    Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved
    Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress
    Remain (28-JUN-04, GAO-04-547).

    Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq
    benefited from new Department of Defense (DOD) strategies and
    technologies, such as improvements in force networks and
    increased use of precision weapons, designed to address changes
    in the security environment resulting from the continuing
    terrorist threat and the advent of the information age. Based on
    the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO reviewed these
    conflicts, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight
    into the changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on
    (1) assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of
    improvements in force networks and in the use of precision
    weapons and (2) identifying key barriers to continued progress.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-547
        ACCNO:   A10640
      TITLE:     Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from
    Improved Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued
    Progress Remain
         DATE:   06/28/2004
      SUBJECT:   Bombs
    	     Counterterrorism
    	     Data collection
    	     Data integrity
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Defense operations
    	     Military training
    	     Performance measures
    	     Terrorism
    	     Weapons
    	     Military interoperability
    	     Afghanistan
    	     Iraq
    	     Kosovo
    	     DOD Operation Allied Force
    	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
    	     Operation Enduring Freedom

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    GAO-04-547

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

                           Report to Congressional Committees

    June 2004

    MILITARY OPERATIONS

      Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, but
                         Barriers to Continued Progress Remain

    GAO-04-547

    Highlights of GAO-04-547, a report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority
    Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services; Chairman and Ranking Minority
    Member, House Committee on Armed Services

    Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq benefited
    from new Department of Defense (DOD) strategies and technologies, such as
    improvements in force networks and increased use of precision weapons,
    designed to address changes in the security environment resulting from the
    continuing terrorist threat and the advent of the information age.

    Based on the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO reviewed these
    conflicts, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the
    changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on (1) assessing the
    impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in force networks and
    in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying key barriers to
    continued progress.

    GAO recommends that DOD take steps to improve standardization of
    information used in bombing operations, address continuing problems with
    battle damage assessments, develop a unified battlefield information
    system to improve analyses of combat effectiveness, and develop realistic
    joint training to help personnel adapt to emerging changes to the
    operating environment. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations and
    stated that it is addressing the issues GAO raised in a variety of ongoing
    efforts.

    June 2004

    MILITARY OPERATIONS

    Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, but
    Barriers to Continued Progress Remain

    Improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons are
    clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in
    recent operations. However, the full extent to which operations have been
    speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear because DOD does not have
    detailed measures of these effects. Enhancements to networked operations,
    such as improved sensors and surveillance mechanisms, and more integrated
    command and control centers, have improved DOD's ability to share a broad
    view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the
    force-reducing the time required for analysis and decision making in
    combat operations. However, recognizing that the full impact of these
    changes is unclear, DOD is conducting a series of case studies to better
    understand the effects of networked operations. Improvements in force
    networks have also been enhanced by the use of precision-guided weapons
    and associated technologies. These improvements not only provide
    commanders with greatly increased flexibility, such as the ability to
    conduct bombing operations in poor weather and from higher and safer
    altitudes, but also increase the accuracy of bombing operations. GAO's
    analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage or
    destruction to targets increased markedly between operations in Kosovo and
    those in Afghanistan.

    Notwithstanding these improvements, certain barriers inhibit continued
    progress in implementing the new strategy. Four interrelated areas stand
    out as key:

    o  	A lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment, which
    reduces effectiveness by requiring operations to be slowed to manually
    reconcile information from multiple systems and limiting access to needed
    capabilities among military services.

    o  	Continuing difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality analyses of
    bombing damages, which can slow ground advances and negate other
    improvements in the speed of operations.

    o  	The absence of a unified battlefield information system to provide
    standardized measures and baseline data on bombing effectiveness, which
    creates confusion about the success of new tactics and technologies, about
    assumptions used in battlefield simulation programs, and about procurement
    decisions.

    o  	The lack of high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all
    levels understand and adapt to the increased flow of information, more
    centralized management, and other changes in the operating environment
    brought about by the strategic changes.

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-547.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    the link above. For more information, contact Neal Curtin, (757) 552-8100,
    CurtinN@gao.gov.

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    Improvements in Networked Forces and the Use of Precision

    Weapons Central to Increased Combat Power Key Barriers Inhibit Continued
    Progress in Implementing the New

    Strategy Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments
    and Our Evaluation

                                           1

                                          2 5

    10

    19 34 35 36

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    Appendix II	DOD Reconnaissance Aircraft, Precision Weapons, and Other
    Technologies Used in Recent Operations

    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

    Bibliography

    Related GAO Products

      Figures

    Figure 1: The Joint Targeting Cycle 6 Figure 2: Percentage of Guided and
    Unguided Munitions Used in

    Recent Combat Operations 9 Figure 3: Notional Networked Operations 14
    Figure 4: U.S. Central Command Battle Damage Assessment

    Manning Levels for Recent Operations 25

    Abbreviation

    DOD Department of Defense

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
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    separately.

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    June 28, 2004

    The Honorable John W. Warner
    Chairman
    The Honorable Carl Levin
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan Hunter
    Chairman
    The Honorable Ike Skelton
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives

    Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have been
    widely regarded as an unprecedented demonstration of combat power.
    Relying predominately on air power, Operation Allied Force drove the
    forces of Slobodan Milosovic out of Kosovo in 78 days during the spring of
    1999. Operation Enduring Freedom, using a combination of air power and
    special operations forces, drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in
    175 days between October 2001 and March 2002. And, most recently, the
    combination of air power and ground maneuver elements used in
    Operation Iraqi Freedom drove Sadam Hussein from power in only 43 days
    between March and May 2003. These operations have benefited from the
    fielding of new strategies and technologies developed to deal with the new
    security environment-now characterized by surprise and uncertainty as a
    result of the evolving terrorist threat, and by the need to transition
    from
    the industrial age into the information age. The Department of Defense's
    (DOD) new capabilities-based strategy seeks to contend with uncertainty
    by improving DOD's ability to act quickly and decisively across a wide
    range of combat conditions. This strategy is being enabled by moves
    toward more highly integrated force networks that combine information
    superiority and advances in technologies for surveillance,
    communications, precision weapons, and other areas to gain the
    advantage and rapidly defeat the enemy.

    On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we reviewed the
    operational results of recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
    with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the strategic and

      Results in Brief

    technological changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on (1)
    assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in force
    networking and in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying key
    barriers to continued progress. We are addressing this report to you
    because we believe it will be of interest to your committees as you
    address DOD's programs and funding. In performing our work, we reviewed
    DOD policies, procedures, and reports related to implementation of the new
    capabilities-based strategy; met with officials from throughout the
    department; conducted a detailed analysis and reliability assessment of
    bombing data; and discussed the results of our analysis with cognizant
    officials. A more thorough description of our scope and methodology is
    included in appendix I. We performed our work from April 2003 through
    March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards.

    Improvements in force networking and in the use of precision weapons are
    clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in
    recent operations. However, the full extent to which operations have been
    speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear because DOD does not have
    detailed measures of these effects. The emerging concept of networked
    operations, referred to by DOD as network-centric operations, involves
    developing communications and other linkages among all elements of the
    force to create a shared awareness of operations. Technological
    enhancements to these network-centric systems include improved sensors and
    other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms for
    observing targets on the battlefield; more integrated command and control
    centers for analyzing targeting data and approving attacks; and
    improvements in precision weapons. The improved ability to share a broad
    view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the
    force has compressed the time required for analysis and decision making in
    bombing operations, thus increasing lethality. However, DOD recognizes
    that the full extent to which operations have been speeded up or otherwise
    affected is unclear because of the absence of detailed measures of these
    effects. As a result, DOD's Office of Force Transformation is conducting a
    series of case studies of training exercises and combat operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq to better understand the effects of networked
    operations. Advances in force networking have been enhanced by
    improvements in the use of precisionguided weapons and associated
    technologies, providing military commanders with greatly increased
    flexibility and accuracy in bombing operations. For example, the
    introduction of laser-guided and Global Positioning System-guided bombs
    has reduced limitations on operations

    created by poor weather and visibility and allowed bombing operations to
    be conducted from higher and safer altitudes. Further, increases in the
    number of aircraft capable of delivering such weapons allow DOD to use old
    aircraft in new ways, further improving flexibility. These improvements
    are also increasing the accuracy of bombing operations. Our analysis found
    that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to fixed
    and mobile targets increased markedly between operations in Kosovo and
    those in Afghanistan.

    Despite such improvements, DOD officials and reports identified a variety
    of barriers inhibiting continued progress in implementing the new
    strategy. Four interrelated areas stood out as key to continued progress.

    o  	Lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment. This is a
    long-standing problem in DOD that reduces effectiveness by requiring
    operations to be slowed as time must be taken to manually reconcile
    information from one operating system into forms usable by other systems,
    or by limiting access to communications or other needed capabilities
    because equipment from one service cannot interact with equipment used by
    another for the same purpose. For example, DOD has not standardized
    procedures used in basic operations, such as reporting on the results of
    bombing missions. As a result, each service and unified command must
    develop its own procedures, with no system to ensure standardization.
    During operations in Afghanistan, the Central Command received mission
    reports using at least 23 different formats-requiring time-consuming
    manual deconfliction. The Joint Forces Command also reported that
    operations in Iraq were beset by a lack of commonly understood
    operational-level standards for evaluating the effect of attacks. The
    integration of information was undermined by groups adopting their own
    standards and formats, resulting in difficulties in translating
    information and coming to a mutual understanding. We have also reported1
    on problems with standardization and interoperability. DOD understands
    that the lack of standardization fundamentally hampers attempts to improve
    networking and joint operations, and it has been trying to address various
    aspects of the problem. However, previous reforms have been undermined by
    parochial allegiances to the services and other problems that continue to
    exist.

    1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to
    Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence Data,
    GAO-03-329 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2003) and Military Readiness:
    Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground
    Forces, GAO-03-505 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2003).

    o  	Difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality assessments of the
    effects of bombing operations. Battle damage assessments are an
    increasingly critical component of combat operations. Slow or inaccurate
    assessments can negate improvements in the speed of operations, create
    uncertainty about the battlefield situation and slow ground advances, and
    ultimately increase the risk of death or injury to ground troops. However,
    lessons learned reports on operations in Iraq-similar to earlier
    operations-found that battle damage assessments could not keep up with the
    pace of operations and failed to provide the information needed for
    operational decisions. These problems are due to several factors. First,
    advances in network-centric operations and precision weapons have
    increased the speed at which targets are generated and attacked. At the
    same time, the lack of an occupational specialty for damage assessments
    and other problems result in shortages of trained analysts when resources
    need to be surged during combat operations, resulting in the need to rely
    upon on-the-job training of personnel from other areas. Moreover,
    according to officials, DOD does not have a comprehensive system to track
    personnel who have received training, further exacerbating the problem.
    The Joint Forces Command has called for recognition of this problem as a
    major obstacle to operations requiring a variety of changes to resolve.

    o  	Absence of unified data to measure combat effectiveness and plan for
    the future. Advances in the accuracy of bombing operations have raised
    expectations for more efficiency and effectiveness in combat operations.
    Instead of traditional operations where multiple sorties and multiple
    bombs were required to destroy one target objective, some DOD officials
    now believe one bomb per target and multiple targets on one sortie should
    be the norm. However, confirmation of such expectations is difficult
    because DOD does not have a unified battlefield information system to
    provide standardized, baseline data on the effectiveness of bombing
    operations. Currently, the services and the unified commands maintain
    their own databases. As a result, the services create databases to measure
    different aspects of operations, and measures of key operational data
    elements-such as attacks needed to destroy a target, effects of
    operations, and basic targeting characteristics-are defined differently.
    The absence of a baseline system to bridge these differences and provide
    information about actual bombing operations effectiveness creates
    confusion about the success of new tactics and technologies and about the
    assumptions used in battlefield simulation programs. The lack of such a
    unifying system also makes it difficult to make procurement decisions for
    weapons required for operations and calculate DOD's return on investment
    from the new technologies.

    o  	Lack of realistic training to help understand and adapt to changing
    command and control environment. DOD officials also cited the need

    for high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all levels
    understand and adapt to changes in the operating environment brought about
    by the move to a networked force using advanced technologies. For example,
    officials noted that large increases in the pace of operations and the
    volume of information associated with more integrated force networks have
    overwhelmed commanders and other personnel at times. Further, increased
    networking and other changes have fostered a more centralized style of
    management, with senior leaders increasingly involved in operations. At
    the same time, network-centric operating concepts are distributing
    information to lower and lower organizational levels, raising the
    potential for increased autonomy for small units and individual soldiers.
    However, training has not kept pace with these changes. For example, the
    Joint Forces Command reported that the lack of realistic training
    undermined intelligence and surveillance management and other
    operational-level capabilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Consistent
    with DOD's basic tenet that a force must train as it will fight, DOD
    officials called for improved training to match the scale and tempo of
    actual operations. Similarly, the Defense Science Board reported that the
    changing operating environment will have unintended consequences that will
    require personnel to adapt to increasing cognitive demands at even the
    most junior levels. However, according to the Board, current training is
    not adequate to prepare DOD personnel to cope with these demands.

    To ensure that these problems do not continue to inhibit realization of
    the full promise of DOD's strategy, we are recommending that DOD take
    steps to provide more standardized operating information for use during
    joint combat operations, formulate a plan to address problems with
    battlefield damage assessments, develop a unified battlefield information
    system to improve assessments of combat effectiveness, and develop
    realistic joint training to help commanders and personnel adapt to the
    changing operating environment. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD
    generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that it is addressing
    the issues we raised in a variety of ongoing efforts.

    Background 	The close integration and coordination of ground combat forces
    and bombing operations is essential to the exercise of lethal combat power
    on the modern battlefield. As depicted in figure 1, military doctrine2
    describes targeting in terms of a cyclical process composed of six basic
    phases.

    2 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Doctrine for
    Targeting (Washington, D.C., Jan. 17, 2002).

    During this process, the joint force commander identifies the objectives
    for military operations in support of the national objectives for the
    conflict and any key limitations on operations-such as procedures for
    limiting civilian collateral damage. The commander's guidance then drives
    the subsequent phases of the targeting cycle to include identifying and
    analyzing potential targets and resources available to attack them,
    obtaining formal permission for the strike, executing the strike, and then
    assessing strike effectiveness and any need to reattack.

    Figure 1: The Joint Targeting Cycle

    The success of this process is highly dependent on the speed and quality
    of interaction among the people and systems conducting the various
    activities at each phase. Trained ground control personnel must interact
    quickly and covertly with manned and unmanned aircraft, electronic sensors
    and space-based satellite imagery systems, or other intelligence,

    surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms to spot the target and
    accurately mark its location. Accuracy depends upon the ability of the
    ground personnel to locate themselves, the target, and any friendly forces
    nearby and accurately judge the distance between each. These elements must
    be able to communicate the targeting information to command and control
    centers that coordinate the actions of a variety of analysts and others
    who assess the situation, plan the strike, communicate the information
    back to the ground personnel, and analyze the effectiveness of the attack.

    DOD is working to improve the interaction of these elements by using
    network-centric operating concepts. The term "network-centric" is used to
    describe a broad class of approaches to military operations that are
    enabled by networking the force. DOD's approach involves developing the
    sensors and other technologies to provide pervasive oversight of the
    battlefield, and then linking them to all elements of the war-fighting
    force through communications and other technologies. This allows the
    various elements of the force to develop a shared situation awareness, a
    shared knowledge and understanding of commanders' intent, and the ability
    to rapidly process and analyze information. The belief is that these
    capabilities will increase combat power by better synchronization of
    weapons effects in the battle space and greater speed in command decision
    making. This strategic change is being accompanied by an array of changes
    to doctrine, tactics, organization, and training to integrate the
    network-centric concept into DOD's culture.

    Advances in networking the force are being complemented by advances in
    precision weapons.3 Precision-guided weapons provide precise control of
    bombs through the use of electrical equipment that help guide the weapon
    in flight. These capabilities provide an advantage in accuracy over
    conventional weapons that do not have the ability to adjust their
    trajectory while in flight. The transition from unguided to guided weapons
    has accelerated rapidly since Operation Desert Storm in 1991 where
    unguided weapons were the norm. For example, as shown in figure 2, only
    about 8 percent of the weapons used during Operation Desert Storm were
    guided, while this number increased to about 68 percent in Operation Iraqi
    Freedom.

    3 In this report, the terms weapons, bombs, and munitions are used
    interchangeably.

    Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq provided a variety of
    conditions for the development of these network-centric approaches. For
    example, operations in Kosovo were conducted primarily by air over rugged
    and undeveloped mountainous terrain. There were no direct attacks by large
    massed ground forces, and the cover of forests and villages allowed enemy
    forces to easily conceal their location. Similarly, Afghanistan's rugged
    and mountainous terrain and large number of caves and bunkers also
    provided numerous opportunities to conceal Taliban and al Qaeda forces.
    Light infantry and special operations forces were the primary U.S. forces
    on the ground, with aircraft as their sole means of fire support. In
    contrast, the terrain in Iraq is characterized by mostly broad plains with
    mountainous regions along the borders and a largely desert climate posing
    threats from dust and sand storms. Initial operations pitted large massed
    forces against one another in more traditional ways of fighting. However,
    the conduct of U.S. operations also relied heavily on small, dispersed
    groups of special operations forces operating on battlefields with no
    clear front and rear lines, as enemy forces blended in and out of urban
    populations.

    Figure 2: Percentage of Guided and Unguided Munitions Used in Recent
    Combat Operations

    With the exception of Kosovo, these conflicts were also characterized
    largely by pronounced U.S. air superiority, with little threat from enemy
    air defenses. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, enemy air
    defenses were so limited that U.S. forces were able to win near total air
    supremacy early in the war. Similarly, air superiority was not a concern
    during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prior to the conflict, military forces had
    been working to set the conditions for air dominance through more than 3
    years of bombing. During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, however, there
    were significant concerns about enemy air defense systems, causing bombing
    operations to be carried out at high altitudes to avoid the threat.
    Moreover, access to overseas bases was problematic in all three of these
    operations, straining logistical support systems and complicating military
    operations. For example, this lack of forward air basing infrastructure
    within effective fighter range of land-locked Afghanistan required U.S.

    forces to rely primarily on carrier-based aircraft to provide strike power
    during the operations. These operations were also conducted in an
    environment of pronounced concerns about limiting collateral damage to
    civilian populations and infrastructure. Adversaries attempted to exploit
    collateral damage in an effort to gain public sympathy for their cause and
    cast a negative light on U.S. operations. U.S. forces adjusted the target
    selection and approval process to minimize collateral damages, calling on
    senior leaders to approve target selection in some cases. However,
    attempts to minimize collateral damages can also create tension with
    military objectives and complicate bombing operations.

    DOD officials cite improvements in networking the force and in the use of
    precision weapons as primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power
    demonstrated in recent operations. Network-centric operating concepts,
    particularly in surveillance and command and control systems, have created
    unprecedented battlefield situation awareness for commanders and their
    forces, yet the full extent to which operations have been affected is
    unclear. Technologies enhancing the use of precisionguided weapons have
    also provided military commanders with increased flexibility and accuracy
    in bombing operations.

      Improvements in Networked Forces and the Use of Precision Weapons Central to
      Increased Combat Power

        Networked Surveillance and Command and Control Systems Create Improved
        Situation Awareness

    Improvements to Information-Gathering Systems Allow for Unprecedented
    Ability to Monitor Battlefield

    Network-centric operating concepts have improved battlefield situation
    awareness for commanders and their forces. DOD has indicated that
    technological improvements in information-gathering systems allow
    commanders an unprecedented view of the battlefield. Such improvements
    provide for greater shared situation awareness, which, in turn, speeds
    command and control. However, while it appears that enhanced networking
    has speeded operations, the full impact on operations is unclear because
    of the absence of detailed measures of their effects.

    DOD officials and reports cite a variety of technological and other
    improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms
    as basic to the unprecedented ability of commanders and forces to observe
    and monitor the battlefield. For example, surveillance aircraft orbiting
    the battlefield-such as the E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system
    (for detecting enemy air and naval activities and directing friendly
    fighters), the RC-135 and EP-3 aircraft (for locating enemy radar and
    other electronic emissions), the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack
    Radar System (for detecting enemy ground activity), and the U-2 (for high
    altitude, wide-area surveillance)-have been outfitted with

    Shared Situation Awareness Speeds Command and Control

    smaller, lower cost, and higher quality sensors and radars, improving
    their ability to detect the enemy and provide high resolution imagery of
    the battlefield. Another key is the development of unmanned aerial
    vehicles, such as the Predator and the Global Hawk used extensively in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. These aircraft carry cameras, sensors, or even
    weapons and are used to constantly circle over the battlefield and provide
    continuous live surveillance of the enemy without risk to human pilots.
    The Predator is remotely piloted by operators on the ground, while the
    Global Hawk is self-piloted, controlled by a preprogrammed onboard
    computer that controls the aircraft from takeoff to landing.

    These systems interact with ground personnel, such as special operations
    forces or specially trained combat controllers, to locate and precisely
    mark targets and assess bombing results. Technological advances now enable
    these controllers to identify a target and determine its precise location
    by using laser designators, which may be connected to a handheld Global
    Positioning System receiver. Reports have cited the use of these
    technologies interacting with aircraft flying at high altitudes to avoid
    enemy air defenses, combined with new tactics for integrating special
    operations forces with conventional units, as a breakthrough capability.
    During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, special forces teams
    used these technologies linked to piloted aircraft or unmanned Predator
    drones-providing live battlefield video directly to nearby AC-130 gun
    ships-to attack small groups of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters and other
    fleeting targets. The Joint Forces Command report4 on missions conducted
    during Operation Iraqi Freedom also cited the capabilities provided by
    these advances.

    DOD officials indicate that the improved ability to share a broad view of
    the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force has
    compressed the time required for analysis and decision making in bombing
    operations, increasing lethality significantly. Before an actual strike
    may begin, information on potential targets generally must be routed
    through command and control centers where the target information is
    analyzed; information is exchanged between a myriad of commanders,
    analysts, and other elements of the force; and final approval for the
    strike is granted. The ability to network these elements and rapidly
    exchange information during this process-central to combat

    4 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command, Joint Lessons Learned:
    Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat Operations (Norfolk, Virginia: Mar.
    1, 2004).

    effectiveness--is enabled by improvements in computing power, digital
    communications, and satellite data links in recent years. For example,
    increases in computing power have enabled the networking of computers from
    a multitude of personnel and locations, with near instantaneous exchange
    of information through techniques such as file sharing, video
    conferencing, and e-mailing. These capabilities are enhanced by digital
    communications, which can be faster and more accurate than voice
    communication. For example, digital systems allow a ground controller to
    input the coordinates and other information needed for an attack into a
    computer and transmit this information instantly to computers on board an
    aircraft or at command and control centers.

    The ability to rapidly exchange information generated by these networks
    has some limitations. For example, the Defense Science Board recently
    reported5 that despite the successes in Afghanistan, there were
    difficulties in passing coordinates from ground personnel to aircraft
    overhead due to the unreliability and limited range of secure
    communications and the absence of digital communications systems. As a
    result, instead of instantaneously transmitting targeting information
    across digital systems, ground controllers were required to pass Global
    Positioning System coordinates by voice radio to aircrews. Aircrews then
    had to write the coordinates on boards held on their knees, and then read
    them back for confirmation. Once confirmed, aircrews needed to load the
    coordinates by hand into the weapons, a process requiring as many as 51
    computer keystrokes and subject to error.

    The ability to rapidly exchange information generated by these networks is
    also dependent upon satellite data links and availability of bandwidth.
    Bandwidth is a term used to describe the rate at which information moves
    from one electronic device to another-usually expressed in terms of bits
    per second--over phone lines, fiber optic cable, or wireless
    telecommunications systems. Increases in this capacity have enabled the
    rapid exchange of large visual and data files, giving commanders
    increasing access to more real-time surveillance, intelligence, and
    targeting information than in previous conflicts. For example, according
    to the Joint Forces Command, U.S. forces in Iraq had access to 42 times
    the bandwidth available in Desert Storm. However, despite this improvement

    5 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on
    Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned, Precision Targeting and Joint
    Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2003).

    the Army and others have experienced continuing shortages in the
    availability of bandwidth.6

    Despite some limitations, technological advances have also made it
    possible to manage conflicts from command centers located far away from
    the battlefield, using so-called reach back techniques, where some
    commanders, analysts, and other support personnel remain at home stations
    and communicate with commanders at the battlefield using the networks
    described above. For example, during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo the
    center used to direct air operations was located in Vicenza, Italy. Images
    from Predator aircraft located over the battlefield in Kosovo were
    transmitted by satellite communications to a ground station in England,
    then by fiber optic cable to a facility in the United States for analysis.
    The information was then transmitted to the District of Colombia area,
    where it was up-linked to a satellite and transmitted back to controllers
    aboard an airborne command and control aircraft in Kosovo. The information
    was then provided to controllers, who provided the information to aircraft
    poised to strike the targets (see fig. 3).

    6 Congressional Budget Office, The Army's Bandwidth Bottleneck
    (Washington, D.C.: August 2003).

    Figure 3: Notional Networked Operations

    The reach back technique not only provides for more centralized control of
    operations but also provides the opportunity for savings in logistical
    support requirements. For example, in previous conflicts, command
    centers-comprised of perhaps 1,500-2,000 commanders, analysts, and others,
    and the equipment needed to do their jobs-had to be transported into the
    war zone. This requirement created major demands on transportation and
    other support elements during the early phases of an operation and reduced
    the air and sealift available to move soldiers and supplies. Now,
    networking permits commanders at the battlefield to reach back to analysts
    and other staff located thousands of miles away for guidance and support.
    During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the joint forces commander
    remained at U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, while air
    operations were directed from centers in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
    Electronic map displays at these locations provided near

    Full Impact of Networking Is Unclear

    continuous tracking of ground, air, and naval units, with Predator drones
    and other aircraft feeding live video imagery from the battlefield.

    While it seems clear that networking has speeded operations, the full
    impact on operations is unclear because of the absence of detailed
    measures of their effects. For example, U.S. Central Command officials
    told us that while the targeting process was slowed by requirements for
    additional command approvals for some targets, they believed that overall,
    the targeting process was more efficient during Operation Iraqi Freedom
    than previous conflicts. However, statistics were not maintained by the
    Central Command to measure this improvement.

    Several experiments and exercises provide some information on this issue.
    For example, according to a recent DOD report7 to Congress, an Army
    exercise in 1997 using computer simulation to determine the war-fighting
    effectiveness of a digitized division-sized force found that the time
    required to process calls for fire was reduced from 3 minutes to 30
    seconds and that the planning time for attacks at the company level was
    cut from 40 to 20 minutes. Similarly, a 1998 experiment involving
    networked Army helicopter units and a range of Navy and Marine units to
    counter a simulated attack by North Korean special operations boats found
    that the average decision time was reduced from 43 to 23 minutes and that
    shooter effectiveness measured in kills per shot was increased by 50
    percent. DOD also reported that a special Air Force project in the
    mid1990s found that F15-C fighter aircraft networked with digital
    communication packages increased their success rate in air-to-air combat
    exercises by more than 150 percent over aircraft equipped with voice only
    communications. The increase was attributed to the benefits of shared
    situation awareness provided by the digital networks. According to DOD's
    report, pilots with voice only communications can only see enemy aircraft
    in the radar zone directly in front of their aircraft, and they cannot see
    supporting friendly aircraft to their rear. To attack enemy aircraft, the
    voice only aircraft must hold verbal conversations with supporting
    aircraft to understand the entire combat picture and develop a coordinated
    attack plan. However, fighter aircraft networked with digital
    communications are able to see the entire picture of enemy and friendly
    support aircraft locations on their screens without the need for
    time-consuming conversations. According to the report, this shared mental
    picture of the

    7 U.S. Department of Defense, Network Centric Warfare, Department of
    Defense Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2001).

    battlefield reduces the cognitive load on the pilots, enabling them to
    concentrate more on the battle, react quicker, and make synchronized,
    mutually reinforcing decisions with their supporting aircraft.

    These examples provide illustrations of the potential effects of
    networkcentric operations. However, DOD's report acknowledges that
    evidence of its full impact is limited and often scattered, rather than
    focused and systematic. Having a fuller, more precise understanding of the
    effects of network-centric operations is important because of its
    potential impact on issues such as the ability to model the speed of
    combat operations and the resources needed to support them. An official
    from DOD's Office of Force Transformation told us that the office is
    conducting a series of case studies of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
    and exercises at the National Training Center and elsewhere to better
    understand these effects.

        Precision Weapons Increase Flexibility and Accuracy

    Precision Weapons Provide Increased Flexibility

    The development of technologies such as laser-guided and Global
    Positioning System-guided precision weapons has provided military
    commanders with increased flexibility and accuracy in bombing operations,
    making them increasingly lethal.

    Precision weapons reduce limitations created by poor weather and
    visibility, enable bombing operations from higher and safer altitudes, and
    allow aircraft to be used in new ways. For example, bombing operations
    have always faced limitations due to targets being obscured by bad weather
    or other limitations on visibility. Traditionally, the process of locating
    and marking a target was dependent on the controllers' ability to see the
    target, judge distances, and accurately find coordinates using paper maps.
    Targeting objectives were marked using smoke grenades, flares, or other
    such techniques. However, Global Positioning Systemguided bombs help
    reduce these limitations by providing an all-weather delivery capability
    enabled by satellite-aided navigation. The system is a constellation of 24
    orbiting satellites emitting continuous navigation signals that handheld
    receivers on the ground can translate into time, location, and velocity of
    targets. Time can be calculated to within a fraction of a second, location
    to within 100 feet, and velocity within less than a mile per hour.
    According to DOD officials, laser-guided bombs- which follow a narrow beam
    of pulsed energy trained on a target by aircraft or operators on the
    ground-are more precise than Global Positioning System-guided bombs, and
    have a capability for attacks on moving targets that Global Positioning
    System-guided bombs do not. However, laser-guided bombs are subject to
    limitations presented by rain,

    clouds, or other visibility conditions since there must be a clear line of
    sight between the laser designator and the target.

    From Operation Allied Force to Operation Enduring Freedom, DOD increased
    the use of Global Positioning System-guided bombs by about 45 percent and
    decreased the use of laser-guided bombs by about 32 percent. Conversely,
    between Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, DOD decreased the
    use of Global Positioning System-guided bombs by about 13 percent and
    increased the use of laser-guided bombs by about 10 percent. DOD officials
    stated that there is a need for both laser-guided and Global Positioning
    System-guided bombs in today's environment and that the use depends on
    such factors as nature of the target being struck, theater of operations,
    weather conditions, availability, and cost. Frequently used guided
    munitions such as the Global Positioning System Guided Bomb Unit 31 have a
    unit cost of about $21,100 to $28,400, depending on the version used,
    while laser-guided bombs such as the Guided Bomb Units 10/12/16 have unit
    costs ranging from $14,600 to $23,000. Unguided bombs such as the
    500-pound MK-82 and 1,000-pound MK-83 have unit costs ranging from about
    $2,000 to $8,700.

    The use of such precision-guided weapons has also made it possible for
    bombing operations to be conducted from higher altitudes. This tactic
    helps limit the threat to pilots and aircraft from air defense systems and
    ground fire, and provides Global Positioning System-guided bombs with more
    time to acquire and guide on the satellite signals. In Kosovo, where air
    defense systems posed a significant threat to U.S. forces, pilots
    conducted bombing missions at an altitude that was beyond the effective
    reach of the Serbian enemy air defense systems. According to DOD
    officials, they have continued to use this tactic in Afghanistan and Iraq
    because of its effectiveness. In addition to high altitude operations,
    Global Positioning System-guided weapons, such as the joint direct attack
    munition used extensively in Iraq, can also be launched miles away from a
    target. The operator can essentially launch the weapon and proceed on to
    the next target, relying on the navigation system to guide the weapon to
    impact. While conducting bombing operations from high altitudes is much
    safer for pilots and aircraft, it also becomes more difficult to properly
    identify and distinguish certain targets, particularly when the enemy
    employs denial and deception tactics. For example, during Operation Allied
    Force, Serbian forces made tank decoys out of milk cartons and artillery
    pieces out of stovepipes.

    DOD has also increased the numbers of aircraft capable of delivering
    precision-guided munitions, allowing military planners to use aircraft in

    Precision Weapons Improve Accuracy

    new and different ways. According to a recent report, only about 20
    percent of U.S. aircraft were equipped with the ability to put a
    laserguided bomb on the target during the first Gulf War. However, nearly
    every combat aircraft was capable of employing precision-guided munitions
    during Operation Iraqi Freedom.8 Bombers such as B-2s are now capable of
    delivering large payloads of weapons in a single strike, providing more
    flexibility in weapons availability. These capabilities increase the
    ability to deliver more precision-guided weapons during each flight.
    Moreover, they also increase operational effectiveness by allowing the
    military to reduce flights by planning to strike multiple targets during
    each flight, as opposed to the traditional approach of carrying out
    multiple flights to attack one target.

    Our analysis found that advances in precision weapons have improved the
    accuracy of bombing operations. For example, we compared data on bombing
    operations in Afghanistan maintained by the U.S. Central Command with data
    on operations in Kosovo from our classified report on Operation Allied
    Force. This analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in
    damage or destruction to fixed targets increased by 12 percentage points
    from Kosovo to Afghanistan. Further, the percentage of attacks resulting
    in damage or destruction to mobile targets increased by 21 percentage
    points. DOD officials agreed that bombing accuracy improved, and
    classified analyses conducted by both the Air Force and the Navy support
    that conclusion. According to DOD officials, there is no similar analysis
    of the accuracy of bombing operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

    While DOD officials agreed that precision-guided weapons have increased
    the accuracy of bombing operations, they stated that it is important to
    note that such improvements may also be influenced by other factors. For
    example, differences in terrain, the relative numbers of fixed versus
    mobile targets (which are harder to hit), and commanders' guidance on
    collateral damage can all influence the accuracy of bombing operations. In
    addition, the experience and the training that military forces gained by
    near continuous combat operations since the beginning of Operation Allied
    Force in 1999 may also influence bombing accuracy. Such factors must be
    considered when interpreting bombing statistics.

    8 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Operation Iraqi Freedom:
    A First Blush Assessment (Washington, D.C.: 2003).

      Key Barriers Inhibit Continued Progress in Implementing the New Strategy

    Despite the improvements brought about by advances in networking and
    precision weapons, DOD has identified a variety of barriers undermining
    continued progress in implementing the new capabilities-based strategy.
    For example, concerns were raised about shortages of digital
    communications, commercial satellite capacity and bandwidth, and other
    equipment. However, four interrelated areas stood out as key barriers to
    continued progress: (1) the lack of standardized, interoperable systems
    and equipment; (2) DOD's continuing difficulty in obtaining timely, high
    quality assessments of the effects of bombing operations; (3) the absence
    of a unified battlefield data collection system to provide standardized
    measures and baseline data on the efficiency and effectiveness of bombing
    operations; and (4) the lack of high quality, realistic training to help
    personnel at all levels understand and adapt to changes in the operating
    environment brought about by the move to a highly networked force using
    advanced technologies.

        Problems in Standardization and Interoperability Slow Operations and Reduce
        Effectiveness

    The lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment during joint
    operations was one of the most frequently reported problems we found
    during our review. According to DOD officials and reports, this
    longstanding problem undermines many operating systems at DOD, including
    systems used to provide shared situation awareness of the battlefield,
    battle management command and control, and damage assessments of the
    effects of bombing operations. For example, officials from the Joint
    Forces and Special Operations Commands told us that during Operation Iraqi
    Freedom, ground forces arrived in theater with several different,
    noninteroperable Blue Force Tracking systems. Blue Force Tracking systems
    are devices carried by friendly ground units and vehicles that
    continuously or periodically transmit their locations to a central
    database, allowing their locations to be displayed on computer screens.
    Since there is no joint standard for such tracking systems, the joint
    force commander is responsible for resolving the interoperability problems
    created by the use of disparate systems. To provide a common picture of
    the location of ground forces using these systems, commanders had to
    develop a number of creative solutions to bridge the differences between
    them and integrate them into a coherent system-requiring considerable time
    and effort.

    DOD officials also told us that the use of differing formats for
    processing information creates similar problems. For example, each service
    and unified command have their own instructions for performing operations

    such as reporting on the results of bombing missions. A recent DOD report
    found that during joint operations in Afghanistan, the Central Command
    received mission reports using at least 23 different formats.9 This
    created difficulty in receiving messages and required time-consuming
    manual data manipulation and entry. Operations in Iraq also faced similar
    problems. According to the Joint Forces Command report on Iraqi Freedom,
    the process of evaluating the effects of attacks in Iraq was beset by a
    lack of commonly understood operational level standards. Integration of
    information was undermined by groups adopting their own standards and
    reporting formats, resulting in difficulties in translating information
    and coming to a mutual understanding because they were not able to make
    specific comparisons between formats or to a common format. DOD has
    published a number of joint publications to help standardize operations in
    the joint environment. These publications provide general terms of
    reference and descriptions of processes, such as the targeting process,
    for use by personnel from the various services while operating in the
    joint environment. However, according to DOD officials, these publications
    do not provide enough detailed guidance, such as standardized formats for
    reporting mission results, for the actual conduct of operations. As a
    result, each unified command must develop its own implementing procedures,
    with no system to ensure standardization among the commands. Further,
    according to DOD officials, when the pace of operations increases to high
    levels, there is a tendency for personnel to revert to using their own
    familiar service procedures.

    We have also reported that a variety of equipment-such as reconnaissance
    aircraft, satellites, ground-based stations processing intelligence data,
    ground targeting equipment, and digital transmission systems used to
    transmit information between airborne and ground personnel-is not
    interoperable across the services. Similar to the examples cited above,
    the inability of these systems to operate effectively together can limit
    access to communications and other needed capabilities and confuse and
    slow targeting activities as less efficient alternatives must be used to
    achieve the mission.

    DOD recognizes that improved interoperability and standardization are
    central to the transformation of its forces, and is attempting to address
    the problem. However, the problem is complex and difficult to resolve

    9U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test and
    Evaluation, Operation Enduring Freedom Test Report (Washington, D.C.:
    December 2002).

    because military operations and acquisition systems have traditionally
    focused on the services and the specific weapons platforms needed for
    their specific missions-not on joint operations with interoperable systems
    and equipment. DOD's budget is organized by service and defense agencies,
    as we and the Defense Science Board recently reported in separate
    publications.10 Therefore, the process of defining and acquiring the right
    capabilities is dominated by the services and defense agencies. Joint
    force commanders' views are considered in this process, but they have a
    difficult time competing with individual service interests that control
    the process. As a result, the acquisition of systems and equipment often
    fails to consider joint mission requirements and solutions, and there is
    no guarantee that fielded systems will operate effectively together.

    DOD is addressing the need for more interoperability and standardization
    in several ways. For example, DOD's April 2003 Transformation Planning
    Guidance requires the commander of the Joint Forces Command to develop a
    plan to address DOD's interoperability priorities. These priorities
    include such efforts as development of a common operational picture for
    joint forces; improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capabilities; improvements to selected targeting linkages; and improved
    reach back capabilities. The planning guidance also requires the services
    and the Joint Forces Command to develop plans for achieving the desired
    transformational capabilities, including an identification of the
    initiatives taken to improve interoperability. DOD is also attempting to
    reform the acquisition process to align it with a new capabilities-based
    resource allocation process built around joint operating concepts. Instead
    of building plans, operations, and doctrine around individual service
    systems, DOD is attempting to explicitly link acquisition strategy to
    joint concepts to provide integrated, interoperable joint war-fighting
    capabilities. For example, in June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff issued Instruction 3170.01 that established the Joint
    Capabilities Integration and Development System. This system provides new
    guidelines and procedures for joint staff to review proposed acquisitions
    for their contribution to joint war-fighting needs.

    DOD is also developing the Global Information Grid to act as the
    organizing framework for network-centric operations and help ensure

    10U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program
    Risks-Department of Defense, GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003)
    and U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Report of the
    Defense Science Board Task Force on Enabling Joint Force Capabilities
    (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2003).

    interoperability in information operations throughout DOD. Begun in the
    late 1990s, this effort seeks to integrate the information processing,
    storing, disseminating, and managing capabilities-as well as the
    associated personnel and processes-throughout DOD into an integrated
    network. DOD's Chief Information Officer has described this network as a
    private military version of the World Wide Web. The effort includes
    programs to develop the policies and guidance needed to implement
    network-centric concepts across DOD, as well as programs to provide the
    technological improvements needed for the success of network-centric
    operations. Parts of this effort, such as policy and procedural guidance,
    bandwidth expansion, and improvements to reach back capabilities, have
    begun or are in place. For example, definitions of requirements for
    interoperable information technology that are used in developing the
    Global Information Grid are cited as the authoritative guidance in the
    requirements determination and acquisition areas-including the Joint
    Capabilities Integration and Development System discussed previously.
    However, according to officials involved in the effort, development of the
    grid is still in its early stages and is planned to continue to the year
    2010 and beyond.

    While DOD appears committed to improving interoperability, DOD officials
    state that such reforms require difficult cultural changes to fully
    succeed. However, we previously reported that various problems have
    undermined past reforms, including cultural resistance to change,
    stovepiped operations, difficulties in sustaining top management
    commitment (the average tenure of top political appointees is only 1.7
    years), and other problems that continue to exist today.11 For example, in
    November 1997, DOD announced the establishment of the Defense Reform
    Initiative, which was a major effort to modernize DOD's business processes
    and ignite a "revolution" in business affairs at DOD. The initiative was
    overseen by the Defense Management Council composed of senior defense
    leaders reporting to the Secretary of Defense. However, by July 2000, we
    reported12 that the initiative was not meeting its time frames and goals
    in a number of areas. We concluded that the most notable barrier was the
    difficulty in overcoming institutional resistance to change in an
    organization as large and complex as DOD. Moreover, the effectiveness of
    the Defense Management Council was impaired because members were

    11 See GAO-03-98.

    12U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Management: Actions Needed to
    Sustain Reform Initiatives and Achieve Greater Results, GAO/NSIAD-00-72
    (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2000).

    not able to put aside their particular services' or agencies' interests to
    focus on departmentwide approaches.

    Similarly, cultural impediments to change were also illustrated in our
    March 2003 report on ground-based systems for processing intelligence
    data.13 In that report, we stated that DOD's system for certifying their
    interoperability was not working effectively. In 1998, DOD began a program
    to reduce the number of ground-based systems that process intelligence
    data from various sensors and ensure that the remaining sensors are
    interoperable with other DOD systems. DOD requires that such information
    systems be certified, and to help enforce the certification process, the
    department set up a review panel to periodically review such systems and
    place those with interoperability problems on a "watch list." However, 5
    years after the program was started, we reported that only 2 of 26 systems
    in the program had been certified and, despite this problem, the systems
    had not been placed on the watch list. DOD officials cited a number of
    reasons for the noncompliance, including that military services sometimes
    allow service-unique requirements to take precedence over joint
    interoperability requirements. DOD strongly agreed with our
    recommendations to take several steps necessary to enforce its
    certification process.

        Timely Understanding of Battle Damages Remains a Difficult Problem

    Battle Damage Assessments Cannot Match Pace of Operations

    DOD's difficulty in obtaining timely, high quality assessments of the
    effects of bombing operations continues to be a difficult problem to
    overcome. Problems with battle damage assessments have been repeatedly
    identified since at least Operation Desert Storm in 1991. DOD has taken
    some steps to address these problems, but they continue to reoccur. As a
    result, some DOD officials have called for approaching battle damage
    assessments in different ways.

    Reports from DOD and others have identified repeated difficulties in
    conducting battle damage assessments in operations in Iraq, as well as
    other operations dating back at least to Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
    Battle damage assessments are a critical component of combat operations.
    Slow or inaccurate assessments can result in inefficient use of forces and
    weapons, as targets must be struck repeatedly--but sometimes
    unnecessarily-to ensure their elimination as a threat. Inadequate damage
    assessments also slow ground advances, as units and individuals face

    13 See GAO-03-329.

    uncertainty about enemy capabilities, which can ultimately increase their
    risk of death or injury since they may have to close with the enemy to
    understand the conditions ahead of them. However, DOD reported that battle
    damage assessments during operations in Iraq could not keep up with the
    pace of operations and failed to provide the information needed for
    operational decisions. Reports on operations in Afghanistan also
    identified similar problems during Operation Enduring Freedom. Our report
    on Operation Desert Storm14 found that battle damage assessments during
    that conflict were neither as timely nor as complete as planners had
    assumed they would be. Battle damage assessments were performed on only 41
    percent of the strategic targets in our analysis, resulting in potentially
    unnecessary additional strikes to increase the probability that target
    objectives would be met.

    The inability of damage assessment resources to keep up with the pace of
    modern battlefield operations is due to several factors. According to DOD
    officials, advances in network-centric operations and precision weapons
    have increased the speed at which targets are generated and attacked. At
    the same time, however, DOD does not have an occupational specialty for
    battle damage analysts. This results in shortages of trained analysts when
    resources are surged during operations, leaving unified commands to rely
    on untrained and inexperienced personnel brought in from other areas and
    trained on the job. For example, during operations in Afghanistan and
    Iraq, the Central Command experienced requirements for large manning
    increases in its battle damage assessment capability. While the command
    was ultimately able to increase its staff of analysts to about 60 (see
    fig. 4), this was only a fraction of the estimated requirement. Typically,
    the Central Command has about three to five full-time personnel assigned
    to its battle damage assessment group.

    14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of
    the Air Campaign, GAO/NSIAD-97-134 (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 1997).

    Figure 4: U.S. Central Command Battle Damage Assessment Manning Levels for
    Recent Operations

    Note: The time frames indicated as Operation Enduring Freedom and
    Operation Iraqi Freedom designate periods of major combat operations.

    Moreover, according to Central Command officials, even when they obtained
    personnel they were often untrained. Operations were further slowed, as
    these personnel were required to receive on-the-job training. Battle
    damage assessment training is available at both the service and joint
    levels. However, according to DOD officials, the absence of a formal
    occupational specialty for battle damage assessment means there is little
    incentive for personnel to seek the training. Further, even if trained,
    analysts are required to use the instructions of the unified command in
    charge of operations during actual conflicts. DOD officials told us that
    there is no requirement for these instructions to be standardized, making
    it more difficult for personnel from the services to quickly adapt to
    operations. Finally, according to officials, DOD does not have a
    comprehensive system to track personnel who have received battle damage
    assessment training, further exacerbating problems in quickly locating
    trained analysts during surge situations.

    Attempts to Address the Battle Damage Assessment Problem Have Been Limited

    Officials Call for Different Approaches to Assessing Battle Damage

    In recognition of the continuing problems associated with battle damage
    assessments, DOD has taken some steps to address these problems. However,
    these attempts have been somewhat limited. For example, DOD established
    the Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test and Evaluation program in
    August 2000 to investigate solutions to battle damage assessment process
    problems. The program was focused on assessment processes used by U.S.
    forces in Korea, but it also analyzed processes used in Operations
    Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Program officials developed a variety
    of enhancements that could improve the battle damage assessment process.
    For example, program officials developed improvements to the processes
    used in Korea to standardize disparate systems and speed the flow of
    information between analysis and command centers. To help address analyst
    training problems, they developed a compact disc-based course to provide
    quick training for untrained personnel assigned to fill shortages of
    analysts during conflicts. Further, they also developed an agreement with
    a reserve organization to develop a core of trained battle damage
    assessment analysts and to have those personnel available to meet surge
    requirements for the Korean command.

    However, according to program officials, acceptance of such approaches is
    voluntary within DOD, and many have not been implemented outside Korea.
    They are trying to gain additional support for adoption of their
    enhancements. Program operations will be discontinued and a final report
    issued by December 2004. In addition to this program, DOD officials told
    us that a Combat Assessment Working Group was recently established at the
    Joint Staff to discuss ways to address problems with the battle damage
    assessment process. However, the group had not developed formal
    recommendations at the completion of our audit work in March 2004.

    Some DOD officials have called for more effort to be focused on assessing
    battle damages from an "effects-based" framework. The effects-based
    operational concept calls for an increased emphasis on conducting military
    operations and assessing their effects, in terms of the military and
    nonmilitary effects sought-rather than in terms of simply the destruction
    of a given target or an adversary. According to a recent Defense Science
    Board report,15 the emergence of this concept has been influenced by the
    opportunity provided by precision weapons, shared situation awareness, and
    other advances enabling the precise use of force, as well as the needs

    15 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Report of the
    Defense Science Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force (Washington,
    D.C.: July 28, 2003).

    presented by the nature of current military campaigns. Operations from
    Kosovo to Iraq have been characterized by tension among multiple strategic
    and operational objectives: destroy enemy infantry and air defenses and
    drive the current regime from power, but do not injure civilians or damage
    necessary infrastructure.

    The use of an effects-based battle damage assessment approach would mean
    that instead of the traditional focus only on damage or destruction of a
    target, battle damage assessments should also attempt to determine whether
    command objectives are being met by other influences in the battlefield.
    For example, initial bombing attacks on nearby targets may persuade enemy
    troops to abandon a target facility, eliminating the need to bomb the
    target facility at all. According to the Joint Forces Command's report on
    Iraqi Freedom, commanders in Iraq attempted to use an effectsbased
    approach to analyze military operations. However, when the speed of
    operations exceeded their capability to analyze and assess how actions
    were changing the Iraqi system, they reverted to the traditional focus on
    simple attrition measures. Coalition forces reverted to counting specific
    numbers of targets destroyed to determine combat progress, rather than
    evaluating the broader effect created on the enemy. The command has called
    for recognition of problems with battle damage assessments as a major
    obstacle to effects-based operations, requiring a variety of changes to
    resolve.

    DOD officials also told us that the traditional focus on damage and
    destruction results in leaders relying too much on visual imagery to
    assess battle damages. This problem can cause leaders to delay battlefield
    progress until full visual confirmation of the desired affect is
    confirmed. According to these officials, given the increasingly reliable
    nature of precision weapons, it may be possible in some cases to rely on
    predicted or probabilistic effects, rather than full visual confirmation.

        Absence of a Unified Battlefield Information System Confuses Measures of
        Effectiveness

    DOD does not have a unified battlefield data collection system to provide
    standardized measures and baseline data on the efficiency and
    effectiveness of bombing operations. According to DOD officials, the
    current system for collecting operational data is for the services and the
    unified commands to maintain their own databases, which are often quite
    extensive. Precisely how data is defined, gathered, and analyzed is at the
    discretion of each individual component and addresses specific needs.
    These unique requirements lead to different purposes for conducting
    analyses, different data collection approaches, and different definitions
    of key data elements.

    Different Approaches Used to Measure the Number of Attacks Needed to
    Destroy Targets

    For example, to better understand the impact of the tactical and
    technological changes on the efficiency and effectiveness of bombing
    operations, we analyzed the number of attacks and bombs required to damage
    or destroy a given target for operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. A
    number of DOD officials told us that advances in the accuracy of bombing
    operations have raised the expectation that fewer attacks and bombs are
    now required to damage or destroy targets. Instead of traditional
    operations-where multiple sorties and multiple bombs were required to
    destroy one target-some officials now believe one bomb per target and
    multiple targets on one sortie should be the norm. The results of our
    analyses tended to support the idea that it took fewer attacks to damage
    or destroy targets in Afghanistan than in Kosovo. However, we could not
    gain agreement from the services on the results of these analyses because
    each had its own system for measuring operations, and the measures also
    differed from the ones used in our analysis.

    The question of how many attacks are required to damage or destroy a
    target is basic to understanding battlefield effectiveness; however, we
    found no consistency among the services and the unified commands as to
    which of several basic measures should be used. Some group information
    about attacks based on "sorties"-defined as the takeoff and landing of one
    aircraft, during which one or more aim points16 may be attacked. Others do
    not attempt to group information based on sorties, making comparisons of
    information between databases difficult and confusing. For example,
    because the Central Command was in charge of operations in Afghanistan, we
    used its database to analyze bombing operations during Operation Enduring
    Freedom and compare those with the results of our classified review of
    Kosovo bombing operations. The Central Command's database provides
    information about aircraft attacks and damages to aim points, since it is
    focused primarily on assessing battle damages. However, it does not
    provide the information needed to analyze by sortie, since it does not
    identify activities that took place between a given takeoff and landing.
    To compare the Central Command's data with our data on Kosovo, we grouped
    the information on the basis of attacks. An attack was defined as each
    time that a single aircraft dropped one or more weapons on any single aim
    point. Based on this definition, our analysis found that it took fewer
    attacks to damage or destroy both fixed and mobile targets during
    operations in Afghanistan than during operations in Kosovo.

    16 A precise point on a target that is assigned for weapon impact.

    Effects Also Measured Differently

    Similar comparisons could not be made with the Air Force's and Navy's
    databases on Operation Enduring Freedom because their data are not
    maintained based on this definition of an attack. Both services list data
    by aircraft sortie. More specifically, each record in the Air Force's
    database corresponds to one delivery of a specific weapon type against an
    aim point, with each weapon delivery linked to a particular sortie and
    mission in the air tasking order. For the Navy's analysis, which describes
    the percentage of sorties that dropped weapons, each sortie can have one
    or multiple attacks, defined as one run at a given target. Because both
    the Air Force's and the Navy's analyses are primarily assessments of
    weapons and not intended to measure battle damage information, the main
    focus is assessing data for and based on specific weapon drops. As a
    result, they contain no analysis that links the relationship between the
    number of sorties flown and the corresponding damage.

    A second basic element of effectiveness is whether or not bombing actions
    resulted in the desired effects. The services and the Central Command also
    differed in their approaches to measuring this element, further
    complicating analysis. The Central Command's database provides information
    on effects based on battle damage assessments, since measuring battle
    damage is the primary responsibility of the unified commands. However, the
    service databases are geared toward measuring the performance of specific
    systems.

    The Air Force, for example, primarily focused its analysis of operations
    in Afghanistan on a munitions effectiveness assessment. This analysis
    measures the actual success of individual weapons against predicted
    results and does not address battle damage assessments. The analysis
    measures whether the bomb landed outside an area around the target within
    which the bomb was predicted to hit, known as the circular error probable.
    Air Force officials stated that it is possible for a weapon to be scored a
    miss for Air Force munitions effectiveness assessment purposes, but still
    cause significant damage to a target. According to the Air Force's
    analysis, the vast majority of munitions employed in Operation Enduring
    Freedom performed significantly better than expected. This could mean that
    the Air Force can adjust its planning and modeling assumptions to lower
    the number of sorties expected to be required to destroy a target.

    Similar to the Air Force's analysis, the Navy measured effects based on
    weapon hit rates. However, the Navy's analysis assessed what fraction of
    Navy bombs that were dropped impacted the intended target and had a high
    order detonation, determined primarily by reviewing weapons system videos.
    According to officials, if a weapon hit the target and had a high

    Basic Target Characteristics Defined Differently

    order detonation, it was counted as a successful hit for analysis
    purposes. The Navy's analysis did not measure whether a weapon fell within
    the planned circular error probable, nor did it measure battle damages.

    The services and the U.S. Central Command also differ in their treatment
    of the basic question of how to define a target as fixed or mobile. This
    distinction is important to considerations of effectiveness because it is
    much harder to hit mobile than fixed targets. Moreover, mobile targets may
    be becoming more numerous as adversaries attempt to use mobility to avoid
    the effectiveness of precision weapons. Inconsistent definitions of fixed
    and mobile targets result in different classifications of like targets and
    disagreement among officials when attempting to measure the relative
    effectiveness of bombing attacks against mobile and fixed targets.

    The Navy's analysis, for example, classifies mobile targets as "mobile"
    and "moving." According to the analysis, mobile targets are those that can
    move between the time of launch and the time of impact, such as vehicles
    and aircraft. Moving targets are those that are actually moving when they
    are hit. Classification results are determined by a direct review of
    weapon system video or documentation in mission reports. Unlike the
    analysis, the Central Command's database classifies all targets capable of
    moving as mobile whether they are moving at the time of attack or not. The
    classification of moving is not used because such information is more
    detailed than is needed for battle damage assessment purposes.

    In contrast, the Air Force's database does not classify targets as fixed
    or mobile. The database provides a description of the desired aim point,
    such as the center of a runway or troops, but leaves it up to the user to
    define which are mobile and which are fixed. There is a field for moving
    targets in the database, but according to Air Force officials, very few
    records have an entry in this field. Targets are only classified as moving
    when there is available weapon system video to confirm that the target was
    moving at the time the weapon was dropped. As a result of these
    differences, an attack on a truck that is moving at the time of an attack
    would be classified as mobile by the Central Command, as moving by Navy
    officials, and as either mobile or moving to Air Force officials,
    depending on the availability of weapon system video.

    Fixed targets are also classified differently in some cases. For example,
    according to Navy officials, there are several types of fixed targets.
    Troops are classified as a fixed, area target because individual troops
    are not targeted with aircraft but rather as an area occupied by troops.
    However, buildings are classified as fixed, point targets where there is a
    specific

    Differences Can Cause Confusion in Operational Assessments and Financial
    Decisions

    place to hit. In contrast, the Central Command classifies fixed targets
    only as those that are not able to move, such as buildings.

    The absence of a baseline system to bridge definitional and other
    differences and provide clear, consistent information about actual bombing
    effectiveness creates confusion in several areas. For example, this
    confusion was graphically illustrated when we provided the results of our
    analyses to the services. The results tended to support the idea that it
    took fewer attacks to damage or destroy targets in Afghanistan than in
    Kosovo. However, we could not gain agreement from the services on the
    results because our analyses were based on Central Command data that
    differed from that in their own systems, as previously discussed. Similar
    confusion occurred over the results of our March 2002 classified analysis
    of bombing operations in Kosovo. DOD did not concur with our use of the
    Air Force's Mission Analysis Tracking and Tabulation System database to
    analyze bombing operations, stating that no single database is completely
    accurate and contains all information needed for the analysis. However,
    that database was the most comprehensive available, developed specifically
    as a primary database for tracking airframe and weapon effectiveness
    during Operation Allied Force, and was used by DOD as the basis for its
    January 2000 report to Congress on operations in Kosovo. DOD cannot
    clearly resolve such confusion until baseline definitions of effectiveness
    measures are reconciled and a unified database developed.

    Further, reliable, consistent data on such issues is needed to make
    procurement decisions on the number of bombs and other resources DOD will
    need to procure for future conflicts. In this regard, we recently
    reported17 that differences in battle simulation models and scenarios used
    by the services and the unified commands were resulting in different
    estimates of munitions needed for operations, and, ultimately, in reports
    of munitions shortages. Clear, consistent, and up-to-date measures of the
    effectiveness of precision weapons-such as the actual number of aircraft
    and bombs required to achieve targeting objectives-could help resolve such
    differences and improve procurement and other planning decisions. In
    addition, as discussed earlier, precision weapons can be considerably more
    expensive than traditional munitions. Without clear data on bombing
    effectiveness, DOD cannot analyze the return on investment from the

    17 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Management: Munitions
    Requirements and Combatant Commanders' Needs Require Linkage, GAO-03-17
    (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2002).

    trade-off of fewer, but more expensive, precision weapons versus the use
    of more, but less expensive, traditional munitions.

        Current Training Does Not Provide Realistic Preparation to Cope with
        Changing Operating Environment

    Operations Characterized by Increasingly High Volume and Centralized
    Command and Control, but More Autonomy at Lower Levels

    Both the Joint Forces Command and the Defense Science Board found that
    current training does not provide the realistic preparation needed to cope
    with the emerging operating environment. DOD officials raised concerns
    that the changing strategy and technological improvements have created
    large increases in the pace of operations and volume of information that
    have overwhelmed commanders and other personnel at times. Further,
    advances in networking the force and other changes have fostered a more
    centralized style of management, with senior leaders increasingly involved
    in operations. At the same time, however, networkcentric operating
    concepts are distributing information to lower and lower organizational
    levels, raising the potential for increased autonomy for small units and
    individual soldiers. According to DOD officials, personnel at all levels,
    but particularly commanders, need realistic training to understand this
    new environment and adapt to it to ensure that the new capabilities are
    used to their fullest advantage.

    DOD officials told us that network-centric operations have advanced to the
    point that the heavy flow of information and rapid pace of operations may
    at times overload systems and personnel. This problem can create confusion
    and inefficiency as systems for conducting battle damage assessments or
    other operations become slow and clogged while sorting and integrating
    large amounts of information, and officials are distracted by having to
    devote precious time to sorting through hundreds of e-mail messages or by
    attending increasingly frequent videoconferences. Moreover, officials also
    believe that this problem may get worse as commanders increasingly
    recognize the advantages of networked systems, creating a need for even
    more information.

    The officials also stated that increased networking is fostering a more
    centralized style of command and control, which can create tension between
    command staffs and operators in the field. For example, according to
    officials, lawyers and senior civilian and military leaders at
    headquarters locations remote from the execution of operations are
    becoming increasingly involved in target selection and other operational
    areas. Historically, one of the principal tenets of U.S. command and
    control has been centralized direction, but decentralized execution of
    operations to give subordinates on the scene sufficient freedom of action
    to accomplish their missions. Increased centralization in the execution of
    operations can result in senior commanders being bogged down in

    Changing Operating Environment Requires Better, More Realistic Training

    operational details and subordinates on the scene losing initiative. This
    development has been linked to the advances in technologies that provide
    the opportunity for detailed views of the battlefield and frequent
    videoconferences and other communications to be shared among a wide array
    of officials that may be located thousands of miles away. This trend is
    also influenced by increased concerns over sensitive issues such as the
    avoidance of intrusions into the airspace of neighboring countries and
    collateral damage to civilian structures. Such issues act as an incentive
    for senior leaders to increase their involvement in lower and lower levels
    of planning and operations.

    While senior leaders are becoming increasingly involved in operations,
    information is also being distributed to lower and lower organizational
    levels, raising the potential for increased autonomy for small units and
    individual soldiers. For example, one of the principal organizing and
    operating tenets of network-centric operations is the concept called power
    to the edge. This concept involves empowering individuals at the "edge" of
    an organization-where it interacts with its operating environment-by
    expanding access to information and eliminating unnecessary constraints on
    action. According to department officials, adopting this concept requires
    DOD to change the way it handles intelligence and other information. For
    example, DOD's current information systems are based on data requirements
    that are focused on the needs of the organizations supplying the data,
    with dissemination of the data based on a sequential process with
    information pushed out to customers at the end. But DOD is now moving to
    systems where broad arrays of information are placed on networks before
    any unnecessary processing at the point of collection, with total access
    for customers who can pull out the information that each needs
    simultaneously. This provides more information to lower organizational
    levels, enabling them to operate more autonomously with less direct
    control by commanders. According to officials at the Joint Forces Command,
    this concept helped DOD use smaller formations of personnel with flexible
    command and control relationships to great advantage during operations in
    Iraq.

    Consistent with DOD's basic tenet that the force must train as it will
    fight, DOD officials have called for improved, more realistic training to
    match the scale and tempo of actual operations. For example, the Joint
    Forces Command reported that the lack of realistic training undermined
    theaterlevel intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management and
    other

    operational level capabilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similarly,
    the Defense Science Board reported18 that the changing operating
    environment will have unintended human consequences that will require
    personnel to adapt to increasing cognitive demands at even the most junior
    levels, and to think and act more quickly. According to the Board, current
    training will not adequately prepare DOD personnel to cope with the
    increasing and constantly changing cognitive requirements.

    DOD officials also cautioned that the joint operational effectiveness
    experienced in Operation Iraqi Freedom was often the result of procedures
    developed during 18 months of practice begun during operations in
    Afghanistan and that such improvements are often fleeting- needing to be
    reinvented in the next contingency. The Joint Forces Command called for
    development of an improved joint training capability to institutionalize
    the operating procedures developed in Iraq and allow commanders and staffs
    to experiment with and practice operational-level processes. Moreover,
    service and DOD officials also noted that expectations for the future need
    to be tempered with the understanding that operations in Kosovo,
    Afghanistan, and Iraq were conducted with other advantages-such as largely
    complete air superiority-that may not be available in future conflicts.

    The development of networked surveillance and command and control systems,
    precision weapons, and other advances has combined to have a synergetic
    effect on U.S. military power-providing increased capabilities for dealing
    effectively with enemies operating out of nontraditional battlefields, as
    well as more traditional approaches to warfare. Notwithstanding these
    advances, the full impact of these changes is still emerging and is not
    fully understood. Moreover, the enemy is likely to continue to evolve and
    adapt its approaches in response to the continued evolution of U.S.
    tactics and capabilities. As a result, it is important to continue
    developing and refining these capabilities. However, the legacy of DOD's
    traditional focus on service-specific operations is inhibiting the
    continued evolution of the new capabilities. The lack of standardized,
    interoperable systems and equipment interferes with the development of
    force networks, slowing operations and reducing effectiveness.
    Difficulties in quickly obtaining sufficient numbers of trained battle
    damage analysts

    18 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Defense Science
    Board Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts-Final Report
    (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003).

      Conclusions

    result in slowed assessments unable to keep up with the increased pace of
    operations, inhibiting battleground progress and the utility of
    improvements in other areas. Similarly, the absence of a unified
    battlefield information system also confuses the clear understanding of
    improvements to the efficiency and effectiveness of operations as a result
    of changing capabilities, slowing the rate of adaptation to changing
    battlefield conditions. Finally, the lack of realistic training limits the
    ability of leaders to understand and systems to sense changes in the
    operating environment-such as the increased pace of operations and flow of
    information, the increased centralization of command, and the increased
    potential for operational autonomy and self-direction of small units and
    individual soldiers, as well as emerging concepts such as effects-based
    operations-further inhibiting the ability to adapt.

    To ensure continuing evolution of the capabilities demonstrated in recent
    conflicts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint
    Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified commands, and the
    military departments to take the following four actions:

      Recommendations for Executive Action

    o  	identify the primary information required for bombing operations, such
    as targeting and battle damage assessments, ensure that planned
    interoperability enhancements provide the standardized definitions,
    mission reporting formats, and other necessary instructions for this
    information to be used by all unified commands during joint combat
    operations, and determine whether this standardized information can
    replace that used by the individual services;

    o  	formulate a plan to provide sufficient numbers of personnel trained in
    battle damage assessment procedures when they are needed for combat
    operations and include in the plan the following: incentives for personnel
    to take the existing joint training on damage assessment, development of a
    system to be used by the Joint Forces Command to track and mobilize
    personnel who have received damage assessment training for use during
    surge situations, and development of guidance on the appropriate use of
    effects-based, probabilistic, and other nontraditional concepts in
    assessing battle damages;

    o  	develop a unified battlefield information system that provides for the
    identification and collection of data on key, standardized measures of
    bombing operations needed to assess the basic efficiency and effectiveness
    of such operations, for use by all unified commands; and

    o  	develop a joint operations training capability that provides
    commanders and staffs with a realistic simulation of the increased pace of
    operations and other emerging changes to the combat operating environment.

      Agency Comments
      and Our Evaluation

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially
    concurred with all our recommendations. DOD stated that the Joint Staff,
    in coordination with the Joint Forces Command, is addressing our
    recommendations for actions to improve standardization of information used
    in bombing operations, develop a unified battlefield information system,
    and develop realistic joint training to help personnel adapt to changes in
    the operating environment in various ongoing initiatives.

    DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to improve the battle damage
    assessment process and stated that it is addressing the issues we raised
    in the Joint Network Fires Capability Roadmap, the Joint Close Air Support
    action plan, and other efforts. However, DOD believed that the section of
    the report titled "Timely Understanding of Battle Damages Remains a
    Difficult Problem" discusses battle damage assessments as if that function
    was detached from the broader targeting process. That was not our intent.
    As indicated on page 6 of the report, we agree that battle damage
    assessments are an integral part of the broader targeting process. The use
    of a separate section of the report to deal with that aspect of targeting
    was meant only to highlight the long-standing problems with battle damage
    assessments and the need to focus DOD's attention on corrective action.
    Officials from the U.S. Central Command, which was in charge of operations
    in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Joint Forces Command report on lessons
    learned in Iraq both pointed to the need to elevate recognition of
    problems in the battle damage assessment process and address them.
    Continued improvement in the speed at which targets are generated and
    attacked will only further increase the need for damage assessments to
    keep pace with operations in the future.

    DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided technical
    comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
    Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. The report will
    also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this
    report, please contact me at (757) 552-8100. The major contributors to
    this
    report are listed in appendix IV.

    Neal P. Curtin
    Director
    Defense Capabilities and Management

                           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    To assess the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in
    networking the force and the use of precision weapons and identify the key
    barriers to continued progress in implementing the new strategy, we
    followed a three-phased approach.

    To identify Department of Defense (DOD), military service, and unified
    command policies and approaches to implementing the new strategy, we
    obtained briefings, reviewed DOD and unified command directives and
    regulations, the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan, lessons learned
    reports, and prior reports by us and others. A bibliography of key reports
    on issues related to our review is included. We also interviewed officials
    from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Office of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff; the U.S. Central Command; the U.S. Joint Forces Command;
    the U.S. Special Operations Command; headquarters offices of the Army,
    Navy, and Air Force; and other offices as appropriate.

    We accompanied this work with a detailed analysis of bombing data
    developed for our March 2002 classified report on air operations in Kosovo
    and bombing data on operations in Afghanistan provided by the U.S. Central
    Command. Prior to conducting these analyses, we discussed the appropriate
    databases to use, the time frames to measure, and other such
    methodological issues with officials from the Central Command. We used
    Central Command data because its commander was in charge of joint
    operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. To determine whether bombing
    accuracy and effectiveness had improved, we compared changes in the
    percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to fixed and
    mobile targets, the number of attacks and the number of bombs during a
    given attack that were required to damage or destroy a given target, and
    other such measures of operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. We then
    provided the results of these analyses to officials from the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense; the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the U.S.
    Central Command; the U.S. Joint Forces Command; the U.S. Special
    Operations Command; and the Army, Navy, and Air Force for their review and
    comment. We also obtained analyses of Operation Enduring Freedom from the
    Navy and the Air Force for comparison purposes. We requested data from the
    Army, but officials were unable to provide such data. We also requested
    copies of any similar analyses of operations in Iraq, but officials were
    unable to locate any such analyses. We did not conduct our own detailed
    analysis of operations in Iraq because of the extremely resource intensive
    and time-consuming nature of these analyses.

    To assess the reliability of the Central Command's database for Operation
    Enduring Freedom, we (1) performed electronic testing for obvious errors

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    in accuracy and completeness; (2) reviewed related documentation,
    including tracking target files to specific data entries, and interviewed
    agency officials knowledgeable about the data; and (3) worked closely with
    agency officials to identify any data problems. When we found
    discrepancies such as missing or incorrect data, we brought them to the
    command's attention and worked with it to correct the discrepancies before
    conducting our analysis. We determined that the data were sufficiently
    reliable for our reporting purposes.

    Following this analysis, we conducted a series of roundtable discussions
    with officials from the offices of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs
    of Staff, unified commands, and the services contacted previously. We
    conducted these discussions to gain a detailed understanding of the
    results of our analyses and officials' perspectives on the impact of the
    changing strategy on operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and the
    key barriers to continued progress in implementing the new strategy. We
    focused our analysis on combat bombing operations. We did not attempt to
    analyze whether larger operational and strategic objectives were achieved.

    Appendix II: DOD Reconnaissance Aircraft, Precision Weapons, and Other
    Technologies Used in Recent Operations

                                        Aircraft

    Appendix II: DOD Reconnaissance Aircraft, Precision Weapons, and Other
    Technologies Used in Recent Operations

    Precision Weapons Systems

    Technologies

                   Sources: DOD and other publicly available sources.

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contacts 	John Pendleton (404) 679-1816
    John W. Nelson (404) 679-1949

    Acknowledgments 	In addition to those named above, Katherine Chenault,
    Steve Pruitt, R.K. Wild, and Kristy Williams made key contributions to
    this report.

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    Defense Management: Munitions Requirements and Combatant Commanders' Needs
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    Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in
    Doctrinal Departures. GAO-01-784. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2001.

    Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability of the Munitions
    Requirements Determination Process. GAO-01-18. Washington, D.C.: April 5,
    2001.

    Defense Management: Actions Needed to Sustain Reform Initiatives and
    Achieve Greater Results. GAO/NSIAD-00-72. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2000.

    Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign. GAO/NSIAD-97-134.
    Washington, D.C.: June 12, 1997.

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