Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved	 
Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress
Remain (28-JUN-04, GAO-04-547). 				 
                                                                 
Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq	 
benefited from new Department of Defense (DOD) strategies and	 
technologies, such as improvements in force networks and	 
increased use of precision weapons, designed to address changes  
in the security environment resulting from the continuing	 
terrorist threat and the advent of the information age. Based on 
the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO reviewed these	 
conflicts, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight	 
into the changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on
(1) assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of	 
improvements in force networks and in the use of precision	 
weapons and (2) identifying key barriers to continued progress.  
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-547 					        
    ACCNO:   A10640						        
  TITLE:     Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from     
Improved Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued
Progress Remain 						 
     DATE:   06/28/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Bombs						 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Military training					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Weapons						 
	     Military interoperability				 
	     Afghanistan					 
	     Iraq						 
	     Kosovo						 
	     DOD Operation Allied Force 			 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 
	     Operation Enduring Freedom 			 

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GAO-04-547

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Committees

June 2004

MILITARY OPERATIONS

  Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, but
                     Barriers to Continued Progress Remain

GAO-04-547

Highlights of GAO-04-547, a report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services; Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member, House Committee on Armed Services

Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq benefited
from new Department of Defense (DOD) strategies and technologies, such as
improvements in force networks and increased use of precision weapons,
designed to address changes in the security environment resulting from the
continuing terrorist threat and the advent of the information age.

Based on the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO reviewed these
conflicts, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the
changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on (1) assessing the
impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in force networks and
in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying key barriers to
continued progress.

GAO recommends that DOD take steps to improve standardization of
information used in bombing operations, address continuing problems with
battle damage assessments, develop a unified battlefield information
system to improve analyses of combat effectiveness, and develop realistic
joint training to help personnel adapt to emerging changes to the
operating environment. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations and
stated that it is addressing the issues GAO raised in a variety of ongoing
efforts.

June 2004

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, but
Barriers to Continued Progress Remain

Improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons are
clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in
recent operations. However, the full extent to which operations have been
speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear because DOD does not have
detailed measures of these effects. Enhancements to networked operations,
such as improved sensors and surveillance mechanisms, and more integrated
command and control centers, have improved DOD's ability to share a broad
view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the
force-reducing the time required for analysis and decision making in
combat operations. However, recognizing that the full impact of these
changes is unclear, DOD is conducting a series of case studies to better
understand the effects of networked operations. Improvements in force
networks have also been enhanced by the use of precision-guided weapons
and associated technologies. These improvements not only provide
commanders with greatly increased flexibility, such as the ability to
conduct bombing operations in poor weather and from higher and safer
altitudes, but also increase the accuracy of bombing operations. GAO's
analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage or
destruction to targets increased markedly between operations in Kosovo and
those in Afghanistan.

Notwithstanding these improvements, certain barriers inhibit continued
progress in implementing the new strategy. Four interrelated areas stand
out as key:

o  	A lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment, which
reduces effectiveness by requiring operations to be slowed to manually
reconcile information from multiple systems and limiting access to needed
capabilities among military services.

o  	Continuing difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality analyses of
bombing damages, which can slow ground advances and negate other
improvements in the speed of operations.

o  	The absence of a unified battlefield information system to provide
standardized measures and baseline data on bombing effectiveness, which
creates confusion about the success of new tactics and technologies, about
assumptions used in battlefield simulation programs, and about procurement
decisions.

o  	The lack of high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all
levels understand and adapt to the increased flow of information, more
centralized management, and other changes in the operating environment
brought about by the strategic changes.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-547.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Neal Curtin, (757) 552-8100,
[email protected].

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Improvements in Networked Forces and the Use of Precision

Weapons Central to Increased Combat Power Key Barriers Inhibit Continued
Progress in Implementing the New

Strategy Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      2 5

10

19 34 35 36

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II	DOD Reconnaissance Aircraft, Precision Weapons, and Other
Technologies Used in Recent Operations

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Bibliography

Related GAO Products

  Figures

Figure 1: The Joint Targeting Cycle 6 Figure 2: Percentage of Guided and
Unguided Munitions Used in

Recent Combat Operations 9 Figure 3: Notional Networked Operations 14
Figure 4: U.S. Central Command Battle Damage Assessment

Manning Levels for Recent Operations 25

Abbreviation

DOD Department of Defense

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separately.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

June 28, 2004

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have been
widely regarded as an unprecedented demonstration of combat power.
Relying predominately on air power, Operation Allied Force drove the
forces of Slobodan Milosovic out of Kosovo in 78 days during the spring of
1999. Operation Enduring Freedom, using a combination of air power and
special operations forces, drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in
175 days between October 2001 and March 2002. And, most recently, the
combination of air power and ground maneuver elements used in
Operation Iraqi Freedom drove Sadam Hussein from power in only 43 days
between March and May 2003. These operations have benefited from the
fielding of new strategies and technologies developed to deal with the new
security environment-now characterized by surprise and uncertainty as a
result of the evolving terrorist threat, and by the need to transition
from
the industrial age into the information age. The Department of Defense's
(DOD) new capabilities-based strategy seeks to contend with uncertainty
by improving DOD's ability to act quickly and decisively across a wide
range of combat conditions. This strategy is being enabled by moves
toward more highly integrated force networks that combine information
superiority and advances in technologies for surveillance,
communications, precision weapons, and other areas to gain the
advantage and rapidly defeat the enemy.

On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we reviewed the
operational results of recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the strategic and

  Results in Brief

technological changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on (1)
assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in force
networking and in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying key
barriers to continued progress. We are addressing this report to you
because we believe it will be of interest to your committees as you
address DOD's programs and funding. In performing our work, we reviewed
DOD policies, procedures, and reports related to implementation of the new
capabilities-based strategy; met with officials from throughout the
department; conducted a detailed analysis and reliability assessment of
bombing data; and discussed the results of our analysis with cognizant
officials. A more thorough description of our scope and methodology is
included in appendix I. We performed our work from April 2003 through
March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

Improvements in force networking and in the use of precision weapons are
clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in
recent operations. However, the full extent to which operations have been
speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear because DOD does not have
detailed measures of these effects. The emerging concept of networked
operations, referred to by DOD as network-centric operations, involves
developing communications and other linkages among all elements of the
force to create a shared awareness of operations. Technological
enhancements to these network-centric systems include improved sensors and
other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms for
observing targets on the battlefield; more integrated command and control
centers for analyzing targeting data and approving attacks; and
improvements in precision weapons. The improved ability to share a broad
view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the
force has compressed the time required for analysis and decision making in
bombing operations, thus increasing lethality. However, DOD recognizes
that the full extent to which operations have been speeded up or otherwise
affected is unclear because of the absence of detailed measures of these
effects. As a result, DOD's Office of Force Transformation is conducting a
series of case studies of training exercises and combat operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq to better understand the effects of networked
operations. Advances in force networking have been enhanced by
improvements in the use of precisionguided weapons and associated
technologies, providing military commanders with greatly increased
flexibility and accuracy in bombing operations. For example, the
introduction of laser-guided and Global Positioning System-guided bombs
has reduced limitations on operations

created by poor weather and visibility and allowed bombing operations to
be conducted from higher and safer altitudes. Further, increases in the
number of aircraft capable of delivering such weapons allow DOD to use old
aircraft in new ways, further improving flexibility. These improvements
are also increasing the accuracy of bombing operations. Our analysis found
that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to fixed
and mobile targets increased markedly between operations in Kosovo and
those in Afghanistan.

Despite such improvements, DOD officials and reports identified a variety
of barriers inhibiting continued progress in implementing the new
strategy. Four interrelated areas stood out as key to continued progress.

o  	Lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment. This is a
long-standing problem in DOD that reduces effectiveness by requiring
operations to be slowed as time must be taken to manually reconcile
information from one operating system into forms usable by other systems,
or by limiting access to communications or other needed capabilities
because equipment from one service cannot interact with equipment used by
another for the same purpose. For example, DOD has not standardized
procedures used in basic operations, such as reporting on the results of
bombing missions. As a result, each service and unified command must
develop its own procedures, with no system to ensure standardization.
During operations in Afghanistan, the Central Command received mission
reports using at least 23 different formats-requiring time-consuming
manual deconfliction. The Joint Forces Command also reported that
operations in Iraq were beset by a lack of commonly understood
operational-level standards for evaluating the effect of attacks. The
integration of information was undermined by groups adopting their own
standards and formats, resulting in difficulties in translating
information and coming to a mutual understanding. We have also reported1
on problems with standardization and interoperability. DOD understands
that the lack of standardization fundamentally hampers attempts to improve
networking and joint operations, and it has been trying to address various
aspects of the problem. However, previous reforms have been undermined by
parochial allegiances to the services and other problems that continue to
exist.

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to
Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence Data,
GAO-03-329 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2003) and Military Readiness:
Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground
Forces, GAO-03-505 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2003).

o  	Difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality assessments of the
effects of bombing operations. Battle damage assessments are an
increasingly critical component of combat operations. Slow or inaccurate
assessments can negate improvements in the speed of operations, create
uncertainty about the battlefield situation and slow ground advances, and
ultimately increase the risk of death or injury to ground troops. However,
lessons learned reports on operations in Iraq-similar to earlier
operations-found that battle damage assessments could not keep up with the
pace of operations and failed to provide the information needed for
operational decisions. These problems are due to several factors. First,
advances in network-centric operations and precision weapons have
increased the speed at which targets are generated and attacked. At the
same time, the lack of an occupational specialty for damage assessments
and other problems result in shortages of trained analysts when resources
need to be surged during combat operations, resulting in the need to rely
upon on-the-job training of personnel from other areas. Moreover,
according to officials, DOD does not have a comprehensive system to track
personnel who have received training, further exacerbating the problem.
The Joint Forces Command has called for recognition of this problem as a
major obstacle to operations requiring a variety of changes to resolve.

o  	Absence of unified data to measure combat effectiveness and plan for
the future. Advances in the accuracy of bombing operations have raised
expectations for more efficiency and effectiveness in combat operations.
Instead of traditional operations where multiple sorties and multiple
bombs were required to destroy one target objective, some DOD officials
now believe one bomb per target and multiple targets on one sortie should
be the norm. However, confirmation of such expectations is difficult
because DOD does not have a unified battlefield information system to
provide standardized, baseline data on the effectiveness of bombing
operations. Currently, the services and the unified commands maintain
their own databases. As a result, the services create databases to measure
different aspects of operations, and measures of key operational data
elements-such as attacks needed to destroy a target, effects of
operations, and basic targeting characteristics-are defined differently.
The absence of a baseline system to bridge these differences and provide
information about actual bombing operations effectiveness creates
confusion about the success of new tactics and technologies and about the
assumptions used in battlefield simulation programs. The lack of such a
unifying system also makes it difficult to make procurement decisions for
weapons required for operations and calculate DOD's return on investment
from the new technologies.

o  	Lack of realistic training to help understand and adapt to changing
command and control environment. DOD officials also cited the need

for high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all levels
understand and adapt to changes in the operating environment brought about
by the move to a networked force using advanced technologies. For example,
officials noted that large increases in the pace of operations and the
volume of information associated with more integrated force networks have
overwhelmed commanders and other personnel at times. Further, increased
networking and other changes have fostered a more centralized style of
management, with senior leaders increasingly involved in operations. At
the same time, network-centric operating concepts are distributing
information to lower and lower organizational levels, raising the
potential for increased autonomy for small units and individual soldiers.
However, training has not kept pace with these changes. For example, the
Joint Forces Command reported that the lack of realistic training
undermined intelligence and surveillance management and other
operational-level capabilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Consistent
with DOD's basic tenet that a force must train as it will fight, DOD
officials called for improved training to match the scale and tempo of
actual operations. Similarly, the Defense Science Board reported that the
changing operating environment will have unintended consequences that will
require personnel to adapt to increasing cognitive demands at even the
most junior levels. However, according to the Board, current training is
not adequate to prepare DOD personnel to cope with these demands.

To ensure that these problems do not continue to inhibit realization of
the full promise of DOD's strategy, we are recommending that DOD take
steps to provide more standardized operating information for use during
joint combat operations, formulate a plan to address problems with
battlefield damage assessments, develop a unified battlefield information
system to improve assessments of combat effectiveness, and develop
realistic joint training to help commanders and personnel adapt to the
changing operating environment. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD
generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that it is addressing
the issues we raised in a variety of ongoing efforts.

Background 	The close integration and coordination of ground combat forces
and bombing operations is essential to the exercise of lethal combat power
on the modern battlefield. As depicted in figure 1, military doctrine2
describes targeting in terms of a cyclical process composed of six basic
phases.

2 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Doctrine for
Targeting (Washington, D.C., Jan. 17, 2002).

During this process, the joint force commander identifies the objectives
for military operations in support of the national objectives for the
conflict and any key limitations on operations-such as procedures for
limiting civilian collateral damage. The commander's guidance then drives
the subsequent phases of the targeting cycle to include identifying and
analyzing potential targets and resources available to attack them,
obtaining formal permission for the strike, executing the strike, and then
assessing strike effectiveness and any need to reattack.

Figure 1: The Joint Targeting Cycle

The success of this process is highly dependent on the speed and quality
of interaction among the people and systems conducting the various
activities at each phase. Trained ground control personnel must interact
quickly and covertly with manned and unmanned aircraft, electronic sensors
and space-based satellite imagery systems, or other intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms to spot the target and
accurately mark its location. Accuracy depends upon the ability of the
ground personnel to locate themselves, the target, and any friendly forces
nearby and accurately judge the distance between each. These elements must
be able to communicate the targeting information to command and control
centers that coordinate the actions of a variety of analysts and others
who assess the situation, plan the strike, communicate the information
back to the ground personnel, and analyze the effectiveness of the attack.

DOD is working to improve the interaction of these elements by using
network-centric operating concepts. The term "network-centric" is used to
describe a broad class of approaches to military operations that are
enabled by networking the force. DOD's approach involves developing the
sensors and other technologies to provide pervasive oversight of the
battlefield, and then linking them to all elements of the war-fighting
force through communications and other technologies. This allows the
various elements of the force to develop a shared situation awareness, a
shared knowledge and understanding of commanders' intent, and the ability
to rapidly process and analyze information. The belief is that these
capabilities will increase combat power by better synchronization of
weapons effects in the battle space and greater speed in command decision
making. This strategic change is being accompanied by an array of changes
to doctrine, tactics, organization, and training to integrate the
network-centric concept into DOD's culture.

Advances in networking the force are being complemented by advances in
precision weapons.3 Precision-guided weapons provide precise control of
bombs through the use of electrical equipment that help guide the weapon
in flight. These capabilities provide an advantage in accuracy over
conventional weapons that do not have the ability to adjust their
trajectory while in flight. The transition from unguided to guided weapons
has accelerated rapidly since Operation Desert Storm in 1991 where
unguided weapons were the norm. For example, as shown in figure 2, only
about 8 percent of the weapons used during Operation Desert Storm were
guided, while this number increased to about 68 percent in Operation Iraqi
Freedom.

3 In this report, the terms weapons, bombs, and munitions are used
interchangeably.

Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq provided a variety of
conditions for the development of these network-centric approaches. For
example, operations in Kosovo were conducted primarily by air over rugged
and undeveloped mountainous terrain. There were no direct attacks by large
massed ground forces, and the cover of forests and villages allowed enemy
forces to easily conceal their location. Similarly, Afghanistan's rugged
and mountainous terrain and large number of caves and bunkers also
provided numerous opportunities to conceal Taliban and al Qaeda forces.
Light infantry and special operations forces were the primary U.S. forces
on the ground, with aircraft as their sole means of fire support. In
contrast, the terrain in Iraq is characterized by mostly broad plains with
mountainous regions along the borders and a largely desert climate posing
threats from dust and sand storms. Initial operations pitted large massed
forces against one another in more traditional ways of fighting. However,
the conduct of U.S. operations also relied heavily on small, dispersed
groups of special operations forces operating on battlefields with no
clear front and rear lines, as enemy forces blended in and out of urban
populations.

Figure 2: Percentage of Guided and Unguided Munitions Used in Recent
Combat Operations

With the exception of Kosovo, these conflicts were also characterized
largely by pronounced U.S. air superiority, with little threat from enemy
air defenses. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, enemy air
defenses were so limited that U.S. forces were able to win near total air
supremacy early in the war. Similarly, air superiority was not a concern
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prior to the conflict, military forces had
been working to set the conditions for air dominance through more than 3
years of bombing. During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, however, there
were significant concerns about enemy air defense systems, causing bombing
operations to be carried out at high altitudes to avoid the threat.
Moreover, access to overseas bases was problematic in all three of these
operations, straining logistical support systems and complicating military
operations. For example, this lack of forward air basing infrastructure
within effective fighter range of land-locked Afghanistan required U.S.

forces to rely primarily on carrier-based aircraft to provide strike power
during the operations. These operations were also conducted in an
environment of pronounced concerns about limiting collateral damage to
civilian populations and infrastructure. Adversaries attempted to exploit
collateral damage in an effort to gain public sympathy for their cause and
cast a negative light on U.S. operations. U.S. forces adjusted the target
selection and approval process to minimize collateral damages, calling on
senior leaders to approve target selection in some cases. However,
attempts to minimize collateral damages can also create tension with
military objectives and complicate bombing operations.

DOD officials cite improvements in networking the force and in the use of
precision weapons as primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power
demonstrated in recent operations. Network-centric operating concepts,
particularly in surveillance and command and control systems, have created
unprecedented battlefield situation awareness for commanders and their
forces, yet the full extent to which operations have been affected is
unclear. Technologies enhancing the use of precisionguided weapons have
also provided military commanders with increased flexibility and accuracy
in bombing operations.

  Improvements in Networked Forces and the Use of Precision Weapons Central to
  Increased Combat Power

    Networked Surveillance and Command and Control Systems Create Improved
    Situation Awareness

Improvements to Information-Gathering Systems Allow for Unprecedented
Ability to Monitor Battlefield

Network-centric operating concepts have improved battlefield situation
awareness for commanders and their forces. DOD has indicated that
technological improvements in information-gathering systems allow
commanders an unprecedented view of the battlefield. Such improvements
provide for greater shared situation awareness, which, in turn, speeds
command and control. However, while it appears that enhanced networking
has speeded operations, the full impact on operations is unclear because
of the absence of detailed measures of their effects.

DOD officials and reports cite a variety of technological and other
improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms
as basic to the unprecedented ability of commanders and forces to observe
and monitor the battlefield. For example, surveillance aircraft orbiting
the battlefield-such as the E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system
(for detecting enemy air and naval activities and directing friendly
fighters), the RC-135 and EP-3 aircraft (for locating enemy radar and
other electronic emissions), the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System (for detecting enemy ground activity), and the U-2 (for high
altitude, wide-area surveillance)-have been outfitted with

Shared Situation Awareness Speeds Command and Control

smaller, lower cost, and higher quality sensors and radars, improving
their ability to detect the enemy and provide high resolution imagery of
the battlefield. Another key is the development of unmanned aerial
vehicles, such as the Predator and the Global Hawk used extensively in
Afghanistan and Iraq. These aircraft carry cameras, sensors, or even
weapons and are used to constantly circle over the battlefield and provide
continuous live surveillance of the enemy without risk to human pilots.
The Predator is remotely piloted by operators on the ground, while the
Global Hawk is self-piloted, controlled by a preprogrammed onboard
computer that controls the aircraft from takeoff to landing.

These systems interact with ground personnel, such as special operations
forces or specially trained combat controllers, to locate and precisely
mark targets and assess bombing results. Technological advances now enable
these controllers to identify a target and determine its precise location
by using laser designators, which may be connected to a handheld Global
Positioning System receiver. Reports have cited the use of these
technologies interacting with aircraft flying at high altitudes to avoid
enemy air defenses, combined with new tactics for integrating special
operations forces with conventional units, as a breakthrough capability.
During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, special forces teams
used these technologies linked to piloted aircraft or unmanned Predator
drones-providing live battlefield video directly to nearby AC-130 gun
ships-to attack small groups of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters and other
fleeting targets. The Joint Forces Command report4 on missions conducted
during Operation Iraqi Freedom also cited the capabilities provided by
these advances.

DOD officials indicate that the improved ability to share a broad view of
the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force has
compressed the time required for analysis and decision making in bombing
operations, increasing lethality significantly. Before an actual strike
may begin, information on potential targets generally must be routed
through command and control centers where the target information is
analyzed; information is exchanged between a myriad of commanders,
analysts, and other elements of the force; and final approval for the
strike is granted. The ability to network these elements and rapidly
exchange information during this process-central to combat

4 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command, Joint Lessons Learned:
Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat Operations (Norfolk, Virginia: Mar.
1, 2004).

effectiveness--is enabled by improvements in computing power, digital
communications, and satellite data links in recent years. For example,
increases in computing power have enabled the networking of computers from
a multitude of personnel and locations, with near instantaneous exchange
of information through techniques such as file sharing, video
conferencing, and e-mailing. These capabilities are enhanced by digital
communications, which can be faster and more accurate than voice
communication. For example, digital systems allow a ground controller to
input the coordinates and other information needed for an attack into a
computer and transmit this information instantly to computers on board an
aircraft or at command and control centers.

The ability to rapidly exchange information generated by these networks
has some limitations. For example, the Defense Science Board recently
reported5 that despite the successes in Afghanistan, there were
difficulties in passing coordinates from ground personnel to aircraft
overhead due to the unreliability and limited range of secure
communications and the absence of digital communications systems. As a
result, instead of instantaneously transmitting targeting information
across digital systems, ground controllers were required to pass Global
Positioning System coordinates by voice radio to aircrews. Aircrews then
had to write the coordinates on boards held on their knees, and then read
them back for confirmation. Once confirmed, aircrews needed to load the
coordinates by hand into the weapons, a process requiring as many as 51
computer keystrokes and subject to error.

The ability to rapidly exchange information generated by these networks is
also dependent upon satellite data links and availability of bandwidth.
Bandwidth is a term used to describe the rate at which information moves
from one electronic device to another-usually expressed in terms of bits
per second--over phone lines, fiber optic cable, or wireless
telecommunications systems. Increases in this capacity have enabled the
rapid exchange of large visual and data files, giving commanders
increasing access to more real-time surveillance, intelligence, and
targeting information than in previous conflicts. For example, according
to the Joint Forces Command, U.S. forces in Iraq had access to 42 times
the bandwidth available in Desert Storm. However, despite this improvement

5 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on
Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned, Precision Targeting and Joint
Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2003).

the Army and others have experienced continuing shortages in the
availability of bandwidth.6

Despite some limitations, technological advances have also made it
possible to manage conflicts from command centers located far away from
the battlefield, using so-called reach back techniques, where some
commanders, analysts, and other support personnel remain at home stations
and communicate with commanders at the battlefield using the networks
described above. For example, during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo the
center used to direct air operations was located in Vicenza, Italy. Images
from Predator aircraft located over the battlefield in Kosovo were
transmitted by satellite communications to a ground station in England,
then by fiber optic cable to a facility in the United States for analysis.
The information was then transmitted to the District of Colombia area,
where it was up-linked to a satellite and transmitted back to controllers
aboard an airborne command and control aircraft in Kosovo. The information
was then provided to controllers, who provided the information to aircraft
poised to strike the targets (see fig. 3).

6 Congressional Budget Office, The Army's Bandwidth Bottleneck
(Washington, D.C.: August 2003).

Figure 3: Notional Networked Operations

The reach back technique not only provides for more centralized control of
operations but also provides the opportunity for savings in logistical
support requirements. For example, in previous conflicts, command
centers-comprised of perhaps 1,500-2,000 commanders, analysts, and others,
and the equipment needed to do their jobs-had to be transported into the
war zone. This requirement created major demands on transportation and
other support elements during the early phases of an operation and reduced
the air and sealift available to move soldiers and supplies. Now,
networking permits commanders at the battlefield to reach back to analysts
and other staff located thousands of miles away for guidance and support.
During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the joint forces commander
remained at U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, while air
operations were directed from centers in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Electronic map displays at these locations provided near

Full Impact of Networking Is Unclear

continuous tracking of ground, air, and naval units, with Predator drones
and other aircraft feeding live video imagery from the battlefield.

While it seems clear that networking has speeded operations, the full
impact on operations is unclear because of the absence of detailed
measures of their effects. For example, U.S. Central Command officials
told us that while the targeting process was slowed by requirements for
additional command approvals for some targets, they believed that overall,
the targeting process was more efficient during Operation Iraqi Freedom
than previous conflicts. However, statistics were not maintained by the
Central Command to measure this improvement.

Several experiments and exercises provide some information on this issue.
For example, according to a recent DOD report7 to Congress, an Army
exercise in 1997 using computer simulation to determine the war-fighting
effectiveness of a digitized division-sized force found that the time
required to process calls for fire was reduced from 3 minutes to 30
seconds and that the planning time for attacks at the company level was
cut from 40 to 20 minutes. Similarly, a 1998 experiment involving
networked Army helicopter units and a range of Navy and Marine units to
counter a simulated attack by North Korean special operations boats found
that the average decision time was reduced from 43 to 23 minutes and that
shooter effectiveness measured in kills per shot was increased by 50
percent. DOD also reported that a special Air Force project in the
mid1990s found that F15-C fighter aircraft networked with digital
communication packages increased their success rate in air-to-air combat
exercises by more than 150 percent over aircraft equipped with voice only
communications. The increase was attributed to the benefits of shared
situation awareness provided by the digital networks. According to DOD's
report, pilots with voice only communications can only see enemy aircraft
in the radar zone directly in front of their aircraft, and they cannot see
supporting friendly aircraft to their rear. To attack enemy aircraft, the
voice only aircraft must hold verbal conversations with supporting
aircraft to understand the entire combat picture and develop a coordinated
attack plan. However, fighter aircraft networked with digital
communications are able to see the entire picture of enemy and friendly
support aircraft locations on their screens without the need for
time-consuming conversations. According to the report, this shared mental
picture of the

7 U.S. Department of Defense, Network Centric Warfare, Department of
Defense Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2001).

battlefield reduces the cognitive load on the pilots, enabling them to
concentrate more on the battle, react quicker, and make synchronized,
mutually reinforcing decisions with their supporting aircraft.

These examples provide illustrations of the potential effects of
networkcentric operations. However, DOD's report acknowledges that
evidence of its full impact is limited and often scattered, rather than
focused and systematic. Having a fuller, more precise understanding of the
effects of network-centric operations is important because of its
potential impact on issues such as the ability to model the speed of
combat operations and the resources needed to support them. An official
from DOD's Office of Force Transformation told us that the office is
conducting a series of case studies of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
and exercises at the National Training Center and elsewhere to better
understand these effects.

    Precision Weapons Increase Flexibility and Accuracy

Precision Weapons Provide Increased Flexibility

The development of technologies such as laser-guided and Global
Positioning System-guided precision weapons has provided military
commanders with increased flexibility and accuracy in bombing operations,
making them increasingly lethal.

Precision weapons reduce limitations created by poor weather and
visibility, enable bombing operations from higher and safer altitudes, and
allow aircraft to be used in new ways. For example, bombing operations
have always faced limitations due to targets being obscured by bad weather
or other limitations on visibility. Traditionally, the process of locating
and marking a target was dependent on the controllers' ability to see the
target, judge distances, and accurately find coordinates using paper maps.
Targeting objectives were marked using smoke grenades, flares, or other
such techniques. However, Global Positioning Systemguided bombs help
reduce these limitations by providing an all-weather delivery capability
enabled by satellite-aided navigation. The system is a constellation of 24
orbiting satellites emitting continuous navigation signals that handheld
receivers on the ground can translate into time, location, and velocity of
targets. Time can be calculated to within a fraction of a second, location
to within 100 feet, and velocity within less than a mile per hour.
According to DOD officials, laser-guided bombs- which follow a narrow beam
of pulsed energy trained on a target by aircraft or operators on the
ground-are more precise than Global Positioning System-guided bombs, and
have a capability for attacks on moving targets that Global Positioning
System-guided bombs do not. However, laser-guided bombs are subject to
limitations presented by rain,

clouds, or other visibility conditions since there must be a clear line of
sight between the laser designator and the target.

From Operation Allied Force to Operation Enduring Freedom, DOD increased
the use of Global Positioning System-guided bombs by about 45 percent and
decreased the use of laser-guided bombs by about 32 percent. Conversely,
between Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, DOD decreased the
use of Global Positioning System-guided bombs by about 13 percent and
increased the use of laser-guided bombs by about 10 percent. DOD officials
stated that there is a need for both laser-guided and Global Positioning
System-guided bombs in today's environment and that the use depends on
such factors as nature of the target being struck, theater of operations,
weather conditions, availability, and cost. Frequently used guided
munitions such as the Global Positioning System Guided Bomb Unit 31 have a
unit cost of about $21,100 to $28,400, depending on the version used,
while laser-guided bombs such as the Guided Bomb Units 10/12/16 have unit
costs ranging from $14,600 to $23,000. Unguided bombs such as the
500-pound MK-82 and 1,000-pound MK-83 have unit costs ranging from about
$2,000 to $8,700.

The use of such precision-guided weapons has also made it possible for
bombing operations to be conducted from higher altitudes. This tactic
helps limit the threat to pilots and aircraft from air defense systems and
ground fire, and provides Global Positioning System-guided bombs with more
time to acquire and guide on the satellite signals. In Kosovo, where air
defense systems posed a significant threat to U.S. forces, pilots
conducted bombing missions at an altitude that was beyond the effective
reach of the Serbian enemy air defense systems. According to DOD
officials, they have continued to use this tactic in Afghanistan and Iraq
because of its effectiveness. In addition to high altitude operations,
Global Positioning System-guided weapons, such as the joint direct attack
munition used extensively in Iraq, can also be launched miles away from a
target. The operator can essentially launch the weapon and proceed on to
the next target, relying on the navigation system to guide the weapon to
impact. While conducting bombing operations from high altitudes is much
safer for pilots and aircraft, it also becomes more difficult to properly
identify and distinguish certain targets, particularly when the enemy
employs denial and deception tactics. For example, during Operation Allied
Force, Serbian forces made tank decoys out of milk cartons and artillery
pieces out of stovepipes.

DOD has also increased the numbers of aircraft capable of delivering
precision-guided munitions, allowing military planners to use aircraft in

Precision Weapons Improve Accuracy

new and different ways. According to a recent report, only about 20
percent of U.S. aircraft were equipped with the ability to put a
laserguided bomb on the target during the first Gulf War. However, nearly
every combat aircraft was capable of employing precision-guided munitions
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.8 Bombers such as B-2s are now capable of
delivering large payloads of weapons in a single strike, providing more
flexibility in weapons availability. These capabilities increase the
ability to deliver more precision-guided weapons during each flight.
Moreover, they also increase operational effectiveness by allowing the
military to reduce flights by planning to strike multiple targets during
each flight, as opposed to the traditional approach of carrying out
multiple flights to attack one target.

Our analysis found that advances in precision weapons have improved the
accuracy of bombing operations. For example, we compared data on bombing
operations in Afghanistan maintained by the U.S. Central Command with data
on operations in Kosovo from our classified report on Operation Allied
Force. This analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in
damage or destruction to fixed targets increased by 12 percentage points
from Kosovo to Afghanistan. Further, the percentage of attacks resulting
in damage or destruction to mobile targets increased by 21 percentage
points. DOD officials agreed that bombing accuracy improved, and
classified analyses conducted by both the Air Force and the Navy support
that conclusion. According to DOD officials, there is no similar analysis
of the accuracy of bombing operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

While DOD officials agreed that precision-guided weapons have increased
the accuracy of bombing operations, they stated that it is important to
note that such improvements may also be influenced by other factors. For
example, differences in terrain, the relative numbers of fixed versus
mobile targets (which are harder to hit), and commanders' guidance on
collateral damage can all influence the accuracy of bombing operations. In
addition, the experience and the training that military forces gained by
near continuous combat operations since the beginning of Operation Allied
Force in 1999 may also influence bombing accuracy. Such factors must be
considered when interpreting bombing statistics.

8 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Operation Iraqi Freedom:
A First Blush Assessment (Washington, D.C.: 2003).

  Key Barriers Inhibit Continued Progress in Implementing the New Strategy

Despite the improvements brought about by advances in networking and
precision weapons, DOD has identified a variety of barriers undermining
continued progress in implementing the new capabilities-based strategy.
For example, concerns were raised about shortages of digital
communications, commercial satellite capacity and bandwidth, and other
equipment. However, four interrelated areas stood out as key barriers to
continued progress: (1) the lack of standardized, interoperable systems
and equipment; (2) DOD's continuing difficulty in obtaining timely, high
quality assessments of the effects of bombing operations; (3) the absence
of a unified battlefield data collection system to provide standardized
measures and baseline data on the efficiency and effectiveness of bombing
operations; and (4) the lack of high quality, realistic training to help
personnel at all levels understand and adapt to changes in the operating
environment brought about by the move to a highly networked force using
advanced technologies.

    Problems in Standardization and Interoperability Slow Operations and Reduce
    Effectiveness

The lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment during joint
operations was one of the most frequently reported problems we found
during our review. According to DOD officials and reports, this
longstanding problem undermines many operating systems at DOD, including
systems used to provide shared situation awareness of the battlefield,
battle management command and control, and damage assessments of the
effects of bombing operations. For example, officials from the Joint
Forces and Special Operations Commands told us that during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, ground forces arrived in theater with several different,
noninteroperable Blue Force Tracking systems. Blue Force Tracking systems
are devices carried by friendly ground units and vehicles that
continuously or periodically transmit their locations to a central
database, allowing their locations to be displayed on computer screens.
Since there is no joint standard for such tracking systems, the joint
force commander is responsible for resolving the interoperability problems
created by the use of disparate systems. To provide a common picture of
the location of ground forces using these systems, commanders had to
develop a number of creative solutions to bridge the differences between
them and integrate them into a coherent system-requiring considerable time
and effort.

DOD officials also told us that the use of differing formats for
processing information creates similar problems. For example, each service
and unified command have their own instructions for performing operations

such as reporting on the results of bombing missions. A recent DOD report
found that during joint operations in Afghanistan, the Central Command
received mission reports using at least 23 different formats.9 This
created difficulty in receiving messages and required time-consuming
manual data manipulation and entry. Operations in Iraq also faced similar
problems. According to the Joint Forces Command report on Iraqi Freedom,
the process of evaluating the effects of attacks in Iraq was beset by a
lack of commonly understood operational level standards. Integration of
information was undermined by groups adopting their own standards and
reporting formats, resulting in difficulties in translating information
and coming to a mutual understanding because they were not able to make
specific comparisons between formats or to a common format. DOD has
published a number of joint publications to help standardize operations in
the joint environment. These publications provide general terms of
reference and descriptions of processes, such as the targeting process,
for use by personnel from the various services while operating in the
joint environment. However, according to DOD officials, these publications
do not provide enough detailed guidance, such as standardized formats for
reporting mission results, for the actual conduct of operations. As a
result, each unified command must develop its own implementing procedures,
with no system to ensure standardization among the commands. Further,
according to DOD officials, when the pace of operations increases to high
levels, there is a tendency for personnel to revert to using their own
familiar service procedures.

We have also reported that a variety of equipment-such as reconnaissance
aircraft, satellites, ground-based stations processing intelligence data,
ground targeting equipment, and digital transmission systems used to
transmit information between airborne and ground personnel-is not
interoperable across the services. Similar to the examples cited above,
the inability of these systems to operate effectively together can limit
access to communications and other needed capabilities and confuse and
slow targeting activities as less efficient alternatives must be used to
achieve the mission.

DOD recognizes that improved interoperability and standardization are
central to the transformation of its forces, and is attempting to address
the problem. However, the problem is complex and difficult to resolve

9U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test and
Evaluation, Operation Enduring Freedom Test Report (Washington, D.C.:
December 2002).

because military operations and acquisition systems have traditionally
focused on the services and the specific weapons platforms needed for
their specific missions-not on joint operations with interoperable systems
and equipment. DOD's budget is organized by service and defense agencies,
as we and the Defense Science Board recently reported in separate
publications.10 Therefore, the process of defining and acquiring the right
capabilities is dominated by the services and defense agencies. Joint
force commanders' views are considered in this process, but they have a
difficult time competing with individual service interests that control
the process. As a result, the acquisition of systems and equipment often
fails to consider joint mission requirements and solutions, and there is
no guarantee that fielded systems will operate effectively together.

DOD is addressing the need for more interoperability and standardization
in several ways. For example, DOD's April 2003 Transformation Planning
Guidance requires the commander of the Joint Forces Command to develop a
plan to address DOD's interoperability priorities. These priorities
include such efforts as development of a common operational picture for
joint forces; improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities; improvements to selected targeting linkages; and improved
reach back capabilities. The planning guidance also requires the services
and the Joint Forces Command to develop plans for achieving the desired
transformational capabilities, including an identification of the
initiatives taken to improve interoperability. DOD is also attempting to
reform the acquisition process to align it with a new capabilities-based
resource allocation process built around joint operating concepts. Instead
of building plans, operations, and doctrine around individual service
systems, DOD is attempting to explicitly link acquisition strategy to
joint concepts to provide integrated, interoperable joint war-fighting
capabilities. For example, in June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff issued Instruction 3170.01 that established the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System. This system provides new
guidelines and procedures for joint staff to review proposed acquisitions
for their contribution to joint war-fighting needs.

DOD is also developing the Global Information Grid to act as the
organizing framework for network-centric operations and help ensure

10U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks-Department of Defense, GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003)
and U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Enabling Joint Force Capabilities
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2003).

interoperability in information operations throughout DOD. Begun in the
late 1990s, this effort seeks to integrate the information processing,
storing, disseminating, and managing capabilities-as well as the
associated personnel and processes-throughout DOD into an integrated
network. DOD's Chief Information Officer has described this network as a
private military version of the World Wide Web. The effort includes
programs to develop the policies and guidance needed to implement
network-centric concepts across DOD, as well as programs to provide the
technological improvements needed for the success of network-centric
operations. Parts of this effort, such as policy and procedural guidance,
bandwidth expansion, and improvements to reach back capabilities, have
begun or are in place. For example, definitions of requirements for
interoperable information technology that are used in developing the
Global Information Grid are cited as the authoritative guidance in the
requirements determination and acquisition areas-including the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System discussed previously.
However, according to officials involved in the effort, development of the
grid is still in its early stages and is planned to continue to the year
2010 and beyond.

While DOD appears committed to improving interoperability, DOD officials
state that such reforms require difficult cultural changes to fully
succeed. However, we previously reported that various problems have
undermined past reforms, including cultural resistance to change,
stovepiped operations, difficulties in sustaining top management
commitment (the average tenure of top political appointees is only 1.7
years), and other problems that continue to exist today.11 For example, in
November 1997, DOD announced the establishment of the Defense Reform
Initiative, which was a major effort to modernize DOD's business processes
and ignite a "revolution" in business affairs at DOD. The initiative was
overseen by the Defense Management Council composed of senior defense
leaders reporting to the Secretary of Defense. However, by July 2000, we
reported12 that the initiative was not meeting its time frames and goals
in a number of areas. We concluded that the most notable barrier was the
difficulty in overcoming institutional resistance to change in an
organization as large and complex as DOD. Moreover, the effectiveness of
the Defense Management Council was impaired because members were

11 See GAO-03-98.

12U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Management: Actions Needed to
Sustain Reform Initiatives and Achieve Greater Results, GAO/NSIAD-00-72
(Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2000).

not able to put aside their particular services' or agencies' interests to
focus on departmentwide approaches.

Similarly, cultural impediments to change were also illustrated in our
March 2003 report on ground-based systems for processing intelligence
data.13 In that report, we stated that DOD's system for certifying their
interoperability was not working effectively. In 1998, DOD began a program
to reduce the number of ground-based systems that process intelligence
data from various sensors and ensure that the remaining sensors are
interoperable with other DOD systems. DOD requires that such information
systems be certified, and to help enforce the certification process, the
department set up a review panel to periodically review such systems and
place those with interoperability problems on a "watch list." However, 5
years after the program was started, we reported that only 2 of 26 systems
in the program had been certified and, despite this problem, the systems
had not been placed on the watch list. DOD officials cited a number of
reasons for the noncompliance, including that military services sometimes
allow service-unique requirements to take precedence over joint
interoperability requirements. DOD strongly agreed with our
recommendations to take several steps necessary to enforce its
certification process.

    Timely Understanding of Battle Damages Remains a Difficult Problem

Battle Damage Assessments Cannot Match Pace of Operations

DOD's difficulty in obtaining timely, high quality assessments of the
effects of bombing operations continues to be a difficult problem to
overcome. Problems with battle damage assessments have been repeatedly
identified since at least Operation Desert Storm in 1991. DOD has taken
some steps to address these problems, but they continue to reoccur. As a
result, some DOD officials have called for approaching battle damage
assessments in different ways.

Reports from DOD and others have identified repeated difficulties in
conducting battle damage assessments in operations in Iraq, as well as
other operations dating back at least to Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Battle damage assessments are a critical component of combat operations.
Slow or inaccurate assessments can result in inefficient use of forces and
weapons, as targets must be struck repeatedly--but sometimes
unnecessarily-to ensure their elimination as a threat. Inadequate damage
assessments also slow ground advances, as units and individuals face

13 See GAO-03-329.

uncertainty about enemy capabilities, which can ultimately increase their
risk of death or injury since they may have to close with the enemy to
understand the conditions ahead of them. However, DOD reported that battle
damage assessments during operations in Iraq could not keep up with the
pace of operations and failed to provide the information needed for
operational decisions. Reports on operations in Afghanistan also
identified similar problems during Operation Enduring Freedom. Our report
on Operation Desert Storm14 found that battle damage assessments during
that conflict were neither as timely nor as complete as planners had
assumed they would be. Battle damage assessments were performed on only 41
percent of the strategic targets in our analysis, resulting in potentially
unnecessary additional strikes to increase the probability that target
objectives would be met.

The inability of damage assessment resources to keep up with the pace of
modern battlefield operations is due to several factors. According to DOD
officials, advances in network-centric operations and precision weapons
have increased the speed at which targets are generated and attacked. At
the same time, however, DOD does not have an occupational specialty for
battle damage analysts. This results in shortages of trained analysts when
resources are surged during operations, leaving unified commands to rely
on untrained and inexperienced personnel brought in from other areas and
trained on the job. For example, during operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the Central Command experienced requirements for large manning
increases in its battle damage assessment capability. While the command
was ultimately able to increase its staff of analysts to about 60 (see
fig. 4), this was only a fraction of the estimated requirement. Typically,
the Central Command has about three to five full-time personnel assigned
to its battle damage assessment group.

14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of
the Air Campaign, GAO/NSIAD-97-134 (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 1997).

Figure 4: U.S. Central Command Battle Damage Assessment Manning Levels for
Recent Operations

Note: The time frames indicated as Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Iraqi Freedom designate periods of major combat operations.

Moreover, according to Central Command officials, even when they obtained
personnel they were often untrained. Operations were further slowed, as
these personnel were required to receive on-the-job training. Battle
damage assessment training is available at both the service and joint
levels. However, according to DOD officials, the absence of a formal
occupational specialty for battle damage assessment means there is little
incentive for personnel to seek the training. Further, even if trained,
analysts are required to use the instructions of the unified command in
charge of operations during actual conflicts. DOD officials told us that
there is no requirement for these instructions to be standardized, making
it more difficult for personnel from the services to quickly adapt to
operations. Finally, according to officials, DOD does not have a
comprehensive system to track personnel who have received battle damage
assessment training, further exacerbating problems in quickly locating
trained analysts during surge situations.

Attempts to Address the Battle Damage Assessment Problem Have Been Limited

Officials Call for Different Approaches to Assessing Battle Damage

In recognition of the continuing problems associated with battle damage
assessments, DOD has taken some steps to address these problems. However,
these attempts have been somewhat limited. For example, DOD established
the Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test and Evaluation program in
August 2000 to investigate solutions to battle damage assessment process
problems. The program was focused on assessment processes used by U.S.
forces in Korea, but it also analyzed processes used in Operations
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Program officials developed a variety
of enhancements that could improve the battle damage assessment process.
For example, program officials developed improvements to the processes
used in Korea to standardize disparate systems and speed the flow of
information between analysis and command centers. To help address analyst
training problems, they developed a compact disc-based course to provide
quick training for untrained personnel assigned to fill shortages of
analysts during conflicts. Further, they also developed an agreement with
a reserve organization to develop a core of trained battle damage
assessment analysts and to have those personnel available to meet surge
requirements for the Korean command.

However, according to program officials, acceptance of such approaches is
voluntary within DOD, and many have not been implemented outside Korea.
They are trying to gain additional support for adoption of their
enhancements. Program operations will be discontinued and a final report
issued by December 2004. In addition to this program, DOD officials told
us that a Combat Assessment Working Group was recently established at the
Joint Staff to discuss ways to address problems with the battle damage
assessment process. However, the group had not developed formal
recommendations at the completion of our audit work in March 2004.

Some DOD officials have called for more effort to be focused on assessing
battle damages from an "effects-based" framework. The effects-based
operational concept calls for an increased emphasis on conducting military
operations and assessing their effects, in terms of the military and
nonmilitary effects sought-rather than in terms of simply the destruction
of a given target or an adversary. According to a recent Defense Science
Board report,15 the emergence of this concept has been influenced by the
opportunity provided by precision weapons, shared situation awareness, and
other advances enabling the precise use of force, as well as the needs

15 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force (Washington,
D.C.: July 28, 2003).

presented by the nature of current military campaigns. Operations from
Kosovo to Iraq have been characterized by tension among multiple strategic
and operational objectives: destroy enemy infantry and air defenses and
drive the current regime from power, but do not injure civilians or damage
necessary infrastructure.

The use of an effects-based battle damage assessment approach would mean
that instead of the traditional focus only on damage or destruction of a
target, battle damage assessments should also attempt to determine whether
command objectives are being met by other influences in the battlefield.
For example, initial bombing attacks on nearby targets may persuade enemy
troops to abandon a target facility, eliminating the need to bomb the
target facility at all. According to the Joint Forces Command's report on
Iraqi Freedom, commanders in Iraq attempted to use an effectsbased
approach to analyze military operations. However, when the speed of
operations exceeded their capability to analyze and assess how actions
were changing the Iraqi system, they reverted to the traditional focus on
simple attrition measures. Coalition forces reverted to counting specific
numbers of targets destroyed to determine combat progress, rather than
evaluating the broader effect created on the enemy. The command has called
for recognition of problems with battle damage assessments as a major
obstacle to effects-based operations, requiring a variety of changes to
resolve.

DOD officials also told us that the traditional focus on damage and
destruction results in leaders relying too much on visual imagery to
assess battle damages. This problem can cause leaders to delay battlefield
progress until full visual confirmation of the desired affect is
confirmed. According to these officials, given the increasingly reliable
nature of precision weapons, it may be possible in some cases to rely on
predicted or probabilistic effects, rather than full visual confirmation.

    Absence of a Unified Battlefield Information System Confuses Measures of
    Effectiveness

DOD does not have a unified battlefield data collection system to provide
standardized measures and baseline data on the efficiency and
effectiveness of bombing operations. According to DOD officials, the
current system for collecting operational data is for the services and the
unified commands to maintain their own databases, which are often quite
extensive. Precisely how data is defined, gathered, and analyzed is at the
discretion of each individual component and addresses specific needs.
These unique requirements lead to different purposes for conducting
analyses, different data collection approaches, and different definitions
of key data elements.

Different Approaches Used to Measure the Number of Attacks Needed to
Destroy Targets

For example, to better understand the impact of the tactical and
technological changes on the efficiency and effectiveness of bombing
operations, we analyzed the number of attacks and bombs required to damage
or destroy a given target for operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. A
number of DOD officials told us that advances in the accuracy of bombing
operations have raised the expectation that fewer attacks and bombs are
now required to damage or destroy targets. Instead of traditional
operations-where multiple sorties and multiple bombs were required to
destroy one target-some officials now believe one bomb per target and
multiple targets on one sortie should be the norm. The results of our
analyses tended to support the idea that it took fewer attacks to damage
or destroy targets in Afghanistan than in Kosovo. However, we could not
gain agreement from the services on the results of these analyses because
each had its own system for measuring operations, and the measures also
differed from the ones used in our analysis.

The question of how many attacks are required to damage or destroy a
target is basic to understanding battlefield effectiveness; however, we
found no consistency among the services and the unified commands as to
which of several basic measures should be used. Some group information
about attacks based on "sorties"-defined as the takeoff and landing of one
aircraft, during which one or more aim points16 may be attacked. Others do
not attempt to group information based on sorties, making comparisons of
information between databases difficult and confusing. For example,
because the Central Command was in charge of operations in Afghanistan, we
used its database to analyze bombing operations during Operation Enduring
Freedom and compare those with the results of our classified review of
Kosovo bombing operations. The Central Command's database provides
information about aircraft attacks and damages to aim points, since it is
focused primarily on assessing battle damages. However, it does not
provide the information needed to analyze by sortie, since it does not
identify activities that took place between a given takeoff and landing.
To compare the Central Command's data with our data on Kosovo, we grouped
the information on the basis of attacks. An attack was defined as each
time that a single aircraft dropped one or more weapons on any single aim
point. Based on this definition, our analysis found that it took fewer
attacks to damage or destroy both fixed and mobile targets during
operations in Afghanistan than during operations in Kosovo.

16 A precise point on a target that is assigned for weapon impact.

Effects Also Measured Differently

Similar comparisons could not be made with the Air Force's and Navy's
databases on Operation Enduring Freedom because their data are not
maintained based on this definition of an attack. Both services list data
by aircraft sortie. More specifically, each record in the Air Force's
database corresponds to one delivery of a specific weapon type against an
aim point, with each weapon delivery linked to a particular sortie and
mission in the air tasking order. For the Navy's analysis, which describes
the percentage of sorties that dropped weapons, each sortie can have one
or multiple attacks, defined as one run at a given target. Because both
the Air Force's and the Navy's analyses are primarily assessments of
weapons and not intended to measure battle damage information, the main
focus is assessing data for and based on specific weapon drops. As a
result, they contain no analysis that links the relationship between the
number of sorties flown and the corresponding damage.

A second basic element of effectiveness is whether or not bombing actions
resulted in the desired effects. The services and the Central Command also
differed in their approaches to measuring this element, further
complicating analysis. The Central Command's database provides information
on effects based on battle damage assessments, since measuring battle
damage is the primary responsibility of the unified commands. However, the
service databases are geared toward measuring the performance of specific
systems.

The Air Force, for example, primarily focused its analysis of operations
in Afghanistan on a munitions effectiveness assessment. This analysis
measures the actual success of individual weapons against predicted
results and does not address battle damage assessments. The analysis
measures whether the bomb landed outside an area around the target within
which the bomb was predicted to hit, known as the circular error probable.
Air Force officials stated that it is possible for a weapon to be scored a
miss for Air Force munitions effectiveness assessment purposes, but still
cause significant damage to a target. According to the Air Force's
analysis, the vast majority of munitions employed in Operation Enduring
Freedom performed significantly better than expected. This could mean that
the Air Force can adjust its planning and modeling assumptions to lower
the number of sorties expected to be required to destroy a target.

Similar to the Air Force's analysis, the Navy measured effects based on
weapon hit rates. However, the Navy's analysis assessed what fraction of
Navy bombs that were dropped impacted the intended target and had a high
order detonation, determined primarily by reviewing weapons system videos.
According to officials, if a weapon hit the target and had a high

Basic Target Characteristics Defined Differently

order detonation, it was counted as a successful hit for analysis
purposes. The Navy's analysis did not measure whether a weapon fell within
the planned circular error probable, nor did it measure battle damages.

The services and the U.S. Central Command also differ in their treatment
of the basic question of how to define a target as fixed or mobile. This
distinction is important to considerations of effectiveness because it is
much harder to hit mobile than fixed targets. Moreover, mobile targets may
be becoming more numerous as adversaries attempt to use mobility to avoid
the effectiveness of precision weapons. Inconsistent definitions of fixed
and mobile targets result in different classifications of like targets and
disagreement among officials when attempting to measure the relative
effectiveness of bombing attacks against mobile and fixed targets.

The Navy's analysis, for example, classifies mobile targets as "mobile"
and "moving." According to the analysis, mobile targets are those that can
move between the time of launch and the time of impact, such as vehicles
and aircraft. Moving targets are those that are actually moving when they
are hit. Classification results are determined by a direct review of
weapon system video or documentation in mission reports. Unlike the
analysis, the Central Command's database classifies all targets capable of
moving as mobile whether they are moving at the time of attack or not. The
classification of moving is not used because such information is more
detailed than is needed for battle damage assessment purposes.

In contrast, the Air Force's database does not classify targets as fixed
or mobile. The database provides a description of the desired aim point,
such as the center of a runway or troops, but leaves it up to the user to
define which are mobile and which are fixed. There is a field for moving
targets in the database, but according to Air Force officials, very few
records have an entry in this field. Targets are only classified as moving
when there is available weapon system video to confirm that the target was
moving at the time the weapon was dropped. As a result of these
differences, an attack on a truck that is moving at the time of an attack
would be classified as mobile by the Central Command, as moving by Navy
officials, and as either mobile or moving to Air Force officials,
depending on the availability of weapon system video.

Fixed targets are also classified differently in some cases. For example,
according to Navy officials, there are several types of fixed targets.
Troops are classified as a fixed, area target because individual troops
are not targeted with aircraft but rather as an area occupied by troops.
However, buildings are classified as fixed, point targets where there is a
specific

Differences Can Cause Confusion in Operational Assessments and Financial
Decisions

place to hit. In contrast, the Central Command classifies fixed targets
only as those that are not able to move, such as buildings.

The absence of a baseline system to bridge definitional and other
differences and provide clear, consistent information about actual bombing
effectiveness creates confusion in several areas. For example, this
confusion was graphically illustrated when we provided the results of our
analyses to the services. The results tended to support the idea that it
took fewer attacks to damage or destroy targets in Afghanistan than in
Kosovo. However, we could not gain agreement from the services on the
results because our analyses were based on Central Command data that
differed from that in their own systems, as previously discussed. Similar
confusion occurred over the results of our March 2002 classified analysis
of bombing operations in Kosovo. DOD did not concur with our use of the
Air Force's Mission Analysis Tracking and Tabulation System database to
analyze bombing operations, stating that no single database is completely
accurate and contains all information needed for the analysis. However,
that database was the most comprehensive available, developed specifically
as a primary database for tracking airframe and weapon effectiveness
during Operation Allied Force, and was used by DOD as the basis for its
January 2000 report to Congress on operations in Kosovo. DOD cannot
clearly resolve such confusion until baseline definitions of effectiveness
measures are reconciled and a unified database developed.

Further, reliable, consistent data on such issues is needed to make
procurement decisions on the number of bombs and other resources DOD will
need to procure for future conflicts. In this regard, we recently
reported17 that differences in battle simulation models and scenarios used
by the services and the unified commands were resulting in different
estimates of munitions needed for operations, and, ultimately, in reports
of munitions shortages. Clear, consistent, and up-to-date measures of the
effectiveness of precision weapons-such as the actual number of aircraft
and bombs required to achieve targeting objectives-could help resolve such
differences and improve procurement and other planning decisions. In
addition, as discussed earlier, precision weapons can be considerably more
expensive than traditional munitions. Without clear data on bombing
effectiveness, DOD cannot analyze the return on investment from the

17 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Management: Munitions
Requirements and Combatant Commanders' Needs Require Linkage, GAO-03-17
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2002).

trade-off of fewer, but more expensive, precision weapons versus the use
of more, but less expensive, traditional munitions.

    Current Training Does Not Provide Realistic Preparation to Cope with
    Changing Operating Environment

Operations Characterized by Increasingly High Volume and Centralized
Command and Control, but More Autonomy at Lower Levels

Both the Joint Forces Command and the Defense Science Board found that
current training does not provide the realistic preparation needed to cope
with the emerging operating environment. DOD officials raised concerns
that the changing strategy and technological improvements have created
large increases in the pace of operations and volume of information that
have overwhelmed commanders and other personnel at times. Further,
advances in networking the force and other changes have fostered a more
centralized style of management, with senior leaders increasingly involved
in operations. At the same time, however, networkcentric operating
concepts are distributing information to lower and lower organizational
levels, raising the potential for increased autonomy for small units and
individual soldiers. According to DOD officials, personnel at all levels,
but particularly commanders, need realistic training to understand this
new environment and adapt to it to ensure that the new capabilities are
used to their fullest advantage.

DOD officials told us that network-centric operations have advanced to the
point that the heavy flow of information and rapid pace of operations may
at times overload systems and personnel. This problem can create confusion
and inefficiency as systems for conducting battle damage assessments or
other operations become slow and clogged while sorting and integrating
large amounts of information, and officials are distracted by having to
devote precious time to sorting through hundreds of e-mail messages or by
attending increasingly frequent videoconferences. Moreover, officials also
believe that this problem may get worse as commanders increasingly
recognize the advantages of networked systems, creating a need for even
more information.

The officials also stated that increased networking is fostering a more
centralized style of command and control, which can create tension between
command staffs and operators in the field. For example, according to
officials, lawyers and senior civilian and military leaders at
headquarters locations remote from the execution of operations are
becoming increasingly involved in target selection and other operational
areas. Historically, one of the principal tenets of U.S. command and
control has been centralized direction, but decentralized execution of
operations to give subordinates on the scene sufficient freedom of action
to accomplish their missions. Increased centralization in the execution of
operations can result in senior commanders being bogged down in

Changing Operating Environment Requires Better, More Realistic Training

operational details and subordinates on the scene losing initiative. This
development has been linked to the advances in technologies that provide
the opportunity for detailed views of the battlefield and frequent
videoconferences and other communications to be shared among a wide array
of officials that may be located thousands of miles away. This trend is
also influenced by increased concerns over sensitive issues such as the
avoidance of intrusions into the airspace of neighboring countries and
collateral damage to civilian structures. Such issues act as an incentive
for senior leaders to increase their involvement in lower and lower levels
of planning and operations.

While senior leaders are becoming increasingly involved in operations,
information is also being distributed to lower and lower organizational
levels, raising the potential for increased autonomy for small units and
individual soldiers. For example, one of the principal organizing and
operating tenets of network-centric operations is the concept called power
to the edge. This concept involves empowering individuals at the "edge" of
an organization-where it interacts with its operating environment-by
expanding access to information and eliminating unnecessary constraints on
action. According to department officials, adopting this concept requires
DOD to change the way it handles intelligence and other information. For
example, DOD's current information systems are based on data requirements
that are focused on the needs of the organizations supplying the data,
with dissemination of the data based on a sequential process with
information pushed out to customers at the end. But DOD is now moving to
systems where broad arrays of information are placed on networks before
any unnecessary processing at the point of collection, with total access
for customers who can pull out the information that each needs
simultaneously. This provides more information to lower organizational
levels, enabling them to operate more autonomously with less direct
control by commanders. According to officials at the Joint Forces Command,
this concept helped DOD use smaller formations of personnel with flexible
command and control relationships to great advantage during operations in
Iraq.

Consistent with DOD's basic tenet that the force must train as it will
fight, DOD officials have called for improved, more realistic training to
match the scale and tempo of actual operations. For example, the Joint
Forces Command reported that the lack of realistic training undermined
theaterlevel intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management and
other

operational level capabilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similarly,
the Defense Science Board reported18 that the changing operating
environment will have unintended human consequences that will require
personnel to adapt to increasing cognitive demands at even the most junior
levels, and to think and act more quickly. According to the Board, current
training will not adequately prepare DOD personnel to cope with the
increasing and constantly changing cognitive requirements.

DOD officials also cautioned that the joint operational effectiveness
experienced in Operation Iraqi Freedom was often the result of procedures
developed during 18 months of practice begun during operations in
Afghanistan and that such improvements are often fleeting- needing to be
reinvented in the next contingency. The Joint Forces Command called for
development of an improved joint training capability to institutionalize
the operating procedures developed in Iraq and allow commanders and staffs
to experiment with and practice operational-level processes. Moreover,
service and DOD officials also noted that expectations for the future need
to be tempered with the understanding that operations in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq were conducted with other advantages-such as largely
complete air superiority-that may not be available in future conflicts.

The development of networked surveillance and command and control systems,
precision weapons, and other advances has combined to have a synergetic
effect on U.S. military power-providing increased capabilities for dealing
effectively with enemies operating out of nontraditional battlefields, as
well as more traditional approaches to warfare. Notwithstanding these
advances, the full impact of these changes is still emerging and is not
fully understood. Moreover, the enemy is likely to continue to evolve and
adapt its approaches in response to the continued evolution of U.S.
tactics and capabilities. As a result, it is important to continue
developing and refining these capabilities. However, the legacy of DOD's
traditional focus on service-specific operations is inhibiting the
continued evolution of the new capabilities. The lack of standardized,
interoperable systems and equipment interferes with the development of
force networks, slowing operations and reducing effectiveness.
Difficulties in quickly obtaining sufficient numbers of trained battle
damage analysts

18 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Defense Science
Board Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts-Final Report
(Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003).

  Conclusions

result in slowed assessments unable to keep up with the increased pace of
operations, inhibiting battleground progress and the utility of
improvements in other areas. Similarly, the absence of a unified
battlefield information system also confuses the clear understanding of
improvements to the efficiency and effectiveness of operations as a result
of changing capabilities, slowing the rate of adaptation to changing
battlefield conditions. Finally, the lack of realistic training limits the
ability of leaders to understand and systems to sense changes in the
operating environment-such as the increased pace of operations and flow of
information, the increased centralization of command, and the increased
potential for operational autonomy and self-direction of small units and
individual soldiers, as well as emerging concepts such as effects-based
operations-further inhibiting the ability to adapt.

To ensure continuing evolution of the capabilities demonstrated in recent
conflicts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint
Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified commands, and the
military departments to take the following four actions:

  Recommendations for Executive Action

o  	identify the primary information required for bombing operations, such
as targeting and battle damage assessments, ensure that planned
interoperability enhancements provide the standardized definitions,
mission reporting formats, and other necessary instructions for this
information to be used by all unified commands during joint combat
operations, and determine whether this standardized information can
replace that used by the individual services;

o  	formulate a plan to provide sufficient numbers of personnel trained in
battle damage assessment procedures when they are needed for combat
operations and include in the plan the following: incentives for personnel
to take the existing joint training on damage assessment, development of a
system to be used by the Joint Forces Command to track and mobilize
personnel who have received damage assessment training for use during
surge situations, and development of guidance on the appropriate use of
effects-based, probabilistic, and other nontraditional concepts in
assessing battle damages;

o  	develop a unified battlefield information system that provides for the
identification and collection of data on key, standardized measures of
bombing operations needed to assess the basic efficiency and effectiveness
of such operations, for use by all unified commands; and

o  	develop a joint operations training capability that provides
commanders and staffs with a realistic simulation of the increased pace of
operations and other emerging changes to the combat operating environment.

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially
concurred with all our recommendations. DOD stated that the Joint Staff,
in coordination with the Joint Forces Command, is addressing our
recommendations for actions to improve standardization of information used
in bombing operations, develop a unified battlefield information system,
and develop realistic joint training to help personnel adapt to changes in
the operating environment in various ongoing initiatives.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to improve the battle damage
assessment process and stated that it is addressing the issues we raised
in the Joint Network Fires Capability Roadmap, the Joint Close Air Support
action plan, and other efforts. However, DOD believed that the section of
the report titled "Timely Understanding of Battle Damages Remains a
Difficult Problem" discusses battle damage assessments as if that function
was detached from the broader targeting process. That was not our intent.
As indicated on page 6 of the report, we agree that battle damage
assessments are an integral part of the broader targeting process. The use
of a separate section of the report to deal with that aspect of targeting
was meant only to highlight the long-standing problems with battle damage
assessments and the need to focus DOD's attention on corrective action.
Officials from the U.S. Central Command, which was in charge of operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Joint Forces Command report on lessons
learned in Iraq both pointed to the need to elevate recognition of
problems in the battle damage assessment process and address them.
Continued improvement in the speed at which targets are generated and
attacked will only further increase the need for damage assessments to
keep pace with operations in the future.

DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; the Commandant of the Marine
Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. The report will
also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this
report, please contact me at (757) 552-8100. The major contributors to
this
report are listed in appendix IV.

Neal P. Curtin
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in
networking the force and the use of precision weapons and identify the key
barriers to continued progress in implementing the new strategy, we
followed a three-phased approach.

To identify Department of Defense (DOD), military service, and unified
command policies and approaches to implementing the new strategy, we
obtained briefings, reviewed DOD and unified command directives and
regulations, the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan, lessons learned
reports, and prior reports by us and others. A bibliography of key reports
on issues related to our review is included. We also interviewed officials
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; the U.S. Central Command; the U.S. Joint Forces Command;
the U.S. Special Operations Command; headquarters offices of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force; and other offices as appropriate.

We accompanied this work with a detailed analysis of bombing data
developed for our March 2002 classified report on air operations in Kosovo
and bombing data on operations in Afghanistan provided by the U.S. Central
Command. Prior to conducting these analyses, we discussed the appropriate
databases to use, the time frames to measure, and other such
methodological issues with officials from the Central Command. We used
Central Command data because its commander was in charge of joint
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. To determine whether bombing
accuracy and effectiveness had improved, we compared changes in the
percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to fixed and
mobile targets, the number of attacks and the number of bombs during a
given attack that were required to damage or destroy a given target, and
other such measures of operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. We then
provided the results of these analyses to officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the U.S.
Central Command; the U.S. Joint Forces Command; the U.S. Special
Operations Command; and the Army, Navy, and Air Force for their review and
comment. We also obtained analyses of Operation Enduring Freedom from the
Navy and the Air Force for comparison purposes. We requested data from the
Army, but officials were unable to provide such data. We also requested
copies of any similar analyses of operations in Iraq, but officials were
unable to locate any such analyses. We did not conduct our own detailed
analysis of operations in Iraq because of the extremely resource intensive
and time-consuming nature of these analyses.

To assess the reliability of the Central Command's database for Operation
Enduring Freedom, we (1) performed electronic testing for obvious errors

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

in accuracy and completeness; (2) reviewed related documentation,
including tracking target files to specific data entries, and interviewed
agency officials knowledgeable about the data; and (3) worked closely with
agency officials to identify any data problems. When we found
discrepancies such as missing or incorrect data, we brought them to the
command's attention and worked with it to correct the discrepancies before
conducting our analysis. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for our reporting purposes.

Following this analysis, we conducted a series of roundtable discussions
with officials from the offices of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, unified commands, and the services contacted previously. We
conducted these discussions to gain a detailed understanding of the
results of our analyses and officials' perspectives on the impact of the
changing strategy on operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and the
key barriers to continued progress in implementing the new strategy. We
focused our analysis on combat bombing operations. We did not attempt to
analyze whether larger operational and strategic objectives were achieved.

Appendix II: DOD Reconnaissance Aircraft, Precision Weapons, and Other
Technologies Used in Recent Operations

                                    Aircraft

Appendix II: DOD Reconnaissance Aircraft, Precision Weapons, and Other
Technologies Used in Recent Operations

Precision Weapons Systems

Technologies

               Sources: DOD and other publicly available sources.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts 	John Pendleton (404) 679-1816
John W. Nelson (404) 679-1949

Acknowledgments 	In addition to those named above, Katherine Chenault,
Steve Pruitt, R.K. Wild, and Kristy Williams made key contributions to
this report.

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Major Management Challenges and Program Risks-Department of Defense.
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