Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of  
the Navy's Fleet Response Plan (18-JUN-04, GAO-04-724R).	 
                                                                 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom have prompted major changes in the employment of naval	 
forces around the globe. These two events resulted in an ultimate
surging to deploy seven carrier strike groups and the largest	 
amphibious task force assembled in decades. According to the	 
Navy, at the time of the September 11 attacks and in preparation 
for Operation Iraqi Freedom, only a small number of ships at peak
readiness were forward deployed. However, most of the Navy's	 
ships were not available for use because they were in early	 
stages of their training cycles. This prompted the Navy, in March
2003, to develop a concept to enhance its deployment readiness	 
strategy. The Navy's Fleet Response Plan, implemented in May	 
2003, evolved from a concept to institutionalize an enhanced	 
surge capability.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-724R					        
    ACCNO:   A10558						        
  TITLE:     Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance     
Aspects of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan			 
     DATE:   06/18/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Equipment maintenance				 
	     Maintenance (upkeep)				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military policies					 
	     Military vessels					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Ships						 
	     DOD Fleet Response Plan				 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 

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GAO-04-724R

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

June 18, 2004

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Subject: Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of
the Navy's Fleet Response Plan

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom
have prompted major changes in the employment of naval forces around the
globe. These two events resulted in an ultimate surging to deploy seven
carrier strike groups and the largest amphibious task force assembled in
decades. According to the Navy, at the time of the September 11 attacks
and in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom, only a small number of
ships at peak readiness were forward deployed. However, most of the Navy's
ships were not available for use because they were in early stages of
their training cycles. This prompted the Navy, in March 2003, to develop a
concept to enhance its deployment readiness strategy. The Navy's Fleet
Response Plan, implemented in May 2003, evolved from a concept to
institutionalize an enhanced surge capability.

The Fleet Response Plan modifies the Navy's pre-2001 rotational deployment
policy, replacing 6-month routine deployments with more flexible
deployment options that provide the capability to deploy as many as eight
carrier strike groups when and where needed. Although we focused our
review of the maintenance impacts of the Fleet Response Plan on aircraft
carriers, the plan applies to all ship classes except submarines.1 The
plan changes the manner in which the Navy maintains, trains, staffs, and
deploys its ships to allow a greater availability of the fleet to meet
Homeland Defense and Defense Guidance requirements. As it relates to
maintenance, the plan relies on increased continuous maintenance during
pier dockings. Primarily, the plan alters the Navy's prior 6-month
rotational deployment and presence policy to the

1 Navy officials informed us that maintenance processes do not change
under the Fleet Response Plan for the submarine force because of the
nature and criticality of submarine systems.

                         GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

current policy of being forward deployed and capable of surging
substantial forces- a "6 plus 2" carrier strike force versus a "3 to 4"
carrier strike force-when and where they are needed. The 6 plus 2 force
concept signifies that six carrier strike groups are available to deploy
within 30 days of notification, and two additional groups are available
within 90 days of notification. The 3 to 4 force that preceded the Fleet
Response Plan generally had only three or four carrier strike groups
available for deployment when needed.

The emphasis of the Fleet Response Plan is on readiness and speed of
response. It assumes a deployment mind-set of quickly-within 3 to 4 months
after completing its maintenance-making a carrier available to surge, if
necessary. This mind-set differs from that of the traditional rotational
deployment process where, in the case of a carrier, the ship would undergo
maintenance, training, and staffing preparations to be ready for the next
scheduled deployment in about 1 year after completing its maintenance
period. The Navy attained the 6 plus 2 carrier strike force capability in
November 2003.

Because of potential budget implications, you asked us to review the
assumption that the Navy's implementation of its Fleet Response Plan would
reduce the duration of aircraft carrier depot maintenance intervals
between deployment periods from approximately 18 months to 9 months.
Specifically, our objectives were to identify

o  	the likely impacts and risks for the Navy's logistics requirements
that could result from shortened maintenance cycles between deployments;

o  	the Navy's plan for fulfilling major repair and maintenance
requirements; upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and
engineering systems; and performing nuclear refueling in the shortened
maintenance cycle; and

o  how the Navy's budget supports its plan to shorten maintenance cycles.

On April 6, 2004, we provided your office with a briefing on our
observations regarding the maintenance impacts associated with the plan.
This report summarizes and updates the information we provided you in that
briefing. A copy of the briefing is included in enclosure I to this
report.

To address our objectives, we held discussions with officials from key
Department of Defense and Navy organizations responsible for
conceptualizing and implementing the Navy's plan. While the scope of our
work did not include an assessment of the impact of staff assignments or
the training aspects of the Fleet Response Plan, we plan to initiate a
separate review to assess the plan's effect on staffing, training, and
meeting the theater commanders' needs. In addition, we did not
independently assess the reliability of the workload data that we obtained
for the Puget Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards. For purposes of this
assignment, we considered the data sufficiently reliable to determine the
extent to which workloads changed.

We performed our work from November 2003 through April 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

The Navy's Fleet Response Plan
Does Not Shorten Maintenance Intervals

The Navy's Fleet Response Plan does not shorten preexisting time frames
for performing aircraft carrier maintenance. Furthermore, it does not
alter existing major repair and maintenance requirements; methods of
upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering
systems; or methods of performing nuclear refueling. At this time, the
potential impact of the plan on the Navy's budget is uncertain.

Maintenance Intervals Remain the Same

The Navy's Fleet Response Plan does not reduce depot maintenance intervals
between deployment cycles as was initially assumed. Navy officials
informed us that the concept of reducing maintenance intervals in order to
deploy ships more quickly if needed was considered during early
discussions of what was to become the plan, but it was quickly dismissed
as an unviable option. The Navy recognized that shortened maintenance
cycles might adversely affect fleet readiness and would not meet the
intent of the plan.

Overall, the Navy's Fleet Response Plan alters how the Navy assigns
personnel, accomplishes training, and manages maintenance to provide a
more ready force. With respect to maintenance intervals, we obtained data
regarding changes that had occurred after the implementation of the plan.
Prior to the plan, the Navy had a notional 24-month Inter-Deployment
Training Cycle for its nuclear carriers-the majority of its carrier fleet.
This cycle normally included a 6-month maintenance period and an 18-month
operational cycle, which incorporated training and a 6-month deployment.
However, the Navy was actually performing a 27-month cycle instead of the
notional 24-month cycle. Under the Fleet Response Plan, in essence, the
Navy formalized the 27-month cycle that it was already performing-revising
its name to "Inter-Deployment Readiness Cycle." This change formally
extended the operational interval for a nuclear carrier by about 3 months.
2 However, it did not alter the 6-month depot-level maintenance period
that existed prior to the implementation of the plan.

Major Repair, Upgrading Systems, and Nuclear Refueling Process Remain
Unchanged under Fleet Response Plan

The implementation of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan does not alter
existing repair and maintenance requirements; methods for upgrading and
modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering systems; or methods
for performing nuclear refueling. These aspects of Navy ship maintenance
requirements will continue to be

2 The Navy is assessing its capability to achieve a 32-month
Inter-Deployment Readiness Cycle. This would extend carrier operational
availability by an additional 5 months.

GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

conducted in accordance with Chief of Naval Operations guidance for naval
ships. 3 However, Chief of Naval Operations and Naval Sea Systems Command
officials informed us that under the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy intends
to provide needed depot maintenance-called continuous maintenance-more
frequently during scheduled, shorter-duration pier dockings, instead of
deferring this maintenance until the normal 6-month maintenance period
arrives. Intensification of the preexisting continuous maintenance process
constitutes the essential core of the Fleet Response Plan's maintenance
component. Navy officials stated that additional carrier operational
availability is being achieved through intensified continuous depot-level
maintenance.

As an additional measure to obtain an indication of the Fleet Response
Plan's impact on depot-level maintenance, we conducted a limited review of
total workload data at the Puget Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards before
and after the implementation of the plan for the period of fiscal years
2003 projected through 2009. The "snapshot" data we obtained indicated
that although the scheduled maintenance workloads varied somewhat on an
annual basis, the total and average maintenance workload, in terms of
staff-days, increased only by about 1 percent and remained relatively
constant over this period. Naval Sea Systems Command officials stated that
workload adjustments are a routine business function among shipyards that
occurred before the plan was implemented and will continue to occur.

Impact of Fleet Response Plan on Navy's Budget Is Unknown

There are no present indications that the implementation of the plan will
affect the Navy's budget. Navy and Office of the Secretary Defense (OSD)
budget officials stated that the plan was relatively new and they were
unaware of any specific budgetary implications at this time. However,
Program Budget Decision 709R, dated December 22, 2003, asserts that the
plan might generate a "bow-wave" of maintenance requirements in future
years. This assertion stems from an assumption that the longer the time
between maintenance periods, the more repair work may be required.
Discussion with an OSD budget official revealed that the assertion was not
supported by analysis, but rather was based on the official's prior
experience with the development of new Navy programs, and on the
official's understanding that the Fleet Response Plan focused on
streamlining ship maintenance and extending operational cycles. The
official raised the bow-wave issue in Program Budget Decision 709R to
provide impetus for improving the plan implementation. However, based on
the Navy's intensification of its continuous maintenance process, the OSD
budget official in retrospect agreed that the Fleet Response Plan probably
would not generate a bow-wave of maintenance requirements. Program Budget
Decision 709R states that, prior to the Fiscal Year 2006 Program Review,
the Navy should evaluate the impact of the plan on (1) sea-shore rotations
and manning; (2) intermediate, organizational, and depot maintenance; and
(3) readiness. OSD and Navy officials stated that such assessments would
not require formal studies but would occur during the normal budget review
process. The officials from the various organizations we visited stated

3 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) NOTICE 4700,
Representative Intervals, Durations, Maintenance Cycles, and Repair
Man-Days for Depot Level Maintenance Availabilities of U.S. Navy Ships,
June 16, 2003.

GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

that it might take several years of experience to assess the effects that
result from implementing the plan.

Scope and Methodology

To address the assumption that the duration of aircraft carrier depot
maintenance cycles between deployments would be reduced from approximately
18 months to 9 months and the effects that such a reduction would have on
the Navy's maintenance operations and budget, we relied on data gathered
through our visits and interviews with key personnel within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Office
of the Navy Comptroller; Naval Sea Systems Command; and Commander, U.S.
Fleet Forces Command. We reviewed the Navy's Fleet Response Plan,
policies, procedures, and pertinent articles and obtained briefings to
understand ship maintenance practices and intervals before and after the
implementation of the plan. Also, because shipyards perform the bulk of
depot-level maintenance, we completed a limited analysis of workload data
for two public shipyards-Puget Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards-to
determine potential workload impacts associated with the implementation of
the Fleet Response Plan. The workload data developed by the Naval Sea
Systems Command are used to make adjustments in workload among the
shipyards. We used the data to determine if significant changes occurred
in shipyard workloads as a result of the Navy's implementation of its
Fleet Response Plan. For purposes of this assignment, we considered the
data sufficiently reliable to determine the extent to which workloads
changed.

To address the effects of shortened maintenance cycles on the Navy's major
repair and maintenance requirements; upgrading and modernizing weapons,
communications, and engineering systems; and performing nuclear refueling,
we relied on data gathered through our visits and interviews with key Navy
personnel within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Naval Sea
Systems Command; and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command. We reviewed the
Navy's Fleet Response Plan, policies, procedures, and pertinent articles
and briefings. Because the Fleet Response Plan does not shorten ship
maintenance cycles, we did not perform any additional work regarding this
objective. These types of maintenance activities continue to be performed
in the normal scheduled maintenance intervals.

To determine budget implications associated with the Fleet Response Plan,
we interviewed Under Secretary of Defense and Navy Comptroller officials
and reviewed and discussed Program Budget Decisions that approved the
Navy's implementation of the Fleet Response Plan.

We performed our work from November 2003 through April 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

Agency Comments

In written comments on this report, the Department of Defense concurred
with the draft report. The department provided technical comments, which
we incorporated as appropriate. The Deputy Under Secretary's comments are
included in enclosure II.

                                   - - - - -

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority
Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that have
jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for the Department of Defense.
We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any question about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-8365 or e-mail me at [email protected]. Key contributors to
this report were David Schmitt, Dudley Roache, Patricia Albritton, Cheryl
Weissman, and Julio Luna.

Sincerely yours,

William M. Solis
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosures - 2

GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

Enclosure I Briefing Slides

GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

                                  Enclosure I

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                                  Enclosure I

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                                  Enclosure I

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                                  Enclosure I

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                                  Enclosure I

GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

                                  Enclosure I

Operating and maintenance Intervals (no change  Conventional a  Nuclear b  
before and after FRP)                                          
                      Operating                      18 months     18 months  
                     Maintenance                      3 months     6 months   
                      Operating                      18 months     18 months  
                     Maintenance                      3 months     6 months   
                      Operating                      18 months     18 months  
                Extended maintenance                 12 months    10.5 months 
                        Total                        72 months    76.5 months 

GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

                                  Enclosure I

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                                  Enclosure I

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                                  Enclosure I

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                                  Enclosure I

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Enclosure II Comments from the Department of Defense

Enclosure II

(350466)
Page 21 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics

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