Military Personnel: Observations Related to Reserve Compensation,
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Mail Delivery to Deployed	 
Troops (24-MAR-04, GAO-04-582T).				 
                                                                 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S.	 
military has deployed high numbers of active duty and reserve	 
troops to fight the global war on terrorism and for Operation	 
Iraqi Freedom. Ensuring that U.S. military forces are adequately 
compensated and that the morale of deployed troops remains high  
have been priorities for the Congress and the Department of	 
Defense (DOD). In response to congressional mandates, GAO has	 
reviewed a number of issues concerning military personnel. For	 
this hearing, GAO was asked to provide the results of its work on
military compensation for National Guard and Reserve personnel	 
and on the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, a tool DOD
can use to enhance retention of military personnel in critical	 
occupational specialties. In addition, GAO was asked to provide  
its preliminary views, based on ongoing work, concerning mail	 
delivery to troops stationed in the Middle East.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-582T					        
    ACCNO:   A09551						        
  TITLE:     Military Personnel: Observations Related to Reserve      
Compensation, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Mail Delivery  
to Deployed Troops						 
     DATE:   03/24/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Military forces					 
	     Military pay					 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military reenlistment bonuses			 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Mail delivery problems				 
	     Personnel management				 
	     DOD Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program		 

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GAO-04-582T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Total Force, Committee on Armed Services, House
of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1 p.m. EST MILITARY PERSONNEL

Wednesday, March 24, 2004

 Observations Related to Reserve Compensation, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses,
                      and Mail Delivery to Deployed Troops

Statement of Derek B. Stewart, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-04-582T

Highlights of GAO-04-582T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Total
Force, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military has
deployed high numbers of active duty and reserve troops to fight the
global war on terrorism and for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Ensuring that
U.S. military forces are adequately compensated and that the morale of
deployed troops remains high have been priorities for the Congress and the
Department of Defense (DOD).

In response to congressional mandates, GAO has reviewed a number of issues
concerning military personnel. For this hearing, GAO was asked to provide
the results of its work on military compensation for National Guard and
Reserve personnel and on the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, a
tool DOD can use to enhance retention of military personnel in critical
occupational specialties. In addition, GAO was asked to provide its
preliminary views, based on ongoing work, concerning mail delivery to
troops stationed in the Middle East.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-582T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at (202)
512-5559 or [email protected].

March 24, 2004

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Observations Related to Reserve Compensation, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses,
and Mail Delivery to Deployed Troops

Reservists who are called to active duty to support a contingency
operation are eligible to receive the same pay and benefits as members of
the active component. Moreover, in constant dollars, basic military
compensation has increased in recent years. For instance, an enlisted
reservist in pay grade E-4 who is married with no other dependents and who
is called to active duty experienced a 19 percent increase in basic
military compensation between fiscal years 1999 and 2003. Despite these
increases, income loss is a concern to many reservists, although DOD has
lacked timely, sufficient information to assess the full scope and nature
of this problem. Benefits for reserve personnel have also improved,
notably in the area of health care. As GAO has previously reported, given
the federal government's growing deficits, it is critical that the
Congress give adequate consideration to the longer term costs and
implications of legislative proposals to further enhance military pay and
benefits before they are enacted into law. For example, proposals to
enhance reserve retirement should be considered in this context.

Although GAO has not specifically reviewed the use of SRBs to enhance
reserve retention, GAO has noted shortcomings in DOD's management and
oversight of the SRB program for active duty personnel. GAO's observations
of this program may be helpful in making decisions for the use of SRBs for
reservists. Concerned about missing their overall retention goals in the
late 1990s, all the services expanded their use of SRBs to help retain
more active duty enlisted personnel in a broader range of military
specialties, even though the program was intended to help the services
meet retention problems in selected critical specialties. As a result, the
cost of the program more than doubled in just 5 years-from $308 million in
fiscal year 1997 to $791 million in fiscal year 2002. However, the
effectiveness and efficiency of SRBs in targeting bonuses to improve
retention in selected critical occupations is unknown. DOD has not
conducted a rigorous review of the SRB program. DOD concurred with GAO's
recommendations to institute more effective controls to assess the
progress of the SRB program, but has not taken action as yet.

Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their
families at home. GAO has been reviewing mail delivery to deployed troops
and expects to issue a report soon. GAO's preliminary findings show that
mail delivery continues to be hampered by many of the same problems
encountered during the first Gulf War. First, DOD does not have a reliable
accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Second, despite
differences in operational theaters and efforts by DOD postal planners to
incorporate lessons learned into planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom,
postal operations faced many of the same problems, such as inadequate
postal facilities, equipment, and transportation. Third, DOD has not
officially tasked any entity to resolve the long-standing postal problems
experienced during contingency operations. GAO plans to make several
recommendations to improve DOD's mail delivery to deployed troops.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work on military
compensation for National Guard and Reserve personnel1 and on the
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, as well as our preliminary
observations concerning mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle
East. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military
has deployed high numbers of active duty and reserve troops to fight the
global war on terrorism and for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Ensuring that
U.S. military forces are adequately compensated and that the morale of
deployed troops remains high have been priorities for the Congress and the
Department of Defense (DOD).

Summary 	Our work on reserve compensation has shown that reservists who
are called to active duty to support a contingency operation are eligible
to receive the same pay and benefits as members of the active component.
Moreover, in constant dollars, basic military compensation-which includes
basic pay, allowances for housing and meals, and the federal tax
advantage2-has increased in recent years. As a result, reservists
activated today are earning more in the military than they did just a few
years ago. Other pay policies and protections, such as the Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act, may help to mitigate reservists' financial hardship
during deployment. Income loss is a concern to many reservists, although
DOD has lacked timely, sufficient information to assess the full scope and
nature of this problem. Benefits for reserve personnel have also improved,
notably in the area of health care where the Congress has improved
benefits not only for reservists but for their families as well. As we
have previously reported, given the federal government's growing deficits,
it is critical that the Congress give adequate consideration to the longer
term costs and implications of legislative proposals to further enhance
military pay and benefits before they are enacted into law. For example,
proposals to enhance reserve retirement should be considered in this
context. We

1 We use the generic term "reserves" and "reservists" throughout this
statement to refer to both National Guard and Reserve personnel.

2 The federal tax advantage is included in basic military compensation to
account for the tax-free status of housing and subsistence allowances. The
federal tax advantage is the added amount of taxable income that
servicemembers would have to receive in cash if housing and subsistence
allowances were to become taxable in order for them to be as well off in
after-tax income as they are under the existing system.

have ongoing work looking at proposals to change the reserve retirement
system.

The SRB program is one tool DOD can use to enhance retention of both
active duty and reserve personnel. Although we have not specifically
reviewed the use of reenlistment bonuses to enhance reserve retention, we
have noted shortcomings in DOD's management and oversight of the SRB
program for active duty personnel. Our observations of this program may be
helpful in making decisions for the use of SRBs for reservists. For
example, concerned about missing their overall retention goals in the late
1990s, all the services expanded their use of SRBs to help retain more
active duty enlisted personnel in a broader range of military specialties,
even though the program was intended to help the services meet retention
problems in selective critical specialties. The Air Force in fiscal year
2001 awarded bonuses to approximately 80 percent of its specialties, which
were paid to 42 percent of its reenlistees. As a result of the services'
expanded use of SRBs for active duty personnel, the cost of the program
more than doubled in just 5 years-from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to
$791 million in fiscal year 2002. The SRB budget was expected to rise to
over $800 million in fiscal year 2005. Despite increased use of the SRB
program, DOD has cited continued retention problems in specialized
occupations. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of SRBs in
targeting bonuses to improve retention in selective critical occupations
is unknown. DOD has not conducted a rigorous review of the SRB program.

Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their
families at home. More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were
delivered to troops serving in theater during 2003. Between February and
November 2003, the Congress and the White House forwarded more than 300
inquiries about mail delivery problems to military postal officials. We
have been reviewing mail delivery and expect to issue a report soon. Our
preliminary findings show that mail delivery continues to be hampered by
many of the same problems encountered during the first Gulf War. First,
DOD does not have a reliable accurate system in place to measure
timeliness. Second, despite differences in operational theaters and
efforts by DOD postal planners to incorporate lessons learned into
planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations faced many of the
same problems: difficulty conducting joint mail operations; postal
personnel inadequately trained and initially scarce in number due to late
deployments; and inadequate postal facilities, equipment, and
transportation. Third, DOD has not officially tasked any entity to resolve
the long-standing postal problems experienced during contingency
operations.

  Reserve Compensation

Now let me turn to each of these issues in more detail.

One of DOD's guiding principles for military compensation is that
servicemembers, in both the reserve and active components, be treated
fairly.3 Military compensation for reservists is affected by the type of
military duty performed. In peacetime-when a reservist is training or
performing military duty not related to a contingency operation-certain
thresholds are imposed at particular points in service before a reservist
is eligible to receive the same compensation as a member of the active
component. For example, a reservist is not entitled to a housing allowance
when on inactive duty training (weekend drills). If a reservist is on
active duty orders that specify a period of 140 days or more, then he or
she becomes entitled to the full basic housing allowance. For contingency
operations,4 these thresholds do not apply.5 Thus, reservists activated
for Operation Iraqi Freedom and other contingencies are eligible to
receive the same compensation as active component personnel.

Basic military compensation,6 in constant dollars, remained fairly steady
during the 1990s but has increased in recent years. As a result,
reservists-enlisted personnel and officers-activated today are earning
more in the military than they did just a few years ago, as shown in
figure

1. For example, an enlisted member in pay grade E-4 who is married with no
other dependents (family size 2) earned $3,156 per month in basic military
compensation in fiscal year 2003, compared with $2,656 per month in fiscal
year 1999, or a 19 percent increase. These figures are calculated in
constant 2003 dollars to account for the effects of inflation.

3 Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military
Compensation Background Papers: Compensation Elements and Related Manpower
Cost Items, Their Purposes and Legislative Backgrounds (Sept. 1996).

4 A military operation may be designated by the Secretary of Defense as a
contingency operation or become a contingency operation as a matter of
law.

5 Reservists who are placed on active duty orders for 31 days or more are
automatically enrolled in TRICARE Prime. Family members of reservists who
are activated for 31 days or more may obtain coverage under TRICARE.

6 Basic military compensation consists of basic pay, basic allowance for
housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and the federal tax advantage.
It does not include special and incentive pays, other allowances, and the
value of fringe benefits, such as health care and retirement.

Figure 1: Annual Basic Military Compensation for Selected Pay Grades for
Fiscal Years 1990-2003

Note: GAO analysis.

In addition to increases in basic military compensation, other pay
policies and protections may help to mitigate reservists' financial
hardship during deployment. For example:

o  	By statute, debt interest rates are capped at 6 percent annually for
debts incurred prior to activation.7 The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act,
passed in December 2003,8 enhanced certain other protections. For example,
the act prohibits a landlord, except by court order, from evicting a
servicemember or the dependents of a servicemember, during a period of
military service of the servicemember, from a residence for which the
monthly rent does not exceed $2,400. The act increased the monthly rental
limit from $1,200 and required the rental limit to be adjusted annually
based on changes to a national housing consumer price index.

7 50 U.S.C. App. sec. 527. 8 Public Law 108-189 (Dec. 19, 2003).

o  	Some or all of the income that servicemembers earn while serving in
combat zones is tax-free.9

o  	For certain contingencies, including Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD
authorizes reservists to receive both a housing allowance and per diem for
their entire period of activation, up to 2 years.

o  	Emergency loans are available through the Small Business
Administration to help small businesses meet necessary operating expenses
and debt payments.

An issue of concern that is closely tied with military compensation is
income loss experienced by many reservists activated for a military
operation. In a recent report, we evaluated information on income
change.10 We found that DOD lacked sufficient information on the
magnitude, the causes, and the effects of income change to determine the
need for compensation programs targeting reservists who meet three
criteria: (1) fill critical wartime specialties, (2) experience high
degrees of income loss when on extended periods of active duty, and (3)
demonstrate that income loss is a significant factor in their retention
decisions. Such data are critical for assessing the full nature and scope
of income change problems and in developing cost-effective solutions. DOD
data on income change has been derived from self-reported survey data
collected from reservists and their spouses. A 2000 DOD survey of
reservists showed that of those who served in military operations from
1991 to 2000, an estimated 59 percent of drilling unit members had no
change or gain in family income when they were mobilized or deployed for a
military operation, and about 41 percent lost income. This survey was
conducted before the mobilizations occurring after September 11, 2001. A
2002 DOD survey of spouses of activated reservists showed that an
estimated 70 percent of families experienced a gain or no change in
monthly income and 30 percent experienced a decrease in monthly income.
The survey data are

9 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Armed Forces' Tax
Guide: For Use in Preparing 2003 Returns, Publication 3, Cat. No. 46072M.
This publication noted that all military pay for the month is excluded
from income when an enlisted servicemember, warrant officer, or
commissioned warrant officer served in a combat zone during any part of a
month or while hospitalized as a result of service in the combat zone. The
amount of the exclusion for a commissioned officer (other than a
commissioned warrant officer) is limited to the highest rate of enlisted
pay, plus imminent danger/hostile fire pay, for each month during any part
of which an officer served in a combat zone or while hospitalized as a
result of service there.

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: DOD Needs More Data
to Address Financial and Health Care Issues Affecting Reservists,
GAO-03-1004 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2003).

questionable primarily because it is unclear what survey respondents
considered as income loss or gain in determining their financial status.
We recommended that DOD take steps to obtain more complete information in
order to take a targeted approach to addressing income change problems.
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In May and September of 2003, DOD
implemented two web-based surveys of reservists to collect data on
mobilization issues, such as income change. DOD has tabulated the survey
results and expects to issue a report with its analysis of the results by
July 2004. These surveys should be insightful for this issue.

Benefits are another important component of military compensation for
reservists and help to alleviate some of the hardships of military life.
DOD offers a wide range of benefits, including such core benefits as
health care, paid time off, life insurance, and retirement.11 Notable
improvements have been made to the health care benefits for reservists and
their families. For example, under authorities granted to DOD in the
National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, DOD
instituted several health care demonstration programs to provide financial
assistance to reservists and family members. For example, DOD instituted
the TRICARE Reserve Component Family Member Demonstration Project for
family members of reservists mobilized for Operations Noble Eagle and
Enduring Freedom to reduce TRICARE costs and assist dependents of
reservists in maintaining relationships with their current health care
providers. The demonstration project eliminates the TRICARE deductible and
the requirement that dependents obtain statements saying that inpatient
care is not available at a military treatment facility before they can
obtain nonemergency treatment from a civilian hospital. Legislation passed
in December 2002 made family members of reservists activated for more than
30 days eligible for TRICARE Prime12 if they reside more than 50 miles, or
an hour's driving time, from a military treatment facility. Last year, the
Congress passed legislation for a 1-year program to extend

11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Active Duty
Benefits Reflect Changing Demographics, but Opportunities Exist to
Improve, GAO-02-935 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2002).

12 Public Law 107-314, sec. 702. TRICARE Prime, one of the options under
DOD's managed health care program, is similar to a private HMO plan and
does not require enrollment fees or copayments.

TRICARE to reservists who are unemployed or whose employer does not

                                       13

offer health care benefits.

As we have previously reported, given the federal government's growing
deficits, it is critical that the Congress give adequate consideration to
the longer term costs and implications of legislative proposals to further
enhance military pay and benefits before they are enacted into law. For
example, proposals to enhance reserve retirement should be considered in
this context. We have ongoing work looking at proposals to change the
reserve retirement system. The key questions we are addressing include:

o  What are the objectives of the reserve retirement system?

o  Is DOD meeting its reserve retirement objectives?

o  	What changes to the current reserve retirement system that DOD and
others have proposed could help DOD better meet its objectives?

o  What factors should DOD consider before making changes to its reserve

  Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program

retirement system?

We anticipate issuing a report addressing these questions in September
2004.

While we have not specifically reviewed the use of reenlistment bonuses
for reservists, our work has shown that DOD could improve the management
and oversight of the SRB program with more methodologically rigorous
evaluations. The SRB program is intended to help the services retain
enlisted personnel in critical occupational specialties, such as linguists
and information technology specialists. Concerned about missing their
overall retention goals in the late 1990s, all the services expanded their
use of SRBs to help retain more active duty enlisted personnel. There were
increases in the number of specialties that the services made eligible for
the bonuses and in the number of bonus recipients. The Air Force, for
example, awarded bonuses to 158 specialties (80 percent of total
specialties) in fiscal year 2001, up from 68 specialties (35 percent of
total specialties) in fiscal year 1997. During this time period, the
number of active duty Air Force reenlistees receiving bonuses increased
from 3,612 (8 percent of total reenlistees) to 17,336 (42 percent of total
reenlistees). As a result of the services' expanded use of SRBs for active
duty personnel, the cost of the program

                       13 Public Law 108-106, sec. 1115.

more than doubled-from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to $791 million in
fiscal year 2002.14 The SRB budget was expected to rise to over $800
million in fiscal year 2005. About 44 percent of the SRB budget growth
over the 1997 to 2005 period is attributable to increases in the Air Force
SRB budget. Despite increased use of the SRB program, DOD has cited
continued retention problems in specialized occupations such as air
traffic controller, linguist, and information technology specialist.

In November 2003,15 we reviewed a congressionally directed DOD report to
the Congress on the program and found that DOD had not thoroughly
addressed four of the five concerns raised by the Congress. As a result,
the Congress did not have sufficient information to determine if the
program was being managed effectively and efficiently. More specifically,

o  	DOD did not directly address the SRB program's effectiveness or
efficiency in correcting shortfalls in critical occupations.

o  	DOD had not issued replacement program guidance for ensuring that the
program targets only critical specialties that impact readiness. DOD did
not address an important change-the potential elimination of the
requirement for conducting annual reviews. We were told that the new
guidance will require periodic reviews, but neither the frequency nor the
details of how these reviews would be conducted was explained.

o  	DOD did not describe the steps it would take to match program
execution with appropriated funding. Our analysis showed that in fiscal
years 19992002, the services spent a combined total of $259 million more
than the Congress appropriated for the SRB program.

o  	DOD provided only a limited assessment of how each service administers
its SRB program.

o  	DOD identified the most salient advantages and disadvantages that
could result from implementing a lump sum payment option for paying
retention bonuses, and we generally concurred with DOD's observations.

On the basis of our work, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to (1)
retain the requirement for an annual review of the SRB program and (2)
develop a consistent set of methodologically sound procedures and metrics
for reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of all aspects of

14 These budget figures are expressed in constant fiscal year 2004
dollars.

15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: DOD Needs More
Effective Controls to Better Assess the Progress of the Selective
Reenlistment Bonus Program, GAO-04-86 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2003).

  Mail Delivery

each service's SRB program administration. DOD concurred with the
recommendations but has not yet taken actions to address them.

Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their
families at home. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, problems with prompt and
reliable mail delivery surfaced early in the conflict and continued
throughout. More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were
delivered to troops serving in theater during 2003. Between February and
November 2003, the Congress and the White House forwarded more than 300
inquiries about mail delivery problems to military postal officials. We
are reviewing mail delivery to troops stationed overseas and plan to issue
our report next month. In the report, we will assess (1) the timeliness of
mail delivery to troops stationed in the Gulf Region, (2) how mail
delivery issues and problems experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom
compare to those during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and (3) efforts to
identify actions to resolve problems for future contingencies.

Although our report is not yet final, the preliminary results of our
review are as follows:

                                   Timeliness

The timeliness of the mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi
Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a
reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Transit time
data reported by the Transit Time Information Standard System for Military
Mail shows that average transit times for letters and parcels into the
theater consistently fell within the 11 to 14-day range-well within the
current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, we determined that the
method used to calculate these averages masks the actual times by using
weighted averages that result in a significant understating of transit
times.16 A second source of data-test letters that were sent to individual

16 In DOD's sampling methodology, random samples are selected from all
incoming letters and packages arriving at a military post office in the
Iraqi theater. The samples are then divided into three categories:
postmark less than 10 days old, postmark between 11 and 15 days old, and
postmark over 16 days old. Each of these three categories is given a
weight value of 10, 15, and 16, respectively, which represent the break
points of each category. The sample size in each category is then
multiplied by the weight value and averaged to get the reported transit
time. Consequently, regardless of the sample size or the actual number of
days the items spent in transit, the resulting average will always be
between 10 and 16 days.

servicemembers at military post offices by the Military Postal Service
Agency between February and September 2003-indicate that mail delivery, on
average, met the wartime standard during all but 1 month. However, we
found that a significant number of test letters were never returned, and
that test letters do not accurately measure transit time to the individual
servicemember because they are sent only to individuals located at
military post offices. It could take several more days for mail to get to
forward-deployed troops. Even though the data shows otherwise, military
postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to troops serving in
Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely.

Comparison With Operations Desert Shield/Storm

Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal
planners to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into
the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems were
encountered. These problems include (1) difficulty in conducting
joint-service mail operations; (2) postal personnel inadequately trained
and initially scarce in number due to late deployments; and (3) inadequate
postal facilities, material handling equipment, and transportation assets
to handle the initial mail surge. U.S. Central Command-the combatant
command for Operation Iraqi Freedom-created an operations plan for joint
mail delivery, but some of the planning assumptions were flawed and the
plan was not fully implemented. This plan included certain assumptions
that were key to its success, but some assumptions produced unforeseen
negative consequences and others were not implemented or unrealistic. For
example, the elimination of mail addressed to "Any Service Member"
increased the number of parcels because senders found ways around the
restriction. In addition, plans to restrict the size and weight of letters
and parcels until adequate postal facilities had been established were
never enacted; and the volume of mail was grossly underestimated. The plan
also directed that a Joint Postal Center comprised of postal officials
from all services manage and coordinate joint postal operations in
theater. However, this effort was never fully implemented, and joint mail
delivery suffered as a result. The Military Postal Service Agency did
implement one strategy that proved to be successful as a result of lessons
learned from Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Dedicated contractor airlift
of mail into the contingency area was employed, avoiding the necessity of
competing for military air cargo capacity, which greatly improved the
regularity of mail service to the theater.

Efforts to Resolve Postal Problems

No single entity has been officially tasked to resolve the long-standing
postal problems seen again during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Military postal
officials have begun to identify solutions to some of these issues.
However, despite early efforts made by the Military Postal Service Agency
to consolidate problems and identify solutions, this agency does not have
the authority to ensure that these problems are jointly addressed and
resolved before the next military contingency. During our meetings with
dozens of key military postal officials serving during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, we collected memoranda, after action reports, and their comments
regarding the postal issues and problems that should be addressed to avoid
a repetition of the same postal problems in future contingencies. These
issues include: improving joint postal planning and ensuring joint
execution of that plan; early deployment of postal troops; preparing
updated tables of organization and equipment for postal units; improving
peacetime training for postal units; and reviewing the command and control
of postal units in a joint theater. The Military Postal Service Agency
hosted a joint postal conference in October 2003 to discuss postal
problems with dozens of key postal participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom
and is currently in the process of consolidating these issues into a
single document with the intent of developing plans to resolve the issues.
In addition, the service components and the Military Postal Service Agency
have taken some initial steps in employing alternative mail delivery and
tracking systems.

In our report, we plan to make several recommendations aimed at (1)
establishing a system that will accurately track, calculate, and report
postal transit times and (2) designating responsibility and providing
sufficient authority within the Department to address and fix
long-standing postal problems identified in this report.

Mr. Chairman, this completes our prepared statement. We would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may have
at this time.

Contacts and For future questions about this statement, please contact
Derek B. Stewart at (202) 512-5559 (e-mail address: [email protected]) or
Brenda S. Farrell Acknowledgments at (202) 512-3604 (e-mail address:
[email protected]). Also making a significant contribution to this
statement was Thomas W. Gosling.

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