps bases. Likewise, the metric for
administrative space in the Air Force was based on the administrative
space at only one Air Force base. Air Force officials stated that this
occurred because under the methodology each Air Force base could only be
considered in one functional area.

While prior BRAC rounds have focused primarily on reducing excess
capacity, DOD officials have stated this is not the sole focus of the 2005
BRAC round. These officials noted that the 2005 round aims to further
transform the military by rationalizing base infrastructure to the force
structure, enhance joint capabilities by improving joint utilization, and
convert waste to war-fighting capability by eliminating excess capacity.
This approach has the potential to identify greater excess capacity than
previously identified. However, a true assessment of excess capacity must,
of necessity, await the completion of DOD's ongoing official analyses
under BRAC 2005.

Extent of Savings from DOD's financial data would suggest that, assuming
conditions similar to 2005 Round Are Unknown those of the 1993 and 1995
rounds, the net annual savings for each of the but Could Be Achieved
military departments for the 2005 round could be achieved by 2011, as by
2011 certified by the Secretary in DOD's report. DOD estimated that it
would

15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: Observations on
Preparations for the Upcoming Base Realignment and Closure Round,
GAO-04-558T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2004).

accrue net annual savings of $3 billion to $5 billion departmentwide by
2011. While we believe that the potential exists for significant savings
to result from the 2005 BRAC round, it is difficult to conclusively
project the expected magnitude of the savings because there simply are too
many unknowns, such as the specific timing of individual closure or
realignment actions and the extent to which DOD's efforts to maximize
joint utilization and further its transformation efforts, would impact
savings. Finally, to what extent forces that are currently based overseas
may be redeployed to the United States and what effect that redeployment
may have on BRAC and subsequent savings remains an unknown as well.16

The Secretary's estimate of $3 billion to $5 billion in net annual savings
by 2011 was based in part on savings achieved from the 1993 and 1995 BRAC
rounds. The lower estimate assumes that the actions in the 2005 round
would reduce infrastructure by about 12 percent, comparable to the
reduction that occurred in the 1993 and 1995 rounds combined. The higher
estimate assumes that infrastructure would be reduced by 20 percent, which
is about 67 percent higher than the previous two rounds combined. While we
believe the potential for significant savings exists, a more reliable
estimate of savings is not practical until the department has developed
actual closure and realignment proposals.

While DOD's report estimated net annual savings of $3 billion to $5
billion could be achieved departmentwide, it did not explicitly indicate
the amount of savings that each service would achieve by 2011. Our
analysis of the savings from the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, however,
indicates that each department accrued net annual savings by the sixth
year of implementation, as seen in table 4.

16 As previously noted, the Secretary of Defense has already undertaken a
comprehensive study of global basing and presence-the Integrated Global
Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). DOD has indicated that it expects
that BRAC will accommodate any decisions from that study that relocate
forces to the U.S. and that DOD will incorporate its global basing
strategy into a comprehensive BRAC analysis, thereby ensuring that any
overseas redeployment decisions inform its recommendations to the BRAC
Commission. See Analysis of Public Comments in 69 F.R. 6948, Feb. 12,
2004: DOD Final Selection Criteria for Closing and Realigning Military
Installations Inside the United States.

Table 4: Net Annual Savings In the Sixth Year of Implementation for BRAC
1993 and 1995 Rounds by Military Department

                              Dollars in millions

                               Net Annual Savings

                   Department         1993 BRAC round         1995 BRAC round 
                         Army                     $62                     $22 
                         Navy                   1,099                     297 
                    Air Force                     168                     120 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD's Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Estimates, February
2004.

Another way of looking at net savings is to consider the point at which
cumulative savings exceed the cumulative costs of implementing BRAC
decisions over a period of years. Experience has shown that the department
incurs significant upfront investment costs in the early years of a BRAC
round, and it takes several years to fully offset those cumulative costs
and begin to realize cumulative net savings. The difference in the
terminology is important to understand because it has a direct bearing on
the magnitude and assessment of the savings at any given time. As
previously discussed, each military department achieved net annual savings
during the 1993 and 1995 rounds by the sixth year of implementation.
However, with the exception of the Navy in 1995, the military departments
did not achieve cumulative net savings for both the 1993 and 1995 rounds
until after the sixth year of implementation.

Notwithstanding the issues we raise that could affect savings, we continue
to believe that it is vitally important for DOD to improve its mechanisms
for tracking and updating its savings estimates. We have previously noted
that DOD's BRAC savings estimates have been imprecise for a variety of
reasons such as weaknesses in DOD's financial management systems that
limit the ability to fully account for the cost of its operations; the
fact the DOD's accounting systems like other accounting systems are
oriented to tracking expenses and disbursements, not savings; the
exclusion of BRAC-related costs incurred by other government agencies; and
inadequate updating of the savings estimates that are developed.
Improvements can and should be made to address this issue. In its 1998
report to the Congress on BRAC issues, DOD proposed efforts that, if
adopted, could provide for greater accuracy in the estimates.
Specifically, DOD proposed developing a questionnaire that would be
completed annually by each base affected by BRAC rounds during the 6-year
implementation period. The questionnaire would request information on
costs, personnel reductions, and changes in operating and military

construction costs in order to provide greater insight into the savings
created by each BRAC action. DOD suggested that developing such a
questionnaire would be a cooperative effort involving the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the military services, the defense agencies, the
Office of the DOD Inspector General, and the service audit agencies. This
proposal recognizes that better documentation and updating of savings will
require special efforts parallel to the normal budget process. DOD has not
yet initiated actions to implement this proposal. We strongly endorse such
action. If DOD does not take steps to improve its estimation of savings in
the future, then previous questions about the reliability, accuracy, and
completeness of DOD's savings estimates will likely continue. We intend to
examine DOD's progress in instituting its proposed improvements during our
review of the 2005 BRAC process.

    Many Affected Communities Are Recovering from BRAC Actions in Prior Rounds

The department's report recognized that BRAC actions can affect the local
economies of the surrounding communities. It noted that from 1988 through
1995, realignment or closure actions were approved at 387 locations; and
that, in implementing the actions, the department had sought to minimize
any adverse local impacts with a coordinated program of federal assistance
from both DOD and domestic agencies.

Our own work has shown that while the short-term impact can be very
traumatic, several factors, such as the strength of the national and
regional economies, play a role in determining the long-term economic
impact of the base realignment or closure process on communities. Our work
has also shown that many communities surrounding closed bases from the
previous rounds have fared better than the national average, in terms of
changes in unemployment rates and per capita income, with more mixed
results recently, allowing for some negative effect from the economic
downturn in recent years.

Our analysis of selected economic indicators has shown that over time the
economies of BRAC-affected communities compare favorably with the overall
U.S. economy. We used unemployment rates and real per capita income rates
as broad indicators of the economic health of those communities where base
closures occurred during the prior BRAC rounds. Our analysis included 62
communities surrounding base realignment and closure sites from all four
BRAC rounds for which government and contractor civilian job losses were
estimated to be 300 or more.

We previously reported that as of September 2001, of the 62 communities
surrounding these major base closures, 44 (71 percent) had average

unemployment rates lower than the (then) average 9-month national rate of
4.58 percent.17 We are currently updating this analysis and attempting to
assess the impact of the recent economic downturn on these communities.
Our preliminary results indicate that, in keeping with economic downturn
in recent years, the average unemployment rate in 2003 had increased for
60 of the 62 communities since 2001. However, the 2003 unemployment
figures indicated that the rates for these 62 communities continue to
compare favorably with the overall U.S. rate of 6.1 percent; that is, 43
(or 69 percent) of the communities had unemployment rates at or below the
U.S. rate.

In our previous work, we had also reported that annual per capita income
growth rate of affected communities for these 62 BRAC-affected communities
compared favorably with national averages. We found that from 1996 through
1999, 33 (or 53 percent) of the 62 communities had an estimated annual
real per capital income growth rate that was at or above the average of
3.03 percent for the nation at that time. Our recent analysis has also
noted that changes in the average per capita income growth rate of these
communities over time compared favorably with corresponding changes at the
national level. This analysis indicates that 30 (48 percent) of the 62
areas examined had average income growth rates higher than the average
U.S. rate of 2.2 percent, a drop from the rate during the previous time
period.

In our previous report,18 we identified a number of factors that affected
economic recovery, based on our discussions with various community
leaders. These factors included

o  robustness of the national economy,

o  diversity of the local economy,

o  regional economic trends,

o  natural and labor resources,

o  leadership and teamwork,

o  public confidence,

o  government assistance, and

o  reuse of base property.

17 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: Progress in
Completing Actions from Prior Realignments and Closures, GAO-02-433
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2002).

18 GAO-02-433.

If history is any indication, these factors are likely to be equally
applicable in dealing with the effects of closures and realignments under
BRAC 2005.

  Certification of the Need for an Additional BRAC Round

Conclusion

In transmitting the 2004 report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense
certified the need for an additional BRAC round. The certification was
predicated on the force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory
included with the report and was reinforced by the department's assessment
of excess capacity, economic impact, and a certification that net annual
savings from a 2005 round could be achieved by 2011. The Secretary's
certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round was echoed by a separate
March 22, 2004, memorandum to the Secretary from the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It stated that the Joint Chiefs unanimously agree that
additional base realignments and closures are necessary if DOD is to
transform the armed forces to meet the threats to national security and
execute national strategy. The Chairman also noted that "(d)uring this
period of transition, we are fundamentally reconfiguring our forces to
meet new security challenges. The military value requirements that flow
from future force structure and future strategy needs will differ in
character and shape from those of today. BRAC offers a critical tool to
turn transformational goals into reality." We found no basis to question
DOD's certification of the need for an additional BRAC round. The need for
an additional BRAC round has long been recognized by various defense
officials and studies-and noted in various GAO products since the time of
the 1995 BRAC round. (See app. V for a summary of key points from selected
GAO products.)

The Secretary's certification of the need for a 2005 BRAC round is
underscored by the department's desire to realize broader objectives in
the 2005 round, including fostering jointness, transformation, assessing
common business oriented functions on a cross-service basis, and
accommodating the potential redeployment of some forces from overseas
bases back to the United States. Analyses conducted in these areas could
identify opportunities to achieve consolidations and reduce capacity not
previously identified. Having said that, we believe the efficacy and
sufficiency of DOD's BRAC analyses now under way-considering the force
structure plan, inventory, and selection criteria-can best be assessed as
the BRAC process unfolds.

While we found no basis to question the Secretary's certification of the
need for an additional BRAC round, we identified some limitations with the
department's assessment of excess capacity, completed outside the

BRAC process, to meet the 2004 reporting requirement. While clear
limitations exist in DOD's assessment of excess capacity, it does
nonetheless point to some areas that warrant additional analysis-and the
current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing so.

Today's security environment is evolving, as are force structure
requirements along with technology advancements, and defense
transformation efforts. The department must consider ongoing force
transformation initiatives in its BRAC analyses as well as factor in
relevant assumptions about the potential for future force structure
changes-changes that likely will occur long after the timeframes for the
2005 BRAC round. This includes consideration of future surge requirements.
Assuring Congress and the public that this analysis has been done and that
appropriate allowances for future force structure changes have been
incorporated into the process will be key to building public confidence in
the soundness of 2005 closure and realignment recommendations. Full
discussion of these issues by the department in its report accompanying
its BRAC recommendations in 2005 is warranted. At the same time,
consideration of these longer term issues should not detract from
opportunities available to DOD in the upcoming BRAC round to achieve
greater economies and efficiencies in support capabilities and use of
infrastructure through cross-servicing and joint utilization of bases.

Finally, many questions have previously existed about the accuracy and
precision of DOD's estimates of savings from prior BRAC rounds. Weaknesses
in DOD's financial management systems have contributed to this problem and
are not likely to be resolved in the near term. At the same time, we have
previously recommended, and DOD has agreed that improvements can and
should be made to the accounting for and periodic updating of BRAC
savings. That notwithstanding, DOD has not made sufficient efforts to
address this issue. DOD needs to provide assurance that it has plans in
place for improvements in this area before it begins implementing any
closure and realignment decisions from the upcoming BRAC round.

Recommendation for 	We recommend that the Secretary of Defense include in
his May 2005 report on recommendations for base closures and realignments
a full

Executive Action	discussion of relevant assumptions, and allowances made
for potential future force structure requirements and changes, including
the potential for future surge requirements.

Matter for Congressional Consideration

  Agency Comments

To ensure that the Department of Defense and the military services improve
their tracking and updating of BRAC savings estimates associated with
implementing closure and realignment decisions for the upcoming BRAC
round, Congress may want to consider requiring DOD and the military
services to provide certification that actions have been taken to
implement previously planned improvements for tracking and updating its
BRAC savings estimates. This certification should be submitted with its
fiscal year 2006 budget request documentation.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Environment) agreed with our report. DOD's
comments are included in appendix VI of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management
and Budget. The report will also be available to others upon request and
can be accessed at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. In
addition, a list of our key prior reports on base realignments and
closures
is included in appendix VII and these reports can be accessed on our Web
site as well.

Please contact me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any
questions regarding this report. Additional contacts and staff
acknowledgments are provided in appendix VIII.

Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable John Ensign
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
Chairman
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Construction
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Joel Hefley
Chairman
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg
Chairman
The Honorable Chet Edwards
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Construction
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

DOD Responsiveness to Legislative Requirements

Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and Selection
Criteria

The scope of this report was determined by the legislative requirements
imposed on us and included in sections 2912 and 2913 of the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended. Our focus was to assess
the Department of Defense's (DOD) March 24, 2004, report to Congress
regarding issues associated with the need for an additional BRAC round as
well as the final selection criteria for the upcoming 2005 BRAC round as
published in the Federal Register on February 12, 2004. Because of time
constraints, we could not fully assess the accuracy of all data used in
the report but performed limited reliability assessments of key data
contained in DOD's report and determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report, with relevant limitations noted.

We evaluated DOD's responsiveness to the legislative reporting
requirements by comparing individual requirements as presented in the
legislation with DOD's presentation of information in its report and final
selection criteria. Where appropriate, we made judgments as to the extent
to which DOD addressed the requirements, and discussed with DOD officials
those areas where we believed the requirements were not fully addressed.
In some cases, DOD officials from the BRAC Office within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) told us that the information provided was
somewhat limited in order to avoid preempting or prejudging the ongoing
analytical process for the 2005 BRAC round.

To address the importance of the worldwide installation inventory, force
structure plan, and selection criteria and evaluated, where appropriate,
the analytical sufficiency and accuracy of each, we interviewed DOD
officials to obtain their views on the relative importance and
applicability of each to the BRAC 2005 process and analyzed the
corresponding documentation for analytical sufficiency and accuracy where
it was reasonable to do so.

More specifically, to evaluate the worldwide installation inventory, we
interviewed officials from the contracting firm responsible to DOD for
managing its Facilities Assessment Database, the DOD-wide database that
was used to compile the worldwide inventory. Our interest was in
documenting the contractor's process for validating the real property data
in the database. Because the DOD-wide database draws from the services'
real property databases, we reviewed the contractor's analysis of
anomalies identified in the services' real property databases (i.e., the
Army's Integrated Facilities System, the Navy's and Marine Corps' Navy
Facility Assets database, and the Air Force's Automated Civil Engineer

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

System) to gain a sense of the relative accuracy of the data. We also
compared the list of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations
receiving the recent data capacity call for the 2005 BRAC round to the
installation inventory to assure ourselves that these installations were a
subset of the worldwide inventory. Furthermore, to determine if the
inventory included all overseas installations, we compared the listed
installations by country to a list of countries where U.S. forces are
currently deployed. We then interviewed a DOD official to verify and
obtain rationale for the absence of some overseas installations in the
inventory.

To evaluate the unclassified portion (fiscal years 2005 through 2009) of
DOD's 20-year force structure plan as presented in DOD's 2004 report, we
identified major force unit and personnel end strength changes by service
over the specified time frame and sought out rationale for the increases
or decreases. We discussed with service officials the nature of these
changes and how these revisions would be considered in the BRAC process.
We also interviewed service officials regarding a number of initiatives
under way, such as the Army's efforts to increase the number of brigades
in its force, that have implications for the future sizing and composition
of the force structure and associated infrastructure for those respective
services. We inquired as to when planned force structure changes stemming
from these initiatives would be incorporated into DOD's force structure
plan.

To evaluate the final selection criteria for the upcoming 2005 round, we
compared the criteria as published in the Federal Register on February 12,
2004, with those used in the 1995 BRAC round. In so doing, we noted the
differences and evaluated whether the legislatively directed language1
regarding selection criteria was incorporated into the revised criteria
for the upcoming round. In addition to discussing with DOD officials the
use of these criteria as part of a framework for conducting its base
analyses for the 2005 round, we relied on our prior work that reported on
lessons learned from previous base closure rounds, which covered, among
other topics, the analytical sufficiency of the selection criteria. We
also referred to a January 27, 2004, letter we sent to the Acting Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) commenting on
our analysis of the draft criteria that were out for public comment at
that time. Finally, we reviewed the public comments received

1 The language appeared in Section 3002 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2002, P.L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001).

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

  Excess Defense Infrastructure Capacity, Estimated BRAC Savings, and Economic
  Impact

on the draft selection criteria and discussed with DOD officials their
rationale for not incorporating any of the suggested changes into the
final selection criteria.

While the mandate did not specifically require us to address excess
defense infrastructure capacity, estimated BRAC savings from the 2005
round, and economic impact of communities surrounding base closures in
prior rounds, as discussed in DOD's 2004 report, we chose to do so because
of widespread interest in Congress and the public and its importance to
DOD's certification of the need for a BRAC round. In addition to an
analysis of these topics as presented in DOD's 2004 report, we relied on
prior and ongoing work related to these areas of interest.

More specifically, to evaluate the analytical sufficiency of DOD's excess
capacity analysis, we interviewed DOD and service officials and reviewed
documentation describing DOD's methodology. We inquired about the
reasonableness of the various metrics used to develop the capacity
measures for the various functional support areas, such as depots,
identified in the analysis in DOD's report. We verified the calculations
of increases in each of the functional areas and on an aggregate basis,
and partially verified the data reported by the services in making the
comparisons of capacity between the 1989 baseline year and 2009. DOD's
BRAC Office provided the services with the 1989 baseline numbers for the
various metrics used to measure capacity. We were unable to verify the
1989 baseline data in DOD's report for the Army and Department of the
Navy, which had accepted the numbers, because supporting documentation
from DOD's development of that data had not been retained from the time
that data were first developed in 1998 for an earlier DOD report. However,
we did verify the Air Force's 1989 baseline numbers because it revised the
DOD-provided 1989 baseline numbers using available data. We also
selectively verified the projected 2009 data in the analysis.

To evaluate whether DOD's estimates for expected savings from the upcoming
2005 round were reasonable, we interviewed a DOD official in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) BRAC Office and examined the methodology,
to include assumptions and the underlying basis employed by DOD in
deriving the estimates. Because a key assumption for building the
estimates focused on the probable range of reductions for aggregate plant
replacement value reductions (i.e., the scope of the infrastructure
reduction) that had occurred across a combination of the 1993 and 1995
rounds, we were not in a position to question whether this

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

assumption would be valid for the 2005 round, given that the analysis for
the 2005 round has not yet been completed. As to whether DOD can achieve
the net annual savings for each military department by 2011, we reviewed
DOD's historical financial data for the 1993 and 1995 round to ascertain
if the military departments achieved net annual savings by the final or
sixth year of implementation for these rounds. This would correspond to
the year 2011 for the 2005 round and again would assume that the 2005
round would be similar to that of the 1993 and 1995 rounds.

To evaluate the economic recovery of communities affected by the BRAC
process in the prior rounds, we first performed a broad-based economic
assessment of 62 communities where more than 300 civilian jobs were
eliminated during the prior closure rounds.2 This work was essentially an
update of similar work we had performed and reported on in April 2002. 3
We used two key economic indicators-unemployment and real per capital
growth rates-as measures to analyze changes in the economic condition of
communities over time in relation to the national averages. We chose
unemployment and real per capital income as key performance indicators
because (1) DOD used these measures in its community economic impact
analysis during the BRAC location selection process and (2) economists
commonly use these measures in assessing the economic health of an area
over time. While our assessment does provide an overall picture of how
these communities compare with the national averages, it does not
necessarily isolate the condition, or the changes to the condition, that
may be attributed to the BRAC action.

We conducted our work from March to May 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

2 The impact areas for communities were defined by using standard
definitions for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan statistical areas and
reflected the impact areas used in the 1995 round.

3 See GAO-02-433.

                        Appendix II: BRAC 2005 Timeline

                             Source: P.L. 107-107.

Appendix III: GAO's Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure
Round

Appendix III: GAO's Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base
Closure Round

Appendix III: GAO's Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base
Closure Round

Appendix III: GAO's Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base
Closure Round

Appendix III: GAO's Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base
Closure Round

Appendix III: GAO's Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base
Closure Round

Appendix IV: DOD's Methodology for Estimating Excess Capacity

To perform the capacity analysis, the services and the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) compared capacity in a sample of bases in 1989 to the
capacity for a sample of bases in 2009. The services then categorized the
bases according to their primary missions and defined indicators of
capacity, or metrics, for each category. DOD divided the metric by
measures of force structure to determine a ratio and calculated the extent
to which the ratio of capacity in 2009 exceeded the ratio in 1989. As an
example, table 5 shows the results for the Army as shown in DOD's report.
Similar tables appear for the Navy, Air Force, and DLA in DOD's report.

 Table 5: Army Analysis of Proportional Capacity Change in capacity relative to
                     force structure since 1989Input Indexa

Delta from 2009

capacityc

                                                        Excess 2009 capacityd

Fiscal year 1989

Fiscal year 2009

Fiscal year 1989

Fiscal year 2009

Proportional capacityb

                              Base category/metric

Administration

Administrative space square
feet (000) 6,627 6,121
Military/civilian authorized 81,518 64,598 .0813 .0948 5,251 870 14%

Depots Industrial

Capacity direct labor                                             
           hours                                                     
           (000)                                                     
    Budgeted/programmed  29,000 16,957                            No       No 
          direct                                                     
        labor hours      21,000 12,828 1.3810 1.3219 17,715 increase increase 

Total facilities square feet
(000) 34,707 24,324
Military/civilian authorized 23,897 9,498 1.4524 2.5610 13,795 10,529 43%

                             Major training active

Base acres 1,509,334 1,242,842 No No Maneuver brigades 48 43 31,444 28,903
                          1,352,112 increase increase

                             Major training reserve

Base acres 258,413 330,393
End strength 319,000 205,000 0.8101 1.6117 166,065 164,328 50%

Maneuver

Base acres 3,053,623 3,361,679
Maneuver brigades 48 43 63,617 78,179 2,735,537 626,142 19%

Appendix IV: DOD's Methodology for Estimating Excess Capacity

     Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989Input Indexa

Delta from 2009

capacityc

                                                        Excess 2009 capacityd

Fiscal year 1989

Fiscal year 2009

Fiscal year 1989

Fiscal year 2009

Proportional capacityb

                              Base category/metric

Schools

Instructional space square
feet (000) 14,964 14,854
Military/civilian authorized 350,108 222,723 .0427 .0667 9,519 5,335 36%

                              Test and evaluation

Total facilities square feet
(000) 48,924 51,321
Acquisition workforce 157,964 62,193 .3097 .8252 19,262 32,059 62%

Source: DOD.

aThe index for each functional area is computed by dividing the
denominator into the numerator. For example, the 1989 administration index
.0813 is derived by dividing 81,518 into 6,627.

bThe proportional capacity is computed by multiplying the denominator of
the fiscal year 2009 input times the fiscal year 1989 index. For example,
the administration proportional capacity 5,251 is computed by multiplying
64,598 times .0813.

cThe delta from 2009 capacity is computed by subtracting the proportional
capacity from the fiscal year 2009 index numerator. For example, the
administration delta from 2009 capacity 870 is computed by subtracting
5,251 from 6,121.

dThe percent of 2009 capacity is computed by dividing the delta from 2009
capacity by the fiscal year 1989 input numerator. For example, the
administration percent of 2009 capacity (14 percent) is computed by
dividing 6,627 into 870.

DOD then took a weighted average of all functional areas to determine the
overall excess capacity for each department. The weights were computed by
the number of bases in a functional area divided by the total number of
bases in all functional areas. Table 6 shows the overall estimated
percentage of excess capacity for each military department and the DLA.

Appendix IV: DOD's Methodology for Estimating Excess Capacity

Table 6: Estimated Percentage of Excess Capacity Department Estimated percentage
                               of excess capacity

Army

Navy

Air Force

Defense Logistics Agency

Total

Source: DOD.

Likewise, DOD computed a weighted average to estimate an overall
percentage of excess capacity for DOD. The weights were computed from the
number of bases per department divided by the total of all bases included
in the analysis.

Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO Products Regarding the Need for an
Additional BRAC Round

At the time the 1995 BRAC round was being completed and subsequently, DOD
officials, including the Secretary and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, recognized that additional excess capacity would remain following
that round and that future base realignments and closures would be needed.
Various GAO products have noted that issue in subsequent years. The
following are selected excerpts from key GAO products.

o  	"Despite these recent BRAC rounds, DOD continues to maintain large
amounts of excess infrastructure, especially in its support functions,
such as maintenance depots, research and development laboratories, and
test and evaluation centers. Each service maintains its own facilities and
capabilities for performing many common support functions and, as a result
DOD has overlapping, redundant, and underutilized infrastructure. DOD has
taken some steps to demolish unneeded buildings on various operational and
support bases; consolidate certain functions; privatize, outsource, and
reengineer certain workloads; and encourage interservicing
agreements-however, these are not expected to offset the need for
additional actions. At the same time, DOD officials recognize that
significant additional reductions in excess infrastructure requirements in
common support areas could come from consolidating workloads and
restructuring functions on a cross-service basis, something that has not
been accomplished to any great extent in prior BRAC rounds." U.S. General
Accounting Office, Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure
Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-151 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997, p. 3).

o  	"Notwithstanding the results of the four recent BRAC rounds, DOD
officials recognized, even while they were finishing the 1995 round, that
they had missed OSD's goal in terms of reductions needed through base
closures. DOD calculated that the first three BRAC rounds reduced the
plant replacement value (PRV)1 of DOD's domestic facilities by 15 percent.
It established a goal for the fourth round of reducing PRV by an
additional 15 percent, for a total of 30 percent. When the Secretary
announced his recommendations for base closures and realignments in 1995,
OSD projected that if all of the Secretary's recommendations were adopted,
the

1 PRV is defined as the cost to replace current facilities using today's
construction costs and standards. PRV is recognized as an imprecise
measure, one that is calculated differently by each service. However, it
was a key measure used by OSD to establish its goals for base closures.

Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO Products Regarding the Need for an
Additional BRAC Round

total PRV would be reduced by 21 percent, nearly a third less than OSD's
goal."2 GAO/NSIAD-97-151, p. 17.

o  	"The Secretary of Defense's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which
assessed defense strategy, programs, and policies, included the issue of
future base closures in the infrastructure portion of the review. In his
May 19, 1997, report to Congress on the results of this review, the
Secretary asked Congress to authorize domestic base closure rounds in 1999
and 2001. That recommendation was endorsed by the National Defense Panel,
the independent, congressionally mandated board that is reviewing the work
of the Quadrennial Defense Review and completing its own review of defense
issues." GAO/NSIAD-97-151, p. 3.

o  	DOD's Support Infrastructure Management has been designated as
High-Risk by GAO since 1997. GAO's January 2003 update noted that "DOD
plans an additional base closure round in 2005; this could enable it to
devote its facility resources on fewer, more enduring facilities. With or
without base closures, DOD faces the challenge of adequately maintaining
and revitalizing the facilities it expects to retain for future use.
Available information indicates that DOD's facilities continue to
deteriorate because of insufficient funding for their sustainment,
restoration, and modernization." U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk
Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).

o  	In commenting on DOD's investment plans for reversing the aging of its
facilities, we noted that "...because of competing priorities, DOD is not
likely to realize its investment objectives for facilities in the near
term. More specifically, the services do not propose to fully fund all of
OSD's objectives for improving facilities or, in some instances, the
services have developed funding plans that have unrealistically high rates
of increase in the out-years compared with previous funding trends and
other defense priorities. The base realignment and closure round
authorized for fiscal year 2005, while it carries with it a significant
up-front investment cost to implement realignment and closure decisions,
offers an important opportunity to reduce excess facilities and achieve
greater efficiencies in sustaining and recapitalizing the remaining
facilities if sufficient funding levels are maintained into the future.
Additionally, DOD is reexamining its worldwide basing requirements, which
could potentially lead to significant changes in facility requirements
over the next several years. As these

2 The 1995 BRAC Commission did not approve all of the Secretary's
recommendations and it added other bases to the closure list. Since that
time, OSD has not recalculated the net reduction in PRV.

Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO Products Regarding the Need for an
Additional BRAC Round

decisions are implemented over the next several years, this should permit
DOD and the services to increasingly concentrate future resources on
enduring facilities." U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense
Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military Construction
Program, GAO-04-288 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2004).

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix VII: Key Prior GAO Reports on DOD's Base Realignments and Closures

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming Base
Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.: March 25,
2004.

Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve
Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003.

Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior Base
Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2002.

Military Base Closures: DOD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains
Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.

Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds.
GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998.

Military Bases: Review of DOD's 1998 Report on Base Realignment and
Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.

Military Bases: Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds.
GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.

Military Bases: Closure and Realignments Savings Are Significant, but Not
Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 1996.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 1995 Process and Recommendations for
Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133. Washington, D.C.: April 14,
1995.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's Recommendations and Selection Process
for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173. Washington, D.C.: April
15, 1993.

Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed Closures
and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 1991.

Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission's Realignment and Closure
Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.: November 29, 1989.

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

  GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

(350485)

Michael Kennedy (202) 512-8333 James Reifsnyder (202) 512-4166

In addition to the individuals named above, Nelsie Alcoser, Nancy Benco,
Ray Bickert, Joel Christenson, Warren Lowman, Tom Mahalek, David Mayfield,
Charles Perdue, James Reynolds, and Laura Talbott made key contributions
to this report.

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