Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in	 
Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges (29-APR-04, 
GAO-04-670T).							 
                                                                 
As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and	 
launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the National Guard has	 
experienced the largest activation of its forces since World War 
II. The Guard consists of 350,000 Army Guard soldiers and 107,000
Air Guard members. With its unique dual status, it performs state
missions under the governor and federal missions at home and	 
overseas under the President. Since September 11, the Guard's	 
missions have expanded, raising concerns about its ability to	 
simultaneously perform all of these functions. The Department of 
Defense (DOD) funds the Army Guard for partial readiness to	 
accomplish mission requirements assuming that there will be time 
to supply additional personnel and equipment in an extended	 
conflict. In contrast, the Air Guard is funded to be an 	 
operational reserve ready on short notice. Today's testimony	 
addresses GAO's observations on (1) the extent and purpose of the
National Guard's use since September 11, (2) the effects of that 
use on Guard forces' readiness for future missions, and (3) the  
challenges that DOD, the states, and Congress face in organizing 
and equipping the Guard to support both overseas and homeland	 
missions.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-670T					        
    ACCNO:   A09911						        
  TITLE:     Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use
in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges 	 
     DATE:   04/29/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Human resources utilization			 
	     Military forces					 
	     Mobilization					 
	     National defense operations			 
	     National Guard					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Warfare						 
	     Agency missions					 
	     Homeland security					 

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GAO-04-670T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT RESERVE FORCES

Thursday, April 29, 2004

Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and
                               Future Challenges

Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-04-670T

Highlights of GAO-04-670T, a testimony before the Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives

As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and launch of the
Global War on Terrorism, the National Guard has experienced the largest
activation of its forces since World War II. The Guard consists of 350,000
Army Guard soldiers and 107,000 Air Guard members. With its unique dual
status, it performs state missions under the governor and federal missions
at home and overseas under the President. Since September 11, the Guard's
missions have expanded, raising concerns about its ability to
simultaneously perform all of these functions.

The Department of Defense (DOD) funds the Army Guard for partial readiness
to accomplish mission requirements assuming that there will be time to
supply additional personnel and equipment in an extended conflict. In
contrast, the Air Guard is funded to be an operational reserve ready on
short notice.

Today's testimony addresses GAO's observations on (1) the extent and
purpose of the National Guard's use since September 11, (2) the effects of
that use on Guard forces' readiness for future missions, and (3) the
challenges that DOD, the states, and Congress face in organizing and
equipping the Guard to support both overseas and homeland missions.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-670T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at (202)
512-4402 or [email protected].

April 29, 2004

RESERVE FORCES

Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and
Future Challenges

With the high pace of operations since September 11, more than 51 percent
of Army Guard members and 31 percent of Air Guard members have been
activated to meet new homeland and overseas demands. The Army Guard has
experienced significant difficulties in responding to these extensive and
ongoing requirements because much of it was funded and equipped as a
later-deploying reserve force rather than an operational force designed
for continued overseas deployments. Moreover, units with certain
specialties- military police, transportation, and combat arms-have been in
high demand, resulting in lengthy and repeated deployments. To ease
critical shortages, 27 Army Guard units were retrained as military police
from other specialties such as field artillery. The Air Guard, although
less affected by the high pace because it is funded to deploy quickly, has
also seen significant use for Iraq combat operations and homeland security
missions. While the number of activated Air Guard personnel has decreased
over the past year, some personnel were activated outside their normal
rotational schedules and tour lengths have been extended. In addition,
some units have been assigned new homeland missions such as flying combat
air patrols and providing radar coverage over the United States.

While the high use of the National Guard since September 11 has led to
declining war-fighting readiness of non-deployed Army and Air Guard units,
the decline is most significant for the Army Guard. To meet wartime needs,
the Army Guard has had to take personnel and equipment from units that had
not been activated to ready others for deployment. For example, the Army
Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers to fill personnel shortages in
deploying units and transferred about 22,000 pieces of equipment from
nondeploying units to ready units deploying to Iraq. The Air Guard's
readiness has also declined because the high pace of operations created
maintenance challenges for its aging aircraft and limited training
opportunities. Because DOD has not fully defined requirements, readiness
standards, and readiness measures for the homeland security missions it
will lead or support, the Guard's preparedness specifically for homeland
security missions is unknown. However, states are concerned that
continuing deployments reduce the Guard's preparedness and availability
for all its homeland security and natural disaster missions.

DOD, the states, and Congress face near-and long-term challenges readying
and funding National Guard units for overseas and domestic missions in the
Global War on Terrorism. Enhancing the near-term readiness of Army Guard
units will be difficult because the Army Guard is still operating with
peacetime funding. In the long term, the Army Guard's ability to
restructure its forces to meet the requirements of the new security
environment will depend on whether it is given adequate resources and
funding priority. Finally, DOD will need to consider how to balance Army
and Air Guard forces needed for both homeland and overseas security
requirements.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our observations on the
challenges the National Guard faces in activating over 213,000 members,
the largest activation of its forces since World War II. National Guard
members are supporting military operations around the world-they are
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and maintaining the peace in the
Balkans-side by side with their active duty counterparts, facing the same
dangers and making the same sacrifices. As you know, the National Guard
consists of the Army National Guard, with 350,000 soldiers, and the Air
National Guard, with about 107,000 Air Guard personnel. With its unique
dual status, the Guard performs state missions under the command of the
state's governor and federal missions-at home and overseas-under command
of the President. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the
Guard's traditional role has been expanded to include new tasks, both
domestically and overseas. This mission expansion has raised concerns
about the Guard's ability to perform all of these missions successfully
within its existing resources.

As you requested, my statement today focuses on the use of the National
Guard since September 11 and on the Guard's preparedness to perform both
overseas and domestic missions. We will publish a final report on these
issues later this year. My remarks today are based on the work we have
completed to date with respect to (1) the extent and purpose of the
National Guard's use since the September 11 attacks, (2) the effects of
that use on the Guard's readiness for future missions, and (3) the
challenges that the Department of Defense (DOD), the states, and Congress
face in organizing and equipping the Guard to be able to support both
overseas and homeland security missions.

To assess these issues, we analyzed data on National Guard utilization and
readiness since September 11. We interviewed officials in the Departments
of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, and the National Guard Bureau and
supplemented this information with visits to Army and Air Force commands
and Army mobilization stations. We also developed case studies of recent
federal and state National Guard operations in four states

- Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. In each of these states, we
visited the Adjutant General and the National Guard headquarters, as well
as Army and Air National Guard units that had been or will be involved in
domestic or overseas missions. We identified future challenges based on
our analysis of the Guard's current status and discussions with National
Guard officials. We conducted our review in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards between April 2003 and April 2004.

Summary 	Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, almost half of
the 457,000 members of the National Guard have been called to fulfill new
requirements for homeland security and to support military operations
overseas. Cumulatively, over 51 percent of Army Guard personnel and 31
percent of Air Guard personnel have been alerted or activated for federal
homeland security missions or overseas missions related to the Global War
on Terrorism. The Army Guard has had difficulty in responding to these
needs because it was largely structured and funded as a later deploying
follow-on force rather than a ready force for rapid deployment. In recent
operations, Guard units were asked to take on more missions, in some cases
with little time to prepare. Certain types of units have been in
especially high demand, leading to extended and repeated deployments for
soldiers with specialties such as military police, transportation, and
combat arms. For example, 92 percent of the Army Guard's military police
units have been deployed at least once and 18 percent more than once. To
relieve demands on these forces, the Army has retrained some lowdemand
units, such as field artillery, for high-demand capabilities like
security. The Air National Guard has also been used more extensively than
expected before September 11 and was tasked with new homeland missions
such as flying armed air patrols over U.S. cities, known as combat air
patrols, and providing radar coverage for the United States. While the
number of activated Air Guard personnel has fluctuated since September 11,
it has declined over the past year to the current level of about 7,500.

The readiness of non-deployed Army and Air National Guard units for
wartime missions has declined because of the high pace of operations since
September 11. However, readiness for homeland security missions is unknown
because DOD has not fully defined requirements for homeland security
missions or established readiness standards and measures for them.
Declining readiness is a more serious problem for the Army Guard because
it is not funded to field the numbers and types of deploymentready units
that recent operations have demanded. Army Guard units are only funded to
meet a portion of their personnel, equipment, and training requirements,
even though theater commanders require the Guard to provide fully manned
and equipped units when they deploy to actual military operations. For
example, some units had only about three quarters of the personnel they
needed when they were alerted. As a result, the Army National Guard has
taken personnel and equipment from units

that were not activated but might be needed in the future to prepare
deploying units. Since September 11, the Army Guard has initiated over
71,000 transfers to provide specific skills or fill shortages of qualified
personnel and transferred at least 22,000 pieces of equipment to units
deploying to Iraq from non-deploying units. As of March 2004, the
remaining non-deployed Army National Guard units lacked over one-third of
the critical equipment they need to be ready to execute their federal
missions. Although the Air Guard is maintained at a higher level of
readiness overall than the Army Guard, its readiness has also declined
since September 2001. Some Air Guard units-such as those that conduct
combat air patrols over U.S. cities, provide airlift capability, or
conduct tanker refueling operations-have reported that high operational
demands made it difficult to meet their training requirements. Some state
officials we spoke with were concerned about the Guard's preparedness for
homeland security missions as well as for state requirements such as
natural disaster response because of the large numbers of personnel and
equipment that have been alerted or deployed for federal missions.

Our work thus far has shown that DOD, the states, and Congress face three
major challenges with regard to balancing the Guard's future role in
overseas and domestic missions. These challenges include (1) the eroding
readiness of Army Guard units that may be mobilized for overseas
operations within the next few years; (2) the need to determine how the
Army National Guard should be structured and funded to support federal
missions in the longer term; and (3) how to balance homeland and overseas
requirements. The Army and National Guard have a number of initiatives in
most of these areas, such as reorganizing the Army Guard into modular
units as part of the Army's reorganization and adjusting how forces are
distributed among states to provide units with the skills needed for state
and homeland security missions. However, funding and force adjustments
needed to implement these changes for the Guard have not been identified
and will require close coordination between the National Guard, DOD, the
states, and Congress. In addition, the Army plans to reorganize its active
and Guard combat units to make them more modular and responsive, but it
has not identified funding to implement these changes for the Guard.

Background 	The National Guard, comprised of the Army and Air National
Guard, has a unique dual mission that consists of both federal and state
roles. In their federal status, the Army and Air National Guard are part
of the Army and Air Force's reserve components, along with the Army
Reserve and the Air Force Reserve, respectively. In their federal status,
Guard units are

deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo for stabilization operations and to
Afghanistan and Iraq in the war on terrorism. The National Guard can be
activated under a variety of legal authorities that differ in terms of
duration, mission types, command structure, and funding source. The
National Guard may be activated under state law to provide critical
infrastructure protection or respond to state emergencies under control of
the governor and paid for with state funds. The Guard can also be
involuntarily activated under federal law for federal domestic or overseas
missions. Title 10 of the United States Code, which is the section that
prescribes the use of the Armed Services while in federal service, gives
the President authority to activate reservists for various periods of
time. Following the terrorist attacks, the President declared a national
emergency on September 14, 2001, whereby reservists can be activated for
up to 2 years. Title 10 provisions also enable Guard members to volunteer
for service. In addition, the Guard can be activated under Title 32 U.S.C.
by which Guard forces remain under the control of the state governor but
receive federal funding.

The National Guard is composed primarily of Guard members who serve on a
part-time basis, usually 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks a year for annual
training. In addition, both the Army and Air National Guard have some
full-time personnel who enhance readiness by assisting unit commanders in
administrative, training, and maintenance tasks. Overall, the Army
National Guard has about 350,000 members and makes up more than one-half
of the total Army's ground combat forces and one-third of its support
forces, such as military police and transportation units. The Army
National Guard has units in more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50
states and 4 U.S. territories. As a part of the Army, much of the Army
National Guard has been organized, trained, and resourced as a strategic
reserve that would receive personnel, training, and equipment as a
followon force to augment active Army units in an extended conflict. The
Air National Guard has about 107,000 Air Guard personnel that make up 20
percent of the total Air Force with 88 flying units and 579 mission
support units located at more than 170 installations nationwide. The Air
National Guard has been integrated with the Air Force's active and reserve
component and resourced as a part of its operational force.

After September 11, 2001, the Guard's homeland missions were expanded to
include activities that it had not previously undertaken, such as guarding
airports and critical infrastructure, that are known as homeland

security missions. Homeland security is a broad term that encompasses
efforts to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism and prevent
terrorist attacks as well as respond to an attack that might occur.1 The
Guard can be tasked with homeland security missions under the state
governors or, when activated, by DOD under command of the president. DOD
refers to its contributions to the overall homeland security effort as
"homeland defense." Homeland defense activities include military missions
conducted within the United States that DOD conducts under extraordinary
circumstances with support, as needed, by other agencies. Flying combat
air patrols over U.S. cities and guarding military installations are
examples of these activities. DOD will also support civilian authorities
to provide quick response or capabilities that other agencies do not have.
The U.S. Northern Command provides command and control for DOD's homeland
defense missions and coordinates DOD's support to civil authorities for
homeland security missions. U.S. Northern Command would take a leading
role in homeland defense missions including land, air, aerospace, and
maritime defense operations.

  Army and Air National Guard Have Participated in Multiple Missions and
  Experienced High Activations for Overseas and Homeland Security Operations

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, nearly half of the National
Guard's members have been alerted2 or activated to meet the multiple
federal requirements at home and abroad arising out of the Global War on
Terrorism. Specifically, over 51 percent of Army Guard personnel and 31
percent of Air Guard personnel have been alerted or activated for homeland
security or overseas missions. Although largely programmed and funded as a
later deploying strategic reserve, the Army Guard has taken on extensive
and ongoing overseas missions. Moreover, Army Guard units with high-demand
specialties have faced extended and repeated deployments. To compensate,
the Army Guard is retraining units to fill high-demand capabilities. The
Army Guard has also taken on expanded homeland missions, such as providing
security for critical infrastructure, Air Force installations, and U.S.
borders. In addition, the Air Guard has taken on new homeland defense
missions, notably combat air patrols over U.S. cities, and about one-third
of its members were activated between September 2001 and March 2004. As
figure 1 shows, about 102,500 Army and Air National Guard members-the vast
majority of whom are Army

1 The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland
Security, Washington, D.C.: July 2002).

2 DOD has established in policy a goal to provide reservists a minimum of
30 days written notification, referred to as "alert," before they are
mobilized for active duty.

Guard members-were on active duty as of March 2004 to support the National
Guard's ongoing participation in operations under federal authority.

Figure 1: Post-September 11 National Guard Federal Activity Under Title 10

aArmy National Guard data represent the number of soldiers alerted and
mobilized. Air National Guard data represent the number of airmen who are
mobilized.

bBecause Army National Guard data for January 2003 are not available,
chart data point was estimated based on trend.

High Use and Expanded Missions of Army Guard Signify Change from Strategic
Reserve Force to Operational Force

The high level of Army Guard forces needed for federal missions for the
foreseeable future represents a fundamental change from the Guard's
planned role as a strategic reserve force that would have additional time
to train following the onset of war to an operational force that has had
to respond quickly. The number of Army Guard members activated for federal
missions more than quadrupled from about 5,500 in the days before the
September 11 attacks to about 23,000 in the first month after the attacks
because Army Guard forces were called on to perform an array of new
federal homeland security missions. As figure 2 shows, by the end of March
2004, about 97,000 Army Guard members were activated for overseas
warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping operations in
Bosnia and Kosovo, or federally funded homeland defense missions such as
guarding Air Force bases. This equates to more than one quarter of the
Army Guard's force. In addition, Army Guard members have experienced
lengthy deployments. For example, as of February 2004, over 57,000
soldiers (about 16 percent of the Army Guard) had been away from home for
more than 220 days in the past year. DOD reports that the steady

state for the next 3 to 5 years will require a total of about 100,000 to
150,000 reserve personnel to support on-going operations, and that many of
these personnel will come from the Army Guard and Reserve. DOD also
expects that mobilizations of up to 1 year or more will be the norm for
reserve component members during the next 3 to 5 years.3

Figure 2: Post-September 11 Army National Guard Activities under Federal
and State Authorities

In addition to its overall high use, particular specialties within the
Army National Guard have been used extensively and at rates that DOD
reports4

cannot be sustained for long durations. DOD has reported that using more
than 17 percent of the personnel in a career field annually indicates an
unsustainably high pace of operations in the career field and we believe
could indicate a need for additional capability. However, as figure 3
shows, usage rates for personnel in some Army Guard career fields exceeded
50 percent in the last 2-1/2 years. Capabilities key to both overseas and
homeland missions such as military police, transportation, and combat
units are among those experiencing a high pace of operations.

3 Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve, Office
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
(Readiness, Training, and Mobilization), 15 January 2004.

4 Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve.

In particular, 92 percent of military police units have deployed during
this time period, with 18 percent deployed more than once. Army Guard
forces that are frequently called on by state governors to respond to
state needs such as natural disasters have also been affected by current
operational demands-about 70 percent of the enhanced brigades5 and
separate

battalions and 75 percent of the Guard's divisional combat battalions have
been deployed at some point since September 11 and, when deployed, were
not available for state needs.

Figure 3: Types of Army National Guard Units with Highest Post-September
11 Use

Note: Data through March 31, 2004.

5 Enhanced brigades are the Army National Guard's highest priority combat
units. These 15 brigades receive specialized training and higher priority
than other National Guard units for personnel and resources during
peacetime. Once called to active duty, they are expected to be ready to
deploy overseas within 90 days.

The Army National Guard is being adapted for expanded missions both at
home and overseas and has been used in different configurations than DOD
war planners had anticipated. In all four of our case study states, Guard
officials reported that their units were adapted and personnel were
trained for previously unanticipated homeland tasks, such as guarding
airports and Air Force bases in the United States. As of March 31, 2004,
about 5,500 Army Guard soldiers were still guarding Air Force bases in the
United States. In our case study states, Army Guard units reported
responding to specific needs in support of governors and federal
authorities. For example:

o  	The New Jersey Army Guard provided security for bridges, tunnels, and
nuclear power plants for the state governor during 2003 and continues to
provide security at two nuclear power plants.

o  	The Oregon Army Guard provided security at federal installations, such
as the Umatilla Chemical Depot and Ft. Lewis, Washington, during 2002 and
2003.

o  	The Texas Army Guard performed border security assisting U.S. Customs
agents from October 2001 to November 2002 and provided security at Air
Force installations and state nuclear power plants from October 2001 to
October 2002.

o  	In Georgia, Army Guard personnel provided airport security almost
immediately after September 11 and were still guarding Army bases and Air
Force facilities at the time of our visit in December 2003.

Army National Guard units were also adapted for overseas missions to
increase the supply of high-demand specialties, meet new operational
requirements, and fill personnel shortages in deploying units. For
example, to avoid critical shortages of military police units, 27 Army
National Guard units, containing over 7,000 personnel, were converted from
other specialties such as field artillery to military police units, some
of which have already deployed to Iraq to perform missions such as convoy
security. In total, more than 34,000 soldiers deployed with new units that
were tailored to provide specific capabilities needed as a result of the
new security environment.

Significant Use of Air Guard Occurred for Iraq Combat Operations and
Homeland Defense Missions, but Number of Activated Personnel Has Decreased

The Air National Guard has also faced expanded roles and high utilization
since September 11, 2001. As figure 1 shows, Air Guard activations
increased in the fall of 2001 to support both homeland security activities
and operations in Afghanistan and declined in 2002. Air Guard activations
increased again in the spring of 2003 at the beginning of operations in
Iraq but have since declined to about 7,500 as of March 2004. The effects
of the increased operations have not been as severe on the Air National
Guard as on the Army Guard because the Air Guard is structured and funded
to be a ready operational force. The Air Force, using an Air and Space
Expeditionary Force concept, divides its forces into 10 groups, each
containing a mix of active, Guard, and reserve forces, and operates on a
standard 15-month rotational cycle. The Air Guard often uses volunteers to
fill rotational requirements, rather than activating large units, for
missions. Because the Air National Guard is structured to deploy in small
units and is funded to achieve readiness levels comparable to the active
Air Force, these small units can deploy within 72 hours after being
alerted.

Since the terrorist attacks on the homeland, the Air National Guard has
been called on to perform new missions such as flying combat air patrols
and providing radar coverage for the continental United States. Units in
the states we visited played key roles in homeland defense missions. For
example:

o  	The 177th Fighter Wing in New Jersey, which is strategically located
near major cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and
Washington, D.C., took on the additional mission of flying combat air
patrols over these cities. Through early November 2003, the 177th had
flown 1,458 combat air patrol missions.

o  	The 147th Fighter Wing in Texas flew a total of 284 combat air patrol
missions over New York City and Washington, D.C., between December 2001
and March 2002. Since September 11, the unit has also flown combat air
patrols over Houston, the Gulf Coast, and in support of special events
such as the Super Bowl and the Winter Olympics.

Like the Army Guard, the Air Guard is also experiencing a higher demand
for particular specialties with some specialties used at rates DOD reports
cannot be sustained over time.6 As figure 4 shows, among career fields
with more than 500 personnel, 86 percent of tanker pilots, 84 percent of

6 Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve.

security personnel, and 81 percent of flight engineers have deployed at
least once since September 2001. Further, about 10,000 Air Guard members
have been deployed for more than 220 days in the past year and about 6,400
of those have been deployed for more than 401 days in the last 2 years.

Figure 4: Types of Air National Guard Specialties with Highest
Post-September 11 Use

Note 1: Data through March 8, 2004.

Note 2: Chart contains career fields with more than 500 personnel and are
more than 50 percent utilized.

To meet the requirements of both its domestic and overseas missions, Air
Guard officials said they added personnel to planned rotation cycles by
activating some units earlier than planned and extending their duty tours.
And, except for some high-demand specialties, the Air Guard returned to
its usual rotation schedule in March 2004.

  Readiness of Nondeployed National Guard Units Has Declined, but Decline Is
  Most Significant for the Army Guard

Since September 11, 2001, the extensive use of both the Army and Air
National Guard in recent operations has resulted in a steady decline in
the warfighting readiness of non-deployed units. The greatest negative
impact has been on the Army National Guard because it is not structured or
funded to meet the demands of recent operations. The extensive transfers
of personnel and equipment needed to prepare lower resourced Army Guard
units to meet wartime deployment standards have eroded the readiness
levels of the remaining Army Guard force. Certain Air Guard personnel
specialties and equipment are also facing continued stress due to the
ongoing pace of operations and aging aircraft. The effect of this
readiness decline on the Guard's ability to perform homeland security
missions is unknown because DOD has not completed its efforts to define
requirements and readiness standards and measures for the homeland defense
missions it would lead or the civil missions is would support. Some state
officials we spoke with voiced concern about the preparedness of their
Guard units for recurring state emergencies or new homeland security
missions given the level of the Guard's ongoing support to overseas
operations.

Extensive Personnel and Equipment Transfers to Deploying Units Erode
Preparedness of Remaining Army Guard Units

Preparation of deploying Army Guard units to meet the theater commanders'
requirements for recent overseas operations has resulted in extensive
transfers of both personnel and equipment that degraded the readiness of
remaining units. For the Army Guard, DOD provides units with varying
levels of personnel, training, equipment, and full-time support based on
how quickly they are expected to be used. For example, DOD aims to provide
certain types of Guard units, such as early deploying support and Special
Forces units, all the personnel and equipment they require to undertake
their wartime missions. Other forces, such as most combat brigades and
divisions which are expected to deploy later, are authorized fewer
personnel and less equipment than they need to meet their wartime
missions.

The Army's goal is to provide the Guard's enhanced brigades, the most
ready of its combat forces, about 85 percent of the personnel and 90
percent of the equipment they need to deploy. However, we found that the
two enhanced separate brigades activated in support of operations in Iraq
needed 2,100 additional soldiers, about one-fourth of their required
personnel, to meet deployment requirements. Combat divisions are
authorized only 65 percent of the personnel and equipment they need, and
it could take months before they are ready to deploy. Moreover, soldiers
must be qualified in their military specialties by attending required
training and meeting training standards to be ready to deploy, but as of
March

2004, only 68 percent of the Guard's required personnel were qualified in
their specialty. Guard members may not be qualified because they have not
been able to attend training when it is scheduled. Since September 11,
2001, the Army National Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers of
personnel from one unit to another to enhance the readiness of deploying
units.

In addition to personnel shortfalls, most Army Guard units are not
provided all the equipment they need for their wartime requirements.
Moreover, the equipment they have is often older than that of the active
Army and in many cases does not meet the warfighting commander's
requirements because it is not compatible with the active Army's newer
equipment. For example, many Army Guard units have radios that cannot
communicate with new communications systems and old trucks for which the
active Army does not stock spare parts. Units deploying in support of
operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 needed about 22,000 pieces of
equipment-including night vision goggles, machine guns, trucks,
decontamination apparel, and radios-to meet deployment requirements. The
Army National Guard filled these shortages by transferring equipment from
other units. In fact, between December 2002 and March 2004, Army Guard
units in every state and territory supplied equipment to three deploying
enhanced brigades. Initially the Guard managed transfers so that many
units shared the burden of losing equipment and could remain at their
planned readiness levels. For example, the enhanced separate brigade we
visited in Georgia transferred machine guns, night vision goggles, and
global positioning systems to deploying units, but officials said that the
unit maintained its readiness rating because the equipment was not deemed
critical or taken in quantities that degraded the unit's overall readiness
level. However, in November 2003, the Director of the Army National Guard
directed that personnel and equipment be transferred to deploying units,
even if that meant degrading the readiness of remaining units, a strategy
that may not be sustainable over the long term. By 2004, deployments and
existing shortages left the remaining Army Guard units without about 33
percent of the critical equipment they need. In New Jersey, officials told
us that some units had less than 65 percent of their wartime equipment
requirements and reported critical shortages of spare parts, utility
trucks, night vision goggles, and pistols.

High Usage and Aging Air National Guard units have also experienced
difficulty in maintaining Equipment Eroding Air their warfighting
readiness while conducting overseas and homeland National Guard Readiness
defense missions and reported overall declines in readiness. The Air Force

and Air Guard attribute these readiness declines to the high pace of
operations and problems associated with aging aircraft.

Many Air Guard units use aging aircraft, and the high pace of operations
has been a training and maintenance challenge. For example,

o  	An airlift wing we visited in Georgia operates aging C-130 transport
planes. Although officials said that in peacetime the wing planned for
2,900 flying hours annually for training, it had flown over 13,000 hours
for operations and training in 2003. This high pace of operations made it
difficult for the unit to continue to perform its warfighting training
requirements for tasks, such as tactical formation flying, thus lowering
its readiness ratings. In addition, officials said that in recent
deployments to Iraq, the unit's aging aircraft and the harsh operating
environment presented a maintenance challenge, as evidenced by the need to
replace 11 turbine engines and 20 propellers to keep the 8 aircraft
operational.

o  	Since September 11, 2001, fighter wings that we visited in New Jersey,
Texas, and Oregon have been directed to dedicate some aircraft to domestic
combat air patrol missions. This has reduced the number of aircraft
available for air crews to use for other warfighting mission training. To
meet training requirements, the units have had to fly the remaining
aircraft more hours than planned, which has created scheduling and
maintenance problems. Officials were concerned about the long-term effects
of the continued high pace of operations on their ability to support both
missions.

DOD Has Not Fully Defined Mission Requirements or Readiness Standards and
Measures for All Its Homeland Security Missions, and Some States Have
Concerns about Preparedness and Availability of Guard Units

It is difficult to assess the Guard's preparedness for the full range of
homeland security missions because requirements for these missions are not
yet well defined. Moreover, DOD has not yet established readiness
standards and measures for homeland defense or civil support missions. DOD
generally organizes, trains, and equips the National Guard for only the
federal missions it leads. DOD's U.S. Northern Command, which is charged
with planning, organizing, and executing DOD-led homeland defense and with
supporting homeland security missions led by civilian authorities, has not
yet finalized its plans that would identify forces and resources for the
homeland missions it may lead or support. In some cases, Northern Command
is awaiting further guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
As a result, National Guard forces that may have to take on homeland
security missions are not organized, trained, or equipped specifically for
these missions. Without specific requirements

and plans that clarify the types of skills and equipment needed for these
missions, it is not possible to measure the readiness of forces
specifically for these missions.

To address some potential homeland security needs, DOD began establishing
weapons of mass destruction civil support teams as authorized by
Presidential Directive and Congress in fiscal year 1999. These teams,
which are comprised of 22 full-time personnel, are maintained at the
highest readiness levels and can rapidly respond to support civil
authorities in an event involving a weapon of mass destruction. Their role
is to assist local officials in determining the nature of the attack,
provide medical and technical advice, and help to identify follow-on
federal and state assets that might be needed. Congress has now authorized
at least one team for each state and territory. Currently, 32 teams are
fully operational with the remaining 23 estimated to be operational by
2007.7 These teams are unique because they are federally funded and
trained but perform their mission under the command and control of the
state governor.

Individual state Guards have also begun to develop plans and organize
their Guard forces for some homeland security tasks that might be
conducted under the authority of the governor. However, these efforts vary
from state to state. For example, in our case study states,

o  	Georgia officials told us they were in the process of identifying
critical infrastructure sites in the state and assigning quick reaction
forces to protect them.

o  	New Jersey has assigned ready-reaction forces to protect key sites in
each of 3 geographic regions.

o  	Oregon has identified some of the critical infrastructure that must be
protected and annually identifies those National Guard units that will be
assigned to perform rapid response force tasks.

Historically, Guard forces could perform state missions using the skills
and equipment they were provided for their federal missions. However,
mobilized and deployed personnel and their equipment are not available

7 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Civil Support Teams, Implementation Act of 2003, April 10, 2003.

for states to use for either new homeland security missions, such as
responding to increased terrorist threats, or recurring natural disasters,
such as floods or forest fires. As figure 5 shows, 15 states currently
have 40 percent or more of their Army Guard soldiers mobilized or
deployed. While Air Guard units are not used as extensively for state
missions as those of the Army Guard, as figure 6 shows, as many as
one-third of Air Guard units were alerted or deployed from some states as
of March 2004. None of the four states we visited had developed a state
system for measuring the preparedness of its forces for homeland security
missions, and officials in all four states we visited raised varying
concerns about homeland security preparedness. For example:

o  	New Jersey units that responded to a terrorist threat alert in
December 2003 reported that they lacked some essential equipment such as
humvees, night vision equipment, cold weather gear, chemical protective
suits, and nerve agent antidote. The state paid for some essential
equipment for its forces during this time on an emergency basis. In
addition, at the time of our visit, New Jersey was preparing to deploy
large numbers of its state Guard personnel overseas and was determining
how it would respond to another such terrorist threat after almost 60
percent of its forces are deployed.

o  	Georgia officials told us that hosting the 2004 International Economic
Summit of Eight Industrialized Nations in June 2004 will increase
Georgia's requirements for security missions such as aerial reconnaissance
and surveillance at a time when its Army Guard aviation units may be
deployed overseas.

o  	In 2002 the state of Oregon called up more than 1,400 Army Guard
soldiers to respond to one of the worst forest fire seasons in a century.
Oregon officials stated that because many of its forces and equipment are
currently deployed and the state has only limited engineering capability
left, it would not be able to provide the same level of support as it did
in the 2002 season.

o  	All of the aviation assets Texas would need to fight fires and all of
its military police were deployed at the time of our visit. However, Texas
officials said that they were able to meet their homeland security needs,
even at the height of its Guard's overseas deployments, because its
largest Army Guard unit had not been fully deployed and, as a large state,
it had ample state emergency response capability.

Figure 5: Percent of Army National Guard Soldiers Alerted, Mobilized, and
                   Deployed for Title 10 as of March 31, 2004

Figure 6: Percent of Air National Guardsmen Mobilized and Deployed for
Title 10 as of March 8, 2004

Some Guard officials noted that their states' Guards had not received
additional federal funding to take on homeland security missions, even as
personnel and equipment that could be needed for these missions are being
deployed overseas. Guard officials also said that the states have limited
budgets and that homeland security requirements compete with other needs,
although the states have funded some homeland security activities, such as
guarding critical infrastructure, and purchased some equipment. Further,
state officials said the Guard is not generally eligible for funding from
the Department of Homeland Security because its grants are limited to
"first responders" such as police or firefighters.

Most states have entered into mutual assistance agreements that may
provide access to another state's National Guard forces in times of need.
These agreements are typically used to access additional forces for
natural disaster response. However, states may withhold their forces if
the forces are needed in their home state. For example, according to New
Jersey officials, their state faces an elevated terrorist threat due to
its proximity to New York City. However, they do not have a fully
operational weapons of mass destruction civil support team in New Jersey.
The officials said they requested access to another state's team on three
occasions. On two occasions, the request was not granted because officials
in the team's home state determined that it was needed at home. When New
Jersey made a third request, in response to a specific and credible
terrorist threat, access was approved.

Readying and Resourcing National Guard Units for Overseas and Domestic
Missions Presents Significant Near- and Long-Term Challenges

Our work has shown that DOD, the states, and Congress face significant
near- and long-term challenges to readying and resourcing National Guard
units for overseas and domestic missions in the Global War on Terrorism.
These challenges include first, enhancing the near-term preparedness of
Army Guard units that may be mobilized for overseas operations within the
next few years. These improvements may be difficult to realize because the
Army National Guard is still operating at peacetime funding levels despite
declining readiness. Second, in the longer term, the Guard's ability to
successfully organize for its missions in the new strategic environment
will depend on whether adequate resources are identified for these efforts
and whether DOD's readiness and funding policies are consistent with the
Army Guard's expected high utilization for the foreseeable future.
However, the National Guard does not have complete control of all the
restructuring and resourcing decisions that will affect its mission
preparedness. Finally, in addition to restructuring and funding to be
ready for the Guard's federal mission, DOD must consider how to balance
homeland and overseas requirements.

The Guard Will Be Challenged in the Near-Term to Enhance the Readiness of
Army Guard Units for Future Overseas Rotations

The high pace of recent operations has left Army National Guard units less
prepared for future overseas operations and in need of additional trained
personnel and essential equipment. In the near term, the National Guard
must continue to provide units capable of performing challenging overseas
missions. For example, the Army Guard has alerted 33,000 troops for
deployment in support of operations in Iraq in 2005. Moreover, while
future deployment figures for operations in Afghanistan had not been
announced as of March 2004, 16,500 Army Guard soldiers are currently
deployed to support these operations.

The National Guard has attempted, where possible, to activate units that
have not been recently deployed to minimize the hardship on personnel.
However, some of these units have supplied personnel and equipment to
previously deploying units, exacerbating existing shortfalls and
interfering with the units' ability to maintain their previous level of
readiness. In addition, the continuing need for some skills may require
the Guard to reactivate units that have only recently returned from
deployment. Furthermore, the readiness of the equipment belonging to
returning units is presently unknown. However, past experience with
prolonged desert operations has shown that equipment may need extensive
maintenance and not be available for training purposes. In addition, some
redeployed units left equipment behind for other deploying units and will
need replacement equipment. Because so many personnel and so much
equipment have been taken from those units not yet deployed, improving
their readiness may become increasingly difficult. In the long term, DOD's
approach of transferring people and equipment does not appear to be
sustainable.

The early alert of some units required for overseas operations may help
identify readiness problems earlier and enable the Guard to take actions
to improve unit readiness. For example, Guard officials indicated that
certain actions, such as sending higher numbers of personnel to school to
become qualified in their specialties, could improve readiness. However,
complicating the Army Guard's efforts to improve the preparedness of its
units is the fact that the Army has not provided the Guard additional
funding for equipment and training to support its new operational
missions. The Army Guard has not received any wartime supplemental funding
in fiscal year 2004 to address the equipment shortfalls caused by the
stress of recent operations in units that might be needed in future
operations.

Long-Term Initiatives to Restructure Army National Guard Face
Implementation Challenges

DOD has a number of efforts to restructure the National Guard to improve
its ability to perform federal missions in the new strategic environment,
although these are long-term efforts that have not been fully funded in
DOD's budget and detailed implementation plans have not yet been
developed. For example, DOD plans to alleviate the high pace of operations
of reserve units by increasing the availability of certain highdemand
units and rebalancing the skills in the active and reserve forces. Other
DOD-wide initiatives to use its forces more efficiently include moving
military personnel out of activities that can be performed by civilians or
contractors and into high-demand specialties and taking advantage of
technological advances to reduce personnel needs.

The Army plans to restructure its forces, including National Guard units,
into modular units that can be tailored for specific needs. After
restructuring, the Army Guard would have 34 fully manned brigades, instead
of its current 15 enhanced brigades, 2 separate brigades, and 21 brigades
in 8 divisions that are not fully manned. The Army plans to begin
restructuring active units immediately, but, according to National Guard
officials, it has not established the time frame and funding for the
conversion of Army Guard units.

As the Army Guard is being restructured over the long-term, the Army's
current resourcing policy, which provides most Guard units with fewer
personnel and less equipment than they need for their wartime missions,
may need to be reevaluated given the Army Guard's operational role at home
and overseas in the Global War on Terrorism.

For example, one Army Guard initiative would address its long-standing
problem of having insufficient full-time personnel to support its units.
Fulltime Guard members enhance unit readiness by performing tasks such as
monitoring member readiness; recruiting and training personnel; and
maintaining supplies, equipment, and aircraft. Without sufficient
full-time personnel, these tasks, which are critical to unit readiness,
suffer. The Army Guard was authorized only 59 percent of its full-time
manning requirement in fiscal year 2003, as compared to the Air Guard's
full-time manning of 100 percent of its requirement. The Army Guard plans
to increase full-time manning gradually to an average of about 71 percent
by 2012, if funding is provided. However, there are no plans to increase
fulltime manning to 100 percent of the Guard's requirements.

Restructuring Efforts Should Consider Balance between Overseas and
Domestic Requirements

Efforts to restructure the National Guard are focused on its primary
federal mission and do not address the individual state Guard's critical
role in homeland security. As noted earlier, DOD planning and resourcing
for National Guard units has assumed that homeland security tasks can be
accomplished with the personnel and equipment supplied for the wartime
mission. However, in the new security environment, the assumption that
Guard units can perform their domestic missions with personnel and
equipment trained for overseas missions needs is questionable. The U.S.
Northern Command, which is responsible for DOD-led efforts to defend the
homeland, has not completed its efforts to identify all the forces and
capabilities needed for homeland defense or homeland security.

In the future, the National Guard would like to adopt a rotational
deployment model that would maintain at least 50 percent of a state's

Guard force available for the use of state officials to perform domestic
missions. In addition to assuring the ready availability of personnel, the
Guard would like to be able to provide each state with capabilities that
could be used for homeland security such as transportation, medical,
aviation, engineering, and military police, among others. Although
providing the variety of assets for state use has been a Guard goal, not
every state has all these capabilities at this time. Further, DOD's plans
to rebalance the active and reserve forces are based on the general goal
of deploying individuals no more than 1 year over a 6-year period.
However, overseas commitments may challenge the Guard's ability to meet
these goals. Moreover, the Guard will have to work with state officials to
balance the mix of capabilities among the state Guards.

As homeland security requirements are identified, DOD, the states, and
Congress may also need to evaluate the need for some specialties or
additional equipment or capabilities. The National Guard is providing some
training and specialized equipment, such as decontamination equipment, for
homeland security missions. At a total cost of about $9 million for
equipment, the National Guard is creating 12 enhanced response forces to
augment its civil support teams who are tasked and trained to respond if
weapons of mass destruction are used. Each Guard team will have
responsibility for 1 of 12 geographic regions in the United States. When
fully implemented, these enhanced response forces will have the medical,
decontamination, engineering, and security forces required to respond to a
mass destruction event. However, these units will retain overseas missions
and could be deployed overseas.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while the high pace of operations has caused
some difficulties for the Air Guard and the Army Guard, the Army Guard's
efforts to ready units to deploy by taking trained personnel and critical
equipment from other units has created urgent personnel and equipment
shortages in units that have not yet been deployed. Unless replacement
equipment and personnel are identified, the Army Guard will have to
continue to take personnel and equipment from one unit to ready another,
which means that the units called in the future will likely be even less
ready. The extensive use of Guard forces and eroding readiness of the
nondeployed units suggest a comprehensive reassessment of the Army Guard's
current structure and resourcing assumptions may be needed. Furthermore,
while homeland security requirements have not been defined, equipment and
personnel may not be available to the states when they are needed because
they have been deployed overseas. Moreover, the Guard may have difficulty
ensuring that each state has access to units with

  Conclusion

key specialized capabilities-such as engineering or medical assets- needed
for homeland security and other domestic missions. The National Guard has
a number of initiatives to address the mismatch between the Army Guard's
tasks and the priority it has received for personnel, training, and
equipment. Most initiatives are long-term in nature, such as reorganizing
units, and face implementation challenges, including the need for funding.
However, unless DOD, Congress, and the states work closely to address
these challenges, Guard units may continue to experience a high pace of
operations and declining readiness that could affect their ability to meet
future requirements both at home and overseas.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond
to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.

GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

For more information regarding this testimony, please call me, at (202)
512-4402. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include:
Margaret Morgan, Suzanne Wren, Jacquelyn Randolph, V. Malvern Saavedra,
Daniel Omahen, Barbara Gannon, Tina Morgan, James Lewis, M. Jane Hunt,
Jennifer Popovic, Jay Smale, and Kenneth Patton.

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