Recovering Iraq's Assets: Preliminary Observations on U.S.	 
Efforts and Challenges (18-MAR-04, GAO-04-579T).		 
                                                                 
Rebuilding Iraq is a U.S. national security priority. Billions of
dollars are needed for Iraq's reconstruction. The U.S. government
and the international community have undertaken important efforts
to recover the assets of the former regime and return them to the
Iraqi people. In this testimony, GAO will present its preliminary
observations on the recovery effort. Specifically, GAO (1)	 
updates its estimate of the revenues diverted from the Oil for	 
Food Program, (2) describes the U.S. government agencies working 
on the asset recovery effort, (3) discusses the results of U.S.  
efforts, and (4) highlights challenges that the United States	 
faces in recovering Iraqi assets.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-579T					        
    ACCNO:   A09531						        
  TITLE:     Recovering Iraq's Assets: Preliminary Observations on    
U.S. Efforts and Challenges					 
     DATE:   03/18/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Assets						 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     International cooperation				 
	     Search and seizure 				 
	     Smuggling						 
	     Illegal asset recovery				 
	     Iraq						 
	     United Nations Development Fund for Iraq		 
	     United Nations Oil for Food Program		 

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GAO-04-579T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Financial Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST RECOVERING IRAQ'S

Thursday, March 18, 2004

ASSETS

            Preliminary Observations on U.S. Efforts and Challenges

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade
and Davi M. D'Agostino, Director
Financial Markets and Community Investment

GAO-04-579T

Highlights of GAO-04-579T, a testimony to Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, House Committee on Financial Services

Rebuilding Iraq is a U.S. national security priority. Billions of dollars
are needed for Iraq's reconstruction. The U.S. government and the
international community have undertaken important efforts to recover the
assets of the former regime and return them to the Iraqi people. In this
testimony, GAO will present its preliminary observations on the recovery
effort. Specifically, GAO (1) updates its estimate of the revenues
diverted from the Oil for Food Program, (2) describes the U.S. government
agencies working on the asset recovery effort, (3) discusses the results
of U.S. efforts, and (4) highlights challenges that the United States
faces in recovering Iraqi assets.

As this testimony reflects GAO's preliminary observations, GAO is making
no recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-579T. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202) 512-8789 or
[email protected] or Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
[email protected].

March 18, 2004

RECOVERING IRAQ'S ASSETS

Preliminary Observations on U.S. Efforts and Challenges

GAO estimates that from 1997 through 2002, the former Iraqi regime
acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues related to the Oil for Food
program-$5.7 billion in oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4 billion in
illicit surcharges on oil sales and after-sales charges on suppliers. This
estimate is higher than our May 2002 estimate of $6.6 billion because it
includes 2002 data from oil revenues and contracts under the Oil for Food
Program and newer estimates of illicit commissions from commodity
suppliers.

The United States has tapped the services of a variety of U.S. agencies
and recently developed domestic and international tools in its efforts to
recover Iraqi assets worldwide. Led by the Department of the Treasury,
about 20 government entities have combined efforts to identify, freeze,
and transfer the former regime's assets to Iraq. The United States also
used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as amended by
provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, to confiscate the property of
the former Iraqi regime under U.S. jurisdiction and vest the assets in the
U.S. Treasury. Finally, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 required all
U.N. members to freeze without delay and immediately transfer assets of
the former Iraqi regime to the new Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).

U.S. efforts to recover Iraqi assets have had varying results. In March
2003, the U.S. government quickly took control of Iraq's assets in the
United States. From May to September 2003, the United States transferred
$1.7 billion to Iraq to help pay for the salaries of Iraqi civil servants,
ministry operations, and pensions. Within Iraq, U.S. military and
coalition forces seized about $926 million of the regime's assets. Other
countries froze about $3.7 billion of Iraqi regime assets in compliance
with U.N. Security Council resolutions. As of March 2004, Treasury
reported that more than 10 countries and the Bank for International
Settlements had transferred approximately $751 million to the DFI. Little
progress has been made in identifying and freezing additional Iraqi assets
that remain hidden. While the amount of hidden assets accumulated by the
former Iraqi regime is unknown, estimates range from $10 to $40 billion in
illicit earnings.

The United States faces key challenges in recovering Iraq's assets. First,
recovering the former regime's assets was not initially a high priority in
the overall U.S. effort in Iraq. Second, U.S. officials stated that many
countries needed to adopt additional legislation to implement the U.N.
requirements and transfer the funds to the DFI. U.S. expectations for the
quick transfer of funds may have been overly optimistic given the legal
capabilities of some countries. Third, the impending transfer of
sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government on June 30, 2004, may further
complicate U.S. efforts to locate and recover assets of the former regime.
It is uncertain whether the new government will allow the United States to
continue its hunt for the former regime's assets.

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our preliminary observations on
U.S. and international efforts to recover assets of the former Iraqi
regime and transfer them to Iraq for reconstruction.

Rebuilding Iraq is a U.S. national security and foreign policy priority.
Billions of dollars are needed for meeting humanitarian needs, stabilizing
Iraq, and repairing the country's infrastructure. The U.S. government and
the international community have undertaken important efforts to recover
the assets of the former regime and return them to the Iraqi people.

In May 2003, this committee asked GAO to examine how the U.S. government
works with the international community to recover the assets of targeted
foreign regimes. We will complete this broader report on U.S. recovery
efforts for the committee in May 2004.

Today, we will present our preliminary observations on Iraqi asset
recovery efforts. Specifically, we will (1) update our estimate of the
revenues diverted from the Oil for Food Program by the former Iraqi
regime, (2) describe the U.S. agencies working to recover Iraqi assets,
(3) discuss the results of U.S. efforts, and (4) highlight challenges in
asset recovery.

To address these issues, we reviewed documents and statements from the
Departments of the Treasury, State, Defense, and Justice on the asset
recovery effort, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)1 in Iraq on the
funds transferred to Iraq, and the United Nations on the Oil for Food
Program. We met with U.S. officials working on the recovery effort,
including officials from the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC), analysts from U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies,
financial regulators, and representatives from U.S. financial institutions
responsible for implementing U.S. orders to freeze and transfer blocked
Iraqi assets. We have yet to review the reliability of the data provided
by the Department of the Treasury and the CPA.

1The CPA is the U.N.-recognized coalition authority, led by the United
States and the United Kingdom, responsible for the temporary governance of
Iraq.

Summary

o  	We estimate that from 1997 through 2002, the former Iraqi regime
acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues related to the Oil for Food
Program-$5.7 billion in oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4 billion in
illicit surcharges on oil sales and commissions from suppliers. This
estimate is higher than our reported May 2002 estimate of $6.6 billion
because it includes 2002 data from oil revenues and contracts under the
Oil for Food Program, newer estimates of illicit commissions from
commodity suppliers. 2

o  	The United States has tapped the services of several U.S. agencies and
used recently developed domestic and international tools in its efforts to
recover Iraqi assets worldwide. Led by the Department of the Treasury,
about 20 government entities have combined efforts to identify, freeze,
and transfer the former regime's assets to Iraq. The United States also
used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), as amended
by provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, to confiscate the property
of the former Iraqi regime under U.S. jurisdiction and vest the assets in
the U.S. Treasury. Finally, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 required
all U.N. members to freeze without delay and immediately transfer assets
of the former Iraqi regime to the new Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).

o  U.S. efforts to recover Iraqi assets have had varying results.

                                       o

                                       o

                                       o

In March 2003, the U.S. government quickly took control of Iraq's assets
in the United States. From May to September 2003, the United States
transferred $1.7 billion to Iraq to help pay for the salaries of Iraqi
civil servants, ministry operations, and pensions. The United States also
transferred $192 million to the DFI in July 2003. Most of the vested funds
have been spent on reconstruction.

Within Iraq, U.S. military and coalition forces seized about $926 million
of the regime's assets. The CPA used these funds for Iraqi projects,
ministry operations, and liquefied petroleum gas purchases.

Other countries froze about $3.7 billion of Iraqi regime assets in
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. As of March 2004,
Treasury reported that more than 10 countries and the Bank

2U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons ofMass Destruction:U.N.Confronts
Sign icant ChallengesinimplementingSanctionsAgainst Iraq, GAO-02-625
(Washington, DC.: May 23, 2002).

for International Settlements had transferred approximately $751 million
to the DFI. State Department and Treasury officials continue to work
diplomatically with other countries to expedite the transfer of remaining
Iraqi assets.

o  	Little progress has been made in identifying and freezing additional
Iraqi assets that remain hidden. While the amount of hidden assets
accumulated by the former Iraqi regime is unknown, estimates range from
$10 billion to $40 billion in illicit earnings.

o  	The United States faces key challenges in recovering Iraq's assets.
First, recovering the former regime's assets was not initially a high
priority in the overall U.S. effort in Iraq. Second, U.S. expectations for
the quick transfer of funds may have been overly optimistic given the
legal capabilities of some countries. Third, the impending transfer of
sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government may further complicate U.S.
efforts to locate and recover assets of the former regime.

                                   Background

In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the United Nations imposed
sanctions against the regime. Security Council Resolution 661 of 1990,
prohibited all nations from buying Iraqi oil and selling Iraq any
commodities except food or medicines. The resolution also required member
states to block the transfer of Iraqi assets from their countries.
Consistent with this resolution, the President froze all Iraq's assets
held in the United States. Other nations similarly froze Iraqi government
assets in their countries.

In 1991, the Security Council offered to let Iraq sell oil under a U.N.
program to meet its peoples' basic needs. The Iraqi government rejected
the offer and, over the next 5 years, food shortages and a general
deterioration in social services were reported.

In December 1996, the United Nations and Iraq agreed on the Oil for Food
Program, which allowed Iraq to sell a set amount of oil to pay for food,
medicine, and infrastructure repairs. The United Nations monitored and
screened contracts that the Iraqi government signed with commodity
suppliers. Iraq's oil revenue was placed in a U.N.-controlled escrow
account. From 1997 through 2002, Iraq sold more than $67 billion of oil
through the U.N. program and issued $38 billion in letters of credit for
humanitarian goods. In May 2003, the Security Council passed Resolution
1483, which recognized the United States, Great Britain, and coalition
partners as the authority for providing security and provisional

administration in Iraq. The resolution also ended the sanctions, except
for the prohibition on exporting arms to Iraq.

Estimated Revenue Obtained Illegally by the Former Iraqi Regime from the
Oil for Food Program Exceeds $10 Billion

We estimate that, from 1997 through 2002, the former Iraqi regime acquired
$10.1 billion in illegal revenues related to the Oil for Food Program-$5.7
billion through oil smuggling and $4.4 billion through surcharges against
oil sales and illicit commissions from commodity suppliers.3 This estimate
is higher than the $6.6 billion we reported in May 2002.4 We updated this
estimate to include (1) oil revenue and contract amounts for 2002, (2)
updated letters of credit from prior years, and (3) newer estimates of
illicit commissions from commodity suppliers.

Oil was smuggled out through several routes, according to U.S. government
officials and oil industry experts. Oil entered Syria by pipeline, crossed
the borders of Jordan and Turkey by truck, and was smuggled through the
Persian Gulf by ship. In addition to revenues from oil smuggling, the
Iraqi government levied surcharges against oil purchasers and commissions
against commodity suppliers participating in the Oil for Food Program.
According to some Security Council members, the surcharge was up to 50
cents per barrel of oil and the commission was 5 to 10 percent of the
commodity contract. The funds were paid directly to officials connected
with the Iraqi government. In addition, according to a Department of
Defense (DOD) official, a DOD report in September 2003 evaluated 759
contracts funded and approved under the Oil for Food Program. The study
found that at least 48 percent of the contracts were overpriced and that
on average the contracts were overpriced by 21 percent.

3This estimate is in 2003 U.S. constant dollars.

4U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons ofMass Destruction:U.N.Confronts
Sign icant ChallengesinimplementingSanctionsAgainst Iraq, GAO-02-625
(Washington, DC.: May 23, 2002).

U.S. Efforts to Recover Iraqi Assets Involve Many Agencies and Use
Recently Developed Domestic and International Authorities

The United States has tapped the services of several U.S. agencies and
used recently developed U.S. and international authorities in its efforts
to recover Iraqi assets worldwide. About 20 entities, including those of
the Departments of the Treasury, Homeland Security, Defense, Justice,
State, intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the White
House National Security Council, are involved in recovering Iraqi assets.

To lead the asset recovery efforts, the United States created an
interagency coordinating body headed by the Department of the Treasury.
The Iraqi Assets Working Group has developed a strategy to identify,
freeze, seize, and transfer former regime assets to Iraq. The working
group's goals are to:

o  	Exploit documents and key financial figures in Iraq to better
understand fund flows;

o  	Secure the cooperation of jurisdictions through which illicit funds
have flowed so that working group members may exploit financial records
and uncover the money trail;

o  	Secure the cooperation of jurisdictions in which illicit assets may
reside to locate, freeze, and repatriate the assets;

o  	Engage the financial community in the hunt for illicit assets
generally, and specifically secure the cooperation of the financial
institutions through which illicit funds have flowed or may still reside;

o  Develop a system to facilitate the fluid repatriation of funds; and

o  	Prepare for potential sanctions against uncooperative jurisdictions
and financial institutions.

The working group is leveraging the expertise of U.S. officials involved
in efforts to recover assets of terrorists and money launderers.

The U.S. Congress recently passed legislation containing provisions that
allowed the President to confiscate foreign funds frozen in U.S. financial
institutions. Specifically, provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
amended IEEPA to allow the President to confiscate foreign property
subject to U.S. jurisdiction in times of "on-going hostilities" or if the
United States is attacked. These provisions gave the President the
necessary authority, through an Executive Order, to confiscate the
property of the former Iraqi regime and to vest these assets in the U.S.
Treasury.

In addition, the State Department cited U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 as an important vehicle for requiring other countries to transfer
assets to Iraq. On May 22, 2003, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1483, which (1) noted the establishment of the DFI, a special
account in the name of the Central Bank of Iraq; and (2) required member
states to freeze and immediately transfer to the DFI all assets of the
former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior officials of his
regime and their family members. The resolution also included a unique
immunity provision to protect the assets from new claims.

In 2003, the U.S. government quickly vested Iraq's assets held in the
United States and transferred them to Iraq. Similarly, the U.S. military,
in coordination with U.S. law enforcement agencies, seized assets of the
former regime in Iraq. The CPA has used most of the vested and seized
assets for reconstruction projects and ministry operations. U.S. officials
noted that some other countries' efforts to transfer Iraqi funds have been
slowed by their lack of implementing legislation. There has been little
progress in recovering the regime's hidden assets.

U.S. Efforts to Recover the Former Iraqi Regime's Assets Have Had Varying
Results

The United States Transferred Nearly $1.9 Billion in Vested Assets to Iraq

In 2003, the United States vested about $1.9 billion of the former
regime's assets in the U.S. Treasury. Between May and December, the United
States transferred more than $1.7 billion to Iraq and $192 million to the
DFI. The United States had the necessary legal authorities to make the
transfers quickly.

On August 2, 1990, in compliance with a Presidential Executive Order, the
Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued regulations to
financial institutions requiring them to freeze Iraqi assets in the United
States. More than 30 banks in the United States identified and froze
accounts with $1.4 billion in Iraqi assets.5 These institutions held
assets in accounts that accumulated interest.

In March 2003, the President used authorities, including the enhanced
authority in IEEPA, as amended by provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act, to
issue a new executive order to confiscate or take ownership of Iraqi
assets held by U.S. financial institutions and vest them in the U.S.
Treasury.

5In addition, according to OFAC, more than $480 million was frozen in U.S.
financial institutions abroad.

According to Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, Treasury instructed
the Federal Reserve Bank to release portions of the funds to DOD upon the
Office of Management and Budget's approval of DOD's spending plans. As of
March 2004, the CPA had spent about $1.67 billion of the $1.9 billion for
emergency needs, including salaries for civil servants and pensions, and
for ministry operations.

The United States Seized More Than $900 Million in Iraq

CPA informed us in March 2004 that the U.S. military, in coordination with
U.S. law enforcement agencies had seized about $926 million of the
regime's assets in Iraq. The U.S. military seized about $894 million in
Iraqi bonds, U.S. dollars, euros, and Iraqi dinars, as well as quantities
of gold and jewelry. This amount included $750,000 found with Saddam
Hussein when he was captured. Department of Homeland Security agents
seized an additional $32 million.

The CPA is authorized to use these seized funds for humanitarian and
reconstruction efforts. As of March 2004, the CPA had used $752 million
for reconstruction activities, including projects, ministry operations,
and liquefied petroleum gas purchases.

Other Countries Have Transferred $751 Million to the DFI

According to Treasury, other countries have frozen about $3.7 billion in
Iraqi assets. Treasury officials reported that, as of March 2004, more
than 10 countries and the Bank for International Settlements have
transferred $751 million to the DFI. Treasury officials noted that the
remaining assets have not been transferred to the DFI because some
countries do not have the necessary legislation to affect the transfer or
are holding about $1 billion to adjudicate claims. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 requires the immediate transfer of Iraqi funds identified
and frozen in these accounts to the DFI.

To encourage other countries to transfer the funds to Iraq, the Secretary
of the Treasury requested that the international community identify and
freeze all assets of the former regime. Additionally, Treasury and State
officials said that they have engaged in diplomatic efforts to encourage
countries to report and transfer the amounts of Iraqi assets that they had
frozen. For example, since March 2003, State officials told us that they
have sent more than 400 cables to other countries requesting that they
transfer funds to the DFI.

According to U.S. officials, Treasury and State continue to leverage the
U.S. government's diplomatic relations with finance ministries and central

banks to encourage the transfer of Iraqi assets to the DFI, according to
Treasury officials. Some of the remaining frozen funds are located in
financial institutions in Iraq's neighboring countries or Europe.

Little Progress Has Been Made in Recovering Hidden Assets of the Former
Iraqi Regime

Challenges to Transferring Frozen Assets and Locating the Hidden Assets

Little progress has been made in recovering the former Iraqi regime's
hidden assets. Because the former Iraqi regime used a network of front
companies, trusts, and cash accounts in the names of the regime family
members and associates, it has been difficult to identify how much remains
hidden in the international financial system. U.S. government officials
have cited estimates ranging from $10 billion to $40 billion in illicit
earnings.

According to U.S. government officials, U.S. government asset recovery
efforts have focused on exploiting documents in Iraq, interviewing key
financial figures, and convincing other countries to cooperate in
identifying and freezing illicit funds that have flowed through or still
reside in their countries. For example, Department of Homeland Security
agents have exploited Central Bank of Iraq records for leads regarding
Saddam Hussein's procurement network. Internal Revenue Service criminal
investigators have conducted interviews of former finance ministry
individuals and exploited financial documents of the regime to obtain
leads on the location of targeted assets. The Defense Intelligence Agency
provides some of the research and analysis used to identify assets of the
former Iraqi regime.

In addition, according to Treasury and State officials, they are
coordinating efforts to gain the cooperation of other countries. For
example, State officials said that U.S. investigators have identified 500
accounts that potentially belonged to the former regime in other
countries. State is working through their overseas embassies to get the
cooperation of these countries to return the funds to the DFI.

The U.S. government has faced key challenges to recovering the assets of
the former Iraqi regime.

First, recovering the former regime's assets was not initially a high
priority in the overall U.S. effort in Iraq. As the need for additional
resources to rebuild Iraq became apparent, the United States placed a
higher priority on recovering the former regime's assets. According to
U.S. government officials, recovering the former Iraqi regime's assets
became the U.S. government's third priority behind the hunt for weapons of
mass destruction and security in September 2003. In addition, Internal
Revenue

Service agents stated that DOD's post-war plans and priorities did not
include protection of financial documents or other information that could
have provided leads on the location of the former regime's assets.

Second, U.S. expectations for the quick transfer of funds under U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1483 may have been overly optimistic given the
lack of legal capabilities of some countries to do so. In June 2003, State
and Treasury officials said that the U.N. resolution included unique
provisions that afforded the United States and the international community
with an opportunity to quickly recover Iraqi assets worldwide. The
resolution required all U.N. members to freeze without delay assets of the
former Iraqi regime and immediately transfer them to the DFI. Many of the
member states that had frozen Iraqi government assets in 1991 did not
immediately transfer the assets to the DFI.

U.S. officials stated that many countries needed to adopt additional
legislation to implement the U.N. requirements and transfer the funds to
the DFI. According to U.S. government officials, some U.N. member
countries have developed the authorities, institutions, and mechanisms to
freeze assets of targeted terrorists, but others had not developed similar
mechanisms for targeted regimes. U.S. government officials also stated
that some countries did not have the administrative capabilities and
financial mechanisms to transfer the frozen assets. U.S. officials did not
have a central repository of other countries' laws and regulations related
to transferring Iraqi assets. Furthermore, according to U.S. officials,
despite the immunity provision included in the U.N. resolution, some
countries are delaying transfer of funds until all claims have been
settled.

Third, the impending transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi
government on June 30, 2004, may further complicate U.S. efforts to locate
and recover assets of the former regime. It is uncertain whether the new
government will allow the United States to continue its hunt for the
former regime's assets. The future transitional government has yet to
conclude agreements regarding the activities of the multi-national force,
which may include the right to interview Iraqi officials and exploit
documents. In addition, it is also uncertain whether other countries will
transfer their remaining funds to the DFI when the interim government
assumes authority over it.

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our
prepared statement. We will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Contacts and	For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph
Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431. Other
key

Acknowledgments 	contributors to this statement were Thomas Conahan, Lynn
Cothern, Philip Farah, Rachel DeMarcus, Ronald Ito, Barbara Keller, Sarah
Lynch, Zina Merritt, Tetsuo Miyabara, Marc Molino, and Mark Speight.

                                  Source: GAO.

                                  Source: GAO.

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